

Wittgenstein as a Gateway to Analytical Thomism

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The issues of the real existence of the objects of knowledge and their alleged intentional existence in knowledge may hardly seem as crucial in Wittgenstein as they are in Aquinas and his tradition. Perhaps that is why analytic philosophy has mainly overlooked aspects of Wittgenstein that are important for helping to solve some of analytic philosophy's long standing problems. Thomists are in a position to recognize those dimensions of Wittgenstein and, therefore, use them to illuminate those problems.

Questions concerning the real existence of objects of knowledge arise at two levels, the level of "intellectual knowledge," the knowledge expressed in language, and the level of sense perception. By "knowledge" I mean awareness in general, not just warranted certitude of truth. "Really existing" is meant in opposition to an object's merely being imagined or conceived.

Wittgenstein's private language argument is intimately connected to the issue of real existence's status as an object of intellectual knowledge, although that connection has never before been pointed out, as far as I know. In fact, a very common version of Wittgenstein's private language argument supports Aquinas's view of being, that which exists, as the primary object of conception. And it supports that view in a way that corrects, in favor of Aquinas, a basic misunderstanding in analytic philosophy about the existential quantifier.

The question of the intentional existence of objects may seem even further removed from Wittgenstein. Yet he and Aquinas agree completely that interior mental relations to objects could accomplish what their proponents want only if those relations were literally existences for their objects.¹ In fact, Wittgenstein may be the only philosopher since Aristotle to arrive at that radical idea independently of interpreting Aristotle as holding it. (Phenomenology got the idea from Brentano, but Brentano got it from the Thomists.) Wittgenstein even provides a strong, though overlooked, defense of that idea. But where he defended it as a reductio ad absurdum of the ability of mental states to explain linguistic behavior, Thomists argue that its absurdity is only apparent.

I will use Wittgenstein to defend the Thomistic idea of intentional existence. Then I will show that Thomism can explain how sense perception makes real existence an intentional object in a way that solves the analysts' problem of perception. The examination of real existence as an intentional object will then show how to avoid analysts' problems concerning reference to the nonexistent.

Real Existents as What Are First Known

Aquinas holds that "that which the intellect first conceives, as the most knowable object, and that in which it resolves all conceptions is being"² (that which exists). This proclamation of intellectual, rather than perceptual, realism may seem far from Wittgenstein's problematic and that of analytic philosophy in general. In fact, the thesis that what the intellect first conceives is being follows from Wittgenstein's argument against private language and does so in a way that leads to a reevaluation, that analytic philosophy needs, of existential quantification.

Wittgenstein's private language argument has been variously interpreted, but we need not enter that dispute. What matters is that an argument commonly attributed to him is sound: A language that could not possibly be understood by anyone but the user would not be a language. If I now decide to use "water" for something knowable only by me, there can be no way for me to tell whether the next time I call something "water" I am using "water" in the same way. But a "language" for which there is no way of determining whether I am using the terms in different ways is not a language; it is at most a make-believe language. What is missing from it is the ability to distinguish correct from incorrect uses of words. To do that, I must have access to objects that allow me to check the relations of words to their uses independently of my present opinions concerning those relations. A person alone on an island could attach labels to things. Then she could write a diary using those labels and know she was using the words correctly by observing which labels were attached to which things. That would not be a private language in the required sense, because someone else finding those attached labels and the diary, together with

other possible public evidence, could reasonably conclude that those labels were linguistic and determine what their meanings were.

Whatever Wittgenstein's intentions, this argument is causal. Certain conditions are necessary for knowledge of the correct and incorrect uses of words, and private objects cannot supply those conditions. Wittgenstein's examples of private objects are often states of conscious subjects' awareness of themselves, for example, pain. But the argument applies equally to merely imagined objects, since the object I am imagining now is no more publicly accessible than is my state of pain. In fact, his argument applies with more force to imaginary objects than to pain, twinges, tickles and the like because the latter states often have specific public behavior associated with them, while imagining object X as opposed to object Y rarely, if ever, does. Hence, the argument most basically shows that language comes into being to communicate about really existing things, where "really existing" is opposed to merely being imagined or conceived. The real existence of objects is a causal condition necessary for the existence of language, because it is necessary for knowing correct usage independently of subjective feelings about usage. So language comes about first for the purpose of communicating about real existents. (Not that what is first said in language is necessarily the truth about real existents.) Introspectible states really exist also; so the real existence of objects is not a sufficient condition for language. The nature of the objects must be such that they are other than our mental states, so that, when they really exist, they can be publicly accessed. But objects of such a nature can be imagined, and when public objects are merely imagined, they are not publicly accessible. Therefore, language requires really existent public objects. The private language argument shows that language first comes about for the sake of communicating about things that exist independently of our mental states.

To judge that a use of language is correct usage, we need awareness that the standards by which we measure correctness are what they are independently of our mental states; otherwise, the correctness could be just an appearance caused by our mental states.

But an imaginary object provides no control by which to measure correctness in the use of language; for the fact that an imaginary object is what it is is not independent of our mental states. So Wittgenstein's argument supports Aquinas's view that conceptual awareness, and hence linguistically expressible awareness, has as its first -- and causally foundational -- goal communication about things that exist independently of our mental states.

Wittgenstein may have seen this point himself. In Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein discusses the kind of "surrounding" necessary for there to be games, rules, and language. He asks whether a new rule, yet to be applied, could even be understood to be a rule, if no rule had ever actually been applied. Then he adds:

And if it is now said: "And isn't it enough for there to be an imaginary application?" the answer is: No. (Possibility of a private language.)³

He immediately connects the insufficiency of an imaginary application of a rule with the need for language to have public objects, thereby implying that if imaginary, not really existing, applications were sufficient for understanding rules, language would not need public objects. The real existence he may seem to be talking about is the existence of rule-governed behavior, including language, not the existence of objects to which the rules relate the behavior. But for an alleged application of a rule to avoid being tantamount to a private language, the real existence both of the rule-governed behavior and of objects to which the rule relates the behavior is required. If we tried to use "water" correctly, and hence repeatedly, by performing the public acts of saying it or writing it down for merely imaginary objects, there would still be no such thing as knowing that we were following a rule correctly. No more could we know that we were now using "water" for the same imaginary object as in the past than we could know that we were using a word for a state of self-consciousness in the same way. Despite the nonimaginary character of the current act of writing "water," the imaginary character of the object for which are using "water" deprives us of any way of determining that we are using "water" as we have in the past. Where there can be no way of knowing that a putative rule has been applied correctly, there is no

such thing as a rule that can be applied correctly. So, for the rule-governed behavior of language to exist, public acts of using words would not be enough, as long as the putative rules attempt to connect those acts with merely imaginary objects. A necessary condition for public behavior to amount to applying a rule for the use of "water" correctly is that the objects for which we use "water" also be public, as opposed to being merely imaginary, and so those objects must be real existents.

