

Nature has designed it so that human persons come into existence as a product of, so that human persons owe their existence to, the desire of one person for another person, as a product of the mutual desire of persons for each other. Nature has so designed it that a human person comes into existence as a result of another person placing a value on a third person. When one potential parent places a value on the other, he/she does not evaluate the other with respect to every feature of the other's makeup. He/she probably does not desire the other, for example, because the other has type O blood. He/she is placing a value on the other person insofar as the other is a sexual being, placing a value on the other person insofar as the other person has sexuality. (For simplicity, I will say that one person places a value on the sexuality of the other. But it must be remembered that you cannot place a value on features like having type O blood or having sexuality in abstraction from placing a value on the entity that possesses the feature, since features do not exist in abstraction from the entities that have them.)

But to place a value on sexuality is to place a value on the other person's person-making ability. So in valuing the other's sexuality the value of a person as such is involved in a way it is not involved when we value, for instance, their ability to make us laugh or to feed us. We pay people for the use of their laugh-causing ability or their food-making ability. As long as the use of their abilities is consensual, there may be no moral issue involved. But valuing another person's person-making-ability involves the value of the product of that ability, the value of that which that ability can make. And one of the things that ability can make is a moral absolute, something for the sake of which all other values exist.

And not only is an end-in-itself one of the things sexuality can make, but sexuality is necessary for the existence of ends-in-themselves. Without sexuality, no ends-in-themselves could exist. Without sexuality, nothing for the sake of which everything else exists would exist. For other values to exist, persons must exist; for persons to exist, sexuality must exist and be used in a way that allows persons to exist.

The question is whether instead of refraining from using that power we can use it while deliberately preventing it from achieving that end, without diminishing the value of that end in our estimation and, therefore, diminishing the value of a previous products of the use of that power in our estimation.

If we claim that the human person is the highest worth, must we not value sexuality primarily for its ability to bring into existence that which is of the highest worth? We value means for the ends, the effects, they can bring into existence. Sex can bring into existence pleasure and human persons, which result is of more worth? So if we do not value sex primarily for bringing human beings into existence, how can we say the human person possess the highest worth in our estimations?

And if we place a value on sex that excludes the bringing into existence of a human being, how can we say that the value of a person is an absolute value, the value of an end-in-itself, something worthy of committed love, not for its function, its ability to bring something else into existence, but for its own sake. We value things other than absolute values for what they can bring into existence. If sex is the only way to get X, but we explicitly decline to value sex for bringing X into existence for the sake of bringing something else into existence, can the existence of X be the value that measures all other values, a value that all other values must at least be consistent with?

But procreation is the primary end to which I am related by what my sexuality is prior to choice. If I choose pleasure over procreation, procreation is not my personal primary end, but it remains the primary end of what I am as a sexual being. But why does that fact constitute a misevaluation of anything? I am evaluatining procreation as if it were not the primary end of my sexuality; in my evaluations, it is not what it is in reality. In my evaluations, in my relating things to ends, procreation is not the primary end of my sexuality, of my sexual acts.

(It may not be the end of a particular sexual act when I am infertile, but it is certainly the primary end of my sexuality.) In my evaluations, the relation of procreation to my sexuality is not what that relation is in reality.

The greater cannot come from the lesser. If I treat a person under the aspect of a-sexual-being the way I treat a person under the aspect of a-being-who-can-perform-function-X, I am treating a procreator as a thing maker, as an agent with a capacity for making things. A person (the higher) does not come from a mere capacity for making things.

It is even a distortion to say that pleasure and procreation are two alternative ends for sex. The pleasure itself is a means, not an absolute end. It is primarily a means to the existence of that for which everything else exists, but it is also the means to other things, such as psychological satisfaction. But if we make psychological gratification and fulfillment the most important result of sex's pleasure, what happens to the absolute moral value of the individual?

Sex has that link to human life not just in the sense that at certain periods of the month it can cause human life, but in the sense that its role in our lives is to make us person-producers and person-rearers. That is its role in the human species.

