

## The Real Presence of The Trinity in Jesus' Human Nature and Ours

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Perfectly valid and necessary theological distinctions can create psychological obstacles to appreciating the glory of the Trinity's real presence in us. ("I thank you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that you have hidden these things from the wise and understanding and revealed them to babes; yes, Father, for such was your gracious will." Mt 11:25-26.)

### I.

For example, we are told, correctly, that the persons of the Trinity are present in us "as object," that is, present by being objects of our knowledge and love. Hearing that, we are tempted to say "Whew! I thought you were asking me to believe another 'hard saying,' like believing that Jesus' body and blood can be true food and drink (Jn 6:55, 60). Thank God all you mean is that the Trinity is 'in' us in the quasi-metaphorical, or indirect, or at least minimal sense in which things we know and love are present in our mind and heart."

But relations between a knower and lover and the *objects* of his knowledge and love are *all* the infinite life of the Trinity consists of, not just in us, but *in itself*. Only because God's existence is identical with his knowledge and love and with the object of his knowledge and love is God a family of persons. God is a Father only because he is a knower who, in knowing himself, generates the Word in which he expresses that knowledge to himself and contemplates the object of his knowledge, his own divine nature. God is the Holy Spirit only because, by mutually sharing the love that is identical with the divine nature and so by loving each other for having the divine nature, the Father and the Word breathe the divine Sigh of love (or "moan" of love, Rm 8:23, 26; since "spirit" means breath) that "WORD"-lessly (Rm 8:26) expresses (that is, affectively and non-verbally expresses, in contrast to the Word's "cognitional" and verbal way of expressing) and contains the love that is identical with the divine nature as perfectly as the Word expresses and contains the knowledge that is identical with the divine nature.

There is nothing metaphorical, indirect or minimal about saying that sharing the Trinitarian relations proceeding from God's being the object of his own knowledge and love

makes the Trinity really present in us and really makes its infinite life our life. Relations proceeding from God's being the object of his own knowledge and love are what the real presence of the Trinity IS in itself — *even in God*. Each of the divine persons is the relative term of an opposite cognitional and/or affective relation. If they are not present in us as terms of relations between knower and known and lover and loved, what was present could not be what the Trinity is in itself. There is no other way the Trinity and its life can be really present in us; for there is no other way it can be really present in God.

Another way to put it. To have the Trinity really present in us is to participate in God's own knowledge and love of what he is — to know and love him as he is in himself, not just as the exterior common good of the universe. To have God as he is in himself as the object of our knowledge and love is to really participate in the Trinity's life; for the Trinity's life is nothing more than the life of a family of persons proceeding from God's knowledge and love of himself. Conversely, there is no other way to really participate in the Trinity's life than to have God as he is in himself present as object of our knowledge and love; for the Trinity's life is the presence of God to himself as object of his knowledge and love. By participating in God's knowledge and love of himself, we become persons who participate in the personal relations that are what the Trinity is; for we participate in the personal relations of knowledge and love that proceed from God's knowledge and love of himself.

The preceding is just a matter of drawing logical consequences from what theology already tells us about the Trinity and its presence in us. If anything hinders theology's treatment of the real presence of the Trinity in us, it is not that the difficulty of understanding the mystery of sanctifying grace is greater than for other mysteries; it is theology's failure to draw logical conclusions from the understanding of the Trinity that it already has. (And that is not as much theology's fault as it is the fault of what Maritain repeatedly called "the laziness of Thomists," as I will explain.)

## II.

Still, the meaning, in creatures, of being "present as object" needs to be much better

explained; everyone can agree on that. Again, however, the fault lies with the laziness of Thomists for, among other things, their not drawing logical conclusions from what we already know.

To understand "present as object" in more depth, consider another psychological obstacle to appreciating the glory of the Trinity's real presence in us: the need to distinguish between entitative and intentional existence to explain the presence of something in us as an object. In creatures, the presence of something as an object of knowledge or love is the intentional existence of the object in the knower or lover. Intentional existence can seem like a flimsy or weak mode of existence in contrast to robust, full-fledged entitative existence. Although intentional is a secondary analogate of existence, still, as an analogate, it is a genuine mode of existence as opposed to a mere imitation or metaphorical existence. Entitative existence is *real* existence where "real" is opposed to merely imaginary or conceived, or merely volitional, existence. But both entitative and intentional are *real* existences where "real" is opposed to imitation, or counterfeit, or metaphorical existence.

But we dearly need, and so I will now offer, an explanation of intentional existence that does not rely on technical Thomistic terminology. When something, for example, the nature of trees, is present in my conceptual consciousness, what is present must not be just a picture or symbol of what a tree is, or a formula representing what a tree is, or a code for what a tree is. If what a tree is was not itself present in consciousness, no matter how vaguely, we couldn't know that a picture, symbol, code, or formula was a picture, symbol, code, or formula *of* or *for* what a tree is, since we wouldn't know that of which they were a picture, code, or formula, namely, what a tree is. In order to know that a sign **for** X is a sign for X, we have to know something else about what X is. If not, knowing that something is a sign for X makes X itself just an unknown; so we could never know what it means for something to be a sign for X. We might know that some symbol stands for the same otherwise unknown thing that the noise "tree" also stands for. But that is not the same thing as knowing that the symbol or noise is a sign for what trees are, as opposed to knowing that what-

ever the symbol is a sign of, the noise "tree" is a sign for the same otherwise unknown thing. When we know that a sign is a sign for what trees are, something else about what trees are must be included in what we know. If what is present in our conceptual consciousness did not include what a tree itself is, we would not know what a tree is but only what some picture, symbol, formula, or code, something quite distinct from a tree, is. To whatever extent what a tree is is known by us, our awareness of what a tree is must be an existence of what a tree itself, and not what something else, is.

Cognition is the presence of the other in us even while it remains other than us. This paradox is verified at the lowest level of awareness, sensation. When I see a square pattern in the spatial environment external to me, there is also a square pattern on my retina, which is internal to me. But the internal square is not the square that is the object of my sight; we didn't even know the internal square was there until modern science told us. The internal square is not our object of sight but is part of the interior equipment by means of which that which is our object, the external square, acquires the status of being the object of sight. Still, being the object of my sight makes the external square now also be a part of my make-up, part of what I am. A description of my being, my reality, that said that I was at that time aware of a circle rather than a square would be an inaccurate description of what I was at that time. So what that external square is, as external, has become one of the characteristics making my being, in its entirety, what it is.

Our consciousness is a real part of what we are if anything is. And what the object of a conscious state is is one of the things making the consciousness of that object what it is. Seeing the Eiffel Tower and seeing the Empire State Building can both be real parts of what we are, but all that makes what one of those states really is different from what the other really is are what the Eiffel Tower is and what the Empire State building is. If I am a being who sees the Eiffel Tower, I am a different being from someone who sees the Empire State Building, and I am different from *what I am* when I am seeing the Empire State Building. If you were now seeing the Eiffel Tower instead of this piece of paper, one of the features

making you what you are would be different from what it is, and so you would be different from what you are with respect to this mode of being: what the Eiffel Tower is (rather than what this piece of paper is). To understand ourselves as conscious beings, we must explain how to get what we are NOT, for example, the Eiffel Tower, into what we ARE, beings conscious of the Eiffel Tower. A description of us that left out what the Eiffel Tower is would be incomplete to that extent.

So consciousness enriches my reality by giving me what I could not otherwise have, the reality of something else, as part of my reality. Consciousness of what an object is makes that object's mode of perfection exist in me; consciousness of an object makes an additional perfection, what the object is, a perfection of me. But that additional mode of perfection, for example, the square object that I see, does not exist in me the same way that the square on my retina exists in me. Calling the existence these two squares have *in themselves* "entitative," we can call the existence in me of the external square as the object of sight "intentional." Entitative existence makes things exist *for themselves*; intentional existence makes them exist *for us*. The object of knowledge becomes part of what I am while still being other than what I am with respect to its, and my, entitative existences, the existences we have in and for ourselves. In addition to the existence of something in and for itself, my awareness of it is an existence of it in and for me, and is an existence in me and for me of something that is other than what I am *merely* in and for myself.

### III.

How important is the fact that intentional existence is a genuine mode of existence? The capacity for sensory intentionality is the main thing that distinguishes animals from plants. The capacity for intellectual intentionality is the only thing that distinguishes rational animals from brutes; for to know and to love is to have the objects of knowledge and love intentionally existing within us. That is what knowledge and love, in creatures, ARE. (So Maritain, in order to have a concept of knowledge that applies to both creatures and God expanded the definition of knowledge to "to be a thing otherwise than by an existence actu-

ating a subject." *The Degrees of Knowledge*, Phelan trans., p. 113. To see how important intentional existence is to Aquinas, no matter how infrequently he uses the term, see *De Veritate*, II, 2.)

To understand "only by intentional existence" as diminishing the reality the Trinity in us would be just as ironic as understanding "only present as object" that way. As it is a misunderstanding of the *Trinity* itself to think that "present as object" dilutes the reality or importance of their presence in us, it is a misunderstanding of *intentional existence* itself to think that the intentionality of the Trinity's presence in us prevents that presence from being infinitely more important than anything else that can happen to us. God gave us the capacity for intellectual intentional existence precisely so that we can share the Trinity's life. The real presence of the Trinity in us by intentional existence is the very meaning of human life.

In the Eucharist, Jesus is present entitatively, not just intentionally. That is one reason why the Eucharist is correctly called the greatest mode of Jesus' presence. But it is not the most important mode of his presence by the standard of Jesus' goals and our needs. By those standards, his real presence by sanctifying grace is infinitely more important than anything else that can happen to us. As I explain in Chapter 1 of *The Best Kept Secrets in Christianity* ([www.foraristotelians.info](http://www.foraristotelians.info); click on bullet six, "The Catholic Pastoral Crisis"), between someone in the state of grace, by water or desire, and someone who is not, there is an infinite distance. But between someone in the state of grace who has a weak devotion to, or has not even received, the Eucharist and a daily communicant with a deep devotion, there is only a finite distance. And although that finite distance can continue in heaven, both of those people will enjoy infinite happiness, while those who do not die in grace will be infinitely distant from any happiness.

That intentional existence is poorly understood and appreciated is not the fault of the real presence of the Trinity in us that is the essence of Christianity. It is the fault of the laziness of Thomists. For example, after over 100 years of modern Thomism, we still lack an account of love as a kind of intentional existence distinct from knowledge. Still, we know

enough about intentional existence to give an answer to the question how the Trinity is really present within us. So absence of a theological answer to that question is not the reason why our appreciation of the Trinity's real presence in us is inadequate for our full cooperation with grace at the *ex opere operantis* level. If anything, part of the reason for our poor appreciation is that the theological explanation we already have must use concepts so sophisticated, complex and abstract that our seminarians can lose the forest for the trees.

I don't mean that intentional existence answers all the questions. But the answers we have, and will have, to many other questions necessarily multiply those sophisticated, complex and abstract concepts, which is fine for theological purposes but not for giving Catholics the pastoring they desperately need. For example, if my knowing or loving of X is an intentional existence of X, that existence is fully actual only when I am actually knowing or loving X. So theology must ask how we live the life of the Trinity when we are not making acts of faith, hope or love. How, for example, does a baptized baby have the Trinity truly present within her?

Consider ordinary human consciousness. When we get a new conscious idea, do we know where it comes from? Usually not. An author said in an interview "I don't know where my ideas come from." Behind our conscious mental life there is an immense preconscious mental life that is responsible for every scientific discovery (even chance discoveries require a prepared mind, to paraphrase Pasteur) and artistic achievement. Nor is our preconscious mental life something that only belongs to the physical part of our mental powers. It is true that angels do not have a preconscious life. But the fact that the soul from which our conscious life springs is by nature a form that activates prime matter requires that the soul NOT be naturally conscious of itself as the angels are. Our intellects and wills are initially in a state of potency and need to be put into act for us to become conscious of them and, through them, conscious of the existence of ourselves as that from which those acts come.

Since we can be alive and well even when we are not conscious, our souls must be alive and well when we are not conscious. If our soul can be alive and well when we are not

conscious, the Trinity can be alive in us even when we are not conscious. In fact, the Trinity's life often first exists in us in a (humanly) preconscious way. The Trinity is always conscious of itself because its life is by essence a conscious life. So when the Trinity is present in our souls, it is always living its life of being conscious of itself. And the Trinity's life in us is always our life also. But in us the life of the Trinity that is conscious in itself can begin as part of our humanly preconscious life, as all our other conscious life begins in our preconscious life. The nature of our souls requires that (and Jesus is like us in all things but sin). Grace presupposes and perfects nature.

Nor does intentional existence occur only at the level of fully actualized consciousness. According to John Poinsett and the Maritain of *The Degrees of Knowledge*, impressed specifying forms are part of our preconscious mental life, but if they did not contain their objects in a real, though non-entitative way, they could not provide the content for the expressed specifiers of consciousness.

#### IV.

Still, wherever there is intentional existence, there must be some entitative existent to be its subject. So our explanation of consciousness' preconscious conditions have to show how what a conscious substance is entitatively allows for its accidents to be instances of another genuine mode of existence, the intentional. The entitative fact that permits intellectual intentionality in us is the fact that our intellectual acts are performed by the substantial form alone, not by the union of form and prime matter, the body. Section VII will explain that, since form is not individuated by itself (as matter is not actualized by itself), form can be a principle of communication, of shared perfection, between beings (while matter is the principle of the incommunicability of, for example, Socrates' humanity with Plato's). What is or are the entitative principles behind the intentional existence of the Trinity in us?

On the one hand, entitative human nature provides a bootstrap, at the created level, that allows God to elevate our acts to the supernatural level. On the other hand, at the uncreated level, the incarnation of a divine person in an individual human nature allows God to



use that bootstrap in Jesus and then to share Jesus' supernaturally elevated human life with other human beings. The bootstrap is the human intellect's ability to grasp "pure perfections," realities whose nature does not require that they only exist in a limited state. Given that ability, the "superanalogy of faith" (Maritain, *Degrees of Knowledge*, p. 241ff) allows us to understand the meaning of a sentence like "There are three persons in God" sufficiently to potentially believe it. We can understand, for example, that this sentence says there are persons, not atoms, and in God, not in rose bushes, and more than 2 but less than 4 of them. After God causes us to sufficiently understand what that sentence says, he can cause our will to move our intellect to believe it, if we do not nihilate. (As far as I know, this explanation is NOT by means of "obediential potency." Just by its nature as intellectual, the intellect is able to sufficiently understand superanalogies when they are proposed to it.)

When we merely understand that proposition, the Trinity already exists within us in a certain mode of intentional existence. When we believe it, the Trinity exists within us in a further mode of intentional existence. But neither of these modes of the intentional existence of the Trinity is equivalent to sanctifying grace; for we can believe in the Trinity without being in sanctifying grace. Still, when we believe in the Trinity we are engaging in a cognitive activity of a "supernatural" kind in the sense that we are sharing one aspect of the Trinity's own life, the knowledge that there are three persons in God, a knowledge that only God can have unless he reveals it.

In order to be in sanctifying grace a person must not only believe in the Trinity (when offered the opportunity — to postpone the question of infants for a moment) but must love the Trinity for its own sake (when offered the opportunity). But having pulled the bootstrap by allowing us to participate in the Trinity's own knowledge of itself through the superanalogy of faith, God can then move us to an act of loving him as he is in himself, not just as the common good of the universe. Since love is based on knowledge of the object of love, we need to have some cognition of the Trinity in itself in order to love it for what it is in itself. Faith gives us that cognition. When God has used the bootstrap to elevate us to that

state of supernatural cognition, he can then move our wills to supernatural love of him for his own sake, if we do not nihilate.

If we love God supernaturally for what he is in himself, the Trinity exists within us by sanctifying grace. "Anyone who loves me will be true to my word, and my Father will love him; we will come to him to make our dwelling place with him" (Jn 14:23). In the adult convert, sanctifying grace as an abiding characteristic begins with her not nihilating a transient actual grace that causes her first act of supernatural love based on faith. In an infant sanctifying grace already exists as an abiding readiness to cooperate with such a transient grace. Relative to our ultimate, fully conscious, acts of supernatural love, that abiding state is part of our preconscious supernatural life. But the Trinity and its full life must already exist there intentionally just as what a tree is must already exist intentionally in the preconscious impressed specifier from which we derive our intellectual consciousness of what a tree is.

