

John C. Cahalan

Ethical values are unconditional, that is, non-hypothetical, objective, that is, determined by the natures of things, and knowable, that is, there is evidence by which reason can judge them. This study will argue for ethical values having these characteristics on the basis of the following four assumptions:

- (1) Humans are equal with respect to possession of a common nature that underlies our individual differences.
- (2) Human reason is capable of knowing the natures of things to some extent and at least to the extent required to know our equality with respect to this underlying nature.
- (3) Human nature gives us freedom of choice.
- (4) Our ability to make free choices is a rational appetite, that is, a faculty of desire that orients us to goals according to our knowledge of the natures of things.

Although these assumptions are contrary to the deep-seated opinions of many philosophers, they are commonplace in the realist tradition, that is, the tradition that derives from Aristotle and Aquinas. Assumption (1), the universality of human nature, is an instance of the problem of universals. Since realism's solution to this problem has been discussed (if not understood) many times, I will take assumption (1) as given and not present any arguments for it here.\* Likewise, I will take assumptions (2) and (3) as given, since I have defended them elsewhere.\*\* I will not make use of assumption (3), that we have free choice, until Section IV.

Assumption (4), with its concept of rational appetite, will be the crucial one for this study. To show the consequences of the concept of rational appetite for ethics, I will compare choice to belief from the point of view of realism's analysis of true and false belief. In addition, I will be comparing desire to consciousness from the point of view of realism's analysis of consciousness. Hence the title of the essay. Specifically, I will argue that just as in knowledge of truth there is identity between what is an object of knowledge and what some extra-cognitionally existing thing is, so there is identity between what is a value for us and what some thing, action, or state is in itself.

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\*See Simon's Philosophy of Democratic Government, pp. xx-xx, for a discussion of the problem of universals in the context of the universality of human nature.

\*\*In Causal Realism.

To see the relevance of analysing choice by comparison with realist epistemological principles, consider the following. Just as ethical relativism makes values something we impose on things according to our subjective point of view, conceptual relativism makes the meanings of our predicates, not what things are in their extra-cognitional existence, but constructs our culturally-conditioned linguistic frameworks impose on things. And just as the idealist says the objects of our knowledge cannot be what exists extra-cognitionally because things are known only to the extent that they are known, so the ethical relativist says that values cannot be intrinsic to things because things are valued only to the extent that they are desired.

The reply of realism's epistemology to these arguments is in terms of the real identity with logical distinction of things as things and things as objects of knowledge.\* To be a thing is really distinct from being an object, but when there is truth, there must be only a logical distinction between that which is a thing and that which is an object, for example, that which is the meaning of a predicate. The realist reply to ethical relativism should have a similar structure because the transcendental good is like the transcendental true in that it is only logically distinct from being, since it adds to the concept of being only a relation of reason.

In other words, to reply to ethical subjectivism and relativism, I will be exploiting resources provided by realism in ways that, to my knowledge, these resources have not been exploited before. The questions I will apply these resources to were not directly addressed by Aristotle or Aquinas. And while other realists have criticized ethical relativism, I am not aware of their doing so from the perspective of the parallel between realism's epistemological and ethical insights.\*\*

At the same time, I will not attempt, within the limits of this essay, to defend the whole of realism's traditional ethical theory. To show that ethical values can be objective, unconditional, and knowable, it is only necessary to show that some ethical values have these characteristics. And since my conclusions are so controversial, the examples illustrating them should be as uncontroversial as possible. Accordingly, I will confine myself mainly to examples of perhaps the most universally admitted kind of ethical value: justice in the sense of fairness in dealing between human beings. This limitation on the scope of the essay does not imply that justice in the sense of fairness is the only ethical value. The last two sections of the paper indicate ways in which the principles of this analysis can be extended to other ethical values.

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\*Obviously, I am following Jacques Maritain's account from the Degrees of Knowledge. For the many who have not fully appreciated Maritain's presentation of realist epistemology, Causal Realism explains and defends at length the analysis of truth I am using here. Maritain's sadly neglected Neuf leçons is another important influence on this study. Especially important is that book's reconciliation of the teleological character of so much of traditional realist ethical theory with the unconditionally obligatory nature of moral norms.

\*\*Causal Realism is an attempt to exploit realism's resources in ways they have not so far been exploited in the epistemological domain and for epistemological questions not directly addressed by Aristotle or Aquinas. This essay constitutes an extension of the analyses of that book to ethics.

The claim that ethical values are unconditional, based on nature, and knowable by reason may appear to contradict the maxim that we cannot derive ought from is. I say 'appear' because I am not sure I will be deriving 'ought' from anything. In explaining the foundations of science, how science derives beliefs from its foundations, and why these beliefs are justified, the philosopher of science does not usurp the scientist's role of being the one who does the deriving. The deriving belongs to a different kind of knowledge from the philosophy of science; it belongs to science. Likewise, the philosophical examination of the foundations of ethics is not ethics. For one thing, ethics is practical knowledge, while the examination of its foundations and of how the ethicist builds on those foundations is speculative knowledge.

On the other hand, if in what follows I do derive ought from is, I can only say that it has ipso facto been demonstrated that there is something wrong with arguments showing that one cannot derive ought from is. For that belief is itself based on theories about what is, about what reason, appetite, and values are, about what descriptions and prescriptions are. Usually those theories deny assumption (2). And if they are to be consistent, they must always contradict assumption (4); for a rational appetite is precisely one that desires things, states, and actions according to our knowledge of what those objects of desire are.

### I. Equality and Ethics

Why is it wrong to treat others as if their interests were not equal to mine? For example, why is it wrong to cheat on an examination that will determine who will get a job? A necessary condition for answering this question is to determine in what sense the interests of another are equal to mine, and even more basically, in what sense the other is equal to me. We are presumably not equal in an indefinite number of respects, intelligence, strength, size, aggressiveness, length of hair, etc. In addition to all these ways in which we are unequal, is there some way in which we are equal, a way that can make our interests equal in a moral sense?

To believe that humans are equal in a moral sense is to believe that there is a respect in which they are equal that is more fundamental to what they are than are the respects in which they are unequal. To believe this is to believe in a common nature underlying the differences. The underlying nature is passed on genetically along with differences and is what causes the differences to belong to members of the same species. The nature making us human is more fundamental to what we are than are the respects in which we differ.

Let us assume that there is such an underlying nature and that we are capable of knowing by reason that we are all equal with respect to it. Here, 'knowing' means, at least, knowing that it is unreasonable to believe the opposite. 'Unreasonable' does not refer to moral unreasonableness. It refers to reason's entirely involuntary awareness of what its goals are as reason. To know that a belief is unreasonable is to know that the act of belief would contradict the goals given reason by its nature. With respect to other human beings, the only reasonable belief is that the behavior we discover in them by external observation is accounted for by their possession of the same nature that we discover in ourselves through reflective self-awareness.

What moral significance does the knowledge of our equality with respect to human nature have? Ethical decisions\* are conscious events that relate us to other beings who exist independently of our conscious states. We can gain some insight into our question by comparing a conscious decision that treats unequally two beings equal in respect of an underlying nature with another kind of conscious event, the belief that the two things do not share a common nature. By hypothesis, such a belief is defective, incorrect, lacking in the kind of achievement appropriate to a belief. The next section analyses what makes such a belief defective to help us see why the corresponding ethical decision is defective; for both are defective as conscious states relating us to things existing independently of our conscious states.

## II. What Makes a Belief Correct or Defective?

That which makes a belief defective is its failure to achieve a certain goal, truth about what exists. But why should the absence of that goal make a belief defective; aren't there many other goals by which to judge mental events? For example, the falsehood that Mary and Tom do not share a common human nature could be just what we need in a science fiction story, as as part of an enjoyable daydream or joke, or as a means of making someone angry.

It is the intrinsic nature of belief that makes a false belief defective and a true belief good. When we say that a false belief is defective, we are not first discovering a species of mental event, giving it the name 'belief', and only then analysing the nature of the event to see if it has a goal in terms of which we can measure it as good or defective. Instead, we first recognize a kind of mental event precisely by the characteristic of claiming to achieve truth about what exists, and we name the kind of event with this intrinsic goal, as opposed to other conscious events which are characterized by different goals, 'belief'. To say that having the goal of truth is intrinsic to belief is to say that a belief, by its very existence, asks for, calls for, evaluation in terms of this goal. Whether or not it is necessary for an act with such a goal to exist, belief happens to be such an act.

There are a number of conscious goals for intellectual acts. Belief in truth is only one of them. But believing things as true of what exists is a goal that is not a matter of choice for our rational faculty. About any given proposition, we may be free to assent or withhold assent. But whether our rational faculty is free not to believe anything at all is another matter. Normally, we believe things involuntarily. Normally also, the belief that some propositions have achieved the goal of truth is a presupposition of the pursuit of the other goals of intellectual acts. Peacefully enjoying a daydream, for instance, normally presupposes our belief that the place in which we are daydreaming is not on fire.

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\*Throughout this essay, I use the phrase 'ethical decision' to refer, not to a judgment that a choice is ethically good or bad, but to a choice that is to be so judged. For example, an ethical decision is a choice to cheat or not cheat on an exam, as opposed to the judgment that such a choice is ethically right or wrong.

What is the exact nature of this goal that reason does not seem capable of not seeking? For the purposes of our comparison with ethical decision, we do not have to give a complete philosophical analysis of truth. But certain features of what goes on when we believe something is true of what exists have to be pointed out. First, belief claims to relate us to things as they exist independently of our acts of belief. The goal in terms of which beliefs ask to be measured is that of informing us what things are in themselves.

Secondly, however, by the very fact that something independent of our conscious states is known, the thing is brought into relation to our conscious states; it can be described as the term of a cognitive relation. For example, when we know the truth of 'This table has four legs', the following things are also able to be true 'This thing is seen, described, understood, referred to', etc. When a cognition-independent thing is also the term of a cognitive relation, we can call it an 'object' of knowledge.

Since to exist is not to be known, to be a thing is not the same as being an object of knowledge. But when there is truth, that which is a cognition-independent thing and that which is known must be the same; there must be identity between that which is a thing and that which has been made an object of knowledge. For example, when 'This is a table' is true, the thing made object of designation by 'This' must be the same as the thing made object of description by 'a table'. Not that the function of 'is' in this sentence is that of logical identity. But identity between what is designated by 'this' and what is described by 'a table' is what makes the sentence true. Such identity would also make true a sentence not using 'is', like 'This has the characteristics of a table'.

The comparison between belief and ethical decision will focus on this thing-object identity, for the correspondence of the correspondence theory of truth is nothing but this identity. And recognizing that fact solves the problem of the correspondence theory of truth.

The correspondence required for truth cannot be a relation between things and names, descriptions, or sentences, nor can it be a relation between things and any mental entities that supposedly are the meanings of names, descriptions, or sentences, or mental entities that are at least required for names, descriptions, and sentences to be meaningfully used. If correspondence were such a relation, there would be no way for us to judge that it held.\* The correspondence required for truth is a relation between that which is named or described in sentences and that which exists. When the thing named by 'This' is the thing described by 'a table', 'This is a table' is true. In other words, the problem of how to establish a relation of correspondence between words or supposed mental entities like a meanings, on the one hand, and existing things, on the other, is an ill-formed question.

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\*It is one of Maritain's most important achievements to have seen how the resources of realism can solve this crucial problem that has received so much attention in other traditions and so little attention in realism. In the Degrees of Knowledge, p. 97, n. 2, he notes that judgment does not make a comparison between psychological concepts and things but declares the identity between what a thing is and what an object of a concept is.

Once names have intended referents and predicates have intended meanings, it follows that some things are successfully named or described (made objects of a cognitional relation) by a particular name or predicate while other things are not. Given that we use 'table' and 'four-legged' the way we do, some things are describable as tables and others are not, while some things are describable as four-legged and others are not. The question of correspondence presupposes that words have certain uses and therefore, that certain things are objectified by them. What the question asks is whether what is given as objectified in one way, for example, by 'This', is identical with some thing objectified in another way, for example, by 'a table'. The correspondence in question is the relation of identity between a thing objectified one way and a thing objectified another. Thus, the relation is between a thing and itself, not between things, on the one hand, and words or mental entities, on the other.

Mental entities are no doubt involved in the process. We introduce terms like 'concept' into language to refer to mental states in which I am related to the meanings of words like 'table' or 'four-legged' (this is 'concept' in the psychological sense). Later, we extend the use of the word 'concept' to these meanings themselves (this is 'concept' in the objective sense, that is, the object we are related to by a psychological concept). But the meaning of the word 'table' is what it is to be a table, the meaning of the word 'four-legged' what it is to be something with four and only four legs. What it is to be a table or four-legged is not to be something mental, as is what it is to be a concept in the psychological sense of that term. Therefore, when we speak of correspondence between meanings or concepts and things, we are not, or should not be, speaking of a relation between a mental entity and a thing. Rather we should mean a relation between that to which we are related by the mental entity and that which exists. For the reason we introduced a term for a mental state in the first place was that fact that we found ourselves in the state of consciously giving words uses like what it is to be a table and what it is to be four-legged. We invent words for mental states to express our conscious relation to the uses we have for words. Correspondence concerns that to which we are related to begin with, before we invent names for the state of being so related; it concerns that which terminates certain relations, relations without whose already being terminated, we would have no reason to invent words for these relations.

Where predicates are involved, the identity between diversely objectified things required for truth is identity between the meaning of a predicate (an objective concept) and what the thing is in some respect. Why is it that 'table' succeeds in accurately describing somethings and not others. In the case of names, the intentions of an individual or community may be sufficient to establish that a given thing is actually the thing named by a given word. Successful description, however, depends on more than intending the description to succeed in accurately describing the thing. If I send you on a mission to find a person named 'Frank' by saying 'Just look for the tallest person in the room', I intend 'tallest person in the room' to describe Frank. But my intention does not make it true. To be an accurate description, the meaning of the description must be what something is.

Again, this identity between the meaning of a predicate and what something is is nothing but identity between thing and object, between what exists and what is known by means of a concept, in the psychological sense of that term. By means of concepts we are related to what things are prior to their being known by means of concepts. Even in the case of such notoriously subjective objects as sense qualities, a concept, like the concept of red, relates us to what some feature of our experience is prior to being made an object of concept. And if a meaning like that of 'longer-than' is a relation constructed by the mind, the relation can be truthfully attributed to things if and only if it is so constructed as to have as its terms what things are independently of the mind, namely, things having length, and can be known true only if we have some way of knowing what things are in this respect independently of the mind, for example, by sight.

The point of this long excursion on truth is that when we make a cognition-independent thing the term of a knowledge relation, when we make it an object of knowledge, what now is an object is identical with what something is in itself. The object we are related to by means of concepts is identical to the reality something possesses apart from its being the term of this relation. We went into truth in order to compare a decision that treats unequally two beings equal with respect to an underlying nature with the false belief that the two things do not share a common nature. The next section discusses what the identity between thing and object in truth has to do with ethical decisions.

### III. Decision Compared to Belief

The application to ethical decisions is that just as when we make something the term of a knowledge relation, we can call it an object, so when we make something the term of a relation of desire, we can call it a 'value'. And just as there can be lack of identity between the object of a concept and a thing, so there can be lack of identity between the places we assign things in our system of values and the way things are in themselves, between the way things terminate our relations of desire and the way their intrinsic realities relate to each other. Thus, we can evaluate the interests of one thing as higher than those of another, even though the natures of these things are equal on the scale of intrinsic perfection. And just as a conscious act is defective if there is a lack of identity between what is believed about the thing and what the thing is as a cognition-independent thing, so a conscious evaluation of the intrinsic reality of things is defective if there is lack of identity between the relation we give things in our desires and the relation that obtains between them in reality. For just as belief claims things exist the way they are objectified by predicates, in giving things different positions in our scale of values, we are treating them as if they existed the way they are evaluated.

For example, when I cheat on an examination, I am acting as if my interests were more important than another person's even though I am conscious that we are equal with respect to the reality contained in our fundamental nature. Although the perfection constituting our natures is known to be equal, I consciously evaluate them as unequal. And in evaluating them as unequal, I am treating them as if they existed the way I evaluate them. In knowingly pursuing my interests at the expense of hers, I am evaluating my reality, the reality of the subject whose desires are being pursued, as though it were higher on a scale of being than hers. Hence, there is a lack of identity between the known relative positions of the natures of the things in reality and the relative positions my conscious estimations of value assigns them, and my value assignments are therefore defective. For as belief claims identity between what it objectifies by means of name and predicates and what things are in themselves, so ethical decisions consciously treat known things as if the comparative perfection of their natures outside of consciousness was identical with the the relative positions assigned them by a decision. Ethical decisions can no more escape treating things as if their natures are related in themselves the way they are related in our evaluations than beliefs can escape claiming to express how things are in themselves. Therefore, ethical decisions can no more escape being defective when things are not related as our value assignments take them to be related than beliefs can escape being defective when what they express is not what things are in themselves.

Why must ethical decisions treat things as if they existed the way they are evaluated? In discussing belief, we noted that intellectual acts can have goals other than thing-object identity, but belief happens to be an act to which a relation to this goal is intrinsic. Likewise, an ethical decision treating things otherwise than they exist is not judged defective by its failure of satisfying some goal exterior to the decision itself, as if the defect was only hypothetical, that is, as if the decision would be defective only on the hypothesis that this external end was desired.

To begin with, the very occurrence of ethical decisions presupposes that potential values are in opposition; otherwise we would not have to make a choice between them. Therefore, every ethical decision will assign something a relative place in our evaluations higher than something else. Next, and more to the point, my disposition for making ethical decisions is a rational appetite. To say it is an appetite is to say that it orients me to goals. To say it is rational is to say that it is a power of responding to objects of rational knowledge and, therefore, of desiring things according to reason's awareness of them. But by reason, we are aware of what things are in themselves. Therefore, a rational appetite relates me to goals according to my knowledge of what things are in themselves; a rational appetite is a power of valuing, esteeming, appreciating, honoring the intrinsic reality of things that are presented to that appetite by reason. Since rational appetite relates me to goals according to my awareness of what things are in themselves, a decision made by the rational appetite cannot avoid consciously dealing with things as if their natures were actually so related as they are related by my decision. In other words, by its intrinsic nature as an act of a rational appetite, an ethical decision calls for, asks for evaluation in terms of identity or lack of identity between the way it treats things as values and the way things exist.

As rational beings, we direct our actions by our knowledge of what things are in themselves, in other words, by that which we are conscious of about what things are in themselves. For example, in the situation of competing on an examination, I have knowledge both of the other person's equality to me in nature and of what the results are that could come into existence from cheating. (I may know, for instance, that I am not likely to get the job if I do not cheat, and I may know that detection of my cheating is very unlikely). In deciding to cheat, I am letting the latter part of my knowledge, not the former, be that by which I rationally form and direct my action.