So the value we place on sexuality will inevitably determine the value we place on human life and vice versa. The way we evaluate human life has logical implications for that which causes human life, that which is the sole way of getting human life. If human life is that which is not only most valuable (a relative description) but of absolute value, then the cause of human life, the sole source of that which is of absolute value, deserves a certain kind of evaluation, a certain kind of place in our system of values. What kind? A kind determined by the following logical link: If we evaluate the necessary means for

the existence of human life as a *mere* means to pleasure or a *mere* means to the production of things less than the absolute value, we are not valuing human life as the absolute value.

The value of the human species is the value of sex, the source of the species. The value we place on sex will be the value we place on that mode of existence of which sex is the source and the essential source, that mode of existence which is nothing but a product of sex; that's all human life is. It is not an accidental product of sex like, e.g., venereal disease. It is essential in the forward looking direction (from cause to effect) and in the backward looking direction. Concerning the latter, all human life is a result of sex. Maybe somewhere in the universe human life is produced in some other way, but here all is a result of sex. And artificial means would imitate sex, would have to imitate sex (a la Aristotelian art). Even test-tube babies show that our attitude toward sex is our attitude toward human life. If human life should not result from an act of giving between two persons, if sex is not the act of giving from which human life should result, human life is something that can be mechanically manipulated.

There is only one way to get a human being, through sex. If X is an absolute value, i.e., an end relative to which all other ends must be measured, then if we use the means to get X while deliberately frustrating X, are we not devaluing X? If other ends are in fact not measured to X, then X is not an absolute value. And those other ends are not measured relative to X, if we can frustrate X, while using the means to X to get them.

But if there were another way to get X, we could not say we were necessarily frustrating X. But what if an artificial means to X is developed, then there is another means to get X, and we are not choosing against X, when we practice birth control. But that assumes there are not other arguments that make those artificial means immoral to use. If they are immoral on other grounds, we are back at step 1.

When I employ sex in a way that intends to avoid procreation, I am placing a value on my partner, even my imagined partner if the sex is autoerotic. I am using her person-making features. But I am not just putting a value other than person-making on those features and hence on her, I am trying to *suppress* those features. E.g., what she is in my values is a source of pleasure for me in a way that requires her not being a person-maker. If so, what is a person in my evaluations? A person is no longer an absolute value, by which all other values must be measured.

Contraceptive sex: (1) cheapens the meaning of sex. It no longer has the meaning of first of all bringing into existence an end-in-itself. (2) cheapens the meaning of our existence, for it cheapens the meaning of that which the act we are engaging in otherwise would create; that which it would have existed is no longer that for the sake of which everything else exists in our estimations. For it is not even that for the sake of which the necessary means to its existence exists. (3) cheapens the meaning of the sex partner and of the lasting union between them that sex helps support, that is "based on" sex.

Because sexuality is our person-making ability, the context in which we use it can either affirm the ethically absolute value of the person as such or deny it. Do we have the right to tell someone else: I consensually give you permission to use my person-making ability in a way that prevents the absolute value of the person from being affirmed?

I do not deal with a person's capacities apart from the person. If I hire a comedian to give me pleasure, I am hiring him or her, not just his or her capacities. But I am hiring him or her AS a being with certain capacities. I can deal with those capacities, which are merely capacities for performing functions, according to justice. I can give money in return for making me laugh. When I do, I treat the capacity under which I am relating to the person as a capacity for making effects that are less than the existence of persons. And I am treating the

person, insofar as he or she possesses that capacity, as less than a maker of something of absolute ethical value.

When I enter into an ordinary business or social exchange, am I denying that the other is worthy of committed love just because the act in question is not an act of complete giving of myself?

No, but in such acts, I am not using, and placing a value on, the other's person-making ability. Nor am I preventing the other's person-making ability from being that.

Using the other person's laugh-making ability does not require me to cease valuing the other person as an end-in-itself. I could be doing that, but I do not have to. However, if I use their ability to make that for the sake of which everything else exists with the intention of preventing that ability to make that for the sake of which everything else exists, what is the place of that for the sake of which everything else exists in my system of values? And if it does not have the place it deserves in my system of values, can I be valuing the other person as an end-in-itself?