Why does one kind of intentional existence of God, sanctifying grace, make us worthy to share his infinite happiness while another kind, mere faith, does not? One way of answering this question is by following Aquinas in distinguishing knowledge from love somewhat like this: The goal of the intellect is to give something that already has its own entitative existence a new kind of existence in us; the goal the will is to either to give something that has an existence for us in knowledge an entitative existence for itself or, if the thing already has an entitative existence, to delight in that entitative existence itself, as opposed to merely delighting in the fact that we know its entitative existence. This surely has a lot to do with the superiority of love, whose source is sanctifying grace, to faith, but my own thinking about this aspect of Aquinas has been too undeveloped to be able to explain it to others to my own satisfaction. There are, however, other tools in the Thomistic tradition we can use to explain why the Trinity's intentional existence by sanctifying grace, and no other intentional existence, is "the one thing necessary" (Lk 10:42).

The love we are talking about is love of friendship, love persons for their own sake, willing the good of persons because they are that for the sake of which everything else ex-

ists (SCG, III, q. 112; see "Person and Ethics in Aquinas" by David Gallagher at [www.foraristotelians.info](http://www.foraristotelians.info); click on the third bullet, "Contributions to Modern Aristotelian Philosophy"), not love of desire, willing everything else for the sake of persons. When we love another person in this sense, he has an intentional existence in us that makes him an additional *self* for us. He is really present in us as our very self because he is present in our hierarchy of values as that for whose sake we value other things, just as we ourselves are present in our values as that for whose sake we value other things. This is a genuine existence of the loved in the lover for the same reason that knowledge must be a genuine existence of the known in the knower: In the last analysis, the only thing that can make knowledge of **X** genuinely knowledge **of X**, and not of something else, is that knowledge makes X itself present in us. Likewise, we must ultimately explain why love of **X** is genuinely love **of X**, and not of something else, by the real presence of what X itself is in our love of X. But in a crucial sense, love's way of making someone really exist in us, that is, as identical with a self for the sake of which we will all other things, is the converse of knowledge's way, which is to make the other exist in us precisely as still *other than us*, as still something exterior to what we are entitatively, and so not as a new self.

That exteriority is even more true of faith's way of making God cognitively present in us. As a mode of intentional existence for God himself, faith is still a presence of what God is based on his effects, the effects that faith tells us are (super)analogates of perfections existing in God, like procession and generation. So, though faith does allow us to know things that only God can know about himself, faith's mode of knowing God, its mode of making God intentionally present, is still from the outside, still exterior. Faith does not allow us to share God's own interior mode of knowing what he is. But the intentional existence of God by the love that is the consequence of sanctifying grace, does allow us to share God's own *mode* of knowing what he is.

V.

I am thinking of the traditional theology of infused contemplation as a connatural

mode of knowing based on the presence of God in us a new self, and so an interior mode of knowing as opposed to the "outside-looking-in" mode of faith. Usually, infused contemplation is an awareness of something that has already been going on within us prior to that awareness: God's living his life within us. Specifically, infused contemplation occurs because we become aware of God's own life of love existing within us. And we do not become aware of that love through intellectual specifying forms, that is, accidental forms that objectify love as something distinct from the acts by which we know what that love is. We become aware of that love as God's own love through the acts of that love existing in us as our love and our acts. We become aware of it the same way we become aware of our emotions, fears and pains, that is, through the existence of these conscious affective states themselves.

By hypothesis, however, a gift or gifts other than sanctifying grace and the charity that necessarily accompanies it, must be involved in infused contemplation, since we can make genuine acts of divine love without having infused contemplation. Maritain invokes Joseph of the Holy Ghost's "faith illuminated by the gifts of the Holy Spirit" to explain love's becoming something we are conscious of precisely as God's love. But whatever the explanation, we cannot have a connatural knowledge of divine love as God dwelling in us unless we are first connatured to God by the presence of a love in us that is not just human but literally divine, literally the genuine existence of the Holy Spirit (and so of the whole Trinity, by the ontological necessity of how the Spirit proceeds from the divine nature through the Father and Son — see Section XII).

As a way the Trinity is present in us through its exterior effects, faith is not sufficient for connatural knowledge of God since it does not connature us to God. As an interior mode of the Trinity's presence, sanctifying grace does connature us to God. When the laziness of Thomists finally gets around to an account of love as an intentional existence, it will have to explain why, even though *knowing an act of love objectively* makes an act of love really present in us, that knowledge does not deserve to be described as our really *performing an act of love*, while an act of loving God as he is in himself deserves to be described as the

real presence of God's own love in us *as our* activity, as a performance of ours. To see the difference, compare knowing intellectually what it is to hit a baseball with actually hitting a baseball. Knowledge makes the act of hitting a baseball really present in us. But we would not describe that mode of presence by saying that performing that act of knowledge makes us really perform the act of hitting. We might be performing the act of hitting a baseball at the same time, but that is only a coincidence relative to performing the act of knowing intellectually what it is to hit a baseball. (As Aristotle would say, it is only *per accidens* that a doctor plays a flute; it is not *per accidens* that a musician plays a flute.) To the extent that our act of hitting a baseball is present as an object of an act of our knowledge, it is presented as something other than the act of knowledge by which it is so present.

If we have God intentionally present in us by loving him as he is in itself, however, we are performing an act by which we really share in God's own loving of himself. If the existence of such acts, as opposed to the existence of specifying forms distinct from them, becomes the means by which we are conscious of the presence of God in us, we have a connatural knowledge of his presence, just as we have a connatural knowledge of our emotions, feelings, pleasures and pains. That is the *contemplative* aspect of infused contemplation.

The highest stages of infused contemplation presuppose the highest stage of the development of the Trinity's life in us, complete surrender of our wills to God's love. So the way the Trinity lives its life in us develops far beyond the way it lives its life in an infant, though only finitely far beyond, since the difference in perfection of two people in the state of grace can only be finite. But because the weakest act of true charity is infinitely beyond any merely natural act, the preconscious sources of that act (sanctifying grace and the virtue of charity) must be ways in which the Trinity is living its own infinite interior life in an infant. In God, the essence/power/virtue/act real distinctions found in creatures become only logical distinctions; his essence, powers, "virtues," and acts are really identical. But wherever essence and existence are really distinct, essence, power, virtue, and act must be really distinct. And since our elevation to the supernatural presupposes, perfects, and coop-

erates with nature, the ways the Trinity lives its life in us must be parceled out through abiding power (sanctifying grace), virtue (charity), and ultimate acts of love.

But the finite modes the Trinity must adopt in order to truly dwell within us do not diminish the all-important (literally, and in the strongest possible sense; "One thing only is necessary," Lk 10:42) fact that each mode is a genuine existence in us of the infinitely glorious divine family.

"I have given them the glory you gave me . . . I living in them, you living in me" (Jn 17:22-23).

(We) "become partakers of the divine nature" (2 Pt 1:4).

"He *destined* us . . . to be his sons . . . to the praise of his glorious **grace**". . . ."

(which turns out to be the same thing as being) "*destined* . . . to live for the praise of his **glory**" (Eph 1:5-14).

"They (the Jerusalem Christians) long for you (the Corinthians) and pray for you because of the surpassing grace of God in you. Thanks be to God for his inexpressible gift" (2 Cor 9:14-15)

"Those whom he called he also justified; and those whom he justified he also glorified" (Rm 8:30).

"The life I live now is not my own; Christ is living in me." (Ga 2:20).

It would not be interesting to ask whether Scripture refers to Christ's real presence in us more times than to his presence in the Eucharist. The only interesting question would be how many MORE times, and in how many different ways, it refers to Christ's real presence in us. "Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?" "He who hears you hears me." "Just as the body is one though it has many members, so it is with Christ." "Whoever gives a cup of water to a disciple gives one to me." Matthew's judgement of the "nations" (the pagans) for not recognizing Jesus in his "brothers" (the people of God). Etc. How many times does the Lord have to hit us over the head with the PURPOSE of his real presence in the Eucharist, namely, that the Trinity may truly live its life in each of us, before he gets as exasperated as Paul was

with the Corinthians?

I warned those who sinned before and all others. . . that if I come again, I will not spare them. . . . Examine yourselves to see whether you are holding to your faith. Test yourselves. Do you not realize that Jesus Christ is in you — unless indeed you fail to meet the test! (2 Cor 13:2-5)

Do you not know that you are God's temple and that God's Spirit dwells in you? (1 Cor 3:16)

The immoral man sins against his own body. Do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, which you have from God? (1 Cor 6:18-19)

Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? Shall I therefore take the members of Christ and make them members of a prostitute? Never! (1 Cor 6:15)

#### VI.

There would be another irony, comparable to thinking that "only as object" diminishes the reality of the Trinity in us, in thinking that the intentionality of the Trinity's presence impedes the genuineness of that presence. Although there is no distinction between entitative and intentional existence in God, so that intentional as distinct from entitative existence is a mixed perfection which can only be found in finite beings, Aquinas teaches that forms of intentional existence, that is, knowledge and love, are what make an image of the Trinity present in our *natural* being (ST I, 93, 5-8). Knowledge and love in God do not require a real distinction between modes of existence, still the superanalogy of faith tells us that they do require certain real distinctions in God, the real distinctions between the divine relations. Nothing is contingent in God; nothing happens by chance. Unknown to natural reason, God's knowledge and love require the presence in him of genuine (as opposed to transcendental) modes of relative being that are really distinct from each other, though not from the divine essence.

So faith reveals that, since God's knowledge and love necessitate really distinct relations in God, the real distinctions between them are (super)analogates of the real distinction

between entitative and intentional existence required in us by knowledge and love, and of the real distinction between the different kinds of intentional existence constituted by knowledge and love. In the Trinity there is a distinction between relations *as opposed* to there being a distinction in nature. In creatures there is a distinction in modes of existence *as opposed* to our being something, the object, that is distinct from our own natures. In the Trinity there is a distinction with respect to relations that *preserves* the identity with respect to nature. In creatures, there is a distinction with respect to modes of existence that *preserves* our identity with respect to our natures. In the Trinity, there is an opposition between the identity with respect to the divine act of existence and the non-identity with respect to relations. In creatures there is an opposition between the entitative acts of existence by which we are each identical with ourselves and the intentional existence by which we relate to what is entitatively non-identical with ourselves.

So faith reveals that the entitative existence/intentional existence distinctions knowledge and love require in creatures are (super)analogates of the kind of real distinctions between persons knowledge and love require in God. Intentional existences in creatures are forms of knower/known and lover/loved objectifications, as are the relations of Generator/Being-Generated and spiration/Being-Spirated in God (spiration is not capitalized for it its not a person). Neither knowledge nor love require an entitative/intentional existence distinction in God, but they do require a kind of real distinction in God. So if the distinction between Trinitarian relations did not exist in God, there could be no distinction between entitative and intentional existence, and so no knowledge or love, in creatures, nor a distinction between knowledge and love as different modes of intentional existence. For knowledge and love in creatures are nothing but real modes of existence for things, modes distinct from their entitative existences.

And why should it be surprising that the Trinitarian distinctions are (super)analogates of the entitative/intentional distinctions in creatures? Isn't the capacity for the intentional existences of knowledge and love what makes us PERSONS, which is what the distinct rela-



tions are in God? Isn't the very definition of "person" a supposit of a rational nature, which in creatures means a nature with the capacity for intellectual intentional existence?

To return to the earlier question, then, why shouldn't intentional existence be the proper explanation of how the Trinity is really present in us, since intentionality, even at the level of our being images of God naturally, is a (super)analogate of what the Trinity is in itself? So disparaging the intentional existence explanation of the Trinity's presence in us would be cutting off our nose to spite our face. It would deprive us of an opportunity, provided by faith, for a deeper understanding both of what the Trinity is and what natural human knowledge and love are. Just as intentional existences in creatures are new, distinct existences, though in different ways, for both the subject and object of knowledge and love, there are distinct relations of being-a-knower-and-lover and of being-an-expression-containing-the-object-of-knowledge-and-love in God. So the real relative distinctions, as opposed to real absolute identity, knowledge and love require in God are (super)analogates of the real distinction between a creature's entitative existence and the intentional existences that constitute what knowledge and love are in creatures. And the distinctions between entitative and intentional existences that knowledge and love require in creatures are (super)analogates of the real distinctions knowledge and love require in God.

And since the entitative/intentional distinctions are (super)analogates of the Trinitarian distinctions, it would lessen our ability to understand the Trinity itself to think that the intentional existence explanation of the Trinity's presence in us dilutes the reality or importance of that presence.

## VII.

In order to understand more about the real presence of the Trinity in us by sanctifying grace, we need to understand more about Jesus' sanctifying grace, since we have grace by participating in Jesus' grace. So Sections VII through X will discuss the Incarnation by offering a firmer philosophical footing for Maritain's important corrections to Cajetan's theory of subsistence and the Incarnation (the supplement to Appendix 4 in the 1954 edition of *De-*

*gress of Knowledge*). Sections XI through XIII will then apply this analysis of the Incarnation to the nature of the sanctifying grace in Jesus' humanity. Nothing I have said prior to this is dependent on what follows. Still, what follows are just further logical consequences from what we already know.

The conclusion will be that the Trinity's choice that the Son, rather than a human person, be the subsistent occupying and acting through Jesus' human nature requires that Jesus' human accidents include the intentional existence of the specific divine co-relations of spiration and Being-Spirated. As St. John of the Cross tells us, we genuinely participate (through intentional existence) in the spiration of the Spirit and so have both the origination of the Spirit and the Spirit himself truly present in us. So Jesus' human nature must have first had, at the level of his human accidents, that participation in the specific co-relations of spiration and Being-Spirated, co-relations which are not said to be in his human nature (or ours) just by appropriation or fittingness. For other than being generated by the Father, the only role the subsistence that is the Son has in the Trinity is to originate the Spirit with the Father, and Jesus' human nature subsists and acts by the subsistence that is the Son.

The entitative nature of the human intellect provides the bootstrap for God's raising us to share his own glory. The hand by which he grasps the bootstrap is the union of Jesus' human nature with a divine person in "subsistence." Whatever subsistence is, it is what makes a substance a supposit. And since "actions are of supposits," subsistence is what makes an individual substance the source of its actions; if the supposit was not the ultimate created source of its actions, they would not be "of" the supposit in the required sense. But to be the ultimate productive cause of its actions, a substance must be the ultimate productive cause of the dispositions and habits through which actions emanate from it. Therefore, subsistence must also be what make the dispositions, and any other prior accidents from which human actions ultimately derive, "of the supposit." A substance is the ultimate (virtual) efficient cause of its properties, its necessary accidents. If a substance were only a passive potency that its accidents actualize, its actions wouldn't be "of" it in the sense of

being *from* their producing cause; they would only be "of" it the sense of residing *in* their material cause. They would be *from* an efficient cause external to the substance that actualizes the substance's passive potency for accidents. So we (or at least Thomists of the non-lazy variety) should conclude that whatever else subsistence may be, it must be *what enables a substance to be a supposit from which its necessary accidents come as from their ultimate created productive cause*.

There has always been a problem about how necessary accidents emerge from their substance; for the same substance is also the passive potency for its accidents. To be a passive potency for accidents a substance must receive existence. But nothing can be a passive potency and active potency in the same respect; for example, a living thing causes itself to change only by one part of it acting on a distinct part. Since receiving existence makes the passive potency for the substance's accidents exist, receiving existence alone cannot be what makes a substance the productive cause of its accidents; otherwise the substance would be both the productive and passive cause for the same reason. *So natural reason tells us that some state really distinct from the substantial nature and its act of existence is needed to account for a substance's producing of its accidents*.

The following comparison may be helpful. A power for immanent action, like the intellect, can exist and be what it is without producing an act of intellection. To produce intellection, it must receive the further actuation of an impressed specifying form from the agent intellect (at least on traditional theories; I offer an alternative to the agent intellect in "How Sensory Intentionality Is Caused" on my web site). Once that power has received the further actuation, however, yet another state of act comes into existence, the act of intellection springing from the fully activated intellect. Just as the intellect's existing and being what it is not sufficient for it to originate intellection, a created substance's receiving existence and being what it is is not sufficient for the substance to originate its accidents. A further actuation is required. Also, the final act, understanding, that springs from the intellect resides in the very power that produced it. Unlike transitive action, understanding does not

fulfill a potency in something distinct from the producing power. Similarly, the states of act that spring from a substance whose potency for being an originator has been fulfilled reside in the substance; for they are accidents of the substance. A substance's production of its accidents, however, is only "virtual" efficient causality because in creatures efficient causality in the "formal" sense must proceed from another already existing accident, a power for action.