Evaluating Existential Quantification

What is more revealing than whether Wittgenstein saw the consequence that public language requires real existents is that either he did not see that consequence or was not concerned about it if he did. If the status of existence as an object of knowledge had been as central an issue for him as it was for Aquinas, he would hardly have overlooked that implication of his argument.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein suggests a reason for his lack of concern about the epistemological status of existence. He there implies that existence is a logical value.

The "experience" which we need to understand logic is not that such and such is the case, but that something is; but that is no experience (5.552).

In implying that existence is a logical value, Wittgenstein was agreeing with what many have said after the success (at least in many contexts) of symbolizing existential propositions by representing predicates as functions whose arguments are quantified variables ($\exists x[Fx \ \& \ Gx]$). Many have interpreted that analysis to imply that the word "exists" is essentially logical; "exists" means that a concept has an application or a predicate has a referent.⁴ Russell, for example, explained the meaning of "exists" circularly, as deriving from the meaning of "true."⁵

For Aquinas, the lessons to be learned from the usefulness of quantificational notation would be almost the exact opposite. One cause of the usefulness of expressing predicates as functions of existentially quantified arguments is the truth, shown by the private language argument, of Aquinas's thesis that the primary goal of language is to "objectify" real

existents. Following Jacques Maritain's usage (which derives from Aquinas⁶) and contrary to the common usage of analysts, I will hereafter use "object" in contrast to existing (actually or possibly) thing. "Object" means object of awareness. To be an object is to be a term of a cognitive relation like sensing, imagining, conceiving, naming, describing, etc. To "objectify" is to make something a term of such a relation. Here we are concerned about linguistic objectification, making thing X the term of relations like naming X, using a pronoun for X, and describing X.

Knowledge of affirmative truth, for example, "Plato knew Aristotle," requires the diverse objectification, for example, objectification by means of "Plato" and by means of "knew Aristotle," of that which is not diverse as an existent thing or things. We can know that "Fa" is true since we are aware to begin with of an actual or possible thing made object by "a" and a thing made object by "F". Knowing the "correspondence" of propositions with reality does not result from directly comparing the mind with things, and in particular, not from comparing propositions with states of affairs or facts, but from comparing different objects already known not just as objects but as actual or possible things. And since a thing that was not objectified diversely could not be compared to itself, when we are aware of the identity of diverse objects, we are at least implicitly aware of our mental acts of objectification including the mental construct called a "proposition" through which we compare diverse objects. So awareness of the identity of diverse objects as things results in awareness of the proposition's, and so the mind's, correspondence with things, truth.

For judgment to be the awareness of the identity as things of what are diverse as objects "it is necessary that every object set before the mind be set there as something able to exist outside the mind."⁷ Because objects are diverse as objects, each object must be first of all known as identical with something that is not just an "object," not just related to a knower in these ways, but with an (actual or possible) cognition-independent thing potentially objectified in more than one way. (So the "is" of predication is not the "is" of identity. The identity with things that causes truth must hold before diversely objectified

things are compared in propositions.) In particular, what predicates first express must be objectified as features of possible existents:

Every predicate not only signifies such or such an intelligible determination, but that which has that intelligible determination. Intellectual simple apprehension, in perceiving what I call "triangular" or "conic," "musician" or "philosopher" perceives something (possible) which is made its object under the formal aspect in question.⁸

Since language is public, the first objects expressed by predicates had the logical property of being so objectified as to be eligible to be attributed to existents, before Frege invented a language that represented this property syntactically by making predicates functions whose arguments are existents objectified as such. Language cannot exist unless its first predicates serve the purpose of communicating about real existents, which requires that predicates have the logical property of being attributable to real existents in propositions. Unless predicates objectify, not only some intelligible determination, for example, what it is to be a philosopher or a musician, but also some possibly existing thing with such a determination, we could not know the identity of diverse objects as things. What it is to be a philosopher is not identifiable with what it is to be a musician; only a thing that is a philosopher can be identical with a thing that is a musician, or a thing with philosophical knowledge identical with a thing with musical skill.

What Aquinas means by reducing all conceptions (conceptual objects) to being is that "all other conceptions of the intellect are arrived at by addition to being."⁹ Being is logically included in all our primary concepts analogously to the ways the meaning of "color" is logically included in the meaning of "red" and the meaning of "body" is logically included in the meaning of "animal," which is logically included in the meaning of "man." (The meaning of "A" is logically included in that of "B" when the information conveyed by "A" is conveyed by "B," but "B" conveys more information than "A.") This property of predicates cannot be better represented than by the function/argument syntax for propositions: The primary predicates of language are functions of being and are known (objectified) as such. And that

is a cornerstone of Thomistic epistemology,

But in order for us to see that the function/argument syntactical form is a good model of the logical inclusion of being in all other predicates, we must recognize that the "something" in the existential quantification, "There is something such that it is a philosopher and a musician," is not just a logical or syntactical place holder. In the case of what language first comes into existence to communicate about, that "something" has to mean a real existent, for every predicate is objectified as a function of the argument, some existent thing, which is just another way of saying that being is logically included in every predicate. Lest Aquinas's intellectual realism be misunderstood, however, note that Cajetan was perfectly consistent with Aquinas when he added the clarification that what the intellect first knows is ens concretum quiditati sensibili: something (ens concretum) red (quiditati sensibili), something four-sided, something loud, etc.

Another crucial fact about human knowing, which Aquinas was the first to recognize, is also a cause of the usefulness of existential quantification: We first objectify existence in language, not the way we acquire predicates expressing what things are, but by making judgments using those predicates.¹⁰ Since existence is not among the objects that the senses are able to distinguish from one another or one of the unobservable things that science tells us underlie sensibly distinguishable objects, existence can only become an object of concept when we become aware that what is objectified other than as "an existent," for example, what is conceptually objectified as moving or oblong, or as a tree or a cloud, has the status of being more than merely objectified. When we become aware of that, we have the knowledge that our language expresses by "There is a cloud" or "A tree exists" or "Something is moving." That judgment is the way existence first becomes objectified in language is symbolized very well by quantification's separating of the existence assertor from predicates that are functions of variables and having the assertion of existence range over the values of those variables. (That being is first known does not mean that "exists" is the first predicate to enter language. Rather, the meanings of

whatever predicates are first must be objectified as belonging to possible existents. But we cannot recognize that fact about the primacy of being until we have acquired the concept of existence by means of judgment.)