I cannot morally choose to achieve an end by using the act of interfering with conception as the means to attain it. I can choose to achieve an end by refraining from an act that would cause conception. It is one thing to refrain from a sex act. It is another thing to choose a sex act, for whatever purpose, and prevent the purpose of conception. In both choosing the sex act as a means and preventing conception as a means, I evaluate whatever other end of the sex act I achieve as a higher end than conception. In refraining from the sex act, I do not evaluate the end I achieve as if it were higher; that fact that it is higher may be the very reason I refrain.

The existence of our person-making ability is not just as valuable, just as important, as the existence of a person. A person is an end-in-itself; the use of our person-making ability is not an end-in-itself. If their value were equal, we

would be obligated never to refrain from using our person-making ability. But we can refrain from that most of the time. However, can we place a value on it while frustrating its value as the maker of persons, can we place a value on the other person while frustrating her value as a maker of persons, and still honor the value of a person as that for the sake of which all other values are values? And If we cannot both frustrate the value of our sexuality as the maker of persons and value persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists, we cannot value our sex partner as an end-in-itself.

The existence of our partner resulted from, and solely from, a previous act(s) of valuing another person. Can we devalue our partner's ability to make ends-in-themselves without devaluing the results of previous uses of the ability to make ends-in-themselves?

The person-making power does not have the same value that a person has. If it did have the same value, we could not refrain from using our person-making power without diminishing the value of a person. But we can refrain from using our person-making power without denying the value of a person as an end-in-itself. In fact, refraining from the use of our person-making power can be a way of honoring the value of a person; for it can result from the fact that person's are not only ends-in-themselves but have the status of ends-in-themselves in our estimations of value. We might believe that it would be unjust for us to assume the responsibility for the life and well being of another end-in-itself, because our health or finances would make it impossible for us to satisfy the justice due that end-in-itself. There are two ways we can avoid that responsibility. We can refrain from using our person-making power, or we can use that power while also doing something to prevent it from achieving the goal of making a person.

If we refrain from using that power, we are sacrificing other goals, other values, other ends, rather than interfere with our person-making power's ability to make ends-in-themselves. So this is a way of honoring the value of the person as an end-in-itself relative to lesser values. We deem the other values worthy of sacrifice rather than make the necessary means for the existence of that for the

sake of which everything else exists into something that cannot produce the value without which there are no other values. We forsake relative values rather than reduce the necessary means for the absolute value to being less than the means for the absolute value.

Can we ethically decide that a sex act will or will not have the end of procreation? On the basis of what standard, what end, could we decide this?

What higher end could there be that could justify such a choice? Or what higher end is there that we could not achieve through another means, through abstinence, and therefore achieved without deciding that this sex act will not have the end of procreation?

Could we decide a sex act will not have the end of procreation for the purposes, for example, of saving my wife's life and still make the decision consistent with evaluating her as an end-in-itself, as an ethical absolute? Doesn't the value of person have a higher place in the estimation of someone who saves his wife's life by abstaining from the use of his person-making power than one who saves it by preventing his sexuality from achieving the end of making a person?

But even if the value of the person is higher in the estimations of A than of B, is A obligated morally to give it that higher estimation? "Higher" is a relative term, but the value we are talking about is an absolute value. If B values it relatively lower than A, is B valuing it as an absolute?

The opponent will say that producing another ethical absolute is the most important end, but not the only end. We can prevent the most important end, without denying that this end is an ethical absolute. But being an ethical absolute is not just being "most important" in this context. Something can be the most important end of X, without being an ethical absolute, and so without X's being connected to an ethical absolute. Sex is connected to an ethical absolute, and it's most important end is not just most important but is an absolute end.

I evaluate refraining from conceiving as a means to my happiness; I evaluate interfering with conceiving as a mean to my happiness. The second case involves more than the first. The second case involves evaluating other aspects of sexuality as means to my happiness, and only as means to my happiness, even though in themselves they are the necessary means to the existence of ends-in-themselves. So I am failing to evaluate them as what they are in a respect that is essentially, not accidentally, involved in every choice I make. Every choice I make is aimed at the well being of an existing end-in-itself, is for the sake of the well being of an existing end-in-itself. So every choice I make either honors or does not honor things as being what they are in a certain respect: as what they are with respect to being ends-in-themselves or means to the good of ends-in-themselves. But contraception involves an exclusive disjunction between valuing sex as necessary means to the existence things worthy of honor for the own sake, means without which ends-in-themselves would not exist and valuing sex as if the necessary means to that which exists for its own sake as means to my happiness in a way that excludes its being a means for there being any ends-in-themselves at all, a means for an end-in-itself existing at all.

