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51986 In the seventeenth century, an obscure Iberian monk was solving Wittgenstein's problem about following rules. John Poinset did not explicitly address Wittgenstein's arguments that mental events cannot explain how we follow rules. But Poinset developed an analysis of mental events that fits Wittgenstein's objections like a glove. Poinset's analysis is developed in two places, in his theory of signs and in his theory of concepts. His complete theory of signs is for the first time available in English in John Deely's edition of his Tractatus de Signis. His theory of concepts has not been translated, but a much more than adequate presentation of it is found in Jacques Maritain's The Degrees of Knowledge.

51686 Call species specifiers (or objectifying forms?)

Kripstein views mental entities as relating us to objects that must be interpreted as (further) related to plus or quus. Thus, mental entities relate us to signs, instrumental signs, not to what the signs signify. But why contemplate mental entities relating us to instrumental signs alone? If they can relate us to one kind of object, they can relate us to the other.

5586 The key to relating Kripstein to Poinset is where Kripstein says the reason a mental entity will not work is that a mental entity must be interpreted. What is it that is interpreted? An object. But Poinset's mental entity is not an object.

Yes, his objects are universals. But the problem of universals is always with us. If Wittgenstein's problem with mental entities is that their objects are universal, he has no new problem with mental entities, on the one hand, and rules or language, on the other.

The problem of universals is not whether we must quantify over predicates or classes. The intentional existence of universals is not the existence we assert by quantifying over them. The intentional existence is an existence required as a cause of our behavior of following rules and using language; it is asserted to exist as such a causal factor.

51486 What kind of mental entities do we need to explain how we intend the function plus by '+' and not the function quus? Mental entities whose business it is just to relate us to the function plus and nothing else, mental entities by which we are related to the function plus and nothing else.

But how can this be? The very asking of this question reveals a failure to comprehend what is involved in positing such mental states, what is going on when we posit such mental states. The pertinent question is 'How could this not be, how could it be any other way? The only reason for even positing mental states in this context, the context of explaining our use of '+' is to explain our relation to the function plus that we call 'meaning' plus, or 'intending' plus by '+'. Anything short of a mental state that relates us to what the function plus itself is and to nothing else is irrelevant. That is really what Wittgenstein's arguments show.

What enables a mental state to explain meaning is precisely that postulated ability to relate me to what is not itself which is the reason for postulating mental entities in the first place. So mental states explain meaning not by relating me to something interior to my mental states but by relating me to what is not my mental state. The only reason for talking about mental states is to talk about entities which are means by which this relation is effected, means by which a relation to something other than themselves is effected, a relation that is given as a premise of the discussion. And the mental state must have whatever ontological characteristics are necessary for it to effect such a relation.

53186 In order for a mental entity to explain our intending plus by '+', Kripstein wants the entity to have some characteristic other than a relation to plus, a characteristic other than a relation to plus which would cause the entity's relation to plus, or determine it (specify it?). But why does it need any other characteristic than being a relation to plus or being something that relates us to plus? (When speaking of a characteristic other than relating us to plus, say relating us to plus rather than being a relation to plus. How does it relate us to plus? By being a relation to plus.)

51686 p. 44, beginning of second paragraph: What quality must a mental state have to be the state of meaning or intending plus by '+'? How about the quality of being the intending of plus by '+', the quality of being the relation of meaning plus by '+'? The skeptic's argument shows that no additional quality, no other quality, can constitute the meaning of plus by '+', but that serves to prove only that the mental state relevant to explaining linguistic behavior is just the mental state that has the quality of, is characterized by, the intending of X, the meaning of X. The skeptic's argument shows that no other mental state or characteristic of a mental state can take the place of a mental state's consisting of intending plus by '+'.

The fact that all past behavior could be interpreted by quus as well as by plus is not contrary evidence, it is supportive evidence. It proves linguistic behavior cannot be explained except by a mental state relating me to plus and not quus, in particular, a mental state of intending plus. It proves that by proving that we need mental states relating us to plus, not quus. Thus, we need mental states that are relations to plus, not quus.

How can such a mental state exist if every instance of plus can be interpreted as a quus (like green and grue)? The same question could be asked about how I know the difference between what it is to be green and what it is to be grue, between what it is to be the plus function and the quus function. The premise of the whole discussion is that I do know the difference. And, by hypothesis, I do not know it by knowing individual cases; nor is it by knowing a Platonic form (with no relation to individual cases). I know it by knowing what it is to be a green individual or what it is for an individual to be an act of addition.

And if I can know the difference between plus and quus, why can't I intend to use signs differently? Why can't I express what I know? If the skeptic's difficulty makes it impossible to express the difference, it also makes it impossible for me to have mental states by which I know the difference. And that shows that I do not know the difference by states relating me to individual instances interpretable as either instances of plus or quus.

82586 Kripstein not only wants a mental entity to have a property other than relating me to plus or quus, he wants them to have a subjective property by which the conscious subject is related to himself, not to something other than himself. He wants them to be characterized by a twinge or special feeling that would be something going on within the conscious subject and part of his own self-awareness. Wittgenstein always seems to make this the proper characteristic of mental events.

Also, Poincaré recognizes that mental 'activities' are not processes. See references in Simon, especially section on the virtual production of the concept.