By hypothesis, the value we are aware of, when we are aware that moving things or trees are more than terms of cognitive relations, does not consist in these things being related to cognition. So the meaning of "exists" is essentially relative to the meanings of terms like "tree" and "motion," not to the meaning of "objectified by 'tree' or by 'motion'"; otherwise, for X to exist would be equivalent to being a term of a cognitive relation, the relation of some "F"'s being predicable of it. To exist would amount to being an object of cognition. Rather, the meaning of "object of cognition" is, at bottom, relative to something that is more than what is expressed by "being object of cognition," namely, to real existence.

Still, for the meaning of "exists" to become an object of concept, we must be aware that what we are judging to exist has been objectified in language as "a tree," "something moving," etc. What we are judging to exist is something satisfying the meaning of "a tree" or "something moving" not the meaning of "what has been objectified by 'a tree' or by 'something moving'." But the fact that awareness of the object's status as object of knowledge accompanies the attribution of "exists" can make it appear that the meaning of "exists" is relative to the status of things as objectified by predicates. So just as the fact that "exists" objectifies something already objectified by other predicates is well symbolized by existential quantification, this fact can also explain the illusion that the value of "exists" is somehow second-order with respect to the predicates we attribute by means of it, the illusion that "exists" expresses a relation to the status of being objectified by another predicate.¹¹ (It can also explain the misleading plausibility of the assertive-redundancy theory of truth.¹²)

The apparent idealism of treating "exists" as a logical word might seem insignificant since none of the philosophers who hold that view intend to draw idealistic consequences from it. However, making existence logical prevents epistemology from doing its job of

evaluating what human knowledge achieves in its various phases. The objectification of what exists is the primary goal by which the success of declarative language is to be evaluated. Failing to recognize that the primary goal of language is to objectify things for which to exist is not to be an object of knowledge will lead to crucial misunderstandings and unsolvable problems.

A third reason for the usefulness of existential quantification, and the most important of all, is implicit in Thomistic principles. The real existence of our primary objects is the cause of the truth of attributions of predicates to those objects. (For this discussion, it is sufficient for a cause of X to be something other than X without which X does not exist.) Since language is public, the devices we use to communicate about objects that cannot really exist (cognition-constituted objects) derive from those first used for real existents. Hence, the language we use to communicate about cognition-constituted objects must be derived from language that comes into being for objects for which the causally most appropriate and perspicuous way to attribute predicates is by means of existence assertions. Even when we do not use an existence assertion to attribute predicates, existence is logically included in what we attribute. "Joe sees Ann" is true if and only if "Joe's seeing of Ann exists" is true, because our first predicates are objectified as possible ways of existing, and so actual existence causes the truth of their attribution.¹³ But it follows neither that using existential quantification for cognition-constituted objects attributes real existence to them nor that the existential quantifier has two different logical functions, so that different logical notations could distinguish these functions. Using quantification to attribute predicates to cognition-constituted objects amounts to logically simulating the assertion of real existence, where "simulate" means that the syntactical and logical relations between the signs for predicates, variables, and quantification are the same as they are for the signs by which we attribute real existence.¹⁴

So building the difference between real existence and its cognition-constituted simulation into the syntax of a language would be logically superfluous. What is built into

logical syntax is, to that extent, something that pertains to objects only as a result of being objects, and what we attribute in attributing real existence is the opposite of that.

Distinguishing real existence from its simulation takes place outside of logic and "semantically," by using adjectives like "extracognitional."

That truth requires the identity of the diversely objectified holds also for statements about cognition-constituted objects. For example, the same set of truth-values is objectified by " $p \vee q$ " and by " $\neg(\neg p \ \& \ \neg q)$ ". The same fictional character is objectified by "Gandalf" and by "wizard of the gray rank." Such objects can be diversely objectified because it is not the case that they are nothing more than the term of this relation or that relation of objectification. Knowing the identity of these objects as more than the term of this or that cognitive relation amounts to objectifying them as identical in a cognition-constituted model of real existence.¹⁵ That existence is "fictitious" as opposed to genuine, but not in the pejorative sense that it involves deception.

Because logical relations first come into apprehension as features of the objectification of real existents, and because all other language derives from language for public objects, the logical relations, as well as the laws based on them, we use in attributing predicates both to objects that are actual or possible real existents and to cognition-constituted objects will be the same at the epistemological level of our understanding of those objects and attributions. A multi-valued logic, for example, might have 3 truth values, T, F and M. Epistemologically, however, we cannot comprehend formulas and procedures in that system unless we know that a propositional variable is either assigned a T or not assigned a T, assigned an F or not assigned an F, assigned an M or not assigned an M. And since public objects are causally primary in language, we must be able to intelligibly explain the way we use language for nonreal objects by means of the language from which all other language is derived, language for real existents. But that places no limits on our creativity in using and developing language.

Wittgenstein has many objections against interior states of awareness being what either constitute or cause language's meaning. I have dealt with most of these objections elsewhere.¹⁶ But his most profound criticism, and the one of greatest importance for human knowledge, has probably received the least attention. Wittgenstein's point is so fundamental that we easily overlook it. But Thomists have not overlooked it.

In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein asks:

What makes an image of him into an image of him? Not its looking like him. The same question applies to the expression "I see him now vividly before me" as to the image.

What makes this utterance into an utterance about him? (p. 177)

"However like I make the picture to what it is supposed to represent, it can always be the picture of something else as well. But it is essential to the (mental) image that it is the image of this and of nothing else." (389)

For mental states to account for meaning and understanding, their nature must explain how they can be of one thing and not another. There is no use postulating the thought of, say, John unless the thought is of John and not of anybody else. This is so basic that we fail to see what the nature of thought would have to be for a thought to be of John.

I see someone pointing a gun and say "I expect a report". The shot is fired.--Well, that was what you expected; so did that report somehow already exist in your expectation? (442; my emphasis)

The normal response would be that the noise did not exist in our expectation. What was in our expectation was something else, perhaps an image of the noise. But the question is what makes that image an image of the noise. Wittgenstein continues:

Or is it just that there is some other kind of agreement between your expectation and what occurred; that that noise was not contained in your expectation and merely accidentally supervened when the expectation was being fulfilled?--But no, if the noise had not occurred, my expectation would not have been fulfilled; the noise fulfilled it; it was not an accompaniment of the fulfillment like a second guest accompanying the one

I expected. (442; see also 95, 195, 389, 428.)¹⁷

When we talk about, imagine, or expect something, we are not talking about, imagining, or expecting a substitute for the thing, for example, a picture "of" the thing; we are related to the thing itself. In fact, to be aware that a picture is a picture of a thing, is to be consciously related to the thing, as well as to the picture. But the "picturing" relation does not explain this consciousness; for different methods of projection can make the same picture represent different things. And if we have a built-in "natural" method of projection, how does nature accomplish the feat of establishing the relation between the projection and the projected? If all nature has to work with are entities distinct from the thing, namely, the pictures, nature does not work with the thing itself. Then how does nature make these distinct entities into pictures of things, things that nature has no contact with?