That a created substance's being the producer of its accidents requires a state distinct from essence and existence is a consequence of the general principle that act is not limited in itself but is limited by potency. We should, for example, be as familiar with the truth that form is not individuated of itself but only by prime matter (see, e.g., ST I, 3, 2 ad 3) as we are with the correlative truth that prime matter has no actuality in itself but only what it has from form. As a mode of act, form is in itself communicable, shareable, not restricted to being the form of just this or that individual. That is why causes produce their like; they communicate the kind of act that makes them what they are. Causality is act's way of communicating itself, because it is act's way of originating something more than itself. As merely *received* by essence, however, existence cannot originate more than itself or be the condition enabling the essence to originate something more than itself. For being received by a passive potency is precisely what puts act in a state in which it is restricted to being the act of this and no more; potency limits act. But any essence that is distinct from its existence cannot have all the perfection due it just by receiving existence. So the essence must also have a state of act that allows it to originate more by being the efficient cause of its accidents.

That is why created subsistence is necessary as a state distinct from existence and essence; for the appropriate candidate for the really distinct state enabling a substance to be the virtual efficient cause of its accidents has been around since Cajetan: subsistence as a "mode" somehow non-identical with essence or existence. This is really just a logical consequence of the facts that (1) subsistence is what makes a substance a supposit, (2)

*actiones sunt suppositorum*, and (3) that in order for actions to be *of the subsistent*, a substance's other accidents, namely, the powers and virtues through which their acts emerge, must also be *of-the-subsistent*. The subsistence enabling a substance to produce its accidents must be a state somehow distinct from the reception of existence. Borrowing Maritain's term, I call subsistence the "exercise of existence," as opposed to the passive reception of existence, by a substance. Maritain got it right intuitively, as usual, but he did see the true philosophical justification for the real distinction between the reception and exercise of existence: the need for a state really distinct from existence and essence to account for a substance's being the virtual efficient cause of its necessary accidents.

As a substance's exercise, as opposed to mere reception, of existence, created subsistence is what enables a substance to be the originator of its necessary accidents. So God must give all created substances, except Jesus, subsistence as a state distinct from essence and existence. If not, a creature could not have whatever accidents it is necessary for its nature to have. So a created essence must not only be a passive potency for receiving existence; it must also have a passive potency for receiving subsistence, the state of having existence as the actuation of a virtual active potency, having existence as the activation of the essence's potency for being an originator.

Subsistence causally precedes the existence of accidents as much as a substance's essence and existence do. If we think of an essence as standing between its existence and its accidents somewhat like this

existence — essence — accidents,

then the potency of essence for subsistence is on the side of essence facing existence, not facing its accidents,

existence — subsistence — essence — accidents.

And the fulfillment of this potency adds *no* notes to the characteristics constituting what the essence is. Those notes are identical with what the potency for being an originator is, just as they are identical with what the potency for being an existent is. Likewise, actuation by an

impressed specifier adds no notes to the nature of the intellect; by existing and being what it is, the intellect is an active potency, a potency for production, that needs a further actualization before it can produce its own act. (Strictly speaking, accidents emerge from the supposit, the existing essence with subsistence, not from subsistence itself; but if we understand that, we can speak of subsistence as originating accidents, for brevity.)

So far, this account of subsistence is just a logical consequence of what we already know by natural reason. Even if Cajetan had been wrong that we need a state distinct from essence and existence for the theology of the Incarnation, we would have to invent that concept to solve the problem of a substance's being both the active and passive cause of its properties in the same respect at the same time. (So this analysis does not assume that Cajetan's theory of subsistence — or mine — is an historically correct interpretation of Aquinas on the Incarnation. But as far as I know, my account is consistent with Aquinas, especially concerning the uniqueness of the *esse personale* in Jesus.) But if we now combine this new metaphysics of subsistence with what we know by revelation, theology can do metaphysics the service of giving us a much better idea of what subsistence is as a really distinct state that is neither existence or essence, substance or accident, nor matter or form. And this will still be a matter of just drawing logical consequences from what we already know, but not by natural reason.

#### VIII.

Jesus's human nature receives a finite act of existence but does not exercise that act of existence. Since there is no human subsistence in Jesus, his accidents do not originate from his humanly existing substantial nature as from their virtual efficient cause. That means that, while God would normally cause a substance's accidents by means of the secondary originating of the accidents by the substance's exercise of its finite existence, he causes the accidents of Jesus' human nature *without any secondary originating on the part of that nature. God directly causes them to exist in Jesus' human nature* (in a way I will discuss in a moment). The exercise of existence from which Jesus' necessary accidents origi-

nate is the divine subsistence, the exercise of divine existence, that belongs to the Son as a distinct person of the Trinity.

Although created subsistence is distinct from existence and essence, still it is a perfection that must be an analogate of an analogical value found in God. In God there is no origination of accidents; so the definition of creaturely subsistence is not verified in God, just as the definition of creaturely knowledge as intentional existence is not verified in God. But since knowledge in itself is a pure perfection, what is communicated by the word "knowledge" must truly exist in God. Likewise, the ability to originate accidents is in itself a perfection; the fact that receiving existence is not enough to exercise it is what constitutes an "imperfection," a limitation, in creatures. So the perfection expressed by "exercising existence" is truly found in God but as identical with his existence rather than distinct from it. In contrast, there is nothing corresponding to what is expressed by "receiving existence" in God. But if what is expressed by "exists" in God was not identical with what is expressed by "exercising as opposed to receiving existence," God's existence would lack a perfection. If we wish, we can emphasize the resemblance between the exercise of existence in God and creatures by saying that God's existence is identical with his ability, his power, to originate creatures. That is true. But the main point is that God's existence does not have the state of restriction resulting from being received by a potency that is the reason why existence's being received must be really distinct from its state of being the actuation of an essence as a power for originating more than itself.

*Absolutely* speaking, there is one subsistence in God identical with his existence and essence. Natural reason does not know that absolute subsistence is of necessity associated with any real originating; for we know that God does not originate creatures by necessity. But since nothing happens by chance in God, the revelation of *relations* of originating and being originated in God tells us that divine absolute subsistence does require origination in God, the origination of distinct persons, not of accidents. *Relatively* speaking, then, there are three subsistences in God in the sense that the divine relations, although each identical

with the absolute divine subsistence, are really distinct from each other as different ways that the absolute subsistence relates to itself. Each really distinct relation inhabits, occupies the whole of the divine essence. They can each totally inhabit the same divine essence while being distinct from each other since they inhabit the divine essence *in different ways*, by being different ways God relates to himself. Since each relation is a different way a rational being subsists, each is a person. Since each relation is a person, each relations is a different way for a person to have the divine nature as its nature, the nature in and through which it subsists. And since each relation has the divine nature as its nature, each is a different way God is identical with himself by being different ways God relates to himself.

For an infinitely inadequate comparison, think of a transparent globe full of a liquid of one kind, with a uniform viscosity, color, and temperature throughout. The identical globe is inhabited completely by the viscosity, completely by the color, and completely by the temperature, without the viscosity, color, and temperature getting in each other's way. The viscosity, color and temperature stay out of each other's way, not despite their being really distinct from each other, but precisely because each of them occupies the whole globe in a different manner. So at every point, the whole liquid is capable of having each of these distinct properties at the same time. Likewise, Fatherhood, Sonship and Spirithood entirely inhabit the same divine essence in different ways because they are different ways the essence is really related to itself. But unlike the liquid's viscosity, color, and temperature, the different manners in which God relates to himself do more than keep out of each other's way; each of these ways of occupying the whole divine essence *requires the presence of the other ways of occupying the whole divine essence*.

To the extent that the persons are relationally distinct ways of being God, they are relationally distinct ways of being subsistents, relationally distinct subsistences. The really distinct divine relations are relationally distinct ways of being identical with God's infinite subsistence, his infinite exercise of existence; so they are really distinct subsistents with relationally distinct subsistences, The subsistence of the Son, for example, is a relational



way that God subsists which is not shared with the other persons because it is a relation distinct from God's other relational ways of subsisting. In particular, the divine relations differ from each other as diverse co-relations of originating and being originated.

As a consequence, since (1) there is in creatures a state, called subsistence or the exercise of existence, that is an instance of the (super)analogical value, originating, and (2) a created substance's way of originating requires that this state be something really distinct from the existence and essence, two of God's four really distinct ways of relating to himself turn out to be (super)analogates of an analogical value also found in creatures, being an originator. Don't the Trinitarian persons differ as real relations of originating and being originated? And is not created subsistence what makes a substance the originating source of its necessary accidents and, through them, of its actions? As present in God, therefore, the really distinct ways of being an originator are (super)analogates of the real distinction in creatures between existence and essence, on the one hand, and that by which a created substance is an originator, subsistence, on the other. Created subsistence is a way of being an originator, and Fatherhood and spiration in God are ways of being an originator. And origination in God requires a real distinction between relations that are otherwise identical with God's existence and essence, while a creature's originating of anything requires a real distinction between existence, the essence that receives it, and the state allowing an existing essence to originate its accidents.

Natural reason can know that a dimension of reality somehow distinct from both essence and existence is necessary to account for the real distinction between a substance's receiving existence and exercising it, between the existence of a passive receptor for accidents and the existence of a (virtually) active producer of them. Can natural reason know the character of such a reality, which is neither existence nor essence, substance nor accident, matter nor form? Perhaps not. But it turns out that revelation can help us understand what kind of "thing," what kind of "being," this dimension of reality must be: *this state must be a (super)analogate of the same the same non-univocal common ratio, RELATION, that*

*constitutes what the distinctions between the divine persons are.*

Created subsistence must be a kind of real relatedness, real relativity, distinct from the predicamental accident of relation, the kind of real relation known to natural reason. As what makes a substance the originator of its accidents, subsistence is not an accident; subsistence is a substance's exercise of its substantial act of existence. So there is a form of relatedness, namely, the way an essence relates to its act of existence, that is both a dimension of entitative reality and a genuine instance of to-something-ness, but which not only does not belong to any category of accidents but even causally precedes all accidents as much as substantial essence and existence do.

We should not think of subsistence, by which an essence originates its accidents, as a form of real relation between an essence and its accidents; it is a form of real relation between an essence and its existence. It is an essence's relation of having its existence as the necessary and sufficient activation of a potency for the essence to be an originator, having existence as its energy for causing. But subsistence does not originate anything further, like a relation to accidents, in the essence itself. The origination of accidents cannot require, short of infinite regress, the origination of a further actuation of the essence, such as another new form of real relation residing in the essence; for when a cause is fully in act, for an effect, A, to come into existence cannot require the cause to produce, B, another effect that would be a new way the cause is related to A. If so, B, that new way of being related to A, would also be an effect requiring the cause to produce one more effect, C, which would be a new way the cause is related to B. Etc.

As an entitative state, the type of relatedness called subsistence can be considered a *transcendental* relation to the essence's accidents, as any entitative mode of created being is a transcendental relation to any other that it causally depends on or that it causes by the necessity of its nature. A transcendental relation is not a mode of entitative being distinct from the being that is thus related. Let us call a created relation whose essence is merely a way some mode of entitative being distinct from itself is related to another mode of

entitative being distinct from the relation a *formal* relation, something that is a relation in its form or mode of entitative existence. Trinitarian relations cannot be instances of the analogical value, transcendental relation; for if so, God would have necessary *causal* relations to things other than himself; creation would not be free. Nor can a Trinitarian relation be *merely* a between-things-other-than-itself, as created formal relations are. But revelation tells us that the Trinitarian relations are (super)analogates of created formal relations because each divine relation is a way of being to-something entitatively distinct from itself, its co-relative opposite divine relation (the spelling "correlative" is too familiar to sufficiently emphasize the need for each divine relation to be matched with an opposite relation). So Trinitarian relations are relations, to-something-others, in their mode of entitative existence.

In itself created subsistence is an instance of the lowest mode of entitative being, a mere form of to-something-ness, to-another-ness, between other modes of entitative being, an essence and its existence. But nothing prevents subsistence, a mere relation between existence and essence, modes of being that are not mere relations, from itself being a transcendental relation to C, accidental modes of being that are not mere relations but do have a necessary causal connection to this mere relation. In the usual case, however, a transcendental relation is not a *mere* form of to-something-ness, a mere relation; it is identical with a created mode of entitative being other than a mere relation.

A substance can only be a virtual efficient cause of its accidents since it is also their passive receptor. But in order for something to be virtually X, it must be formally Y. The formality that constitutes the really distinct state allowing a substance's accidents to emerge from it is a type of relation perhaps unknowable as such to natural reason. In creatures, relation is the most minimal form of entity. As a kind of relatedness, created subsistence is not only an analogate of the most minimal form of created entity, and so minimally distinct from what it relates, essence and existence. It is also a *secondary* analogate of that minimal form of entity; for the terms it relates, existence and essence, are really distinct, but not the way one substance is really distinct from another to which it has a predicamental relation, or the

way one substance's accidents are distinct from another's accidents. Created subsistence's multiply minimal nature, minimal by virtue of the analogue it instantiates, relation, and by virtue of being a secondary analogate of that minimal form of reality, may be why it has been so difficult for natural reason to distinguish subsistence from essence and existence.

Still, subsistence as so described may seem to violate the exhaustive distinction of modes of existence into substance and accident, that which does not exist in another and that which does exist in another. The only place for subsistence as a mode distinct from substantial essence and existence would be as something that exists in another, in the substantial essence. So subsistence would seem to be an accident. If so, subsistence could not explain the originating a substance's accidents. Either that or the originating of all its other accidents would presuppose subsistence as a proto-accident, and the Incarnation would have to take place at the accidental, not substantial, level.

In fact, however, subsistence need not violate this exhaustive distinction. To be an accident is to exist in another existent, another existent that is a full-fledged existent, as opposed to the mere secondary existent that an accident is. To be a full-fledged that-which-does-not-exist-in-another, a substance must not just receive existence but must exercise it, must have existence as the energy by which it acts. Accidents merely receive existence; they do not also exercise the existence they receive. Their substances exercise their accidental existences. To do so, a substance must first exercise its own existence. So in the distinction between substance and accident, we must unpack the objective concept *substance*, that which does not exist in another or that which exists in itself, as that which receives and exercises existence in itself, or as that which receives existence in itself and exercises its own existence, or as that which does not receive existence in another or have its existence exercised by another. All of this is implied in contrasting substance to accident as that which "exists" in itself or does not "exist" in another.

We can correctly describe created subsistence as existing in "another," in a mode of being that is non-identical with itself, substantial essence. But an individual substantial es-

sence, say, Peter's humanity, cannot be correctly called a full-fledged, a complete "that which exists in itself or does not exist in another" unless it not only receives existence but is also a place where existence is exercised. The metaphysical cash-value of saying this is that God cannot create a substance without subsistence as a principle distinct from and accompanying the substantial existence the substantial essence receives. That would contradictorily violate the exhaustive division between what does and does not exist in itself or in another. So God must either give each created substance its own created subsistence (because a substance cannot exist without the *necessary* accidents the substantial essence calls for) or, since created subsistence is an instance of the analogical value, *relation*, must allow one of the uncreated relational subsistences to originate the substance's necessary accidents.

It may help to look at this problem another way: We said above that the fulfillment of an essence's potency for exercising existence adds *no* notes to the characteristics constituting what the essence is. The substance/accident distinction is a distinction between kinds of essence, those essence that do and those that do not have their existence in themselves or in another. The notes constituting an essence are capacities for existing, possible ways of having existence. Existence itself adds nothing to those notes as notes, as capacities for existence. But one or more notes can add to another. What is animal can also be rational; what is rational can also be politically conservative, Caucasian, Christian, etc. So substantial and accidental perfections can add to an essence in the order of essence itself, in the order of what-it-is that exists; accidents are new "what-it-is" that exists. That is how accidents perfect a substance, by adding new notes to what the substance is. But the "old" what-it-is that exists, the substance, must be a full-fledged, complete, independent existent, one in which substantial existence is both received and exercised.

Substantial existence does not perfect substance in the order of the notes constituting what-it-is-that-exists. The actuation of a substantial essence's potency for existence does not add any notes to what the substance is; that is not how substantial existence adds to essence. Existence is an added perfection of a different order, a perfection added in a dif-

ferent direction. And subsistence is a perfection of essence in the same direction as existence, a perfection in the order of existence as opposed to the order of further essential notes, either substantial or accidental. For a substantial what-it-is is not just a capacity for receiving existence but for exercising existence. And like substantial existence, subsistence resides in something non-identical with itself, the essence. So if residing in something non-identical with itself does not make existence an accident (in the sense of the categories), residing in something other than itself need not make subsistence an accident.