52686 Does going to the community really help Kripke solve the problem? A judges that B can count, i.e., is justified in relying on B to give him the right amount of goods. But what makes X the right amount? Why shouldn't A really want the result of quusing, not plussing. How does A know that he wants B to add and not to quus?

Is it enough to say that plus is useful to our life and quus isn't? Why couldn't quus be useful? Answer: it could be useful in another life, but in fact, it isn't. That's just a fact, that's all. But how do we know this fact, that is, how does A know this fact? In the last analysis, A judges just as blindly as B does. A judges that what he wants from B, what is useful for him, is plus, not quus. Or better, that which A happens to want from B, and what A happens to judge he wants from B, is plus, not quus. But that judgment is blind.

Perhaps Kripke admits this in one of those footnotes at the end where he talks about the necessity for assuming language in order to formulate the problem. But (1) this assumption is invalid re the skeptic; (2) especially because the so-called skeptical solution does not solve the problem since A acts blindly.

But most importantly, we don't act blindly, i.e., we know what plus, not quus, is. If we know it, why can't we use a word for it knowingly. Further, we know that and why plus, not quus, is useful in this life.

1586 Put together Dretske and following rules. Following rules requires that the nature of that of which we are aware have a causal relation to our behavior, but not an efficient causal relation, a relation of an extrinsic formal cause.

51486 Kripke is further confused in thinking that grue illustrates Wittgenstein's rule problem. For that problem applies to grue itself, as well as to plus and quus. The skeptic can say, 'How do you know you should apply 'grue' this way today' maybe I should apply it to things that are purple today.

Kripke's example of using an image a green when applying 'grue' illustrates the difference between concepts and images. Both intend objects. But a concept relates me to what it is to be green and to nothing else, while a green image can be used in conjunction with the concept of what it is to be something grue and nothing else.

If a mental state relates me to green, it relates me to color. But the concept of green adds something to the concept of color. Does the mental state relating me to green relate me to grue? Unlike color, grue makes reference to something really distinct from gree, blue. As a result, the mental state relating me to green does not necessarily relate me to grue (and if it did, so what?). Thus, with the concept of green, I can use 'green' the word to say 'X is green today and X will be green tomorrow'. And if it will be green tomorrow, I cannot say truthfully 'X will be grue tomorrow'. So the mental state explaining my use of 'green' is not identical with the mental state explaining my use of 'grue'. 'Grue' is not logically included in green; and I need both the mental state for green and the mental state for what is really distinct from green to have the mental state for 'grue'.

92885 It is interesting that we speak of correspondence with objects and refer to reality as composed of objects, the reality we want to know as composed of objects. For calling them objects relates them to knowledge, i.e., it describes them as terms of knowledge relations. We need terms that do not relate them to knowledge.

81586 The only evidence we have for existence is the direct awareness of objects as extra-objectively existing (sense experience and introspection) and reasoning from these objects about what other things are necessary for their existence (causes).

101851 Evidence for existence consists of (1) the presence in awareness of an actually existing object and (2) the presence in awareness of a necessary causal relation terminated by the first existence and another hitherto unperceived existence. Why a necessary causal relation? A less than necessary connection is not sufficient to exclude the opposite from truth. And the relation is a causal relation because it is a relation to the existentially other, other than what is present in awareness.

Induction is based on knowledge that this is all evidence can consist of. For by knowing this, we know that it is unreasonable to believe in what is not evidenced by (1) or (2). It is not reasonable because existence is the goal of reason, and evidence for existence other than (1) that is not a necessary causal connection cannot exclude the opposite from truth. (Our thoughts must be measured by what is independent of our thoughts. If we do not have a cognition-independent object to provide us with evidence, contradictories could be true. Also, without evidence from a cognition-independent source, our thoughts are measured only by themselves, which is not their goal.)

51486 Language needs the intentional existence of the object and its real existence. Intentional existence alone does not give us a ground (cause) for a use of language being correct. To know that my use conforms to prior intentions, I need evidence on which to base an inductive argument using simplicity. Only awareness of actual existence provides such evidence.

The actual existence of internal states will not do as a basis for induction and simplicity. I can conclude that my present use of 'green' conforms to past if I am alone on a desert island and there are all sorts of green things, few of any other color, and I remember using 'green' frequently. And that kind of evidence would be available to a distant observer as well. I may think I remember having many pains of the kind I now call 'Tom', but there is not now any existing exterior evidence for the veracity of those memories.

52686 I can decide right now to intentionally use '-' for plus. But what does it mean to so use it? I can construct a sentence and imagine that '-' is so used in a community that '-' has the use '+' happens to actually have. For the concepts of plus or quus are characterizing causes of the meaningful use of words; concepts come into existence in that way.

Imagining a new use for '-' or any similar private act of meaning does not give me any inductive causal basis for knowing I am using a word correctly. But a causal inductive basis is precisely what is called for, since there is no necessary connection between a particular language-form and a particular concept. The absence of such a necessary connection calls for factual evidence for the connection. Factual evidence is provided, not by sense experience as sensible or as original but as presenting us with an existence. Interior acts give us current existence only; the phenomenalist argument says this. Memory appears to relate me to existence, but that's all. It's only an appearance, epistemologically speaking.

71186 As Maritain says in Theonas, there is an interior process going on. As I contemplate a painting, I may not be directly aware of the interior process, but there are still relations of before and after. The proof is that I could perform an interior act of counting, '1,2,3...'. That act would measure the contemplation, so the contemplation is a process at least potentially measured, i.e., a temporally measurable process. The duration of the process is a quantity.