But in choosing to let that part of my knowledge direct my pursuit of goals, I remain aware that the other person's nature is equal to mine in reality, that in directing my action by my knowledge of the results of cheating, I am putting my pursuit of goals ahead of hers in my evaluations, and that, in so doing, I am treating her as if her nature were not equal to mine. I am consciously putting myself, as the subject of desires, ahead of her, as if the content of our beings were not equal with respect to that which it is the nature of rational appetite to esteem, namely, what things are in themselves. In other words, I remain aware of myself as a rationally conscious being and, hence, a being whose rational appetite cannot avoid treating things as if the reality of their natures had the relative position my evaluations give them. In deciding to cheat, I am consciously relating to existing things as if what they are in themselves was not what I know them to be. Therefore, I am aware that my decision is defective as the conscious act of a rational being just as a false belief is defective, that is, not by the standard of some goal external to itself, but by the nature of the act I first become aware of as having the goal of relating to things as they are, and then name an 'ethical decision' or 'choice'. Acts of such a nature happen or exist. Not only that, but we cannot avoid producing them. And we can no more change the structure of those acts as acts of a rational appetite than we can change the structure of belief so that falsehood would not be a defect.

This comparison of ethical decision with belief will enable us, in the next section, to analyse our fundamental ethical concepts.

#### IV. The Nature of Obligation

I have so far introduced no ethical terms into the discussion. I have not even made an ethical judgment about the kind of defect I have described in ethical decisions. I have not, for instance, claimed that we are obliged to avoid such defects or that we ought not make decisions having them. I have not said that equals deserve or have the right to be treated equally; nor have I said that we deserve retribution if we do not treat them equally. I have used 'good' as the opposite of 'defective' in a non-moral sense to describe a true belief. If the moral connotations associated with 'good' or 'correct' are too strong, I could use a rather awkward circumlocution like 'successful'.

The only additional thing needed to explain (I do not say 'derive') ethical concepts is assumption (3), that rational appetite gives us free choice, that our ethical decisions are free. The assumption that rational appetite gives us free choice might seem to contradict other things I have said about rational appetite. It is the nature of rational appetite to value things according to what they are in themselves, since it is an appetite for objects presented by reason, and reason knows what things are in themselves. Therefore, how can rational appetite not value things according to the reality contained in their natures, unless through inculpable ignorance on the part of reason of what those natures are? Must not rational appetite necessarily make things values according to the way reason has made them objects of knowledge?

Not only is freedom compatible with the nature of rational appetite but the nature of rational appetite requires that ethical decisions be free. For a rational appetite to fulfill its intrinsic finality for esteeming the being things are given by their natures, insofar as reason knows that being, the appetite itself must give things a place in our priorities that corresponds to the relative positions of their natures in reality. Thus, if reason presented the rational appetite with the direct apprehension of an infinite being, the appetite would necessarily, not freely, value the infinite being as its complete good; for by hypothesis, there would be no reality lacking the in the infinite being that the appetite could prefer to it. Confronted with anything less than an infinite being, including an action that was necessary for the appetite's access to the infinite being, the appetite's response is free, since any finite reality could exclude some other reality it is also capable of valuing. The appetite's attainment of its true natural end requires that it value things according to what they are, but it can fail to attain this end because it has freedom respecting finite values. Therefore, its attainment of its true end requires that it freely give things a place in our evaluations that is identical with the relation between their natures that holds in reality.

For example, I am capable of ensuring that her pursuit of the goal of being first on an examination has a chance of success that is equal to my chance of success in pursuit of the same goal. Since I am capable of doing this, a defect in my ethical decision is my responsibility. I am the ultimate and conscious cause of the defect, of the absence of identity between the relation that holds between the two beings in reality and in my evaluations.

The fact that a conscious decision treating equals unequally is freely defective as the kind of conscious decision it is (as a false belief is defective as the kind of decision it is) is what we mean by saying we ought to treat equals equally, we should treat equals equally, or we are obligated to treat equals equally. That fact is also what we mean when we say that someone equal in nature to us has the right to be treated equally to us or is owed, is due, is worthy of, or is deserving of equal treatment. When we say someone is deserving of equal treatment from a rational being, we are saying a conscious decision not to so treat her is defective as the kind of act it is and as our responsibility, while the decision to treat her equally attains the goal of the finality intrinsic to the kind of act it is (just as a true belief does) and as our responsibility. Moral goodness and evil are the presence and absence, respectively, of identity between the comparative positions her nature and mine have in my free evaluations, on the one hand, and the comparative perfection of our natures in reality, on the other.

This is not a 'paradigm case' argument which moves from the given existence of a word (effect) to the necessity for a known referent of the word (cause). My argument moves in the opposite direction; it first points out the existence of something and then notes that this thing is the referent of a particular word. In Section V, I will argue that my analysis of ethical meanings in terms of the rational appetite conforms to common beliefs. I will not try to argue that my analysis conforms to the historical usage of any particular philosopher (although it is certainly consistent with philosophers of the realist tradition, since it follows from their premises, and is extremely close to Cajetan's explicit formulation of the nature of obligation\*). Instead, I will argue in this and the next two sections that the usages I have pointed out for these words explain and justify the claim that ethical values are unconditional, objective, and knowable. In other words, philosophers wanting to defend ethical deontology, categoricity, and absoluteness, as well as naturalness, do not need any meanings for these terms other than those I have given.

The sufficiency of this understanding of ethical terms can be seen, for example, from the fact that it gives an objective, measurable way of knowing the truth of 'This decision is ethically defective'. Reason judges whether a decision is ethically defective if the decision fails of identity between the comparative perfection of the natures of things in reality and the relative place the decision gives things in our desires. In other words, reason judges a decision to be good or bad that way it judges the proposed belief that the natures of things are equal or unequal to be true or false. The evidence for the latter is also evidence for the former.

Reason's knowledge of our nature also provides criteria for judgments concerning the relative importance of conflicting interests. For example, does my desire for loud music at 4 o'clock in the morning make it justifiable for me to keep the person in the next apartment awake? We know this is not the case from our knowledge of the needs of human nature. A decision that would evaluate my listening to loud music as equal or higher on a scale of priorities to his sleeping would give these things relative places in my evaluations in conflict with the relation that holds between their contributions to the needs established by human nature. If it is just to keep another awake with loud music, then at least one horn of the following dilemma must hold: either his interests are not equal to mine (our natures are not equal) or loud music is as necessary for the well being of a human being, as measured by the finalities of human nature, as is a good night's sleep.

#### V. Rational Appetite as a Common Belief

Perhaps it will be admitted that assumptions (1) to (3), equality in underlying nature, its knowability, and freedom of choice, are objects of general belief. Can the same be said about assumption (4), the claims I have made for rational appetite? Yes, and seeing why will help to make clear the meaning and power of this approach to ethical values.

It is a common belief that unfair ethical decisions are defective and that the reason they are defective is that they treat equals unequally. The question is whether treating them unequally means treating them as if they really were unequal, that is, as if they are related in existence the way they are related in our evaluations. If that is what it means to say that the reason unfair decisions are defective is that they treat equals unequally,

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\*Quoted by Maritain in Neuf lecons, p. xx.

then the common belief is that ethical decisions do treat things as if they existed the way our decisions evaluate them -and that is the concept of rational appetite I have put forward.

To see that this is indeed the common view of ethical decisions, notice that we do not hold someone ethically responsible who could not have known any better. When inculpable ignorance is behind a decision that we would otherwise hold morally defective, we do not hold it defective in a moral sense. And if we hold someone's ignorance to be culpable, we do so because of other knowledge she possesses on the basis of which we judge that she should have taken steps to overcome the ignorance. The knowledge in question belongs, of course, to the sphere of rational rather than sensory knowledge.

With reference to fairness, we would not hold someone morally responsible for an unfair decision if she was inculpably ignorant of human equality with respect to underlying nature. So, when the common person judges that an unfair decision is indeed defective in a moral sense, the moral defect is judged on the basis of the unfair person's presumed rational knowledge of the equality in nature. The moral defect in treating people unfairly is believed to come from the fact that people are known to be equal, or at least thought to be equal, in their extra-cognitive existence. Hence, the ethical decision is judged by the standard of whether it treats things according as they are known really to be. When we judge an ethical decision by this standard, we are implying that we understand that decisions performed by beings with rational consciousness treat things as if they exist the way they are related to each other in our evaluations. Otherwise, the prior knowledge that things are not so related would not make our decisions culpably defective.

In other words, the person on the street believes our ethical decisions are governed by our rational awareness of what things are, where 'governed' does not mean physically regulated (necessitated) but means that rational knowledge provides the standard by reference to which decisions are to be judged properly done or defective as rationally conscious decisions. Does this position imply the supposedly impossible circumstance of reason prescribing to appetite, rather than vice versa? As we will see later, appetite is nothing but a species of the universal relation of powers and their acts to goals. In the case of acts of the rational appetite, the goal of treating things as if they exist the way they are evaluated is inscribed in the nature of the act as a rationally conscious function; it is not an external standard imposed on the act by reason. If our decisions resulted from an appetite that was not oriented to acts treating things as if they exist the way they are evaluated, then what reason knows about the existence of things could not prescribe for that appetite. But if the appetite producing our decisions has the nature of a rational appetite as described here and as believed in by the person on the street, that is, an appetite relating to things as reason relates to them, then it is a false dichotomy to oppose reason to appetite on the matter of who prescribes to whom or to oppose deriving 'ought' from desire, on the one hand, to deriving it from knowledge of what is, on the other.

Only if nature could have so designed us that we had reason but did not have a rational appetite would there be a problem about reason prescribing to appetite. But if nature had so designed us, we would not be ethical beings, that is, beings who pass the ethical judgments we do pass on our decisions and the decisions of others. Perhaps there was no necessity that nature produce

beings endowed with a rational appetite; perhaps there was no necessity that nature produce beings for whom the passing of ethical decisions is a feature of their behavior. But nature has produced beings endowed with rational appetite. We are stuck with that contingent fact and, therefore, with its necessary consequences. One of those consequences is that a free decision failing to conform to what reason tells us about the equality of our natures is a decision defective by the standard of the decision's own intrinsic finality. In other words, the contingent fact of a rational appetite's existence necessarily implies the equally contingent fact of the existence of beings who make unconditional, objective, and knowably true ethical judgments.

#### VI. What It Means to Deserve Retribution

To return to the analysis of ethical terms. The sufficiency of this account can also be seen from the fact that it justifies the claim that unethical acts deserve punishment. What if a necessary condition for achieving the ends of my nature is making ethical decisions that do not have the described defect? That is, what if a necessary condition for achieving the ends of my nature is the making of ethical decisions that give things a relative place in my evaluations that is identical with the relation of their natures in reality? In other words, the necessary condition is that I value things according to what they are. Then, if that the necessary condition is lacking, I will fail to achieve the ends of my nature. I will fail to achieve the state that brings happiness. And to be punished is nothing other than to be deprived of happiness in some respect. Further, since the hypothesis is that the absence of the necessary condition for happiness is my free choice, I am responsible and I alone am responsible for my failure to be happy.

It is this situation that we describe as that of our not 'deserving' happiness or, on the other hand, the situation of our being responsible for having done everything necessary for happiness is the situation we describe as our 'deserving' happiness. Again, this is not a paradigm case argument. Rather, I have first pointed to a described a situation in reality and then pointed to the fact that this is the situation for which we use a particular word.

Does it follow from the description given that the only thing implied by our deserving or not deserving happiness is that we have freely chosen to pursue or not pursue our ends, rather than pursue or not pursue what we ought to do? In other words, does it follow either that deserving has nothing to do with what ought to be the case but only with what happens to be our end or, on the other hand, that what ought to be the case is entirely reducible to our finalities, in other words, that something is good only because it fulfills the desires of our nature, desires that could have been otherwise? No.

Let us ask why ethical decisions that treat things as they really are should be necessary conditions for our happiness. Perhaps the connection can appear arbitrary, as if some higher beings were going to dispense happiness to us upon our successful completion of an obstacle course they have designed for their amusement rather than in a way demanded by the natures of things. To see why the connection is not arbitrary, all we have to do is look at the nature of ethical obligation as analysed here and at the reason why we cannot avoid actions to which those obligations apply.

Ethical obligation springs from our nature as beings with reason, beings who direct our actions by means of our knowledge of what things are, beings who are capable of so directing our action that things are valued according to their known intrinsic reality, and who are responsible for whether or not we do so value them. In other words, our nature is identical with a tendency to, among other things, decisions of the kind governed by ethical obligation. Such actions are among the goals the achievement of which constitutes the fulfillment of the tendencies of our nature, and the fulfillment of those tendencies produces happiness. Thus, that which makes ethical decisions necessary conditions for happiness is the same thing that makes decisions governed by ethical obligation a necessary feature of our existence, namely, the fact that our nature includes knowledge of things as they are in themselves and, consequently, a power oriented to giving things a place in our desires that is identical with their relative positions in existence. If we fail to so evaluate things, we fail with respect to the tendency of our nature that necessitates such acts to begin with. Therefore, for a rational being, good ethical decisions must be necessary conditions, at least, for happiness.

Note that on this analysis ethical decisions are not correct because they are necessary for happiness. They are necessary for happiness because they are correct, because because they satisfy obligations. Ethical decisions fulfill the tendencies of nature because they satisfy obligations, and they satisfy obligations because they value equals equally. Another way to put it is that the reason we deserve punishment is not that we have failed to achieve our end, as opposed to having failed to fulfill our obligations. Failing to achieve our end is not the reason for punishment; it is the punishment. And failure to fulfill our obligations is the reason for failure to achieve our end.

The orientation to its end is intrinsic to the ethical decision as a rationally conscious act; the end is not something set for it extrinsically as we might use a hammer for chiseling a statue or for driving a nail. The act of choosing to treat ethical decisions as if they were not relative to what things are in themselves could not escape being itself an ethical decision treating something as if it were not what it is in itself. Ethical decisions cannot avoid being measurable by the standard of whether they treat things as they are any more than belief can. It is the fulfillment or failure to fulfill this intrinsic orientation that makes an ethical decision good or bad and, as a consequence, determines whether a particular decision will contribute to or detract from our achievement of the ends of our nature. I could wish that I did not have a nature that included an orientation to acts with such an intrinsic finality. But as long as my nature is what it is, achieving the ends of my nature, as opposed to the ends of those acts, requires that those acts achieve their ends.

A decision is not ethically good because it is a necessary condition for achieving the ends of my nature. It is a necessary condition for achieving the ends of my nature because it is ethically good. An act is ethically good because it achieves its end, that is, because it treats things as they are in reality. But there is a distinction to be drawn between the end or ends of our nature and the end of any individual ethical decision. This for two reasons. First, assume that ends of my nature are identical with the sum total of my ethical decisions; that is, assume I have no other end than being an ethically good person. Still, no one ethical decision exhausts my

teleonomic orientation to ethical decisions, and therefore an individual decision can be at most a necessary condition for the achievement of my ends, not constitutive of the achievement of my ends.

Second, it is not the case that being an ethical person is the only end of my nature. In fact, as I will argue in Section VII, acts of the rational appetite always concern the objects of other pre-existing desires, the desires for self-preservation, pleasure, fame, security, etc. These other desires are all functions of faculties other than the ability to evaluate things according to our knowledge of what they are. ('Desire' here includes that unconscious or preconscious orientation of a faculty to its function, for example, reason's orientation to contemplation, which is not really distinct from reason's nature--see Section VII.) So in one sense, the goal of the rational appetite, namely, the ethically good pursuit of these other desires, is not identical with the ends of our nature, since it is not identical with the accomplishment of these other desires. (However, in another sense it is identical with them, since, if all our other desires were fulfilled, the rational appetite would be fulfilled also and would have nothing left to do but experience complete satisfaction in the state attained by our other faculties.)

Still, ethically correct acts of the rational appetite are necessary conditions for the complete fulfillment of our other desires and for the happiness that fulfillment can bring. For they are a necessary conditions for the fulfillment of our end as beings endowed with reason, namely, to know what things are, and with a rational appetite, namely, to evaluate them accordingly. And if we do not pursue other desires in a way that evaluates things according to what we know they are, we do not deserve the happiness that can only be caused by things being what they are. Again, that is just what it means not to deserve happiness in some respect; or, at least, 'deserving punishment' need not mean any more than this culpability in depriving ourselves of a necessary condition for happiness.

(N.B. The final version of the paper will emphasize two more ways that we deserve retribution on my analysis. First, the act of the rational appetite always concerns some other faculty's orientation to an end. For example, acts of the will ultimately aim at the fulfillment of the intellect's orientation to contemplation in Aristotle and Aquinas. Hence, if we pursue the end of some other faculty in a defective way, we not only deserve the unhappiness of having made a defective decision but also the unhappiness of the frustration of the other desire whose fulfillment depends on our free decisions. Second, if a decision unjustly deprives another person or persons of the fulfillment of their desires, retribution from us is due them in the sense of 'due' I have tried to explain.)

On one interpretation of the question, 'Why be moral?', therefore, it is equivalent to 'Why avoid unhappiness?'. Put this way, its answer should be self-evident. But it is important to see not only that the failure to achieve happiness is a brute fact if I am not moral, but also that I do not deserve happiness if I am not moral. I do not deserve it because I have freely and consciously chosen against what is necessary for it. And that is what 'deserve' here means.

Answering 'Why be moral?' with 'To be happy', seems to make morality subordinate to happiness in our consciousness. It is the opposite that is the case. 'In order to happy, I must be moral,' means 'In order to be happy, morality, not my own happiness, must be my goal'. If I make my own happiness the end I am seeking and treat another person equally merely so that my

treatment of her will contribute to my happiness, I may perform the external acts required of treating her equally, but in my evaluations she does not have a place equal to mine. Therefore my evaluations are ethically bad. I am obligated not to make my happiness my primary consideration, and if I do, I fail in what is necessary for my happiness. On the other hand, I am obligated to seek my happiness in the sense that consciously choosing against what is necessary for happiness would amount to consciously evaluating things contrary to what they are in themselves, which I am obligated not to do. I am obligated to pursue the ends of my nature. Doing otherwise would require a free conscious decision that would evaluate things otherwise than as they are. The intrinsic finality of that decision would render such a decision intrinsically morally defective.

#### VII. The Structure of Desire

This account of the foundations of ethics will be subject to objections that come from incorrect, but very plausible, ideas about the relation of desires to things, on the one hand, and to knowledge, on the other. This section and the next three sections will deal with these objections. Answering these objections will make the significance of this analysis, as well as the shortcomings of standard analyses, clearer.

Some of the difficulties have already been anticipated. For example, if in acting ethically we are seeking happiness, is not morality subordinated to finality; am I not really treating the other equally because I am interested in my own happiness first and interested in her happiness only as a means to my own? If I am seeking happiness in every act, is not what is valued valued for its relation to some other thing we want to obtain, our own happiness? We are seeking happiness, and that is the value by which we measure other values. If I want something, I want it because it will make me happy.

