

Dinner, who paid, when, Sep 11, 2000

Ann and Tom Paid for dinner in Maine, May, 2000

Loselles and Emericks paid for dinner at Morro's, Aug. 2000

Bob Crane paid for lunch at Gar Wood's, Sep., 2000

I owe Tom Mercier \$40.00 for dinner at 220, Aug. 2000

Joe Cahalan and Leo paid for dinner at Sibley's, Aug. 2000

In May, 2000, I split lunch tabs with Jane P. and Rod and Martha

In May or June, 2001 Jane Pollock paid

In July 2001, the Pakaluks paid

In July 2001, Jack Truslow paid

In Sept. 2001 Bill Pflaum paid

Spring 2002, I think Jane Pollock paid

Summer, 2002, John and Margo Wilson paid

Fall 2002, Dave Meltzer paid

Winter 2003, Jim Devlin Paid after I paid in 2002 or 2001.

Summer, 2003, Mulcare's paid saying that I paid the last time.

Spring 2002, I sort of paid for Pakaluks, but we agreed to split it from now on.

Fall, 2003, Chas and I split.

Dec. 2003, Devlin paid.

Apr. 2004, I paid for Jane.

Notre Dame visits

Kollers

Ranaghans

FitzGerald

Simons

O'Connells

Ollie Williams

the other priest

O'Connor

Bobik

Dunn

Bradley

Finnis

Brown

McKee

Emericks' email address

Frank and (Sue?)

SLE2148Z@HOME.COM

Thinkers who have lived alone, Apr 10, 2003

Solitude by Anthony Storr, Ballantine Books, p. ix.

Descartes, Newton, Locke, Pascal, Spinoza, Kant, Leibniz, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Wittgenstein.

Quotations, Jun 1, 2001

(Quine and Anscombe were) united in their attachment to a conviction that philosophy had been transformed by the work of Gottlob Frege. (John Haldane, Obituary for Anscombe, Fellowship of Catholic Scholars Quarterly, vol 24, no. 1, Winter 2001, p. 47)

The term 'open sentence' has been used by Carnap and others. The older term for the purpose is 'propositional function', but this can be misleading, since a function in the mathematical sense is best seen as a certain type of relation rather than as a notation. (Quine, Methods of Logic, 4th ed., p. 147)

One of the most important of (Frege's conceptions) is the profound comparison between a predicate and the expression of an arithmetical function, e.g., $(x)^2$. The notion of what is termed a 'propositional function', e.g., 'x is bald', is directly based on this comparison: here we get a proposition if we replace 'x' by a (real) proper name, just as from $(x)^2$ we get an expression of a definite value by replacing the 'x' by a definite number. This comparison is fundamental to all modern logic. (Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p. 14)

The more things change, the more they remain the same. (French proverb)

G and L, SSR, Gay marriage, Dec 27, 2003

Homosexuals Have Always Had the Legal Right to Marry

John C. Cahalan

With rare exceptions, every member of our society has always had the legal right to marry, after reaching a certain age. Medical, psychological or other causes prevent some from being able to exercise that right. Disability does not constitute state discrimination against them, unless the state is responsible for their disability. But the state can at least share that responsibility.

Clinicians tell us that many, even if not all, of those with a homosexual orientation can adapt sufficiently to have a satisfactory heterosexual relationship. Clinicians also tell us that the earlier and longer someone engages in homosexual activity, the more difficult it is to adapt heterosexually. By encouraging homosexually oriented students to come out of the closet and join environments supportive of the homosexual life style, then, public schools are de facto promoting homosexual behavior, thus making it more difficult for many youths who could otherwise do so to adapt heterosexually. If homosexual activity is that socially acceptable, why should they restrain their powerful desire to engage in it?

So the support of the homosexual lifestyle in public schools amounts to state discrimination against many children. The only human relationship comparable in importance to the parent-child relationship is the spousal relation to the other parent of one's children. When government deprives children of the ability to choose that relationship successfully, it is discriminating against them in a most serious way.

Whether someone's homosexual orientation can change is independent of whether it is genetic or "natural." Animals with a natural fear of human beings can lose it. And being genetic does not make something good; consider cystic fibrosis.

This is not homophobic; it is gay-rights-activists-phobic. Many homosexuals are not gay rights activists, and many gay rights activists are not homosexuals. The public needs to know that since the early 1970's, gay rights activists have systematically stifled research into changing sexual orientation, thereby preventing many young people with a homosexual desires, not to mention pedophiles and ephebophiles of whatever orientation, from successfully choosing to modify their sexual preference.

If adults choose homosexual activity, that is another matter. The state should not interfere

but should treat the choice as private behavior for which neither state punishment nor state support is appropriate. The argument that we should give homosexual unions public recognition because they are private behavior is oxymoronic. And when private behavior becomes public, it has social consequences.

Society has previously felt obligated to promote marriage as the norm for sexual behavior on the belief that, without that support of marriage, we cannot fulfill our obligation to educate children as they deserve. For the last fifty years, we have conducted the closest thing we will ever have to a controlled experiment intended to disprove the connection between marriage's being the norm for sex and the education of children. But our abandonment of marriage as the norm for sex has only confirmed that connection, as even Swedish education shows.

The rights of children need not require parents to sacrifice their own happiness, if we make marriage work in the first place. But our fifty-year experiment has shown that sex cannot make its most important contribution to human happiness — as a support for successful committed personal relationships — with sufficient reliability for society's good, if we first seek sexual pleasure outside of marriage.

We give special benefits to the married, even those without children, because, as we previously believed and now know, marriage cannot fulfill its essential social function sufficiently without society's support. It takes a village to raise a child, because it takes the village to support the family. If benefits for a social function performed are unjust "discrimination," so are benefits for veterans, including those who do not fight.

As a New Deal Democrat, this author believes that government must defend the defenseless. Those least able to their defend own interests are children, whom we have made the most disadvantaged minority in our society. Government protects the interests of children most by promoting the family. What money and programs can do can never replace what love can do.

If the state is responsible, it is guilty of discrimination of a most serious kind.

Michael,

You said I could email my problem to you. And I'm afraid (4) on p. 184 is going to bug me until I find out just where I'm going wrong.

BTW, on p. 185 Quine states, "Valid polyadic schema may or may not be monadically valid. The validity of (4) is an irreducibly polyadic matter." So there is more to it than " $p \rightarrow q \vee q \rightarrow r$ ". The validity of (4) depends on the arrangement of quantifiers and variables, as a comparison of (4) and (4') shows.

And I see entirely how Quine's proof of (4) works. That is not my problem. My problem is that there appear to me to be an infinity of counterexamples to (4). So either I must be misunderstanding the concept of validity in the polyadic case or misunderstanding the rules of interpretation and substitution that seem to me to give counterexamples. Or is it something else that I don't understand?

Doesn't validity mean truth under all interpretations in all nonempty universes? Sure, (4) is true in all one-member universes. But doesn't that prove only that there are interpretations that make (4) true in every universe, not that every interpretation makes (4) true in every universe? The existence of some true interpretations shows consistency, not validity.

My problems start in a two-member universe. Even Quine calls his John and Mary example "strange." Why aren't there substitutionally correct interpretations of (4) that make it not just strange but false? E.g., in a two-member universe, if John is the uncle of Mary, it is false that Mary is the uncle of someone; if 1 is greater than 0, zero is greater than something (taking the universe to consist of just those two integers). And besides, even if (4) were true in all two-member universes, that would again only prove consistency in larger universes.

So take the universe of integers. If it is true that 9 is the square of z , it does not follow that z is the square of some integer; etc., ad infinitum.

Maybe my problem is something very simple, so simple that I'm looking in all the wrong places for it.

But if my counterexamples are correct substitutions in (4), the moral I would draw is that a proof of a polyadic formula can obey all the rules and still give a result that is not a "logical truth," if by that we mean true under all interpretations in all nonempty universes. The culprit would not be material implication, but the combination of material implication, i.e., the fact that the falsehood of the antecedent or the truth of the consequent is sufficient for the truth of a conditional, with some rule or rules about quantifying over the variables of polyadic predicates and/or about substituting for such variables. And then the important question would be precisely where in the rules the anomaly(s) occur?

In effect, (5) is $p \rightarrow Fxy \vee Fxy \rightarrow q$. Call it (5*). Since Fxy must be true or false, we know by material implication that (5*) is valid. So we know that if there is any one polyadic formula of which both sides of (5*) are correct substitutional instances, that formula is valid. But starting this way, we need not yet know what that formula would be, since we only have "p" and "q" and don't yet know what predicates and variables they contain nor in what order.

So could there be a "many questions" fallacy here of the kind with which Geach reproached Russell's account of "The present kind of France is bald"? That is, Fxy is either true or false, but it can be falsified by the nonexistence of x , the nonexistence of y , or the nonexistence of both. So any of those nonexistences are sufficient to make the right-hand side of (5*) true. Yet we are supposed to know at the end of the proof of (5*) that there is a valid formula of the form "There exists a z such that (. . .)" where there somewhere occurs F , and x and y , or their correct substitutes, in some as yet unknown order, if that formula is a correct substitute for both sides of (5*).

In other words, we know a priori that if there is a conditional for which Fxy is a correct substitute for

both the antecedent and the consequent, there is a valid formula asserting the existence of some z that is made valid by the NONEXISTENCE of x and/or y , or their substitutes, and yet that tells us that if x exists in a certain ordered relation to z , y exists such that z has the same ordered relation to it.

There seems to be something fishy about material implication, not in general, but when the identity of the same existent, z , is declared necessary even though z is described in such diverse ways. But my problem is NOT relevance. It is the fact that the diversity of the descriptions is such that the identity appears to be extensionally falsifiable. The proof of (5) and (5*) appears to say that we know that there is a formula that is not extensionally falsifiable, even though what makes (5) and (5*) valid is the fact that no x or y need exist in the required relations (whatever F may be) to existent z .

And while (5*) looks like a good substitute for (5), isn't there a rule about "p" etc. in quantificational schema not containing any free variables?

But I am not trying to convince you that I am right, only that it would be a good deed if you could point out exactly what rule(s) I am misunderstanding.

Thanks,

Jack

My problems start in a two-member universe. Even Quine calls his "For any two people John and Mary" example "strange" and goes out of his way to qualify "true" by adding "logically true." But if it is correct to substitute any two individuals for x and y in (4), why aren't there substitutionally correct interpretations of (4) that make it not just strange but false? E.g., in a two-member universe, if John is the uncle of Mary, it is false that Mary is the uncle of someone; if 1 is greater than 0, it is false that zero is greater than something (taking the universe to consist of just those two integers). And besides, even if (4) were true in all two-member universes, that would again only prove consistency in larger universes.

So is it wrong to interpret F to be any two-place relation or interpret x and y to be any two individuals? If it is not wrong, is it true in any universe that for any two-place relation, F , whatsoever and any two individuals whatsoever, there is something such that if the first individual has relation F to that thing, that thing has relation F to the second individual?

Take the universe of integers. Is it true that for any two integers 9 and 8, if 9 is the square of z , z is the square of 8? It is not even true that if 9 is the square of z , z is the square of some integer.

Maybe my problem is something very simple, so simple that I'm looking in all the wrong places for it. And if you can tell me what rule(s) my counterexamples are misinterpreting, you can stop now and spare yourself any further reading.

But if my counterexamples are correct substitutions in (4), the moral I would draw is that a proof of a polyadic formula can obey all the rules and still give a result that is not a "logical truth," if by that we mean true under all interpretations in all nonempty universes. The culprit would not be material implication, but the combination of material implication, i.e., the fact that the falsehood of the antecedent or the truth of the consequent is sufficient for the truth of a conditional, with some rule or rules about quantifying over the variables of polyadic predicates and/or about substituting for such variables. And then the important question would be precisely where in the rules the anomaly(s) occur?

In effect, (5) is $p \rightarrow Fxy \vee Fxy \rightarrow q$. Call that (5*), its left-hand formula (L), and its right-hand (R). Since Fxy must be true or false, we know by material implication that (5*) is valid. So we know that if there is any one polyadic formula of which both (L) and (R) are correct substitutional instances, that formula is valid. But starting this way, we need not yet know what that formula would be, since the rest of (L) and (R) are only "p" and "q" and don't yet know what predicates and variables they contain

nor in what order.

So could there be a "many questions" fallacy here of the kind with which Geach reproached Russell's account of "The present kind of France is bald"? That is, Fxy is either true or false, but it can be falsified by the NONEXISTENCE of x , the nonexistence of y , the nonexistence of both, or if both exist, by some F not being true of them. So any of those nonexistences are sufficient to make (R) true, and the nonexistence of x is sufficient to make (L) true. Yet we are supposed to know at the end of the proof of (5*) that there is a valid formula of the form "For any hypothetical x and y there EXISTS a z such that (. . .)" where there somewhere occurs F , and x and y , or their correct substitutes, in some as yet unknown order, if that formula is a correct substitute for both (L) and (R).

In other words, we know a priori that if there is a conditional for which Fxy is a correct substitute for both the antecedent and the consequent, there is a valid formula asserting the existence of some z that is made valid by the nonexistence of x and/or y , or their substitutes, and yet that tells us that for any ordered two-place relation whatsoever and any x and y , if x has a that ordered relation to that z , z has the same relation to y .

Now, the nonexistence of x is sufficient to make (L), (R) and (4) true by the falsehood of their antecedents. The nonexistence of y is sufficient to make (R) true by the falsehood of its antecedent. But is the nonexistence of y sufficient to make (4) true since z replaces the y of the antecedent but only one y of the consequent, and (4) asserts the existence of (the hypothetically described) z ? If only the nonexistent y is the y that is not replaced in the consequent, the antecedent could still be true and the consequent false.

[However, while (5*) looks like a good substitute for (5), in the "Rules of Passage" chapter, ch. 23, Quine says " p " represents a sentence with no x , the variable in the quantified schema. But in the "Substitution" chapter, ch. 26, he says " p " represents a sentence with no free x .]

In any case, there seems to be something fishy about material implication, not in general, but when the identity of the same existent, z , in the antecedent and consequent is declared hypothetically necessary even though z is described in these diverse ways. But my problem is NOT the lack of relevance between these descriptions of z . It is the fact that the diversity of the descriptions is such that the hypothetical identity appears to be extensionally falsifiable. The proof of (5) and (5*) appears to say that we know that there is a formula that is not extensionally falsifiable, even though what makes (5) and (5*) valid is the fact that all existing x 's and y 's need not have, in all universes, the required ordered relations (whatever two-place relation F may be) to an existent z that make the hypothetical identity of the z true in all universes.

, even though what makes the hypothetical identity of existent z true in all universes is the fact the required ordered relations (whatever two-place relation F may be) need NOT be true of all existents x and y in all universes.

But I am not trying to convince you that I am right, only that it would be a good deed if you could point out exactly what rule(s) I am misunderstanding.

Thanks,

Jack

The proof of (5) and (5*) appears to say that we know that there is a formula that is not extensionally falsifiable, even though what makes the hypothetical identity of existent z true in all universes is the sufficiency of the nonexistence of an x in the required relation to z (which can be any two-place relation), or of the nonexistence of a y in the required relation, to make the hypothetical identity of existent z true in all universes. So what guarantees the extensional truth of the hypothetical identity of z in all universes is the sufficiency for that truth of the mere extensional falsehood of the existence of an x or a y .

is the fact the required ordered relations (whatever relation F may be) need NOT be true of all

existents x and y in all universes.

Given the descriptions of x , y , and z in (4), what makes the existence of the same z as so diversely described extensionally true in all universes is that the mere extensional falsehood of an x as it is described or of a y as it is described is sufficient for the truth of the identity of the z as so diversely described in all universes.

Now, the nonexistence of x is sufficient to make (L), (R) and (4) true by the falsehood of their antecedents. The nonexistence of y is sufficient to make (R) true by the falsehood of its antecedent. But is the nonexistence of y sufficient to make (4) true, since z replaces the y of the antecedent but only one y of the consequent, and (4) asserts the existence of z ? If only the nonexistent y is the y that is not replaced in the consequent, the antecedent could still be true and the consequent false. The nonexistence of x makes $Ez (-Fxz \vee Fzy)$ true, but does the nonexistence of y make it true?

[However, while (5*) looks like a good substitute for (5), in the "Rules of Passage" chapter, ch. 23, Quine says "p" represents a sentence with no x , the variable in the quantified schema. But in the "Substitution" chapter, ch. 26, he says "p" represents a sentence with no free x .]

In any case, there seems to be something fishy about material implication, not in general, but when the identity of the same existent, z , in the antecedent and consequent, is declared necessary even though z is described in these diverse ways. But my problem is NOT the lack of relevance between these descriptions of z . It is the fact that the diversity of the descriptions is such that the identity appears to be extensionally falsifiable. The fishyness has something to do with the fact that the extensional truth of the existence of an identical z described in these diverse ways is supposed to be guaranteed merely by the extensional truth of the nonexistence of an x or a y , as described in the antecedent or consequent, respectively. Again, how does the nonexistence of y make $Ez (-Fxz \vee Fzy)$ true for any x and y ?

Putnam, concepts, meaning of meaning, twin earth, Dec 23, 1999

Different mental states can each make us aware of X. Can the same brain state make 2 different people aware of different objects? In part, at least, yes. Brain state Y can make A1 think of apples and Hy think of oranges, because Y does these things as part of a whole complex of brain states that can differ in each case.

Both A and H are daydreaming. In one and only one of them a change bringing brain state Y into existence occurs. Because of Y plus all this other brain states, A would think of apples, H of oranges. This can especially apply to different languages where different structures condition the way we form concepts.

Chas Reick's internet reference, Dec 22, 1999

Bibliofind, keyword Marietti

Detroit used records, Tommy Mercier, Sep 21, 1999

Car City Records, 1-800-213-8181, 21918 Harper (north of 8 mile)
1-810-775-4770

Desirable Discs, 581-1767, 1 block east of Schaeffer on Michigan

Natural Obligation, AA, Aug 23, 1999

Last line: for a rational appetite what ought to be is that what something is in my values be the same as what it is in reality.

There is such a thing as what something is in my values being the same as what it is in reality; and there is such a thing as the opposite.

By any standard relevant to ethics it is the same concrete agent that existed before. If a lack of features justifies killing it, we value the existence of the feature, e.g., reason, more than the existence of the subject of the feature. The agent producing them is the same concrete agent that existed before. The concrete entity producing them is the same concrete entity that existed before, is the same agent that existed before. And it is this concrete agent whom we cannot avoid evaluating as equal or unequal to another. As equal to another precisely as an agent in pursuit of ends, or as unequal to another precisely as an agent in pursuit of ends. His way of pursuing ends is less developed than mine, but the value of either stage of development has to be measured by the fact that each is oriented to ends of equal value.

Add nod to Maritain in last footnote.

Add a footnote reference to Causal Realism.

Before killing the brain damaged, we must ask if there is any interest there that we must count equally to our own interests, that we must count as the interests of an end-in-itself. Yes, there is the interest, the orientation to future effects, to maintain itself in existence.

The absolute value is an entity, the existence of an entity, with an orientation to free choice. Should we say that a brain-damaged person has such an orientation? For the RA to disvalue an entity with any kind of orientation to free choice is against the RA's goal, for the selection of a goal by which to disvalue it must be, contrary to the goal of being reasonable, irrationally arbitrary.

To declare an entity not to be an end-in-itself because it lacks a feature that would be in its interest, as measured by its orientations to goals If an entity lacks a feature that would be in its interests, as measured by its orientations to goals

the fact that it serves his interests

To not have the end of conforming to rational knowledge, we would have to stop using RK to guide our action. Is that in our power to do or to choose? Only if we choose to stop using RK by getting drunk.

There is an objective moral order because the RA has being objective as its goal. The inclination of the RA is to do that which is objectively good, that is, to do that which conforms to what things are and which satisfies the inclination precisely because it conforms to what things are.

Desires terminate in what things are. A desire terminates in A because A has properties F, G, and H. It does not terminate in A because A has the property terminating-desire. In the case of the RA, "objectively good" means conforming to what things are, not, circularly, conforming to the RA's inclination to conform to what things are.

The murderer must first value the victim as if he (the victim) were not like her, equal to her, with respect to that which first enables her to value him at all and what first gives all her acts of evaluation.

So I can't pretend that the comparative evaluation begins only after . . . that there is no conflict until So I am aware that the comparative evaluation begins . . . that the conflict begins.

If appetites evaluate things to be the kind of things they are oriented to, what does the RA evaluate things to be? Since its goal is to conform with reason, and since the object of reason is what things are, the RA must evaluate things to be what they are as known by reason.

Earlier I said that even those who use other tests first eventually must sometimes use the test that utilitarians use. But the converse is also true, just as other theories make the test by consequences subordinate to other tests, so in actuality do utilitarians. Just as other theories use other tests first, so do utilitarians.

So moral good is doubly "objective," that is, relative to what things are.

End with: the RA is a common belief, the common belief, about the nature of moral evil. When we judge that someone's behavior does not treat another person justly, we are saying that it does not give the other person her due. This can only mean that we believe that what she is due a certain kind of treatment. E.g., we believe that what we are makes us due a certain kind of treatment.

How can what I am make me due anything, necessitate that I am due anything, cause me to be due anything? We think that what we objectively are makes it objectively the case that we are due something. How can our being what we are cause it to be objectively the case that we are due something?

Note that so far I have said nothing about whether the unjust person is culpable or not, is subjectively evil or not. We believe the behavior is objectively unjust regardless of whether the other person is due blame for the behavior. How can what we are cause it to be objectively the case that we are due something or cause it to be objectively the case that she is due blame for not treating us as we are due?

To see this, we only have to ask what conditions need to be satisfied for her to be due blame for the behavior. One condition is that she know what we are. If she is inculpably ignorant, the objectively unjust behavior does not allow us to blame her for being unjust. So what we are can make it objectively unjust that we be treated a certain way only in the sense that it is objectively unjust to be treated a certain way by someone who knows what we are. We are anthropomorphizing if we consider it objectively unjust for an animal, say a pet, to treat us a certain way. It would be objectively unjust, if the animal had RK of what we are.

The other condition for her to be objectively due blame is that she have free control of her behavior, that she not only knows what we are but also has the ability to choose to use that knowledge to direct her behavior.

But still, it may not seem that these two conditions explain how what we are can cause something to be due us. To see this, I will introduce a term I have not yet used in this summation. If have said that something can be due is, but I have not yet described not giving us our due as evil, bad or wrong. To say that such behavior is wrong on the part of someone is to say that it violates some goal of theirs. The reason it is not wrong of an animal is that we attribute no such goal to an animal. What is the goal we attribute to others when we describe their behavior as wrong?

We cannot describe their behavior as violating such a goal if (a) they do not have RK of what we are and/or (2) they do not have the power consciously to make that RK the RK that directs their behavior, the RK by which they guide their behavior. So when we blame someone for not giving what we are its due, we are saying that they have the goal of behaving in a way that conforms with their RK of what we are. We are not an old shirt. I am not a mere physical object to be used as a means to the exclusion of being able to achieve my own ends.

Or when we blame someone for treating us like an old shirt or for manipulating us as if we were merely a means to their ends, we are blaming them for not achieving the end of treating us according to their knowledge of what we are.

But how can we believe that their knowledge of what we are leads them to knowledge that we are due something from them? That belief can be true if it amounts to the belief that doing or not doing X requires them to consciously choose as if what they know us to be were not what they know us to be. And conversely, if that belief is true, doing or not doing X amounts requires them consciously to choose as if what they know us to be were not what they know us to be. So that belief is true if and only if choosing X requires them to choose as if I am not what they know me to be.

Search for "common belief" in c:\ethics for a shorter way of saying the above.

Hence it is to believe that X violates some goal to which things who make choices based on rational knowledge and who possess the relevant knowledge are oriented independently of their preferences and to which they would not be oriented if they could not make reason-based choices or did not have that knowledge of what AI is. For to believe that X deprives what AI is of its due is to believe that it treats AI as if he was not what he is.

And to believe that X is objectively evil is to believe that it violates some goal to which we are oriented regardless of our subjective preferences. So to believe that X is objectively evil is to believe that it violates some goal to which we are oriented because we have the relevant knowledge of what X is. What goal can that be?

So if choice X requires us to act as if something is not what we know it to be, we cannot avoid being aware that choosing X violates a goal to which our dispositions for making reason-based decisions necessarily orient us. So to violate the goal of treating AI as if he is what he is is objectively evil. And to deprive AI of what he is is due to treat him as if he is not what he is; for AI is due something only if what AI is is due something. But at least one thing AI is due from us is to treat him as if he is what he is. The only remaining question is whether So to treat AI as if to believe that AI is due something is to believe that what AI is is due something. So it is to believe that depriving AI of his due is to treat him as if he is not what we know him to be. And to believe that X treats AI as if he is not what he is known to be is to believe that X violates a goal to which we are oriented by knowing what X is. if X does not give AI his due, is to believe that X does not treat AI as if he is what we know him

So to believe that X deprives AI of that which it is due is to believe that X treats AI as if he is not what he is. So it is to believe that treating AI as if he is not what he is violates such a goal. So to believe that X is objectively evil because what AI is due something is to believe that X violates some goal to which we are oriented because we can base our choices on knowledge of what AI is. So it is to believe that this is a goal of those who can know that choosing X treats AI as if he is not what he is known to be. So to believe that X does not give AI something he his due is to believe that X violates a goal is due something is to believe that makers of reason-based choices who know what AI is are necessarily oriented to the goal of treating AI as if he is what he is, that is, to believe that makers of reason-based choices are necessarily oriented to the goal of treating things as if they are what they are, as known by reason.