I am not obligated to seek the existence of another end-in-itself. I am obligated not to make the necessary means to the existence of a moral absolute into less than a means to a moral absolute. Because doing so would involve evaluating things without which no moral absolute would exist to be merely nonnecessary means to nonabsolute values. But there can be no nonabsolute values unless absolute values exist. Sex is not just a necessary means to ends-in-themselves. Water, air, blood, etc., etc. are all necessary means to the existence of persons. But each of that latter are only accidentally connected to the existence of persons. Sex is not accidentally connected to the existence of persons. Sex is a sufficient condition and the only sufficient condition, a necessary and sufficient condition, for the existence of persons. So sex's relation to the existence of persons is the necessary means for the existence of any moral value. Sex is the only sufficient means to the existence of moral value.

If we do not value an end-in-itself as such, moral values cannot have the

place they should have in our system of values. For in failing to honor an end-in-itself as such, we are failing to value that without which there would be no moral values. Likewise, if we fail to value sex as the only sufficient condition for the existence of an end-in-itself, we are failing to value it as the only sufficient condition for the existence of any moral values whatsoever.

I cannot morally choose to achieve an end by using the act of interfering with conception as the means to attain it. I can choose to achieve an end by refraining from an act that would cause conception. It is one thing to refrain from a sex act. It is another thing to choose a sex act, for whatever purpose, and prevent the purpose of conception. In both choosing the sex act as a means and preventing conception as a means, I evaluate whatever other end of the sex act I achieve as a higher end than conception. In refraining from the sex act, I do not evaluate the end I achieve as if it were higher; that fact that the person is higher may be the very reason I refrain.

In interfering with conception, I am evaluating something other than a person as the reason of my sexuality's existence, the reason of its existence for me at that time, the value of its existence for me at that time. I am evaluating my sexuality as primarily existing for something other end than producing something for the sake of which everything else is produced.

The structure of the human act is that we choose means in view of an end, and we do so on the basis of knowledge of the connection between a means and an end. So we cannot avoid placing a value on our sexuality that either does or does not value the product of sexuality, human persons, as ends-in-themselves.

Choices evaluate things by making them ends or means. (Should I make the rosary a means of deception, a means of scoring points?) Thus they either evaluate something as an end or relate it to another thing that is an end. So a choice relates things to the (other?) Ends of man. Isn't pleasure an end to which I am oriented by being what I am prior to choice? Yes, but procreation is also an

end to which I am oriented prior to choice by being what I am. So I can choose the end of pleasure as long as it doesn't interfere with the end of procreation. But why can't it interfere? Aren't I *always*, in every choice, selecting between ends to which I have an inclination prior to choice? Yes, but pleasure is just an end for me; a child exists for its own sake.

Preventing the occurrence of conception because we do not want the child, makes the product of sexuality something whose value depends on whether we want her or not, i.e., whether she satisfies some other goal for us than the goal of allowing a means to an end-in-itself produce an end-in-itself. Whether she satisfies some other goal for us than the goal of the existence of an end-in-itself. If a product of sexuality has value because she is wanted, the product of sexuality is not an absolute value in our estimations. She is wanted in view of some other end, e.g., personal satisfaction for the parents. Hence she is not an end-in-herself.

Sometime in our youth, we learn two things: sexual activity can produce pleasure; sexual activity can produce human beings. Which should be more important to us? Think of parents who lose a child. They would trade all the pleasure that sex ever gave them for having their child back.

To put sexual pleasure in perspective in relation to our happiness, consider parents who have had to experience the death of a child. That child is a product of their sexuality; another product of their sexuality is pleasure. Which product is more important? Any parent who has lost a child would trade a lifetime of sexual pleasure to have that child back. That child IS the meaning of their sexuality. What children contribute to our happiness is INCOMPARABLY more than what sexual pleasure contributes to our happiness.

Sex has that link to human life not just in the sense that at certain periods of the month it can cause human life, but in the sense that its role in our lives is to make us person-producers and person-rearers. That is its role in

the human species.