IX.

Since there is no created subsistence in Jesus, God must create all Jesus' necessary human accidents directly, not through the medium of a created subsistence in Jesus. *Jesus has a full human act of existence, a full human substantial nature and a full set of human necessary accidents.* But his full human nature does not originate that full set of necessary accidents. That would be for the substantial nature to exercise the human act of existence it receives, but there is no need for it to exercise existence, because God directly causes accidents to perfect Jesus' substantial nature without the intermediary of a created supposit. A created exercise of existence would be superfluous in Jesus; it would have nothing to do.

Does God, then, act through Jesus' accidents but not through His substantial nature? No, Jesus' substantial nature is the subject necessary for the existence of his accidents; accidents can exist only by existing in a substance. God is the only productive originator of Jesus' powers, but Jesus' substance remains their necessary material cause. God's direct causing of the powers does not change the fact that an accident is only a being-of its substance and not a being by itself. When we say Jesus' accidents come to exist, it is more correct to say that his human substance comes to exist in these accidental ways. That is true in every case of a substance and its accidents. By acting through Jesus' powers, God is acting through what are nothing more than beings-of Jesus' substance, acting through modes of being whose whole nature is to be additional ways in which his substance exists. Jesus acts are not efficiently caused by his substance, but they are "from" it by being from the powers

and virtues that reside in his substance, powers and virtues whose whole reality is to be nothing but beings-of and actualizations-of his substance.

And they are from powers and virtues that have their natures determined by his substance; for Jesus's substantial nature determines *what* its necessary human accidents will be as their "external" formal cause. The nature of any efficient cause determines the nature of its effects, and in particular, the natures of accidents must be adapted to the substance in which they exist and of which they are perfections. A tree's substantial nature can neither produce nor receive intellect and will. But the *existence* in Jesus of accidents whose *essences* have the determinations required by Jesus' substantial nature comes from the divine supposit exercising its existence in Jesus' human nature. Jesus' human nature is not the virtual efficient cause of its accidents because it does not have its own subsistence. Still, it is the nature through which divine subsistence acts, and so it determines the nature of the effects. (And Jesus' is capable of genuine created causality.)

By denying Jesus' human nature created subsistence and by causing its powers directly, God is taking that nature to Himself; he is appropriating it as his own personal nature, as the locus of acts which must be *of* a supposit but in this case are of a divine supposit. Jesus' human nature is a place where God acts personally as opposed to acting through a secondary person, a created supposit.

The whole Trinity is the creator of Jesus' human nature; the whole Trinity gives Jesus existence. The whole Trinity also gives Jesus subsistence. But the subsistence the Trinity gives Jesus is not the absolute subsistence shared by all three persons, nor is it the relative subsistences of the Father and the Spirit. When the Trinity chooses that the Son will become incarnate, it is choosing that the Son's relative subsistence be the principle of origination for the accidents in Jesus' human nature. How can the Trinity decide which of the persons will become incarnate?

That there would be no difference in God if he had not chosen to create anything at all is explained by the fact that his not choosing to create would have been a nihilation, a

non-act adding nothing to what God is (as my friend, the late Joseph Sikora, S.J., pointed out). The freedom to act or not act is freedom of exercise. But the choice of which of the three persons to become man is freedom with respect to the specification of the act, not just the exercise. So whatever difference explains the choice of which person to incarnate must be found, not in God's nature, but in the substantial or accidental characteristics of the chosen created nature, Jesus' human nature. If the theory of subsistence presented here is correct, the Trinity would choose to incarnate the Son and only the Son by choosing that the accidents a divine subsistence will originate in a human substance include accidents that could only originate from the Son's subsistence and not the Father's or Spirit's.

For example, since any divine person residing in a human nature would *ipso facto* always have to tell the *truth*, all the Trinity would have to do to choose that the Son's subsistence, not the Father's or Spirit's, originates Jesus' accidents would be to choose (1) that the accidents of Jesus' human nature be created directly, without his substance's being their secondary created producer and (2) that the accidents originated by divine subsistence in Jesus would include Jesus' making statements like "I am the Second Person of the Trinity" rather than "I am the First or Third Person of the Trinity." Since statements belonging to a divine subsistent must be truthful, for that statement to be truthful, the subsistent originating that statement must be the Son. Nor would the Trinity have to choose that the historical Jesus actually make that statement; it could be the Church, as the risen Jesus's personal instrument, that makes that statement for him. Or it could be that the historical Jesus had just the moral ability, via his perfect virtue of justice, to make that statement if he chooses; for if his human accidental *habitus* would allow him to deny that statement, the subsistent acting through those accidents could not be divine. As caused by God without using a created cause, his accidents could not be defective even *per accidens*. So by deciding that Jesus of Nazareth will or at least can assert that, the Trinity is deciding that the subsistence originating Jesus' accidents be the subsistence of the Son, not of the Father or the Spirit.

Thus, in creating Jesus' substantial nature, God is creating a place where the Son will



act personally. The Son is a person inhabiting the divine nature as a nature through which he exists and acts, and the Son is also a person inhabiting a human nature as a nature by which he acts in a personal way, a way shared neither by the other divine persons nor by a created originating cause. Jesus *is* a person who is the productive cause of his powers and virtues, and, through them, of his ultimate human effects. But he is that person by reason of his divine subsistence, while the accidents the person produces are human by reason of the nature in and through which that person is acting.

By originating Jesus' accidents without a created substance as a secondary originator, the Son's subsistence is, *ipso facto*, standing in for the created *relation* of subsistence otherwise required for Jesus' substance to have accidents. Insofar as Jesus' accidents require a passive potency in order to exist, Jesus' human nature is also the material cause from which his accidents take their existence; in fact, their existence is identical with their state of perfecting Jesus' substance. But insofar as their existence requires either a created or an uncreated supposit as their producing cause, they take their existence from Jesus' exercise of divine existence, not from Jesus' human nature as having a finite act of existence. Jesus' human nature isn't their producing cause because it only receives and does not exercise its finite existence, and so there is no human supposit, no human producing cause of necessary accidents in Jesus. Miraculously, his accidents are created to exist in Jesus directly by God without the intermediary of a created producing cause. (I disagree with Maritain that the Son unites with Jesus' human nature by exercising Jesus' human existence. There is no need for Jesus' human existence to be exercised if God creates his accidents directly without the intermediary of a created secondary productive cause. The only exercise of existence in Jesus' human nature is a divine supposit's exercise of its existence; for the Son to subsist in a human nature as well as in the divine nature is for him to exercise his divine existence in Jesus' human nature.)

X.

This account leaves Jesus' human nature with an unfulfilled potency for having a kind

of formal relation to its existence, the exercise of its existence. But the absence of the fulfillment of that potency does not detract one iota from the notes constituting what Jesus' essence is as human; for the fulfillment of that potency would not add one iota to that essence. That essence is what it is in itself, wholly and completely, whether it is a fulfilled or unfulfilled potency for subsistence. Likewise, the intellect is what it is in itself, a power for knowing, whether or not it acquires the final actuation it needs to go from only potentially producing an act of understanding to actually producing one.

And although Jesus' human essence has a potency for subsistence, his essence exists by receiving a fulfillment of its potency for existing, not the fulfillment of its potency for exercising existence. There are many unfulfilled human potencies in Jesus, for instance, the potency to marry, but the absence of that fulfillment does not make Jesus any less truly a human being. So why should the fulfillment of his nature's potency for the relation of subsistence make Jesus any less truly a human being? Because it would deprive him of accidents that a human nature cannot exist without? But that is precisely what the absence of human subsistence in Jesus need not do, if God creates those accidents in Jesus without the secondary virtual efficient causality of Jesus' substantial human nature.

As a consequence, when Jesus talks, it is a divine supposit speaking to us, not a human supposit; actions are of (from) the supposit, and Jesus' acts are the acts of a divine supposit. When a dog barks, on the other hand, the action is both from a canine supposit as the ultimate created producing cause AND from God as the ultimate uncreated producing cause. But Jesus' acts, are not from a human supposit as from an ultimate created producing cause; their only ultimate producing cause is their uncreated producing cause, the subsistent that IS the second person of the blessed Trinity.

When Jesus' talks to us, it is an uncreated supposit talking to us, not a created supposit talking to us as when any other human being talks to us. Still, Jesus' speech is an action with a fully human accidental essence that exists as a fully human perfection of a fully human substantial nature, which exists by a fully human act of existence. And that accident

has its nature fully determined by the fully human substantial nature in which it exists. Peter's acts are acts *of* Peter, not just because they exist only in, are perfections of, and have their natures determined by, his individual human nature, but because Peter's individual human nature is their ultimate created producing cause, since it exercises Peter's fully human existence. Jesus' acts are acts *of* Jesus's individual human nature, because they exist only in, are perfections of, and have their essences determined by, that human nature, but not because Jesus' human nature is their ultimate created originating source; for while Jesus' essence has a fully human existence, it does not originate its accidents.

So on this theory, *the incarnation, the hypostatic union, requires ONLY the following:*

- (A) that the Trinity chooses not to give Jesus' human nature created subsistence and instead chooses that his necessary human accidents be directly caused by divine subsistence without the intermediary of a secondary created productive cause, and
- (B) chooses that divine subsistence cause an accident or accidents in Jesus' human nature that could only have one relative divine subsistence, the Son, not to the absolute divine subsistence or the relative subsistence of another divine person, as the subsistence that uniquely terminates their relation of originating-from. (God's termination of that relation is common, not unique, to other creatures's; what is unique to accidents in other creatures is the created subsistence they originate from.)

These two conditions make the fully human actions of a fully human being the personal actions of one divine subsistent, the Son of God; for they make a fully human nature a nature in which the Son IS the subsistent. Jesus' accidents don't just need a substance to reside in; they need a subsistent to spring from. And as accidents belonging to a substance of a rational nature, they need a rational supposit to spring from, a Person of which they are the personal acts. The only person originating those actions is the Son of God, not a human person.

The Trinity as a whole is their ultimate originating source, as it is for all creatures. But the Trinity becomes the ultimate originating source by (A) choosing that those accidents originate miraculously without their substance having a finite relational subsistence and (B)

by choosing to originate accidents that could only spring from the subsistence of the Son. So *as it does for all creatures*, the Trinity that subsists absolutely becomes the ultimate originator of Jesus' accidents through the "intermediary" of a relational subsistence. In this case, however, the relational subsistence the Trinity chooses to be the subsistence needed for a created substance to have accidents is not a created subsistence; it is the divine subsistence of the Son of God. So the actions of Jesus are personal actions of the Son of God and of no other of the three persons. Like all created actions they are still caused by the absolute subsistence of the Trinity, though not caused by it as by the relational subsistence of which they are the personal actions. But the actions of all other human beings are created by the absolute subsistent while being personal actions of only a created relational subsistent.

Perhaps the fact that the otherwise necessary state being replaced is a relation means that only a relational divine subsistence, not the absolute divine subsistence shared by all three persons, could become man. Since what is being replaced is a formal relation, perhaps another (super)analogue of formal relation is required to replace it. (I find Aquinas' answer to whether the divine nature abstracted from the personality can assume human nature [ST III 3, 3] to be ambiguous. He says yes, but he may mean only from the point of view of the human way of conceptualizing, namely, by abstraction, what happens when a divine person assumes human nature.) Also, if only a personal relation could substitute for the created relation of exercising existence, perhaps only those persons, namely, the Father and Son, who have the role in the Trinity of originating another person could substitute for the state that allows a created essence to originate its accidents.

I don't wish to speculate on whether this proposal allows us to say that only the Son "creates" Jesus' necessary accidents; that would require an investigation of the meaning of "creation" in all other cases of necessary accidents in finite beings. But in creating this universe the Trinity as a whole, not just the Son, chose that the Son's subsistence would be the relational subsistence from which Jesus' accidents originate. Only the divine relation of Sonship would take the place of the created relation by which Jesus' human substance would

have its created existence as the actuation of its potency for originating accidents.

If we must say, however, that the Son is not the sole creator of his human accidents, that would simply mean that the Son has two roles pertaining to those accidents in Jesus. First, he shares with the other persons the role of being the creator of the accidents. Second, he has the role, not shared with the other persons, of taking the place of the created principle that would have made Jesus' human nature the secondary productive cause of its accidents. So Jesus' accidents would have two uncreated ultimate productive causes, not an uncreated one and a created one as in other creatures: first, the absolute subsistence of the whole Trinity, as all created effects do; second, a relational subsistence, as all created accidents do. But the relational subsistence would be a divine relational subsistence identical with the divine nature, and so with the absolute divine subsistence, but not identical with the other divine relational subsistences, which are different ways the absolute divine subsistence relates to itself, different ways it relates to itself by relating to other ways it relates to itself.

But the Son's subsistence is not the actualization of the potency of Jesus' human nature for originating accidents, since the actuation of that potency would be superfluous. What, then, does it mean to say that the Son of God, and only the Son of God, "exercises his divine existence" in Jesus' human nature? It means that God chooses that Jesus' accidents originate miraculously without the intermediary of a created originator, and that Jesus has accidents that must originate from only the Son's divine relational subsistence, instead of the created relational subsistence accidents would otherwise require.

#### XI.

Nothing that Sections I through VI say about the real presence of the Trinity in us depends on what Sections VII through X say about subsistence and the Incarnation. The analysis of the Trinity's presence by intentional existence remains true if the analysis of subsistence as the really distinct state allowing a substance to be an agent is not true. But this account of subsistence can give us a deeper understanding of the real presence of the Trin-

ity by sanctifying grace in Jesus' soul and, ultimately, in ours.

The Son of God's divinity is really present in Jesus at two levels, the substantial level and the accidental level. At the substantial level, the Son is entitatively united to Jesus' human nature by subsisting in it, by being both the relational exerciser and exercise of existence that originates Jesus' accidents. At the accidental level, he is intentionally present in Jesus through sanctifying grace, the accompanying virtue of charity, and the resulting acts of divine love. I suggest that the *divine character* of the entitative originating of the dispositions for action, e.g., intellect and will, in Jesus' human substance is sufficient, together with his intellect's ability to know pure perfections, to account for how those dispositions can be elevated to produce acts by which the interior life of the Trinity itself exists intentionally in us, and specifically acts by which the three persons are present in us as additional selves. All that this elevation of his human nature would require is the production in Jesus' soul, through the divine exercise of existence, of an additional disposition toward actions not able to be caused by substances with a merely created subsistence. This disposition would be a supernatural accident received directly in Jesus soul, rather than through the intermediary of any other accident, as scientific knowledge perfects us by being an act of another accident, the intellect. Jesus' human intellect and will would then co-exist with a disposition, found first only in him, in which the Trinity can exist in us intentionally because the entitative bases of that intentionality are (1) human nature's ability, as intellectual, to be so elevated and (2) the originating of Jesus' human accidents by a divine exercise of existence.

If so, this analysis allows us to know much about the specific character of that supernatural accident. It will be produced by a supposit who, in addition to being generated by the Father, has one and only one role to play in the life of God: spiration, originating with the Father the Sigh of love that expresses the mutual love of the Father and Son so perfectly that it is also God. Jesus' substantial human nature is united with the relation of Sonship, not the relation of spiration. But since (1) the subsistence that is the Son necessarily originates the Spirit with the Father by spiration, and (2) originating the Spirit is the only thing

the Son does in the Trinity, other than being originated by the Father, and (3) originating Jesus' necessary accidents is what the subsistence of the Son does in Jesus' human nature, the Son's origination of accidents in his human nature *must cause a created participation in the distinct divine relation of SPIRATION to exist as an accident of his human nature*. A necessary element of the Trinity's choice that only the Son become man would be this man's having the intentional presence of the relation of spiration among his human accidents.

St. John of the Cross tells us that infused contemplation made him aware of participating in the very spirating, originating, of the Holy Spirit (references in Maritain, *Degrees of Knowledge*, p. 375ff). Since we have grace by sharing in the grace that is an accident of Jesus' humanity, Jesus' humanity must have an accident by which it truly participates in the originating of the Spirit. So there are two originations in Jesus. At the substantial level, the Son's divine subsistence as Son originates Jesus' accidents by taking the place of his human exercise of existence. One of the accidents the Son's subsistence originates makes another origination, spiration, the origination of the Spirit, intentionally present in him at the accidental level. Only the divine relation of Sonship is united to Jesus' human nature at the substantial level; Jesus' human participating in originating the Spirit is at the accidental level.