I can measure an apparently changeless inner process by another inner process, e.g., counting '1, 2, 3...'. But that inner counting doesn't give me an objective standard of equal values just as private language does not give me a standard of correct or incorrect usage. Correct or incorrect usage is a means of objectifying. But words do not objectify by themselves. They are instrumental signs. They objectify by being associated with other objects. That association must have a cognition-independent base. The association takes place voluntarily (conventionally). But unless the convention directs a cognition-independent association, there is no standard of right and wrong and hence no useful instrumental objectifying.

Why not? for the same reason that '1, 2, 3...' done entirely in the imagination does not give a standard of equality. Reference to a conventionally decided standard is a means of instrumental objectifying, the relation to the equal standard (the bar) is not instrumental. But using it for defining quantitative terms, i.e., using it as a means of objectifying is instrumental and cognition-dependent. The instrumental must be reducible to the non-instrumental. The standard must not be dependent on my current decision to say '2' now rather than a second earlier or later. If the standard is totally cognition-dependent, it is dependent on my current decision. (That is the only thing that exists as far as cognition is concerned.)

Or: If I want the period marked by '3' to be equal that marked by '2', I must have some way of knowing that, of objectifying that fact. If the period marked by '2' no longer exists because it only existed in my imagination, I have no way of knowing it. The problem is epistemological (Kripke), but with an ontological base. The reason there is no way now, currently, of knowing it is that the previous act did not produce any cognition-independently existing situation, state of affairs (e.g., the disposition of others to use words in certain ways) that I can now objectify. For all my objectifying traces back to cognition-independent existence given in sense experience.



82586 The real reason interior counting won't do: cognition is measured by what is independent of cognition. Truth is measured by what is independent of cognition, hence by real existence. It is not just measured by what is other than cognition except in the sense that it is measured by existence that is other than being cognized. If it was just measured by what is other than cognition, it could be measured by something constructed by, and hence measured by, cognition so that cognition would make itself true. Wittgenstein's private language would be a language that was self-justifying in a strong causal sense; it would make itself correct.

Thought is ordered to something that will measure it as true or false, correct or incorrect, right or wrong. It therefore must be ordered to real existence, i.e., to what is cognition-independent. Otherwise, there is no goal for objectification to achieve such that the objectification can be measured as successful or not successful.

71186 To have a standard for the equality of the periods of '1', '2', and '3', I have to have a way of judging the equality of two periods. Such a way of judging requires that the objects about which we judge not be our own subjective ideas, feelings, concepts, etc. As Aquinas says, if the objects of judgments were our own ideas, contradictories could be true. I say the periods were equal; you say they were not. Our ideas must objectify something beyond themselves.

Then how do we judge the truth about the objects of these ideas? By appeal to objectified evidence. Here that can only be the evidence of the senses. But the senses have a subjective side likewise. They provide a means of judging only insofar as they relate us to objects, and here the objects really exist. When it comes to a way of judging time intervals, the object must not be our feelings about how much time has passed. We must relate to an object that is other than any of our subjective states.

Will a possibly existing object do? There are an infinite number of possible intervals. How do I judge that conceived or remembered or imagined interval A is equal to the current interval B that I want to know about? In the last analysis, there has to be something cognition-independent and, hence, really existing. There must be an object capable of measuring our judgments. For necessary truths, possible objects can do it, but not for contingent truths about what is other than our mental states.

'The imagined arrow is blue'. That is contingently true. But can we use language to objectify the objects of imagination unless we have standards for correct usage? 'Interval A is equal to B'. I can hypothesize this and make it so by fiat. But does that help me develop a language? If I invent the word 'blue' solely for an imagined object, do I have a standard of correct usage, of achieving a certain goal, an intended goal, a standard by which I can judge the goal to have been achieved? It is not just that the currently imagined object measures the truth of 'The object is blue'. But what standard measures the achievement of a goal intended for 'blue'? An imagined standard could only give me an imaginary achievement of the goal, any non-cognition-independent standard only an achievement that is cognition-dependent and, hence not necessarily relative to any thing (to any real existence) other than that of my own current states.

Maybe the contrast is between entitative existence and the status things have solely as objects (don't use the words 'intentional existence' yet). I need an object with a status of more-than-a-term-of-a-cognitional-relation in order for it to measure my judgments so that my judgment, which bears, not just of the status of objects as objects, but on real existence, will be measured by a real existence other than that of my mental states. So maybe the whole private language thing comes down to the fact that judgment asserts existence and judgment can't bear on the existence of our mental states because contradictories would then be true.

Judgment, even of necessary truths, does not bear on intentional existence, but on at least possible extra-objective existence. For time I need judgments amounting to more than 'It seems to me that interval 2 equals interval 3'. So I replace it with, 'The second hand moved five places for interval 2 and five places for interval 3'. Did it only seem to me that the second hand moved five places? How remove the subjectivity? Inductive methods bearing on real existence. And now the data for the induction can include the reports of others, reports which are necessarily excluded if I am just judging by awareness of my interior mental states. Why do I have an object I can, at least possibly, share with others and hence enhance induction in the second case? Because the object exists cognition-independently. And because the goal we are seeking is awareness of the fact that it is cognition-independently true that the hand moved five places. So even if it is in doubt whether the object exists cognition-independently, that doubt bears on the goal we are seeking. And the evidence of the opinions of others is pertinent to that goal as it would not be if the goal were awareness of our own mental states.