The fact that sexuality is what it is in order to be a means for procreation is indicated by the following. There are times when there is a better than 50/50 chance for conception to take place. We would use contraception then because sexuality is more likely to be a means to procreation than not. But there are also times when the chances are less than 50/50 but more than 0. We would still use contraception at those times. If sexuality has the chance of producing a human being, its main purpose and meaning is as an instrument for producing human beings, since (1) our existence is more fundamental to us than any other purpose sexuality might serve and (2) the existence in question is the existence of an ethical absolute.

As teenagers, we learn two things: sexual activity can produce pleasure; sexual activity can produce human beings. What happens to the value of a person when we make sex an instrument for pleasure first, or at least separate the value of sex from the end of creating persons? We know what happens. We kill people at the beginning and end of life. Also we can see the results in the excesses of gay culture, i.e., those excesses say "For me, sex is for pleasure. I want to stay gay because it gives me pleasure."

But why should the creation of persons have so much pleasure associated with it? Because of what is needed for the upbringing, the nurturing, of a person.

Of the two things we learn as teenagers, which is more important? The production of human beings. But why is that more important? One answer would be that the preservation of the species is at stake. The same answer could be given in respect to every species: the importance of the pleasure of sex is less than that of the preservation of the species. But in the human case, is the preservation of the species the only thing that is more important than is the pleasure associated with sex? We like to think that at least two other things are more important. One is the lasting relationship between two people that is based on sexual attraction. The other is the existence, not of the species, but of

individual human beings.

At one time, the latter was considered the most important of all. The human species differs from other species in that the individual, not just the species, has an importance in herself that transcends the pleasure of sex, and any other temporal value.

But why should an individual human being have such a high value? That is, why should we consider an individual human being to have such a high value? At one time, we would have given people the following reason for placing individual human beings on such a moral pedestal: A human being as a child of God or as the image and likeness of God, or as the personal dwelling place of God, has a unique relation to something whose value is unequivocally absolute and objectively so: God. That answer may not have satisfied philosophers. But for the rational man on the street who does not have philosophical scruples, it is a sufficiently clear answer to the question why she should consider each individual human being to be of absolute moral value. Our behavior may not have lived up to our concept, but at least we had a concept that made clear why our behavior should live up to it.

And so we had a reason for considering sex to be the means of the coming into existence of something of absolute moral value greater than which there could be no value short of God. That was the most important value of sex. The second most important value of sex was the lasting relation it formed. For two reasons. First, the lasting relation was necessary for the just upbringing of the entity of absolute moral value that sex produces. Second, the lasting relation gave each of the partners the committed love that, as entities of absolute moral value, they each deserved.

Rather, the value we put on life is the value we put on our sexuality. Just when our knowledge of the genetic code taught us about human life, the sexual revolution occurred. The latter determined the value we put on life. That value is what we evaluate human life to be, that is, we evaluate it to be the existence of some mature characteristics. But in so doing, we are evaluating those characteristics relative to our ends, not the ends the being with those

characteristics has the future potential for.

Jun. 11, 96

Can love affirm the value of the loved as an ethical absolute value, if the love is not open to allowing our mutual love, our unifying love, to make our unity the cause of another ethical absolute? (What is the cause of an ethical absolute? The union of two other ethical absolutes; not just two other persons, but the the loving union of two other persons.) -- if we are not open to letting our unity produce another ethical absolute? Mar. 2, 96

And see Notes2, SSR, of this date. The structure of the human act is that we choose means in view of an end, and we do so on the basis of knowledge of the connection between a means and an end. So we cannot avoid placing a value on our sexuality that either does or does not value the product of sexuality, human persons, as ends-in-themselves. So this is one of those areas where we cannot avoid evaluating a thing to either be or not be what it is, i.e., cannot avoid "treating" things as if they are or are not what they are. (We can say we "evaluate" human persons a certain way in deciding for sex; can we say we "treat" them as if they are not what they are? We can't treat a nonexistent one way or the other, but we can treat ourselves and our sex partner as if we are not what we are, ends-in-ourselves.)