But if a participation in originating the Spirit is truly present in him, that origination must make the Spirit truly present in him. Where spiration is truly present, its co-relative, the Spirit, must be truly present. That is what spiration does, or better, what spiration IS: the making present of the Holy Spirit. (Conversely, where the Spirit is, spiration must be really present; no spiration, no Spirit, and vice versa.) From the substantial level, the Son originates a supernatural accident in Jesus' human nature. That accident is an entitatively existing disposition by which the originating of the Spirit and so the Spirit himself is truly present, at the accidental level, in the only way possible or needed: by intentional existence. Since spiration is nothing but the originating of the Spirit, and the Spirit is truly present (entitatively) in God only by being the co-relative of the relation of spiration, Jesus' created participation in spiration, participation in the relation of originating the Spirit, must make the

Spirit truly present (intentionally and at the accidental level) in his human nature.

XII.

We call that real presence of the spiration/Being-Spirated co-relatives "sanctifying grace." John, Paul and Luke call it "the gift of God." Scripture often just calls that which is present in us "the Holy Spirit." And is it just by "appropriation" or "fittingness" that we call it the real presence of the Spirit or call receiving sanctifying grace receiving the Spirit? It is certainly not just by appropriation that we say that only the Son subsists in human nature; nor is it just by appropriation that the only Trinitarian role the Son has other than being generated is to spirate the Spirit. So on the theory that created subsistence is the originating of a substance's accidents by virtually efficient causality, it might not be merely appropriation or fittingness to say that the Son's subsistence causes the created presence specifically of the spiration/Being-Spirated co-relations in his human nature — any more than it is just fittingness or appropriation that we say only the Son subsists in Jesus' human nature.

But where spiration is truly present, both the Father and Son must be truly present also; for the relation of originating the Spirit is shared by the Father and the Son. The spiration of the Spirit is love; love comes through knowledge of the object loved. Knowledge and love are each identical with the undifferentiated, absolutely simple, divine essence; as such they are shared completely by each of the persons. But those persons are cognitional and affective relations distinct from each other as relations. Looked at that way, the love that spirates the Spirit proceeds from the Father's knowledge of himself through the Word, by which the Father expresses his knowledge to himself. Just as Jesus' human nature is not directly united with the relation of spiration, but of Sonship, it is not directly united with the relation of Fatherhood. But since the Son is the originating source of whatever exists as an accident in Jesus' human nature, and the only originating that belongs to the Son as a divine person is spirating the Spirit with the Father, to cause Jesus' human nature to have an accident by which spiration is intentionally present, the Son's subsistence must cause an accident by which both he and the Father are intentionally present. So in making a created par-



participation in spiration truly present, the divine subsistence from which Jesus' accidents emerge makes each person of the Trinity truly present but for different reasons. (Again, the union of Jesus' substantial nature with the Son is entitative; the ways he and the rest of the Trinity are truly present in Jesus' at the accidental level are intentional. But the intentional presupposes the entitative. The entitative reason Jesus' human nature can be the passive receptor of a supernatural entitative accident is, again, the intellectual soul's ability to perform acts that are not acts of the composite but of its own, which enables it to grasp pure perfections and so have pure perfections intentionally present.)

Still, if the Father and Son are truly present in Jesus at the accidental level because and only because a true participation in the distinct divine co-relations of spiration/Being-Spirated is truly present, then it might not be mere appropriateness to call the real presence of the Trinity in us the real presence of the Spirit. Another possible way to put it: Where the Spirit exists, due to spiration, the other persons of the Trinity must exist because the Spirit is the completion, the ultimate relative term, of the Trinity's life, which as an essentially relative life must have an ultimate relative term. As such, the Spirit is the fulness of the Trinity's life; that's the Spirit's role in the Trinity's life. For us to receive the Spirit, then, is to receive the Trinity, but we receive the Trinity by receiving spiration. Likewise, the Spirit is made entitatively present in God by the relation of spiration, not by the relation of Fatherhood or Sonship, but the entitatively distinct relation of spiration can only be present in God by belonging to the Father and Son together.

Some traditional Thomistic terminology can help us understand the idea of the Father and the Son being made intentionally present because spiration is intentionally present. Intentional actions have formal and material objects. A red, square-shaped patch that is an object of sight must belong to something that is either animal, vegetable or mineral. But it is not under the aspect of being animal, vegetable or mineral that it becomes an object of sight. It becomes an object of sight by being something with a color, a shape and a size, at rest or in motion. The latter are what formally make the thing an object of sight; they are

the only aspects of the thing that sight is able to detect. But an object of sight must have other characteristics, including being either animal, vegetable or mineral, or it wouldn't exist at all. The thing with all its characteristics, including those that are not the formal object of sight, is the material object of sight. It is necessarily true, for example, that what is intentionally present as an object of sight is at least something mineral, but that does not mean that sight makes it intentionally present under the aspect of being something mineral.

Likewise, the formal object of the (virtual) act of originating that the Son's subsistence does in Jesus' human nature is a participation in the relation of spiration, not of Fatherhood or Sonship. That is the aspect under which (the *ratio formalis sub qua*) his human nature becomes a partaker of the divine nature at the accidental level. But where spiration is present, Fatherhood and Sonship must be present, just as something mineral must be present in sight whenever something with color, shape and size is present in sight. So what is made present under the aspect of spiration includes the Father and the Son, just as what is made present to sight under the aspect of being a square patch of red is at least something mineral. Still, it is not merely by appropriation or fittingness that we say that the relation of spiration, not of Fatherhood and Sonship, is the aspect under which whatever else is present is made present. Another very relevant example: The formal object of the action Jesus performed by saying "This is my body" is the real presence of his body where bread used to be, not the real presence of his soul and divinity. But unlike what would have been true on Holy Saturday, his body cannot now be really present without his soul and divinity being really present. Nor can the relation of spiration be present in us intentionally without the other divine relations being present in us intentionally. And it is not merely by appropriation that we describe the action performed by saying "This is my body" causes the real presence of Jesus' soul and divinity only because it causes the real presence of his body. Nor is it only by appropriation that we say the Son's subsistence originates the real presence of the Father and the Son in Jesus' human nature only because it originates the real presence of the spiration/Being-Spirated co-relations.

Also, by being present in us as the co-relative of *our* participation in the relation of spiration, the Spirit is intentionally present in us as *our* Spirit, just as it is entitatively present in God as his Spirit because of the relation of spiration. For as truly spirating the Spirit, we are truly originating the Spirit with the Father and Son. The loving of himself that takes place in God originates a person. God's loving of himself that takes place in us through intentional existence originates in us the intentional existence of the same person.

This tells us something else about the real presence of the Son at the accidental level that must accompany the real presence of spiration in our human natures. That presence IS our state of adoption as true Son's of God; without it, we could not be true originators of the Spirit with the Father. The Father and the Son must both be present, at the accidental level, for spiration to be present. But the presence of spiration in us comes from Jesus' union, at the substantial level, with the Son's relational subsistence, not the Father's; so spiration is present in us because the Son's subsistence originates in him a created participation in *his* originating role in the Trinity. We become true co-originators of the Spirit with the Father by sharing this participation by Jesus, at the accidental level, in Sonship.

(Again, nothing that Sections I through VI say about God's real presence in us by intentional existence depends on this theory of the Son's subsistence producing a created participation in spiration/Being-Spirated as an accident of Jesus.)

### XIII.

As in Jesus, our human natures' ability to be elevated to the supernatural is one of the entitative bases for the Trinity's intentional existence in us. And since we have sanctifying grace by sharing Jesus' sanctifying grace, another entitative basis is, again, the divine subsistence that allows the person, Jesus, to originate sanctifying grace in his own soul. But why can other human persons share the products of Jesus' subsistence; for Jesus is a distinct supposit from each of us?

If Jesus was a human supposit, we couldn't. Cajetan was right about subsistence to the extent that it is a state of incommunicability. Prime matter is the principle of communi-

capability with respect to the multiplication of specific essences in individuals. So in relation to the passive reception of existence by an individual nature, like Socrates' human nature, prime matter is the sufficient principle of incommunicability. But in relation to Socrates' quasi-active production of his accidents, the production that makes Socrates act "of" Socrates alone, an additional principle of incommunicability is required, his exercise of the existence he has otherwise only received. Socrates' originating of his accidents, his subsistence, makes that origination and its products incommunicably *of* the one supposit, Socrates.

Subsistence is a kind of incommunicability opposite the kind, incommunicability with respect to the perfections of essence, caused by prime matter. Subsistence is the incommunicability required by the dignity of existence as the act of all acts. As the act of all acts, existence must not just be received; it must be exercised. It must originate more than the essence that receives it; for any essence that is distinct from its existence cannot have all the perfection due it just by receiving existence. So we can conclude that in creatures originating more, starting with a thing's accidents, is a (super)analogate of the one, simple and infinite divine subsistence's "overflow" into multiple relatively distinct subsistences. (Metaphysics' natural understanding of the principle "The good is diffusive of itself" must stop at its application to the reason for God's free choice of creating: If God chooses to create, he can have no purpose other than sharing his goodness with his creatures. But faith reveals the good's being diffusive of itself not to be just a hypothetical necessity but a necessity verified by the procession of multiple distinct persons in God.)

A created substance's exercise of its own existence, subsistence, is the principle of incommunicability with respect to its actions being from a unique productive supposit. But Jesus is not a created supposit. He is an infinite supposit that contains in itself the perfection of every other possible supposit. Every created supposit, and every perfection in every created supposit, is nothing but a way of being by participation what an infinite supposit is by essence. If not, there could be no created supposit. That is one reason why the incommunicable subsistent, Jesus, can share what belongs to his subsistence with us.

At the same time, the individual human nature in which that infinite supposit originates the accidents differs from our individual natures only by means of a cause that is the closest thing to nothingness that any reality can be, prime matter. Prime matter is what it is *solely* for the sake of being actualized by a substantial form and so restricting the resulting essence, like Socrates' individual human nature, to being a unique individual essence, even though that essence shares all its specific perfections with other individual essences, like Plato's human nature. So other than permitting substantial change, prime matter exists solely to permit there to be a multiplicity of incommunicable individuals that can otherwise communicate in shared perfections. The *incommunicability of distinct individuals* is a necessary precondition for there to be *multiple individuals communicating*, sharing. Someone said about the Trinity's distinct subsistences that each person keeps for himself only the bare minimum (being a relation) without which he could not share everything else he is with otherwise distinct persons.

So effects the infinite supposit originates in Jesus' human nature can be shared with other individual human natures, despite the fact that those other human natures are themselves incommunicable both as individual natures and as finite supposits. Even at the natural level, as we saw earlier, our being created supposits does not stop us from being ways of being by participation what the divine supposit is by its essence. And our being incommunicable supposits does not stop our individual natures from differing from Jesus' individual human nature only by a principle that has absolutely no positive reality in itself and exists only for the sake of making perfections shareable between individual natures. Nor does the fact that Jesus' individual human nature belongs to an incommunicable supposit stop that supposit's subsistence from being infinite and so from being able to share the perfections it originates with other individual human natures, since everything in their limited subsistence is a participation in what is unlimited in God.

The individuation of human natures by next-to-nothingness may why Christ is a "corporate person" and the new Adam; for the individual human natures of our entire race differ

from those of our first parents only by next-to-nothingness. (And that may be the reason, or at least a necessary condition, for the fact that everything else derived from prime matter groans until the divinization of our human natures is revealed.) That may also be why our union with Jesus makes us higher than the angels even though our natures are lower than theirs. They have divine life, but are not united to a divine supposit by sharing a nature that is distinct only by next-to-nothingness from a nature that the divine supposit inhabits.

But most importantly, the individuation of human natures by something whose sole purpose is to make sharing possible may be why the acts of one human being, Jesus, can atone for the sins of all other human beings. The offense of our first parents belonged to individuals sharing a human nature. Justice required that those human individuals be deprived of sanctifying grace and so be unable to pass sanctifying grace on to their children, all other individuals sharing human nature. Due to the infinity of the object of the human offense, justice also requires an act of infinite value if the offense, and all other human offenses, is to be atoned for. As a human being, Jesus differs from us only by the principle that permits sharing of perfections, and so of defects, between individual human beings, but as human acts that belong to an infinite supposit, his acts can justly atone for human offenses against the infinite good.

In Jesus there are two entitative bases for the elevation of his human nature to the supernatural at the level of accidents: his divine subsistence and his human intellect's ability to grasp pure perfections. Since we do not share Jesus' divine subsistence entitatively, there must be an additional entitative basis for the real presence of the Trinity in us. That basis is the entitative existence in Jesus' of acts of choice whose intentional object is the sharing of his sanctifying grace with us. Acts of choice made by Jesus' human will are not just further, and ultimate, participations in the divine spiration that already exists in him; they are acts produced by an accident, the will, that perfects a created substantial nature but originates from a divine supposit, a divine supposit exercising its own existence in that substantial nature. So Jesus' choice to share his grace with us has the divine authority to cause in us an

extension of Jesus' human participation in spiration, the originating of the Holy Spirit.

And if spirating the Holy Spirit exists in us, the Holy Spirit exists in us, since co-relatives require each other, and exists in us *as our own spirit*, since we originate it. So we call having sanctifying grace, which is an extension of Jesus' human participation in spiration, having the Holy Spirit. In short, Jesus' human acts of will have the divine authority to send us the Holy Spirit, one genuine human participation in originating the Holy Spirit originates another genuine human participation in originating the Holy Spirit. (This is an instance of the general principle that since form, actuality, is not individuated of itself, it can communicate itself when there is a properly prepared receptor for it). Jesus' human acts have the divine authority to send the Holy Spirit to us intentionally because they are acts entitatively originated by a divine supposit and are acts perfecting a substantial nature that differs from ours only by next-to-nothingness.

#### XIV.

Note also that while there are no real relations to *other* creatures in God, we may be able say that God's free choice of becoming man gives him real relations, the Trinitarian relations, to one creature, Jesus' humanity, and to other creatures, ourselves, through our sharing in the grace of Jesus' humanity. In order to be a principle of incommunicability, subsistence must be a principle of unity in the sense of undividedness, wholeness; numerical unity presupposes transcendental unity. Subsistence is what makes the whole of Jesus, with all his multiple parts, one divine person. So God's Fatherhood is a real relation, not just to Jesus' divine subsistence, but to the whole of Jesus of Nazareth, since Jesus as a whole is one supposit subsisting by the Son's subsistence. For the same reason, the Spirit's being-spirated is an entitatively real relation to the whole supposit, Jesus of Nazareth. Since the co-relative term of Fatherhood, on the one hand, and Being-Spirated, on the other, encompass the whole of Jesus, the terms of those relations include Jesus' accidents and so his sanctifying grace. (As the human being, Mary, is the mother of God, because of the hypostatic union, the human being, Jesus, is one of the spirators of God. Here I am not referring

to the intentional presence of spiration as an accident of Jesus, but to the union of Jesus' human nature with the divine nature in one person who is a spirator of the Spirit in God.)

And Jesus shares his sanctifying grace with us. So the co-relative terms of those real relations encompass us also, as a result of our sharing Jesus' sanctifying grace. When we cry "Our Father" or "Abba" we are saying, in effect, "Oh, thou real relation of Father-of-us." And when we say "Holy Spirit," we are saying "Oh, thou real relation of being-our-spirit. (Are pedantic phrases like these any more incongruous in prayers than Aquinas' "Genitori, Genitoque, . . . Procedenti ab utroque"?)

In itself, the spirated divine Sigh of love is a nonverbal expression. But looked at as being originated by distinct supposit (see ST I, 36, 4 ad 1), the divine Sigh requires distinct verbal articulations expressing the fact that the one Sigh originates from different ways the divine nature relates to itself. It especially requires distinct verbal articulations in its state of being participated in by Jesus' human nature and ours, where the distinct divine relations become real relations of God to creatures. One distinct articulation the divine Sigh requires is "You are my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased!" (Mk 1:11; Lk 3:22). The other is "Abba, Father!" (Rm 8:15; Ga 4:6). One of these articulates what the divine Sigh expresses as the Father's love of the Son, and the Sigh IS the expression of the Father's love of the Son. The other articulates what the divine Sigh expresses as the Son's love of the Father, and the Sigh IS the expression of the Son's love of the Father. But these diverse articulations do not themselves express, except implicitly and as known by reflection, that what they are diversely articulating is really only one expression of love shared by both the Father and the Son, a Sigh of love which in itself is not a cognitional expression of love. Still, it is not just by appropriation or fittingness that the human participation in spirating the one Spirit results, in Jesus and in us, *both* in our **hearing** "You are my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased" and in our **crying** "Abba, Father!" For we are truly participating in a life lived between distinct divine persons.