There is a way in which happiness is our end, but there is also an importance way in which happiness is not our end. Happiness is not our end in the sense of being the object our knowledge proposes to us and to which our faculty of desire responds. In this latter sense, an end is an object of knowledge that we value, for example, wealth, social justice, or reliable personal relationships. When that which we desire in this sense is achieved, desire is satisfied, and a conscious state of satisfaction results. The conscious state of satisfaction is a state of partial happiness. If all our desires could be satisfied completely, a complete state of happiness would result. From this point of view, happiness is not our end but is the consequence of achieving our end, not that which we desire but the result of fulfilling desire.

To say we are seeking happiness in everything we do is simply to comment on what might be called the metaphysical physiology of action. Every action whether conscious or not, necessarily results from a pre-existing orientation to the action on the part of the cause. By hypothesis, an action is caused, but without a pre-existing orientation, it would have no cause. For without a pre-existing orientation, any number of contrary actions could equally well emerge from the agent. But then the pre-existing agent would no more be a cause of this than it would of that. That is to say, there would be no cause for this event as opposed to that, which contradicts the hypothesis that, since it is an action, this event is a caused. Desire is simply a species of causal orientation in the domain of conscious agents. We have conscious orientations to achieve as yet unachieved states; other agents, and we ourselves in many respects, have unconscious orientations to as yet unachieved states.

When we achieve a goal, the same disposition by which we experience desire allows us to experience a conscious state of satisfaction of desire, partial happiness. Therefore, every action seeks happiness in the sense of being driven by a desire whose fulfillment will, as a concomitant consequence, necessarily produce partial happiness. But this is not to say that the object of knowledge which has provoked our desire, the end we are thinking of as we pursue action and whose attainment will produce happiness, is happiness itself.

A conscious desire, as conscious, relates us to an object of cognition. For example, we think of an ice cream cone and we therefore experience a desire for that which we are thinking of. The fact that we seek happiness in every action does not mean that our desires are responding to our own happiness made object of cognition and proposed by our cognitive faculties to our faculties of desire as a potential object of response. That analysis would lead to the following vicious circle. Cognition proposes the attainment of happiness as an object of desire. This object provokes my desire so that accomplishing it will make me happy. Therefore, what will make me happy is the attainment of happiness. But how can I attain happiness unless I am pursuing some other end whose attainment as an end, not just as a means, will produce happiness as a result? Understanding other objects as means to happiness does not break the vicious circle. If X makes me happy only as a means to the attainment of something else, some other object proposed to a faculty of desire by cognition, that something else is what really makes me happy, what really terminates a relation of desire whose satisfaction is happiness. Whatever that something else is, we get nowhere by calling it 'happiness'.

This analysis of seeking happiness seems to contradict the wide-spread theory that the valued object in terms of which we measure the value of other things are enjoyable states of consciousness, pleasures, in the broad sense of that word. That we are not seeking pleasure as an object proposed seems to contradict more than a philosophical theory; it seems to contradict our most fundamental and consistent experience with desires. Consider the imagined ice cream cone again. What we are really desiring when we desire an ice cream cone is the taste of the cone, the enjoyable state of consciousness the cone will produce. To deny this is to deny one of the most basic features of human experience.

I am not denying it, however. There is no doubt that our own pleasure can be and often is the object of cognition which provokes a desire in us and which we seek to attain through action. Am I now contradicting my previous analysis? No. What is happening here is that one faculty of desire, the rational appetite, is making an enjoyable state of consciousness produced by attainment of the end of another faculty of desire, the desire for food, its object. But neither faculty is making the enjoyable state of consciousness produced by its own satisfaction its own object. Otherwise, we would be in the vicious circle. The object of the desire for the ice cream cone is the imagined ice cream cone. But imagining the ice cream cone can produce the memory of pleasurable past satisfactions of that desire. That memory can result in a similar pleasure being proposed to the rational appetite as an object of choice. The rational appetite can then choose as its goal a pleasure resulting from the the satisfaction of the faculty whose goal is the consumption of food. At no point, does a faculty of desire have its own satisfaction as the end proposed to it by cognition.

Consider, now, a situation in which we do choose our own pleasure as an object but to the detriment of someone else's interests, for example, when we cheat on an exam for the ultimate pleasure we will obtain or when we keep someone else awake for the pleasure that comes from playing loud music. In putting my pleasure ahead of the opportunity or well being of others, I am doing more than selecting one object proposed by cognition, my own pleasure, from among others. I am making myself, the ontological seat of the desire, the highest value and therefore evaluating myself as higher than other beings even though our natures are equal. I am evaluating the subject of that desire for pleasure, myself, as if I were of a higher nature than other persons. Hence I do not treat them as they deserve to be treated by a rational appetite, a faculty that cannot avoid relating to things as if they were as it takes them to be.

#### VIII. Acting to Attain an End

The objection concerning happiness can also be expressed in terms of seeking our ends. Just as we are always seeking happiness when we act, we are always acting because we are seeking an end. Therefore the value I place on another must be her relation to one or more of the ends I am seeking. By the very metaphysics of action, therefore, the value of another must be that of a means to my ends and can never be any thing higher than that.

The fact that in any action I am seeking an end, however, is just another way of stating the metaphysical physiology of action, conscious or unconscious. Action necessarily results from a pre-existing orientation to action. Pursuing an end is nothing other than accomplishing that which the orientation is an orientation to. It does not follow that my orientation is itself the cognized object that provokes a desire for action. In fact, it cannot follow for the reason we have already seen. The orientation to action is what is provoked by the presentation of the cognized object; the orientation to action (desire for an end) is not provoked by the cognitional presentation of itself. Therefore, it cannot follow that other persons are valued only for their relation to my orientation to ends, understood as itself the end that I am seeking.

In the case of a rational appetite, the end to which it is an orientation is that of treating things or evaluating things according to the comparative perfection of their natures. The cognized objects are, for example, myself and another individual as pursuing interests such as getting a job by taking an examination. The provoked desire is the desire that her interests have an equal opportunity of accomplishment. My end in this case is justice for the two of us, or my end can be described as the pursuit of my own opportunity but the just pursuit of that opportunity. (Note that, again, the rational appetite's orientation to its end takes place in an action, the decision, that concerns the fulfillment of other desires, for example, the desire for the security or prestige or wealth that would come from getting the job.) That I am acting because I am seeking my end, therefore, does not imply that I am evaluating myself, as the subject of orientation to ends, to be more worthy of having my ends fulfilled than she is. On the other hand, to make a decision reducing the other, in my evaluation, to the state of a means to my ends would be to treat her as if her being were not really equal to mine, at the level of underlying human nature. Hence I am defective if I rate the pursuit of her interests as having a lower priority than mine. (In Section XI I discuss equality of nature precisely with respect to being oriented to ends.)

### IX. The 'I' of the Beholder

Another way of formulating the objection concerning happiness challenges the very idea that desire can relate to things as they are in themselves, the heart of my account of ethical obligation. Is there not a contradiction between the notion of value and what a thing is in itself? A thing becomes a value by being related to one or more of our desires. That is what the word 'value' means. And one thing becomes evaluated higher than another because it satisfies desire more than another.

This is not to say we cannot have altruistic desires. When a female animal sacrifices her life for her offspring's life, she is satisfying an altruistic desire. Still, her action springs from her desire, and her offspring's life is a value for her only because it satisfies a desire. Therefore, what something is in itself is pertinent to evaluations only to the extent that it terminates a relation of desire on the part of the evaluating subject, that is, only to the extent that it comes into relation to the desires that are what propel us to make evaluating decisions.

In one sense it is true, though trivially true, that desires relate to things as they are in themselves. A dog may evaluate a larger bone as better for it than a smaller one because of the bone's size, which is a characteristic the bone possesses in itself. But this characteristic becomes a value for the dog only because the characteristic terminates a relation of desire which is totally exterior to what the bone is in itself. It may always be the case that what is valued is identical with what something is independently of our evaluation of it. But the question is why do we value it? Because of its relation to a desire we possess independently of it.

That what terminates a relation of desire can be something existing independently of the desire may indeed seem trivially true, but remember that the theory of knowledge I have sketched is not held by most philosophers. Most philosophers today would question the identity between the meanings of terms and what things are independently of our knowing them. Meanings result from using language to communicate about things; and languages impose structures on our meanings that are independent of what the things we communicate about are. So when we make things linguistic objects, we bring them in relation to our linguistic frameworks. Likewise, when we value what something is, we are valuing it because of its relation to some desire we have. That which is a value may be a characteristic something has independently of our desiring it, but the reason that characteristic is a value is that it comes into a certain relation to a desire we possess prior to the thing's becoming a value. Conceptual relativism says the content of our beliefs about things is not what things are intrinsically but is a structure we impose on things. Ethical relativism says the value of things is not what things are intrinsically but a relation we impose on them.

How can values be identical with the intrinsic reality of things if values are objects of subjective desires? By some metaphysical miracle or sleight of hand? No. The fact that a thing is valued only insofar as it terminates a relation of desire proves no more in ethics than the fact that a thing is known only insofar as it is known proves in epistemology. That a thing is known only insofar as it is known has been used to justify idealism, or at least subjectivism, in knowledge. Allegedly, we cannot know things as they are outside of knowledge because we know them only by bringing them within knowledge. However, from the fact that we know something, it does not and cannot follow that it is known under the aspect of being known, that what

is known is that something is known. The aspect under which a thing is known must always be something more than that it is known and something causally prior to the fact that it is known. The alternative is an infinite regress, since something must already be known in order for it to be known as known; in other words, the thing would have to be known before it could be known.

Similarly, we cannot desire something without relating it to our desires. But the characteristic because of which we desire something is not and cannot be the fact that it satisfies desire. It must terminate the relation of desire because it possesses some other characteristic, in the case of desires for cognized objects, a characteristic capable of provoking desire by being known. Otherwise, the reason why something satisfies desire would be that it satisfies desire. Desires are relations to characteristics in things, characteristics other than that of satisfying desire. (The comparison with the idealist's argument could also have been made for the view that actions are necessarily ego-centric since we are seeking our happiness in every action. To say we are pursuing a course of action only insofar as it brings happiness is like saying a thing is known only insofar as it is known. It does not and cannot follow that the generation of happiness is the value we perceive in the course of action, the characteristic whose existence as a result of the action will generate happiness.)

In making the interests of another the object of my desire because I recognize the intrinsic perfection of her nature as equal to mine, I am pursuing my own end, but I am not thereby reducing the other to being an object of my desire for my own end anymore than I reduce the known to being known only as an object of knowledge. To be a value is to be related to human desires. But that which is valued is not valued as related to desire. Rather, human desires are relative to perfections in things just as human knowledge is. (Again, we must keep in mind that the fulfillment of one desire may be the object of another desire.)

Our altruistic desires can evaluate some things, for example, the survival of our child, our family, or our nation, as higher and more worthy of pursuit than our own survival. In giving our family's survival a higher place in our evaluations than our own survival, we are pursuing the end, fulfilling the preconscious orientation, of giving things a place in our conscious evaluations corresponding to the comparative perfections of their natures. In other words, we have an orientation (on the level of nature) for specific kinds of desires (on the level of acts of desire, decisions). And in pursuing an altruistic desire, we are fulfilling both the orientation of our nature to acts of that kind and the orientation inscribed in the act itself for our desires to relate to things according to the way things themselves are related.

Do we measure the value of things by relating them to desires? No. Desires relate us to things. Desires are measurements of intrinsic reality possessed by things. Desires are estimations, appreciations of intrinsic characteristics of things as worthy of respect or pursuit. A dog does not pursue the larger piece of meat because he finds it more satisfying of desire; he pursue the larger piece because it causes more desire in him. It is more satisfying of desire because it is larger and, hence, provokes a greater desire.

This is true of aesthetic values as well as ethical values. Assume a drug is found that causes us to like a kind of music we would not like otherwise. Does this not show the subjectivity of aesthetic evaluation? That evaluations are performed by an evaluating subject there is no doubt. That the existence of the evaluation therefore depends on the abilities and dispositions of the subject, there is also no doubt. But what the drug has done has so modified our dispositions that we estimate a certain cognized set of intrinsic characteristics, those of the music, in a way we didn't before. (That the intrinsic characteristics may be those of sounds having only phenomenal existence is not at issue here. If the existence of sounds is subjective, that is a different subjective existence from that of the evaluation. For by hypothesis, the same sounds can be evaluated differently.) In other words, as a result of the drug, the intrinsic pattern of the sounds now causes a different reaction than it did before. But it is that intrinsic pattern that is a cause of and an object of this reaction. The reaction itself is an esteeming of the sounds for their intrinsic qualities.

In order to appreciate, esteem, or value something for certain of its intrinsic qualities, our faculties have to be in a certain subjective condition. That is what the drug example illustrates. The drug puts our faculties into the condition necessary for being attracted to music of a certain kind. But it is still the music, whose intrinsic characteristic are presented to the faculty of desire by a faculty of cognition, that attracts the desire. Our faculties of cognition must also be in the necessary subjective condition if they are to perform their function. But dependence on subjective conditions does not prevent their function from being that of knowing what things are in themselves.

And as the aesthetic example shows, that desires are relative to characteristics in things is true of sensory appetites as well as the rational appetite. But sensory and rational appetites differ in essential respects from the point of view of the foundations of ethics. Sensory cognition objectifies things insofar as they affect us, insofar as they act on our sensory faculties. Still, it is in an important sense true that the senses know what things are. For to know that things are acting on us in a certain way is to know something about what they are, namely, that they are things capable of acting in this way.\* But the knowledge that goes beyond the way things affect the senses to the not-directly-sensible characteristics they must possess in order to so act is accomplished reason rather than by the senses. This is the knowledge I describe as knowing the underlying natures of things. In the case of other persons, it is the belief that underlying the external actions I perceive is a consciousness like that which I experience in myself.

Since I know the nature of other persons, the appetite correlative to rational knowledge is capable of evaluating them, esteeming them, appreciating them as equal. To do so is nothing other than to desire that they have an opportunity equal to mine to achieve their goals. My rational appetite is even capable of evaluating my family's or nation's survival as something higher than my own, since, all other things being equal, there is more perfection in a multitude with a certain kind of perfection than in an individual of that kind. To so evaluate them is nothing other than to desire their survival more than my own. In other words, I am measuring the intrinsic reality constituted by their survival as more worthy of desire than is mine.

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\*See Causal Realism, Chapter 10, for a more adequate treatment of this issue from the point of view of realism's principles.

To do so is, in a real sense, to love them more than my own happiness. Yes, in dying for others I am seeking happiness in the sense that the action springs from a pre-existing orientation whose accomplishment will bring satisfaction. But I am not seeking happiness in the sense that the fulfillment of one or more of my desires is the object of cognition that I am giving the highest place in my evaluations. That would be to act as if the subject of those desires, myself, had a reality that was not equal to but higher than the collective reality of the others. And it is precisely the opposite that I am doing.

#### X. Is Goodness a Characteristic?

The preceding analysis of desire and the relation of values to desire allows us to answer the question whether goodness, be it ethical or aesthetic, is a characteristic of things in their own existence. Without being facetious, we can say that the answer is a clear 'Yes and no'; for we can make precise the sense in which the answer is 'Yes' and the sense in which it is 'No'. Being desired by a dog is not a characteristic existing in the bone. Being-desired, like being-known, is a logical construct, specifically, a relation of reason, based on a characteristic, desire of the bone, existing in an entity other than the bone itself. If 'being good' means being desired, being good is not a characteristic of things in their own existence.

But 'being desired' is predicated of the object, not the subject, of desire. And the very fact that 'being desired' predicates of something a logical construct implies that there can be no real distinction between what is described as 'desired' and what is described as 'a thing that is what it is independently of our desires'. If 'being desired' adds only a relation of reason to 'what an existing thing is', what is desired is identical with what the thing really is, that is, what its characteristics are. Therefore, there is no real distinction between the goodness of a thing and what its characteristics are (in other words, goodness is a transcendental property of being).

Let us assume the aspect of the bone that attracts the dog is its odor. Then the goodness of the bone for the dog consists in its ability to produce this odor. The ability to cause an odor is a characteristic existing in the bone, but this ability's being that which makes the bone attractive to the dog is not a characteristic existing in the bone. It is a logical construct adding nothing real in the bone to the characteristic by which it causes odor. This ability to cause odor is something in the bone, while being that for which the dog desires the bone is not something in the bone. But precisely because 'being that for which the dog desires it' adds nothing real to the characteristic by which it causes odor, there can be only a logical distinction, and hence real identity, between that characteristic and the bone's goodness.

The problem of understanding the sense in which goodness is a characteristic is complicated by the fact that many philosophers seem to believe that to each distinct distinct predicate truthfully attributable to something a distinct characteristic must correspond.\* Hence, either 'good' designates a characteristic distinct from other characteristics of things or, if 'good' does not add anything real to a thing's characteristics, 'good' cannot be a predicate used to describe a thing's characteristics. It may ascribe, prescribe, or subscribe, but not describe. However, the assumption

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\*For example, Plantinga seems to assume this in The Nature of Necessity, p. xx and elsewhere.

that every descriptive predicate must have a corresponding real characteristic is a case of projecting a fact about language, the occurrence of distinct predicates, onto extra-linguistic things--an accusation that many holders of this assumption have probably made against others. (It is not metaphysicians of the classical variety who are hypnotized by language; it is those who can see no more in classical metaphysics than a projection of language who are hypnotized by language.)

To get back to goodness, the same 'Yes and no' answer must be given to the question whether things are good only because desired or desired only because good. A thing is good because it has some characteristic (it is what it is in some respect) and because some appetite is so adapted to things with this characteristic as to desire them. But appetite based on reason's knowledge of things is not so adapted as to be limited to this or that characteristic, or this or that way something is able to produce effects in us. Rational appetite is, by definition as well as by the common belief of humankind, adapted to what things are in toto, and, since what things are includes an underlying nature that is causally more fundamental to what things are than are characteristics presupposing this nature, rational appetite is adapted to valuing things according to what things are in their underlying nature. In a word, rational appetite is adapted to the being of things, and things are desired by this appetite because they are what they are.

#### XI. Persons as Ends-in-Themselves

The situation in which a person sacrifices her life for just one other person rather than for a group of persons seems to create another difficulty. When I am dying for more than one person, there is clearly a sense in which that which I am giving the highest place in my evaluations is, in reality, something greater than my own life. But what about when I am sacrificing my life for one person? Here the objects of evaluation are equal in reality; yet I appear to be evaluating one of them, myself, as less than the other, since I am offering my life for that of the other. If 'Treat equals equally' is an unconditional principle, how can I morally treat myself unequally?

And there are other difficulties with the principle that we should treat equals equally, where 'equal' means with respect to a common underlying nature. Does it follow from this principle that I must treat all african violets equally, not, for instance, destroy one and preserve another on the basis of aesthetic preference? Or does it follow that I cannot prefer my african violet to my collie, since the collie has a higher nature?

The principle of treating equals equally was selected as the focus of the analysis in order to minimize controversy. That the fair thing should be done and the unfair thing not be done is one of the most universally accepted moral intuitions, an intuition we should expect our ethical theories to account for. Most people, including most ethical theorists, grant that there is something wrong with, for example, cheating on a competitive examination. The question, therefore, is what does the ethical defect in cheating on an examination consist of?