To achieve our goal, we must apply inductive standards to all the evidence that appears to consist of the direct experience of cognition-independent existence, not experience of our subjective states. I use inductive methods to judge whether or not I am hallucinating or unduly subjectively prejudiced (sick, drugged, drunk, tired) when judging that the clock moved five places in these intervals. What does it mean to say I use inductive methods? I apply necessary causal principles to give a causal analysis of existence and of the awareness of a sensory object. Necessary causal principles bear on (possible) cognition-independent, real existence. For causes are causes of existence, and causal principles are principles governing the causing of existence.

Here the existence of the awareness is explained by the fact that the object is causal action producing the awareness, or the awareness is explained by some causal action which is not itself the object, and hence the object is not existing causal action. The alternative 'inductive' account would postulate a cause behind the object. But inductive laws only apply to experienced cause-effect couples, i.e., couples in which both cause and effect are objects, not postulated objects. So induction applies to sensation if and only if the sensation hypothesis is true. And if induction does not apply, phenomenalism would be true.

But there are two problems (incoherencies) with phenomenalism: (1) it makes to be to be known; (2) it can't explain the truth of the inductive principles we use in deciding perception versus hallucination. It can't explain it because the only solution to the problem of induction is that of necessary causal principles, and causal principles bear on (possible) real existence.

71386 The question comes down to: what is the difference between imagining or hallucinating that each period took five clicks of the clock and perceiving it. Why is the latter superior to the former? (Don't say by definition, the answer that perceiving is somehow a 'successful' mental state won't do in the context of the private language argument where the problem is why can't the others be successful?)

What do we decide when we decide we perceived it and did not hallucinate it? The perceived clicks really exist, or are judged to really exist. The only real existence in the case of imagination and hallucination is the existence of the mental act itself, the act whose relation to what is not itself is the very thing in question. In judging inductively that an act was a perception, we judge that the object really exists, that it does not just have intentional existence. So we can reformulate the question above, 'Why is real existence important in this context?'

Can't we just say right away that the reason is that real existence is the goal? I want to say that as the conclusion, i.e., that identity with real existence is the goal of knowing. One answer: mere intentional existence or the real existence of mental acts won't do because contradictories could be true. Also, the reason contradictories can't be true is that things can't both exist and not exist; the reason is not the converse. Also, in judging the equality of intervals, we are judging the equality in real existence. The interval, even the length of an hallucination, has real existence. The terms of the relation of equality that we want to know about have real existence.

Even if it wouldn't make contradictories true, imaginary equality won't do because we couldn't know that the equality was real. We are judging real, not imaginary, equality. In all cases, need real as opposed to imaginary existence. Why? Because real existence is cognition-independent, is more-tha-the-term-of-a-knowledge-relation? Because the real existence of mental acts has for its goal awareness of their identity with something more-than-objects? Is this a reductio ad absurdum that mental acts have real existence as their goal, or do I need a further reductio ad absurdum, i.e., if they did not exist, there could be no language, no counting time, etc.? Maybe just have to say that Wittgenstein showed that the inadequacy of mental acts for language proves that real existents are the objects of mental acts.

42886 When I judge 'This is red', I do not compare this with the concept or idea of red, but with the object of the concept. The object of that concept is one of the answers to the question 'What is this?' But is it legitimate to speak of our ideas attaining an object? The only reason we posit ideas is that we have already attained objects.

no date Truth is correspondence (identity) between a thing and itself. But how is the comparison made? It is in answer to this question, not the question of what is a thing compared to judge correspondence, that concepts come in. Concepts are part of the causal account of grasping the identity of a thing with itself. How do concepts cause this? How do the meanings of terms help? By being identical with what something is, in whole or in part. Meanings are what a thing is. Concepts are the psychological dispositions what relate us to meanings. How do they relate us to meanings? By being the meanings themselves existing intentionally within us.

311821 Correspondence is a relation of a thing with itself, i.e., with that which is objectified in a proposition by a concept, etc. Sure it remains a question how one thing rather than another becomes so objectified. But that is a different question, and it can be asked intelligently only after it has been separated from the question of correspondence, i.e., after the question of correspondence has been located at another place.

The question of why one thing rather than another is objectified has two sides: (1) the relation of the word-function to the thing; (2) how we establish our relation to the word-function. The second question is one of psychological causal analysis. The relation of a sentence to a thing is established by the word-functions of a sentence. So question (2) is how do words acquire word-functions. Once they acquire them their relation to things and, hence, truth and falsity, is fixed. (Question of things versus descriptions comes up in (2), or does it?)

92885 Truth is not a correspondence with representations but with that which is represented. "But what right have we to speak of anything being represented?" That question literally puts Descartes before the horse. The question is what right we have to speak of representation, as if it is assumed that our thoughts have a relation to something outside themselves. The answer is that we introduce the concept of representation as the after-the-fact explanation of the fact that we do relate to things other than our thoughts, because that is what we mean by thought, namely, what explains an existing relation to things. But is it not a fact that language, something visible and not mental, represents by what it means? Yes, but meaning is something out there. Somehow, something does terminate the relation of being-meant-by language. How language succeeds in doing this is another matter.