So if we can know that we have the goal of . . . Why do we believe that? Because what AI is, and therefore some goal of those who can know that X treats AI as if he is not what he is.

that what AI is is due something from those who can base their choices on the knowledge that choosing X is choosing to treat AI as if he is not what he is. of what AI is such that.

Dec 22, 1999

Treat others as you want them to treat you. But why? Enlightened selfishness. But why will treating them well achieve your selfish goals? Because if we don't treat them well, they won't treat us well. But why won't they? Because they see that it would be unfair for you to expect good treatment if you do not give good treatment.

The specific difference in a causal definition should be something that has its proper home in the genus, that dwells in the domain of the genus, that is endemic to the genus, because it causally depends on the genus and so belongs to the genus as what it, the genus, is.

E.g., defining material logic. In distinguishing the sciences, material logic uses a truth like "can exist immaterially." This is a statement about things as things. In distinguishing propter quid from quia demonstrations, it uses truths like "This is the cause of that" "This is the effect of that."

But in paragenic definitions, the SD is a reaffirmation of the G. So the SD automatically belongs to the G as G, as what the G is. Humor is that which is congruous found is what appears to be, in the same or in a strongly related (causally related) respect, incongruous. So this makes the definition of humor easier than finding Sds in the case of generic definitions. To define humor, just reaffirm the G in a certain way.

The G is luminosity, clarity, intelligibility. It is the kind of clarity, etc., that is appropriate to this kind of unity and proportionality (harmony), to the kind of unity and proportionality that is, in this case, that which is clear. And it is the kind of unity and harmony that is appropriate to the kind of clarity that is one and harmonious.

What does "clarity " or "splendor" mean? It can only mean "intelligibility in two ordered senses. The sense first in order is the intrinsic intelligibility that we describe as knowability in se as opposed to knowability to us. In other words, it is that which the object has to offer to the intellect, has to give to the intellect. It is the interior depth of that which a thing as to offer the intellect. The more such depth, the more beauty, as long as that in which the depth exists is also whole and harmonious.

"Clarity," "intelligibility" etc. are object-descriptions; what is important is the depth of interior being belonging to the object as thing.

But of course, we cannot perceive the beauty unless it is knowable to us. The artist must make something whose intrinsic depth is perceivable by us. This is the second sense in order of intelligibility.

Another aspect of the intelligibility specific to humor, intelligibility of the objects specific to the grasp of the humorous: they are connatural objects of a particular kind of intelligence, rational intelligence, reason. For example, they are rationally understandable causal connections. So perhaps instead of the paragenus being beauty in its fullest extent, the paragenus is rationally perceivable beauty, the beauty proper to an intellect that must find the objects of its understanding in the senses and through the senses.

Used Computer phone number

617-438-8065

Bumper Stickers, Jun 15, 1999

If we let her choose, it's her
responsibility not ours. Right?

Hatred is not a family value -
But neither is deceit.

Proud to be hated by gay activists
(because of my love for all my fellow sinners)

Gay rights is a con.

"I'm against abortion. But it's her
decision, not mine." - Adolf Eichmann

No Pedophile-phobia

Homophobia - No!
Christian-phobia - Yes!

Hatred Homosexuals - No!
Hatred of Christians - Yes!

It is arbitrary to what we are trying to say when there first exists an agent oriented to human ends as its own ends. But the objection might be that a brain-damaged person is oriented to human ends in the same way that the zygote was. Or that she has a way of being oriented to human ends that is the same as the way the zygote was oriented to human ends. That is, she has a way of being oriented to human ends that is the same as the way the causality of the agent existing as a zygote was oriented to human ends. The kind of causal activity that constituted the way the entire agent was oriented to the future production of human ends still exists in us at the cellular level. And that kind of causal activity is necessary for any other way in which we are now oriented to human ends.

We can ask when does there first exist an agent oriented to human ends in a temporal sense or in a causal sense. We must ask it in a causal sense because we must decide what level of orientation to human ends that we now possess is the level at which we are persons, that is, ends-in-themselves. It is not the level we possess when fully alert because we do not have that level when we are daydreaming, sleeping, drunk, in drug-induced unconsciousness, reversibly comatose or irreversibly comatose.

It is arbitrary to stop anywhere short of the causally lowest and most fundamental level at which there is still a causal orientation of the organism to human ends as its ends. That level is, at least, the level of inter-cellular division, and might even be at the intra-cellular level, but we need not know that. There are two reasons why it is arbitrary to stop anyplace short of that. First, that is the level at which the zygote was so oriented, and we would not be the same agent as existed then if that level did not continue to exist in us.

Second, above that level, it is conceivable that we may someday find a cure for any currently "irreversible" way of being unable to achieve human ends. If so, we would have an obligation to cure those we want to kill today. So they must be persons today. If the anencephalic embryo started out as a normal human fetus and did not lose the genes that made him human, he is a person who deserves cure if we can. So those whom we cannot cure today are persons.

If not the . . ., then we are not valuing the concrete entity, the agent. We must comparatively evaluate agents whose orientations to ends our choices can come in conflict with. Our choices can come in conflict with an agent's orientation to maintain itself in existence. But what if that agent is maintaining itself in existence as an agent whose nature orients it toward free choices.

Maybe emphasize in section 5 that equality is not the thing, rather unequal evaluations mean not evaluating us to be what we are.

Move the ranger's manual example up one paragraph.

Can make us mistakenly desire an experience presented by a memory as if it were the kind of experience that would please the appetite producing the desire.

Delete first footnote; change the later reference to note #3 to #2.

There are too many mitigating factors to include in the definition of a term.

It is not just that using reason would be superfluous. Worse, it doesn't conform to what it is based on.

It's consistent with everything Aquinas said. And if it is consistent, it must be more than that, since it follows from principles of his philosophy. (Compare "If X is possible, then X must be necessary.")

May 11, 1999

my disposition for making ethical decisions is a rational appetite. To say it is an appetite is to say that it orients me to goals. To say it

is rational is to say that it is a power of responding to objects of rational knowledge and, therefore, of desiring things according to reason's awareness of them. But by reason, we are aware of what things are in themselves. Therefore, a rational appetite relates me to goals according to my knowledge of what things are in themselves; a rational appetite is a power of valuing, esteeming, appreciating, honoring the intrinsic reality of things that are presented to that appetite by reason. Since rational appetite relates me to goals according to my awareness of what things are in themselves, a decision made by the rational appetite cannot avoid consciously dealing with things as if their natures were actually so related as they are related by my decision. In other words, by its intrinsic nature as an act of a rational appetite, an ethical decision calls for, asks for evaluation in terms of identity or lack of identity between the way it treats things as values and the way things exist.

And since it is the nature of the rational appetite to esteem the being things have in themselves, in putting my pursuit of goals ahead of hers, I am treating her as if her nature were not equal to mine.

However, more than equality of nature is at stake in an ethical decision. What is at stake is equality of nature, yes, but equality of nature with respect to being things whose nature allows us to pursue ends we set for ourselves. In any free decision, I am pursuing an end I determine for myself. If in a free decision, I consciously place the pursuit of my end ahead of hers, I am treating her as if her nature were not equal to mine precisely with respect to the point of conflict, namely, the pursuit of freely chosen ends. Since her nature is indeed

equal to mine in this respect, such a free decision is defective in that the relative position it gives us in my evaluations differs from the relative positions of our natures in reality.

To say that we have the obligation to treat as equals those things that are equal to ourselves with respect to the free determination of their own ends is to say that the intrinsic finality of acts of the rational appetite is to treat things according to what they are with respect to being able to pursue ends of their own choosing. Why should acts of the rational appetite have this finality as opposed to that of treating things according to what they are in other respects (height, intelligence quotient, number of chromozones, etc.)? A better question would be how could a rational appetite not have a finality relating to this aspect of things as opposed to others. As an appetite, the rational appetite is intrinsically ordered to the free evaluation of things as ends and means. As a rational appetite, it is therefore ordered to the free treatment of things according to what reason knows about the natures of things with respect to the free evaluation of things as ends and means. Reason is not only capable of knowing the equality of our underlying natures; it is also capable of knowing the concepts of end (and not just the concept of my end), of freedom (and not just of my freedom). Therefore, reason is capable of knowing the equality of our natures with respect to that to which rational appetite is ordered as appetite, the free evaluation of ends and means. Treating equals as equals means treating as equals those whose nature makes them equal as treaters, that is, as free deciders.

Knowledge is needed to satisfy this appetite because it is an appetite oriented to valuing things insofar as reason is aware of what those things are. But the objects of reason are what things are in their extracognitive existence; when truth is obtained, there is identity between what an extracognitive state of affairs is and what the object attained by reason is. A state of affairs becomes an end for the rational appetite because of our rational knowledge of what the state of affairs is or will be. Therefore, our appetite is satisfied by our knowledge that the desired state of affairs exists. But unless there were identity between the object of knowledge and the existent that is the end of the appetite, the appetite's satisfaction would be illusory, just as a desire that misevaluates a potential existent to be the kind of thing an appetite is oriented to would be a defective desire.

a decision deals with things as if what they are as values for us is identical with what they are in themselves;

And a desire aims at bringing something into existence so that it will exist the way it has been imagined or conceived to exist. Hence desires deal with their objects as potentially existing the way they are desired.

And our disposition for making ethical decisions is a rational appetite. As an appetite, it orients us to goals. As rational, it is a power of responding to objects of rational knowledge and, therefore, of desiring things according to what reason informs us about them. But by reason, we are aware of what things are in themselves. Therefore, a rational appetite relates me to goals according to my knowledge of what things are in themselves; a rational appetite is a power of valuing, esteeming, appreciating, honoring

the intrinsic reality of things that are presented to that appetite by reason.â

If there is any doubt about the existence of the rational appetite as here described, we have only to consider that otherwise we would not be capable of desiring goals according to our rational knowledge of what things are. Yet, to pursue a goal is precisely to aim at making something consciously conceived exist as we have conceived it. And our conception of future goals is always founded on our consciousness of what things are that already exist. Furthermore, our satisfaction in an accomplished goal derives from our awareness of what exists when that goal exists.â

Since the rational appetite relates me to goals according to my awareness of what things are in themselves, a decision made by the rational appetite cannot avoid consciously evaluating things to be of certain kinds, to exist in certain ways; it cannot avoid evaluating things as if their being were this or that. In other words, by its intrinsic nature as an act of a rational appetite, an ethical decision calls for, asks for, being judged in terms of identity or lack of identity between the way it treats things as values and the way things exist, between what something is as a value for us and what it is in itself.

exists.âThe features enabling me to cause decisions include proximate dispositions, for example, my state of readiness to make decisions when I am awake. They also include more remote dispositions, for example, the dispositions for making later decisions that I possess when asleep, drugged, or in a coma. But it is not the dispositions that cause decisions; it is I who cause decisions by means of whatever features of my being constitute my dispositions for making decisions. To be aware of myself as a cause is to be aware of myself as a concrete existent. Only concrete existents, not their features considered in abstraction, can be causes.â

Therefore, in evaluating myself to be higher than another person as a producer of decisions, I am evaluating myself to be higher as a concrete entity whose features enable him to be the cause of decisions, and I cannot avoid evaluating myself as higher with respect to what makes me a cause of decisions. When

I put my interest ahead of hers, the reason my comparative evaluation does not stop at the interests in abstraction from the entities whose interests are in conflict is that I am aware of our desires as achievements, effects, of dispositions belonging to us. But both the proximate and remote dispositions by which I cause decisions are themselves actualizations of more fundamental dispositions. If the fact that our desires are actualizations of dispositions requires evaluations made by rational beings not to stop at the desires themselves, that same fact requires that those evaluations not stop at the more proximate dispositions but extend to the more fundamental dispositions.â€

Indeed, for a being who evaluates things according to knowledge of what things are, the more fundamental dispositions must be the more fundamental features in respect to which the things are evaluated; otherwise, the evaluations would be defective by the standard of failing to evaluate according to our knowledge of what things are, the intrinsic finality of the will. For I am made a cause of decisions principally, as opposed to instrumentally and secondarily, by the more fundamental dispositions through which I produce the more proximate dispositions for decision. In particular, I have my proximate ability to make decisions because the organism that existed when I was a child developed that ability by means of causal dispositions it then possessed, causal dispositions that still exist in every cell of my body.â€

A child is an agent who will produce, in the course of her development, the dispositions enabling choice, just as a novice athlete is an agent who will produce, in the course of her training, the dispositions for feats she is now incapable of. And just as the agent who now produces admirable athletic feats is the same agent who undertook training some time ago, the person who now makes ethical decisions is the same agent who began developing the proximate ability to make decisions long before she had that ability. Contrast the existence of the sperm and ovum that will become the child to the existence of the child. When the sperm and ovum exist separately, there does not yet exist an agent whose causal dispositions will enable it to produce the proximate dispositions for choice; when the child exists, there does exist such an agent. Therefore, when the child begins producing choices, the agent producing them is the same agent

Another aspect of the features by which we make decisions leads to the same conclusion. Usually, the tools an artist makes in order to produce her final work exist independently of her, as brushes exist independently of the painter. However, the more proximate dispositions by which I make decisions exist in me derivatively and secondarily relative to the more fundamental features of which the proximate dispositions are achievements. The proximate dispositions exist only by residing in a being constituted what it is by more fundamental features, features by which the proximate dispositions are caused. And it would be defective for an appetite adapted to what exists as known by reason to value things according to what exists secondarily and derivatively more than what exists primarily and foundationally.â€

However, the features of our nature necessary for making decisions include many dispositions we share with nonhumans. Does it follow that I must give them a place equal to myself in my evaluations? No, the equality in question is equality as beings whose natures bestow on them, actually or potentially, the ability to pursue goals based on rational knowledge. The generic features we share with nonhumans are necessary but not sufficient for our having underlying dispositions that will produce the rational appetite, since rational appetite is specifically human. Hence, it would be defective to evaluate what these other beings are equally to what I am as a being that can produce acts of a rational appetite.

And we evaluate entities according to their underlying causal dispositions, since causes are what make things what they are, and reason is aware of that fact. Specifically, we evaluate entities according to the relation of the rational appetite to their underlying causal dispositions, since it is evaluations by means of the rational appetite that are in question.â€

are.â€To return to the main point. The features primarily responsible for our being causes of decisions are features belonging to our underlying nature. Therefore, in denying her an equal opportunity to pursue goals, I cannot avoid evaluating us as if we were unequal with respect to our underlying nature. Since the finality of the rational appetite is (1) to

evaluate concrete entities (2) according to what reason knows of them, my evaluation could abstract from the nature only if I did not know that the underlying nature made me the kind of entity that can make decisions. In making the decision, I am evaluating myself as a certain kind of agent. The fact that it is my nature that enables me to be such an agent by producing the proximate dispositions is something that could not be altered by a choice to act as if it was not. If I chose to kill someone who was unconscious on the grounds that she was not then equal to me with respect to the proximate ability to make decisions, my decision could not avoid evaluating her as if her nature were not equal to mine. I would still be evaluating one concrete entity as being higher than another in respects that include human nature. For I would be evaluating myself as the kind of entity from which decisions emanate, that is, as having whatever the features are that enable me to cause decisions.

In denying another person equal opportunity to pursue goals, I am consciously relating to existing things as if what they are in themselves was not what I know them to be.

We know rational decisions have this finality because we know from our own case what rational decisions are, and we know she is similar to us in having the ability to make decisions based on rational knowledge. We know that if we do not treat her equally to ourselves as a pursuer of goals, we are not treating her according to our knowledge of what she is. And we know such a decision is defective because a decision made in knowledge of her equality in this respect has the intrinsic finality of giving her a place in our evaluations consistent with what she is known to be.

And just as there can be lack of identity between the object of a concept and a thing, so there can be lack of identity between the places we assign things in our system of values and the way things are in themselves, between the way things terminate our relations of desire

and the way their intrinsic realities relate to each other. Thus, we can evaluate the interests of one thing as higher than those of another, even though the natures of these things are equal on the scale of intrinsic perfection. And just as a conscious act is defective if there is a lack of identity between what is believed about the thing and what the thing is as a cognition-independent thing, so a conscious evaluation of the intrinsic reality of things is defective if there is lack of identity between the relation we give things in our desires and the relation that obtains between them in reality. For just as belief claims things exist the way they are objectified by predicates, in giving things different positions in our scale of values, we are treating them as if they existed the way they are evaluated.

For example, when I cheat on an examination, I am acting as if my interests were more important than another person's even though I am conscious that we are equal with respect to the reality contained in our fundamental nature. Although the perfection constituting our natures is known to be equal, I consciously evaluate them as unequal. And in evaluating them as unequal, I am treating them as if they existed the way I evaluate them. In knowingly pursuing my interests at the expense of hers, I am evaluating my reality, the reality of the subject whose desires are being pursued, as though it were higher on a scale of being than hers. Hence, there is a lack of identity between the known relative positions of the natures of the things in reality and the relative positions my conscious estimations of value assigns them, and my value assignments are therefore defective. For as belief claims identity between what it objectifies by means of name and

predicates and what things are in themselves, so ethical decisions consciously treat known things as if the comparative perfection of their natures outside of consciousness was identical with the the relative positions assigned them by a decision. Ethical decisions can no more escape treating things as if their natures are related in themselves the way they are related in our evaluations than beliefs can escape claiming to express how things are in themselves. Therefore, ethical decisions can no more escape being defective when things are not related as our value assignments take them to be related than beliefs can escape being defective when what they express is not what things are in themselves.

Although our ways of relating to our own ends is the same, I evaluate them as if it was not the same. In evaluating them differently I am treating them as if they were not the same in reality. So there is a lack of identity between the relative positions the nature of things have in reality and the relative positions my conscious estimations of value assign them. Decisions treat things as if the comparative (relative) perfections of their natures outside of consciousness was identical with the comparative (relative) positions assigned them by the decision. Decisions treat things as if the way things are related in themselves is the way they are related in our values. There is an identity or lack of identity between the way we treat things as values and the way things exist.

It is the nature of the RA to value, to esteem, the being that things have in themselves. So I cannot avoid treating her as if what she is in herself is or is not the same as what I am with respect to being something the determines the ends at which she is aiming, the ends she is pursuing.

If you do not like calling our ability to make decisions an appetite, or do not like comparing decisions to desires, or do not like describing desires as evaluating things to be the kind of thing the appetite producing

the desire is oriented to, we must still describe decisions as evaluating things to exist in certain ways. The will responds to objects presented by rational knowledge, giving them places as ends or means to ends in our system of values. The objects of rational knowledge are what things are in extramental existence. Hence the will's responses give things places in our values based on reason's representation of them as actual or possible ways of existing. But we would not be capable of basing our pursuit of goals on our rational knowledge of what things are, if the will's responses did not evaluate things as if they exist, actually or potentially, in certain ways. To pursue a goal consciously is precisely to aim at making something conceived exist the way we have conceived it to exist. And our conception of future goals is always founded on our consciousness of what things that already exist are. Furthermore, our satisfaction in an accomplished goal is a response to our awareness of what exists when that goal exists. Since pursuing goals based on rational knowledge is deciding for things as if they were of certain kinds, if we can describe desires as evaluating things to be of certain kinds -- and I believe we should so describe them, a fortiori we must say the same thing of decisions. In other words, that evaluations treat things as existing in certain ways is true for desires as well as for decisions, but it is especially true for decisions and would be true of decisions even if it were not true of desires.

For the purposes of the foundations of ethics, this point about decisions can be made even more unassailable. My claim is that unethical decisions are defective because they evaluate things as if they were not what they are. In the strictest sense, however, I need not claim that decisions (or desires for that matter) evaluate things to be this or that. All I need to say is that decisions relate us to things as if they were this or that. If a decision relates us to something as if it really were X and the thing is not X, the decision is defective to that extent. We can relate to things as if they were not what they are without defect, since there are other goals for conscious states and acts than relating to what things really are.¹ For example, we can imagine something to be other than it is without believing it to be other than it is. Imagination can be said to relate us to things "as if they were of certain kinds," but the "as if they were of

certain kinds" is not meant to imply that imagination has the finality of relating us to things as if they really exist the way they are imagined. Beliefs and decisions, on the other hand, do have the finality of relating us to things as if they really exist in certain ways. I believe my arguments show that decisions evaluate things as if they really were this or that, but I also believe these arguments show at least that decisions relate us to things as if they really were this or that; and that is all that has to be shown. I will continue to call our decision-making ability an appetite and to describe our decisions as evaluating things, but in the last analysis, my case does not depend on either way of speaking.²

To see why consider the following statements: to value is to value what something is (some action, state of affairs, or entity); to evaluate is to evaluate what something is; to evaluate is to give what something is a place our values. Although these statements may appear trivially true, they have the following nontrivial consequence. If your orientation to an end with characteristic X causes you to desire two things equally, you are evaluating those things as being equal with respect to having characteristic X. Faculties of desire and the faculty of making decisions are oriented to acts that evaluate modes of being. And to give modes of being relative places in our values is to evaluate those modes of being as if they had those relative places in reality, since relations of evaluation terminate in what things are. Decisions and desires evaluate things to exist in certain ways. Hence, if you put a value on what someone else is equal to the value you put on what you are, you evaluate what she is to be equal to what you are.

Notes for "Does Everything Follow" article, Feb 26, 1999

Paragraph about reducing the chance for error by replacing the abstract with the mechanical. Note that in the mechanical area, criteria for identifying instances becomes more useful because more needed.

Let us assume that what we are aware of when we are aware of X differs from what we are aware of when we are aware of non non-X only by ... And let us assume that we cannot be aware of not non-x without being aware that it differs from x only by ...

If we know how to use certain words, we cannot not be aware of LCOs that make certain statements self-evidently necessary.

What we need to know is what "all," "if," etc. mean; we do not need to know that "all" etc. refer to LCOs.

Against Routley on 'ordinary' negation. If we happen to give some sign the job of other-than, then the PNC and PEM hold. This is the use the negation sign has in Disjunctive Syllogism. That is, this is the use that makes DS work, the job of taking away. So, by hypothesis, that is the use, the job, we happen to be talking about. If we are not talking about that use, we are just changing the subject.

If what is expressed by terms "F" and "G", and/or by sentences "p" and "q" on the other hand, differ from each other only by certain LCOs, certain sentences cannot not be true.

Instead of "We have learned nothing when we learn . . ." use "We have achieved nothing when we learn . . ." or "What have we achieved when we learn . . ." or "What end have we achieved when we learn . . ." if for all we know it is also true that .

Faith and reason, Mar 1, 1999 BIG

There must be something lacking in the way(s) we state the question of faith and reason. E.g., to say faith is assent to something because God has revealed it leaves open the question of how we are aware that God has revealed it, or why we assent to the proposition that God has revealed it. Do we assent to that proposition by reason or by faith? Isn't how we assent to that proposition the question?

Rationalists like to talk about keeping their minds open, as if that meant never thinking that anything had been settled. But in a much more fundamental sense, the issue of an open versus a closed mind is this: Is reason, as we evaluate it, open to the possibility of God's using it to communicate to us something that reason on its own could not learn? If we are not open to that possibility, do we not have a closed mind? Or at least, is not our view of reason a closed view?

By its very nature, reason is an openness to that which "transcends" reason in the sense that reason did not create its objects and cannot achieve its own goals unless it submits to that which it does not create and conforms to that over which it has no control.

In a crucial sense, we *close* reason if we say that what reason learns about that which transcends it cannot give reason justification for assenting to something which reason could not know on its own, when what reason knows about a person asking for this assent gives justification for thinking that that person can know that for which he asks our assent.

Faith is never just assent to a proposition but is always a case of a person asking us to put our faith in him, to trust him, on the basis of the credentials he presents to reason for that purpose. Or, the proposition(s) in question amount to the proposition "This person is worthy of my trust in these matters."

If we say that God cannot use reason as the instrument for showing us that a person is worthy of trust in matters beyond reason, have we not closed reason's transcendence a priori and in a way that itself lacks rational justification. And if so, are we not on a slippery slope to where what started as a putative glorification of reason has come today, namely, to the view that reason cannot know any truth about what things are?

So if we start with saying that all there is is what reason tells us, can we avoid arriving at the conclusion that there is nothing for reason to tell us, because we have unconsciously closed reason off from some of the things that transcend it, a necessarily arbitrary move and so one that prevents us from appealing to anything that would not be arbitrary.

We can be obligated to assent to propositions like "This person deserves my trust in these matters," "I should put my trust in this person in these matters." And that matters concerned can even be, and often are, life and death matters. For example, a parent can be obligated to trust a doctor about a child's health, even if the parent does not like what the doctor says and would not what to believe it otherwise.