A moral intuition almost as universal and perhaps as universal as that of the obligation to be fair is that this obligation concerns equality of interests between ourselves and those to whom we should be fair. The attempt to explain ethics in terms of a minimally controversial example, therefore, would explain the obligation to be fair by explaining this quality of interest. My explanation of equality of interest included several controversial assumptions, including the assumption of a common underlying

nature (assumption 1). This is the assumption that is giving us a difficulty now. The difficulty can be solved, however, by another assumption of this explanation, an assumption that accounts for two more of our very universal moral intuitions and in addition is necessary for any explanation of ethical obligation, not just this one, the assumption that our common nature gives us the power of free choice (assumption 3).

We cannot be obligated to do what we do not have the power to do, or we cannot be obligated to do the opposite of something we do not have the power to avoid doing. That is why any adequate theory of obligation must assume that we have freedom of choice. But most ethical theories assume the opposite. They do so because of the many difficulties with the concept of free choice, and difficulties there are. The wide acceptance of these theories is an example of the 'best in field' fallacy in which a theory is accepted because there appears to be no viable alternative on the horizon. However, accepting an invalid theory for that reason merely dulls our awareness of our ignorance and, as a result, prevents us from looking for more adequate theories. It is much better to withhold commitment to a theory and remain aware of our ignorance than to accept a theory merely as the best in the field. In the present case, it is much better to remain aware that, if there is no freedom, there is no such thing as moral obligation.

On the other hand, that we do have freedom of choice in making ethical decisions is a very common belief among those who have not been taught that it does not exist. Therefore, it is a general belief that we are equal with respect to a common nature that gives us freedom of choice. And that intuition provides a justification for one more wide spread moral intuition, a belief that solves our dilemmas about treating equals equally: human nature makes us equal with respect to being ends-in-ourselves, from which it follows that each human should be treated as an end while anything whose nature does not make it an end in itself is eligible to be treated as a means to the ends of those who are ends in themselves.

Why does freedom of choice make a person an end in herself and its absence makes something eligible to be a means for a person? The non-free being has ends, as any being does. That is, its nature is an orientation to certain forms of behavior that, ipso facto, are goals for those orientations. But the ends of a non-free being are not its, do not belong to it, in the sense that it does not give itself its relation to ends. Its relation to ends come to it completely extrinsically; the universe gives it its relation to ends. There is nothing in the reality constituting its nature that gives it the power of selecting the ends of its own existence, of being the ultimate cause of placing on other things the value they will have for it.

Let us assume you have constructed a mechanical device to perform some function. If that function is interfered with, there is an important sense in which the loss is to you and not to the device. The device has that function because you gave it a function in view of some goal of your own. The interference with the function is a loss to you because the device no longer serves to achieve your goal. Is it a loss to the device? In some respects, perhaps it is. But it is not a loss to the device in the sense of the device's being deprived of a pursuit of an end it gave itself. The device's end, that is, its function, is given it by something else in view of ends the other thing has given itself. The non-free beings in nature are exactly like the device in this example, with one difference. The device is given ends by a being who does not get its ends from anywhere else but itself. Things in

nature are given their ends by beings that do not give themselves their own ends but that themselves are given their ends by a other beings. (For the present discussion, I abstract from the question of things in nature being given their ends by God. I address that question in Section XIII.)

The makeup of a person, on the other hand, includes the power to determine its own ends. The external causes bringing us into existence determine our ends only in general (as long as they are in the domain of finite being). For example, it is a natural determination out of our control that we are oriented to acts evaluating things according to what we know of their intrinsic being. But our evaluations are made freely; hence, we can choose to evaluate them contrary to what we know of their being. In other words, that natural determination does not include a specification of any of the particular, concrete ends we actually direct ourselves to in our choices. We will necessarily choose some goal or goals, pursue some end. But experience shows that humans are capable of making an indefinite variety of contradictory things the ends of their behavior. When we are talking about the existential ends we are actually in pursuit of, we are talking about ends that are our own in the sense that we are the ultimate and conscious cause of the fact that we are directed to these ends and not others, the ultimate and conscious cause, therefore, of the fact that things have whatever value they do have for us.

We can ask, however, how this fact about persons produces an obligation to treat them as beings in control of their own ends rather than using them as means to my ends regardless of how that affects their pursuit of their own ends. To argue from a person's being an end in herself in the first sense to to the fact that we should treat her as an end in herself in the second sense seems to be a clear case of attempting to derive ought from is.

So far, we have said that obligation consists in the fact that in failing to treat our interests equally an ethical decision is culpably defective because it treats us as if our natures were not equal. However, more than equality of nature is at stake in an ethical decision. What is at stake is equality of nature, yes, but equality of nature with respect to being things whose nature allows us to pursue ends we set for ourselves. In any free decision, I am pursuing an end I determine for myself. If in a free decision, I consciously place the pursuit of my end ahead of hers, I am treating her as if her nature were not equal to mine precisely with respect to the point of conflict, namely, the pursuit of freely chosen ends. Since her nature is indeed equal to mine in this respect, such a free decision is defective in that the relative position it gives us in my evaluations differs from the relative positions of our natures in reality.

No such point of conflict occurs in my treatment of non-free things. My collie and my african violet are unequal in many respects but they are equal in that the nature of neither of them makes them able to determine their own ends. Nor, insofar as the existence of non-free beings results from the causality of impersonal nature, does interfering with, or at least manipulating, their functioning cause a loss of anything's chosen goals the way interfering with a device I have designed can cause a loss for me. I am not implying that our treatment of animals has no moral significance. Again, to illustrate the unconditionality, objectivity, and knowability of ethical values, I am using the example justice without denying the existence of other ethical values. The ethical significance of our treatment of animals would not be a matter of justice in the sense of fairness.

To say that we have the obligation to treat as equals those things that are equal to ourselves with respect to the free determination of their own ends is to say that the intrinsic finality of acts of the rational appetite is to treat things according to what they are with respect to being able to pursue ends of their own choosing. Why should acts of the rational appetite have this finality as opposed to that of treating things according to what they are in other respects (height, intelligence quotient, number of chromosomes, etc.)? A better question would be how could a rational appetite not have a finality relating to this aspect of things as opposed to others. As an appetite, the rational appetite is intrinsically ordered to the free evaluation of things as ends and means. As a rational appetite, it is therefore ordered to the free treatment of things according to what reason knows about the natures of things with respect to the free evaluation of things as ends and means. Reason is not only capable of knowing the equality of our underlying natures; it is also capable of knowing the concepts of end (and not just the concept of my end), of freedom (and not just of my freedom). Therefore, reason is capable of knowing the equality of our natures with respect to that to which rational appetite is ordered as appetite, the free evaluation of ends and means. Treating equals as equals means treating as equals those whose nature makes them equal as treaters, that is, as free deciders.

We are equal not only in having a similar nature but in having a nature that makes us free beings. Free beings are ends in themselves. I can freely choose to subordinate my interests to others, because doing so does not interfere with the rights of any other free beings, beings over whom my personal freedom has no jurisdiction. More importantly, in sacrificing myself for another, I am not reducing myself to a mere means, for I am still pursuing my own freely chosen end. The rational appetite, which makes us free beings and to that extent ends in ourselves, always directs other powers to ends and, therefore, always governs the pursuit of other desires. Here the other desire is the desire for self-preservation. But the rational appetite frustrates the pursuit of that desire for the sake of another desire that it freely chooses to pursue, that is, for the sake of another end that it chooses, specifically, the preservation of another person. Still, one could think of unjust forms of voluntary self-sacrifice; for example, it would be immoral to sacrifice myself for my cat. I would be evaluating something as an end in itself, the cat, whose nature does not make it an end in itself. In sacrificing myself for another person, on the other hand, I am not treating my nature as less than the other's. In fact, I am precisely affirming them to be equal. For since they are equal, her preservation has a right to an equal place in my evaluations. But in a situation where not both of the equals can survive--the assumption in the case of self-sacrifice--the ethical decision should ensure that one of the ends-in-themselves survive.

## XII. Ethical Values Other than Justice

Having established the unconditionality, objectivity, and knowability of ethical values in the case of fairness, I have accomplished what I set out to do. In closing, I will briefly indicate how my analysis can be extended to other some other ethical issues. For many, where justice toward another human is not at stake, no ethical values are at stake. The examples to follow will, as a result, be controversial. Since this study already has its share of controversial theses, I will not give a thorough discussion of these examples, only enough to illustrate how my analysis would attempt to handle them.

Any ethical theory must avoid the following difficulty. Seeking a basic principle that can be used as an ethical standard, the theory abstracts a principle from some agreed upon ethical examples. The theory then assumes it has the principle it needs only to find that applying the principle to other cases produces results that no one would agree with. Is there a danger of that happening as I extend the analysis from fairness to other cases? There could be such a danger if it were a matter of deriving consequences from a principle. But I have put forward no such principle. I accepted (and do accept) 'Treat equals equally' as a principle not in order to treat it as the foundation of ethical decision but to treat it as something in need of foundation. The foundation was located not in a further principle from which 'Treat equals equally' and other principles would be derived but in certain factual situation. The obligation to treat equals equally is not derived from that situation but consisted in that situation. (If my analysis has been correct, then one who has followed it derives his philosophic understanding of the obligation to treat equals equally from the analysis of that situation, but deriving our philosophic understanding of this obligation from X does not imply that the obligation stands to X in a relation of logical derivation from prior principles or of causal derivation. How we derive our understanding of obligation is an epistemological matter; what obligation consists in is an ontological matter.)

Likewise, in the examples to follow, I will not be deriving ethical consequences from a principle but will be pointing a factual situation like that I pointed to in the case of justice, namely, a culpable defect in placing evaluations on things, a defect measured not by any standard external to the act of deciding but by a decision's intrinsic finality of treating things as if their existence was identical with the way they are evaluated. If someone wishes to conceed the occurrence of the defect but refuses to call it a moral defect on the grounds that it does not involve justice in the usual sense, I can only reply that we are free to use words any way we want. However, the opponent will have to find something that moral obligation consists in other than the defect in question, since the defect occurs in each of the cases. Furthermore, since the defect is culpable, the guilty party deserves retribution for exactly the same reason that her ethically defective decisions earn her retribution: if evaluating things according to what they are in themselves is the goal of the rational appetite, to evaluate things otherwise is to freely reject a necessary condition for our happiness. And since the rational appetite's act will concern the fulfillment of some other desire, the guilty party deserves not to have that other desire fulfilled.

Let us now turn to an example. Let us assume that non-free nature has produced a device that has for one of its functions the creation of things that are somehow absolute ethical values. That is, among the results of using this device are the existence of things that are somehow good-in-themselves so that their value does not (and should not) consist in or derive from their

relation to some other thing which is valued for its own sake. (I will explain in a moment what such a thing might be.) The device in question does not give itself its ends; rather, like any physical agent, its nature is identical with its orientation to its functions. For that is what it means to say that the metaphysical physiology of action requires that action must come from a prior orientation to action in the agent. Ultimately, that orientation is nothing other than the agent's underlying nature. Likewise, the nature of an agent's action is identical with an orientation to whatever will exist as a result of that action.

Here, one of the things that will result from that action is the existence of something of absolute ethical value. But that need not be the only thing that will result from the action. Let us assume the action can also result in other things we are capable of making objects of desire, for example, some form of pleasure. Could one ethically decide to frustrate the device's function of producing absolute ethical values in order to use it solely for the pleasure? How could one do this without facing the following dilemma: either the device would be treated as if it were not, by its identity with itself, an orientation to something of absolute ethical value; or, by the fact that we reject it in favor of something else, this thing which is an absolute value would be treated as if it were not absolute value. In either case, our evaluation is defective because the place something has in our evaluations, with reference to the status of objects of evaluation as ends or means to ends, is inconsistent with what the thing is in itself.

The device in question is, of course, human sexuality, and the absolute ethical value to whose existence an action using this device is oriented is, of course, a human person. For the status of a human person as an end-in-itself makes the person an absolute ethical value, a thing not to be valued as a means for anything else, but to be valued as an end because of what it is in itself. To remove any ambiguity about the orientation of sexuality to the existence of a human being, let us consider only the case in which conception will result if we do not interfere with it. In that case, the sex act is, by its identity with itself, an orientation to the coming into existence of things other than itself, including a new human being. If we frustrate that orientation we are saying that we can use something that, of its nature, is a means to an absolute value while rejecting that value in favor of some other value.

My obligation not to interfere with this goal of the sex act is not one of justice. I owe no debt of justice to a being that may never exist. If justice were the issue, the obligation would be to bring the new human into existence. In other words, we would be obliged to perform the sex act. On the contrary, the obligation not to interfere with the coming into existence of a new human being only occurs on the hypothesis that I am performing a sex act. For it is only then that preventing conception would imply that I can use the sex act for my own lesser ends even though the act itself is ordered to the existence of something which is an end in itself.

It is important to be clear about where this analysis locates the moral evil in artificial contraception. The evil does not consist in frustrating the primary natural end of a faculty. We have many faculties whose primary function can be frustrated with no moral implications. The frustration becomes morally significant when the natural end of the faculty is something of absolute ethical value. (The absoluteness of the value ipso facto makes it

the primary end of the faculty in a moral sense, but it is its ethical absoluteness, not its primacy in any other sense, that is relevant here.)

The person who prevents conception when engaging in sex, fails to achieve her own ends insofar as a necessary condition for that achievement is to give things a relative place in our evaluations, with respect to being ends and means to ends, identical with the relation that holds between them in reality. The person deserves this failure to achieve her own ends and the partial unhappiness that it brings. Included in that unhappiness is the damage done to her personality by an act that increases her tendency to further selfishness, as well as the deprivation of whatever good would have come to her through the existence of the person who now will never come into existence.

For another example, contrast the case of sacrificing our life for the sake of the lives of others to that of committing suicide to avoid pain. We have already seen why sacrificial death does not require us to treat ourselves as if we were not ends in ourselves. But if we choose death to a life of pain we are implying, in our evaluations, that the existence of a being free from pain is ontologically higher than the existence of a being capable of selecting the ends of her own existence. In other words, we are treating the existence of an end-in-itself as if it were a means to the existence of a being free from pain, so that if the goal of freedom from pain cannot be reached, the means to that end can be dispensed with.

The final example will show that there are ways short of death that we can evaluate being an end-in-oneself as less than something else we are capable of being. The difference between drug-induced states such as drunkenness, on the one hand, and drug-induced unconsciousness, on the other, is that while drunk we continue to perform activities that would otherwise be under the control of reason and the rational appetite. Drunkenness, however, clouds our reason and therefore restricts our ability to exercise freely chosen rational direction over these activities. Ordinarily, drunkenness contains a threat of injustice, since our sub-rational behavior can affect others at any moment. But consider the person shipwrecked and isolated on a remote island. The possibility of injustice to another is nil. Is her decision to get drunk ethically neutral? No, for the decision evaluates behavior in which she functions as less than an end-in-herself to be preferable to behavior performed as an end-in-herself. Such a decision is defective for the same reason unjust decisions are defective.

### XIII. Conclusion

In contrasting a person as giver of its own ends to things given their ends by the impersonal universe, I do not mean to deny that the universe is the way it is because God so planned it. However, there are many ethical values that can be recognized as such by those who do not know of God's existence. For such values, it is necessary to explain how they are recognized in the absence of knowledge of God's existence. Likewise, for such values, it is necessary to abstract from the existence of the afterlife in discussing retribution.

But for those who know that God exists, examples such as those in Section XII involve justice in a deeper sense than fairness, the sense of giving to each thing what is due it from an appetite adapted to the being of things. What is due an infinitely actual being from a rational appetite is obedience to His will. For He is an ethical absolute, an end-in-Himself, in an infinitely superior way than is a human person. He is an end-in-Himself in the sense of possessing in a superabundant manner all the actuality that is able to become an end for an appetite adapted to being.

## OUT-TAKES BEGIN HERE

If there were no more to say on the matter, the preceding analysis would be sufficient to establish the unconditionality, objectivity, and knowability of ethical obligation. But as a matter of fact, there is still more that can be said. The initial explanation of obligation consisted in identifying it with the fact that a decision was intrinsically oriented to treating things as if their natures had the same relative position in reality that they have in our willed priorities. The reason for pointing to the defect of evaluations not relating things in desire as their natures are related in reality, was to compare defects in evaluations to defects in beliefs: in both cases the defect consists in a lack of identity between that which is an object (of knowledge or evaluation) and what something is as more-than-an-object.

But there is a clear difference between the defective belief and the analysis so far given of defective evaluation. Non-defective belief requires identity between our objects and what things are absolutely, not just relatively to one another. Sometimes the identity required for true belief can be identity between a relation objectified and a relation existing, but the scope of true belief cannot be reduced to that. In order to know that the relation holds, we must know something about what its relata are other than the fact that they are so related. Even if we assume a relation like longer-than is a logical construct, it must be so constructed as to be dependent on what its terms are, and we must be able to objectify what its terms are in order to know the truth of one thing's being longer than another.

Likewise, if identity between objects of evaluation and what things are as real existents is to measure the correctness or incorrectness of evaluations, identity between the relative positions we give things in evaluating them and the relative positions their realities possess must be based on identity between what they are in our evaluations and what they are in themselves absolutely; that is, something is an end-in-itself, it should be evaluated as such. Equality of underlying nature is still a necessary condition for obligation, only not a sufficient condition. That underlying nature gives us the power to choose our own ends. We are not just equal but equal with respect to being free beings, beings whose ends are their own.

In other words, the identity between thing and object that makes which evaluations correct or incorrect is identity with respect to that feature of things that is directly pertinent to our making of choices by which we determine our ends and determine the value of things for us, namely, their feature of being things capable of making choices by which they determine their ends and determine the value of things for themselves. An evaluation can identify a person with being an end in herself just as a belief can. When there is identity in reality between a thing that is so evaluated and a thing that is an end, the evaluation is good, just as the belief that the thing is an end in itself is true. When a person is evaluated as a means, the evaluation is defective for the same reason that the belief that the person is not an end in herself is defective: there is no identity in reality between what the thing is and what a mere means is.

If I subordinate her interests to mine, I am making myself the determiner of the ends for which her actions are or are not intended. Just as I intend an end for which my actions are means, I intend an end for which I want her actions to be means, or I intend that her actions not be means for a particular end. Thus, my decision treats her as if she were not the determiner of the ends her actions are intended to achieve. For example, she takes an examination intending to get a job. In deciding to cheat, I do not just deprive her of that end, I deprive her of the opportunity to pursue that end, and I impose on her actions my intention that those actions not really be steps that can lead to a job if her abilities are superior to mine. In my evaluations, she is not treated as the determiner of the ends her actions will be a means to. And therefore, my evaluation of her is defective since she is being treated as if she were not what she is, namely, a being that does determine the ends she will pursue.

My evaluation of her is defective if she is not evaluated as someone whose ends are her own, just as mine are. I am consciously treating her as if she is not a being whose ends belong to her as being under her control. When I evaluate a subhuman thing as a means, I am not treating a thing whose being gives it the power to determine its own ends as if its being were not what it is.