81986 What if the skeptic is just saying that mental entities have nothing to do with our concept of correctly following rules? Then he is saying what I am saying about truth; it is not a comparison of a mental entity and a thing. But it does not follow that mental entities are not causally necessary for this behavior.

111985 The correspondence is between what exists and that which is meant, between what exists and the meaning, where meaning is not a mental entity or mental relation, or linguistic relation, but a possible way of existing. For example, 'tallest mountain'; its meaning is a possible way of existing, i.e., being the tallest mountain. Or 'red': being red, being something red.

9985 The correspondence that makes sentences true is between things and that which is described. But what determines that which is described, what brings it about that one thing rather than another is accurately, rather than merely intentionally, described? The 'meaning' of the description. But 'meaning' in this context does not refer to any mental entities. It is equivalent to 'that which is meant'. It does not matter how we analyse meaning here. If we say the connotation of a description or its sense we mean that which it connotes or that which is its sense.

Thus, 'table' means (or that which is meant by 'table' is) the kind of thing we designate by 'This' in 'This is a table'. How we explain the fact of meaning, i.e., of relating linguistically to that which is meant by 'table', is another matter. The understanding of truth does not presuppose an understanding of that explanation; otherwise, children would have to be psychologists to know truths. Rather, the fact of knowing truths is one test of the adequacy of any proposed explanation. The failure of an explanation to account for correspondence does not disprove correspondence. For correspondence is the fact that that which is meant is what thing named or described is in some way. It is the fact that that which is meant is among the things that the entity named or described in some way other way is. The fact that that which is meant is one of the many valid answers to the question 'What is it?'. (But isn't the last formula a begging of the question in a definition of truth, i.e., defining truth by a valid answer?)

417791 If a word-function is what something is, is the word-function of 'red' what something is? The opponent we say that we mean by red, incorrectly, a quality intrinsic in things. If that is what we mean, then 'red' may be false of things, or at least we have no evidence of its truth. But this need not be what we mean. The word-function of 'red' may simply be what some feature of our visual experience is. And it is true that things appear as having this feature of our visual experience as a quality. Still, as long as we only mean what this visual feature is, not whether or not things really have it as a quality, we are not wrong in using 'red'. Its word-function is identical with that which it objectifies, with what the thing objectified, visual experience, is in some way.



But let us now assume the word-function of 'red' is not identical with anything because it implies, falsely, red is a quality inhering in things. Then our sentences using 'red' are false. But don't we know what is objectified by 'red' anyway, so we can get along with saying 'This is red'? We know what is intended to be objectified, but intentions don't make truth. We know what the Babylonian intends by 'En-lil roared', i.e., what occurrence objectifiable truthfully in our language he is intending to objectify in his, i.e., intending to describe in his. But he must succeed in some intention; how else would we be able to interpret him? He succeeds in communicating his intention to describe a particular identifiable occurrence; that is not the same as succeeding in describing it. The same can go on within a language, e.g., a patient describing a symptom inaccurately but the doctor grasping what he intends to describe.

But we can continue to say "This is red", 'En-lil roared', or 'American Indian' by giving them different word-functions, this time a word-function identical with the thing to be objectified, for example, using 'The sun rose' not to mean the sun goes around the earth but that the position of the sun relative to the horizon changed in a certain way. All our old uses of 'Roses are red' could turn out to be just as falso as our old meanings for 'The sun rose'.

91285 Maybe Davidson's point is the same as my point that the relation determining truth is between things that are 'out there', i.e., the differences are 'in here' and so do not affect truth. The differences are in the means of objectification, and these differences don't count in determining truth. Different conceptual schemes are translatable as far as what they attribute to things as objective things. Where they do attribute different features to things as things, it is not that they are not translatable. Rather, they both cannot be true. The last point may not be Davidson's explicit. If not, it is my enhancement on Davidson.

912852 The identity theory of truth is independent of psychological explanations (mental entities, etc.) behind the use of language, and it is independent of ontological accounts of the entities corresponded to in front of language (events, substances, processes, etc.). Rorty has a confusion about this someplace.

5379 To understand what is meant by identity between a word-function and what a thing is in some way, or what a thing is at least in part, it is necessary to keep in mind that this is an epistemological doctrine with no direct ontological implications for what is known (as opposed to the knower and his knowledge, for epistemology is ontological). It is independent of substance-accident, thing-property, event-attribute ontologies. To impose such an ontological interpretation on it, to say things are so structured because they are so objectified, is to commit an epistemological fallacy.

Hence 'part' may or may not correspond to a part of the thing objectified really distinct from other parts. A thing may be objectified by a part. For example, in 'The box is oblong,' 'oblong' objectifies the box by an accident, shape. But what is thereby objectified is not just the shape. 'President of the USA' = set of relations with others, an accident. But 'color' objectifies 'redness' in part in a logical, not ontological, sense, by objectifying less explicitly and more vaguely.

825854 'The tenth planet has a moon' is false because there is no identity between terms of relation of objectification as more-than-terms-of-objectification. How about 'The tenth planet has no moon' where the predicate is negative? Could the negative predicate make it true? Not on Russell's analysis; for it is just like 'The present king of France is bald'. 'Bald' = 'has no hair'. 'There is an x such that x is the king of France now and is bald' is false.