The following premises of conditional syllogisms are not only rational, they are necessarily true and knowably necessarily true by reason. If someone (A) rises from the dead gloriously, can walk through walls etc. (has a teaching that conforms with the best of what reason teaches about morality, e.g., excludes force as a way of dealing with enemies of the religion, etc.), that person is worthy of my trust in these matters. What more could I ask of God to show me that a person was worthy of trust in these matters?

And if another person (B) claims to have witnessed (A), that person is worthy of my trust in these matters if that person can work miracles including raising people from the dead and if that person's teaching conforms to the best of what reason teaches about . . . , and if that person could not have thought up some of these things himself, and if the teaching does not say that eternal life depends on pulling ourselves up by our own boot straps, as if we were not totally dependent on God, but says that eternal judgment depends on our allowing God to do what he wants in us.

what reason learns about that which transcends it can give reason justification for assenting to something which reason could not know on its own, when what reason knows about a person asking for this assent gives justification for thinking that that person can know that for which he asks our assent.

Faith is never just assent to a proposition but is always a case of a person asking us to put our faith in him, to trust him, on the basis of the credentials he presents to reason for that purpose. Or, the proposition(s) in question amount to the proposition "This person is worthy of my trust in these matters."

Reason is not free. When it is aware of sufficient evidence, it cannot keep itself from assenting to that which is evidenced. But God has made it so that salvation requires an assent that is freely made. How can he do this? Only if the rational knowledge we possess prior to the free assent is such that we know that we should give this free assent, that it would be morally evil not to give that free assent. How can we know this?

It is impossible to answer this question unless we know precisely the proposition(s) to which we are freely assenting. For example, are we freely assenting to "My good is to believe Jesus is the Son of God" because we nonfreely know that we are justified in believing "Jesus should be trusted in these matters"? Or are we freely assenting to "My good is to believe that Jesus is to be trusted in these matters" because we nonfreely know that we are justified in believing something else, something like "I should place my trust in someone who performs miracles?"

We can't hope to possibly understand the reasonableness of faith unless we sort these matters out in precise detail. At a minimum there are three levels that must be distinguished from and related to one another. The first level is the free ultimate practical judgment that my good is to assent to p. The second level is the practical judgment of conscience that I should assent to p. And within this second level there is the universal nonfree judgment, e.g., "I should put faith in what is said by someone who works miracles," and the particular nonfree judgment, .e.g., "Jesus works miracles," leading to the particular nonfree conclusion, "I should put faith in what Jesus says," that precedes the ultimate free practical judgment.

The third level, finally, is the nonfree assent to the speculatively known truths the knowledge of which is the basis for our knowledge of the nonfree universal practical judgment that I should put faith in what is said by someone who works miracles. (See "Natural Obligation" for an explanation of the last point.)

If the choice to refuse to believe p is contrary to right desire, it is contrary to some moral knowledge like "I should believe things of kind K," because not believing things of that kind would be to act as if some speculative knowledge like "Things said by miracle workers express the mind of God."

The question is what kind of moral and speculative propositions does someone act contrary to if he refuses assent to particular speculative proposition like (1) "The alleged miraculous event did not occur" or like (2) "The event that occurred did not manifest divine power." Should we say that they really know the truth of these propositions but that their denials are insincere, that is are lies? If so, his choice to assert that (1) or (2) are true is contrary to right desire automatically.

That is, to justify his assent to "Jesus is not to be believed," he would have to deny that something he knows to be true is not true. Otherwise, he would be admitting that his assent to that proposition was contrary to right desire.

But what about the person who insincerely assents to that proposition but is never asked to justify his assent? Then the knowledge he has and has not yet denied having is the same knowledge that the person who assents of "Jesus is to be believed" has. What is that speculative knowledge that makes it contrary to right desire not to believe Jesus?

We need to abstract from the case of the person who has been inculpably deluded by philosophical sophism's about miracles. Before we learn philosophy, the reasonable man is clearly justified in believing that the external world and other minds exist. What must the reasonable man who has not been corrupted by philosophical sophisms believe about someone who works miracles? What does he really know in his heart, whether he admits it or not?

(There is of course the case of the people who hear of miracles and go on their way without deciding for or against Jesus, because the Lord has not called on them to make that choice yet. Maybe we should inquire how the Lord goes about creating the situation of their having to decide on way or the other at that time. That may be important.)

But one helpful way of answering that question would be to ask what kind of belief about miracles is the philosophically confused man left with after we disabuse him of the sophisms?

Another helpful approach might be this. What would happen if Jesus chose to

use creative miracles such as immediately replacing missing limbs. And what if he did this all the time? Perhaps the evidence would be so overwhelming that we would not be free not to assent to "Jesus is to be believed." And so that kind of merit would be eliminated.

A miracle is either done by God directly or by some created secondary cause to whom God gives that power. But the created secondary cause would have to be a created person, a free cause. If there is such a created secondary cause, we must certainly assume that his ability to know truths about God exceeds our own. So the question of whether to believe him or not would come down to whether he is philosophical malevolent or not. If he is not malevolent, it is unreasonable not to believe him, that is, unreasonable to not believe that he is in a better position to know truths about God than we are.

So maybe "Does this person have good will toward me" is the issue. But is it the issue in the sense of being something we have speculative knowledge of before assenting to what he says, or is it the issue in the sense of something that righteousness would require us to freely assent to, on the basis of some other nonfree speculative knowledge?

Is my good to believe that "This person wants my good?" This person may oppose "my good" in the sense of opposing the ultimate practical judgments by which I have made unrighteousness that which I am in fact seeking. So those practical judgments may motivate me to freely deny that "This person wants my good," even though I have sufficient evidence to nonfreely assent to the propositions "Persons of type X want my good" "Jesus is a person of type X."

I should believe this person when He talks about God (have an attitude of trust in this person; give this person my faith, my trust; this person is due my trust; I owe this person my trust). But what if I don't want to know the truth about God? E.g., what if I don't want to know the truth about what God does or does not want me to do?

The modern bargain was: give up faith, put all trust in reason, and reason will give you all truth. Now, 300 years later, modern reason tells us "Well, there really wasn't any truth to find." But that wasn't the bargain. It's a bait and switch instead of a bargain. Could it be that faith is necessary to keep reason straight and/or to defend reason's ability to know truth? Well, isn't the RC church the only place where reason's ability to know truth is defended?

Prior to revelation, relying on reason alone implied no privation affecting the ability of reason to function. But once revelation has taken place, rejecting it wounds reason's ability to know truth. Rejection is a privation. Mere absence of revelation is not.

Title: Faith Is Not Blind; Faith Is Not a Blind Leap

HU, Mar 1, 1999 BIG

Why doesn't a necessary accident's relation of dependence terminate all the way back at the substance's act of existence? Of course, it should. So the question is what could prevent a necessary accident's relation of dependence from extending all the way to the act of existence? There are two possibilities.

The exercise of existence is at least logically distinct from the reception of existence. Can the logical distinction ever correspond to a real distinction? Here is where the two possibilities come in. If in order to cause our properties, we need a state of exercising existence that is really distinct from the reception of existence, God's depriving Christ of that state of exercising existence would prevent his properties' relation of dependence on a quasi-efficient cause from extending all the way back to his created act of existence. But there is one more possibility.

What if in all other creatures, the exercise of existence is not really distinct from receiving existence? Then, to prevent Christ's properties' relation of dependence from terminating at the created act of existence, God could add something to Christ that was not found in other creatures, something corresponding negatively to the state of exercise of existence. He would add something that would not be the exercise of existence but would prevent Christ's human substantial nature from being the exerciser of existence.

Perhaps there is an insight in the fact that, in the case of human nature, subsistence belongs directly to the soul, not to the composite. Perhaps that explains something about the "change with no subject" in transubstantiation.

Poinsot, signs, cx, formals signs, language, AI, Feb 26, 1999

What makes something an instrumental sign? Awareness of what some noise or shape is by means of formal signs.

Ordinati, UPS, PPP, Feb 26, 1999

To train priests to make the sacraments effective, the training must overcome unconscious assumptions we pick up from our society.

An example of how we unintentionally abuse the sacraments and fail to put the Church's doctrine into practice at the practical level.

What do we tell Catholics to do to respond to the grace of the sacraments? There must be something to tell them that doesn't amount to salvation by good works. There must be something to tell them that is pastorally consistent (not just theologically consistent) with Paul's repeated declarations to his converts that works are not it but faith is.

Do we sometimes misuse the Eucharist?

What is our de facto pastoral strategy? It is to overcome the influence of pagan environments without first bringing Catholics to a personal relation to Christ, a personal knowledge of Christ, a personal acceptance of Christ as Lord and Savior.

Statement at the FCS: The real presence in the Eucharist should always be the true focus and basis of the faith of the Church.

That's why we don't have God-centered, spirituality-centered priests.

How we pastorally abuse the Eucharist.

Imprimatur: Msgr Richard Lennon, 2121 Commonwealth Ave., Brighton 01233.

Authority, government, Simon, Feb 26, 1999

"The morality of the sovereign" What are his DUTIES, what things exceed his duties?
What constitutes the tyrannical exercise of power beyond what is moral?

Freedom, causality, Feb 26, 1999

If Y does not occur after X, does it follow that X is not sufficient for Y? No, it only follow that either X is not sufficient for Y OR X is not determined ad unum.

Nature, substantial change, life, substance, continuity of life, abortion, persons, February 26, 1999

Can there be a single nature perservering through all the changes that we undergo from the zygote to adulthood? Yes, because the concept of nature implies the concept of change; so the concept of a single identical nature implies a succession of non-identical states. For a nature is a principle, a source, of change, that is, of a succession of non-identical states. Nature is a principle directing change, controlling change, limiting change.

Tank, Feb 26, 1999

In some cases, I can know that it is not reasonable to believe the opposite of p. In the case of whether or not I am a brain floating in a tank, I can know that it is not possible that it be reasonable to believe that hypothesis. I can know that the only possible reasonable hypothesis is that I am not floating in a tank. For I can know that the hypothesis eliminates the possibility of any evidence whatsoever in its favor. I can know that the only possible kind of evidence for the existence of the world as I perceive it is the kind of evidence that I have.

PNC, Logical relations, Modes, logic, possibility, necessity, Feb 26, 1999

According to Causal Realism, there are two meanings of possibility, and the first refers to concepts, not to truths. So possibility precedes truth. So maybe that explains why we express the PNC by "It is not possible that . . ." That is, maybe possibility as said of truth precedes necessity, etc., in the psychological order of discovery or of coming into our consciousness; for there is already an instance of the possible, i.e., concepts, before truth. So the first thing we do in objectifying the modes is to extend the use of a concept that we already possess and build our other concepts of the modes on it. But that psychological genesis would not make possibility more fundamental than necessity in any other sense.

Memory, Jul 15, 1998

In Prolegomenon, note 9, I say memory is an awareness of a conscious state. Rather, it is awareness of an event, e.g., a fire, as having been present in a conscious state of a certain kind. I can imagine a fire and remember fire, and I can be aware that I am imagining a fire or remembering a fire. I am aware of both states as emanating from their source, and therefore am aware of the existence of the source as such. But that source perceives one of them to be a memory because, (or for that source to perceive one of them to be a memory is to perceive it as) it perceives the fire as having been the object of a certain kind of awareness, an awareness perceived as emanating from the same source in the past. What makes it perceived to be from the SAME source? All that identifies that source is the way we are aware of it, namely, as being the producer of conscious acts. I am aware of sensed objects as emanating from a source and of the act of sensation as emanating from a source. The difference between these awarenesses is the difference between awareness of the other and awareness of the self. For the "self" is just that cause we are aware of in the second way. And we are aware of objects of memory as objects of acts emanating from a cause in the same way.

Bumper stickers, slogans, Jun 18, 1998

Right to vote? Yes. Right to work? Yes. Right to social approval of a lifestyle?
No.

Title, Posterior Analytics, Jun 17, 1998

Posterior Analytics

Charlie Parker, Bird, Bebop, KoKo, Ko-Ko, Jun 17, 1998

The famous version was recorded in Nov. 45. Bird is listed as the writer of the song. He is also listed as the leader of the group. Dizzy is a member of the group.

Another classic is supposed to be "Just Friends" on a with-strings album.

P and CG, Haldane on Liberalism, Rawls, Jun 17, 1998

Does society need common beliefs. Yes. But that is a different question from "Should the state enforce common beliefs" or more generally from "What should the state do, if anything, about this need." If Rawls is right on the second question, it does not follow that he is right on the first.

Example of why we need common beliefs: Laws are written to rely on the judgment of the "reasonable man."

Tommy Mercier, jr., Detroit used Cds, Jun 17, 1998

Car City Records, 21918 Harper, St. Claire Shores. Take edsel ford east to the 8-mile (Veridian) exit. Don't turn, the exit puts you right on harper. Keep going. Good CD and vinyl. 1-800-213-8181; 1-810-775-4770

Desirable Discs. Good vinyl, very few Cds. Dearborn, 1 block east of Schaeffer on Michigan. 1-313-581-1767.

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203-319-5259

Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy

Simon Blackburn

C and D, T-O, LOT, Abstraction, Nature Absolutely Considered, Apr 27, 1998

There are at least 4 cases of the T-O distinction in Aquinas. But many Thomists can't recognize a T-O problem when they see it. Why not? Why, for example, isn't it enough to understand the distinction between the mode of signifying and the signified?

It's best to understand two or more different cases and understand them as cases of the same common principle. That ensures that we have abstracted the relevant common principle from the distinguishing features of each case (*abstractio formalis*), features of each case that are accidental in relation to the relevant rationale. We could do this from awareness of only one case, but experience shows that we very often do to make this abstraction from one case.

Catholic Pastoral Reform: A website on the current pastoral crisis in the church

Catholic Pastoral Renewal: A website on the church's pastoral weakness

The Pastoral Crisis in the Catholic Church: A website on Catholic Pastoral Reform

The Catholic Church's Pastoral Weakness: A website for Catholic Pastoral Renewal

Pastoral Problems in the Catholic Church: A website on Catholic Pastoral Renewal

Making the Sacraments Effective: A website on Catholic Pastoral Renewal

Making the Sacraments Effective: A website A website on the Catholic church's pastoral crisis

Unleashing the Power of the Sacraments: A website for the pastoral renewal of the Catholic church

Unleashing the Power of the Sacraments: A website on the Catholic church's pastoral weakness

The Pastoral Crisis in the Catholic Church: A website on Catholic Pastoral Renewal

Making the Sacraments Effective: A website on Catholic Pastoral Renewal

Unleashing the Power of the Sacraments: A website on Catholic Pastoral
Renewal

Buridan people, 1998 ACPA people, Apr 1, 1998

Buridan people:

Jack Zupko
Ed. Mahoney, Duke
Steve Brown, B.C.
Gyula Klima, Notre Dame

Other people

Jim Conant, U. of Pittsburgh, conant+@pitt.edu
Fritz Monsma (sp?), BC grad student(?), monsm@bc.edu
David W. Oyler, the other publishing scholar who works for a living
Urban Thobe, community college near Northwestern

Article by Haldane

Intentionality and 1-sided relations, in Ratio in the last few years.

Anthology corrections, Apr 1, 1998

Title: A Classical Realist Critique of Wittgenstein

Corrections to Wittgenstein and Poincaré

Explain that imagining is not imagining of an "arrow" or of "Mr. Smith", but of a shape, group of shapes, with color, etc. Maybe bring up subject this way: What makes something an instrumental sign? Answer: awareness of some noise or shape by means of formal signs.

Actlimit, limitation of act by potency, infinity, Mar 5, 1998

A received whiteness is so much whiteness. A separate whiteness is not "so much" whiteness in the same way. A separate whiteness would be so much being, but not so much whiteness the way a received whiteness is. For it would lack nothing of whiteness. But any measurable whiteness must lack the whiteness by which it is measured, lack whatever whiteness by reference to which it is measured. Were there no other whiteness outside it, it could not be measured. A separate whiteness would have whatever could be had of the perfection of whiteness, would be whatever there can be of the perfection of whiteness.

A separate whiteness cannot have the kind of so much that derives from a subjective, receptive, potency. That kind of so much is what we measure by comparing one so-much-whiteness to another. So separate whiteness may be finite from some point of view, but not with respect to the kind of so much that is caused by being received in a subjective potency.

Catholic web sites, www., vatican, ewtn, l'osservatory romano, Feb 2, 1998

www.vatican.va/news_services (is there another slash at the end?)

www.home_eng.htm

ornet@ossrom.va

www.rcab.org

www.ewtn.com/

Deely's friend, Rutz, Joe Novak, Jan 22, 1998

Joe Novak (Augustin Novak, O.P.)
University of Waterloo, Ontario
519-576-0148

Ontological analysis, paralogues, C and D, genus and species, Jan 21, 1998

Being is in the differences between red and green in the same way that it is logically included in the sameness. That is, it is in the differences in the same way as far as our concepts, our means of objectification, are concerned. It is logically included in both in the same way. To be logically included in the differences is to be logically included in the same way that it is included in the sameness.

So in the case of red and green, being is in the background only, i.e., not in the foreground differences.

But being is not logically included in the differences between substance and accident in the same way that it is present in the differences.

The distinctions between genus, species and specific differences have a foundation in a real distinction, a real distinction that is known as such in apprehension. E.g., the generic predicate "animal" is attributed because the features of the thing include sensible acts, the predicate "rational" because its features include intellectual acts.

There is actually another real distinction on which these logical distinctions are "founded". For causally, the real differences between the features from which these logical objects are drawn depend on the relation of prime matter to substantial form. But that fact does not enter our apprehension when we form these concepts, the real differences from which we form these concepts do enter our apprehension and must do so for us to form these concepts.

In the case of "exists in itself" and "exists in another", the feature from which the differential concept is taken in each case is not other than the feature from which the paragenic concept is taken. The existence of a substance is not different from an existence that is not in another, the way sensible acts are different from intellectual acts. The existence by which we call an accident a being is not different from an existence that is in another, the way sensible acts differ from intellectual acts.

In the case of any paragenus, what functions as a common ground is objectified as a relation between terms, e.g., having existence, being that which exists. What functions as the difference is the same relation more explicitly stated, that is, stated by reusing the concept that is used for the common ground. And the new way of using the concept that was used for the common ground was not drawn from anything really distinct from that which the concept for the common ground was drawn.

A substance's relation to its existence, its way of being related to its existence, is not different from what the substance is, and vice versa. An accident's way of being related to its existence is not different from what the accident is, and vice versa.

A paralogue is always a way of being related to a term objectified as such, as a way of being related to a term. When two ways of being related to a term can both be objectified by a common concept of that way, e.g., both by having existence, and when the concept we use to differentiate these ways is also just another concept of the same thing and does not allude to anything really distinct from that thing, we have a paragenic relation. In contrast, we do not repeat the concept of color to differentiate red and green.

What if the universe is one substance, existence and causality, existence distinct from essence, metaphysics, contingent being, Jan 21, 1998

If there were only one substance, but that substance was subject to accidental change, its essence must be distinct from its existence. For if its existence were identical with its essence, with what it is, existence would be in potency to something. For the essence is in potency to something, namely, its accidents. But existence cannot be in potency to anything.

Jan 23, 1998

If a thing is subject to change, its essence differs from its existence. So if its essence does not differ from its existence, it is not subject to change. We are asking about the hypothesis that being just pops up without having anything causally prior from which it pops up. This thing's essence must not differ from its existence. If the essence did differ, the thing would need something causally prior to it. So to hypothesize that being just pops up out of nothing, we have to hypothesize that being is unchanging.

In order to hypothesize an unchanging being, what features must we assume that it has? Must the only kind of being we can assume to be unchanging be an infinite being? An eternal being? If so, it does the agnostic no good to postulate that a thing just pops up, unless he is willing to postulate that the thing is infinite or eternal. And if it were, it could not be this universe, which is limited and temporal.

Eternity is not just an infinite extension of time, because there can be on actually infinite extension of anything. Eternity is not a quantity.

Or what features would a being whose essence is not its existence have? Since it could not be subject to change, it could not be an extended, i.e., potentially divided, being. At most it is a point; so we could not get the universe out of it.

A being whose essence was its existence, and so would be uncaused, would have to be a pure actuality and have no potentiality whatsoever.

If there is a being whose essence is an existence, there is something that is an existence. If there is change, there is a being that necessarily exists, that cannot not be. Why? Must that which can not-be have some potency in it?

Is it that it can cease to exist but cannot cease to be this or that, because it has no potency in it? What causal relation would make it impossible for it to cease being this or that; for example, what causal relation would make it impossible for Socrates to cease being a man? Causal relations have really distinct terms. No causal relation requires that the components now making up Socrates do make up Socrates. But a causal relation may require that the components now making up Socrates also make him snub-nosed.

A being that cannot cease to be this or that must be absolutely simple, have no distinct parts between which there can be causal relations.

(If there is one being whose essence limits existence, must a pure existence be an infinite being? If so postulating that a pure existence pops up amounts to postulating that God pops up.)

Feb 2, 1998

If a being's essence is its existence, the being has no parts, is absolutely simple; composition requires a relation of potency to act; otherwise, the composite is just a mereological sum. So if the being that pops into existence is a pure existence, it is absolutely simple, unchanging, infinite, etc. And if it is not a pure existence, it needs a preceding cause.

Not even a point would be absolutely simple in the required sense, because a point lacks parts only in a privative sense.

Does the basis for a logical distinction have to be a prior real distinction? If so, the distinction must be of one of two kinds. (1) An apprehensible difference between objects of apprehension, i.e., a difference that is apprehended when the objects are apprehended; (2) The metaphysical cause behind the first kind of distinction. Thus the distinction between color and red (1) is not the same as the distinction between the matter, the potency for color, and its act, a particular color (2). But the

latter distinction is the ontological, not necessarily epistemological, root of the other.

If there is only a logical distinction between essence and existence, to assume the existence just pops up is to treat a logical distinction as if it were real. Color is never separate, except logically, from red or green, etc. But we conceive an existence as if it did not exist.

A change exists through another. To exist through another is to derive existence from another; to have an existence that is an existence-from. To derive F from another means to depend on another for F and to depend on another that has F. That is, I depend on X for F because X has F. My having F would not exist if something really distinct from me, X, did not exist and if X's having F did not exist. If I did not exist, X and X's having F would still exist, but not vice versa.

The subject of a change can exist without the change's deriving existence from the subject. The change in ball B derives from the change in ball A. But take away ball A and where does the change, the motion, in ball B derive from? From nowhere. And so is the existence of the motion not a derived existence, a caused existence? But the motion's need for a cause is a material relation, is something not distinct from the motion itself. So is the motion's deriving from A, dependance on A, something distinct from the motion's need for a cause?

Feb 12, 1998

If pure existence just pops up, that existence cannot be caused. But we are causes of its popping up in our mental states.

There could only be one such being. When two things agree in genus, they are different from their existence. For what they are is the same to the extent that the genus is predicable of both of them. So what they are must differ from existence.

A being whose essence is existence cannot be in a genus. The generic word-function is identical with what the being extra-objectively is. What it is, by hypothesis, is existence, so being would, per impossibile, be a genus.

Only one thing can be a pure existence, and so everything else must be caused by it.

Feb 24, 1998

Whatever would pop into existence would be something whose nature made it capable of existing. A square circle will not pop into existence. So we are saying that a pure existence is able to be. But under what conditions is it able to be? Only if it is unchanging, infinite, etc.

Also a pure existence, if it exists, is that greater than which nothing can be conceived, ie., greater than which nothing is possible. So if it is possible for a pure existence to be a necessary existence; it is necessary for it to be a necessary existence. If it is possible for it not to be a necessary existent, it is impossible for it to be a necessary existent.

For if a necessary existent is possible, it is greater than a contingent existent to that extent. So unless the pure existence were a necessary existence, it would not be the greatest being possible.

If something pops into existence, its duration is able to be finite. Can an existence be infinite but its duration be finite?

A separately existing whiteness would lack nothing of whiteness. A being that is just an existence would lack nothing of the perfection of being. So by imagining it to pop up, we are imagining it as if it were caused and so were not a perfect being.

Any being to which the actual exercise of existence is accidental is caused. If the ultimate way of being real is accidental to something, that thing's essence must not be its existence. For the exercise of real existence must be other than its essence, other than what it is.

So we can imagine a being that is its existence to popup. But if that thing is a being that can and cannot actually exercise existence, that being is not an

actual exercise of existence.

So if there is a first cause whose essence is its existence, that being exists necessarily. The exercise of existence is not accidental to that thing's being what it is.

Of anything that we can say that it pops up, we are assuming that that thing's being what it is is not identical with an actual exercise of existence. We are assuming that the actual exercise of existence is accidental to what it is that exists as a result of popping up.

Computers, to learn, Donahue, Jan 21, 1998

Internet, fax, read CDs, write CDs, modem

Health, CFS, CFIDS, etc., Jan 5, 1998

From a TV report: "shadow syndromes." Dr. Ratey. Beta-blockers: Paxil, Dizippermene;
1/3 success.