What could another's freedom be a means to? If they freely choose to help us they become a means, but by the very fact that we may have convinced them to freely help us, their status as ends has not been violated. Aspects of their beings other than their wills can become means to our ends against their will. But it would be contradictory for their will to become a means to anything except through an act of that will, that is, a free choice. (Still, we can trick someone into making a choice that aids us and, ultimately, hurts them. But any of our free choices can ultimately hurt us, even the most ethical choices, due to our limited knowledge. The evil of tricking someone comes precisely from our manipulating her knowledge and, thus, treating her as if she were not an end in herself, that is, depriving her of what she needs, knowledge, to choose her ends and pursue those chosen. The objector may want to say that she is not aware of denying that the other person has free choice. We don't deny this at the level of belief. The fact that we believe it is precisely what makes treating the other as a means defective.) It is contradictory for a power of free choice to unfreely become a means to something else. Therefore we are treating them as if they were not what they are if we treat them as a means.

(But what about angels and God, ends in themselves whose natures are higher than ours? And what about God? Is He only an end in Himself because He has free choice? Hardly. And when we lose free choice in the beatific vision, do we cease being ends in ourselves? No. In fact, we are lesser ends than God because we have free choice, in the sense that we have freedom because we have not yet attained our end.

The choice as an act of the rational appetite is directed to a consciously apprehended state of affairs to be brought into real existence and, hence, it is directed to real relations that will be brought about between consciously apprehended real existents. The state of affairs it is directed to is a state of action on my part, a consciously apprehended state of action in which I am apprehended as treating the other equally or not; it is directed to a consciously apprehended situation in which things apprehended as equal in nature are treated as if they really were equal in nature or not. For the choice is directed to relations between things apprehended as having a relation of equality, yet it is directed to a situation in which they have apprehended relations of inequality. There are all sorts of inequalities outside the level of nature, but the choice introduces an inequality with respect to being equal in being ends in themselves, with respect to being equal as things in pursuit of freely chosen ends. The choice introduces an inequality with respect to the pursuit of freely chosen ends. Yet rational choice of an end is choice made in consciousness that we are equal with respect to being things in pursuit of freely chosen ends. The choice consciously treats them as if they were not things equal with respect to being things in pursuit of freely chosen ends. I can treat a dog this way without the defect of treating him as if it was not what it is.

The value, goodness, of my choice has to be measured by its fulfillment of the ends of the other's nature just as much as it is measured by the fulfillment of the ends of my nature, because the natures are precisely the same in this respect. The ends of the other's nature are, first of all, the end of making its own choices; this is the first act toward which the nature tends. It is therefore the first end, by which I do not mean the ultimate end or the first from the point of view of that for which everything else exists, for example, the beatific vision or Aristotle's intellectual contemplation. To achieve those, we both have to make free choices. And if a choice interferes with the ends of her nature by depriving her of pursuit of freely chosen ends, the choice is invalid relative to the ultimate ends of my nature because it is the same nature, existing in two subjects, for the fulfillment of which nature her choice and mine exist. Hence the choice must be measured correct or incorrect by the fulfillment of the ends of her nature as well as mine. The whole meaning of my choice's existence is its relation to the fulfillment of the ends of a nature, and the same nature exists in another.

Only persons exist for their own sake, for the sake of achieving ends that they give themselves. You exist for the sake of whatever your ends are. Only persons cause their ends to be their ends. So only persons exist for the sake of something that they cause to be that for the sake of which they exist. Only persons exist for their own sake. They exist for the sake of selecting that for the pursuit of which they exist.

Is not morality also subordinated to finality because the goodness of a decision is measured by its attainment of an end? Because of its subordination to finality, my account can produce only hypothetical values: if you are oriented to end X, you should make decision Y. Most fundamentally, something becomes a value for us only by becoming related to some desire; that is a necessary truth. Therefore the concept of a value that is both unconditional and objective is contradictory. What is objective is the fact that we do indeed have certain interests, but these give rise only to conditional imperatives. What is valued must always be valued by its relation to something else, namely, to some desire. Fulfillment of desire, the achievement of a desirable state of consciousness, is, by definition, the final cause of all behavior.

The orientation to an end, however, that measures the value of an ethical decision, is intrinsic to the ethical decision itself. In other words, an ethical decision is such an orientation, an orientation to treat things as if the comparative perfection of their natures was identical with the comparative place we give them in our evaluations. To say that it has such an end is simply to say an ethical decision has morality for its end, has conformity to obligation for its end. Yes, the reason it is defective is that it does not achieve the end of treating them identically with what they are, but that is to say it does not achieve the end of doing what it should do.

This no more subordinates morality to finality than the fact that a thing is known only insofar as it is known reduces knowledge to being about the relation of things to our consciousness and prevents knowledge from being measured by what things are in themselves.

It might seem inadequate for my analysis to say that ethical decisions treat things as if they were that way. That is, this might seem inadequate as a basis for measuring decisions as defective. For since they cannot avoid treating them in this way, it seem they cannot avoid succeeding in treating them as if they were such and such. But belief also succeeds in putting me in relation to things as if they were such and such. But for me to be in relation to things as if they were such and such when they are not such and such is a defect for me and a defect for the act which succeeds in putting me into a relation, or in itself establishing a relation, for which there is an intrinsic claim of non-defectiveness but which is defective. Belief claims to put me in relation to what things are; it succeeds in making that claim but is defective if the claim is not true. Decision does put me in relation to what things are since, unlike belief, my actions affect things. And decision puts me in relation to what things are as if they were the way they are positioned in my evaluation. Decision succeeds in putting me in relation to what things are and in claiming, as belief does, that things are the way in puts me in relation to them. Decision implies a claim about what things are as belief does, but decision is even more existential in that it brings me in relation to what they are by acting on them, instead of merely bringing them in relation to me by a relation that does not affect them, cognition.

(\*Later objection: am I moral for the sake of seeking happiness, i.e., is the answer to "Why be moral?" "To seek happiness"?)

## NOTES BEGIN HERE

27794 Title: The Ethics of Realism, Realism and Ethics, Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Ethics from the Point of View of Realism

71986 Start by firmly and adequately describing the situation where the place the other has in my conscious desires is not ID with the place his perfection has as compared to mine in reality. Use no ethical terms to describe this situation. Then start defining ethical terms as in 12881. If you get to a place where you can't go on defining ethical terms, go back and make the non-ethical description more complete.

3779 Title: That's Right. Method: take an act. e.g., fair treatment of another, that all would consider right or at least that is right and that the utilitarian would analyse as right on his principles. Then show the reason it is right is the intrinsic value of the act for a rational being as known and freely willed by that being. (Could do the same thing for act recognized by utilitarians as evil.) That way you avoid having to come up with a norm for morality first of all. Rather norm for possible extension to other cases (but you will not have to show how it can be done) will emerge from the analysis. Big things are reason's recognition of equal value of other and fact that we are defective if we do not direct act by knowledge of equal value of other re specific causal situations in question.

8186 Title: Ethics on Planet X. Planet X is not populated by human beings but by two kinds of beings, brutes and another kind who are capable of knowing what things are and of freely giving things a place in our desires according to our knowledge of what things are. The other class are, of course, human beings; and planet X is earth. The non-human beings are unequal in all respects except for the genetically transmitted possession of a nature that is common to the extent of allowing us to know what things are sufficiently to give them a place in our desires according to what they are.

8286 Difference between reason and animal knowledge. Dog sees his master. Dog does not know the truth of propositions about the master. Knowing the truth of factual propositions, we can use necessarily true causal principles to learn not-directly-observable facts about the inner make up of things, the inner make up that allows them to cause the directly observable phenomena by which our senses relate to them.

71986 By the senses we know two things have the same color, speed, etc. The senses alone do not inform us they have the same nature, nor what that nature is. There is a nature objectified by the senses but what it is beyond acting on us is not objectified by the senses. This is what it means to say that the intellect knows natures and the senses do not. The senses do and do not. But there is a definable manner of knowing natures that the intellect has which the senses do not share.

Correction, Ethics Appendix Applying the ID theory of truth to the value assigned to things depends on deriving value from what things are extra-objectively. And that depends on distinguishing what things are accidentally and substantially. It invokes the problem of universals, etc. In short, ethics depends on metaphysics. But it does not follow that one derives ought from is anymore than the truths of science are derived from metaphysics. Metaphysics explains and justifies the methods of science, but one does not deduce the results of that method from metaphysics. So with ethics.

415841 Finnis: the first principles of ethics may be both self-evident and practical. But metaphysics and the philosophy of man can and must defend them indirectly by showing that if they are denied, some truths about human nature are denied also (e.g., that we have free will, can know what things are, have certain natural ends, etc.). This indirect method is how philosophy defends the self-evident truths of logic, math, and the philosophy of nature.

122984 Utilitarianism is much like empiricism with respect to singular judgments. It appears to tell us how we make decisions in particular cases, i.e., add up advantages and disadvantages. But like empiricism, it really deprives us of any basis for judging, as Finnis and Grisez show. Actually, we judge what is harmful or not relative to the nature of those affected and the fact that they are persons, i.e., have the right to what their nature needs.

1229811 Ethical concepts just are what they are. One person can either treat another fairly or unfairly. Treating him unfairly lacks the value due a relation between persons. Treating him unfairly is bad, lacks the value due a relation between persons. Treating him unfairly lacks something which should be there, should characterize rational, i.e., conscious, relations between persons, i.e., these relations should correspond to what we know of the relative intrinsic perfection of two persons, where "correspond" means to be ID with.

128811 The other person's interests are equal to mine. What does this mean? It means in setting priorities, which we physically have to do in order to live, his interests get rated equally with mine in a list of priorities. His interests are as important as mine. If we do not do this, a situation occurs which is lacking something (which we recognize as lacking something); that which is lacking is what we call "good", "goodness", "what should be", "what ought to be". This is not a paradigm case argument. It first points out the existence of something and then notes that this something is the referent of a particular word.

To further clarify the nature of this something, ask: what is the difference (relative to this something which either does or does not exist in a situation and/or which we either do or do not recognize to exist in a situation) between the following cases:

- a) one person accidentally and inculpably killing another (physical evil only, i.e., the good that does not exist--and is recognized not to?--is a physical good only. We must define moral good as a special kind of physical good.)
- b) one person killing another in self-defense when we recognize the characteristic "justice" as an attribute of the self-defense, i.e., just self-defense. Justice and goodness are attributes we recognize to exist and that do exist as characteristics of a person's actions and intentions relative to another person. If the other is means to your ends, goodness does not exist in you action.
- c) one person killing another unjustly--both a physical and a moral evil.

Moral evil consists in one's conscious attitude, or lack of it, to a physical evil, or lack of it. Consciously using the other as a means (don't worry about the obligation to become conscious if you are doing it unawares--all we need here is an example of moral evil, can expand to other examples later) lacks the attribute we call "goodness", "what ought to be". Here, goodness is an attribute of a conscious relation--the attribute of assigning value to interests (his or mine) according to the relative being (formal cause) involved (i.e., the terms of the relation are equal in being, hence in value.) Value is a response to what exists intrinsically in the terms of the relation. (A response to the object, Von Hildebrand.)

Why are we obligated to do that in which we find goodness? Don't confuse questions. This question is valid but different from what is this thing we find when we find goodness. Obligation is another attribute we find in relations, intentions, etc.

To choose evil is to direct one's goals, desires, etc. away from what is ontologically good for us, from the being whose intrinsic characteristics are good for us, to reject this. In that situation, we find an attribute we call not deserving goodness, not having earned it by placing one's happiness there rather than elsewhere. He is a being whose orientation, desires, wants, are away from goodness and freely so. This situation has what we call not deserving goodness.

Deserving and not deserving just mean the following kind of situation: I am oriented or not oriented toward what is good, and I am the free cause, ultimate cause, of the orientation. If I am the ultimate cause of my orientation away from true happiness and if I could have caused the opposite orientation--that is what not deserving means, what it is.

Value = the intrinsic characteristics of a thing by which (causal, final causality) it terminates a relation of desire--not just the terminating of a relation of desire, but the intrinsic characteristics which terminate the relation, that more-than-a-term-of-a-relation of desire which all terms of desire relations must be in order to be the causal terms of such relations.

We judge the good or evil of desires (of the place we give things in desire, their objectification) by their correspondence to the intrinsic characteristics (of the desirer and desired) involved.

Why is reason the norm of morality? Because goodness, justice, etc. are attributes of rational acts, acts taken in knowledge of what things are (or in the absence of knowledge that should be there).

Someone treats another unfairly. We recognize this as unjust because lacking in a due evaluation of the value of the other's interests relative to our own (as compared to our own). Evaluations are due the ontological content of that which is being evaluated--or, rational evaluations are so due since based on knowledge of what things are. An evaluation of the other as equal to me is due him on the basis of what he is. Because evaluation, a relation of desire, terminates in being, in that which is more than a term of a relation of desire and which is prior to the desire that that which causes is causally prior to its being a term of desire.

Obligation is simply the fact that a certain evaluation is owed the thing simply by knowing what the thing is. (owed = my conscious evaluation is defective as a conscious evaluation if the relative place I give it in my conation is not ID with the relative place its being gives it. Why? because my desires, conations, terminate in that which is more-than-an-object-of-desire, terminate in what things are as more-than-objects-of-desire. Contrast the case of beings whose consciousness does not objectify the nature of things, e.g., animals, their desires are not defective if the place they give things is not ID with the place things have in se. In some sense, animals know, objectify, natures, what things are, but they do not objectify them as such, they objectify them as acting on the senses but not as being ID with an objective concept whose content is a certain nature known, not just as causal term on action, but for what is is as a mode of being.

\*If I fail to evaluate him equally to myself, I consciously choose against (what I know) the ends of my nature. The end of my nature is to seek good for the sake of good, i.e., because its intrinsic perfection (not its benefits for my ends) is known. If I fail to seek good for the sake of good, if I seek something as satisfying my subjective desire, I make myself, the ontological seat of the desire, the highest value, I evaluate myself as higher. Seeking my end is not the same as evaluating myself as higher. When evaluating things as they really are, I am seeking that which the end of my nature happens to be--but I do not seek it for the sake of being the end of my nature; I seek it for itself.

In evaluating things for their own sake, I am doing what is required to achieve happiness. I do it (efficient cause) because my nature is oriented to an end (final cause moves efficient cause) and oriented to an end = oriented to achieving an end = oriented to happiness. (A thing is known only insofar as known, desired only insofar as desired.) \*The formal constituent under which the end is evaluated is not that of satisfying desire, that which is first known is not that something is known. A thing is evaluated, made an object of desire, according to the being knowledge presents to the faculty of desire, according to that by which it is more-tha, prior-to, an object of desire.

\*To make myself my end is to evaluate the ontological being I have prior to my desires as the highest good intrinsically (As a rational being, I direct actions by knowledge. But I know the other as equal, hence I fail to direct action by what I know; I consciously direct action contrary to what I know.), as being due this place in my desires.

\*In evaluating the other as higher or equal, I am pursuing my end and, therefore, happiness. But I can do it because I am obligated to, because pursuit of my end is owed my being (and owed the other being, e.g., God). The goal of my being, which as a matter of fact brings happiness, is that of evaluating things according to their intrinsic perfection, the intrinsic characteristics which are able to terminate relations of evaluation, relations of making it an object of desire.

12288110 Given that A exists with some intrinsic characteristics and that B, a power of desiring things, of evaluating things, according to knowledge of what things are intrinsically, then A is owed a certain evaluation by B. That is what we call being "owed" a certain evaluation. And B does not just relate to what A is but relates according to knowledge, consciousness, of what A is, so that the evaluation is a conscious act. B knows what he is doing re A. B owes it to A to consciously evaluate A in a certain way; A is owed a certain conscious evaluation by B.

B knows that A deserves it, and that is what we call deserving. B knows the intrinsic reality of A. And B has a conscious power of, and is conscious of, a power of desiring things, evaluating things, according to their intrinsic reality. To deserve is to have an intrinsic reality to which a certain conscious desire corresponds. That is what we call deserving, to have the reality to which a certain evaluation is appropriate, is due, a reality such that this evaluation is what the rational evaluation is, what the natural conscious evaluation is.

What makes an evaluation correct or incorrect? What makes truth? ID of thing and object. I evaluate him as unequal = lack of ID between relative positions as objects of desire and as intrinsic perfections. What makes correct? ID between relative positions as objects of desire and intrinsic perfection, ID between statuses as objects of desire and intrinsic perfection.

I pursue happiness by making the good, not my happiness, most important in my desires. In making the interests (finality) of the other my object, I am pursuing my own finality, but I am not thereby reducing the other to being an object of my finality anymore than I reduce the known to an object of knowledge. The "relational fallacy", the "terminative fallacy" (more general than the epistemological fallacy): What is known is, as such, more than what is known, what is desired is, as such, more than what is desired, not just what is desired but something desired precisely because of that in it which is not just that which is desired.

1228819 It is correct to point out that the known is known only insofar as known is a harmless truism, but that is not enough to point out. We must also see that the causal analysis of knowledge requires the object to be more than the "known" in order to be known. Likewise, the causal analysis of desire requires the object of desire to be desired precisely as more than what is expressed by "object of desire". Even when something is desired because giving subjective pleasure, what is desired, the satisfaction of an appetite, is more than what-is-desired. To choose the satisfaction of desire is to evaluate the subject of the desire as deserving to have its appetites satisfied, as intrinsically worthy of having appetites satisfied. If not, Maritain is right, there is no intrinsic value. Pleasure is an intrinsic value (utilitarianism) only as the pleasure of a subject capable of pleasure and deserving to have pleasure, i.e., of having an appetite fulfilled.

no date Do we measure the value of things by relating them to human desires? No. Human desires relate us to things. Human desires are measurements of the value in the thing, i.e., we place a value on the thing because of what it is, i.e., we estimate its worth, we evaluate its true worth, we evaluate it. That is what a desire is--an evaluation of the thing. Measurement does not come after the desire and in relation to it; desire is a relation of measuring thing thing. Desire = a measure relative to that which is measured-- a correct or incorrect measurement. It is not self-evident that if x has this place in our desires, that is the place it should have. We measure one intrinsic value by another, e.g., his interests as compared to mine, not two intrinsic values as relative to my interests.

52086 Based on what we are, we cannot avoid making judgments about the comparative value of things, value based on what they are. Because we cannot avoid knowing what things are and choosing on the basis of that, we cannot escape being under ethical obligation, we cannot escape the ought. In knowledge, the object is ID with what something is, with what exists. 'Object' in knowledge is replaced by 'value' in ethics. The comparative value we assign things may or may not be ID with the comparative perfection of their essences as they exist extramentally.

4385 Conceptual relativism says the content of our beliefs about things is not what things are intrinsically, but is a structure we impose on things. Likewise, ethical relativism says the value of things is not what things are intrinsically but is what we impose on them. In desiring, we relate them to our desires (note tautology and circularity); in judging, we relate them to our conceptual schemes. Just as concepts can reveal what things are intrinsically, so we can value things as they are intrinsically.