Also, faith reveals that the Trinitarian relations are (super)analogates of predica-



mental relations. Just as reason tells us that knowledge and love, which in creatures are accidents of the category quality, really exist in God, faith tells us that relatedness, to-something-ness, as a genuine distinct mode of entitative being (in contrast to transcendental relations which are really identical with modes of entitative being that belong to categories other than relation) exists in God. The entitative existence of relations as a distinct category of real being is controversial. At least one Thomist, the aforementioned Joe Sikora, argued that there is no need to posit predicamental relation as a category of entitative being distinct from (1) substances, and (2) the quantities, qualities and actions that are the foundations of the relations by which we DESCRIBE one substance in reference to (3) another substance whose quantities and qualities make it the term of a relation. The only thing relations would add to the related substances and their quantities, qualities or actions are beings of reason, the descriptions of one substance's quantities, qualities and actions by reference to another's. One place, however, where relations as a distinct category of entitative being not only escape the usual arguments against them but where they are a necessity is as a condition for intentional existence as something really distinct from both the objectifier and objectified and from the entitative existence of each.

As Poinset (Curs. Phil. Thom., II, q. 21, a. 1, "*Ad confirmationem*" 654b 41ff) and Maritain (*Degrees of Knowledge*, p. 114) hold, the intentional existence of object X requires an entitative predicamental relation to X. Acts of knowledge and love, as well as the specifying forms that make things objects, are predicamental qualities, not predicamental relations. But Poinset argues that they must found predicamental relations in order to be vehicles of intentional existence. And faith tells us that while predicamental relations do not exist in God since they are mixed perfections, there does exist a (super)analogate of them in God, the Trinitarian relations.

I think Poinset and Maritain are correct; intentional existence requires the real existence of a predicamental relation between objectifier and objectified. Our knowledge or love of what X, something distinct from ourselves and from our knowledge or love of it, is cannot

be reduced to our entitative quantities and qualities which, by hypothesis, are distinct from X. Our act of knowing X and the psychological, rather than the objective, concept of X are entitative qualities, not predicamental relations, that must be transcendental relations to X. But transcendental as opposed to predicamental relations are insufficient to account for the entitative/intentional distinction, since a transcendental relation is identical with an "absolute," subjective mode of entitative being, while relations are, by hypothesis, suprasubjective since they are entitative ways of being *to*-another-entity. Yet our knowledge and love really relate us to X, not to some substitute for X. So in addition to being qualities, our acts of knowledge and their associated psychological objectifying forms must be the foundations of real predicamental relations to X. So the revelation of the Trinitarian distinctions as (super)analogates of the distinctions between entitative and intentional existence is even more significant because the intentional existence of object X requires an entitative participation in another (super)analogical value found in God, relation.

The real distinction between relations in God, therefore, is a (super)analogate of a variety of distinctions found in creatures, one at the substantial level, and others at the accidental level. At the substantial level, the real distinction in God is a (super)analogate of the relation of subsistence, the state distinct from a substance and its act of existence that enables a substance to originate its properties. Subsistence in creatures is a form of entitative origination, as are the relations of Fatherhood and spiration in God. On the accidental level, the real distinction in God is a (super)analogate of the created distinction between entitative and intentional existence and between the diverse kinds of entitative existence, knowledge and love. Also in creatures, the existence of relations as a distinct category of entitative being is a (super)analogate of the existence of real relations in God. So created origination, intentional existences, and predicamental accidents are each a different kind of (super)analogate of the real distinctions between relations in God.

How can these diverse modes of created being be (super)analogates of one aspect of God? In the same way that *all* created modes are limited ways of having the one simple per-

fection that God does not have but is, infinite existence. The only difference is that the status of some created perfections as analogates of what God is cannot be known by reason. That is why Maritain called it the superanalogy of faith. Created subsistence, intentional existences, and predicamental relations are, like all created realities, diverse limited ways of participating in perfection that exists infinitely in the distinct real relations in God.

In fact, Trinitarian relatedness would be a (super)analogate of created subsistence, intentional existence, and predicamental relations, even apart from the issues of the Incarnation and the Trinity's real presence in us by grace. A substance's origination of accidents, intentional existence, and predicamental relations are facts of human reality whether or not Jesus is a divine person or the Trinity is really present in us. And whether or not we know it, these created perfections are (super)analogates of what the Trinitarian relations are in themselves. Also note that the real distinction of divine relations would be a (super)analogate of the creaturely entitative/intentional, knowledge/love, and absolute/relative predicaments distinctions even apart from the theory of subsistence as a substance's origination of its accidents. The real distinction between divine relations would be (super)analogates of these creaturely distinctions on any theory of subsistence, and whether or not there was an Incarnation. We just wouldn't know about these (super)analogies without revelation.

#### Appendix A: Random Thoughts on the Spirit's Presence in Jesus and in Us

St. John of the Cross tells us that in the advanced stages of infused contemplation he was aware at the human level of his participating in the relation of spiration. We must assume, therefore, that Jesus's human nature would have had the same awareness, at the human level, of the relation of spiration.

But we participate in the relation of spiration humanly before we are aware of it by infused contemplation. For we participate in it any time we make an act of the supernatural virtue of charity. We participate in it any time we make an act of love of God for his own sake or for a

human being as made in the image and likeness of God. So we can participate in that relation without having infused awareness of the relation.

Still, we can have an awareness that we are participating in that relation whenever we make an act of charity, because we have the virtue of faith that tells us that acts of charity are participations in God's love and therefore in the relation of spiration. But what this means is that simply making an act of charity does not give us of itself a new way of being aware of the presence of the presence of divine life in us. The act of charity is in us. And we are aware of its presence in us since it is an interior conscious act that we make. And we are aware that it is a divine act by faith. But by making it I'm not given any new awareness of its divinity. On the other hand, by infused contemplation we are given a new awareness of its divinity. And Jesus would have been given a new awareness when he was baptized also.

The traditional thomistic explanation of confused contemplation is that the making of an act of charity, which though conscious does not give us a new awareness of our participation in divinity, is transformed, is changed, the Latin is "transit," into a means of a new kind of awareness. This new kind of awareness is infused contemplation. So the new kind of awareness of our participation in divinity, as opposed to the awareness given by faith, is a subjective, interior, affective, awareness. We are aware of interior affections, like joy, sorrow, pleasure, pain, not by means of concepts whose principal job is to make what is other from ourselves and from that themselves objects of our consciousness. But by means of conscious states themselves making themselves, not something other than themselves, things we are aware of.

An act of love performed before infused contemplation is a conscious act which we are aware of as an affective act by making the act itself. But the consciousness of the existence of the act and the nature of the act that the act itself gives us is not a new awareness of its

participation in divinity. That is, we do not have an awareness of its participation in divinity, it does not give us an awareness of its participation in divinity, in addition to the awareness we already have through faith.

In infused contemplation, according to the traditional Thomistic account, the new awareness of divinity is a new affective awareness, a new awareness given by the existence in this of an affective act itself. Infused contemplation is a new awareness, but not necessarily an awareness of a new act or state of love. It is an awareness of the sanctifying grace by which God has had an abiding presence in us.

Now we must assume that Jesus would have shared all the degrees of infused contemplation that we are capable of having. And Jesus would have received those degrees at his baptism. For his baptism was an advance in consciousness over his previous consciousness. So at his baptism, Jesus's human nature was given the gift of awareness of participation in divinity through the act of participating in the relation of spiration act the human level. This is an affective awareness of the relation of spiration as a divine relation act the human level.

It might seem that this new awareness was signified at the baptism only by the separate appearance of the spirit. No the separate appearance of the spirit and the words of the father actually signify the same event taking place in Jesus's human consciousness.

The words of the father expressed a father's love for the son. But that love by which the father loves the son is the very same relation of spiration by which the son spirates the spirit. Spiration it is a relation shared by the father and the son. For the son to become aware of the relation of spiration dwelling in him and therefore of the Holy Spirit dwelling in him is the same thing as for the son to become aware of the relation of love by which the father spirates the Holy Spirit.

So the same new consciousness that the Gospel's express by Jesus's hearing the words "you are my beloved son in whom I am well pleased," is identical, is the consciousness, is the same consciousness, that is expressed by Jesus's interiorly uttering "Abba, father." From the point of view of the father that spiration is saying, in effect, "I love you son." From the point of view of the son, that same spiration is saying "I love you father."

What the baptism made Jesus aware of a new way is his being the originator, as the son of God, of the Holy Spirit, of being in the breather of the breath. That relation to the Holy Spirit longs to him at the divine level. His new consciousness of it is at the human level; it is a new way of being humanly conscious of the fact that that relation belongs to him at the divine level. Jesus was aware of the real presence of spiration in him as an activity of his human nature. At the human level is aware of the divine originating of Holy Spirit as his own "activity," his own originating of the Holy Spirit; for every human act in Jesus belongs to the same divine person that the breathing of the Holy Spirit belongs to. The human participation in that breathing belongs to the same person, the same supposit, the son of God, as that breathing does in its divine state.

If he already knew by faith that he was the originator at the divine level, he did not know that at the human level by the act of originating the spirit itself; he did not know that at the human level through his consciousness of the act of love itself, even though that act was all along a participation in spiration.

However, if Jesus's faith prior to the baptism did not include an awareness that he was the spirator, then what he became aware of at the baptism was that he was a role player equal with the father in spirating the spirit.

At the human level, our participation in divine love makes us aware of how great God's love

is by being aware of the glorious gift he has given us, which is that divine life of love itself. So we become aware of our glory and God's goodness in the same awareness, of our love-deserving glory and his love-deserving goodness in the same awareness.

In hearing "you are my beloved son," Jesus has the same consciousness that God is his father that he expresses interiorly to himself by "Abba, father!" The mutual love of the father and son is the same love, the love is identical with the divine essence. So the breathing that originates the Holy Spirit is one breathing shared by both father and the son. So there is only one holy sigh of love of originating both from the father and son. As originating from the one love shared by both the father the son, the holy sigh is "inexpressible," that is, not linguistically expressible, in contrast to what originates from the father alone, the intellectual expression of God's knowledge of himself, the word.

But when we are looking at it as originating from the father the one holy sigh expressing the one divine love is equivalent to "you are my beloved is son". Here we use concepts, correctly, to express what that consciousness of the Holy Spirit is because we are humanly looking at it from a particular point of view. And looking at it from a human point of view is what we have to do because we are participating in it at the human level.

And looked at as originating from the son, the same holy sigh expressing the same unique love is equivalent to "I love you father." Here again we use concepts, concepts that apply only to the son, because we are participating in the son's human life and participating in a human way. So when becoming aware of the holy sigh at his baptism, Jesus was also becoming aware of his relation of being originated by the father and the father's relation of being the originator of the son.

"You are my beloved son" is equivalent to "you are the beloved term of my relation of gen-

erating; you are my beloved co-relation of that-which-is-generated." Or better, "you are my equal in breathing the Spirit you are newly aware of because the love you are newly aware of is both my love for my son and your love for your father."

When Jesus' human nature receives the Holy Spirit he is loving the father; so the otherwise inexpressible sigh Jesus utters is equivalent to saying, using words, "I love you father." And the same otherwise inexpressible sigh, is the father loving the son. So when the father breathes the Holy Spirit, he is loving the son. So the sigh of father utters is equivalent to "I love you son." In itself, the divine Sigh is inexpressible. But we can understand what it is just as we can understand that a sigh is a non-conceptual expression of love. And our human articulation of that understanding uses, and must use, concepts.

These expressions of love are diverse at the human level. But they express the same human awareness of the Holy Spirit. They express the same human consciousness of participating in the common relation of spiration that is caused by the participation in the relation to spiration itself. At one time, that participation is not a cause of this new awareness; at another time it is. It was always there in us, that is, participating in the breathing was always there in us. But now we have the gift of being aware of the breathing both as an affective state and as a divine affective state, aware in a way caused by the divine affective state itself.

On a human level, crying "Abba, father" is a real participation in the divine breathing of the spirit. And the existence of that cry in Jesus's human nature is the real presence, in a human mode, of the Holy Spirit in his human nature, is a receiving of the Holy Spirit by his human nature. It's a new way of receiving the holy spirit by his human nature. (The Spirit was always present in his human nature by sanctifying grace.) That is why Paul can once say it is the Holy Spirit who cries "Abba, father" and at another time say that we, and there-



fore that the human being Jesus also, cries it. Jesus's cry is Jesus' human nature really participating in the Trinity's life by spirating the Spirit. So in us it is both the Holy Spirit crying it and we crying it; for we are really participating in the originating of the divine breath, and so that breath is both God's breath, and his spirit crying, and our breath and our crying. (The Trinity's life is our life; its acts are our acts, and vice versa.)

The Holy Spirit is Jesus's cry of love to the father. The Holy Spirit is Jesus's cry "Abba, father!". So when that cry first occurs in Jesus, he receives the Holy Spirit.

Assume that before his baptism Jesus's human faith did not include awareness of the existence of the Trinity. As a good Jew, he would have known the existence of the father, and the father's love. He might have even known, by faith, that his acts of love for the father were a participation in divine essence, love; that is, they were a human way of participating in the divine essence. But he was not conscious of his act of loving God as a participation in the origination of a divine person or of any person. And so he was not yet aware of his personal equality with the father, his own identity with the divine nature. He would become aware of that by, in, and only by and in, is becoming aware of breathing the spirit mutually with father.

In his previous human loving of God, and so his previous human participation in the breathing of the Holy Spirit, he was not conscious of that breathing as being a relation to another divine person. At the baptism, he became aware of his acts of love as a relation to another divine person, the breathing of another divine person. The relation he became aware of was not just any relation; his breathing is the originating of a divine person. At his baptism Jesus could not be aware of this relation to the spirit without being aware of himself as a divine person. In other words, in becoming aware of his relation to the spirit at his baptism, Jesus became aware that the words of God "you are my son" did not just mean that he was an-

other created child of God. By giving the Spirit, revealing the Spirit at the same time, the Father was telling Jesus that God was his father in the sense of a co-equal of the same nature.

And becoming aware of his originating of the spirit, by now having the consciousness interiorly expressed by "Abba, father" and "exteriorly" expressed by "you are my beloved son" (expressed in the first person by , and in the second person by ,) meant that Jesus was becoming aware of the mutual love shared by the father and himself. By being aware of his relation to the spirit as that of originating a divine person, he was aware of himself, on a human level, in a human mode of consciousness, as a divine person. That is, by the way he was aware of the father and his mutual love at the baptism, a love that is the breathing of Holy Spirit, the originating of the Holy Spirit, he must also have been aware of his own divinity.

By becoming aware of his love for the father as the originating of a divine person, he was aware that he and the father love each other as equals.

Was this for the first time? Well, on the one hand, Matthew tells us that both Jesus and John the Baptist had an awareness of Jesus' unique holiness and dignity prior to Jesus's baptism. (Perhaps the fact that both John the Baptist and Jesus were where of it indicates that they were aware of because their parents told them so.) But on the other hand Luke tells us that Jesus was not fully aware of his Messiah ship until baptism. Jesus could hardly have been fully aware that he was a divine person and not be aware that the person dwelling in and living in and acting through this human nature was the Messiah. If he wasn't the Messiah, then whoever was going to be the long-awaited one of the ages would have to play second fiddle to him, someone who was not the long-awaited of the ages; he was only God. So I think we can say that there is no question that Jesus was not fully aware, in a human sense,

of being God prior to the baptism

We might ask whether Jesus became fully aware of his divinity later, whether the Transfiguration was the time when he became aware of being God. I think not for two reasons. First, the father's words at the Transfiguration are addressed to the apostles, and perhaps to Moses and Elijah, not to Jesus. Second, and much more importantly, the Holy Spirit is not present as a distinct person at the Transfiguration. But it would have been Jesus's new awareness of his relation to the spirit at his baptism that required him to also be aware of his own identity with God. So I strongly suggest that the Gospels are ultimately saying that what happened at Jesus's baptism was his first becoming aware that he was God.