But why is it "higher"? I must be evaluating something as if it were not what it is. Refraining from sex for other purposes cannot be intrinsically evil, since most adults are doing just that for most of their waking hours.

Accidental birth control would deprive me of an end, but not in a moral sense. Intentional birth control deprives me of an end as a rational person. But it does so because I have failed to choose correctly.

ethics, 12-10-92

example of the great mouthpiece using the rosary to deceive. There are two misvaluations here; deception is only one of them. Using a sacred symbol for deception is an evil even though no further harm is being done to the people being deceived.

Ethics, Sexuality, Contraception, 8/ 1/94

Contraception article: In contraception we willfully oppose (a la Grisez?) the value of our own existence; we devalue our own existence (and hence contradict ourselves a la Gewirth?). We do this because our existence is nothing but a product of sexuality. To prevent sexuality from producing human existence for the sake of some other value is to oppose the value of human existence, and hence to oppose our own value. It is to devalue human existence, and hence to devalue ourselves.

Or consider this paragraph on birth control from elsewhere in the notes files:

We cannot use our person-making power outside of a context in which we leave the use of that power open to making persons. Nature may close the context so that persons cannot be made, but we cannot. This illustrates the sense in which we are responsible for our actions, not for their results. Or better, the sense in which ethics governs good or evil actions, regardless of results. The action in question is the act of the will. Just as it is against the goal of the rational appetite to evaluate ourselves to be agents oriented to our own destruction, and to the cessation of our orientation to ends, it is against the nature of the rational appetite to evaluate ourselves to be agents oriented to the preventing our person-making power from making persons.

The knowledge that directs my action cannot be the knowledge that act X will cause a posited sex act to be infertile, i.e., to achieve the end of being free from

children. But I can use the knowledge that nature will cause a posited sex act to be infertile as the knowledge that directs my choice of whether or not to have sex.

The reason why even consensual extramarital sex is exploitation is that you are reducing the value of human life and so reducing the value of even the consenting partner -- and of yourself. The reason why you are reducing the value is that the value we place on sex will be the value we place on human life, and vice versa.

The prohibition of birth control is like the moral prohibition against taking someone's life. That is, we are not always obligated to do something positive to save a life; similarly, we are not always obligated to perform an act that will produce a baby. And we are always obligated never to do something positive with the intention of taking a life; similarly, we are obligated never to do something positive with the intention of preventing the production of a baby.

It seems that in both of the above cases it is the value of a human person as a moral absolute, as an end-in-itself that is at stake. That is, the same status of a person as an end-in-itself prohibits positive action for the end of taking a life or of preventing a life, but does not prohibit refraining from an act that will save a life or that will produce a life.

But is it the case that we can never refrain from an act with the intention of someone's dying as a result, but can refrain from an act with the intention of someone's not coming into existence as a result? If so, the difference between these cases must be explained.

Mar. 24, 95

Why is extra-marital sex "dirty" or degrading? What does it degrade? It degrades the value of human life.

The pinup model who did not want to pose nude because she did not want her

future children to see the pictures. Why worry if a child sees her mother nude? To be nude is to expose and give away her ability to be a mother. For her ability to be a mother is her ability to stimulate the male. And the male's ability to be a father requires his being stimulated by the female.

Human life is the product of an act of animal passion. What then is the value of human life?

Human life is the product of committed love between persons. What then is the value of human life?

Pornography, casual sex, etc., trivialize our person-making ability. They do it even though, e.g., the woman in the pornography is not fertile at the time. The features of her we are trivializing are the features by which we make persons, when we can make them, the features necessary for making children, when we can make them. The brain is an instrument for thinking, even when we are sleeping. It still is what it is, because evolution selected it for thinking. The stomach is still an instrument for digesting, even when we are fasting. What the stomach is, its design, its nature, is an organ selected for digesting; etc.

SSR, Woman's lib, Pew, 3-19-96

"I don't want my body to be respected for its ability to carry children." Then your inevitably making your body into a sex object. "No, I want my body to be respected as belonging to a person, an end-in-herself." But you cancelled the value of a person when you refused to let your body be respected as the place where *persons* come into existence and are nurtured. Once that value is rejected, reduction to being a sex object is inevitable.

If people are not nothing-but products of sexuality, because God infuses the soul directly, then the argument holds a fortiori.