22786 How do I tell what is right and what is wrong? Well, what am I doing when I judge right from wrong, e.g., when I say 'Hitler was wrong to...' or 'It is wrong to cheat on exams'. What I am doing will determine how I can tell. How does judging that cheating is wrong compare to judging that water freezes at 32 degrees F? (I judge the latter on the basis of causal relations.) To say the latter is false would be to say that there is a lack of ID between object and thing. Likewise, cheating is wrong says that intentional cheating involves a lack of ID between what things are as things and what they are as objects of our conscious activity, of our desires, our intentions. To say something is wrong is to say that consciously performing some action denies something (some person, thing, action, event, process, state of affairs) in our conscious desires a value that it has a thing or gives it a value it does not have as a thing. What determines the value a thing, action, or event has in itself as a thing, how does our knowledge determine what this value is? Ontologically, the entity is either an intrinsic value, an end in itself, or is connected with an intrinsic value either necessarily or de facto in these circumstances? How do we determine that value in our knowledge? In judging that water freezes at 32 degrees, we use necessary causal truths to interpret that which we experience. What truths play this role in ethics?

416841 Finnis, p. 303, something like 'Everyone has reason to value the interests of others as much as his own'. What is that reason, and what is it to 'value'? The reason has nothing to do with my self-interest. The reason is my knowledge of the equality of the intrinsic perfection of the two natures.

And to 'value' is to give them a relative place in my desires. But it is they, identical with themselves, that come to have such a place. That which is valued is ID with something more than an object of desire. The value is ID with the intrinsic perfection they have as more-than-values, more-than-objects-of-desire. I do not value them equally because it is good for me to do so, because it fulfills my ends. The act of valuing them equally is good for me because it corresponds to the intrinsic perfection that exists extra-objectively.

11085 Does the diacritical theory give only hypothetical imperatives, i.e., if we want ID between object of desire and what is? We are obligated to seek this ID. Why? If we do not, we freely lack an ontological value called for by our nature. We knowingly and freely lack an ontological value called for by our nature. Is that what we call obligation? If so, is it based on the finalities of our nature?

65841 Jesse says he has criteria to judge between different viewpoints, human nature. But is human nature just a brute fact, i.e., if it were different, the results of deciding between conflicting viewpoints would be different? Or does human nature impose synthetic a prioris a la Kant? It is a brute fact that we are capable of knowing the natures of things and of judging their objective value on that basis.

617841 An intrinsically evil act is one that it is impossible to knowingly choose without giving some value a relative place in our desires that it does not have in reality, e.g., giving our pleasure a higher place in our desires than our responsibility to others (give something a place relative to the goals of my nature that it does not have in reality?).

1218831 We measure the value of means relative to our ends. But the goal of an intelligent being is ID with what things are, ID known as such. The senses are (partly) ID with what things are. \*But the sense do not know their ID with what things are. Therefore, intelligent evaluations are measured as good or bad (as opposed to true or false) by the ID or lack of ID between the value they place on things, or the place they give things in our desires, and the value things have in themselves, the relative place their realities have in themselves. The relative degree of perfection in their natures. Identity between what the thing is in itself and that which our evaluations imply the thing is in itself, imply about the intrinsic reality. (So ethics = according to reason, i.e., intelligence.)

Goal of the intelligent is to give things a place in desires ID with value contained in se. The goal of the intelligent as such is to esteem, appreciate, value the perfection, the being, the actuality of things for what they are. The intelligent knows its ID with what things are. And if he values things differently, he knows his lack of ID between things and his values, because he knows his conscious ID with what things are. The value of things for an intelligent being is not different from what things are just as the known, the objectified, is not different from what things are, is logically distinct only. For example, if the place of an absolute perfection in my desires were its relation to my happiness made end, made object desired, the value of the absolute perfection would not be ID with what it is in itself.

122841 Just as the object is ID with what things are when the intellect is true, the value is ID with what the desired thing is extra-desiredly, appetite-independently, extra-valuationally, when the intellectual appetite is good. Of a thing whose nature is less than mine, I am not bad if I value it as less than me (if I use it as a means for my ends). Of something whose nature is equal to mine, I am bad if the value I place on it is less than the value I place on myself. The relative valuation is bad because of the non-relative value each is in itself, the non-relative perfection each is extra-valuationally.

122843 How can values be intrinsic if they are objects of subjective desires. By some metaphysical miracle or sleight of hand, by some metaphysical contrivance? No, just because values are ID with what things are; that's all. Just because things are what they are and intelligent beings know the ID between objects and what things are, between intellect and what things are. Hence, even example that looks most relative, i.e., the relative evaluation of two things, reveals the intrinsicity of value, because relative value must be ID with the relative perfection of what the two things are.

undated Values are not relative to human desires. Human desires are relative to perfections in things. That which is known is not relative to knowledge, knowledge is relative to it. The value of thing X is not relative to human interests. The value of decision X is not its fulfillment of human desires.

119781 Happiness is a result of achieving an end; it is not necessarily the end we seek. It is the fulfillment of our desire for something, but the state of fulfillment of our desire for something is not necessarily the same as the something we desire. (Infinite regress otherwise; the reason the opposite appears true is that one faculty, e.g., the will, can choose the fulfillment of another faculty as its end, the end that makes it happy.) Food brings an animal contentment, but it is food he desires, not contentment. Desire is not a desire for fulfillment of desire anymore than knowledge is only of knowledge. 'Desire for fulfillment of desire' is tautological, a pleonasm. The desire for X is the same as the desire for the fulfillment of the desire for X. The fulfillment of the desire for X is not X, but it is happiness.

It is even misleading to say 'desire an end'. 'End', 'goal', is an extrinsic denomination like 'object of knowledge' or any other object description. We desire that which is our end under the title, not of end, but of God, interpersonal relations, etc. We no more desire it under the title of 'end' than what is first known about something is that it is known.

What is that which we desire? Fulness of being, plenitude of actuality, that our actions be characterized by goodness, by the actuality and perfection which fulfills the ontological tendency of our nature. What mode of being fulfills the ontological tendencies of our nature and thus is the mode of being describable by the extrinsic denomination 'end' or 'goal'? Free acts proportioned to what we know about the nature of realities affected by our acts and the relative values of the natures of things affected--relations of nature of our...to tendencies of the nature of another and the relation of each thing to its ends, i.e., end in itself or not. Actions governed by the object (goal) of our intellect, knowledge of what things are.

Our nature is intelligent. Our goal as intelligent beings is to know what things are. Our goal as free beings is to act in accord with knowledge of what things are. If an action bestows on things (ourselves and those our actions affect) relations contrary to those bestowed by their natures and the tendencies of their natures and their own relation to the tendencies of their natures, our actions are defective; and we are defective. We know what things are. And what things are constitutes that which terminates extrinsic denominations like 'goal', 'value', 'end'. That which anything is an intrinsic value. Calling it value relates it to another but that which is named a value is not the relation, it is the term of the relation (object and thing are identical). Do our actions recognize the intrinsic perfections that constitute the value of things?

\*Our goal as free beings is action governed by what we know about the natures of things. For that which is so known, natures, bestow on things values, constitute values, relative to the tendencies of other natures. And so they constitute values independently of our knowledge of those natures, previously to our knowledge of those natures, and independently of our freely chosen desires. And when we freely choose, the nature of things will terminate desires, will be that which is our freely chosen value. But that which is our freely chosen value will either be our value independent of choice or it will not be, be that which fulfills tendencies independent of knowledge or choice, or it will not, be or not be the perfection, the being, which is what fulfills the ontological desires. If not, we are defective.

But is last point circular? That which is chosen will or will not be that which fulfills desires. But we were answering the question what being fulfills our desires. Answer: action in accord with what we know of natures = of what we know of the being that does or does not fulfill pre-cognitive desires or tendencies. So maybe not circular.

Good is that which is sought, happiness results from achieving the doing of good. Happiness is not the end anymore than existence is definable as that which is true. Truth is an effect of existence, happiness of goodness.

12811 An incorrect evaluation says the intrinsic perfection of A is more worthy of desire than B. Worthiness is not a property of A; it is a property of the nature of desire as a faculty oriented to the intrinsic perfection of things, as knowledge is. \*To say A is more worthy of desire = has more intrinsic perfection (worthy of rational desire, i.e., desire based on knowledge of what things are), has more of that which it is the nature of desire to value, esteem, appreciate, i.e., perfection. That-which-is-to-be-esteemed corresponds to that-which-is-objectified-in-knowledge, where what is objectified in knowledge is something more than what is objectified.

To desire does not mean to grasp for ourselves. The power to desire is the power to admire, esteem, appreciate, love, choose, e.g., to choose to live for the other--to worship, to adore, to respond to the perfection in the other, honor the perfection in the other. We have a power such that we can love something because it deserves to be loved, is worthy of love, merits love, and because we know it deserves love.

117821 What does it mean to love God for Himself (the power of desire is the power to love, to love the good of the other)? It means to will that He be, and to will that He have the perfection He has, to assent to His having His perfection, to be happy that He is and has His goodness, to be satisfied that He does. (Here, assenting, etc., is not aesthetic; it is an act that directs action, either the action of adhering to God totally in the beatific vision or the act of taking the means necessary to reach God.) The act of doing this gives Him a value that corresponds to the perfection He has. The act that evaluates Him contrary to His intrinsic perfection lacks what an evaluation should have. To lack this is for the act to be defective, to not be what it should be.

It is up to my freedom to place such an act. This is what we call "obligation", that is all there is to obligation: acts we freely choose can be deficient or not. To say that knowingly doing X is deficient is to say we are obligated not to do X. We are obligated to do X means we are responsible for whether an act is deficient in value or not.

\*Whether an act is bad, lacking what is due it, does not depend on a condition like "If X is your end, you must do Y". A particular evaluation is due God because that is what He is and that is what evaluation is, i.e., giving it a value in our choice ID with the perfection it is in itself. Knowing that a particular evaluation is due God is what is meant by being obligated to evaluate God this way. We are also obligated when we do not know the evaluation is due, if our lack of knowledge is the result of a previous failure to evaluate something according to the value we then knew it was due.

117822 Knowing that a particular evaluation is due God--knowing that a particular evaluation based on what He is, based on knowledge of what He is: To know that evaluation X is the evaluation based on what He is is to know it is the evaluation due Him by a being capable of evaluating things based on knowledge of what they are. To not do so is to fail of our end, but we are obligated to pursue our end. Our end is making Him object of evaluation X, and we are obligated to do so and hence obligated to pursue our end. We don't physically have to, but if we don't, we don't deserve our end, e.g., we deserve to have all our ill-gotten goods taken away.

27791 Can I define 'value' independently of the definition of the good as the desirable, i.e., as final cause? No, but I need not. Given the definition of the good as what is desired, I can say value is that which is desired looked at from the point of view of the term of the relation of desire rather than from the point of view of the bearer of the desire. Value is the intrinsic state of actuality possessed by the desired which constitutes it the desired, i.e., the intrinsic state of actuality which terminates (as extrinsic formal cause) the relation of desire, the perfection which calls forth desire, merits desire, is the reason for which it is desired, provokes desire (cf. Von Hildebrand in Transformation in Christ on value being in the object).

Thus, if I seek my own good in preference to someone else's, if I do not treat him equally, I imply his intrinsic perfection is not equal to mine, does not merit desire equally. (That is what 'meriting' desire is.) Clearly, it does not call forth desire equally from the subjective point of view. But I imply there is something in my intrinsic perfection such that, from this point of view, I merit desire more than he, that the difference in desire corresponds to, and is terminated by, a difference in intrinsic perfection. (The reason I imply this--and the dog does not--is that I have knowledge of what we are and my desires are based on knowledge.) And since I know this is not true, my treating him unequally is a defective act from the point of view of the orientation of my nature to fulfillment. For my nature is that of a rational being who knows these values and whose fulfillment consists in acting according to what he knows.

Natural law is a participation in divine reason which structures things as ordered to ends. But divine reason is identical with God who is absolute intrinsic perfection, so natural law obliges by the intrinsic value (perfection) it objectifies. In obeying it, I am indirectly relating myself to the absolute value intrinsic in God.

27793 What does it mean that a value deserves desire or merits it? Is not this a matter of the subjective makeup of the one doing the desiring? But our subjective makeup is one that can relate to things because of what they are intrinsically, what must be true of them if they are to exist, unlike sense knowledge which knows them as acting on us and that is all. I know the intrinsic perfection that constitutes things what they are. The intrinsic perfection of a person call for me to will his good along with mine.

My desire, in other words, is based on knowledge of what things are in themselves, not just--as in sense knowledge--as affecting me. The intrinsic nature of persons calls forth love from me, respect from me. My subjective nature enables me to appreciate the intrinsic value of others. \*If I value self above others I am responding to known intrinsic perfections, but not according as I know them. I know persons to be ends in themselves, but I do not respond to them as ends in themselves or as equals. I have the power to so respond because I know the equality of the intrinsic perfections, but I do not bestow worth on the basis of what I know. Still, I am bestowing worth on myself only because I know myself, so I am being double-minded.

When I do admire, value, desire things known intellectually for what they are, I am responding to a call for admiration in the thing. For that is what my will is, an intellectual appetite, a power to respond to known intrinsic perfection by admiring it, respecting it, etc. But the will is free, and I can negate what I know of some things or part of what I know.

The phrase 'calls for' is in our vocabulary because we have experience of the will responding to known intrinsic perfection. Still, it is not subjective. The will responds to admirability, desirability, etc., found in the thing. These are extrinsic denominations like 'being-known', but what is known is ID with something more-than-known.

Similarly, what-is-desired is ID with something that has an internal constitution independent of the fact of desire. 'Desired', 'admired', etc. name that-which is desired, provokes desire.

21879 In judging that it is wrong to treat equals unequally in the human sphere, we perceive a value in each of the humans that are equal, we perceive in them something that calls forth equal respect. For respect is by its nature relative to an object; it is a kind of intentionality = object-directedness. In dealing with objects, we imply that there is something in them that does or does not call forth respect, call forth respect on the basis of what each object is. We imply this because we know what objects are and because we deal with them according to our knowledge of what they are (and because we are conscious beings). \*We, as a matter of fact, show respect for some things and not others in our behavior. We say: what this thing is terminates a relation of respect, I respect this for its characteristic F or G. So its characteristic F or G is such as to call forth respect; and we are saying by our action that it is 'worthy' of respect, that it is of a nature to call forth respect.

But if two values are perceived to be worthy of the same respect and we do not treat them as such, our actions say (since they are actions of conscious beings whose nature is to act according to what they know) they are not equal. We lie to ourselves and imply we do not know they are equal though we do know it. (We use some other part of our knowledge) And hence we are defective for not being rational and acting according to values perceived to be true. We fail of rationality by putting ourselves in a state of self-deceit.

35792 'Measurement' of value: does the set of intrinsic characteristics of this act as an act freely and consciously chosen constitute that which I exist for, that which fulfills the tendencies of my nature? Do the intrinsic characteristics conform to the moral ideal? Conforming to the moral ideal or natural law does not make the value extrinsic, for it is by intrinsic characteristics that it does or does not conform. Law or ideal tells us what kind of intrinsic characteristics an act must have (a thing belongs to a class because of what it is). Moral obligation comes from an objective relation between what I am (intrinsic nature) and what the act is (intrinsic nature). I cannot help being a man, so obligation is imposed on me, nor can I prevent the act from being the kind of act it is. So if I do it, I necessarily become a bad man and, at the same time, deprive myself of happiness to a certain degree or in a certain respect.

34792 Finality is predominant in the order to action but not in the order of moral specification, in reason's determining the moral goodness of an act. In the latter, value is predominant. End predominates = utilitarianism. Criteria of value, norms, = judgments of value (reason) = Criterion not 'achieving happiness' but 'accomplishing natural obligation' = has the value for which our nature exists, which our nature is ordered to.

Nature, for instance, is ordered to action taken in cognizance of the equality of the value of other free beings. 'Taken in cognizance' = directed by cognizing of ('considerate' actions), not directed by accidental features, e.g., pleasures. Obligation = knowledge that nature exists for action taken in cognizance of equal value or taken in cognizance of what our nature exists for, i.e., the value of acts, intrinsic value of acts. Practical judgments = measured by natural law and in turn measure the goodness of particular acts.

71986 I treat him unfairly, put my desire to pass the test ahead of his interest in passing the test and ahead of his abilities, ahead of other's interests in knowing who has more ability, etc. I consciously imply that my interests are more important than his on some objective scale of importance, by some objective scale of importance, in reality, according to what we are extra-objectively.

71386 Sure, that which is valued is ID with what something is. But the question is why do we value it? Why does the (future) roast pig not value sugar-cured ham? So ID theory of value appears not to escape subjectivism.

But what if the valuation is free. I value X because I knowingly decided to give X this place in my values, the place in my values that it has. Then I am responsible for whether the comparative place it has in my volitional life if ID with the place what-X-is has in reality as compared to other values. Also, what if there is a faculty of valuation designed to respond to the intrinsic perfection of things. Then the fact that in valuing X I was seeking happiness (fulfillment of my finality) would be as irrelevant as "a thing is known only to the extent that it is known".

718176 Happiness is not our end. An end is an object of knowledge that we value. To say we are seeking happiness is not to say we objectify our happiness in knowledge and place a value on it higher than on other objects of knowledge.

\*Our goal, our happiness, is accomplished principally by our freely giving things a place in our evaluative life that is ID with their comparative position outside of our evaluative life--or ID with what they are outside of our evaluative life. Thus, if something is infinitely perfect in itself and we give it a lower position in evaluation or do not treat it as such in evaluation, we ipso facto fail to attain our happiness for we have freely rejected a necessary means to our happiness. In this case, we fail to achieve happiness because we don't deserve it. That is what not deserving it (or deserving it) consists in, namely, achieving it is principally a matter of our freely treating things as they are, according to what they are.

So there is an objective measurable way of saying 'this choice is deficient' because it fails of ID between what a thing's perfection is and the place that perfection is given in our desires by this choice. And if we freely choose evil, we don't deserve happiness because we have freely rejected the necessary means to happiness. In other words, our failure to achieve happiness (or our achievement of it) is our own responsibility.

117862 How do we decide what is right and wrong? What actions are good and bad? Our decisions, as a matter of fact, give comparative evaluations of the intrinsic values of things. In all cases of moral choice, a comparative evaluation is involved. The beatific vision is not a comparative evaluation, but it is also not a moral choice. We ask, what is the comparative evaluation I give the intrinsic perfection of things if I make this choice or make the opposite choice, e.g., if I choose my pleasure over his need or if I choose to use sex for a lesser end than human existence.