Thing and object, truth, Maritain, DOK, material and formal objects, Jan 5, 1998

A comment on the logic of Maritain's introduction of the concepts of thing and object in *The Degrees of Knowledge*: First, he explains the definition of truth. Then, he says that truth requires that diverse objects of knowledge be identical other than as objects, or as more than being objects. So truth requires that every "object" be more than an object; i.e., truth requires that awareness of a formal object *logically include* awareness of a material object. Truth, and so knowledge of truth, requires that awareness of an object be awareness of it as more than an object, as more than what is made an object in *this* way, where "what is made an object in this way" refers to the formal object.

So he is not begging the question by assuming the scholastic doctrine of formal and material objects. He is saying that that doctrine follows necessarily from the definition of truth, if there is to be truth and if we are able to know it.

Feb 24, 1998

If we didn't get a material object along with a formal object, we couldn't even ask whether "Snow is white" is true; we couldn't even contemplate its being true; we couldn't even understand the sentence. In other words, if we were not from the beginning aware of a formal object as an aspect of a possible material object, then we couldn't even ask . . .

Medical ethics, killing and letting die, obligation to save life, Jan 5, 1998

The BC teacher Ron Tacelli recommended for a course in medical ethics: Oliva Blanchette.

Faith, revelation, belief, practical judgment, Simon, agnosticism, Oct 9, 1997

In the Rationality of Catholicism, Simon says that "Reason can show that believing is a sound, honest, virtuous action, that it is, for sure, the action expected of a man determined to seek the right and avoid the wrong." That is, reason can show that a proposition ought to be believed, where "ought" has a moral sense. Reason can show that I ought to perform the action which is accepting the testimony of this witness.

This gives a way of stating the agnostic's position. He thinks reason shows that it is morally evil, morally wrong, to accept certain kinds of testimony. He thinks we are *supposed* to withhold judgment on things without complete evidence.

So the question is what is the prudentially good thing to do? To withhold judgment or not to withhold? But the least we can say is that just the fact that the evidence is incomplete is insufficient to justify withholding.

Science and philosophy, empiricism and metaphysics, C and D, U-turn, Sep 25, 1997

I do not accept scientific success as the only standard of truth. The reason is that if there were no other possible (kind??) Of proof, science itself could not succeed in achieving long-term agreement, or could not succeed in revealing the "truth", or even in regularly achieving long-term agreement among "experts."

See the article on Godel's proof in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (original edition). The author quotes Hilbert as wanting formal systems because application of the rules requires nothing but the physical recognition of the shapes of marks and of strings of marks. Yes but awareness that a shape is what a rule calls for, ie., is what will get the monkey a reward if she points to this shape, is one thing. Awareness that this shape is necessarily what the rule calls for, i.e., awareness that if this shape were not right, the rule would both be and not be what it is or the shape would both be and not be what it is, is another thing.

Awareness that the shape is necessarily the right one requires awareness that the opposite would make something both be and not be what it is.

So the use of formal methods does not do away with the need for us to be able to recognize necessity. For example, a monkey could indicate what placing of "-" does or does not conform to a truth-table, e.g., that $\neg(p \ \& \ q)$ does conform and that $(p \vee \neg q)$ does not. But our reliance on truth-tables presupposes and relies on our awareness that those 16 tables exhaust all the possibilities, that the four entries in the table for "-" exhaust all the possibilities and that the eight entries for each sentential connective exhaust all the possibilities. That is, we use truth-tables because we know the necessary truth that all the possibilities are covered. The monkey would not know that.

Necessary truth, realism, LTA, logical relations, truth, September 25, 1997

Addendum to Everything-Follows article: We can explain why logical relations make sentences necessarily true if and only if necessity is not just a matter of logic, that is, if and only if necessity is a matter of what terminates logical relations. A sentence is logically necessary because what terminates diverse logical relations is necessarily identical, if logical relations are the only difference between them.

It is not just truths of logical that are (logically) necessary, that are necessarily true because of logical relations. What is necessary is that things are what they are and are not what they are not.

So we can explain why linguistic relations make sentences necessary if and only if we have a realism of, a realistic evaluation of, the goal of sentences.

Math, infinitesimals, Routley, logic, September 8, 1997

Be sure to look through the underlined sections in Routley, Relevant logics and their rivals. For one thing, he refers to the overthrow of the assumption of the existence of infinitesimals in math.

What are numbers, Jan 20, 1998

Tom, Dick, and Harry exist. A multitude exists, a magnitude, a quantity. If we ask does the number of this multitude exist, all we need to know is what we mean by an assertion of the kind that a number of men exist, or that a multitude exists. Consider the multitude Holmes, Watson, Moriarity. The answer to the question whether a multitude exists is no. So what we are asking about is the status of (are the statuses of) the terms of a relation of being an instance of a universal, a logical relation. But we are asking a nonlogical question about the term of a logical relation, does it really exist.

To say that a multitude exists is to say that more than one term of the relation of being an instance of exists. So like motion and time which are partially cognition-independent and partially cognition-constituted, "real" number is a mixture of the logical and the real. Extension is a form of magnitude, of quantity that is not like this. Extension exists really pure, and simple, though accidentally. Motion, time, and number are not name of things that exist really, pure and simple.

In one sense, when Tom, Dick and Harry exist, nothing exists over and above them called their number. Number is like a transcendental. Being and truth and the same, but to say "being" is not to say "truth". To say that Tom exists, and then to say that Harry exists, and then to say that Dick exists, does not mean the same thing as saying that a multitude of men exists. But to say a number of men exist adds no reality over saying that Tom exists, and then saying that Dick exists, etc.

Number adds the relation of reason of being an instance of a universal, and it adds the fact that something else is simultaneously an instance of the same universal, and the fact that something further still is an instance of the same universal, etc. Of course, "and" can be looked at as a being of reason also. Does that mean that nothing real is added when we say "and"? No, for the terms of the relation can be real. So number involves at least two cognition-constituted objects, instantiation and conjunction.

Each number is a species of the genus number. Each number differs from its predecessor (or successor) by another conjunction of another instance. This might seem circular, but in this paragraph I am defining how species differ; I am not defining the genus. And is "an additional addition" really circular? It is not really redundant. "Additional addition" does not try to define number by number; conjunction is only part of the definition of number. Given that conjunction is part of the definition of number, part of the definition of the genus, "additional conjunction," i.e., "conjoined to a different conjunction" explains how species are distinguished. And why not refer to part of the definition of the genus when defining species, i.e., use part of the definition of the genus but not the whole definition.

Feb 12, 1998

From Aristotle's Physics, somewhere early in Book VI or in V. Points and units cannot be identical. Points can touch, while units can only be in succession. And there can always be something between points, i.e., lines, but it is not necessary that there be anything between units.

But can points touch? If they are dimensionless, mustn't they completely overlap?

Science and Rity, Einstein, BORs, Spatial relations, Maritain, August 22, 1997 BIG

Einstein made up (deduced?) General Relativity "out of whole cloth" and only then found out that it predicted Mercury's orbit. But he started out from the insight that there could be nothing more to gravity, from the viewpoint of the methods of empirical physics, than what is expressed by the curvature of a mathematical world-line. He got that insight from the equivalence of gravity and inertia. Previously it was thought that accelerated motion was not relative, that laws of physics could tell the difference between acceleration and inertial motion. Yes, but laws of physics cannot tell the difference between gravitational acceleration and any other kind. If not, then the world can offer no empirical evidence about gravitational behavior that could not be expressed by the curvature of a world line, and by the same kind of curvature of a world line that expresses any kind of acceleration.

In other words, if gravity and acceleration are equivalent, then a curving of Minkowski's space-time will give you gravity. And if gravity and acceleration are equivalent, then there can be nothing more to gravity, from the viewpoint of strictly empirical evidence, than what a curving of M's space-time will give you.

September 8, 1997

A change occurs when A goes from relative rest to relative motion. Now A has kinetic energy that can cause effects not possible before. But is the locomotion itself a process of change? If so, change in what? Can we say that for relativity it can only be a change in A's world line, and so is a change in relative space-time? If so, can we say that when A changes to being in motion, A changes to being in a state of causing a change in the geometry of space-time? Perhaps the relativist will say that inertia, being in a state of relative rest or of continuous relative motion, is the limit case where there is no change in the geometry of space-time. But then, what is there a change in? If gravity is acceleration and is universal, perhaps it is a change in the relation A to the acceleration A would otherwise be undergoing.

Jan 21, 1998

Place is an extrinsic denomination, a concept by which we objectify some aspect of reality - what is that aspect of reality? See Heinz' Schmidt's articles.

BIG

Place is relative, as Sikora said. So the result of A moving closer to B is the same as the universe so moving that B becomes closer to A. As in the case of other relations, e.g., being the double of, a change in either term of the relation can produce the same change in the relation. So the relativity of place really poses no problem for my attempt to replace the existence of spatial relations with causal influences on the environment.

The question is what reality changes when something changes place. The answer is that causal relations, (i.e., effects,) to (or in) the environment change. The problem was that the same causal influence change could come about through different changes in place, e.g., if A moves closer to B or B to A. But relative to the universe as a whole, it does not matter whether a causal influence state comes about by A being at rest and the universe moving or vice versa.

To exist is to be somewhere, i.e., to be in place. For a cause to act, to produce an effect, the cause must exist there, where it acts, where it produces the effect. For its production of the effect is just the existence of the effect as dependent on it; so its power must be where the effect is. So God's power must be where the effect is. This is what it means for the cause to exist there, i.e., its influence is there. But other than the change going on in the patient, the influence has no reality. So to influence the patient is to be there, to exist there.

Mar 12, 1998

Mathematically, there is nothing more to describe, there are no more questions to ask, than what can be described as a change in the geometry of a space-time continuum. That's all there is to say.

Maybe this helps to understand what Maritain means by suggesting "If you want a certain kind of theory, a certain approach, then you will necessarily use BORs. Maybe he's not implying by the "if" that you could have a different kind of mathematical science, or a different kind of scientific theory. He is saying, if you want to do mathematical physics, if you want to do physics quantitatively and deduce from mathematical assumptions, then if and when you think of viewing space/time data and space/time descriptions as if they were coordinates in one space/time continuum, you will know that you can't want anymore of a description than describing the "geometry" of that continuum can give you.

Someone might say, "What do you mean 'If I want to do mathematical physics,' what other kind of physics is there? Well, Maritain does not mean that there is another kind that could do the same thing for you that mathematical physics does, something that will get you the same results about predicting events by space/time coordinates but will get them by starting from a different kind of theory. He means the opposite. Only mathematical physics will give you that. But he means there are other kinds of things to learn about nature. The kind of things biology, geology, etc. learn, and the kind of things the philosophy of nature learns. But if you set out to deduce the measurable aspects of nature, you will inevitably get many BORs.

But if the success of mathematical theories derives from the fact that quantity is both a reality and the first accident, why must any of the quantitative constructs that science uses be BORs? Because the data science has available can be simpler than the reality, because a dianoetic knowledge of natural events would be ontological, not empirical. And for a reason I haven't thought of before: the quantitative aspects of things though perfectly real need not derive from the things' substantial forms but from accidents of the disposition of matter resulting from the history of the universe.

For example, man is a featherless biped. This is a way of knowing what man is. For "biped" and "featherless" are both ways of answering the question "What is it?" about something. We can say that "featherless biped" is a superficial understanding of what man is, but only if we are ready to define the goal or goals from the perspective of which some ways of knowing what man is are more or less superficial than others. But defining those different perspectives is precisely what Maritain is striving to do.

"Featherless biped" gives us only a perinoetic understanding of what man is because a common accident like being bipedal need not result from the interior nature of man's substantial form. It may result from an historical accident in the evolution of man's body. For example, man's substantial form may require man to be pedal, or multi-pedal, or multi-appendaged, but not to have this or than number of feet, or to have both legs and arms, etc. So a combination of common accidents may not tell us anything revelatory of the nature of a specific kind of substantial form.

And among such nonrevelatory, or nondianoetic, common accidents are quantitative features like the two-ness of our feet, hands, eyes, nostrils, etc.

Causality in science and in philosophy, Apr 1, 1998

Science does not determine what to believe about causality. Causality determines what to believe in science – just as nonstandard logic requires us to use standard logic. That is, to verify the nonphilosophic uses of causality in science we have to rely on our philosophic understanding of causality.

Apr 27, 1998

We discover new ways of describing the world, e.g., chaos theory, mandelbrot sets, non-euclidean geometries, statistics. Thus we discover new kinds of statements we could not have made before (and hence neither could we have contradicted them before).

References from *The Thomist*, Wallace, Lavane, DiNoia Aquinas' argument against abortion, August 22, 1997

Commentary on the Sentences, Book 4, distinction 31 L (primo, beginning). Grisez, *Abortion, the Myths, the Realities, the Arguments*. John Connery, *Abortion: the Development of the Roman Catholic Perspective*.

Act limited by potency, infinity, act-limit, August 8, 1997

Two things can be measured against each other only if they have some property in common (as opposed to one of them's not having but being that property?)

Logical relations, definition of logic, Logic, PNC article, formal systems

aa, Jun 17, 1998

Every question in or every question about a nonstandard logic must have a yes or no answer, or it does not have any answer. Or it must be expressible as a yes or no question. E.g., is "p" a theorem? Yes or No. Is this proof valid? Yes or No. If a proof did not give me us knowledge that "p is a theorem" is true, the proof would not have the value for us that we need it to have to be aware of logical success, of technical logical success.

-p takes away p. But does positing p take away -p? If -p is posited and positing p does not take away -p, then -p does not take away p. Why? Because we are letting ourselves posit that which -p takes away, namely, p, even though we have already posited -p. So if -p takes away p, p must take away -p and vice versa.

aa, Apr 27, 1998

Just as Putnam says Tarski is technically successful and philosophically (epistemologically) irrelevant, I am saying that formal systems are irrelevant to the nature of logical awareness. That is, (1) There is such a thing as awareness of necessary truth based on logical relations; (2) awareness of the validity of a step in a formal system is not the same as (1); and (3) without (1) we could not be aware of the validity of step in a formal system. A step in a formal system is just as instance of (1); it does not explain (1), but (1) explains it.

We must use logic to do logic, and the logic we must use is bivalent and consistent, even if the logic that we do by its means is multivalent and/or dialectical.

aa, Jan 22, 1998

LCOs are not psychological relations. They come into awareness as a result of psychological acts, but all objects of awareness become so through such acts.

aa, Jan 21, 1998

The paragraph on "not not .5" Of course, this assumes a meaning for "not", but it would be irrelevant to argue whether this meaning is in the metalanguage as opposed to the language. The important thing is that for which "not" is used; that which it communicates, at whatever level it is communicated. The important thing is what we know, by implication, if we know that it is true that p does not not have value .5.

July 11, 1997 BIG

Logic does not concern laws of thought in any psychologistic sense. It concerns objects of awareness because they are relations between other objects of awareness. Further these relations pertain to causally prior objects of awareness because these prior objects have become objects of awareness; this distinguishes these relations from relations that obtain between objects of awareness in their pre-objective state.

Their may be other such secondary relations that are not the concern of logic. We must further say that these relations between prior objects of awareness affect or concern the truth-value of these objects of awareness called statements. That is some relations between statements that belong to statements only because they are objects of awareness (the relations do not pertain directly to the states of affairs that statements make objects of awareness) relate the truth-values of different statements or different occurrences of a statement. Or some relations between objects of awareness as objects of awareness are such that they affect the relations between the truth-values of statements.

So logical relations belong to objects "as objects" in two causal senses of "as". First, they come into awareness as a result of other objects being made objects of awareness; that is, they pertain to other objects only as a result of other objects becoming objects of awareness and only in their state of being objects of awareness (as opposed to other relations that may result from prior objects being objects of awareness but do not pertain to their state of being objects of awareness). Second,

among the relations satisfying the first description, they are those that relate the truth-values of statements in the way described. This second condition is causal, and so allows "as objects" to have a causal sense, because it concerns a final cause, a goal, we have in making things objects of awareness, the goal of being aware of the truth-value of certain objects of awareness, statements.

This definition, of course, assumes that truth itself is not a relation pertaining to objects in their pre-objective state but is one of the relations pertaining to objects only as a result of having been made objects by means of statements.

July 28, 1997

We cannot arrive at a pragmatic view of which logic to use without using inferences, and we cannot apply the pragmatic view once arrived at without using inferences. For the reason we accept a theory T on pragmatic grounds are the implications of T, in contrast to the implications of competing theories. E.g. the implications of T may be simpler than those of other theories.

August 8, 1997

The need for self-evidence is the reason we need not make explicit the inference that is implicit in our awareness of the validity of a step in a formal proof. The validity must be self-evident. Making the implicit argument explicit would make the awareness of validity depend on the self-evidence of other arguments. And this makes the awareness more complex than the original awareness of self-evident necessity, that is, the awareness of validity would depend on the self-evident necessity of more complex implicitly known arguments.

August 8, 1997

In "If p then q" we happen to use "If . . . then" for a particular linguistically constituted relation between the truth-values of p and q such that when that relation holds (when "if p then q" is true) and p holds, q must be true unless that relation is not what it is. So "If P the q" and "P" not only materially imply a, but given that a relation of material implication holds between p and q, the truth of that relation and of p entails q. For entailment means that the cause of the impossibility of q's not being true if the premises are true is logical relations, linguistically constituted relations between the premises.

That p extensionally implies q and that p, extensionally implies q. But together they also intensionally imply q. For linguistically constituted relations between "p extensionally implies q" and "p is true" cause the necessity of the consequent, q. So there is a "metaphysical" sense of entailment in addition to an epistemological sense of entailment.

August 8, 1997

Self-evident necessity does not result from stipulation. Neither is it relative to a language in Sellar's sense, that is, it is no more relative to a language than the contingent truths of the language are.

August 8, 1997

The necessary and sufficient conditions for awareness of the validity of a step in a formal proof are not identical, though related to, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the awareness of the logical necessity of the conclusion or the rule from which it is drawn, although it is identical to the conditions for awareness that the conclusion does indeed follow from the rule. That is, the awareness that the conclusion follows validly from the rule is an instance of an implicit awareness of the necessity of a (different) rule.

For any awareness of the validity of an inference is an implicit awareness of the necessary truth of a rule stating that any inference based on the linguistically constituted relations this inference exhibits is valid.

Awareness that a step satisfies rules is an awareness of an validity-of-inference relation. And so it is awareness that if the rule is what it is, this step is valid. That is, if X is a rule, then (3) is a valid step; or if X is a rule, then step (3) satisfies a rule.

August 8, 1997

How can sentences like (II) not sometimes be true, if we cannot express everything at once; if we cannot say everything at once?

The reason for treating (II) as only hypothetically true. In it, the linguistically constituted relations are not explicit. So their presence there is somewhat hypothetical, as opposed to the way they are explicitly present in "A is not non-A". But if their hypothetical presence could cause necessity, or their implicit presence, then a fortiori, their actual occurrence does. So I wanted a hypothetical example first.

August 8, 1997

As long as logical awareness is bivalent, binary operators express at least necessary conditions for valid inference. As long as unary relations are simpler than binary, and binary simpler than tertiary, rules for unary relations will at least express necessary conditions for employing binary operators, and rules for binary operators will express necessary conditions for employing tertiary.

August 8, 1997 BIG

And why should we not be able to express certain necessary truths about inference relations by means of truth-functional operators? The only real question is whether these necessary truths are sufficient for logic. For truth-functionally defined operators are just operators defined by abstract, unspecified values (1 and 0). They are value-defined operators, where the values can be unspecified unary values, unspecified binary values, etc. So operators defined otherwise must be just specifications of these abstract value-defined operators.

For the operators defined otherwise by the rules for an object language must have either unary, binary, or tertiary values, etc. And if so each operator that takes a binary value, for example, must be just a specification of an operator governed by the rules for any unspecified binary value. So Routely must be right. Any operator defined otherwise will be just a specification that presupposes and includes what is expressed by a truth-functional definition, if the result of the other definition is that the operator does bear some value, that is, either a unary, binary, etc. value. As defined by the unspecified truth tables, the operator is defined is like color in relation to red.

The binary truth tables generate knowledge of necessary truths, i.e., stipulation in the tables together with logically necessary rules (there are only so many sets of binary values, etc.) Generate necessary truths about conjunction, etc.

And these truths happen to be fundamental to all other logical rules by reason of the fact that they are binary rather than tertiary, etc.

August 8, 1997, Limits of formal systems BIG

Other examples of the limits of formal systems from the point of view of their usefulness for inquiries demanding ontological analysis: The way the problem of universals is defined (see Poinsot article). Routely p. xi, the irrelevance of extensional logic to a priori reasoning. Quine on regimentation (the sacrilization of logic).

August 8, 1997, Church's thesis, formal definitions of informal notions, limits of formal systems, Turing machine, recursive functions - BIG

There is more to the limitation of the kind of analysis, and the kind of arguments one gives for the analysis, of intuitive notions by formal means. Not only is there always a gap because you cannot make an absolute connection between the intuitive and the constructed. But also awareness of validity, including awareness of the validity of a step in a recursive proof, can never be explained by the methods of constructing formal proofs, because it can never be caused by the methods of constructing formal proofs. Awareness of necessity and validity always involve "intuitive" notions because they always must involve implicit, not explicit, awareness of the truth of the rules governing the inference.

August 26, 1997, limits of formal systems, Godel's proof, BIG, BIG

Formal methods show that from certain rules and certain assumptions, contradiction necessarily follows. The assumption in question is the assumption that the rules are complete. Completeness is a characteristic of a tool of logic. Godel shows that assuming that tool to have completeness produces a contradiction. So he shows that this tool will never be such that (1) it can define a set of wffs including numbers and (2) it can define a set of rules such that all wffs can be known to be true or false. So basically what he is showing is the limitation of this tool as a tool of logic.

In terms of awareness, we can be aware that a self-referential sentence is false the way colors are neither odd nor even, i.e., both statements are false. But we do not make that distinction as a result yielded from using the tool of formal method. That tool is just not suited to produce that result or its opposite. So Godel shows, that if we do not make that distinction concerning self-referential statements, formal methods yield contradictions in certain cases. Likewise, formal methods show that everything follows from contradiction, but we can be aware that such a conclusion has no necessity. Likewise, we can be aware that completeness does not really impose contradiction with necessity, but contradiction only follows if applies rules to self-referential statements as if they were just like other statements. Similarly, contradiction implies everything if we apply the rule of disjunctive syllogism as if it still retained its force when we permit contradiction.

September 25, 1997

Contradiction doesn't say everything; it says nothing.

Jan 5, 1998

Whatever mental states, if any, are required for awareness of necessary truths must be included in, are a subset of, the mental states required for knowing contingent truths and empirical truths.

Jan 5, 1998

. . . We exclude the possibility of (awareness of) the validity of any further inferences in the nonstandard system.

C end D, predicament, July 28, 1997 BIG

But look at the successes we have had in refuting the errors of the past generation of philosophers. But (1) those are negative successes and (2) every generation of philosophers has been able to claim the same kind of negative success. Every generation has also said that "We are the generation that is finally on track to produce positive successes." The fact that every generation has said that does not prove that we are not a generation where the statement has finally come true.

That could be the case someday. But where are the signs that it is the case today? Those signs would consist of the production of fewer paradoxes and disagreements than in previous generations. And we certainly have not produced that kind of evidence.

The opponent replies: OK, we don't have those two kinds of evidence but we have another kind, i.e., our methods are based on successful methods in logic. Yes, but previous generations thought the same thing.

Again, the opponent says, but we can only do the best we can. We are doing philosophy the best way possible (given the state of its development) at this time. But the truth of that statement presupposes the point I am questioning. For if philosophical truths are intrinsically less socializable, less fungible, less communicable even though they are public, than other kinds of truth, we may well have overlooked a better way of doing philosophy in the past or present.

Jan 5, 1998

Ontology/logic article, epistemological fallacy, Kelly, July 9, 1997

Examples to use in article showing that, even when claiming to, analysts do not escape the fallacy of basing ontology on logic.

Rescher's claim that his paraconsistent world is ontological, not logical. The proof that what "A is not what A is" in the Everything-Follows article shows that it is not circular, as Rescher claims that it is, to argue against inconsistent worlds on the basis of consistent logic.

The irrelevance of Tarski's account of truth to any philosophical problems about truth, and hence the irrelevance of disquotational philosophers. The metalanguage/object language distinction is at most relevant to a tool of logic, not to logic, and logic itself is not philosophy. The problem shows up in the fact that Tarski's account of truth is plausible only because we implicitly declare "'S' is true if and only if S" a TRUE sentence, in the same sense of truth.

Also re Tarski, bring in (a) "this sentence is". Is (a) prime? No, so is it divisible by something other than one and itself? No, neither. Nor is it either scalene, equilateral, or icosoles. In the same way, it is false that (a) is either true or false.

The book, A Philosophical Introduction to Set Theory, and its argument that sets cannot be mental entities, since there are sets we have never thought of, and those we have thought of we have never exhaustively counted. (Pollard, p. 43, quoting Max Black) No, until we think of them, they are not SETS. And we think of them not by counting them but, as always before we can begin to count something, we think of the principle of unity that will make them members of one set. That is, we count apples or oranges, etc.

The reviewer of Causal Realism who said I owed an account of the logic of causal relations.

The BU atheist who spoke at the Merrimack SCP meeting and only used post-Fregean definitions because they are clearer than previous definitions. His name is Michael Martin and he has a book. Warren Kay gave me his name.