If so, it could not be more significant that Jesus's becoming aware that he was God coincided with something else he did at his baptism: identify himself with our sinfulness by accepting a baptism of repentance that he had absolutely no need of. And one of the choices by Jesus that preceded and was a condition for, but did not cause, his illumination by the spirit was the choice to love his fellow human being so much that he took responsibility for their sins. And maybe that choice was a cause of receiving the spirit. That choice was a new act of divine love. Maybe that new act of divine love was the act by which Jesus became now affectively, aware by inclination, of his participation in spiration. After all, his whole mission, the whole of the incarnation, the whole of the redemptive incarnation, is from the point of view of the Trinity and extension of the spirit. Since it is an extension of the love of God's essence for God himself to us, it is therefore an extension of the mutual relation by which God is both spirator and spirated. It is an extension of the love from which spiration and being spirated come.

Aquinas in talking about the different missions of the second and third persons of the Trinity speaks of them as if they were not simply attributed to those persons by accommodation or

appropriation, appropriateness. He says they can have distinct missions because they are distinct real relations. And Aquinas says that at the baptism the separate appearance of the spirit was a separate mission of the spirit. The father does not have a mission, since he is not sent, or rather since he is not originated and therefore is not sent. But if we use a wider concept than mission, the concept of role, we can say that the father and the Spirit have really distinct roles at the baptism. But the father's role at the baptism would not be really distinct from the son's role with respect to being spirator and the Spirit's being the spirated.

The real distinction of the missions is an expression of and result of the real distinction between persons. The real distinction between the persons is the real distinction between relations. Those relations, however, are not relations to creatures. But there is one exception to that.

When the son of God became man and assumed human nature, the relations that constitute the father son in the Spirit, the distinct relations that constitute the father son and the Spirit, become distinct relations to at least one creature, the humanity of Jesus. So perhaps it can be said that the baptism of Jesus was a receiving of the Holy Spirit in the sense of a distinct mission of the spirit which was not just attributed to the spirit by fittingness or appropriateness.

This is a new human participation in breathing which is a new human participation in the presence of the Spirit specifically. And so a new mission of the spirit which is specifically really distinct from the missions of the father and son.

But through the son's human nature those divine real relations become real relations to all those who belong to Jesus's comprehensive human nature. So they become real relations, distinct real relations to all the creatures who belong to Jesus comprehensive human nature.

So the Holy Spirit can be said to have a distinct relation to us and a distinct mission to us that is not just by appropriation or fitness.

In the state of grace, we receive spiration and so have the Spirit within us as term of the relation of spiration. Spiration is just the originating of the Spirit; so spiration makes the Spirit present within us.

When we say we receive the spirit, we are given the gift of the Spirit, we are given the new awareness that Jesus had at his human level, we participate in a new awareness Jesus had at his human level. What happened at the baptism and at Pentecost was specifically an awareness of originating the breath and of the breath as that which is originated. We participated in the breathing before, and that breathing is by its nature a conscious act. But the consciousness that we had before was a human mode of consciousness that was not itself, with respect to the mode, of participating in God's way of being conscious of his own divinity, and the Trinity's way of being conscious of each other and their own equality. That way is in interior way, an affective way, a personal way.

On the contrary, the awareness we are given by faith is an objective awareness, an awareness as from a distance. An awareness of something as other than the act by which we are aware of it. The new awareness is the same mode as the Trinity's awareness of itself because it is not an awareness that is other than the act through which we are aware of it. This we call receiving the Holy Spirit because we are now aware of being a spirator and so of our having the spirated in a personal interior way. To be aware of being a spirator is the same as being aware that we have the spirated, have what we spirate, within us.

Perhaps Jesus was aware of his own divinity by having had the Scriptures opened to him the way that he opened them to the apostles after the resurrection. Note that the opening of the

Scriptures to the apostles after the resurrection came before the reception of the Holy Spirit. So perhaps Jesus had the Scriptures opened him before the reception of the Holy Spirit. But the Isaiahan 42 prophecy in Luke appears to have been opened to Jesus as a result of receiving the Spirit at this baptism.

But when we are aware of the Trinity in an interior way, we share at the human level, in a human way, the Trinity's way of knowing itself. That is, our mode of, our human mode of knowing participates in the Trinity's mode of knowing. It is not just that the content known in the human mode, the existence of the Trinity, is identical with the content that the Trinity knows in a divine way.

The holy sigh is not just a conscious expression it is in interior conscious expression, a personal conscious expression. The love itself makes us aware of its divinity. The love itself makes us aware of its divine origin. When the Holy Spirit himself makes us aware of his divine origin and his presence in us as divinity we say we have received the Holy Spirit.

We call it receiving the Holy Spirit because it is specifically an awareness of an expression of love originating from love as an interior state and an interiorly conscious state. We could believe we had God's love dwelling us before, but the new interior awareness of that love is the awareness expressed as an interior cry "Abba, father" and by "you are my beloved son." So Jesus knew he was God because he had the interior awareness of the love of God dwelling in him in a living way, a personal awareness of the life of God, love, as his own life.

To receive that personal awareness in the human conscious way is to receive the Holy Spirit in a humanly conscious personal way. For that is what that love is, namely, the originating of the Holy Spirit, and that is what the Holy Spirit is, namely, that which God's love is originating of.

As (1) conscious and as (2) interiorly and personally conscious, the originating and the originated did not exist in Jesus' human nature before. When Jesus was sleeping, it existed but did not exist in a conscious way. When Jesus and we are old enough for acts of faith, it can exist in a conscious way, but not yet in interior and personal way, an affective active way, through the existence of a conscious inclination. And so it did not exist before Jesus baptism such that both the content of the consciousness and the mode of the consciousness correspond, at the human level, to Trinity's life. We knew we had God's life in us before, but now we receive the gift of a personal awareness of love, which is in fact the gift of a personal interior awareness of a person. We call that gift receiving that person, the Holy Spirit.

But before receiving Holy Spirit, Jesus's' participation in divinity, and our participation in his divinity through his humanity, was a "secret." Not a secret from Jesus' faith or our faith. But a secret in the sense that he and we did not know it yet in Jeremiah's sense of knowing it. In that sense, before the baptism and before we receive the spirit, it was still unknown to him than us and so a secret. We and he did not yet have the interior, personal kind awareness of his divinity that does not depend on the teaching of others (his parents or the opening of the Scriptures in Jesus' case). We and he both become aware of Jesus's divinity. And in becoming aware of Jesus's divinity, we become aware that we are sharing that divinity in a human way. That is, we are sharing the divinity the same way the human nature of Jesus shared it at the human level. We are not sharing it in the sense that our human nature of makes one supposit with Jesus, the son of God. But we are sharing it in the second way in which Jesus participates in divinity.

But in that second way, Jesus' humanity became aware of his divinity, and the apostles became aware of his divinity, at the same time, by the same gift, at the same stroke,. And so at the same time, the apostles became aware of his divinity in the second way being aware. Or rather, they became aware of their participating in the Trinity in the second way that Je-

Jesus is said to participate in it, namely within strictly within his human nature as opposed to the way that constitutes the union of his human nature with the divine nature.

The words of Jn 14 applied to Jesus' humanity at his baptism: "On that day, you will know that you are in me and I in you."

What Jesus is aware of at his baptism, and we from confirmation, is the father's love, which theology tells us is one mutual love shared by Jesus and the father, and Jesus and we are aware of the Holy Spirit, which theology tells us is that which their mutual love is the originating of. That's what the Holy Spirit is and all that the Holy Spirit is, namely, what is originated by the father and son's shared love. And that's all their shared love is, what originates a third person sharing the divine essence equally with them. At the baptism and that Pentecost love became the object because the father and son's originating of the Holy Spirit became the object.

It is the Spirit who cries "Abba, father" in us because the Spirit is the son's cry of love the father. So to have that conscious cry of love in us as conscious is to have the Holy Spirit in us in a new way, is to receive the Holy Spirit in a new way. To enter this state, the conscious state, of having that conscious cry of love is to receive the Holy Spirit in a new way.

That awareness is the same as the awareness that God is our loving father and we are his beloved child.

That conscious breathing is always there, and in itself is a conscious expression. When it first becomes a conscious expression at the human level, we say we have first received the spirit because we are first aware of it, of the spirit, and in interior way, which is the way that corresponds to the conscious nature of the Spirit as an expression of God's love, as a con-



scious expression of God's love, and the way that corresponds to the Trinity's conscious life in itself.

As this conscious expression, as this conscious state, the Spirit did not exist in us before. We call that expression, as conscious, the Holy Spirit, because that breath breathed by God is the Holy Spirit and not just in any "fittingness" or "appropriateness" sense.

Faith and hope are specifically human ways of sharing the life of the Trinity by intentional existence. But now the presence of the divine life of love becomes the object of the awareness through the divine life of love itself; now we become aware of the presence of the divine life of love through that life of love itself, not just through faith. And love becomes the means of this awareness because the breathing of the father and the son, the Holy Spirit, becomes the means of this awareness. So now we say we have received the Holy Spirit.

When Jesus knows spiration only through faith, he does not have a knowledge of his love of the kind such that the knowledge comes from the act of love or state of love itself. He knows that the act of love comes from his person. But that the act of love is a participation in a divine act comes through faith, not through his state of originating that love himself. We have a co-natural knowledge about human acts as human. We have a knowledge of them as divine acts through faith, not through co-naturality; co-naturally they appear to be human acts, or they only appear to be human acts.

Faith and Hope are not only specifically human ways of sharing life of the Trinity; they are such in a manner that makes it impossible for them to continue in heaven, although we will still be human's in heaven. They are specifically pilgrim ways. Love is not just a pilgrim way. And we can know through faith that it is not just a pilgrim way, just as we know the truth in a specifically pilgrim virtue.

The way we are now becoming aware of the presence of the Trinity within us, the direct way, is specifically by being aware of God's love for us as his children and our love for him as our father. This state of being conscious of that love is itself an expression of that love. And the expression of the father and son's love that we are now aware of is itself the Holy Spirit. And we are becoming aware of that love of the father and the son because we are becoming aware of it in that expression, the Holy Spirit, or because we are participating in that expression, participating in breathing the Holy Spirit and so having the Holy Spirit. For that expression is the Holy Spirit himself.

So the early Christians naturally called their initially acquiring this new mode of awareness "receiving the Holy Spirit," receiving the son's sigh of love for the father and the father's for the son. In making acts of love based on faith they had participated in the father and son's conscious sigh of love before, but not in the manner of being a human conscious sigh of love. Faith gives us a conceptual awareness of what the life of God in us is. To receive the gift of a humanly conscious awareness of love through the existence of love itself, of love and not as the object of the concept, of love that we are aware of through love itself, to receive that gift is to receive the Holy Spirit in a humanly conscious way. This is a human way of having the spirit of participating in a spirit that did not exist before.

We had the HS before, but our human consciousness through the ancillary gift of faith was not itself a way of having the Holy Spirit. Or it was only a way of having the HS as object of knowledge of another. Not through self-knowledge, not through the fact that the Trinity's life is our life because spirating the Spirit is now or life.

If Jesus knew he was the Messiah before the baptism, then at the baptism he now knew it was time to start his ministry. The reason he now knew it was that he now knew that he was

God.

And the evangelists knew that the early Christians would interpret the events at Jesus' baptism as his becoming aware of his divinity through the Holy Spirit. For that's how the early Christians themselves became aware of his divinity and their participation in divinity by the real presence of the Trinity and their. Participation in it. The words of John 14 apply to Jesus: On that day, he knew on the human level that he was in the Father was in him.

The expression contains the very same reality, the same entity, the same essence, that the expressor (lover) expresses (or that lover loves), the expression is the very same reality that the expressor expresses. The expressor expresses the very reality that he is. And the expression is so perfect that it's content is the very same reality of the expressor that the expressor expresses when he expresses himself, when he expresses what he himself is. And the expression is the very same reality, and the "nature" of the expression is that very same reality.

The entity, the nature, that allows the relatedness that allows one kind of relatedness to be a reality is the very same nature that allows the other kind of relatedness, the other to-something, to be a reality, by that to-something being identical with not-just-a-to-something, and allows it to be a reality by the nature's being identical with, the non-just-a-to-something's also being identical with a to-something, and so with more than one to-something.

(What is the subjective, absolute essence to which a relation in God would belong? The same essence to which other relations must belong, each of the relations being relations of the essence to itself.)

The cash value of saying that God is not a transcendental relation? There must be an opposite formal relation in God. There must be a correlative formal relation in God.

God wanted Jesus' mission to be confirmed, or to be conferred, by a free decision on his part, just as his death was a free decision on his part. Jesus made the free choice to offer his repentance for our sins. That choice occurred at a particular time in Jesus' life because God wanted our salvation to be accomplished by Jesus' action as a man, and so was result of his free choices as a man.

Accepting responsibility for our sins at his baptism is what "fulfilling the demands of justice" (Matthew) must mean. Accepting the responsibility of atoning for the sins of man; for God's justice required an atonement for sin. In order to atone for human sins, Jesus must accept the responsibility for the sins of those whose individual natures differ from his individual human nature only by next-to-nothingness, prime matter. Because just one human act of this one human being is infinite in value, God cannot refuse it as justice for the acts of other human beings. Jesus' act would satisfy the demands of justice for Martians or angels. It does not atone for the sins of creatures of another substantial nature, because the person performs act of infinite value through his human nature, not his divine nature.

Other than permitting substantial change, the only function of prime matter is to permit a multiplicity to share the same specific perfections. But that creates the possibility of sharing of defects also.

Jesus was "made sin for us" (2 Co) in intentional existence at his baptism. By loving us, Jesus makes us other selves in intentional existence. We become identical with his "self," that is, with that for the sake of which he wills other things. And so sinners become other *selves* to Jesus *himself*. So selves that contain sin become one self with him in intentional exis-

tence.

"Made sin for us" might refer to Jesus's death, but it might also refer to his accepting a baptism of repentance. "Will you let me lead you to become Lord and Messiah in your resurrection?" God wanted Jesus to change as a result of that choice.

I am sending you to be the Messiah today. Then Jesus said "as the father sent me at my baptism, I send you."

It is not only by fittingness, appropriation, appropriateness, that Jesus is said to have a mission, and a mission distinct from something belonging to any of the other persons. So that mission as distinct from anything belonging to the spirit. That real mission is really distinct from anything belonging to the spirit. But Aquinas says the spirit's separate appearance is, ipso facto, a separate mission. So doesn't the spirit have that mission as something really distinct from what belongs to the son, and not just by fittingness?

Does the character of confirmation connect us to the relation of spiration in a new way?

Does it specifically "relate" us to spiration in a new way?

To be aware of having the Holy Spirit within you as yours, as an element in your life, is to be aware of originating the Holy Spirit. Because that's all the Holy Spirit is, namely, the expression originated by the father and son. And to be aware of being the originator of the Holy Spirit is the same as being aware of having Holy Spirit within you as part of your life.

The relation of spiration itself now produces a new way for Jesus to be conscious of what his act of love for God is. The Trinity as a whole wills that a new human mode of consciousness be produced in Jesus' human nature. But the whole Trinity wills that this new mode will be

an awareness of participating in spiration, an awareness that is produced, not by concepts, but by the participating in spiration itself, namely, by Jesus' act of love itself. So the whole Trinity wills that this new consciousness will be the kind of awareness that we have of our own interior feelings, pains, pleasures, attitudes, fears, etc.

When Paul uses the phrase "the Spirit witnesses to our spirit," he is saying that the Spirit gives us an interior awareness, a personal awareness, a Jeremian awareness.

Jesus (1) was conscious of God's fatherhood and (2) actually participated in spiration by making conscious acts of love of the father. But he was not yet conscious of his acts of love as a participation in spiration of divine person. That is, unless he knew of the existence of the Trinity by faith beforehand, he was not conscious of his acts of loving God as a participating of the spiration of a divine person. And so he was not aware yet of his own personal equality with the father, his divinity.

He then became aware of the love going on within him as a spiration of a divine person, that is, as loving God as an equal. That is expressed by the fathers "You are my beloved son." The words of the father are the commentary of the evangelists on what the meaning of Jesus seeing the spirit was. Without those words, there's no teaching in the synoptics about what the meaning of Jesus's seeing spirit was. That is, no teaching about what the change of consciousness in Jesus when he saw the Spirit was. There's no teaching about what the change of consciousness that seeing the spirit was.