Our decisions give comparative evaluations of things, i.e., our freely chosen actions, or our actions insofar as they are freely chosen, or insofar as they are directed by our conscious thinking. For we evaluate things by making them ends to be pursued or not. The comparison is not just aesthetic comparison. The difference between aesthetic comparison and making them ends is precisely the difference between aesthetic comparison and moral choice. Aesthetic comparison is not free. Free choice concerns goals not yet attained. Even if action is not imminent, going beyond aesthetic appreciation, say, of sex, to giving the object a certain place in our moral value system is giving it a place in ends to be pursued by action if you had the chance or if other things did not interfere.

Nature also enters into determining comparative value to begin with, since two human beings are not equal in any other way than natural kind.

71586 There is something hypothetical about obligation, but it is epistemologically, not morally, hypothetical. That is, there is obligation if I am aware of such and such (not culpably unaware). Being aware that his interests are equal to mine, I know it is wrong to cheat. There is nothing hypothetical about it. Knowing it is wrong is what it means to be obliged, i.e., knowing it is bad to do and I am bad, defective, as a free, conscious being if I do it.

71986 Why am I obligated to value things according to what they are? Because desires are relative to what things are, i.e., desires are oriented to what things are, are a way of relating to what things are, terminate in what things are. Why am I defective? Why are my desires defective if they lack moral goodness, lack correspondence with what things are? Because moral goodness, evaluating things according to what they are, is my end, the goal of my nature. A dog is not defective if its action lacks moral goodness. Not valuing things according to what they are is to deny them their due from me, what is owed them from me, from a being who knows what they are, is capable of desiring them accordingly, and whose nature is ordered to so desiring them as its end.

72186 When I give him a place in my evaluations not ID with the relative place of his intrinsic actuality, my act of evaluating ipso facto fails in what we call our obligation, lacks what we call fulfillment of what is obligatory. For he is denied the evaluation due him, the evaluation he deserves: due him from my power of evaluating things according to my knowledge of what they are, deserved from a power capable of evaluating him according to what he is.

Yes, I am also capable of knowingly evaluating him otherwise than I know him to be. This just means I am capable of failing in justice, in my obligation. \*If I fail to pursue my end of giving a higher reality a higher place, I fail in an obligation when I fail to pursue my end. I am obligated to pursue my end because, if I don't, I knowingly give something else a place higher than it really has. I am obligated to pursue my end because my end is to freely give things their rightful place in my evaluations, to perform acts of giving things evaluations, acts that are not defective because the places given are not ID with what things are. If I do not pursue my end, I knowingly give something the wrong place.

529831 When we are unfair, we assign a relative value to two things that is not ID with the relation that holds between their natures intrinsically. We assign them a place relative to our desires that is not ID with their place relative to one another as determined by their natures. So the rightness or wrongness of a moral decision is determined analogously to truth or falsity in sentences: the ID between what things are as objects of desire and what they are as things. (but there is no ID between what things are as objects and as things--so watch formula)--a place in our desires not ID with the relation that holds between their natures outside of our desires.

419821 'Unfair' -- Equals deserve to be treated equally. What does "deserve" mean? What reality is it that we use this word for? Not to treat him equally is to give his value a place in my desires out of conformity with the real relation between our values. The ends of my being are more important, have more right to fulfillment, claim to fulfillment, than his. His ends are the ends of a being with equal value to mine. His achieving his ends is of equal value to my achieving mine. 'Deserve to be treated equally' = the value of his achieving his ends is equal to my achieving mine. Or he deserves to be punished equally. To not punish the other is to say he deserves it less, to say that punishing X has less value than punishing Y, less intrinsic value. Punishment is owed them equally, due them--lack of achieving ends is due them equally. If not, one has more right to his ends, i.e, the achievement (the failure to deprive him) of his ends is more important in itself.

91585 \*Why be moral? I am obligated to pursue happiness. So why fulfill my obligation to pursue happiness? = Why avoid unhappiness, avoid loss of my happiness, avoid being deprived of my happiness? Why avoid punishment, etc. Answer self-evident. But why avoid deserving loss of happiness, or why do I not only lose it but deserve loss of happiness, deserve unhappiness, punishment, etc. I deserve it because I freely choose against it. So the reason why I should not be happy ( or why I should seek happiness is that I have free will and, therefore, whether I do or not is my responsibility. That is what deserving means, what 'responsibility' and 'should' means. So the reason why I should be moral or why I deserve unhappiness if I don't is the fact, the very fact, that I can not be moral, that I am capable of not seeking happiness. The reason why I have to be moral (to attain happiness and avoid punishment) is that I don't have to (in the sense of causal necessity. (Parageneric 'have to', or rather speculative vocabulary versus practical. I don't have to be moral in the causal sense. I only have to to avoid deserving loss of happiness, to be what I am called to be by nature, to do what my nature demands if unhappiness is to be avoided.

Why do I have to avoid deserving unhappiness. Because it is moral to seek my end, i.e., because it is evil, defective, not to, deficient in a way I am responsible for (but aren't I also responsible for non-moral evil, so what makes moral obligation, value, etc.) Because I am freely, responsibly deficient in a way directly related to my ends (as opposed to being responsible for deficient works of art, for example). That's all it means to be obligated to, to have to, seek my end.

52086 Why be moral? This might mean "Why avoid hell?" Because it will make me unhappy. Or "Why would I deserve hell?" Because I have freely chosen to be without any goodness. Or "Why am I obligated to avoid hell?" = Why is it wrong to seek it, or in what does the moral evil of choosing it consist? The last calls directly for an analysis of the nature of moral evil. The first two follow as consequences from that analysis.

81285 My turn for coffee clean-up comes. I don't do it. If ought does not come from is, what is the point of all the arguments from the others, 'You use the coffee as much as I do', if I do not want to clean up. 'You use it as much as I do, and you are equal to me. Hence...'. But our equality is overruled by my not wanting to do it. 'If you refuse to clean up, so can I; I have as much "right" to.

The fact that we are equal renders my not wanting to bad, evil, deficient in what ought to be there given the fact that our natures are what they are. They are not only equal but include reason, which allows me to know what things are (including their reason and what follows from it). My knowing what things are makes the lack of equality in the action my responsibility.

425841 Good as value versus good as end: When Veatch (at ACPA) defines the good as a fulfillment of a potential, he defines it by value, i.e., no explicit reference is made to the finalities of the being whose potential is fulfilled--no explicit statement is made of the fact that the fulfillment of the potential also fulfills the tendencies, orientations, of the subject, also terminates its orientation to actuality.

But Grisez points out that not all fulfillments of potentialities are morally or physically good. They are metaphysically good, but not either morally or physically good for a subject. A bullet in the heart is a metaphysical good but brings about the absence of what is good for the subject. This distinction refers to the finality of the subject, does it not. Must we not bring in finality to establish what is good for X, i.e., the finalities of X's nature = those perfections which are perfections for X. If so, how is morality based on value, not finality? The rational being's orientation (finality) is to act according to knowledge of what things are and, hence, according to free choices whose morality is measured by what things are.

from card            Why can't we deny other people are what they are in intentions and action as well as in thought? For what is the thought that others do not have rights but a defective state of consciousness. Why defective? Because what is said is not what is. To act in a certain way is to say, 'X is equally or unequally valuable as Y', i.e., we give things a place in our consciousness that either is or is not ID with what they are outside of consciousness, with the relative perfection they possess in themselves, with the value they possess in themselves.

4385                What is valued is ID with some perfection things have. It does not follow that what is valued is valued for its relation to some other thing (our own happiness) we want to obtain. We are seeking happiness, not as the value we measure other values by, but just in the sense that we have a nature seeking completion in action. But those actions value other things for what they are and, as a result, those actions produce happiness. My happiness is not the object I seek, not the end I seek in the sense of an object I place before my consciousness. My nature is fulfilled when I place other objects before me, and then I am happy. So my nature is tending toward self-fulfillment (happiness) when it places before it an object other than myself-as-subject-of-desires.

416843            Why be moral, why do the right thing? We see that the right thing embodies values (perfections) that are desirable, to be desired, to be sought (to be valued)? They are not seen to be good because we desire them, we desire them because they are seen to be good and, hence, are seen to be what 'should be desired (valued), i.e., seen to be good and hence seen to be desirable since the good is that which is desirable, that which is to be sought.

We see that doing wrong destroys the desirable, that which 'should' be desired in the sense of that which is truly desirable, genuinely good, i.e., that whose intrinsic perfection is desirable, and because its intrinsic perfection is the desirable, it should be desired, i.e., if I do not desire it, my desire is defective, i.e., does not correspond to the desirability that is ID with what things are--my desire lacks that which is its normal perfection, natural perfection.

3579                \*Happiness is a mode of being with intrinsic qualities giving it a value. But God is a higher mode of being whose intrinsic perfection gives Him a higher value, so He is more lovable and more loved than human happiness.

35793            Fagothey: If moral value presents itself as an obligation to be carried out, then it presents itself as an end to be attained. For that is the definition of end. So the opposition between value and finality is illusory. Because it fulfills the definition of an end, it does not follow that we do it for the sake of our happiness valued first. On the contrary, if it is an obligation to be carried out, it is ipso facto an end to be attained, i.e., doing it for obligation is the end to be attained. No conflict necessary between teleology and deontology. There is a conflict only if we make utilitarian assumptions about what is intrinsically good a la Aristotle (happiness, desirable state of consciousness, the highest good).

34793 The will tends to good loved for itself. The nature of the will, a faculty of desire, is to love the good for itself, adhere to goodness itself, value. Goodness brings happiness, first of all, because the will loves it. So when it acquires it, the will is happy. Hence, the will loves justice to our fellow men because it loves the value of fellow men for that value's own sake. It will what is good for fellow men because it loves the value of men for that value's own sake.

We even sacrifice our own interests, subjective possession of goods as ends, for the value of acts helping others, ordered to the help of others (even to death)--acts acquiring value from relation to the loved value of others. It is not my subjective good I will in dying for others. It is an act fulfilling my nature because of the value of other subjects which I love cause I am cognizant of what that value is in itself. I do not love it for my sak but for its sake. My happiness results as a matter of fact, not beauce it is willed, but because it consists of loving the value of tohers for its own sake. We long for deliverance from self-love; this is our goal.

128821 The power to love is not eg-centric, it is ego-centrifugal, the power to attach oneself to another, to exist for the other.

To love is not to become the other as other; it is to become the other as self, or rather it is not for the self to become the other, it is for the other to become the self as other, i.e., to become the intentional self.

'Seeking happiness' is not ego-centifical. What we call seeking happiness is simply the fact of tending to the accomplishment for which our nature is designed. The accomplishment for which we are designed and tend by nature is to exist for the other, to love the other for itself, to love goodness for its sake. Such happiness is not ego-centrifical any more than a thing is known only isnssofar as known. A thing is desired insofar as it brings me happiness, yes. But I know the other as such and love the other for its sake. I respond to the value of the other.

22821In order to efficaciously do the morally good thing, I must make the good that which I desire. To choose the good is to make it that which I desire, that which I want to happen. If it is that which I desire, it will, as a matter of fact, bring me happiness. It does not follow that I desire it because I first choose something called happiness and choose other things for its sake. No, I choose the good and ipso facto make it that which makes me happy. I choose the good for its own sake, i.e., I will the intrinsic value of the good as a result of perceiving the intrinsic value. I will the good to exist because it deserves to exist. I make the good chosen for itself my end.

617841 To say we are seeking an end is a statement about the relation of a good to an efficient cause, not whether the good is or is not loved (by the efficient cause) for its intrinsic perfection. The eye is pleased with beautiful sights. On some other planet, there may be totally different seses. But if those beings are also intelligent, their desires are not measured by subjective fulfillment but by what things are--just as the eye is defective if it cannot detect certain variations in wave lengths (color blind).

22379 If I don't treat other persons according to what I know them to be, I deny the value I do perceive there. I deliberately deceive myself. Knowing the value that is there, I deliberately ignore it and act, consciously, as if it were not there. I direct my action by something other than the knowledge of that value which is causally relevant to the action in question.

E.G. I give different grades to equal papers because one student laughs at my jokes. I act as if the papers did not have the intrinsic values they have, the intrinsic characteristic which is relevant to the act of grading because grading is a declaration of the value of the content of a paper. That is the publicly accepted definition of grading and language is public.

My act does not fulfill my nature as a rational being--to act in accord with known value. It is a defective act and a consciously defective act. And it deliberately deprives me of happiness by depriving my act of the perfection that constitutes the fulfillment of the tendencies of my nature. Act defective as mine, and so defective in happiness.

18821 The power of desire is not the power to covet, the desire to have for oneself in the sense that the being of yourself is evaluated as being worthy of having that. It is the power to esteem, to have (love?) for its sake, for the sake of the value seen in the object. It is the power to esteem the value seen in the other. We see that it is valuable. The intrinsic perfection seen is worthy of being valued, is that that it engages our power of valuing known perfection. That which our power of valuing responds to is what is seen in the object. The intrinsic perfection is seen as value (grammatical object) as worthy of response from our power of esteeming. That is what we call 'worthy of response', i.e., is seen as such that our power of estimating does respond, as that more-than-the-term-of-a-power-of-estimating which our power of estimating is able to respond to.

Rather than the power to covet, it is a power to will the good seen, consent to the good seen, surrender to the good seen, consent to is as good, as worthy of being. Not to covet, but to consent to good as intrinsic perfection and what it to be, will it to be, desire it to be because of our valuation of its intrinsic perfection, not of our intrinsic perfection as subject's with desires. To will it to be; say yes to its being, not as a cognitive affirmation, but as desiring it to be because of what it is, not because of what the subject of desire is. Consent to its finalities being equally to be pursued, achieved.

114821 The end is value, value as terminating the relation of that to which an agent tends, that which causes an agent to act, that which an agent is seeking through its action. And if this is what we call 'desire', this tendency to X through action, then desire need not be subjective.

120821 Power of desire is power to respect the value of something, cherish it.

3679

Utilitarianism needs the addition of at least two things: 1) the concept of the value of a person as objectively an end in itself, ie., over and above the subjective end, happiness. Happiness is an intrinsic good because it is happiness due to persons. 2) The concept of human nature and the needs of human nature (essential goals). How else decided which is higher in cases where our happiness comes in conflict with another's happiness (our desires with another's desires? How else decide whether my increase in happiness justifies his decrease, or is more important than his decrease?

Needs (goals, ends) of human nature give an objective standard possibly making some acts, not just consequences of acts, invalid by depriving men of what they exist for, are ordered to. Also, the objective value of persons possible makes some acts, not just consequences, bad. ('Tendency', 'inclinations' too weak. 'Essential goal,' etc. strong enough but past used makes them see, appear to, imply anthropomorphism or, at least, the begging of ethical questions because they have acquired connotations of teleological ethical theories.

12979 The natural tendencies of my essence enter into ethical theory as values without which I am defective and without which I am personally defective if, recognizing these tendencies by reason, I choose contrary to them. Then I am defective because my whole being is directed to values other than those which my nature calls for and because I so direct my whole being freely.

111791 The privation theory of evil say something positively existing is evil, e.g., a blind eye is defective. But what is it that makes this positively existing thing evil, the possession of some actual characteristic? No; the absence of characteristics required for its functions, required for the functions determined by the nature of the thing. An evil will, therefore, can be said to make a whole person a defective person. For the will directs all other faculties towards ends. It directs and determines the function of all other faculties towards the ends of the person. If the will lacks the voluntary direction to ends that it should have, the will is defective and the person's functioning re the ends he should have as a person is defective. So the person is defective as a person, not as a thing but as a free agent. What we mean by calling a person bad is that some free agent, responsible for its own acts, is defective as such, as someone responsible for his own acts. Not defective in the sense of failing to be free, but in the sense of using freedom improperly, that is, freely failing in the ends proper to a free being as a free being.

34791 Value = intrinsic qualitative achievement as worthy of love or desire, as calling for love, deserving love. Human acts are judged morally first by their intrinsic value relative to the tendencies of human nature, not by the value of anything further they achieve (end) relative to the tendencies of human nature. Without regard to further ends to be achieved, we recognize courage, helping the poor, etc. as intrinsically good, or betraying a friend or accepting a bribe as bad. It is reason which grasp them as good or bad = measures them, evaluates them as good or bade.

Free acts are ends. And to judge them as good or evil we judge whether they themselves constitute ends our natures are oriented to. Don't judge them by further ends they achieve or don't achieve.

What is the good that a man is made for: the state of achievement, perfection, that is his value as a rational being? Good acts are measured by reason in its very capacity of tending directly toward the values which constitute the fulfillment of the tendencies of human nature. Act not moral unless taken in awareness of its value.

41841 To say that in making choices we are always seeking happiness is simply to say that choices are the exercise of a fulfillment of the tendency inscribed in the nature of the will. It is not to say that in making a choice we choose happiness as opposed to something else, e.g., God's will, as our end; it is not to say we make ourselves the highest value. It is a statement about the efficient causality of choice, not the final cause. It is not to say that we choose our happiness as the end in relation to which the value of everything else is measured.

It is simply to say that the will has a nature in virtue of which it acts and that the will chooses in fulfillment of the essential structure of its nature, the essential tendency to bring about a state of attempting to procure some specific end, the possession of which will, ipso facto, be our happiness because it will be the possession of our goal. But the goal is not happiness.

41842 'We necessarily seek happiness'. What does this mean? We necessarily seek a state of possession of fulfillment of potencies that now are unfulfilled, a state of possession of goods, of things that satisfy desire. We act out of desire. A desire drives us--truisms. Here the desire is for the possession of some specific end to be procured by actions directed by choice of that specific end. Again, desire drives the efficient cause, a desire for some specific, actual, concentered good.

But the good is not chosen because it fulfills desire as if fulfillment of desire itself were the end chosen. 'Chosen because it fulfills desire' means, because the efficient cause acted according to the design of its nature--design being a tendency aiming at, a tendency toward, fulfillment. But the good chosen 'because it fulfills desire' in this sense--because the will is driven by an aim at fulfillment--is not chosen because it relates to fulfillment as the final cause. Rather, it fulfills desire because it is chosen as final cause for its perfection, because (final cause) of the perfection intrinsic to the state of affairs chosen as end, because of the known perfection intrinsic to the state of affairs we make our end, because of its intrinsic value, not its value as a means to this other value called 'fulfillment of my tendency to happiness'.

The latter implies an infinite regress, efficient cause to final cause, to efficient cause, etc. The concrete state of affairs fulfills my desire because, and only because, it is known to have intrinsic value, it intrinsically deserves a place in my desires higher than my love for self (He who loves his life will lose it). It is not chosen out of self love where self is the end. It is chosen out of a power to love, a power, tendency, that fulfills self by loving things for their known intrinsic goodness.

An ethic of happiness is not an ethic of consequences. 'Will seeks happiness in loving' = will is an efficient cause driven by a tendency to love. But the object of love is not itself. It is a tendency to love things according to their intrinsic perfection. That is where its happiness lies, not in loving things according to their relation to its happiness as that which is loved first.

The end loved is not my enjoyable state of consciousness. My enjoyable state of consciousness results (efficient cause) from loving (final cause) things according to their known intrinsic perfections, loving them because (final cause) of their known intrinsic perfections. So much for utilitarianism. To seek enjoyable states of consciousness is really to love self, to make the intrinsic value of the self higher in my desires than anything else, including intrinsically higher things like the common good or God.