Wittgenstein does not deny that we can be truthfully described as meaning one thing and not another, but he denies that interior mental relations to objects constitute or cause our meaning one thing rather than another. For there is only one way that mental states could accomplish this, so that there would remain no question about the connection between a given mental state and a given thing: The thing itself must exist in the mental state; that is, the mental state must be an existence of this thing and not any other thing. If the existence of the mental state is not an existence of the thing, there will always remain an unbridgeable gap between the mental state and the thing the mental state supposedly explains our cognitive relation to; there will never be an answer to the question why what exists when the mental state exists relates us to this thing and not some other thing. In fact, even if the problem of how a natural method of projection relates to things can be solved, the underlying problem would remain: The result of that method of projection would be that we are aware of the thing itself, not just its picture; for that is what the method of projection is supposed to explain, our awareness that the picture is of that very thing. So our awareness would relate us to the thing itself, not just the picture; if it did not relate us to the thing as well as the picture, we could not know that the picture was of this thing.

Hence, the argument of 442 is meant to force the mentalist into an affirmative answer to the question "Did that report somehow already exist in your expectation?", because Wittgenstein thinks that would be a reductio ad absurdum of the mentalist's position:

If it weren't too absurd (my emphasis) we should say that the fact which we wish for must be present in our wish. For how could we wish just this to happen if just this isn't present in our wish? It is quite true to say: The mere shadow won't do; for it stops short before the object; and we want the wish to contain the object itself.--We want that the wish that Mr. Smith should come into this room should wish that just Mr. Smith, and no substitute, should do the coming, and no substitute for that, into my room, and no substitute for that.¹⁸

Compare this statement of Wittgenstein's to a passage of Poincaré's considered classic in the Thomistic tradition for expressing what knowledge consists in:

Beings that know . . . can receive in themselves that which belongs to the other precisely as it remains distinct in the other. ("We want the wish to contain the object itself . . . Mr. Smith, and no substitute . . .") Thus, beings that know are that which they are in themselves but are also able to become other than themselves.¹⁹

Anything that changes becomes other than itself in the sense of other than what it was before, and after the change what was formerly other is now what the thing is. But Poincaré held that the change from not being aware of X to being aware of it makes X itself exist in my awareness, and therefore in me, while X remains other than what I am and I remain other than X. I have acquired that which belongs to the other as a feature of what I am, and yet what I have acquired still remains other than what I am.

This is indeed a paradox, but there is an alternative to Wittgenstein's response to it. Just the year before Wittgenstein pointed out this consequence "too absurd" to be held, Maritain had said:

By an apparent scandal to the principle of identity, to know is to be in a certain way something other than what one is; it is to become a thing other than the self. . . . We

are forced, if we would conceive of knowledge without absurdity (my emphasis), to introduce the notion of a very special kind of existence . . . called esse intentionale, . . . which is opposed to esse naturae, i.e., to the being a thing possesses when it exists in its own nature. . . . We must needs, to avoid absurdity, distinguish two ways of having existence. . . . How does the thing known exist in the knower? The tree or the stone does not exist in the mind, according to its natural being. Another kind of existence must be admitted; an existence according to which the known will be in the knower and the knower will be the known, an . . . existence, whose office is not to posit a thing . . . for itself and as a subject, but, on the contrary, for another thing and as a relation. . . . Intentional being is there as a remedy for the imperfection essential to every created, knowing subject, to wit, the imperfection of possessing a limited natural being and of not being, of itself, everything else.²⁰

For X to be in our awareness, for our awareness to be of X, is for X to exist in our awareness, to exist, not for itself, but for us. What the object is, the features making up its actual or possible being, exists in us, and so we possess the being of the other within ourselves. But we do not possess it by the kind of existence we have prior to knowing, the existence making us just this thing having just these features and not the features of any other thing. With Maritain, I will call the latter existence entitative existence and the former intentional existence. Entitative existence is what we call "real" existence, when we contrast a real existent with something that is merely an object of imagination or conception. However, Maritain is saying that to be an object of consciousness is a real mode of existence, where "real" is in contrast to what is apparent or fictitious but not genuine. Intentional existence is a secondary and diminished sense of "existence," but it is a genuine mode of existence, since the relation of awareness of an object could not be what it is were awareness not an existence for the object. Although being an object of awareness is a genuine mode of existence for the object, that genuineness does not make it the real existence that is a state of being more than an object of awareness, and that state is the

primary and undiluted sense of "existence." (Hereafter, I will resume using "real existence" only for that existence which is other than being an object of awareness, entitative existence.)

Not only had the position too absurd to be held already been held, but Wittgenstein could not have come closer to adopting Maritain's position. He and Maritain agreed that, for interior mental states to explain the behavior we describe by predicates like "imagining," "expecting," and "making utterances about," those states would have to make objects of awareness exist within them. He and Maritain also agreed that this would be absurd in the ordinary sense of "exist." We can express their agreement in terms of the distinction between psychological and ontological intentionality. Psychological intentionality is the property, belonging to at least some mental states, of being directed toward objects; ontological intentionality is the (alleged) fact that for mental states to be directed toward objects is for the objects to have an existence within the mental states. Wittgenstein's argument shows that psychological intentionality requires the ontological. Only the very existence of X within consciousness can make the consciousness be of X, directed toward X, rather than of anything else.

Some have argued that intentional existence is superfluous for the explanation of mental states, because those states are directed toward the existence (past, present, future, or possible) of things outside of our mental states, not inside of them. Assume someone objected to the intentional existence analysis of expecting the sound of a gun shot by noting that the intentionally existing gun shot is supposed to be immanent to our mental state of expectation, but our expectation of a gun shot (psychological intentionality) is directed at a gun shot outside of our mental state. Likewise, Diogenes was looking for an honest man existing outside of his thoughts, not inside of them.²¹ This objection constitutes an ignoratio elenchi of the reason for analyzing conscious states as modes of existence for their objects, an ignorance that Wittgenstein and Maritain were not guilty of. If the conscious state of desiring to find an honest man is an existence within us of what it is to be an honest man,

then, by hypothesis, this state is not a desire to find an honest man existing within us. For it is not a desire of itself, and it would be a desire for itself if it were both the intentional existence of the object and a desire for the intentional existence of the object. When we explain a conscious relation to an object as a mode of existence for the object, we know to begin with that the conscious state is a relation to the object's entitative, extracognitional existence. Postulating the new mode of existence is not meant to provide the existence that the conscious state is a relation to; it is meant to express the nature of the conscious state, the nature of the conscious relation to entitative existence. Intentional existence is a relation to (actual or possible) entitative existence and is conceived as such when it is postulated.