Moreover the other values we are sacrificing rather than make a person in an unjust way are themselves primarily means to the existence of a moral absolute. A means is valued for something other than itself that it can bring into existence. The existence of a person is that for the sake of which everything else that sex can produce exists. So we must value everything else that sex can produce is subordination to its value of bringing a person into existence. Otherwise, the existence of a person is not the existence of a moral absolute in our chosen system of values.

Sex is responsible for producing many values, many ends. But one of the things sex produces, and only one, is an absolute value, an end-in-itself. Whatever the other results of sex are, they are relative values, not absolute values. And they are values for already existing persons, not for another person sex could bring into existence. But these relative values for already existing persons, values that are not ends-in-themselves for already existing persons, exist primarily for the end of the existence of something that will be an end-in-itself for other persons.

So, on the one hand, all those other values are for the sake of already existing persons, on the other hand, all those other values exist for the sake of the existence of a new person. There is no contradiction between these two "exists for the sake of" unless our motivation to pursue, or are conscious way of pursuing, those relative values for the sake of what they can contribute to us excludes their existing for the sake of bringing into existence another end-in-itself.

In other words, nature designed it so that the existence of new ends-in-themselves would result from the satisfaction of desires on the part of already existing persons, desires aimed at things that are goods relative to already existing persons. Nature designed the following situation: there exist in us desires for things good because they bring us satisfaction of those desires;

nature designed the existence of those desires in us for the sake of bringing into existence something other than the satisfaction of those desires, and something not just in addition to the satisfaction of those desires but something that, contrary to those other goods, is something for the sake of which all other values exist.

Something that is an end-in-itself in reality must be an end-in-itself in our system of values. If we pursue those lesser goods for our own sake to the exclusion of the existence of another end-in-itself, we are evaluating the existence of those desires, we are placing a value on the existence of those desires in us, which contradicts the fact that the primary reason for our having them is the very existence of something that everything else is for, not just the existence of a relative part of the happiness of another person.

The existence of the potential parent is of equal value to the existence of the potential child. But the existence of a relative part of the potential parent's well being, a nonnecessary means to the parents well being, is not as important as the existence of another person itself. And the existence of a nonnecessary means to a part of my well being is not as important as the existence of a necessary means to the existence of an absolute good.

Now I can often chose between unequal values with no moral implication because something necessary for the good of an end-in-itself is not involved. But the different ends of sex are not merely of unequal value, as two nonabsolute goods might be. The difference between the various ends of sex is that between an absolute value and a nonabsolute value, an end that is an absolute good in reality and an end that in reality is not an absolute good. So the choice of contraception has implications for where something that is in reality an absolute good, where that good is in my system of values.

Likewise the choice between means to nonabsolute goods often has no moral implications. For the value of means to nonabsolute goods is not connected to anything absolute. But the difference between the value of a necessary means to something absolute and the value of a nonnecessary means to something relative is incommensurable. So contraception does not just make sex a means to something of

lesser value but it makes sex a means to a relative value at the expense of being a means to an absolute value.

Even though classical music is more deeply satisfying than popular, there are times when popular is better for us because we need the particular kind of satisfaction it brings more than that which classical music brings. But here we are comparing relative values. There are times when it is better not to create children than to create them. But there can be no time that it is better to use a necessary means to the very existence of an end-in-itself as if it were only a nonnecessary means to the existence of something less than an absolute good. We should not make our nature into a nonnecessary producer of a relative good at the expense of my nature's being the necessary producer of an absolute good.

But when I refrain from sex, I am not evaluating my nature to be less than a producer of an absolute. I am doing the opposite, I am giving it a place in my system of values as the necessary producer of the *only* thing that has absolute value, a person. For I am evaluating it to be something that should not be used in a way that excludes its being the only producer of the only thing that has absolute value. I am saying that the other things produced by sex exist for the nonnecessary relative good of one end-in-itself to the exclusion of existing as the necessary means to the very existence of the only good without which there would be no relative goods.

Since sex is the only example we have of something that is the only means to something that is the only absolute value, it is difficult to find analogies. But since all arguments from analogy are imperfect, it is not impossible to find an analogy, that like all analogies, is good up to a point.