Even true at the sense level. If I am drugged to be pleased by a sense object that would otherwise repel, still it is the object that is now pleasing me. My desires have been altered to relate to the object in a new way; still, they are relating to this object, and not to something else.

329841 To say I am pursuing happiness when I choose God as greater than myself is merely to say that in choosing God I am exercising a mechanism, my choice of God is the act of a mechanism, fulfilling the design of its nature. The choice is an act triggered by the structure of my will. The will is oriented toward acts. My choice results from the will's orientation to certain kinds of acts. For the will to move to action is to pursue its end, and hence pursue happiness. But the action it moves to is that of desiring God above all other values, including the will's pursuit of its ends. Pursuit of end is just the trigger of the efficient cause. That this act brings happiness is just to say that this act is caused by the will's fulfillment of its nature. In choosing, I exercise a tendency identical with the nature of the will. That is seeking happiness, but it is not making happiness the end chosen.

from card If I want something, it need not be the case that I want it because it will give me pleasure; rather, getting it can give pleasure (satisfaction) because I want it. Do animals desire happiness? No, they desire things like food, shelter, sex. Happiness is not that which they desire; it is what results from the attainment of that which they desire.

2579 We desire that which gives happiness, not for the sake of happiness, but for the sake of that itself which gives happiness, for the sake of having that itself which gives happiness. Happiness is unlike pleasure in this respect. We desire that which gives pleasure for the sake of the pleasure. (Really, pleasure can never be the end of any power, but one power can take as end the pleasure of another, for example, I choose--will and intellect--to seek the pleasure of eating.)

But happiness results from the fact that we have fulfilled our desire for something that was desired for its own sake. Having it gives happiness because it was desired, but it was not desired because it would give happiness. It was desired because it is what it is and we are what we are. Finding truth gives satisfaction because it is desired. But truth is not desired just because it gives satisfaction.

410841 Is teleology hypothetical? 'If you want this end, do X.' We are free, so we can choose against the de facto ends of our nature. But what's wrong with this; why is this not right? It is not good where good is defined as good-for-us, i.e., good in view of ends nature happens to have set. But why is it bad (wrong) in the moral sense; why shouldn't I choose something against my ends?

If a dog had free will and chose against nature, would it be morally wrong? Is the goodness the dog is deprived of simply that of a means to an end, i.e., not an intrinsic good? Or is the only good the attainment of an end, the satisfaction of a desire not because that which satisfies it is good in itself?

from card When we say such or such is good for our dog, we view the nature of the dog as ordered to a certain state of being or certain kind of activity, view dog as ordered to, as something ordered to, as a structure ordered to, as having a structure ordered to. View the make up of the dog as ordered to, as existing for.

1024781 The tendencies of our nature determining what we exist for, what makes us good or defective men are linked to what things are independently of our tendencies. Good or bad, other men are free beings whose destiny is God independently of the tendencies of our nature. Animals are not free beings independently of us. Values are relational (not relative) in the sense of related to the tendencies of our nature. That is, the value of an act is relational. Act fulfills or does not fulfill tendencies.

But the nature of the act, not its consequences, is the primary thing whose value is what we exist for. Acting knowing bad consequences is bad as act because I act knowingly, this is intrinsic part of my action as such. If bad consequences result by inculpable ignorance, the act is not morally bad. Morality concerns an act as my act, as what I exist for or not, as proceeding from my knowledge. But my knowledge relates me to what things are independently of my tendencies. Knowing the a person is behind the tree, I shoot (as opposed to thinking a tiger is behind the tree).

Freedom exists for the purpose of choosing what does fulfill the tendency of nature so that my being defective or not is my responsibility. So I must know whether or not an act is what I exist for or not. I must know the nature of the things my act relates to and the relation of those natures (or that knowledge) to what I exist for.

I exist for acts taken in cognizance of the nature of God, and I exist for knowledge of God. What I exist for is determined by a relation between my nature and God's nature, a relation independent of my knowledge of it. But I exist for acts taken in cognizance of those tendencies of my nature determined by what things are independently of my knowledge. I exists for acts taken in cognizance of the natures of the things my acts bear on. For the tendencies of my nature and the relation of things to them are determined by the natures of things prior to my knowing them. For example, I am defective if I cant acquire any rational knowledge, and I am personally defective if I knowingly act so as to prevent the acquisition of all further rational knowledge.

But I know the end of another person. I know I am not what that other person exists for. That other person exists for tendencies of our nature, which is knowing God (union with God), and exists for his own free activity. I exists for actions which, if they are related to him, are taken in cognizance of the fact that he exists for his own activity personally fulfilling the tendencies of his nature. To knowingly interfere with him = to be defective in acts I exist for, acts determining the relation of our natures in themselves. \*I exist for acts bringing the ontological relations of natures into existence on the level of personal responsibility. I exist to personally (cognitionally and freely) affirm what the other thing is and the relationships of things are. I exist to so act that the tendencies of its nature play their proper determining role in my action. 'Proper' = if free being, or if tendencies of a free or non-free being. I exist for acts which give a person his personhood both in nature and in my intentions. I, like God, bestow his personhood on him. If not, I am defective, personally defective. I knowingly fail to fulfill the tendencies of my nature, fail to produce acts consciously determined by the relation of what my natue is to what the natures of others are independent of my knowledge or free choice.

An animal has unconscious tendencies, I have pre-conscious tendencies, but they are tendencies to consciousness of the nature that others have prior to choice, and tendencies to choices consciously determined by the relations of things I am conscious of (and one of the things I am conscious of is consciousness). \* It happens that the acts that fulfill the tendencies of our nature are acts relating us to other things such that the perfection constituting that fulfillment coincides with and is measured by their relation to the perfection constituting the natures of the things they relate us to. (coincide with the natures of things independent of my nature.) Why? Because I am a knower of what things are.

D'Arcy in Beck, p. 83      The mind...can know the intelligible nature of the entire universe. Its good, therefore, is not measured by personal pleasure or utility but by absolute goodness and truth...It can know other things as they are in themselves, not as they appear to it or merely insofar as they minister to its private well-being. (and see Aquinas's subsidiary arguments for the immateriality of knowledge, i.e., if act of organ would know things only as they affect the organ, à la animals; and on self-consciousness, see *Contra Gentiles*, II, 68.)

124781      Freedom exists for doing good, hence our happiness consists in doing good. This includes good for others. Perhaps an animal's happiness does not consist in doing good for others, only for itself. But the same consciousness that gives us freedom gives us knowledge of the value of the other. Could God create us so that morality would not be doing that which produces the greatest happiness? Morality would be one thing, that which produces happiness another? Animals can be happy not doing good. Our happiness results from doing good. That is the fulfillment of the tendency of our nature, knowingly doing what is called for by the natures of things affected by our actions.

Freedom exists for the sake of making our concrete goal: that which is good. If we do not make this our goal, we are not happy. Freedom exists for the sake of making our motive goodness for the sake of goodness. We do not choose without a motive (*contra* Holbach); we choose with a motive, i.e., choice is the choice of a motive in the concrete. We desire some motive (some goodness?) necessarily. Can good be other than that which makes men happy? No, but the good is not the good because it makes us happy; it makes us happy because it is good. Animals are perhaps not made happy by the good. We have knowledge of the good and the freedom to do it, freedom for doing it. Our tendency to ends coincides with that which is good.

113085 Treating each other equally is not enough. If I treat myself as an animal or pleasure machine, that doesn't give me the right to do the same to you (so treating as end is not the question--treating as value is). The comparative place of two things in my desires is not as important as the absolute place of each. I must give him a place in my desires ID with what he is, i.e., just as my judgement must assert that he is what he is, my desire must treat him as what he is. What he is must define his place in my desires. If he has infinite value, he must have infinite value in my desires, he must be an object of unlimited value in my desires, he must be objectified as such by my desires, in my desires.

42886 What about a suicide who kills his family, is he not treating equals equally? He is not treating them equally in allowing them to have the choice that he has. So it's not just equality but the fact that we are free beings.

8686 Reason why equality is not enough: Why is equality in nature so important from an ethical point of view, what gives differences in nature an ethical significance that accidental differences do not have? In some cases, after all, accidental differences can make a big ethical difference. (I shouldn't hire the less qualified person even though he is my cousin.) The answer is that there is something peculiar about human nature, something that gives its intrinsic structure absolute ethical value, ultimate ethical value, infinite ethical value.

\*Here there seems to be another reason for saying that equality is not enough. 'Treat equals equally' seems to be a self-evident ethical truth. But when I sacrifice myself for another, I am treating myself as less than the other. How can this be justified? Why am I not obligated to treat myself as equal to him? We are equal not only in having a similar nature but in having a nature that makes us free beings. Free beings are ends in themselves. I can freely choose to treat myself as less, because doing so does not interfere with the rights of any other free beings, beings over whom my personal freedom has no jurisdiction.

In other words, identity between the relative positions we give things in evaluating them and the relative positions their realities possess is not enough. There must be identity between what they are in our evaluations and what they are in themselves absolutely with respect to being ends in themselves. Perhaps I cannot treat her as being equal to me unless I treat her as an end. What is it to treat someone as an end in themselves? It is to will that they have what is necessary to satisfy their needs, including what is necessary to have the just opportunity to attempt to achieve their goals.

So if there is not sharp difference between animal and human nature, there is no objective ethical obligation at all, i.e., no ethics at all.

An ethical decision is a practical judgment of the intellect 'This course of action, e.g., cheating on an examination, is my good'. Why is it defective? As an act of the intellect, as a judgment, to be defective is to be false. So why is it false? Because cheating is not identical with 'my good'. Why is it not identical with my good? Because it is not moral or because it does not treat equals equally? Say because it is not moral. Then the question is why is what is moral good for me? Answer: because morality means evaluating things according to the intrinsic reality that we know them to consist of, and the end of the act of my will (not intellect at this stage) is to esteem things according to the relative perfection of their intrinsic natures. In other words, the truth or falsity of the practical judgment depends on what it is that is the intrinsic end of an act of the will as a rational appetite, as an appetite that is rational before the practical judgment of reason is made.

Go back to 'Why is it not identical with my good? Because it does not treat equals equally. Why is treating equals equally my good? Because the nature of the will (not my nature, but the nature of part of me) as a rational appetite, as an appetite oriented to respond to the intrinsic reality we find in things, gives the will the end of evaluating things as they are. So the truth or falsity of the practical judgment is measured by the natural end of the will.

It no longer seems that the reason the ethical decision is defective is that it places a relative evaluation on things that 'claims' the natures of things are so related in reality. It no longer seems that the defectiveness of the decision is measured by an implicit claim in the decision that things are related the way my evaluations have related them. Now the defectiveness is measured by what is identical with the natural orientation of the will to its ends. Claiming would be a function of an act of the intellect, not of the will.

Is there something in the act of the will that calls for measurement as defective or successful in terms of what things are. This must be something intrinsic to the act of the will so that the moral imperative will not be hypothetical. What is it about an esteeming by the will that treats things as if they really had the relative positions the esteeming gives them? (Notice that when we say an ethical decision treats things as if they really were related the way our evaluations relate them, if the decision is the practical judgment, the evaluation is something causally prior to the practical judgment, namely, the will's freely holding one part of our knowledge before us as it moves us to make the practical decision. Causing us to focus on one thing as it moves us to form the practical judgment is what evaluating something as higher amounts to.)

Why isn't the will saying, I know her interests are equal to mine in nature, but I choose to place my interests ahead of hers in my action? There is nothing defective in this choice. I don't claim that our interests really are unequal; I just claim that the equality is irrelevant to measuring my choice as good or bad. But you are treating her as if her nature were not equal to yours. No, I'm not. Yes, you are; for that is what treating her as if her nature was not equal to yours amounts to: putting your interests ahead of hers in your decisions. But if that is what it amounts to, why is my decision defective? Doesn't it succeed in treating her as if she were unequal? Yes, and false belief succeeds in relating us to things otherwise than as they are; that does not make false belief any less defective.

Perhaps the act of the will is defective because it consciously causes a defective practical judgment, 'Cheating is my good'.

(Notice that the practical judgment caused by the will is 'Cheating is my good' not 'Cheating is what my will decided on'. The will does not aim at its own decision, it aims at something to be brought into existence. Maybe that is the answer. The will does not just say 'I like this more' but in aiming at bringing something into existence says that the accomplishment of my interests will be the achievement of a higher state of perfection than the accomplishment of her's. In saying 'This is a more desired existent', it is not just expressing the fact that it does desire it more; it is saying that the existent has more to be desired. In evaluating my goals as to be brought into existence,

Perhaps the practical judgment contains such a claim. For example, 'Cheating is my good' would implicitly claim that my opponent and I are not of equal natures. 'Cheating is my good' can be expanded to 'Given my nature and the nature of the other things cheating brings me in relation to, given what cheating is, cheating is my good'. If this is defective, it is because of a lack of identity between my good and cheating, given what cheating is and what my nature and the natures of the other things affected by the cheating are. Why does this lack of identity hold? Because my good consists of evaluating things according to their relative intrinsic being. Therefore, either the end of my will's nature does not consist of so evaluating things or the things are evaluated according to their natures. Both alternatives are false. Then is something morally wrong because it does not fulfill the ends of my will's nature? No, it does not fulfill the ends of my will's nature because the the of that nature is to evaluate things according to their relative intrinsic being, and evaluating them according to their relative intrinsic being is what we mean by what is ethically good.

Thus there is an implicit claim in the act of the will causing the practical judgment that either the natural end of the will is not to treat things as the are or that things really are as the act of the will evaluates them. Failing in this natural end of the will produces an unhappiness that is deserved.

The benefit of my earlier analysis of obligation was that it allowed me to define it in terms of a defect in a decision relative to an intrinsic finality of the decision. That way, I wasn't reducing obligation to fulfilling the finality of my nature, as if the only reason something wrong was that it did not fulfill my ends, rather than what it did to another person. Does the analysis of the last two pages preserve that benefit? Does it avoid falling into analysing the defect in terms of failure to fulfill the end of the will? Or does the fact that a choice is an act of the will ipso facto give that choice the necessary intrinsic finality? Or does the fact that the choice produces a state in the intellect which regards things as they are give it the necessary intrinsic finality? Or can I grant that the defect in the act is measured by the finality of the will and still distinguish that finality from the finality of my nature at least to the extent that I can say that failure to achieve that finality causes me to fail of happiness without saying that the defect is because it makes me unhappy? For it is one thing to say it is defective because it fails of finality; it is another thing to say I will be unhappy because it fails of finality. Or is it enough to say the act is defective because it fails of the end of the will, but the end of the will is to be moral? That is, what we mean by ought is not that it is the end of the will to treat equals equally, as if there would still be an ought were the end something different, but what we mean by ought is that the end of the will happens to be what ought to be, namely treating equals equally.

I will not here present evidence in favor of this theory of reason and appetite except for the following: it is denied by the great majority of philosophers. As rational beings capable of learning from our experience, we have justly come to believe that common agreement among experts in such fields as science, mathematics, and history is prima facie evidence that what they agree on is true. On the same grounds, we should know by now that philosophy is unlike these other fields in that we cannot take the kind of agreement among experts that philosophy achieves as evidence for truth. Tomorrow these experts will hold the opposite. More, their views can usually be recognized by non-experts as self-referentially contradictory and as suppressing their own data. Just as experience teaches that the safe thing to do is to accept the testimony of experts in other fields, experience teaches that the safe thing to do is to withhold assent, at least, from what philosophers testify to.

That ethical values possess these characteristics is commonly denied by philosophers. In fact, many philosophers would not admit that it was even possible for values to have these characteristics.

r values to have them on the basis of certain widely held (and reasonable) assumptions. I will not attempt to prove these assumptions. However, I will argue, at least in the one instance crucial to my case where it may not be obvious already, that these assumptions do represent the common beliefs of humankind. My theory is not one concocted in an ad hoc fashion merely to evade a philosophical dilemma.

The assumptions are as follows

(The fact that we can avoid such seemingly ethical terms only awkwardly is significant. The fact is that a judgment of truth or falsity is an evaluation of a belief, and ethical evaluations are only one species of evaluations.)

Is this combination of 'Yes' and 'No' now clear? Again, the answer is 'Yes and no'. To understand the answer to whether goodness is a characteristic, we must be able to keep both sides of the apparent contradiction simultaneously in mind. For the apparent contradiction does not consist solely in equivocal uses of the term 'goodness', uses that have no connection with one another. If they had no connection with one another, we would not have to keep them in mind simultaneously. But we cannot understand the sense of 'goodness' in which a thing's goodness is identical with its characteristics without understanding the sense of 'goodness' in which the goodness of a thing consists of a characteristic of a really distinct thing, namely, a relation to the thing that belongs to the really distinct thing. It is not by accident that goodness has these two senses. There is a necessary causal relation between the realities we are talking about, a causal relation that makes the sense in which goodness is identical with a characteristic a necessary consequence of the event described by the sense in which goodness is identical with the desire for that characteristic. And our recognition that what is expressed in the latter sense has a causal priority over what is expressed in the former sense (the relation of reason attributed in the former sense depends on the real relation expressed by the latter sense), together with our recognition that the former sense is only a logical construct, creates an all but irresistible temptation to deny the former in favor of the latter. For when we assert the identity of a thing's characteristic with its goodness, we appear to deny that its being called 'good' is based on a characteristic of a totally different thing.

The difficulty caused by the need to hold two such distinct but related things in mind to overcome an apparent contradiction is endemic to philosophy and, indeed, is the ultimate reason for philosophy's inability to achieve the kind of long-standing consensus among experts that many other disciplines achieve. For it is never the case that we must hold only one set of such distinct but related things in mind to overcome an apparent contradiction. To overcome one apparent contradiction we must use terms for whose philosophic use other apparent contradictions are lurking in the background, only waiting the chance to raise both their ugly heads. For example, our explanation of the apparent contradiction concerning 'goodness' involved the use of terms like 'characteristic', 'cause', 'logical' as opposed to 'real' 'distinction', 'logical construct' as opposed to 'characteristic of a thing in its own existence'. The correct understanding of each of these terms, in fact of all philosophic terms, requires us to keep both sides of an apparent contradiction simultaneously in mind where the apparent contradiction arises from a relation between the sides that makes the appearance of contradiction more than a mere equivocation. The relation may be a causal one, as in the present case. Or it may be a relation of similarity between things insufficient to ground the univocal use of terms, but still requiring the use of the same terms because different terms would not express the similarity and because we need to express truths that hold necessarily for both members of the pair as a result of the respect in which they are similar.

Better than other realists, he has seen the primacy for realist epistemology of the problem of truth (p. xx), rather than, for example, the problem of the concept, seen the connection of Aquinas's doctrine of logical distinction and real identity in truth with Aquinas's distinction between things as things and things as objects of knowledge, and perhaps above all, seen how the resources of realism can solve the problem of the correspondence theory of truth (p. 97,