The reason for holding that a conscious relation to an object is another mode of existence for the object is not precisely to account for the fact that the conscious state is a relation to entitative existence. The reason is to account for the fact that a conscious state is a relation to the entitative existence of this object not some other.²² The intentional presence of the noise of a gun shot, for instance, explains why our expectation of something existing outside of our expectation is an expectation of that kind of noise and not of something else. In Thomistic terminology, a mental state's being a mode of existence for its object explains the specification of the state by this object as opposed to any other.²³ Intentional existence is a causal explanation in the order of formal causality, the order of the characteristics that distinguish what the consciousness of A is from what the consciousness of B is. (What A is is a cause since it is not identical with what the consciousness of A is but is something without which the consciousness of A would not be what it is.) But this formal cause, what A is, is not a characteristic of what the knower is in the knower's entitative existence; what A is is a formal cause extrinsic to the knower's entitative being; it does not cause the knower to be what the knower is in entitative existence. However, what A is could not be a cause at all if it did not cause some mode of existence for the knower, since causes cause existence (either directly or by supplying some necessary condition for existence).

Therefore, the object can be a cause only by causing the knower to have characteristics that exist otherwise than by entitative existence. And since the characteristics that the object causes the knower to have are what the object is, the object has an existence in the knower other than its entitative existence. Wittgenstein did not express his argument in terms of causality, but that is what is at issue.

Anything short of an expectation's relation to a gun shot existing outside of it being a genuine existence of a gun shot within it cannot explain that relation. Psychological intentionality, rather than making ontological intentionality superfluous, makes it necessary. Those swayed by the argument that ontological intentionality is superfluous do not understand medieval philosophy's reason for positing intentional existence as well as Wittgenstein did, even though Wittgenstein was innocent of any familiarity with medieval philosophy.

But where Wittgenstein thought that the idea led to a reductio ad absurdum of the mentalist, Aquinas and his tradition saw the need to posit a mode of existence distinct from, but entirely relative to, existence in the ordinary sense; for the absurdity does not follow unless there is only one status that constitutes a genuine existence for things. Which view is correct? I will try to show that consciousness is an existence for its objects without using technical Thomistic terminology. This will introduce a discussion of the analysts' traditional problems of sense perception and reference to the nonexistent.

What Intentional Existence Is

Consciousness is a relation-to a term or terms. We can draw a contrast between relations and other characteristics in the following way. A relation, for example, your height's being equal to mine, can cease to exist as a result of a change in my height with no corresponding change in yours. In fact, your life could have been the same whether or not your were equal to me in height. When the object of your consciousness changes, however, you change. For example, when you see a figure passing by your window, you are different from what you were when you were not seeing it. Your visual experience of the moving

figure is one of the features belonging to what you are the way your height belongs but your height's being equal to the height of that figure does not. If the figure grew in height while you were not looking, your height would cease being equal to its, but that relation would cease because of a change happening to what it is, not to what you are. But if the other thing passed out of sight, your visual experience of it would also cease, and the cessation of your visual experience of it would be a change occurring in you. Or if the other thing grew in height relative to other things in your visual field, your visual experience would change from being an experience of one set of relative heights to another, and that change would be a change occurring to you even if your own height did not change.

Your visual experience is part of what you are, if anything is, and the object of a visual experience is one of the things making the visual experience what it is. A visual experience of a moving, four-sided object is something other than a visual experience of a stationary, three-sided object. If you were having a visual experience of a mountain instead of a piece of paper, one of the features making you what you are would be different from what it is, and so you would be different from what you are in that respect. Any description of you that would leave out what the objects of your consciousness are would be an incomplete description of what you are. Being someone thinking about supernovas is different from being someone thinking about cancer. To explain what beings with consciousness are, we have to find a way of getting what they are not (what the objects of their consciousness are) into what they are.

The features constituting what the objects of your consciousness are are features characterizing what your consciousness is and, therefore, characterizing what you are. Your consciousness exists within you; hence the features constituting the objects of your consciousness exist within you as features characterizing what you are. They are features that exist within you because they are features of what exists within you when your consciousness of them exists. If they were not features of that consciousness, that consciousness would not be of them.

But when you see a moving figure, the features making the figure what it is do not exist within you the way they exist in it. For example, in it, they have an existence that remains even no one is having a visual experience of them; they do not have that kind of existence in your visual experience. The shape existing in your visual field may be tall and thin relative to other shapes in the environment; your physical shape may be short and fat relative to those other shapes. The figure existing in your visual field may be in motion relative to the environment; your body may be at rest. The way the features making the object what it is exist in it is by entitative existence; the way they exist within you when you see them is not by entitative existence. We call this other way of existing intentional existence. When you are not seeing a moving, round figure of a certain size, those features may still exist for the thing that is moving, round and of that size. When you are seeing it, those features also exist for you. Their existence for the thing itself is entitative existence; their existence for you is intentional existence. (When you are not seeing the shape of your thumb, that shape still exists "for you" in the same way that the shape of a tree exists for the tree when you are not seeing the tree. When you see the shape of your thumb, that shape exists "for you" in a different way, the same way the shape of the tree exists for you when you are seeing it.)

The Problem of Perception

In addition, seeing a moving, round figure, as opposed to imagining it, makes you directly (noninferentially) aware of it as an actual entitative existent; for you are aware of something as really existing in the same experience that makes you aware of it as moving and round. Therefore, the actual entitative existing of your visual object is present within your consciousness by a different mode of existence, different from the mode that it is itself. When you see an object, as opposed to imagining it, the entitative existing of the visual object is something existing within you intentionally, because your awareness of that existence exists within you, and what you are aware of is a characteristic of what your awareness is. I will explain how sensing makes us aware of real existence while imagining

does not. A position called "the causal theory of perception" is familiar to analysts.²⁴ But Thomists have a different causal theory of perception that can show the analysts' problem of whether we perceive sense data or physical things to be a false dichotomy.²⁵

Compare seeing a red surface to imagining one. In both cases we are aware of red as a feature of a surface, but in sensation I am aware of the red surface as an element in an environment that is now acting on my sense faculties. For sensing and imagining a red surface to be distinguished in my consciousness, I must sense the red surface as an element in a causally active environment; so I must sense the environment including the red surface as actually acting on me. I must sense the action of the environment in its nature as action. And if I sense that environment as acting on me, I am aware of it as acting on me in a red manner, rather than a brown or green manner, to the extent that the environment's action makes me aware of red rather than brown or green.