Chuck Kelly's theology articles and the references he cites there saying that, e.g., predicating "is identical to X" or "knows this contingency" of God puts a relation to creatures in God, especially in light of his comments about Aquinas. Why not point out that Aquinas denies that fundamental assumption without which Chuck's efforts are without point? Between "A knows B" and "B is known by A" the logic may be completely different, but the state of affairs that makes each of those sentences true is the same state of affairs. The identity cannot be in the logical aspects of those statements, only in the non-logical aspects; logically they differ, but the ontological cause of their truth does not differ.

Check Kelly's references to critiques of Aquinas's use of "qua" to explain statements about the Trinity and the Incarnation. These should be given a causal, not a logical, meaning. For example, see the causal explanation of "objects qua objects in the preceding note.

Quine's examples of being a rabbit, having rabbithood, etc.

Hanson's examples and my examples against him.

See Putnam's appendix to Representation and Reality.

See Lowenheim-Skolem theorem in Ontological Relativity and other essays.

Life, June 16, 1997 BIG

Life refers to the self origination of motion. You see that ant crawling on the floor and realize that the ant is alive, i.e., that it is causing itself to move, that it is the cause of its own motion.

Can this concept be clarified by consideration that no cause acts alone, as in the article on Abortion. There it is argued that a putative chemical from the mother is not what orients the fetus toward the future production of ends that are human. Why? Because such a chemical could not give the fetus that specific orientation, just as water or nitrogen is not what specifically orients an acorn to the production of an oak. Likewise, the specific features of the ants motion have their origin in the structure of the ant, not in the causes whose cooperation the ant needs in order to move.

Perhaps stick the vegetative example, the acorn. The water in the acorn may be the source of motions by which one part of the water acts on another. Such motions may be found wherever water is found. The nature of water, however, does not account for those motions of the acorn in which in part of the acorn acts on another so as to orient the acorn's action to the production of an oak. The structure of the acorn, as opposed to the structures of its water or nitrogen, accounts for the fact that the acorn originates motions with the specific effect of orienting it to the production of an oak.

But what is the differences between life and inanimate causality, if water and other physical causes can be the source of motions in which one part acts on another? Life would have to be defined as one part acting on another so as to maintain the causal system in existence. The living causal system is specifically oriented to originate motions of one part on another such that the causal system is maintained in existence as such a causal system. Here "maintained in existence" refers to the fact that despite other changes, especially changes in the physical parts making it up, the same causal system exists.

Can human beings create such self-starting causal systems? Part of the causality of a living system depends on the fact that it is maintaining itself in existence by replacing or adding parts. That is, its maintenance of itself in existence in such ways is not just an effect of its causality, it is essential to the causality itself as something of which the system is the active source. That is, the maintenance depends on such motions as on the active source of the system's keeping itself in existence.

Jan 3, 1998

One important question to ask about life is whether the ability to perform living functions can derive from an external efficient cause that acts on an already-existing substance to give that substance a new accidental form. If not, then a living substance must have a different kind of substantial form than does a non-living substance.

One life function that might not be explainable this way is reproduction. To have the ability to reproduce is to have a certain kind of power. The object of that power is a certain kind of effect. What kind? And effect with the same kind of power. Reproduction is power X, which is the ability to produce an effect with power X. But does not every cause produce its like?

Immanent action

A substance that already has the power to produce an immanent action can passively receive a form from an external cause, which form puts its internal capacity for IA into act so that it now produces an IA, that is, produces an act which is internal to it, but not internal to it as a passively received form, not internal to it as a form actuating a passive potency for receiving forms, but a potency for having forms linked to it by the relation ab or from.

Any externally received form that modulates a substance's action must presuppose some active disposition already existing in the substance. Could an externally received form make the difference between an active disposition to produce an effect received passively by a subject which, for other reasons, must be considered part of

the same substance, and an active disposition to produce an effect that does not actuate a passive disposition of the substance?

A substance already has disposition D. On receiving a form that actuates D, another form simultaneously emerges from the substance through actuated D. What does this mean. In the case of transitive action, it means that any substance with D must also be a substance with a passive potency P. D must necessarily be linked with P in a single substance. And when D is altered by an external form, P cannot remain what it is; P must also undergo a change, because D is now something different from what it was before.

Assume that the change in P is the only new form in addition to the form received by D and which forced P to cease being what it is. Could D receive some other kind of form from an external cause such that, in addition to the change undergone by P, there is another new form in the substance, not actuating a passive potency of the substance. There is no reason why this could not happen. But there must already be a disposition for causing such an additional form, on actuation by an external cause, in the substance.

So perhaps all we can say is that if we know there is a disposition in the substance that can only cause a passive change in another part of the substance, then an external cause cannot change that disposition into a disposition to produce an immanent act. But if there is a disposition to produce an immanent act, that does not prevent a passive actuation from also resulting from the disposition's possession of a new form received from an external cause.

So we can indeed conclude that the external cause cannot give a substance a disposition for producing an immanent act. The question is when can we know that a disposition for producing only a transitive act when it receives external form X is not also be a disposition for producing an immanent act if it had received external form Y. We know that Y cannot be the cause of its having the prior disposition for immanent action. But how do we know that a disposition that so far has only manifested an ability to perform transitive acts could not also perform immanent acts, given the right kind of stimulation from the environment?

The question would be why are these the same disposition, or why are they not the same disposition. How do we distinguish dispositions from one another? But note well, this is not the Quinean question of how we individuate abstract entities. We are talking about how we distinguish dispositions oriented to different kinds of effects. When the cause of an effect having property F must be different from a cause of an effect having property G, we know *ipso facto* that these causal dispositions are ontologically, not just logically distinct. So this is an ontological argument, not just a logical argument. The logical distinction of individuals results from, is an effect of, an ontological necessity.

We know that a disposition form immanent acts may also be a disposition for transitive acts. So the question is how do we know that a disposition for transitive acts with this or that property could not also be a disposition for immanent acts with this or that other property? An external cause cannot make a disposition into a disposition for immanent acts if it is not one already. But how do we know that a disposition for transitive acts is not also a disposition for hitherto unrecognized or hitherto unproduced immanent acts.

If the transitive acts that may accompany immanent acts have a specific character that allows us to say that a disposition for this kind of transitive act must differ from a disposition for this other kind of transitive act, then we can distinguish one disposition from another and say that a substance with a disposition for transitive acts of type I, the type accompanying immanent acts, must differ substantially from a substance that does not have a disposition for transitive acts of type I.

Identity theory of truth, word-functions, meanings, what things are, May 20, 1997

Why do I use constructions like "what it is to be an X" instead of "what an X is"? One reason is that the former construction is less likely to be misconstrued lexicologically as "what an 'X' is". "What is it to be an X" versus "what is it to be an 'X'". At least that was my hope.

Paralogues, Communicability and difficulty, predicament, May 20, 1997

A pure relation is *more* of a relation, more of what it is to be a relation, than is a mixed relation. A substance is more of a being, more of what a being is, than is an accident. Entitative existence is more of what existence is than is intentional existence. God's goodness is infinitely more of what goodness is, infinitely more of a goodness, than is a creature's goodness.

In contrast, a rational animal is not more of an animal than is an irrational animal. Nor is an irrational animal more of an animal than is a rational animal.

Sensation hypothesis, causes of sensation, self-consciousness, May 20, 1997

Some more vocabulary of action used to describe sensation or the contrast between sensation and imagination: there are "weak" sensations (Simon uses the phrase in his essay on sensation) and "feint" sensations. Likewise, images are "weaker" or "feinter" than sensations are.

The object of the soul's act of sensing and the form by which the sense power produces its act are the same thing: the action of the environment. Memory and imagination also objectify the action of the environment, but they do not objectify it under the aspect of an action presently received. For memory and imagination do not take place through that very action as the form through which the object is made present. In sensing, the form through which the object is present is that action itself.

This is the lowest form of cognition because the form through which it occurs is the same (thing) as the object, i.e., is also the object. (Is this also true of self-reflection, the other kind of consciousness that gives us an actual existent directly and as such?) (The identity of species and object is a better formula than the identity of immanent action and transitive action. There is an immanent action distinct from a transitive action, but not a species distinct from an object. On the other hand, in the immanent act the same transitive act exists again intentionally. Or, the immanent action is an intentional existence of the transitive action itself.)

The form through which sensation occurs, that is, the action received, has an entitative relation of dependence, or is an entitative relation of dependence, on an agent. In sense awareness, that entitative relation exists intentionally. In imagination, the object exists intentionally, but its entitative relation to its cause does not; for the form through which imagination takes place is not an entitative relation of dependence on the object but on the subject of awareness. In sensation, a feature of ourselves, a feature existing entitatively in us, that is, the action received, has or is a relation of dependence on what is not ourselves. (A relation of dependence in the order of efficient causality.) In imagination, a feature of ourselves, the image in the psychological sense, has a relation of dependence on our own efficient causality, not on the efficient causality of the environment.

In sensation we produce an act as an entitative existent, but the object of that act is action dependent on the external agent, and so the action's dependence on an external agent now exists intentionally. The intentional existence of that dependence results from us; the entitative existence of that dependence results from the environment.

Apr 27, 1998

We are aware of actual existents sensed as such (as actual existents) as causes of our awareness in the order of exercise. The imagined apple and the sensed apple are both causes of our cognition in the order of specification. The sensed apple is also a cause of our cognition in the order of exercise and in sensation we are aware of the object as causing our cognition in the order of exercise.

That is, in sensation, that object that is the cause of our cognition in the order of specification includes, as one of the features that causes our cognition in the order of specification, the causing of our sensation by that object in the order of exercise.

Does this mean that there is a very minimal but essential reflection on the self at the level of sensation? Why not? That would be the first kind of consciousness, *petites conceptions*?, a chimp's kind would be next, and so on.

Mar 20, 1999

Whether it is a genuine perception or an hallucination, there is always the appearance of real existence. Why? There is the appearance of the dependence of awareness of the object, not just on the subject of the awareness, but on the object itself. "Appearance of dependence" means there is always the appearance that the awareness is caused, not just by the subject of awareness being what it is, but by the object's being what it is. But the appearance of causal dependence on the object is the appearance of dependence on the action of the object. How can awareness of the object appear to depend on the action of the object? Dependence on the action of the object must itself be, or at least be part of, the object we are aware of. For that is what it means to say that X, i.e., to say that is to say "that X" is an object of

awareness.

So if an experience is not hallucinatory, it IS an awareness of action as action, of causal dependence as causal dependence.

As I turn my head, I do not know what objects will enter my field of vision next. That statement is merely negative. More than that negative statement, when a new object enters my field of vision, the object enters the vision as if it itself were causing its presence in my vision. I am causing my eyes to move and, so, am causing my field of vision to change direction; and I am aware that I am so doing. But I am aware of the objects as if their existence was causing their presence in my vision. To say this is NOT to say that the object seen appears to be caused to be seen by something other than the object, something behind the object that the object reveals indirectly. The awareness that the object causes is awareness of the object itself. So at least part of the object we are aware of is action, causality, on the sensory power, perceived as action, as causality or causal dependence.

Self-consciousness, animal consciousness, May 2, 1997 BIG

To animals other than chimps lack self-consciousness because they do not recognize themselves in mirrors? No, self-consciousness exists at the most basic level, the sense of touch. So dogs and cats are aware of their own existence. But when they look in a mirror they do not associate what they are aware of by sight with one of the things they are aware of by touch. When the ability to associate those two things emerges, it is not the emergence of self-consciousness as something radically new. It is just one step in the development of what was there all along.

AI, Adler-U, Jun 17, 1998

How to ask a machine: Are you conscious? Don't ask it if it is self-conscious. Ask about the contents of self-consciousness, that is, the prior consciousness of the other that self-consciousness is consciousness of.

Are you related to, do you have a relation to ... To the word "triangle"? Yes. To that for which the word "triangle" is used? Here one answer might be "Yes, I have a relation to that triangle, and that triangle, and that triangle, ad infinitum" (Wittgenstein on the series). Since it can't be related to an actual infinity of triangles, can we replace the reference to the members of the set by a reference to a formula that covers each member, the formula for a triangle? Yes, but then we have to ask the same questions about each sign in the formula.

Can I ask it "But do you have the kind of relation to that for which "triangle" is used that my Poincaré article shows to be a necessary cause of the behavior of using "triangle" meaningfully?" "Yes, I am related to that, that, that, etc. and each of them instantiates that for which "triangle" is used." But do you have a relation to it such that what individuates that, and that, and that is not included? "Well, I've got a relation to a math formula that applies to all triangles." But do you have a relation to each term in the formula such that you are related to that for which the term is used without including what differentiates this and that?

Tarski says liar paradoxes show ordinary language rationally defective and logically unworkable "its truth conditions being such that one is forced to classify mutually inconsistent statements as true". Maybe the lesson of the liar is the exact opposite, or nearly the exact opposite; and maybe the reference to truth conditions shows this.

The real conclusion should be that it is rationally defective to apply the standards of formal systems to natural language. It is by applying that standard that we think the liar leads to Tarski's conclusion. The reference to truth conditions shows that we are applying that standard. In other words, does contradiction really result unless we look only at the *form* of apparent sentences. There is no need to look for truth conditions unless a string is a sentence. And we have to decide that before applying the methods of formal systems to them. (Just as Hempel's critique of the verification principle presupposes that we already know that the strings of marks being evaluated do in fact express meaningful propositions. Hempel's apparently formal critique just gave logical positivists an apparent excuse to do what they wanted to do for years, dump the verification principle. They wanted to do it because they knew that critiques of a different kind from the formal, a la Hempel, were valid, but their dogmas gave them no grounds to admit they were valid. Hempel appeared to give them an out.)

To get to the point of explaining the liar's contradictions in terms of deficiency's of natural language, we have to first bypass other ways of explaining them: ways of explaining them other than in terms of whether the language satisfies some standard of logical "deficiency" or "workableness". In fact, does not the implicit application of such a standard beg the question of whether formal methods account for our awareness of the logical necessity that Tarski finds natural language to violate? Or at least some similarly formulated question?

Before we apply formal methods to sentences like (A) "This sentence is false" we can perform analyse like the following. And if we can perform them, we do not need to treat the above as a "sentence" other than grammatically. If we do not need to so treat them, we do not need to apply formal methods to them. So Tarski implicitly assumes that we cannot and should not perform analyses like the following.

(A) is grammatically a sentence. Is it semantically (one of Tarski's favorite terms borrowed from natural language) a sentence? Or is it like "The green religion walks furiously," i.e., a non"sense" statement, a statement having no semantical sense? We can even say it is a semantically false statement, like (B) "This sentence is isoscoles." It is false that the sentence is isosceles, but it does not follow that the sentence is scalene or equilateral. It is none of the above. Likewise we can say "This sentence is false" is false, and "This sentence is true" is false.

To see why consider (C) "This string of marks is . . ." Can we say that the string of marks is isoscoles? That is, if we add "isoscoles" withing the quotes around (C), do we produce a semantically meaningful statement? We can say yes, but not in the sense that, if the statement is false, some contrary statement is true. We can say that this sentence is not isoscoles is true, but also that this sentence is not scalence is true, etc. Likewise, we can say that "This sentence is not true" is true, but also that "This sentence "This sentence is not false" is not true and "This sentence is true" is not true.

In other words, we are saying that "This sentence is false" does not fulfill the conditions (whatever they are; and we need not know) for a string of marks to be a bearer of truth or falsehood. Why? Because "This sentence is . . ." does not fulfill such conditions. Tarski will ask how do we know that C's lack of truth or falsehood implies A's failing to fulfill the conditions for truth or falsehood? The answer would seem to be that the opposite produces a contradiction. But Tarski has another way of avoiding that contradiction. Yes, but the problems with Tarski's method shows that my method is superior.

For one thing, Tarski concludes that a "language" cannot talk about its own relation to its objects. But what does he mean by the noise "language"? If he means what you and I mean by "language" then everyday we use our language to talk about its relation to objects without contradiction. And if we did not use our language to talk about our language's relation to its objects, we could not talk about that relation; for how else could we talk about it. Tarski says we can only talk about the relation of part of our language to its objects; and to do that, we must use a different part of our language. But if so, and that is far from clear, why not say that? Because saying that implies that a language can talk about its own relation to its objects.

Even if its only part B referring to part A, isn't it better to say that than to say its one language talking about a non-identical language?

For even though these parts are distinct, could they be learned in separation from one another? Could they acquire their meanings, their usefulness, their truth conditions, in separation from one another. Could they continue to have their meanings in separation from one another? That is, could they continue to have their meanings if we artificially distinguish between a language and a metalanguage the way Tarski does? (Tarski's move has a lot of possibly false implications.) In particular, consider the meaning of "true."

Tarski would probably want to say that his metalinguistic definition of "truth" is not itself a true or false statement but is a stipulation, an order, about how to apply the metalinguistic noise "true" to statements in the language. So that definition is not itself true or false. For if it were true or false, then "true" here would be a predicate in the meta-metalanguage, not in the metalanguage, and could not mean the same thing in the meta-metaL that it means in the metaL.

But if his definition is meant as sheer stipulation, why not define "false," instead of "true," this way? Or why not define "glug" or "arf" this way? The point is that Tarski is trading on the understanding we already have of the way we use the noise "true". The response might be that so trading is OK, because we are in the metaL, not the object L. But "'p' is true" is a statement in the metalanguage. ". . . is true if and only if snow is white" is a statement using an L where both "true," "snow," and "white" have meaning. And can Tarski avoid saying (D): ["'p' is true" is true]?

D is a statement in the meta-metaL on Tarski's analysis, not in the metaL. And the entire plausibility of defining the noise "true" of the metaL Tarski's way depends on "true" in "'p' is true" meaning the same as "true" in ["'p' is true" is true]. If we try to avoid saying D by using a Ramseyan analysis of "true", then the whole procedure is nullified at the very beginning, at the level of the object L. For if we use Ramsey to eliminate the need for using "true" as a predicate at D, we can also use it to eliminate the need for using "'p' is true". And if we can eliminate "'p' is true", we do not need the whole business of distinguishing object Ls metaLs to begin with. The purpose of doing that was to enable us to use "true" as a predicate applied to sentences. And also the assertive-redundancy theory of "true" implies that "true" has the same meaning in ({["'p' is true" is true] is true} is true). The fact that "true" would have the same meaning is what we say when we say that "true" is redundant. And the whole plausibility of Tarski depends on that redundancy.

Tarski might agree with all this and say that he'd rather deal with the noise "true" as if it were a predicate in the meta, not the object, L because of the clarity this achieves. Well, there's no question that we achieve greater clarity in formal systems than elsewhere, but that statement happens to be true, and the reason why we are attracted to formal methods is that that statement happens to be true and that we know that statement is true.

Besides, this is will-power philosophy a la the verification principle: I will use the noise "meaning" only of . . . But why not say that you will only use the noise "glug" that way? You want the stipulation to coincide with at least some use of the ordinary word "meaning." But then the verification principle puts you in the dilemma that your definition is either analytic, and so tautologically empty, or empirical, and so both falsifiable and having no normative force. You face this dilemma because they are the only two choices your definition of the noise "meaning" gives you. To avoid the dilemma by invoking the OL/ML distinction is precisely to beg the question.

In brief, Tarski assumes that the grammatical structure of a string of marks should be enough to tell us that we can apply the standard of "truth conditions" to it. When it turns out that using the grammatical structure as that criterion does not work, Tarski blames the language instead of the criterion. Then he concludes, circularly, that this proves that the criterion/truth-conditions analysis, i.e., the formal system approach as applied to natural language, is the correct one.

Why is this the "formal system" approach? Because we can speak of molecular propositions as having truth conditions, namely, the truth of the atomic sentences. But should we speak of atomic sentences as having truth conditions. We can't speak of them as having truth conditions *in the same sense* of "truth condition". Why? Because truth-functional sentences differ from simple sentences only in being logically different ways of saying the same thing that simple sentences say. Simple sentences do not differ from reality only in being logically different ways of saying

what reality (their presumed truth condition) says. They have their own way of differing only logically from reality. But the truth functional ways of differing logically from reality presuppose that prior way of differing only logically from reality. It is because truth functions are only logically distinct ways of *saying* what simple sentences say that they can be, and we can grasp them as being, necessarily true, while we cannot grasp the simple sentences as necessarily true (or at least not in the same way, not by logical relations rather than causal).

May 20, 1997

According to Rescher and B... Tarski argued that no language can talk about its own relation to its objects because doing so produces paradoxes. But at most this proves that some uses of a language to describe its relation to its objects produces paradoxes. We talk about the relation of English to its objects all the time, and we use English to do so without producing paradoxes.

Does the fact that such paradoxes sometimes occur prove anything special about the fact that these paradoxes occur when using a language to describe the language's relation to its objects? It might prove that if this were the only time that statements in everyday language produced philosophical paradox, but this is not the only time that philosophical paradoxes result from the statements of nontechnical language. And Tarski's solution to these specific paradoxes generates its own paradoxes.

Things specific to the human are within our immediate and direct grasp (through self-reflection; "direct" is a paralogue here). But how do we conceptualize those things so as to form propositions that are intersubjectively verifiable. Despite the apparent directness of knowledge of the human, that kind of knowledge has proven the most difficult to successfully conceptualize, as the history of epistemology shows.

From the point of view of concept formation, the most direct and connatural objects of our understanding are not things specifically human, especially where those things are to some degree immaterial. The connatural objects of our concepts are the material natures of material things, i.e., the material aspects of the natures of material things. So to conceptualize the specifically human we have to rely on negation. But negations can only inform against the background of positive information. Empirical concepts cannot yield that positive background, so what can? Only a knowledge of things common to the material and immaterial; and only ontological concepts provide that kind of conceptual knowledge.

So the fact that we must use negations does not imply that our knowledge is entirely negative. And even with respect to the specifically negative concepts, they can lead to positive knowledge and do not imply that the knowledge they yield is entirely negative. For the reason we need to conceptualize properly is in order to verify. One of the main means of verification is the *reductio ad absurdum*. A *reductio* does not yield merely negative knowledge. The negation enters by our denying the thing we want to prove and drawing a contradiction from that denial. What is proven need not be negative or entirely negative.

But in order to construct such proofs, we need concepts that we can negate and from whose negation we can reason, using other concepts, to a conclusion. To be useful at all, the negations must presuppose some positive concepts that are common to things on both sides of the negation. For example, "immaterial" is a negation, but it makes sense only when used with reference to immaterial *things* or *beings* or *causes* or *essences*, etc. So the use of *reductio ad absurdum* presupposes ontological concepts. And what is negated to generate the *reductio* can itself be a negation. We can negate a negation and show that the resulting positive statement yields a contradiction.

Few philosophers must have found a vocabulary for conceptualizing the deliverances of direct, introspective experience. What could that vocabulary consist in? It cannot consist of empirical concepts. They are what must be negated of the specifically human, or at least they include concepts that must be negated of the specifically human. And whatever is so negated cannot express what is common to the human and non-human.

One such vocabulary has been found. The problem is that the vocabulary defines its terms by reference to something we do not find when we turn to sense knowledge and catalogue all the objects the senses are capable of distinguishing from one another. But when we sense knowledge for that purpose, we have already committed the epistemological fallacy. We are already defining things by reference to how they are made an object of a particular kind of knowledge.

Yes, things become our objects only by means of sensibly distinguishable features. But the goal attained in that knowledge need not stop and the means. Rather the means are a means to something else. What that something else is, however, cannot be expressed solely in terms of those means. The means, awareness of sensible qualities, must itself be analysed in terms of the goal, e.g., analysed as the awareness of action on our sense organs as action.

The vocabulary that has been found defines terms by reference to real existence (as opposed to merely imagined, conceived, hypothesized, or possible existence – although it can be described as possible existence, not as exercised by things, but in its state as object: so note the paralogical relation between the object being real as opposed to possible existence and yet being objectified using the logical relation of possibility). Real existence is not found among the catalogue of features the senses can distinguish from each other, or that we distinguish from each other by means of sense knowledge (note the difference between those last 2 formulas: in fact, we distinguish between existence and non-existence by means of sense knowledge (plus memory, concepts, or something else); the senses themselves do not so distinguish.)

I cannot bring you to the intuition of being. But I can illustrate what I mean by defining the necessary ontological concepts in terms of existence and then showing

how they are used to describe interior, especially epistemological, phenomena.

Rescher and . . . , p. 31: "The possession of properties is governed by the semantic principle . . ." This is an example of using the techniques of formal languages to allegedly solve or avoid the problems of traditional metaphysics. That is, it is doing, or thinking one is doing, what traditional metaphysics tried to do, but doing it in a different way, a way that is superior because more precise and clear.

But of course, the fallacies of Rescher and friend are a good example of the futility of trying to answer traditional questions this way, of the irrelevance of this method to the traditional questions. The response might be that I prefer doing this kind of philosophy to the old, because this kind of philosophy gives me the feeling that I am in control of what I am doing, the feeling that I am doing something under control, something I unambiguously know how to handle.

There is nothing wrong with preferring that as long as you don't tell anyone else that their way of doing things is wrong, that is, as long as you don't turn your preference into an objective absolute. But the response might be that there is more to it than that. Not only does my way have admirable features because of which I prefer to do it, but you have to point out the features of your way that deserve any admiration at all.

