

last update: 82786

52084, The knowing subject does not first become aware of the knowing subject's existence in a second act of consciousness. It is aware of itself as such in and through the first act. The second act is just a further development of what is already there. So there is no mystery why the object of the second act is the same as the knowing subject performing the first act.*f*, The subject of the second act is already aware of itself as the subject of the first act. That is, the subject of the second act is aware of itself as reflecting, in the second act, on its own prior act. For it is already aware of itself as a conscious knower, as the conscious subject of the first act who is expanding the first act, building on the first act.*f*, To be aware of itself as the subject of the second act is to be aware of itself as expanding the self-consciousness that depends on and comes into existence with the first act. It is ___ to be aware of the first act as emanating from, depending on, the subject who becomes more aware of itself in the second act. It is to be aware of the first act as depending on the being which, in the second act, is aware of itself as the which the first act depends on.*f*, That is what the second act of awareness is, awareness of an agent who performs the second act because he performs the first. (The agent is aware of the second act emanating from it. It is aware of the object of the second act and of the existence of a subject from which the second act emanates; and it is aware that the second act could not take place, could not emanate from its subject, if the subject were not the same as the object of the second act. Why? That is the nature of the second act; a development of the consciousness-of-the-existence-of-a-knowing subject that began in a prior act emanating from that subject. Therefore the subject from which the development emanates must be the same as the subject from which the prior cons show by their behaviour that they relate to sensed objects as more than objects. A sheep does not flee from a wolf simply as an unpleasant object of sight, an ugly object or one that it hurts the sheep to look at. If so, the sheep would not have to flee from the wolf. To avoid the wolf as an object of sight, the sheep would merely have to look in a different direction. It is the existence of the wolf, not distinguishable from other characteristics by the senses but presented to the senses by means such sensory characteristics, that causes the sheep to flee. iousness-of-a-subject emanated.)

The subject it is aware of in the second act is the same as the subject of the first act because the subject of the second act is aware of an act (the second) performed because the subject of the act (itself, as it turns out) performed the first. The subject's awareness of the second act is awareness of an act performed because its agent performed the first act, performed by performing the first act. The subject's awareness of the second act is awareness of an act linked to the first by necessarily being performed by the agent of the first, an act linked to the

first in the sense that the agent of the second must be the agent of the first to perform the second.^f It must perform the first to perform the second, because it is aware of the second as reflexive, as an act of an already existing actor turning back of the first action. To be aware of it as reflexive is not just aware of it, as in sensation, as needing an existing object. It is to be aware of it as needing an awareness of the causation of the first as emanating from the cause of the second. Reflection = an agent finding itself as object.^f While aware of itself causing the second act, the agent is still aware of itself causing the first act. Or, while an agent is aware of itself causing the second act, it is also aware of itself causing the first act. So the subject of the acts must be the same. But why must the object of the second be the same as the subject of the first? Because that's the kind of act the second is, an act performed by the subject of the first to acquire more knowledge of itself, an act performed in response to the subject's first awareness of itself. The new awareness of itself does not replace the old one. The additional awareness that I am performing the second act coexists with the same self-consciousness the already existed in the first act. Likewise, in response to seeing something, I perform more acts to learn about it. I listen, smell, walk nearer and around. I try to remember its name or where I saw it before, try to figure out what it is or what its doing here, etc. Just so, in response to the subject's first awareness of itself, it performs reflective acts to gain more knowledge. Reflective acts have as their object an awareness already understood as emanating from me, from the same agent that is aware of itself producing the reflective act. For the agent is already aware of itself as aware, and its awareness of itself as producing the second act does not suppress that first awareness.