So in sensing the action of an environment containing a red surface as action, I am aware of red as a manner in which the environment is acting on me at the same time that I am aware of red as a feature of a red surface. And these are not two different awarensses of what red is; they are the same awareness. If they were not the same awareness, either it would not be true that both imagination and sensation make me aware of red as a feature of a red surface or it would not be true that I distinguish sensing from imagining a red surface by sensing's making me aware of the action of the environment as action. For when I am aware of the action of an environment containing a red surface as action, I am aware of the environment as acting on me in a red manner.

Awareness of action as action is awareness of it as something coming from a source, an agent; so awareness of the existence of action as action is noninferential awareness of the existence of the agent insofar as it is an agent. Awareness of red as the way a surface acts on us makes us directly, noninferentially aware of the existence of the surface as an agent; so awareness of red as the way the surface acts on us is the same as awareness of red as the way the surface presents its existence to the senses.

We can be aware of a red surface, not just as a surface, but as an agent only by being aware of red as the manner in which the surface is acting on the senses; for whatever action is, a thing is constituted an agent by its action. That is, to be acting is what it is for a thing to be an agent; without action, it is not an agent. Since a thing is constituted an agent by its action, we are aware of a red surface as an agent by being aware of red as something belonging to an agent that constitutes it an agent, namely, its manner of acting.

Awareness of action as action is awareness of it as coming from a source, and hence as presenting the source. But that source *is* not just an unspecified agent; it is an agent having such and such a causal disposition as a feature, the disposition to act in this manner in these circumstances. And the source is not *presented as* just an unspecified agent; it is presented as having such and such a causal disposition as a feature. For whatever else action is, it is a communication between things by means of features that dispose them to act in this way or that. So to be aware of an agent as acting in this way or that is to be aware of it as having the disposition to act in this way or that. When the existence of an agent is present in consciousness as the existence of an agent, it is present as the existence of something with a causal disposition by which it presents itself in this manner. For just as we are aware of action as that which constitutes something a cause, we are aware of action as that which constitutes a causal disposition's being a causal disposition.

So just as we sense red, a surface's manner of acting, as something belonging to a surface insofar as the surface is an agent, since action is what constitutes it an agent, we sense red as belonging to the causal disposition by which the surface becomes an agent, since a thing acts in this way and not that by being disposed to act this way. And since the awareness is of red as a manner in which an agent acts and so as a feature belonging to an agent insofar as it is an agent, it is at the same time awareness of red as a manner in which the agent, a surface, is disposed to act and so as a feature belonging to the surface insofar as it is disposed to act, as a feature characterizing the surface insofar as what the surface is includes a disposition to act in this manner.

This is what sensing red as a feature of the red surface amounts to. Sensing red as an agent's way of acting is sensing red as a feature of the agent only because it is sensing red as the way that an agent presents its existence, and that of the disposition through which it acts, to the senses, since a thing acts through features that dispose it to act in this way or that. When a surface looks red in our vision, the environment is acting on us by reflecting light of a certain wave length; so in experiencing the reflection of light in its nature as action, we become noninferentially aware of an agent with a causal disposition to reflect light in this way in these circumstances. The senses do not lie. Seeing a surface that looks red, that acts on us in a red manner, is seeing the surface as having the disposition by which the surface, in these circumstances, reflects light of that wave length. And seeing that surface when it looks orange, when it acts on us in an orange manner, is seeing the surface as having the same disposition; for the feature or features by which the surface was disposed, in the original circumstances, to reflect light of red's wave length is the same feature by which the surface is disposed, in these different circumstances, to reflect light of orange's wave length.

That when something looks red the environment acts on the senses in a "red manner" does not mean that the environment acts on the sense organs the way a red light acts on a thing it illuminates. If acting in a red manner meant that, it would mean that the environment causes our eyes to look red to other eyes by reflecting red light in turn; acting on us in a red manner would refer to the environment's causing our eyes themselves to physically look red. Rather, phrases like "looking red" and "appearing red" refer to the way the environment's reflection of light exists intentionally in sensory consciousness as a result of the way the environment acts physically on the sensory organs. The environment can act on sensory consciousness only through acting physically on sense organs; so the action of the environment can exist intentionally in sensory consciousness only by the environment's acting physically on sense organs.

Is red, then, merely a phenomenal object having only an intentional existence? And if

so, are the senses lying when they present red as if it were a feature belonging to a surface in the surface's extracognitional existence? As is the case with most philosophical questions, the answer to these must be yes and no. If the shade of red I am now seeing is an entitative feature of the surface, then an infinite number of distinct shades of red can exist entitatively in the same place at the same time, since different people can see different shades at the same time, depending on lighting, distance, angle, shadows, etc. (not just on the subjective conditions of our organs). But if, when red exists intentionally in vision, we are aware of it as a manner in which a surface is now acting on the senses (is now reflecting light to the eyes), we are noninferentially aware of red's belonging to the surface as the way the surface is making its entitative existence, and the entitative existence of its disposition to act in this manner, present to the senses, and so a way that the surface's entitative existence and that of this disposition exist intentionally in vision. And that was the issue: how can the extracognitional existence of a surface exist intentionally in vision?

Since it does, the senses are not lying about the entitative existence of the surface's action, of the surface's disposition to so act and of the surface itself as the agent of the action, when the senses make us aware of red as the manner in which the surface is acting on the senses in these circumstances. The reason is that the surface's "looking red" is identical with sight's awareness of red as the action of an agent insofar as it is an entitatively existing agent disposed (whose features include the disposition) to act in this manner in these circumstances (and in an orange manner in others). So speaking carefully, but justifiably, we can say that red is something belonging to the surface as opposed to merely being a phenomenal object belonging to the act of sight. For the disposition to act "redly," which is what "looking red" means, in this circumstance (and act "orangely" in other circumstances) is something belonging entitatively to the agent as agent, and that disposition is what sight is made aware of when we are aware of a surface acting on us in a red manner; for we are aware of what the surface is, not just as a surface, but as having a causal disposition to present its existence to the senses in a red manner (to reflect light in

this manner). When I am seeing a red surface, I am being communicated to (acted on) by an agent that is, in effect, saying (directly saying, not asking us to infer) "I am an entitative existent that has a causal disposition (extension in two dimensions, opaqueness, sufficient size to be seen, etc.) to present my existence to you in the manner in which you are seeing me present it in these circumstances; what you are seeing is my presentation of my entitative existence, and therefore my existence as possessing the disposition to do so, to your sense of sight." The senses do not lie when they present red as a feature of a surface, since that amounts to presenting red as the way the surface is acting on us and so amounts to presenting the surface as something with the characteristic of being disposed to act in this way in these circumstances.