The answer is, yes, I have to do that. But I do that by stating my rules for justifying my metaphysical assertions and providing justifications that indeed satisfy those rules. Then you can either attack my rules, attack my examples as not satisfying those rules, or both.

One way to "attack" the rules would be: I prefer not to play by those rules; there is nothing intrinsically wrong with them, but there would be too much risk of error involved in trying to follow them correctly. So I want to play a different game.

But that is exactly my point about the communicability of philosophy. I can provide rules of justification that are entirely valid and knowably so (knowably so by means of the very same rules). These rules are not impossible to implement but they are of a nature that there is a great degree of risk of error (and not knowing one is in error) in attempting to use them. So you may choose not to play this game, but this game happens to be one we cannot entirely avoid.

There is no more hope of agreement here than there is in politics. But just as in politics, we cannot avoid playing the game. And the fact that we cannot hope for agreement in politics does not mean that there is no answer to questions such as "Is it better to pursue course of action X or not pursue it?" Not only do such questions have answers, they can be knowable answers. That is, some people may have actual knowledge of answers to specific questions (though not the same people having knowledge of correct answers to all the questions: Joe knows the answer to question A but is mistaken about B). But the fact that Joe has achieved intersubjective verification about question A does not imply that the actual conditions of intersubjective communication in politics are such that Joe will succeed in communicating that verification to anyone else.

Also, Rescher's definitions, e.g., top of p. 32 and elsewhere, mislead him into believing that he is speaking ontologically as opposed to epistemologically. Those definitions are perfectly clear in themselves. But the mistake committed by Rescher and friend shows that the philosophical interpretation of the value of these definitions, the philosophical analysis of what is accomplished by definitions of this type, is far far from clear. Moreover, their clarity (of one kind) kind cause obfuscation (of another kind). Their clarity in their own domain dazzles us into putting more weight on them than they deserve (that is, putting weight on them that is beyond their own domain. Descartes committed exactly the same fallacy. We think of ourselves as having the tools to avoid all of the conundrums Descartes gave us, when we are only repeating his exact error but in different clothing, spectacularly different clothing.

Instead of philosophy's "predicament", how about philosophy's "condition" or "the condition of philosophy"?

Our philosophical experience indicates, inductively, two things. The first is that we cannot avoid philosophical questions. All attempts to show philosophical questions invalid or intrinsically fallacious fail by winding up committing the very

fallacies they condemn in others.

The second is that the conditions of philosophical communication are such that it may be possible for a philosopher to have intersubjectively verifiable knowledge on a particular point and yet not be able to communicate that knowledge to more than a few of his colleagues, and not even to the same colleagues on different points. By the rule of simplicity, this is the most that our experience allows us to conclude. It does not allow us to conclude that philosophical inquiries are intrinsically invalid.

Now we can ask why it should be the case that the conditions of intersubjective communication in philosophy are such. That is an interesting and valid question. But before even attempting to answer that question, we can know certain things, or we can rationally believe that certain statements are justified. Namely, we can know that if true, a theory explaining why conditions make intersubjective communication so difficult in philosophy will itself be subject to those conditions so that the intersubjective communication of the evidence for its truth (other than the experiential evidence?), i.e., the communication of the evidence for the causal conditions it hypothesizes (other than the experiential evidence from which we start, evidence about the effect, not the cause), that communication will itself be subject to the same difficulty.

Everyone embarking on a career in philosophy should know these things or should at least be made to confront this analysis of the history of philosophy.

From marginal comments to Introduction to Metaphysics of Knowledge, p. 31: "Either the knower is the other by his very nature or he possesses by nature only the aptitude to be the other."

The knower's substance has the aptitude to know. But the actual existence of that substance is not the actualization of that aptitude. For existence to be the actualization of that aptitude, the substance's existence would have to be the same as its act of knowledge. If the substance's existence is not the same as its act of knowledge, its act of knowledge must be an act of It must be the act of some kind of potency, but why not the act of a substance's potency for accidents?

Since a substance's existence is not the actualization of its aptitude for knowing, another act must actualize it. So the substance must produce another act. So the substance must have the aptitude to produce another act. Why cannot this aptitude to produce be identical with the substantial nature, not an accident, so that only the produced act is an accident?

One argument might be that the production of an act of knowing must be formally, not just virtually, an act of efficient causality. But the substance's first accidents must be produced by virtual, not formal, efficient causality.

Another argument might be this: A substance is not always producing that act, so it must always be producing its power to produce that act. If the substance was always producing that act, it would be through its act of existence that it produces its act of knowing. And so it would become the other by virtue of its act of existence.

Also, for a substance to go from potentially producing an act to actually producing it, requires that the substance receive a prior actualization passively every time it actively produces a new act. (That outside causality can only be of the accidental order; otherwise, it would destroy the substance.) What the substance receives from the outside agent cannot be the power itself, for then the acts of that power would not belong to, would not be acts of, the supposit. But if what the substance received from an outside agent were an accident residing directly in the substance, and not in a power distinct from the substance, that accident would be equivalent to a power received from an outside agent. For without that accident, the substance cannot produce its own act, but with that accident, the power can produce its own act.

Can it be existence, rather than subsistence, that is virtually identical with an act of producing necessary accidents? A cause must produce an effect in another. If existence produces an effect in the essence, existence has become the efficient cause, not the essence, although it must be the essence that produces its necessary accidents. Also, we have really made existence into a thing distinct from essence as from another thing. For that is what we do when we imagine the existence as a (virtual) agent.

Also, existence is received by essence. So if existence were producing the essence's necessary accidents, those accidents would be produced by something the essence receives and, therefore, not produced by an act exercised by the essence. The essence would not be producing its necessary accidents. The cause of the essence's existence would be producing the essence's necessary accidents, would be the cause of the essence's necessary accidents.

In immanent action, the received act prior to the action is not virtually identical with the production of the action. The immanent action itself is virtually identical with that production.

If subsistence is necessary for a substance to produce its necessary accidents, it would require a miracle for God to produce the necessary accidents without the substance's subsistence. Then the acts of the substance would be acts of God but not the acts of a secondary created supposit. Would these be acts produced with no subsistence whatsoever? Not if created subsistence is a participation in a perfection found in God, e.g., relations in the trinity. See Maritain on how his theory of subsistence ties in with subsistence in the Trinity.

If created subsistence is a participation in a perfection shared by all three persons, how can one person be the cause of those acts? They can be the acts of one person by, for instance, being statements about his relation to other persons that only one person could make.

Oct 9, 1997

That which is fatherhood itself is identical with that which is truth itself. But there can be a thing of which we can predicate fatherhood itself if and only if there is a thing such that (1) we can predicate sonship itself of it and (2) we can predicate all the same nonrelative predicates of it that we predicate of that which is fatherhood itself, including uniqueness, unicity, infinity, etc.

We can predicate being an Relation itself of an infinite being because formal relations need not be predicamental accidents to be formal. That which is goodness is the same as that which is truth. Goodness itself is truth itself. But fatherhood itself is not sonship itself.

Nothing *ontological* prevents there being an infinite formal relation. What prevents it is the alleged *logical* logical relation of identity and the alleged transitivity of the logical relation of identity. But can that logical relation ground an ontological truth.

Being fatherhood or sonship itself is not like being truth or goodness itself in all respects. Truth or goodness do not call for the existence of a relative opposite that, despite its relative opposition, is also something identical with the sole goodness itself and truth itself. If truth itself and goodness itself called for the existence of a corresponding opposite, they would call for the existence of contradictory or at least contrary opposites. But relative opposites need be neither contradictory to one another, like truth and untruth, nor contrary to one another, like truth and falsity.

There is one and only one that-which-is truth itself and goodness itself. Now this one and only that which is truth and goodness can also have something related to it by the relation F. But in order to have something related to it by the relation F, this one and only that-which-is-truth-and-goodness-themselves must also have something related to it by the relation S.

Jan 3, 1998

For "A Theory of the Incarnation" in the MS fire box:

Other than being what it is, other than existing in this way or that way, what does a creature need to be a cause? It needs something really distinct from itself. A creature cannot make out of nothing. This is why there is a problem about a substance causing its own necessary accidents. So this is a problem the theory of subsistence as something somehow distinct from the substantial essence can help solve.

But remember, the kind of efficient causality we are looking for need only be virtual efficient causality, since there is not an absolute distinction between agent (the essence with subsistence) and the patient (the essence merely with existence). But the theory of virtual presence can only work if there is something formally present that is identical with that which is virtually present. What is formally present? One thing that is formally present is the causality by which the substantial form causes prime matter to become this or that. The SF does not merely conjoin with the PM. The PM becomes something actual by the causality of the SF.

For other candidates for what is formally present when efficient causality is only virtually present, see the MS "Properties, Existence, Change."

Feb 24, 1998

There must be two acts of existence in Jesus. See Summa Contra G. I, 27,2 (and I, 22-26). "Divine existence cannot belong to any quiddity that is not existence itself."

Jun 17, 1998

The act of existence can't be the cause of our accidents. For that which exists is a passive cause relative to the act of existence, so that which exists would be a passive cause entirely relative to its accidents. The cause of the accidents must be that which existence actuates; it must be the actuated essence, the existing essence. And that is true of all cases and kinds of causality.

Having been actuated, the existing essence must then "do" something else: it must exercise the existence it has received.

To produce accidents is to thrust our existence outwards, is to push against other existents.

When we are aware that "He is called Cicero", we are then aware of that for which "Tully" is used. But we are aware of that for which "Tully" is used without being aware that "Tully" is so used. That is nonlexicological awareness of meaning.

But we can be aware of (acquainted with) that for which "Cicero" and "Tully" are used without being aware that any term is so used. This can also be nonlexicological awareness of *meaning*, even though know linguistic knowledge is involved. If we have all the psychological preconditions necessary (whatever they may be) for assigning a name to an object of acquaintance so that the only thing that needs to be added is the lexicological awareness that "Cicero" has this use, we have nonlexicological awareness of meaning. There may be many ways of being acquainted with that for which "Cicero" is used short of having all the psychological conditions necessary for assigning some word that use. Those would not be awareness of meaning in the nonlexicological sense. Nor do any of my arguments require that we have criteria for identifying instances of these distinct states.

Likewise, when we are acquainted with that for which "red" is used, we are acquainted with that for which "color" is used, even if we do not yet have a word for color as distinct from its instances. So not only is synonymy irrelevant, because we can be lexicologically mistaken, but any lexicological knowledge is irrelevant, any knowledge of the assignment of some noise to a particular use as a linguistic sign.

Still, to be aware of the truth (however it is expressed) that red is a color, we must become aware of that for which "color" is used in a manner distinct from our awareness of that for which "red" is used. Yes, but we need not yet have assigned any term for color. We may, for instance, just notice that red and green have something in common.

Abortion, AA, simple, highest secular value, choice, January 8, 1997

Mar 20, 1999 BIG

Is the principle (A) "Make any choice you want as long as it does not interfere with anyone else's choices?" sufficient for ethical behavior? One problem, of course, is that every choice we make places limits on the choices other people can make; so we need other principles to tell us which limits are valid and which are not. But there is a deeper problem.

By making (A) the sole principle, or at least the highest governing principle, the principle that gives meaning to the subordinate principles, we are implicitly taking away any reason for respecting the entity that makes the choice, taking away any special value belonging to the entity making the choice. For example, if the entity making the choice is a child of God or has an immortal soul and will live forever, the entity has a special value that deserves our respect before it makes any choices. But making (A) the regulatory principle implicitly takes away that value. Why?

Consider, for example, the common view that sex is ok as long as it is consensual, a matter of choice, for both parties. Can we expect pedophiles, rapists and others to control their behavior when all other forms of sex are permitted? That is, can we expect pedophiles and rapists to submit to choice as the regulatory principle and recognize that choice, not the unrestricted satisfaction of their sexual desires, is the important value to honor?

By permitting any kind of sex as long as it is consensual, we have implicitly taken away the value of the entities making choices that is the real ground of morality. We have taken away their value as ends-in-themselves. For if they are ends-in-themselves, then sex should not be used in a way inconsistent with the value of making persons. Since sex can be used in that way, persons are not that for the sake of which everything else exists, and so the entities making choices need not be treated as ends-in-themselves.

September 8, 1997

We say, in effect, that choice is the highest value. We at least imply that choice is the highest value. Can the highest ethical principle be do anything you want as long as you do not interfere with other's pursuit of their ends? But every choice we make affects other's pursuit of their ends either by commission or omission. By choosing to type notes right now, I am preventing myself from working at a soup kitchen, from political activism, from praying, etc.

And in actual fact, for which there is abundant empirical evidence, asking people to respect the choices of others does not work if people do not at the same time value the existence of the entity to whom those choices belong. Examples abound of the failure to get people to respect the choices of others if we give them no reason, or if we take away any reason or obligation, to value the existence of those to whom the choices belong. If the existence of the entity is not an existence of an end-in-itself, why should we make respect for that entity's choices the highest value? The fact that we are equal with that entity, even though neither she nor we are ends-in-se? The failure of equality as a moral absolute (see Gewirth) shows that our faculties of reason and desire orient us to metaphysical absolutes.

Examples of choice not being respected: date rape, rape, sexual harassment, child abuse, involuntary euthanasia, no help for gays who want to change, support for involuntary birth control and abortion in China. Prostitution is allegedly victimless, but does the John respect the prostitute as a person? No, even though he justifies his action by saying what she did was voluntary.

A morality of equality based on enlightened self-interest, I'll scratch your back if you scratch mine, may work out by accident the majority of the time. But a mere majority of the time is not enough. Tell that to the person who is a victim of child abuse because we gave the abuser no more important ethical value than respect the choices of others.

August 26, 1997

Does society need a highest secular value? If so, we need it as something to guide our choices. Can we say that the only value we need is to choose anything you want as long as you do not interfere with someone else's choices? Then we might consider

choice itself the highest value. But it can't be. Choice is a means to whatever is the end of the choice. So it gets its value from its end. So if no end imposes itself prior to choice, there is no highest value, that is, it is not the case that choice is the highest value, because there is no highest value.

And the fact of the matter is that we must always be interfering with other people's choices. So we need values other than choice to guide our choices.

Abortion, choice, human life, value of human life, April 22, 1997 BIG

The opponent says that the sexual revolution did not cause is to change or estimation of the value of human life, only our definition of when human life begins. Whenever it begins, it has the same place in our values as it did before the sexual revolution, but now we put the point at which it begins somewhere else.

But we have definitely reduced that value of that which we called human life at the time of the sexual revolution. At that time everyone said human life began at conception. By moving the date forward, we reduce the value of that which was then called human life.

But more importantly, what criterion do we use to decide when human life begins? In practice, we use the criterion of which answer to the question will maximally expand my sexual freedom. So in practice my sexual pleasure is a more important result of my sexuality than human life, because, in practice, I decide when to bestow the value of human life on something on the basis of what is most convenient for my pursuit of sexual pleasure. So that pursuit is in practice more important than human life.

The proof that this is what we (ordinary people, not philosophers) do in practice is that almost *everybody* allows themselves to permit abortions up to birth. This unanimity is not the result of any common *ethical* reflection, beyond that of recognizing that once the baby is born, it is impossible to cover up the fact that we are putting more value on sexual pleasure than on human life. Pleasure is a more important result of sex than human life to the point that we define human life by whether or not it interferes with our pursuit of pleasure, by whether or not it is an anti-means to that end.

Instead of calling it the pursuit of sexual pleasure, we call it sexual freedom. But is it really "freedom" if it leads us to kill. Are we not really slaves to our sexual desires if we let them justify killing?

April 12, 1997

We're not reducing the value of human life; we're just redefining when human life begins. But what value are you seeking to accomplish by means of the redefinition? The value of the truth. The truth about what? The truth about when human life begins. But you have just made that a matter of definition.

Really we are seeking truth. The truth we are seeking is when does this organism become my moral equal; or when does its life become of equal moral value to mine? That is what we mean by "life," when we ask when human life begins. Likewise, that is what we mean by "person," i.e., we mean when does this organism achieve the mature features we associate with moral value when we say things like "A person is an end, not just a means; or a person should not be treated just like an object in my universe but as something having its own universe just as much as I do. Etc.

So the end we are seeking is the truth about the question when does this organism acquire the kind of features that give it the moral value we who have already achieved the state of seeking that end have?

But is human life, so defined, the highest value? Won't there be some other value that measures the value of a living organism. If the status of human life is not already known, won't we have to appeal to some other value to determine when human life exists. We will have conflicting answers to the question when human life begins. Presumably, the answers will have different values according to whether they help us achieve the end we are seeking in this decision or do not help us achieve that end. What is that end?

It might for instance be the end of maximizing the choices that those who have already

achieved the proximate ability to choose have. But if that is our end, have we not already decided that fetuses are not equal to us. Is not the question already settled?

And is there any way to avoid having the question already settled? Won't we always necessarily beg the question by already putting ourselves ahead of the fetus. (Some would say this is begging the question; others would say this is a necessary truth because, necessarily, our asking the question shows that we are already ahead of the fetus.) For we are judging the value of its future achievements, the future achievements we will be preventing it from ever having, by our ends not its.

We are already saying that the value of the ends we will achieve in answering this question are more important than the ends we would prevent it from ever attaining. For we are making the decision in view of attaining future ends.

It will be replied that what gives us the right to make this decision is not the achievement of some future end, but the fact that we have already achieved ends that put us above the fetus in value. And no doubt a 15-year old has more value, by some standards, than a 5-year old, because it has more humanity in the sense of more specifically human achievement and perfection. But do we measure the value of the 5-year olds achievements relative to that organism's relation to ends or to ours?

The answer will be that we measure the value of the 5-year olds achievements relative to its achievement, not of future ends, but of ends that, though present, are still called for by the underlying structure of its nature. But, the abortionist says, we do this because at some point we said, this collection of features gives this organism a moral value equal to my own. And there is no escaping that question. We all have to call it as we see it.

Yes, but the very nature of choice and of the values at stake in choice show that there is only one consistent answer to that question, only one answer that can preserve the very existence of moral values, that does not contradict the existence of moral values: There exist a moral equal if and only if there exists an organism oriented to the future achievement of ends of the same kind that give value to my choice, that give my choice whatever value it has.

What if it is said that just as we cannot avoid asking that question and calling the answer as we see it, we cannot avoid the fact that we are seeking an end of our own in doing so, the fact that it will be some end of our own that gives the answer whatever value it is that justified seeking that answer?

But consider this situation. We land on another planet where there are edible life forms. We run out of food. We want to know whether it is moral to kill any of these life forms and eat them, as we would plants and animals on earth, or there are any that it would be immoral to kill unless they were attacking us. How do we decide? We ask whether any of these life forms are rational in the way that we are. Our goal, the goal we are seeking that gives our decision whatever value it has, is knowledge of an objective truth, are they rational or are they not. Why is this our goal? Because we think it will settle the question of whether any life form is of equal value to us in a moral sense. In other words, we have the further end of knowing whether any life form there has equal value to us in a moral sense, and we think that the former question will give us an *objective* answer to that question, will be a means to an objective answer to that question.

In seeking this goal, are we measuring the value of it by relation to our personal ends. Yes, in an important way we are. Knowledge of the truth happens to be an end we are seeking at that time. But does seeking that truth in anyway reduce the value of the other entity's features to being means to our ends as opposed to its ends? Aren't we rather asking the ends to which that being is oriented are of the same kind as the ends for sake of which I am asking this question and give its question that value it has for me? And is not knowledge of this truth knowledge that, in seeking ends of my own as I cannot avoid doing, if I interfere with its ends, I am treating something whose ends are of equal value to mine as if they were not of equal value to

mine?

In other words the ends of of being who can relate to other beings on the basis of awareness of what those beings are, can be to treat those beings in accordance with that knowledge. In fact, among its ends must be the end of treating those beings in accordance with that knowledge, the end of giving its achievement of its end a status in my evaluations equal to that of my own. I can have the end of giving its relation to its ends a status in my evaluations equal to my own relation to my ends; and as a rational being, I must have that end.

For not only do I know what things are (in some sense animals to that) but I can be aware that I know what things are, and I can be self-reflectively aware that I would be lying to myself if I judged that it was reasonable to believe the opposite of certain statements. Animals cannot do that. Animals can know certain features of things, but not the features that determine whether some other thing has ends of the same kind that give value to my decisions.

Back to the planet. We cannot avoid asking our question. And we cannot avoid the fact that any further answer has to be consistent with the answer to whether that entity is an organism oriented to ends of the same kind that give my asking and answering this question value. Does the makeup of that organism, do the features it possesses, make it an entity oriented to the same kind of ends. Is a 15-year old such an entity? Yes. So is a five-year old. Is a zygote? That can only be answered by the facts that biology tells us about that organism: is it actively oriented to making itself into the kind of mature being we are?

When we ask it that way, twinning is the only problem remaining. And cloning has eliminated that as a problem. And is the zygote oriented to the same kind of ends we would achieve by saying that the zygote is not "intrinsically oriented to ends?"

We all have to call it as we see it. Yes, but do we all have to accept the criteria that we do accept for calling it one way or another. That is, in accepting different criteria for calling it one way or another, are we not adopting different ends on the basis of which to make the judgement. Or, are we not adopting different to our ends, because we see that different means will get us to different ends?

In other words, we cannot avoid choosing criteria as means to some end. So we cannot avoid the fact that any end we choose must be consistent with the end of knowing whether the makeup of the organism makes it an organism oriented to the same kind of ends we seek in choosing our criteria.

We must ask, is this entity an organism oriented to human ends as the most fundamental level. What do I mean by most fundamental level. The being is composed of water, oxygen, carbon, nitrogen, etc. None of these causal systems has a specific relation to human ends. The most fundamental level means the first level at which there can be a specific relation to human ends: the genetic level. If there is a specific relation to human ends at that level, what is the value of the being if its development frustrates it from attaining its ends? It is still of equal value to us.

Abortion, AA, simple, January 8, 1997

From "If it were to achieve its ends, they would be equal in value to our ends" it does not follow that "If it does not achieve its ends, it is not equal in value to us." Nor, therefore, does it follow that "If it cannot achieve its ends, it is not equal in value to us."

You cannot separate the question of the nature of ethical value from the question of the nature of the "others," the beings, to whom ethical values apply. Sumner sees this too.

The conditions which make ethics even possible make the value of the Z and the adult

equal, make it necessary that grounds for killing Zs must also be grounds for killing adults, whatever those grounds may be, whatever the full development of an ethics will shows those grounds to be.

Does a zygote really have the capacity to think or be a mathematician? We think of an undeveloped capacity for something as if it were a weak muscle that needs exercise, or an unused part of the brain, that is, we think of an undeveloped capacity as a thing that is already there. The Z has no muscle; it has no unused part of the brain, because it has no brain.

But think of the toddler who "has the ability to produce greater music than Bach." Like the toddler, the Z gives itself whatever later abilities it has.

Is being a person like being a musician? That is, we have the capacity to become musicians later in life; do we have the capacity to become persons later in life?

Last sentence: Instead of "their value must be" put "the value of both must be".

Because the concepts of causal system and orientation to ends are so fundamental, we can know as we stand at the very threshold of ethics that . . . But because they are so fundamental, it also follows that they can only take us so far. But it also follows from the fact that they are so fundamental that they can only take us so far.

For unless causal systems oriented to ends of the same kind are of equal value, ethical values are arbitrary.

Why doesn't the inability to achieve ends deprive of value? Value *for* whom? For us, or for the being who loses the ability to achieve ends?

To make the case as strong as possible, let us hypothesize that . . . , let us use a fictitious example.

July 28, 1997

Thomson: the mother, in effect, is not just pulling the plug but is putting the baby in a life-threatening situation the baby otherwise would not be in. She is responsible putting the baby in a situation where the baby will die, because she is pulling the plug, just as she previously put the violinist in a situation where he will die, because she is pulling the plug.

August 8, 1997

On the delayed fertilization theory of twinning, the Z is actively oriented to produce twins from the very beginning. For that is the point of the delayed fertilization theory, that is, that twinning depends upon when it is that the Z begins to exist, that is, when in the cycle of the ovum's life does the Z begin to exist. So there are two human causal systems from the beginning. Either that or in these cases and only in these cases, there is no human agency yet. The Z would be defective as a human agent, and a human agent would exist only after twinning. And see Lee, p. 99.

The Heythrop Journal, look at it as a possible place of publication.

August 26, 1997

Does society need a highest secular value? If so, we need it as something to guide our choices. Can we say that the only value we need is to choose anything you want as long as you do not interfere with someone else's choices? Then we might consider choice itself the highest value. But it can't be. Choice is a means to whatever is the end of the choice. So it gets its value from its end. So if no end imposes itself prior to choice, there is no highest value, that is, it is not the case that choice is the highest value, because there is no highest value.

And the fact of the matter is that we must always be interfering with other people's choices. So we need values other than choice to guide our choices.

Oct 9, 1997

Two common defenses of abortion are actually contradictory to one another. One is that the fetus is not a person because at various stages it possesses nothing but the same kind of life that an amoeba or tadpole possesses. The other is that the fetus is only potentially a person (or human or has human life).