Jesus receives the Holy Spirit, as such, as the love of the father and the son for each other, Jesus receives that consciousness for the first time in his human consciousness. Jesus receives the Holy Spirit as the conscious love of a father and son for each other for the first time in his human consciousness at the baptism.

The synoptics are showing Jesus as becoming aware of his divinity at the baptism. Would the three apostles have become aware of it at his transfiguration? Perhaps they only knew that he was then revealing his divinity after the resurrection.

When we have first received the reality of a conscious experience of love in an interior way, a personal way, we say we have now received the spirit.

Jesus's awareness of the spirit was Jesus's proof that the human words he heard, "you are my beloved son," did not mean just created son. The Holy Spirit was the "pledge" of this to Jesus.

Faith and hope are specifically pilgrim ways of sharing the life of the Trinity. Until we get to heaven, the Spirit produces in us a longing and an expectation of getting to heaven. Spirit produces in us the intellectual belief that we are going to heaven and the affective confidence, trust, that we are going to heaven. In heaven we don't need to trust anymore. So having we don't need faith anymore either in the sense of the intellectual virtue of faith or in the sense of trust.

Holy Spirit, September 11, 2009 and continued

What confirmation makes us newly aware of is the son's action of spirating the Spirit. When the son spirates the spirit, he is loving the father. So his breath, groan, sigh, is equivalent to "Abba, father." And the father's sigh is equivalent to "you are my beloved son". Each of these expressions is the Holy Spirit.

We call the new existence of the conscious event of being aware of that spiration receiving the holy spirit. In that new conscious event we are receiving the reality of participating in

spiration, the reality of saying "Abba, father." We are receiving the reality of saying "Abba, father" in a conscious way; we are receiving it as a conscious reality. To receive it as an expression, as a conscious expression. We are receiving it as an expression, as a conscious expression. To receive that expression that conscious expression that way is to receive the Holy Spirit. To be newly given an awareness of that expression emanating from us is to be newly given the Holy Spirit; for that is what the Holy Spirit is, the conscious expression that emanates from the father and son. Prior to confirmation we had received that conscious expression in a divine way but not in a human way that reflects its divine mode of existence.

It is always there in us, and in itself is a conscious expression. In "receiving the Spirit" it becomes a conscious expression at the human level, a specifically human conscious expression of the divine expression. That new conscious expression didn't exist in us before; and that conscious expression is the Holy Spirit. So the Holy Spirit now exists in us in a way it didn't before. Its previous existence was a secret relative to the kind of knowledge that Jeremiah promised us.

Perhaps even Mary, conceived in grace and full of grace from the beginning, had to undergo the baptism the Holy Spirit in order to choose to accept her lifetime mission. She made that choice and would have received the Holy Spirit at the annunciation. Note that immediately after the annunciation she undertook a mission to Elizabeth. As part of that mission she spoke a greeting to Elizabeth. And at the words she spoke John the Baptist received the spirit. So perhaps this was the first case of a disciple of Jesus carrying on the spiration of the spirit by sharing it with others. She shares it by speaking a word. As a result of accepting the word, the receive the Word under the formality of spirating the Spirit with the Father.

The father and Spirit sent Jesus so that the father would be manifested through Jesus. Jesus spirated the Holy Spirit into the disciples so that the Holy Spirit would manifest Jesus to and



through the disciples. Jesus sent the disciples by giving them the power of spirating the Spirit. .

As signifying spiration, confirmation signifies Jesus's sending disciples on their mission at a point in time, as the father manifested Jesus's mission to him at a point in time.

"I accept my relation to the spirit, the relation of being the one who spirates the spirit to others." Jesus' works are extensions of God's love of himself, and so extensions of God's spirating, originating, his Spirit. Our works are extensions of our life of spirating the Spirit.

The father makes Jesus aware of his work of spirating, and Jesus consciously accepts that work, that mission of spirating spirit, now spirating it to other human beings.

Now Jesus knows he is the son in the sense of truly having divine life at the human level, and so is spirating spirit with the father. Or, now Jesus knows he is truly a divine person, knows it at the human level, and so knows he is spirating spirit with the father.

After confirmation we have a conscious desire to help others find salvation. That conscious desire is the love of God himself dwelling in us. It is the very life of God, who has chosen to love us as he loves himself and so gives us his life, which is that love. And so gives his life, which is that love, to us.

It is better to have the spirit than Jesus. That is, the body of Christ is the continued real presence of Jesus in us, in the body. So much so that it is better to have the spirit than Jesus. In John 16:7 Jesus was saying "now you have an intermediary between the spirit and yourselves, me, the person, the only person, in whom the spirit at this time dwells.

Jesus says, in effect "what I am doing, namely, sending you on a mission, by giving you the spirit, the father did to me when he sent me. When Jesus spirates the spirit to us we receive Jesus's work, his role, his mission. For in generating the son the father was necessarily generating a person who together with the father would have the role of spirating spirit. So to be united to the person of his son is to have the role of spirating spirit and Jesus's work, and our work, is an extension of spirating the spirit, of loving.

Jesus says, in effect, "when he sent me, he gave me the spirit in the sense that I was now aware of the spirating going on in me and so aware of the work I was supposed to now start, which was to spread the spirit to others so that they could also spread the spirit to others. I became aware of the spirit in me because I was aware of being the spirator of the spirit, of being the owner of the spirit. And I spread the work of spirating the Spirit to other human beings by giving them the work of giving the Spirit to other human beings.

Jesus would have always had a sense of having a messianic mission, at least as a member of the people, but not in the "personal," "individual" senses, the unique personal sense. That required a choice accepting his unique sentient, a unique relation to the father. Not just "Messiah," "Savior," or "Lord," in the general sense of that term, but a unique personal relation to his work. Even the status of equality with him. Concerning equality remember that Jesus said "I call you friend's" and "you can ask the father in my name," and "as the father loves me he loves you."

Perhaps this is betrothal, like the relation of future spouses after their mutual revelation of love.

Jesus was enabling them to consciously accept spirating as their personal identity, their destiny, their personal mission, the meaning of their life, (the royal priesthood). And they did so

by a conscious fully aware choice.

Just as both the spirit and we are said to make the exclamation, "father," so the Spirit and the bride are said to make the same exclamation "come." The father also dwells in us just as much as the spirit does. But the father does not say "come" with the bride because the father unlike the Holy Spirit is not a relation of proceeding-from-the-son.

Perhaps baptism signifies our union with the relation of being generated, and confirmation signifies the spirating of the Holy Spirit. This would not mean that the spirating is not present when baptism signifies the relation of being generated. It doesn't mean that any more than the fact that the words "this is my body" don't mention blood means the blood is not present. Nor would the fact that spiration is already present remove a reason for having a separate sacrament any more than the fact that the blood is already present when the body is present removes the reason for signifying the separate conversion of the wine to the blood.

"I am sending you to be the Messiah today." "As the father sent me at my baptism, I send you now."

The mission Jesus accepted at his baptism was the mission of saving us from our sins. So by accepting a baptism of repentance, he was accepting the mission of saving us from our sins. Or better the other way around. He accepted his mission of saving us from our sins by identifying himself with our sins in accepting a baptism of repentance. Or, in identifying himself with our sins he was accepting the mission of saving us from our sins. He then accepted the responsibility to atone for our sins.

That is, he was accepting it in an adult mature way; he was accepting it in a adult fully con-

scious way; he was accepting it in a fully conscious of adult way. He was accepting it in a way that only mature adult could responsibly accept it.

And the choice following from confirmation would also be a new way of participating in spiration. It would now be a conscious adult free choice to participate in that mission.

Jesus was united with God in 2 ways, (1) incarnationally and (2) through sanctifying grace. (1) was a union in entitative existence between his human and divine natures. (2) is a union in intentional existence entirely within his human nature.

Intentional existence must be founded on entitative. In Jesus, the foundation of the intentional existence (2) is the entitative union between his natures (1). What is the foundation of the intentional existence (2) in us?

In both Jesus' and our human natures, there is a natural preconscious ability to say yes or no to propositions like "There are three persons in one God." (Maritain's superanalogy of faith). If we say yes, we are participating in the life of the Trinity to the extent that we share a knowledge only the Trinity can have directly.

This is a small but important step that can be shared by those even who do not have sanctifying grace. And it is the bootstrap by which God can lift us to the higher way of living his life.

When we do have sanctifying grace, the entitative foundation for the intentional existence in us is both (A) our cognitive nature as able to be lifted up to Trinitarian belief and (B) the union of divine and human natures in Christ. But how can we share in Christ's SG?

The SG in Jesus' human nature does not belong to a human supposit. But since it belongs to an infinite supposit containing all the perfection found in finite supposits, that human grace can be shared by other finite supposits if their substantial natures differ from the human nature of the non-human supposit only by a principle that is as close to nothingness as is metaphysically possible, prime matter. Ultimately, the only thing that distinguishes our human natures from Jesus' is something that is next to nothingness as possible, prime matter. Only that makes our natures incommunicable with one another. So their actuality is communicable with one another on the intentional level.

Ordinary human beings, however, are also incommunicable in existence; they cannot share their acts of existence with other beings of whatever nature. That is why they are distinct supposits, and their actions belong to them incommunicably since actions belong to the supposit.

Jesus' actions, however, do not belong to a human supposit but to an infinite supposit, due to the entitative union of Jesus' human and divine natures. Jesus has a human act of existence, but that existence is shared with another existent of another nature, an infinite existent. Since the entitative base of the actions of Jesus' human nature is not a human supposit but an infinite supposit containing all perfection possible in finite supposits, Jesus' dispositions to act and his acts themselves can be shared with other supposits of human nature, because other supposits of human nature differ in their individual human natures, at the intentional level, from the human nature of the infinite supposit only by that which is next to nothingness.

So Jesus can share with us entitative dispositions for intentional existence that belong to his human nature because his human nature is distinguished from ours only by pure potentiality.

But what does it mean for two existents, with two acts of existence, to be united in existence; so that there is only one supposit. It means that the human nature that exists in Jesus does not have subsistence, which is what it means for a nature not to be able to share its existence with another existent. But what is subsistence in the sense of something that blocks a nature's existence from being shared by another existent. In what sense is an existence "shared," or in what sense does a nature "share" an existence with another existent.

The opposite of pure potency is at work here. Subsistence is not a full mode of being, substantial or accidental, any more than prime matter is. But its way of being next to nothing is the opposite of prime matter's way. It is next to nothing after the manner of a relation, the lowest mode of entitative being, without being a full-fledged relation. Also it is opposite to prime matter in making a finite existent complete on the side of actuality, as a point makes a line complete.

Subsistence is a termination of some kind. Existence alone makes nature a passive potency for accidents. A "relation" of termination vis-a-vis existence makes nature able to exercise its active potency toward accidents. Prime matter limits form. Essence limits existence. Subsistence limits the actions from the existing essence to being actions springing from the existence of this substance by the essence's causing of its own necessary accidents.

The mission, and so the role, of the Spirit at the baptism was really distinct from the roles of the Father and the Son, it was the role of being the term of their relation of spiration now present in Jesus' human nature through SG. Since spiration was in him humanly, the Spirit was in him humanly. Jesus' human nature has really distinct real relations to the Father, Son and Spirit.

By humanly spirating the Spirit, Jesus's human nature becomes the originating term of the

relation of spirating the Spirit to other human beings. Jesus' love isn't just the undifferentiated love belonging to the divine essence that any creature not in SG can and must participate in just by existing. And the love by which he gives the Spirit to other human beings isn't just that undifferentiated love. The love by which he gives the Spirit to other human beings, gives divine life to other human beings, is an act belonging to the Son, not to the other divine persons. So it is a Trinitarian act of spirating the Spirit with the Father. So it is by spirating the Spirit that he gives SG to us. (Just fittingness?)

And as Trinitarian, Jesus' own SG, the giving of SG to Jesus' human nature by God, would be an extension of the relation of spiration that arises from love, not just an extension of the divine essence's undifferentiated love, Trinitarianly undifferentiated love, that creates all creatures. In the case of one creature, Jesus' individual humanity, the union of the creature with one and only one person of the Trinity would require a Trinitarian differentiation of the relations involved in love to play a role in giving Jesus' human nature SG. It would be an extension of the relation of spiration because it is an extension of the love by which the Father loves the Son. For a creature is now God's only begotten natural son.

And Jesus' giving of SG to other human beings is a further extension of the relation of spiration, now not only existing in Jesus's divine nature, but existing in his human nature. And we can participate in that.

In an infant, the Trinity has not yet caused the way its intrinsically conscious life is being lived to develop to the point of humanly conscious acts of love. But nothing but the prior real presence of the Trinity can enable us to make supernatural acts of love. *Nemo dat quod non habet.*

The absolute divine subsistence does not overflow into accidents distinct from itself but into

distinct terms for distinct ways of being related to itself, into distinct co-relations that provide distinct terms for each other. (Poincaré argues that the term of a relation, as such, is something itself relative, as a term has no reality other than relatedness-to the bearer of the relation, other than being a way of facing the first relation bearer.)

The absolute divine subsistence overflows its subjectivity into a way of being-to itself. In so doing it overflows in a way that has no reality other than being the co-relative of another suprasubjective way of being-to itself.

The real presence of the Son that must accompany the real presence of spiration as an accident of our human natures IS our state of adoption as true sons of God. For it we were not true sons of God, we could not be true originators of the Spirit with the Father, as St. John of the Cross tells us we are.

Objective knowledge of our acts of love makes them present as something other than the acts by which we know them; so they are present as something other than the acts by which we are aware of them. And to that extent objective knowledge makes them present as acts of something other than the knower *as knower*, the knower as such; something other than that from which the act by which we know them proceeds. Connatural knowledge is the opposite.

Likewise our objective knowledge of our acts of hitting a baseball is knowledge of them as other than the acts by which we are knowers of our acts of hitting a baseball.

A received act is an act that comes from another source, another originator. An exercised act is an act that makes the exerciser a source of further act, the source of act that some receiver receives.



Why did the early Christians call what they were aware of at Pentecost (On that day you will know . . .) receiving the Spirit even though the Spirit was in them from baptism. Because they became personally aware of spirating, originating, the Holy Spirit.. Spiration is participating in the divine nature, but is not a divine person (though where spiration is really present, the Father and Son must be really present under the formality, the formal object, spirating). All spiration is is the making present of the Spirit.

So in becoming aware of the spirating that had been going on since baptism, they were becoming aware of the making present of a specific person, the Spirit. And so they called it, correctly and not just by appropriation or fittingness, receiving the Spirit.

Human sins did not belong to Jesus' divine subsistence, to him as a divine supposit. But they belonged to supposits with a nature that differed from the nature the Son now personally inhabited as the nature through which and in which it subsists (exercises existence) only by a mode of being that is a close to absolute non-being as you can get, prime matter.

At the infinite level, it is possible for *relatively* incommunicable supposits to share the same "individual," that is, unitary, nature. (And all created supposits are relatively incommunicable in the sense that subsistence in them is the secondary created analogate of the same nongeneric value that predicamental relations are the primary created analogate of.)

His human act of existence does not belong to Jesus' human nature as an exercised act belongs to the nature that exercises it. His human nature does not communicate (share) with any other nature in the reception of existence but does share the exercise of existence with another nature, Jesus' divine nature. Because the only existence that is exercised in Jesus is the divine existence.

An existing substance's passive reception of its accidents explains why its accidents incommunicably belong to it as to their principle of individuation. An existing substance's virtual production of its accidents explains why they incommunicably belong to it as to their originating source. So subsistence is a "principle" of incommunicability, or just IS the incommunicability of the substance as the originator of its accidents.

Christ's accidents do not belong incommunicably to his human nature as to their originating source. So they can be shared with other human natures belonging to other human supposita, natures distinguished from Jesus' only by next-to-nothingness, not by anything in any way actual in itself.

Jesus made human, supernatural acts of love prior to his baptism, but those acts of love did not become the means of a new way of being aware of the real presence of divinity in his human nature.

By the fact of being limited, the natures of distinct creatures constitute "boundaries" between their realities. This much and no more; this far and no further. Relations are suprasubjective, they transcend the limits, the boundaries, that separate created subjects. Where there are no boundaries for relations to reside in, why can't they be infinite and so identical with the same unbounded being?

The existence received by substance is the act of all its other acts, including that most minimal of additional acts, the relation subsistence. But it turns out that this most minimal kind of created acts is a (super)analogate of a value, relation, that exists formally, not just virtually, in God.