We could define "sense data" as the action of the environment known as action. To be aware of action as action is to be noninferentially aware of the real existence of the environment acting on us. And it is to be noninferentially aware of the environment as something existing independently of the sense organ, since the organ is receiving, not causing, the action. But this is not awareness of the existence of the environment as a cause hidden behind the action. Awareness of being acted on in a red manner as the action of an agent is the same as awareness of the real existence of an agent as acting on us in a red manner, and so the same as awareness of the existence of the agent as having a disposition to act in this manner. In being aware of the environment's action as the action of an environment containing a red surface, I am aware of the real existence of the environment as containing something extended in two dimensions that is acting on me in a red manner. In imagination, however, we are aware of a red surface as having a feature by which it is capable of acting in a red manner (by which it could act on the senses in a red manner if seen) but not as a feature by which the environment is now acting on us. So imagination does not make us aware of a red surface as an actual entitative existent.

Sensing as opposed to imagining makes us directly aware of actually existing unities of distinct features like color, extension, shape, motion, rest and number. For example, vision

can make us aware of three really existing, moving, round figures each occupying a different amount of space in our visual field. So sensing makes us directly, noninferentially, aware of existing physical things. Color is not the same as extension, shape, motion, rest and number, but the experience of color (or tactile resistance) makes us directly aware of things in which those features are united. We cannot be more directly aware of extension, shape, motion, rest and number than we are in visual experience; yet they are made present to us through the experience of something other than themselves, color (or tactile resistance; and hearing, smelling and tasting can make us aware of number, as well as of auditory, olfactory and gustatory qualities). Likewise, sensing color, since it is an awareness of action as action, makes us directly aware of things in which these diverse features are united as real existents, even though real existence is not one of the features, such as redness, smoothness and four-sidedness, that sense faculties can distinguish from one another. If sense data are the actions of the environment known as actions, sense data make us directly aware of existing physical things as color makes us directly aware of objects in which color, extension, shape, motion, rest and number are united.

At the same time that awareness of action as action justifies a realist account of sense data, it explains the relativity of sense data. Whatever is received, here the action of the environment, is received according to the mode of the receiver. The receiver's dispositions to receive affect the way the action of the environment is received. The same surface that takes up an area of one shape in one person's visual field takes up an area of a different shape in a different person's visual field, depending on the angle at which the light from the surface acts on their sense of sight. But both people are directly aware of the existence of the surface as physically acting (reflecting light) on them. And because of the causal laws governing the action of light, they would not be aware of the way the environment is actually acting on them if the surface's light did not take up spaces of different shapes in their visual fields. Because of differing receptive dispositions of the tasters, the same active disposition by which something tastes sweet to one person is the active disposition by which

the thing tastes sour to another. But both tasters are aware of the way a thing in their environment is acting on them through the same active disposition. If sense data are the actions of the environment known as actions, the sense data/physical thing problem is a false dichotomy.

The preceding defense of perceptual realism has not used any technical terms other than "intentional existence." and it could have avoided that term, if I wanted to make it longer. Assuming that the defense has been successful, however, allow me now to use some technical terms to make some further clarifications as briefly as possible. Sensory and imaginary objects like red and tactile resistance can make us directly aware of objects, like two-dimensional extension and shape, that are nonidentical with color and resistance because of the causal relation between these objects: a surface is a material cause for which the dispositions by which the surface acts in a colored or tactilely resistant manner are formal causes. In sensation as opposed to imagination, objects like color, tactile resistance, two-dimensional extension and shape also make us directly aware of the real existence of the light-reflecting, touch-resisting surface because of another causal relation: the efficient causality by which the surface acts on the senses. (The difference between these modes of causality explain the differences between the features the senses can distinguish and real existence, which the senses make us aware of even though it is not a sensibly distinguishable feature.)

Thomists have traditionally spoken of our cognitive powers as the causes of cognitive acts "in the order of exercise" (efficient causality), while the cognized object is the cause of the act in the order of specification (extrinsic formal causality). In other words, this act is an act of, say, sight because it is produced by the power of sight. But it is the sight of A as opposed to B because its object is what A is and so what A is a specifying formal cause of what the act is. In sensation as opposed to imagination, however, the sense power is not the sole cause in the order of exercise; the efficient causality of the environment is also required. This is true of sensation but not imagination because in sensation the efficient

causality of the environment enters into the specification of the sensory act by its object; since the object sensation as opposed to the imagination includes the action of the environment presented as such. But sensation could not make us aware of the action of the environment on the senses as action unless the that action were actually taking place. So sensation cannot take place solely by the efficient causality of the sense power; the efficient causality of the environment is needed also. When we open our eyes in a totally dark room, an act of vision does not take place.

The reason imagination and the other interior cognitive faculties can present objects that do not actually exist is that the efficient causing of the psychological modifications by which those acts take place includes the efficient causing of permanent modifications by means of which objects can have an intentional existence even without an entitative existence. Sensation, however, depends on the action of the environment and so on a form, that is, a state of actuality, received from the environment. But that form cannot be a permanent form that remains in existence after the action of the environment has ceased. If it were, either sensation would not differ from imagination by presenting its object as actually existing, since the action of the environment would not need to continue to exist for sensation to exist, or sensation would be distinguished from imagination by falsely presenting its object as if the object included the actually existing action of the environment on us.

The form that the sense power depends on the environment for, therefore, must be the incomplete actualization of continuous motion. In sensation, the efficient causality of the environment in the order of exercise enters the (objective, intentional) formal causality of the object in the order of specification because the (subjective, entitative) formal causality that actualizes the sense power is not a permanent form that can remain in existence when the action of the environment ceases; it is a transitory state of motion that can only exist as long as the action of environment exists. This does not mean that the object of sensation must be sensed as if it were something in motion. The motion in question exists entitatively

in the sense power, not intentionally in the object. But the intentional existence of the object amounts to the existence of another state of act produced by the sense power under the influence of the environment. The other state of act must only be able to exist as long as the motion from the environment enables the sense power to produce it. The other state of act can be "permanent" but not in the sense that it remains in existence when the action of the environment ceases. If it could be permanent in that sense, the object of this intentional existence need not include actual entitative existence. It is permanent only in the sense that this new state of act is not itself a motion, an incomplete act, even though its entitative existence in the subject cannot continue when the environment's motion ceases. (Nor is the new state of act the form through which imagining or remembering the object takes place, since they do not require the current entitative existence of the object. But the latter forms must also be produced while the action of the environment is taking place; for they support intentional existence, which must be derived from the intentionality already in existence at the sense level, and sensory intentional existence can be produced only as long as the action of the environment exists.)