But an amoeba or tadpole is not potentially a person and does not potentially have other human characteristics. The life of a tadpole is not the life of a potential person. In fact, only a person can have the potentiality for future personal features. Why? Because the person is the entity that does or will possess the features, not the features themselves.

That which now exhibits features similar to those of a tadpole also has the potentiality to become a mathematician; a tadpole does not. The entity that now has things in common with the tadpole also has something that the tadpole does not possess, the potentiality to be a mathematician.

That which is not yet a person but will become one is the same entity that will exist when the person exists, is the same causal system, agency, the will exist when the person exists. For the nature of that agency is to make itself into a person and the nature of the person is to be a product of an agency that makes itself into that product, as a worm makes itself into a butterfly.

And if the same entity exists at both times but a person does not yet exist, then to be a person is not to be an underlying entity, it is to be an accident of an underlying entity. If so, it would not be personhood that was valuable but being the entity that now is the person. But being an entity that now is a person is the same as being an entity that was formerly a zygote.

Jan 5, 1998

Title: A Prolegomenon to Any Future Ethics of Abortion

Jan 5, 1998

The entity for whom, for whose good and perfection, mature features will someday exist exists now as a fetus.

Is it a religious question when human life begins? Two comments: (1) If we choose a time after conception as the beginning of human life, it is a religious question. (2) But notice that almost all of us would consider it unreasonable to place the beginning of human life before conception. So (1) most of us would agree that the "religious" question begins at conception and not before; for all practical purposes,

there is no doubt when that question begins. And (2) we can know that whatever later answer we give is arbitrary.

In fact, the pro-choicer thinks she *knows* that the fetus is not a person. She really thinks she knows that, what science tells us about human development, shows, allows us to know, that a fetus does not have human life in the moral sense.

Mar 5, 1998

I am connecting abortion with how we discriminate unit entities in our experience by induction, how we do it rationally. Why the Z is the same entity.

Mar 5, 1998

If features and not the entity itself are that which is of value, then the entity is not an end-in-itself. If the entity is not an end-in-itself, all ethics is arbitrary, since there is nothing that is good-in-itself, i.e., there is no absolute good by reference to which relative goods can be relative goods.

Finally, my argument has a narrow focus. I do not cover handicapped adults, but more than abortion is at stake in that case.

Apr 27, 1998

Twinning. It would not make any difference if most of us started out as twins. The crucial test is this: In order for the zygote to be a CS that makes itself into an adult, nothing from the outside of what the zygote already is has to happen to the zygote in order to prevent it from making twins.

Jun 17, 1998

A blueprint consisting of commands for making a whole organism is there already. A blueprint for making an organism that will either be a democrat or a republican is there already. A blueprint for something that will be able to do math, given the mother's chemical, is there already. If a chimp zygote were there, no potential mathematician would be there. We know the Z is a potential mathematician because of what it is before the mother does anything to it.

The commands that are there already do not determine whether the organism will have the features of being a democrat. But commands for a "whole" in the sense of the kind of organism that can be either a D or R is there already. The question is whether an orientation to a sufficient number of those features that are specifically human exist already or whether new orientations are required later.

Being a D or R is specifically human, but they only modify specifically human features (1) which will later exist and (2) for which the orientation already exists in the Z.

Jun 17, 1998

Consistency of she who says "I can kill it because it is no longer oriented to human ends." She is measuring value by an orientation to human ends. So consistently she should say that most abortions are wrong. If not, she changes criteria in midstream.

Jun 17, 1998

Later, the cell will passively receive new stuff that will be new parts of the cell. But the parts the cell already has orient it to, actively orient it to, human ends. And the new parts will be parts of something oriented to human ends only because the cell and acorn are so oriented by what they already are.

Jun 18, 1998

Thoughts from Bernadette Waterman Wards talk at Toronto:

Quoting Girard: A woman perceives abortion as the only escape from the terror of living in a woman's body. So abortion alienates them from their own bodies. The

terror is not just the pangs of birth but the pains of pregnancy, the need to give away or care for the baby once born, etc. So the source of their inequality with men is their own bodies.

Jun 18, 1998

Causal relations are the only epistemological standard ethics can use for determining what is a unit entity.

PNC, December 30, 1996

Our concepts are tools that serve a purpose. Contradictions are unsuitable for that (those) purposes, incapable of serving those purposes. "Not" means "Not this purpose."

Negation signs are just the tools we use when we want to cancel something. Paraconsistent logics just puts those signs to a different purpose, a different use.

Negation is more fundamental than truth or falsity.

If you say negation need not cancel, how else would you suggest that we cancel? Or are you saying that we shouldn't cancel? Fine, but do you mean that we should and should not cancel? Or do you mean that we should only affirm? Fine, if we only affirm, we cannot contradict other affirmations, so we have not violated the principle of non-contradiction. The same conclusion would follow if you say that we should only affirm in ways that do not contradict other affirmations. For if you permit affirmations to contradict one another, you are saying that one cancels the other. If they do not cancel each other, the PNC is not violated. If they do cancel each other, you are using something that is equivalent in purpose to our negation signs. And you are not really saying that we should not cancel.

Liberal/conservative, December 11, 1996

Liberals made fools of themselves defending Alger Hiss. C's made fools of themselves defending Joe McCarthy. Some C's make fools of themselves by their acts of censorship. L's make fools of themselves by talking about "self-censorship" and by attacking the free speech of others in the name of opposing censorship.

C's: no root cause; L's only economic root cause.

Abortion: L's, no choice for unborn women; C's, welfare reforms that encourage abortions.

Jan 22, 1998

Why we need to be saved from conservatism, i.e., why we need to reform liberalism so that we can be saved from conservatism. If we propose a stupid medical plan like Clinton's, we will either wind up with no medical plan or a bad one. So to defeat the conservative opposition to any medical plan, we need a good one.

We have learned or could have learned the limitations of bureaucratic solutions, the point where the cure for problem X can have side effects bad enough that this cure is unjustified or needs tinkering. Instead of learning this, the criticisms of bureaucratic methods that we hear come from, or appear to come from, people who are against any governmental solution. So that what could be constructive criticism becomes, in effect, anti-government propaganda. So we shun it.

Search for "utopian" at the Vatican website. Clinton's medical plan tended toward the utopian, trying to cover all social problems at once. California's bi-lingual education tended toward the utopian, requiring the scores of languages be taught at taxpayer's expense.

What is the cause of this extremism among liberals? How do we cure it. At least one cause is the association of political liberalism with philosophical liberalism. Philosophical liberalism is so intellectually mushy that it, de facto, trains or encourages sloppy thinking, prejudice, intolerance, and naive judgments. Yes, philosophical liberalism the belief that there are not absolutes, encourages prejudice. For without any intellectual, objective way of distinguishing what is objectively too much or too little, what goes too far or does not go far enough, human nature puts us at the mercy of emotional reactions to appearances. We cannot overcome emotional reactions to appearances through rational awareness of realities, either because reason does not give us sufficient access to reality or because value judgments are not based on objective reality but on subjective dispositions.

Trained not to look for objective standards, for things that are objectively excessive or insufficient, we naturally do not find them. This leads us into really stupid positions. That gives political liberalism a bad name. Without objective standards, we are at the mercy of cultural conditioning.

An example which illustrates both how philosophical liberalism is sloppy and how it leads to stupid results. We tend to judge actions by their good intentions rather than their results, .e.g, the judge who wants us to be concerned about the cause of homelessness rather than to make people who use the public library observe minimal standards of hygiene. First, even though we find the intention good, this obnoxious way of pursuing the intention tends to put the intention itself in a bad light, just as the methods of terrorists tend to make people unsympathetic to their cause, no matter who just the cause is.

But more deeply, what does it mean to consider an intention "good" if there are no objective standards?

It is important to be clear about what the objectivity of moral good or evil consists in. I am talking about the moral quality of concrete, individual actions, as opposed to the successful formulation of universal principles about individual actions. I do not need to be a moral philosopher to know that the holocaust was wrong, that it would be wrong for me to rape someone tonight. But formulating general statements expressing exactly why, when, and where a generic type of action is wrong is not always easy. We almost always consider what we call "stealing" to be wrong. But we can also think of situations in which actions that resemble stealing would be

justified, actions for which many people have no better term than "stealing."

And even when we succeed in expressing the idea that it is not wrong for a genuinely needy to take what she needs from someone who has more than he needs, as long as there is no other way to satisfy her need, it would be very difficult to express in general statements guidelines that would tell us, in every case, when one person is so in need and another has so much more than they need that the first would be justified in taking something by "stealth" from the second.

But do I need general statements of that kind to know that, now, given the circumstances I am in at this very moment, it would be wrong for me to take food from a starving baby for the sake of enjoying a pleasurable snack for which I have no nutritional need. We know that such an act would be evil and that knowledge consist of awareness of an objective fact. For we can give factual reasons why the act would be evil. At some point in our attempt to give factual reasons, we would run into problems of a philosophical nature. But that statement is true about every area of human endeavor; when we get down to the fundamental underpinnings of everything, we run into philosophical problems, because that is the nature of philosophical problems.

This is not to diminish the importance of those problems. But we know that such problems are important because the matters those problems concern are objective matters and objectively important. We know its worth pursuing our interminable philosophical debates about, for example, ethics, despite the fact that induction would lead us to believe that philosophers will never come to long-lasting (more than a generation) agreement on them, because we know that the things about which philosophers disagree are objectively important.

We can even know the truth of some general statements about ethics, which could not be the case if those statements did not concern objective matters. For example, peace is better than war and love between people is better than hate, all other things being equal. Of course, there could be something better than peace, something that would necessitate war, not as better than peace in itself, but as a means to something that is better than peace in itself, for example, the defense of those who are unjustly attacked and who cannot defend themselves. The fact that the "all other things being equal" clause often makes decisions about what is or is not the right action difficult does not diminish the fact that those decisions are important precisely because they concern things that are in themselves objectively better or worse than the other.

And when we think that some political intentions are better than others, we are really thinking that it is true that they are better than others, that their being better than others is because of what they and other things are, not because of our subjective dispositions. We know that Our dispositions will cease when we die; we do not think our political beliefs will cease being true when we die.

There is nothing more dangerous than ignorance in action, but ignorance is measured by objective standards. Because their are objective facts, there is something more dangerous than ignorance in action: well intentioned ignorance in action. For the tendency is to think that the goodness of the intention absolves us from looking at facts to determine whether the way we are pursuing that intention is good or bad.

Feb 2, 1998

When someone like Nat Hentoff leaves the ACLU, no matter how much good it still does, that should tell us something. We are at the mercy of currently fashionable causes, ideas of right and wrong, with no way to distinguish fashion from justice, distinguish what is good and bad in fashion, what is lacking from fashion.

The effect of these arguments may be "moderation" but that is not their intended goal. The goal is to be able to recognize when we are defeating our own purposes.

Sep 16, 1998

The embarrassed liberal. I find in contemporary liberalism vices, failings of the same kind that I find in conservatism. E.g., dogmatism, absolutism, inflexibility, selfishness. Where did those vices come from, how did they creep into liberalism? Of course, they were always there in the extreme left wing of the party, but I was innocent of the fact that they were called liberals. An example of conservative absolutism and dogmatism was calling every government action "socialism," that is, they were unable to distinguish between what was socialism, in the justifiably bad

sense, and what was not.

That dogmatism came into liberalism as a result of the sixties. In particular, it precisely came from currents that promised tolerance of other views, currents that thought of themselves as existing for the sake of tolerance, of nonabsolutism, etc. Those currents were unknowingly sawing off the limb they were sitting on. For unless the person is an absolute, an end-in-itself, there is no foundation for maintaining tolerance against all the pressures not to maintain tolerance.

Start: there are tremendous pressures against being tolerant of others.

Jan 6, 2004, Social liberal, social conservative,

gun control, death penalty, protection from Ashcroft, medical reform.

Differences of degree or nature, October 23, 1996,

Also, are differences of degree to be explained as accidents of a common substantial nature, or as specific differences only logically distinct from what the natures have in common? Logical differences have to have real differences behind them as their ultimate cause, e.g., the genus is taken from matter, the difference from form.

Conceptual relativism, October 23, 1996

I do not deny that our language structures our thoughts. I deny the necessary ontological significance of this structuring. I deny that it constitutes an (our) ontology for us.

Formal systems, self-evidence, meaning, October 23, 1996

Recognizing that the opposite of a self-evident proposition is contradictory is not like applying the rules of a formal system. Understanding the rules of a formal system, we see that we should write the negative sign before formulas of the form $p \ \& \ \neg p$, and we see that we should not put the negative sign before formulas of the form $p \ \vee \ \neg p$.

But grasping that there are no square circles means grasping that the statement "Squares are not circles" is always true, that square circles cannot exist. And grasping this, unlike grasping how we should form formulas in a formal system, does not involve a version of Platonic essences, but a knowledge of the meanings of "square," "circle," "exists," and "not."

And that does not involve a mental entity called "meaning," or at least not an *illegitimate* mental entity. If mental entities are required at all, they are (1) not themselves the meanings but that by which we relate to the meanings and (2) are no more than are required for understanding the words in any statement, not just the words in a necessary truth. Nor, if meaning is not a mental entity, is it any sort of additional entity other than the referents of words.

If grasping a necessary truth is not applying the rules of a formal system, but the grasp of a truth, of what is the case, neither can it be finding a model for a formal system. We don't start with a formal truth and then find that it applies to the world of being; we see directly that a truth applies to the world of being.

This theory of necessary truth requires no special epistemological theory, that is, no theory that is not required for the knowledge of truth in general, of any truth.

Quine's attack on "Truth by Convention" can give us a *reductio ad absurdum* of the "finding a model for a formal system" approach to necessary truth. "Given a definition of domain of objects X , then formulas of this system apply to X ." Is that statement self-evident or not? If not, then an infinite regress is involved in seeing that a domain is a model for a formal system. If it is self-evident, there are self-evident truths that are not formulas of a formal system.

Course idea, only in Thomism, Aug. 22, 96

An alternative to the dichotomy between logic concerning laws of thought (psychologism) and logic concerning relations between abstract entities (Platonism): logic concerning objects of thought as objects (diacritical realism, Aristotelianism, cognitivism). See Baker and Hacker, Language . . . , pp. 28-29.

Rorty just happens to be wrong, because there happens to be such a thing as truth and as knowledge of the truth. But he may as well be right, if we have no better way of explaining truth and knowledge than, say, Putnam can come up with, given the limited tools at his disposal. As long as we try to do philosophy with those limited tools, we will keep on shifting from position to position. Putnam's career is a metaphor for philosophy's predicament. We will keep on being tossed to and fro by every wind of doctrine.

There are less than a thousand people in this room. At least one light bulb is on in this room. At bottom, our knowledge of these contingent truths is guaranteed by "necessity."

Necessity derives from what things are, specifically from the fact that change and what undergoes change are material relations. A change is a material relation of dependence on what undergoes it. What undergoes it is a material relation of capacity for undergoing such a change; for not everything can undergo just any kind of change. I cannot produce a human egg, for example.

So C, the change, is a material relation to S, what undergoes the change. And S has a material relation of potency for C. So C is a material relation of dependence on a material relation of capacity for, or potency for, C (note the circularity of that statement!). S is a material relation of potency for a material relation of dependence on S. But is it sufficient for C to be a material relation to what is only a potency for, or capacity for, C? Of course, S is not only a potency for C; S is also many other actual things. But actually being all those other things, S is only in potency for C. By actually being all those other things, S does not actually terminate C's material relation of dependence on S; by S's actually being all those other things, C does not have anything that terminates its relation of dependence; C is not an actual relation of dependence on anything.

S actually terminates C's relation of dependence on S only when S is no longer only potential with respect to C but actual with respect to C. C has that which terminates its relation of dependence, only when S is no longer only potential with respect to C but actual with respect to C. But it is not any of S's other features that makes S no longer potential with respect to C, not any of S's other features by which C has that which terminates its relation of dependence. It is only C that makes S no longer potential with respect to C. So C brings it about that C has that which terminates its relation of dependence; C brings it about that S terminates C's relation of dependence on S. So C is cause of itself.

Cause, December 30, 1996 BIG

THIS IS IT

A change's existence, and its existence alone, is what gives the change that which terminates its relation of dependence, is what gives the change something that terminates its relation of dependence, is responsible for the change's having something which terminates . . ., is what constitutes the subject of the change something that terminates . . ., is what constitutes the subject of the change that which terminates . . .

Also, the subject of the change needs a cause in order to change, to be in change. Namely, it needs the change, something non-identical with itself, to be in change. But does that make the change a cause, when the effect appears to be identical with itself? Yes, because the changing subject is not just a juxtaposition, like a Kantian unity or a mereological sum. So the change is both a cause and not a cause, but that which is caused.

And consider the hypothesis where the change has an efficient cause, where that hypothesis means that given that A is what it is, it would be contradictory for B to remain what it is. Then, given that A is what it is, a new existence necessarily occurs. A new event occurs, the event of B's not remaining what it is, the existence of B's ceasing to be what it is. That new existence is a material relation of causal dependence on B. But that event is not itself what

constitutes B that which terminates the event's relation of dependence. A's being what it is is what necessitates B's ceasing to be what it is. So A's being what it is makes B that which terminates the new existence's relation of dependence on B. In one sense, the new event constitutes B that which terminates the event's relation of dependence, but the new event does not so constitute B in a way that makes the event a cause of itself. For the event also have a relation of dependence on A's being what it is, a relation hypothesized when we assume that A's being what it is requires that B ceases to be what it is, necessitates B's ceasing to be what it is. But A's being what it is, not the events being what it is, constitutes A that which terminates this relation of dependence, and so at the same time constitutes A that which gives the change something which terminates its relation of dependence on a material cause.

(With these ideas, re-read Sullivan on Hume proving too much.) We are sometimes aware that a change, e.g., laughing, has a relation of dependence on some efficient cause, e.g., getting the joke. Does that dependence of which we are aware imply that the change could not occur when the causal conditions that brought it into existence existed? If so, dependence means a necessary connection, which means a material, not formal, relation. If the relation of resulting-from is a merely formal relation, then the efficient cause has 2 effects, the change, and the change's formal relation of resulting-from. But that second effect does have a necessary relation of dependence on a cause. So there is some effect that follows necessarily from a cause, and Sullivan shows that if any effect is necessary, they all must be.

A change either has something that terminates its relation of dependence on a material cause or it does not. If it has something that terminates its relation of dependence on a material in the absence of an efficient cause, the change itself brings it about that it has something terminating its relation of dependence on a material cause. The change itself is the only thing that makes the difference between its having and not having such a terminator. The change itself's being what it is is the only thing that makes the difference between its having and not having something to terminate.

Now compare the situation where there is an efficient cause, e.g., ball A hits ball B. Here A's being what it is, not the changes being what it is, makes the difference between ..., is what brings it about that

July 15, 1997

Whatever exists and has conditions must have sufficient conditions.

From a card dated 7-10-70-2: End: so the issue really is whether the causes qua composite are per se causes qua synthesis. At the very least, this is not the Hume issue and we are beyond the Hume issue. The cause issue is at least open. One reason we are ready to consider it closed is that all necessity seems to belong to the family described as "tautological," "linguistic," etc.

11-21-71-1: We accept Hume because we see no alternative that will satisfy our demand for empirical epistemological rigor. My solution claims rigor while seeming to sacrifice the empiricism. Why does it seem to sacrifice it? Because it relies on a necessary truth. But what is nonempirical about that? No necessary truth can give us knowledge of factual existence? But why Not? Because reasoning to unobserved facts is causal reasoning. But why can't causal reasoning be necessary?

So, our whole belief that reliance on necessary truths is nonempirical rests on Hume's treatment of causality, which is precisely what I have refuted.

11-29-72-4: When I know one necessary condition is missing, I know that sufficient conditions do not exist. When I know that sufficient conditions exist, I know that some conditions are necessary. For if x has sufficient conditions, it is caused; how can it be caused at one time and not another?

May 2, 1997

From old 3x5 notes: A cause must exist to be a cause. So if the change were the sole cause of the component cause's being a component cause, the change would be cause and effect in the same respect, i.e., in respect of its existence. Change must exist to be a cause of the component cause. But the change needs the component cause to be a component cause in order for it, the change, to exist. ("Needs," i.e., would not exist without, in the sense of a necessary cause, not a necessary effect; for the component cause can exist, though not as such, without the effect.

From old 3x5 notes: "Sufficient" means "all that is required" If A is sufficient, no more than A is necessary; A is all that is required. So if something has necessary conditions, it must have sufficient conditions, i.e., conditions such that when they are fulfilled, no more must be required. But if B does not occur when all its necessary conditions occur, more must be required for B. That is, if a set of conditions for B is present and B is not present, whatever makes the difference between the presence of B and the absence of B is missing, and whatever that is, it is a condition necessary for B.

It might seem that this argument makes B, circularly, a necessary condition for B. For B itself is whatever it is that differentiates the situation where B is present from the situation in which B is absent. But no, B is the new presence of a form in an already existing matter, the new presence of a characteristic in a previously existing component cause. But what makes the difference between the situation in which B is and is not present, is the previous presence of that form in the efficient cause. Add that previous presence to the situation, and the new presence of the same form in a new component cause occurs.

But is it really the same form? Is it not a new form and a form identical with B itself? It is the same form in the essential (causally essential) sense that a form is not restricted of and by itself to being a form in this or that component cause, to being the form of this or that. When the efficient cause exists, the form exists as individuated in that being. The only thing new when B occurs is the reception, and, therefore, the individuation, of that form by the new component cause. When a previously existing form acquires a new relation to a new component cause, it new instance of a specifically identical form occurs. You can indeed call the new form an individually distinct form. But the crucial issue for causality is that the form is specifically the same as a preexisting individual form that is not individuated of itself but requires the causality of a component cause to be individuated.

If a form is not individuated of itself but requires a component cause to be individuated, the only instances of the form that we can compare as more or less, as greater or smaller with respect to the form, are individuals composed of form and matter. So we cannot compare an individual with the specific form itself. So we cannot measure the specific form by an individual instance of it. So the specific form is immeasurable (i.e., infinite) with respect to an individual instance.

But does this argument rule out the possibility of there being any existence for any form outside of being received in corresponding potencies. For only individuals can exist, and individuation of a form requires a component cause. But a form-matter kind of act can be an instance of, a participation in, a higher type of act, which higher type of act can exist apart from a matter-form union. What that higher type of act cannot be is *limited* the way its matter-form participants are limited. So if it is limited, it must be limited in another way than limited to being the form of this individual of this species.

Truth, Dummett, Jul. 16, 96

The question of whether we have a concept of truth apart from a way of determining truth is less important if in fact we can know the truth.

Course idea, Jul. 16, 96

Have a course showing what is unique to Thomism in the solution to philosophical problems. I.e., a course showing the alternatives that Thomism offers but no one else offers. Use Adler's list (see Deal) and Maritain's Introduction to Philosophy. Also use the similarities between The Degrees of Knowledge and current philosophies of science to show the superiority of Maritain's approach, e.g., he can say with Quine that scientific truth applies to theories as a whole, because he has another absolute standard of truth. And he can distinguish the aspects of quantum mechanics that do and do not have ontological weight.

Spatial Relations, Jun. 1, 96

Does it makes sense to speak of a particle, or any body, as "capable of being in such or such a place"? Is there any place a particle is not capable of being in? What potency of the body is fulfilled when it comes into a certain place? One is the potency of being at rest. But are rest and motion only relative? Relative to what?

Perhaps the apparent relativity of place makes no difference. I am trying to replace spatial relations with something else, because a mere change in place does not seem to affect a thing internally. It doesn't matter to the apparent superfluity of spatial relations whether they are or are not only relative. Therefore causal relations can be relative in the sense that the same effect would occur by the universe's moving relative to me, me moving relative to it, or each moving relative to the other. The important thing is that any one of these three models for change can bring about an "internal" alteration in the sense that the environment now has different effects on me, and I on it.

Smith, Mar. 19, 96

Smith is scary not just because you can't base theology on his methods, you can't base life, society, and moral life on any kind of standards.

Ben Cogen questions, Rity questions, science questions, May. 14, 96

In General Rity, does the unity of space and time in one continuum depend on multiplying by an imaginary number or on some other mathematical trick?

Does light have mass? If so, there is some mass that does not increase to infinity at the speed of light.

What does it mean to describe nonEuclidean space as the space on the outside, or on the inside, of a sphere. I.e., what does it mean to say that on the outside or inside of a sphere there can be infinite parallel lines through a point or no parallel lines, respectively.

Feb 12, 1998

What is a pseudosphere and how do you map parallel lines onto it?

Equality = in a minimal ethics

Before we develop (begin) our theory of how to choose, we can know that if human life is a matter of choice and not of knowledge, then everything is; for no more basic standard can be found to measure, determine the value of, give value to, our choice of what is human life and what is not. So it must be a biological, scientific, factual, question. Biologically, when does there exist an organism oriented to the eventual achievement of its own human ends.

So if we can decide when human life begins, we can pull values out of thin air. Deciding when a human infant acquires value is the same thing as making up standards of value to suit our (chosen) purposes, i.e., the same thing as making all morality into a "religious" question.