What constitutes the truth of 'Sherlock was not a married man'? Identity between what is objectified two ways and the stories about Holmes. 'Was not married' = true because of lack of identity in the stories.

no date Extrinsic characterizing causality. Actual existence is the characterizing cause of the truth (not the meaning) of existence assertions. Intentional existence is the characterizing cause of the meaning of existence assertions. Intentional existence need not be there in the first case, since truth is there whether or not truth is known; actual existence need not be known for the sentence to be true.

1985           When I know that this rod is four times the length of that, I know something about what each rod is; there is identity between what I say of the rod and what it is. Thus, even if relations like 'four times longer than' are cognition-dependent, they allow us to objectify what something is. So if the relativist is right that we objectify by means of culturally conditioned logical constructs, he is not right in concluding that we don't therefore know what things are. These constructs are so constructed as to terminate in what things are so that what things are determines, measures, their truth. And they make us know what the things that terminate them are. That is, I know the length of A as terminating the relation four-times-longer-than-B. Length is not a logical construct; it is something of what A is.

no date Cognition-dependent objects. How do they objectify that which they are 'founded' on? How do cognition-dependent relations do this? We cannot be acquainted with such a relation without also being acquainted with whatever extra-objective nature the nature of the relation requires as its term.

no date The word-function of the relation must require that it be terminated by what A, not B, is; and to know the word-function must require that it be terminated by A, not B. We cannot be acquainted with such a relation without also being acquainted with whatever extra-objective value the nature of the relation requires as its term. (Acquaintance with word-function together with our knowledge of what thing is)

no date Whose truth is determined by what things are and knowledge of (acquaintance with) what things are.

51884       Assume equality in length (as opposed to length itself) is a cognition-dependent object. Then 'equal to twice the length of bar A' is a predicate that objectifies what the length of B is. Then the truth of this predicate is based on word-functions identical with what things are, for example, 'the length of bar A' or 'something that can be placed next to bar A two times'.

22086 If we can objectify things by relations that are cognition-dependent objects, logical constructs, why can't the word-functions of all predicates be logical constructs? First, logical constructs are not the same as logical relations. Logical relations pertain to objects as objects. Relations that are cognition-dependent need not pertain to things as objects. That is, at least one term of the relation need not be an object or means of objectification objectified as such. For example, longer-than.

Second, these cognition-dependent relations can be truthfully attributed if and only if their preeication is determined by what things are, i.e., the relation is such that its holding or not holding is caused by things being what they are. And our knowledge of the truth is caused by knowledge of what things are, knowledge other than the fact that this relation holds. For example, objectifying events as taking place in a space time continuum is objectifying them by a cognition-dependent relation. The relation terminates in the four spatial-temporal coordinates of an event. These coordinates constitute the 'what things are' that determines whether the requirements of the cognition-dependent relation are satisfied.

92851 Rorty thinks that the evidence against referring is also evidence against the correspondence theory of truth (p. 293)--or is it vice versa? No matter. His attack on the correspondence theory assumes correspondence is a relation between things and representations, not between things and that which is represented. (But the confusion between correspondence and referring might be the tie-in needed to bring an analysis of truth into the article on signs and following rules.)

Causal Realism does not offer a theory of reference, it offers a theory of truth. If a statement is true, maybe it also refers; that is a secondary point. So it is also a secondary point whether a false statement refers. no date My theory of truth, although referring to names and descriptions, does not commit one to a theory of them (for example, Kripke's theory or Russell's, Mill's, Searle's, etc.) My theory of truth works either on the view that names have sense in addition to reference or do not have sense, on the view that the meaning of a name is a definite description or set of them or is not a definite description or set of them.

Kripke's discussion is a good example of how the absence of causal concepts prevents us from seeing the truth and forces us to construct substitutes for the truth.

825854 Why is there a problem about names needing an existent? The meaning of a predicate is what it says about what something is. But what is the 'meaning' of a name? Voila the problem. It is ironic that people who have so little to do with 'meaning' in the case of descriptions would have such a motive for the problem of names.

But what does the name of a non-existent 'refer to'? What? 'Refer to'. I didn't say anything about referring, I just talked about that which is named. 'But if that which is named doesn't exist, what does it refer to?' By the dictionary definition of naming, it refers to that which is named. 'Referring' just means 'naming' in the case of names. 'But what I mean by referring is having an existent terminating the relation of naming.' If so, I deny that names need to refer. The 'meaning' is just the individual objectified in a way that does not say what it is.

57831 A name objectifies an individual without describing or characterizing it. Then how does the name accomplish this? The name becomes associated with the individual by some causal process. So where is the problem? 'Red', 'democratic', 'carcinogenic' all get their meanings by some associative process. To objectify, must the term of the relation of objectification be a real existent? Once having words for universals, I can construct a definite description that objectifies an individual by characterizing it (as opposed to naming it). But how do the words in the description get their meaning, i.e., why is there a problem about names and not about predicates.

And is there any more problem about naming Gandalf than about imagining him, i.e., if imagining him does not require him to exist, why should naming him?

no date What does 'cat' refer to? 'Blue'? Predicates don't refer, only names? Why? Only names have referents? Why? Because to refer, a word must be used for real existents and only names are be used for real existents. (More the thing's a word is used for must not just happen to exist; the use must some how drag the existence along with it.) But in order to refer, why must words be used for real existents? Is it because reference, like perception, is defined as terminating in real existence? If so, why must names satisfy this definition, unless we also define names this way. And if we do so define 'names', why not just define individual designators, 'Ronald Regan', 'Gandalf', some other way?

no date What is that which is referred to by general terms? General terms don't refer because only individuals exist? But this merely defines 'reference' to terminate in a real existent. And if so defined, why must names 'refer'? Something must terminate the relation of used-for, but then what are general terms used for, what terminates that relation?