The subject it is aware of in the second act is the same as the subject of the first act because the subject of the second act is aware of an act (the second) performed because the subject of the act (itself, as it turns out) performed the first. The subject's awareness of the second act is awareness of an act performed because its agent performed the first act, performed by performing the first act. The subject's awareness of the second act is awareness of an act linked to the first by necessarily being performed by the agent of the first. Why? Because the content of the first awareness of the subject, the content that is made more explicit in the second act, is awareness of the subject, not as the source of an outside influence as in sensation, but as producing the awareness of the outside world. In sensation we are aware of the existence of an exterior agent because we are aware of an influence passively received. But __in being aware of an influence passively received, we must also be aware of the existence of that which undergoes the passive reception. We are aware of the existence of that which undergoes the passive reception by being conscious of that awareness as an action performed by the subject of the passive reception in response to the passive reception.^f In

other words, when the awareness of blue comes into existence, there is awareness of an action passively undergone by something and awareness of that something producing the consciousness of that passively undergone action. And the awareness of the production of the consciousness blue is not something different from the consciousness of blue. It exists with the consciousness of blue as part of it. So awareness of the existence of the subject producing the consciousness of blue exists with the awareness of blue. And the awareness of an act reflecting on the first is awareness of an act performed by the subject that is still aware of itself as performing the first act.

81486, Self-consciousness is another case of one thing made object through another without a second act or inference being involved. Through color and resistance we become aware of size, shape, motion, etc. Through awareness of motion, we become aware of the agent of that awareness. Through awareness of that awareness (the second act) we become aware of the agent of the second act as such, as the agent of the second act, etc.^f52186, Concerning Hume on the self. Look up his quotes on only finding impressions (plural?), not a subject of impressions. In fact, we find a multitude of impression. But their unity is not just logical; and if logical, a mind is required to unite them, an apprehender. That is, there are impressions and there is one apprehender of them. At the same moment in time, there are memories, images, thoughts, sensations of sounds, colors, smells, tastes, touches, and an apprehension of all these. And there

is an apprehension of previous apprehensions.^f Further, the objects of the original 'impressions' are not identical with the apprehension of them. There is a relation to a term. Is there also a foundation for the relation? As a matter of fact, there are diverse relations (impressions of objects) united by the same subject of the relations. I see the sky, I discover my existence as seeing the sky. I now hear a sound and discover the same existence I previously discovered.^f Likewise, I become aware that I am aware. The subject that is now aware of itself is not a new subject since it is still aware of itself as seeing the sky. So the diverse relations require a source of unity that, by hypothesis, must be distinct from the diversity in the relations. So much for Hume.^f11380, DOK, p. 95. A dog knows its master without the power or knowledge to say so to himself. That is, in rational knowledge we speak to ourselves, 'This page exists'. Language is communication, even communication with oneself.

In judgment we are aware of ourselves in exercised act, i.e., in exercised act we are aware of the primary act where the non-self is that which I am aware of in signified act. So I signify something to myself, aware, in second act, that I have signified something. Does animal language go this far?^f Roland Dalbiez, *Animal Psychology*, p. 95ff.

Adler-U, 42886,,Does consciousness exist? Consciousness is what makes the difference between moral culpability and its absence. If there was not way I could be aware of X and no reason for me to be aware that there might be something morally relevant, X, that I was not aware of, I cannot be morally guilty of ignoring X's existence.^f,Also, one big difference between humans and animals is that humans make moral judgements. If animals do not, they are not equal to us in the ability to be aware of the moral dimensions of situations and theories.^f31386,What do we lose by denying consciousness? What if I promised you on-demand, eternal orgasm with a person you love, except that you would not be aware of the pleasure or of the emotions of love? Any takers? Or what if I offered you a machine enabling you to function without eyes in all respects except that you would not be aware of color or visual beauty. Any takers? Well, whyyyyyy not? I thought you didn't lose anything by denying the existence of consciousness.

Carroll's P, 31186,,Does it matter whether consciousness exists? What do we lose if we assume it does not exist? Imagine a blind man given equipment to turn color radiation into signals so that he could do everything we can do except experience the beauty of colors. Nor is the only thing we lose aesthetic. Imagine a retarded person attached to a computer that allowed him to go through all the steps of all possible recursive functions but was never aware that any given step was a step made in conformity with a rule. What do we lose? Knowledge itself. Or call it by some other name; whatever we call it, it is all-important.^f3186,,Behaviorists say awareness is irrelevant to our scientific explanation of knowledge. Yes, it is. But scientific knowledge is not the only kind of knowledge.