Abortion is based on a lack of development, what hasn't developed yet is our instinctive response of affection for the child. That is something in us, not in it, something subjective in us.

Mulcare: change "fetus" to "embryo" on p. 21

If Z's weren't oriented to human ends, contra Ford, we wouldn't be and couldn't be. If Z weren't oriented to the end of making itself into an "ontological" individual, the ontological individual could not exist. The ontological individual is just a mature state that the Z makes itself into. If the Z weren't oriented toward acquiring an "intrinsic" finality, that kind of finality could not come into existence.

Rational knowledge explanation may need beefing up.

Explain that what makes an "ontological individual" for Ford is that twinning is no longer possible (but why not say when having split personalities is no longer possible?).

Add DeMarco to the acknowledgements in the published proofs. And add C. before Kischer's name. Add Warren Kay.

Replace "However, I am not arguing about other species. . ." with "However, I do not need to argue about. . ." in footnote 7.

Replace "Pain is negative. . . other things being equal" with "Pain is usually considered of negative value"

First sentence: When do human infants acquire the kind of value for ethics that makes killing human adults wrong?

replace "that is, I am not discussing cases where two lives of equal value" with "or any case where two lives of equal value"

What does the fetus depend on outside help for? For making itself into. . . Contrast the chimp who depends on outside help for the ability to make itself into.

(Ford) These are all stages called for by the design that exists in the zygote.

Twinning: It is oriented to produce too few daughters to be oriented to making itself into one and only one human adult....too few daughters before the ZP ruptures to

continue to be oriented to the eventual achievement of only one set of human ends.

A glance at the nature of value shows that. . .

She is just as responsible for the death of the F as she is of the violinist.

The mother only determines that the cell produce this kind of protein or that. She doesn't put the control genes that she puts on there, nor does she put the control gene that produces this kind of protein there.

When does it become wrong to kill a twinning cell or group of cells? When conditions occur that. . . or when it begins acting toward its own. . .?

The first unit whose causal dispositions embody a design for producing a complete human being.

Human Nature, Mar. 19, 96

Human nature governs what the zygote can become, what we can become. There is a structure in us and in the zygote governing what we can become, a structure defining what we can become, controlling what we can become.

Even after we have become it, or in some cases have failed to become it, the structure governing what we were designed to become remains, the structure defining what we were designed to become remains. And we remain what we have actually become only as long as the underlying structure supports what we have become, only as long as the underlying structure is there supporting what we have become and governing our ability to continue in existence as what we have become, governing our ability to maintain ourselves in existence as what we have become.

That structure is not just the genome, but the structure of being a whole causal system, a unit causal system, whose most fundamental causal dispositions embody a design for maintaining itself in existence as an entity oriented to human ends at the most basic level.

Human nature = Being a unit causal system whose causal orientations orient it to, whose design as a unit orients it to. Human nature is the nature of being a unit causal system whose most fundamental causal dispositions orient to be, to maintain itself in existence as . . .

Abortion article, thoughts to go back to before finishing it, Jun. 23, 95

Feb. 1, 96

Is it conceivable that reality impose any limit on the value of our choices? If the existence of the orientation to human ends cannot impose such a limit, nothing can. If an ethician wants to hold that reality cannot impose such a limit, then all things are allowable.

After Archiving: Aug. 16, 95

Jim O'Rourke's reader: Bob Augros

Do my statements about the presence of the genome contradict what I say about fertilization being the start?

Tape worms - fragmentation. Mushrooms - spores. Some weeds put out shoots. Can take clippings from some plants; put it water; the clippings will sprout roots; can plant the sprouted clippings and they will grow.

Shorten the paragraph about the fetus being, like us, in a life-threatening condition called "life."

Take out the Tchaikovsky quote, and maybe that whole paragraph.

The question is whether a 5-year old's future achievement of ends is less important than a 10-year old's future achievement of ends. Is one's achievement of end of less value than the other's.

The opponent will say that value is measured by the ends they can achieve now. The 5-year old can't achieve the ends a 10-year old can, but they both can achieve personal ends. So as soon as personal ends are achievable, they have moral value. But that is just a decision on the part of the opponent, a decision achieving some end to which the zygote is also oriented.

Start off consciousness section be referring to "some degree" of consciousness, or some form of consciousness.

Delete the paragraph at the end of the consciousness section contrasting the subject of consciousness to the deliverances of consciousness.

Is something the same entity as before? The real question is, for what purposes shall we consider something the same entity. What should our criteria be, and what purposes define the "should." We can have different purposes in different contexts. The opponent will grant that zygotes share all the same purposes. She will try to say that only some purposes are relevant for deciding if the zygote is a moral peer. For example, the zygote certainly is not now a great violinist, even if she is oriented to become one. Maybe there are purposes for which we can say that the Z is not now a moral peer. Sure there are, but they are self-interested purposes, not moral purposes. And even if not "self-"interested, they are not moral, since they serve the interests only of a selected group.

Concerning a universal definition of "complete causal system . . .". Move the sentence about its being the facts summarized, not the usefulness of similar phrases elsewhere, that is important up next to the sentence about we need not do that here. Then start the sentence about clear cases with "And."

The position that memor makes us the same agent confuses the means of knowing, memory, with that which is known. Memory makes us aware of past conscious states, but we have conscious states only because we are pre-consciously oriented to them.

Possibly footnote the "speculative question" paragraph. But if so, watch out for the later use of that phrase, introduced as "another" speculative question.

The possession of more abilities to achieve ends does not make a 10-year-old's achievement of ends more important, or of more value, than a 5-year-old's.

Additional abilities do not make my achievement of ends of greater value than someone else's. The ends may be of greater value in some respects, e.g., artistic value, but those respects are not the measure of moral value.

Refer to the mechanisms, plural, not singular, of twinning. And concerning the "and" or "or" theories of active dispositions for twinning. Perhaps put a footnote at the end of the discussion of both possibilities. The footnote would say that the way we could tell the difference between them would not be that we could identify one twin as the continuation of the original fetus, since the twins are identical after the split. Rather, the distinction would come from the kind of mechanism that existed before the split and produced the split or produced the primitive streak. All you have to say is that even though the twins afterwards are identical, we might be able to distinguish the "and"/"or" cases by the previously existing mechanism that produced the effect of twinning or of the primitive streak.

Jul. 28, 95

One more thing that a preamble can say about a hypothetical complete ethical system. To be consistent with the presuppositions of any ethics, the system must make the risk of unjustly killing a possible complete human agent a greater risk than that of unjustly depriving a woman of choice over her own body. How it assigns these relative values would be a test for any ethical system to pass before it need be considered any further.

The issue here is the evil of treating something of equal moral value as if it were not of equal moral value. The precise reason why killing is wrong is not a future like ours. Even equality is only a sufficient reason. A complete ethics need not make equality the most important reason.

The dependence of the rape child on the mother only increases the baby's claim to the mother's help.

If an adult chooses to kill a zygote, the adult is saying that her orientation to ends is more important than the zygote's orientation to ends. Whatever means do, they do not make my orientation to ends more important than the zygote's, because the only measure of importance is the orientation to ends, and we have the same orientation to ends.

Concerning rational choice as the central feature: Whatever features the adult has in addition to choice, they cannot justify abortion, if the future value achieved by killing the Z is no greater than that the future value the Z is oriented to. And no matter what other features the adult has, the Z is oriented to features of equal value. Also, rational choice presupposes all the features necessary for rational choice.

Not only is a definition of a complete causal system that would exclude the zygote arbitrary, more importantly, it is not needed for purposes of deciding the ethical value of the zygote. The facts about the Z that I have summarized by the phrase "complete causal system" are decisive for ethics, whatever the value of that phrase elsewhere.

Utilitarianism might justify killing a fetus, but it cannot justify the fetus's not being a moral equal until later in its development. Even utilitarianism must count the fetus in the number for which the greatest good of the greatest number is calculated.

Same causal system, unlike the sperm-ovum-mother: don't say the ends are its; say the mature features are its and are not features of the sperm-ovum-mother.

Utilitarianism: how can killing the fetus be the greater good, when we are cancelling a whole normal human lifetime of achievement? Answer: alleged external conditions,

such as economic conditions, make its attainment of ends cost too much for others. But unless it is killing others, how can the cost be too much? And where is it actually killing people? Maybe the predictions of over-population may someday come true, but while people have tried to justify abortion on those predictions, the history of the past two-hundred years shows that those killings were tragically unjustified even on utilitarian grounds.

I am approaching abortion from the viewpoint of things that any ethical theory must presuppose at the most fundamental level. I could not credibly do this if my case depended on casuistic distinctions.

After violinist and F are equal before the V gets attached: The dependence of the F on the mother is the reason Thomson does not consider their equality before the mother takes the action that will certainly kill both.

We would be willing to put up with nine months of torturous labor, if that were required to finish work on the mine that would make us rich.

If the zygote were not oriented to the future achievement of human ends, we could not be so oriented.

Where is that line that used to start "There are only two possibilities; either . . .

Can the opponent claim to measure the sameness of the temporally extended causal system only by its so-called "immediate" effects? How does one measure that?

Can the opponent say that memory defines the "same" causal system? In addition to the arguments against consciousness, there is the following problem for the opponent: memory tells me that the same being pre-consciously oriented to my current conscious states was oriented to the conscious states memory makes me aware of. If that is not what memory claims to tell us, then memory has nothing to do with the sameness of the causal system, because the conscious states memory makes us aware of are not the same as my present conscious states. The only thing that could be the same is what memory claims to be the same, namely, the pre-conscious subject of the conscious states. It is understandable that our philosophical training gives us a professional bias toward the epistemological over the ontological. But to define the deliverances of memory in terms of the means by which they are delivered, namely, by consciousness, is a reflection of that bias.

"Why be moral?" can have a speculative philosophical meaning. It can also have the practical meaning of how serious should we be about basing our behavior on what we know about the moral equality of others. For example, some opponents of the death penalty reluctantly prefer it in situations where the possibility of parole exists. They would say that those who would parole first-degree murders aren't sufficiently serious about affirming the moral value of justice by making that the rule of their decision. Their point, whatever its merit, is not just that rehabilitation is more important than justice to those who would parole. Their point, whatever its merit, would be that no one is truly rehabilitated in the moral sense unless they can see the justice of life imprisonment, and so they are not really rehabilitated if they seek parole. And the failure of the parolers to see that such prisoners are not rehabilitated demonstrates the paroler's lack of sufficient concern for justice.

And if being moral is not what's guiding our decision to, for example, kill fetuses but not adults, what is guiding it? Personal preference of some kind.

Before Jul. 28, 95

Perhaps start the last section this way. How does my argument address those who justify abortion even if the fetus is a person? Is it possible to evaluate their arguments without leaving the preamble to ethics and following the casuistic disputes down all the labyrinthine ways generated by the problem of when we are permitted to kill our moral equals? Or rather, the casuistry comes from attempts to find moral significance in the asymmetry between the mother and the fetus. Here's one way out. Since the working hypothesis is that the fetus is a person, we can put the following

words in her mouth.

What if it was the woman who put the V in danger of death by her knowing choice to do something that would, if not kill him, at least put him in the danger of death that he is now in. So before this deliberate act on her part, the V was not in danger of death. Would the woman have the responsibility to keep him alive? Yes. But the F is not now in danger of death. In that respect, the F is exactly like the V before the woman acted against the interests of the V. Since the moral value of the F's life is equal to that of the V's, the woman has just as much responsibility not to act against the F's interests now, and therefore to keep the F connected to her, as she did not to act against the V's interests before the V was connected to her.

Since the assumption is that the F is a person, we can imagine the F saying the following to the the mother: In what way are you treating my life as if its value were the moral equal of yours. You say that the mere fact of our equality does not mean that you can't expel me, even though that means my certain death. Is that doing on to others what you would have them do onto you? You say I am an intruder, a parasite. But so were you. You only have the ability to kill me now because another former parasite, your mother, did not let your being a parasite prevent you from living. In what sense are you treating me equally if you don't let me live? You say that the equality of human organisms does not give one the obligation to be a good Samaritan to another. But we're not talking about the obligation to, for instance, let me develop my musical talent by giving me violin lessons. We're talking about my very life.

You say you don't have to go to extremes to save my life. You ask what if I already were a great violinist. But you would have the obligation to go to extremes, if you were responsible for the violinist's being in danger of death. You could even be locked up for much more than your example's hypothetical nine years. If you were not obligated to go to extremes when you were responsible for his condition, in what way would his life be the moral equal of yours. Well, I am like the violinist before you attacked him, because my life is not now in danger. I am much more like a siamese twin than like the violinist. Like a siamese twin, I am not doing anything that would be unjust if I were fully rational, as the violinist would be doing if you were not responsible for his condition.

You say I am unlike a siamese twin because I am the result of rape. But do you have the right to kill the rapist now that the rape is over and self-defense is not an issue? Then why kill me? I am part of the burden the rapist inflicted on you. But if that burden does not call for the death penalty against him, why does it call for the death penalty against me. Perhaps you would have had the right to kill him at the time of the attack [BUT NOT IMMEDIATELY AFTER, WHICH IS THE HYPOTHESIS HERE. THE F ONLY EXISTS IF THE RAPIST WAS SUCCESSFUL. NO, THE SELF-DEFENSE COULD TAKE PLACE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RAPE, AFTER THE RAPIST PLACED SPERM IN THE VAGINA]. Likewise, after the attack, you would have had the right to prevent my conception. But if you tried to and failed, my existence is part of the continuing burden he inflicted on you. For example, even if you succeeded in killing him, he may have left psychological scars that last for life. But you have the right to try to get rid of those scars, because doing so would not be correcting a horrible wrong by another horrible wrong, killing me.

In assuming that the woman is responsible for the violinist's condition, I am assuming that what she did to put him in that condition is the same thing that abortion does to the F. So how is the F's life of equal moral value to the violinist's, ie., before the violinist was harmed.

We can invent other tricky cases that appear to justify the mother's killing the fetus. But as long as the mother's life isn't being saved, we know beforehand that, as in the case of the violinist, we are in some surreptitious way suppressing the moral equality between the mother's life and the fetus's. Either that, or we are accepting a "the interests of those who have the might" ethic. For the mother will be doing something she would not want others doing to her.

The casuistry only comes up if the mother's life is at stake. And if the casuistic distinctions can't do the jobs they are intended to do, as Thomson and Davis seem to think, then, contrary to Davis, we can't kill the fetus to save the mother. (That is Davis's big assumption, namely, that abortion opponents must permit the mother to save her own life by taking the fetus's.)

Millions of lives have been lost because philosophers did not recognize

beforehand where the benefit of the doubt must lie. The answer to that question derives, not from the metaphysical question of whether the fetus is a person or not, but from an analysis of the only nonarbitrary basis for moral values.

How can biological categories bestow value? If they can't, then the abortionist can't use biological facts to justify killing. But that is what the abortion defender does.

Calling the fetus an intruder or parasite is analogous to the old curmudgeon's attitude toward children: he refuses to acknowledge that the once deserved the kind of treatment he would now deny to children.

The rapist is like an intruder who destroys your property in a search for gold. When he leaves and you justly punish him for the intrusion and destruction, you also have the benefit of the gold mine that he built on your property. For since the fetus's moral value is equal to that of ours, the value of the fetus is equivalent to that of the "gold mine" that the value of an adult human being amounts to.

And unlike the rapist, it is not unjust for the fetus to be there. Is the rapist like someone who trains a child to trespass? A Fagan? But we do not kill trespassers. Thomson does not treat the child as a moral equal or treat his life as having binding dignity.

Why is equivalence of moral value measured by the "kind" of ends, the sameness in the "kind" of ends? The alternative is to measure the moral value of the fetus against the concrete individual ends the decider of the issue "what value does the fetus have?" has chosen to seek in answering that question.

Maybe bring up the fact that you are not arguing for the personhood or the humanity of the fetus at the end of the section on consciousness. For appeals to consciousness as determining moral value usually come up in discussions of whether the fetus is a person or not. I am not arguing that the fetus is a person, but my argument against the relevance of consciousness would apply if instead of speaking of personhood, they were speaking of the moral equality of the fetus.

Go back over Davis, Cudd, and probably Thomson for points you should pick up on and for references. For example, Davis or Cudd talks about "conflicts of interest" between the mother and the fetus in a way that may appear to nullify the way you set up the problem in the introduction, i.e., if we can settle conflicts of interest between ourselves and an adult by killing the adult . . . , and minimal ethical standards concern conflicts of interest, etc.

I am not just arguing that it is the same individual (Grisez). I am arguing that this same individual is already, from the beginning oriented to the future achievement of the same kinds of ends that give whatever value they have to an adult's future choices.

And see blue paragraph in Grisez, p. 37 on whether the sperm, ovum, and the mother constitute a causal system.

It could be argued that the rights of infants extend to whatever ends they are capable of pursuing at their stage of development.

Since all I am showing is the hypothetical that zygotes have the right to life in adults do, the question for ethics proper, not just the preamble, is whether human adults do indeed have the right to life. Make that statement in the last section and say the answer involves our beliefs about the dignity of the person.

If I choose a point after conception, I am valuing the infant by the ends I am achieving by that choice, not by her ends. So I am subordinating my ends to her own. Opponent: but what if the end I am seeking is truth or conformity of decisions with reason's knowledge? Well, isn't the zygote oriented to those ends also? If I mistakenly think that the zygote isn't, my subordination of her ends is inculpable. But if I know she is oriented to those ends and still choose a point after conception for her moral value, then I am culpable of subordinating her ends to mine.

The moment before conception, the ovum is surrounded by many sperm. Only one complete

human causal system will result, or if the ovum is not fertilized, no complete human causal system will result. But which complete human causal system will result depends on which sperm fertilizes the ovum. If sperm A fertilizes the egg a different complete human causal system will exist than if sperm B fertilized the egg.

The humanness of the organism is complete in the decisive sense that everything specifically human about the way the present and future causal dispositions of the organism will respond to the influences of its environment will be the effect of the active causal dispositions the organism possesses when it exists at the zygote stage (from the moment of fertilization). By having those causal dispositions, the organism is oriented to make itself into a being with mature human characteristics. It causes itself to acquire those characteristics, and so those characteristics are effects of the dispositions that exist in the zygote.

Like all causes, the zygote's causality is a response to causal influences in its environment. But everything specifically human in the organism's responses to its environment come from the set of causal dispositions that exist completely in the zygote and not before.

This answers a question posed by my statement that neither the sperm nor the ovum is just an environmental condition necessary for the complete human causality of the other gamete. It could be asked how we can distinguish the causality of the sperm or ovum from just being an environmental condition for the causality of the other. We can make the distinction because the each contributes specifically human causal components to the other.

A complete human causal system: It lacks none of the active dispositions it needs to be the first stage in (an organism needs at the first stage in) the existence of a causal system that causes itself to become an achiever of human ends (just as we cause ourselves to become achievers of human ends). It causes itself to become an achiever of human ends by means of the design for a complete human being that it embodies. The structure (design) of the zygote constitutes a design for a complete human causal system, a causal system designed to cause itself to become an achiever of human ends.

Every tissue in the body, not just specifically human ones, will be produced by . . .
. . . will be the effect of . . .

If the possibility of twinning shows that the zygote is not an agent oriented to human ends, then adults are not either. For any of our cells could be cloned.

I need not discuss whether "innocence" discusses such cases as sleepwalkers, the insane, or children who unknowingly and involuntarily threaten others. The concept of innocence at least extends to the rational, voluntary behavior of adults. If those adults have the right to life, so do infants.

I need not discuss many questions about human "ends", not just the question of specifying what they are. I am not presupposing that there is a predefined set of human ends, or that there is an ultimate end, etc., etc.

Last section: We constantly hear "The embryo is not a person," "Human life does not begin until . . .," "The beginning of human life is a religious question." (I have not relied on the concepts of person or human life.) These justifications for abortion imply that there is something morally special about personhood or human life. What the pro-abortion rights person should say is that the reason abortion is alright is that there is nothing special about a human being. Nothing in what a human being is imposes restrictions on our choices.

We might not want to tell that to the general public. We might not want to disabuse them of the idea that the reason the woman has the right to choose is that being an adult human being bestows on her a value that restricts our choice concerning the value of her unborn infant. Not to worry. There is nothing wrong with allowing her to be deceived. If we can kill her, surely we can lie to her.

Maybe start last section this way: Many of the justifications offered for killing the Z, even if the Z is a person, would justify the Z killing the mother, if it could. Likewise, some of the justifications for its being ok to kill innocent adults would justify the Z's killing the mother, if it could. Of course, these are not just

contrary to fact conditionals, they are contrary to possibility conditionals. But the reason they are contrary to possible is facts about the Z, fact's about the assymetry between the Z' and the mother's assymetry which give us more responsibility to the Z, since the Z cannot protect its own interests.

The justifications are those of the technical or causal guilt of the Z. But maybe these only come up when the mother's life is at stake. And when the mother's life is at stake, does Aquinas's "you can do what is necessary to preserve your own life without intending to kill the other" apply to justify the what the mother does?

Maybe begin last section this way: I have not shown that innocent adults have the right to life. Of course, not all writers on abortion assume that it is unjust to take the life of an innocent adult. E.g., Thompson, and maybe Davis and Gillespie. But those who do not make it unjust to kill an adult still give the preference to the woman, as if she had the greater right to life.

Maybe begin last section: Some say mature features are not the key to the right to life but whether or not the infant is outside of the mother's body. Respond that life is more important than choice. Then say an objection more relevant to my argument is that even if the Z were a person, we can kill it, because of assymetry with the mother. Respond that we have more responsibility to the infant because of the assymetry. This does not mean we have to prefer the infant's life to the mother's, when both lives are at stake. For when both lives are at stake, the very existence of moral value is at stake.

Maybe conclude that the abortion dispute is really about the nature of ethics: are values absolute or relative, i.e., is the value of the human being absolute or relative, is the adult's right to life absolute or relative? If relative, there could be two different reasons for saying so: either there are absolute values, but the life of an innocent adult is not one of them; or there are no absolute values. But if human life is not an absolute value, there can be no absolute values. So the real question is are all values relative to something else?

Other ways of putting it if the abortion dispute is really about the nature of moral, that is, human, values: are all imperatives hypothetical, or are some categorical; is choice itself the highest value -- as it must be if choice is more important than life?

Can I say that what I am really doing is clarifying the nature of the dispute for both sides?

Maybe begin the last section: For example, deontologists and utilitarians can hardly be expected to be swayed by all of the same arguments on abortion.

For a person who says it is always unjust to kill an innocent adult, it is enough to establish the Z's equality. But for a person who permits killing innocent adults for some reasons, the Z's equality is not enough.

If utilitarianism is correct, the value of an individual human being is her contribution to the greatest good of the greatest number of human beings, whether or not she is included in that number.

The anti-abortionist can point to the mother's relationships, when preferring her life to that of the unborn's. But the utilitarian has a hard time justifying sparing a short time of human accomplishment by terminating a life time of human accomplishment. (Quote Finnis to this effect.)

Maybe sum up the "is it the same organism" section, not with the question: what more could it do to be an organism that makes itself into . . . ", but with the statement that if these facts don't make it the same organism than either an adult is not the same organism or being the same organism is not necessary for being an agent oriented to human ends for the purposes of our question.

Must explain that my disclaimer about rights means that I need not worry about the logic of "rights talk."

Need a footnote (to Gewirth and perhaps to Simon) indicating that I know the ends/means distinction is not absolute, i.e., the fact that it is not does not affect my argument.

Ask Chris Watters and/or Peter Cataldo:

Names of plants that can be divided in to and then grown. Also names of worms?

Can we call a one-celled living thing an organism? Can we call the Z that?

Where can I get the latest on twinning?

Is there a word that covers the conceptus from fertilization to birth? I.e., something more inclusive than "fetus" or "embryo."

Do red blood cells produce protein?

Are both twins within the amniotic sack?

Science and Rity, Jan. 1, 96

Why can't we guess at the hidden essence of physical things? Because to do so would require ontological concepts, and ontological concepts do not descend to that level of detail. The cannot get to the detail of phenomena because of the causal opacity of empirical concepts (see Causal Realism).

References to check, April 25, 1997

Robert Geis, Personal Existence After Death, Open Court (mentioned by Roy V?)

Martin Davis, Why Godel Didn't Have Church's Thesis, Information and Control, 54 (1982), 3-24 (mentioned by Parsons)

Mick Detlefsen (editor of NDJFL mentioned by Mike Pakaluk?) Has an e-mail address

Home Video Festival, Scranton, PA: Mark Jury. Try also Film Comment or Film History (or Washington and Lee U. film library, where Phil O'Mara gets many of his movies)

Dodd's Analytical Concordance; Young's Analytical Concordance.

1. See Section 2.1.

2. Of course, a desire can also be described as relating us to some mode of existence in accordance with its appetite's relation to that mode of existence. Appetite or not, the will is doing nothing strange when it causes decisions relating us to what things are. Other words for this relation would be "esteeming," "estimating the worth of," or "appreciating." Desires and decisions estimate or appreciate the worth of things with respect to the finalities of appetites and our decision-making ability, respectively.