112684 'Joe' is said to do something 'blue' does not. "Joe' refers or has reference. But what is the difference? Both are used meaningfully, and both are distinct from their meanings. 'Joe' refers because it relates to an existing object. If that is the definition of 'refers', then we can still ask why 'Joe' must relate to an existing object if 'blue' need not. 'But how could "Joe" signify if it had not object"? How does 'blue' signify? Will 'blue' signify by meaning but not naming? Why? Because names have existing objects? Why? Because names refer? But why doesn't 'blue' refer?

10285 'Fixing the reference'. Does 'reference' mean a word is somehow linked to a real existent the way knowledge (as opposed to belief) that something really exists is linked to real existence? Linked so that the answer to the question 'What does it refer to?' must be some real existent? (Attached to?)

51686 Names are supposed to have a property predicates don't, a property called 'referring', 'designating'. This property comes from or consists in a difference in that which terminates these relations, not in anything on the side of us; our cognition is independent of that which terminates these relations.

4986 If existence is relevant to names at all, it can only be our belief in existence, not actual existence. To name something, I need only believe it exists, e.g., baptizing a dummy which I think is a baby. Likewise, see Deely's 'Reference to the Non-existent' article. It quotes someone (Guido Kung?) to the effect that Russell's theory of descriptions only shows us how to express what someone believes is true about what exists.

81585 'Scott is the author of Waverly'. 'Author of Waverly' conveys information other than the linguistic information that something is objectified by the language-form 'author of Waverly'. 'Scott' does not convey information other than linguistic information about objectification. 'Author of Waverly' objectifies a thing by means of a word-function logically distinguishable from the thing. The thing is more than the author of Waverly. The same is true of everything we objectify; it is more than the word-function by which we objectify it.

But 'Scott' does not have a word-function logically distinguishable from that which it objectifies. The fact of being so objectified is logically distinguishable from other things. But 'Scott' does not objectify by such a distinguishable word-function. More, 'Scott does not objectify by means of a word-function that...'.  
312851

Description, 'the only pink elephant', name, 'Imre'. The word-function of 'Imre' is the individual here described by 'the only pink elephant'. But the word-function of the name is not the word-function of 'first pink elephant'. The name does not tell us what the objectified is outside of the fact that it is so objectified; the description communicates what it is. Does the name at least communicate that it is an individual? Yes, but an individual is a logical entity, not a real existent but a cognition-dependent object. 'The smallest prime number' may be a logical entity, but naming it '2' tell us nothing of what it is other than what it has in common with all objectifiable objects, namely, that it is an individual, a property independent of whether it really exists or is only cognition-dependent.

312851 Is the word-function of 'Scott' the same as that of 'the author of Waverly'? No. The word-function of 'author of Waverly' is what it is to be an individual that wrote Waverly. The word-function of 'Scott' is that and more. The word-function of 'Scott' is also the individual that wrote Ivanhoe. What it is to be the author of Waverly is not what it is to be the author of Ivanhoe. In each case, it is to be an individual with a certain characteristic. That is the word-function of these descriptions, a definite individual with a certain characteristic.

The word-function of 'Scott' is an individual, but not an individual with any of these characteristics. Yes, we have to objectify Scott in some other way, e.g., by description, in order to name him. But once otherwise objectified, we can name an individual. And by hypothesis, the word-function of the name is an individual capable of many descriptions, and not necessarily this one, while the word-function of the description is that of having this characteristic. The description fixes the reference by giving the individual an intentional existence. But once existing intentionally, the name does not mean the description.



12385 Once I construct a cognition-dependent-object by description, I can fix the reference of the name in more than one way, for example, 'the time traveller', 'the cognition-dependent object I created a moment ago', 'the cognition dependent object I created while wearing a blue shirt', 'the cognition-dependent object I created with the description "time traveller".'

12385 'A time traveller from 2045 living in 1985' = a description. I name him 'Joe Smith'. Even if I say the name and description have the same word-function, it does not follow that they objectify the word-function in the same way. The way the objectify may differ by logical relations.

The way a description obejctifies depends on the language-forms or component language-forms being useful in other contexts; this is essential to descriptions. In particular, it depends on using component words with universal word-functions, combining words some of whose word-functions are unviersal. They specify the individual by means of intersecting universals or precisely as instances of an objectified universal, rather than as individuals, without reference to an objectified universal. Individuality is always opposed to universality. But to say a name objectifies an individual as such means it objectifies without reference to this objectified universal or that objectified universal, but with reference to some universal, i.e., a name objectifies it as an individual of some kind (for what is individual re X may be general re Y, i.e., may be a collection re Y). Maybe a distinction between a unviersal and a collection is pertinent to the problem of names versus descriptions.

1885 What does the name of a fiction objectify? Something objectified in some other way, for example, by description. Does that make the description the meaning of the name? No, naming is precisely a different way of objectifying what is also objectified as described. But what is that which is objectified? An object! But how can we objectify a non-existent? By describing it and then naming it. We objectify it by objectifying it. Naming comes second, but naming does objectify that which is named. Naming is a way of objectifying, i.e., a way of making something an object, of objectifying a cognition-dependent object. The important thing is not that the named exist but that it already be objectified in some other way.

