

This is true of aesthetic values as well as ethical values. Assume a drug is found that causes us to like a kind of music we would not like otherwise. Does this not show the subjectivity of aesthetic evaluation? That evaluations are performed by an evaluating subject there is no doubt. That the existence of the evaluation therefore depends on the abilities and dispositions of the subject, there is also no doubt. But what the drug has done has so modified our dispositions that we estimate a certain cognized set of intrinsic characteristics, those of the music, in a way we didn't before. (That the intrinsic characteristics may be those of sounds having only phenomenal existence is not at issue here. If the existence of sounds is subjective, that is a different subjective existence from that of the evaluation. For by hypothesis, the same sounds can be evaluated differently.) In other words, as a result of the drug, the intrinsic pattern of the sounds now causes a different reaction than it did before. But it is that intrinsic pattern that is a cause of and an object of this reaction. The reaction itself is an esteeming of the sounds for their intrinsic qualities.

In order to appreciate, esteem, or value something for certain of its intrinsic qualities, our faculties have to be in a certain subjective condition. That is what the drug example illustrates. The drug puts our faculties into the condition necessary for being attracted to music of a certain kind. But it is still the music, whose intrinsic characteristic are presented to the faculty of desire by a faculty of cognition, that attracts the desire. Our faculties of cognition must also be in the necessary subjective condition if they are to perform their function. But dependence on subjective conditions does not prevent their function from being that of knowing what things are in themselves.