1985            Whatever is named must have some status other than being named, the status, not of existing, but of being objectified in some other way, for example, as described. But to say that the named (in fiction) must have the status of being described does not imply that the description is the meaning of the name. Do not equate 'the named must have some other status' with 'the other status is the meaning, the word-function, of the name'.

The word-function of the name is what the name objectifies, the cognition-dependent individual that the name objectifies. That individual is also objectified in some other way, is also that for which a description is used. But the description is not the word-function of the name, nor is the word-function of the description the word-function of the name. Why not? It seems the word-function of the name and of the description are logically distinct only in that the name objectifies it in a logically distinct way?

There is also the consideration that the description works only because it is made up of terms that have word-functions not identical with the word-function of the name. Is the individual the word-function of the description or that which is objectified by the word-function? The fictional individual has no status other than the way we use certain words or that which is objectified by using words in certain ways. Either way, 'having no status other than...' does not make that status the word-function of the name.

82586          Since a name does not say anything about what the named is, there is always more than a logical distinction between the word-function of the name and any description of the named; hence no description is logically necessary. For while a description may use universals that are only logically distinct from the described ('the man who...'), the description must be individuated by referring to some individual really distinct from the described ('the man who was born in Detroit on 82586'). Otherwise, the description, if such were even possible, would describe the individual by itself.

Why is such a description not possible? The description must either combine other universals (which will not work since an individual cannot be reached just by intersecting universals) or combine a universal description with some individuating conditions. Individuating conditions come from an individual we treat as a repeatable universal, i.e., the axes of a coordinate system.

The real reason such a description is not possible is that the only way to objectify an individual linguistically otherwise than by intersecting universals or references to other individuals is by including a name for the individual in the description. In other words, then there would be logical necessity linking the named and the described. No one denies that. But short of including a name for the individual in the description of the individual, the description must make reference to something really distinct from the individual. Hence there will be no logical necessity linking the named and the described.

1285 Names need not refer to individual things, only to individual objects, i.e., to something objectified in some other way than as named, e.g., as described, imagined, remembered, perceived. It does not follow that names have the same function as these other modes of objectification; the opposite follows. Naming is another way of objectifying what has been objectified otherwise than by naming. Yes, the reference of the name is fixed to another object. But it is fixed to the object, not to another means of objectification.

Specifically, names objectify an individual not as described but as eligible to be described, eligible to be the subject of predication--not as a substance or as a featureless entity. The other way of objectifying something as eligible for predication is 'There is something...'. But this other means of objectification does not objectify an individual as such. It objectifies an individual as one of a potential many, not as this unique one. That is why we say 'Joe Smith exists', not 'There is Joe Smith'. Everything accomplished by 'There is' is accomplished by 'Joe Smith' and more. 'Joe Smith objectifies in a way that renders 'There is' pointless. So Frege was wrong.

825851 Paradoxically, Kripke's theory of fixing the reference can be extended to non-existents. If 'naming an individual' is a matter of human behavior, then the existence of the individual is extraneous to naming. My behavior remains the same whether or not that which I name exists?

But what is 'that which I name'? Not something that necessarily exists, but something I have objectified some other way than by naming, e.g., 'the first pink elephant', 'the largest space station'. This, too, is a matter of behavior.

Then is the description the meaning of the name? No, the connection is historical and causal. The meaning may just as well be 'the non-existent individual I thought of last night' or 'the non-existent individual I thought of while riding the train' or 'the fourth non-existent I thought of last night'. The name objectifies the same individual I have described, but the function of naming is to objectify without saying anything about what it is (so the word-function of the name does not terminate any logical relations that could ground necessity or at least the apprehension of self-evident necessity). Descriptions say something about what it is, where its relation to other things is included in the idea of 'what it is'. In writing a story, I could change the description and keep the name.

I need causal entities to explain this behavior. But the explanation is not justification in the sense that the causal entities constitute the evidence on the basis of which I judge the truth. Evidence always consists of that which is conceived, sensed, referred to, meant, as opposed to the concept, the sensing, the act of referring, etc. Still, the entities have to be such as to make possible our access to the evidence we do in fact have.

'Joe' may say something about what Joe is, for example, 'Joe' may be a masculine grammatical form indicating that the named is a man. This is part of the history of the name, not part of the 'meaning' of the name. But why can't names sometimes have that sort of meaning? All we have to say is that the theory that what is named must be previously objectified does not necessitate that the previous objectification be the word-function of the name.

'Gandalf has a disease'--but what disease? It must be one of the set of diseases. No, the author could decide later to invent a new disease, or decide to later invent a new disease. We usually know that a real person has a disease before knowing what disease, and maybe the real person has a new disease that just came into existence.

112384 Russell: The question whether mental or intentional existence is required by my believing the present king of France is bald is not whether the assertion of the king's existnece is logically entailed, or quantifying over this individual is logically entailed, by 'referring' to him. The question is whether the causal analysis of my state of believing this or referring or whatever requires such existence as a causal factor. The answer is yes.

'I imagine that there is something which is a hydra' does not logically imply 'There is something which is a hydra'. The question is whether the causal analysis of imagining implies the hydra exists in some sense.

Intentional existence does not explain how I imagine X or refer to X; it explains how I imagine X or refer to X, how one relation terminates in this and another in that. Because the relation is an existence for this or that.