Finally, distinguishing genuine perception from hallucination requires inductive, and therefore causal, reasoning. This use of causal reasoning does not imply that we infer the existence of otherwise unknown causes behind what we perceive. Since genuine sensory awareness is itself causal, the awareness of action as action, the conclusion of our inductive inference is that an experience is a genuine awareness of the action of the environment as action and so a noninferential, direct awareness of the existence of the environment as acting on us, and so a direct awareness of the existence of physical things disposed to act in this manner. In other words, the conclusion is that an experience is genuinely the kind of causal awareness that it presents itself as. When we conclude that an experience is an hallucination, the conclusion is that the experience is not genuinely what it presents itself as.

We also use inductive, and so causal, reasoning to distinguish genuine states of

remembering from states of imagining. But what is the causal character of the object of a memory that allows us to distinguish it from a mere object of imagination, since the current action of the environment is absent from both objects? How does an object of memory present itself as if it is something that previously acted on the senses? It can do that if (and perhaps only if) genuine remembering, as opposed to imagining, includes, in addition to an awareness of objects that once did but are not now acting on us, an awareness of the conscious subject as having passively received the action of those objects. For in sensation there is an awareness of the subject as passively undergoing the action of the environment that is concomitant with the awareness of the environment as acting on the senses. (And perhaps these awarenesses are in some sense identical, at least identical "in subject." For whatever sensory self-consciousness is, it is not a secondary act that has a prior, distinct act of the knower, the sensing itself, as its object.²⁶) To infer that an apparent memory is genuine is to infer the past extracognitional existence of the object remembered. But it is also to infer the previous existence of a sensory act that was a direct, not inferential, awareness of the extracognitional existence of the object.

What Intentional Existence Is Not

You sometimes get the impression that the main reason for positing intentional existence is to solve the problem of conscious relations to the nonexistent, reference to the nonexistent in particular.²⁷ Analyzing sensation has shown that intentional existence is not a device invented to explain how our cognitive relations can have nonexistent (nonentitatively existent) terms. Intentional existence is needed to explain our awareness of actual entitative existence in sensation, the primary way of consciously relating to objects on which all our other conscious ways of relating to objects depend. But once we see that even entitative existents need intentional existence in order to be objects of cognition, we should not find cognitive relations to nonentitatively existing objects paradoxical. The presence in consciousness of a nonentitatively existing object is a genuine existence for that object, just as much as the presence in consciousness of an entitatively existing object is a (new)

genuine existence for that object. The latter's presence in consciousness is not its entitative existence, but an intentional existence. And if intentional existence can make a real entity present in consciousness, it can make a nonreal entity present in consciousness.

It is also important to understand that the function of existential quantification for cognition-constituted objects is not to assert intentional existence of them. The truth, for instance, that the set of odd numbers is included in the set of integers requires the identity of two diverse intentional objects, the set objectified by "set of odd numbers" and one of the sets objectified by "a set included in the set of integers"; so the intentional existences of these objects are distinct, not identical. Although the only reality possessed by these objects is that of being known, intentional existence, these distinct objects can be identical because for neither of them is it the case that the object is nothing more than a term of this relation of objectification or that and therefore nothing more than what exists intentionally in this way or that. For example, what I can objectify as the empty set I can also objectify as a set included in every set. Knowing the identity of these objects as more than the term of this or that cognitive relation amounts to objectifying them as identical in a fictitious, cognition-dependent ideal existence modeled on real existence, as we have seen. So the reason for postulating that conscious relations to objects are the intentional existence of the objects is not to provide a justification for existential quantification as applied to cognition-constituted objects. Nor does intentional existence provide two meanings for the existential quantifier.

Likewise, the role of intentional existence is not to provide a referent for words by which we objectify nonexistents. A purpose of Russell's theory of descriptions, for example, was to show that a sentence like "The present king of France does not exist" does not logically commit us to asserting some form of existence of a thing in order to assert that the thing does not exist. When we use such sentences, the rules of logic do not commit us to any existence claim. Perhaps Russell's logical points were sufficient to refute Meinong on mental existence (discussing Meinong is beyond this paper's scope). But the postulation of intentional existence in the Thomistic (and Wittgensteinian) sense does not result from our

being logically committed to intentional existence by the way we talk about nonentitatively existing objects. Intentional existence is necessary for our behavior of talking about nonexistent — and real existents as well — by causal, not logical, necessity. Similarly, the postulation of the intentional existence of propositions, as distinct from sentences, is based on causal necessity, not on whether our ways of talking about beliefs or truths logically necessitate quantifying over propositions.²⁸

Russell's theory of descriptions explains our conscious use of "The present king of France does not exist" or "The present king of France is bald" without the logical necessity of postulating the existence of an otherwise nonexistent king. But it neglects to tell us that understanding "There is/is not something that is presently king of France and is bald" requires that what it is to be a king, what it is to be bald, what France is, and what the meanings of "the present," "there is," "not" and "something" are exist intentionally in awareness. Assume you receive a telegram containing the words "Your spouse has died," if you understand English, when you read those words you are consciously related to what death is. If you were not consciously related to what death is, the cause of your being shocked and sorrowful would be your awareness that the physical string of marks, "died," is what it is, or something equally trivial. That awareness of what death is, however, is not something separate from, behind, or parallel to your awareness of what the string of marks "died" is when you are aware of using that string of marks as a sign.²⁹ And awareness is an intentional existence for its objects.

Concerning cognitive relations to the nonexistent, it is difficult to go further into a discussion of "reference" to the nonexistent until analysts provide a clearer treatment of reference to the existent. I agree with Richard Rorty's (disparaging) remark that "'reference' is a term of philosophical art" and one afflicted by "equivocity."³⁰ (Of the treatments I have seen, Fred Sommers's comes the closest to being acceptable.³¹) This problem is exacerbated by the common analytic view that reference determines one's "ontology": We are committed to the existence of the individuals that "referring" expressions "pick out."³² But reference in

this context is sometimes opposed to quantification,³³ while Quine identifies it with existential quantification.³⁴ And what does picking out individuals have to do with such statements of "ontology" as traditionally understood, and not just by Thomists, as "Everything either exists in itself or in another," "Every existent is either capable of not existing or incapable of not existing," "Everything is either caused to exist or is not caused to exist," or "There are two modes of existence, intentional and entitative"?

In any case, taking intentionality in the "ontological" sense we can say this. To whatever extent reference to a real existent may involve (whatever "involve" might mean, for example, "has as a prior condition" or "is constituted by") a cognitive relation to a real existent, reference requires intentional existence; cognitive relations to real existents require intentional existence, as sense perception shows. But since intentional existence for real existents is required at the very foundation of our conscious states, nothing prevents intentional existence from functioning at other levels, cognitive relations to the nonexistent included. If even real existents require another mode of existence in order to be objectified, what prevents this other mode of existence from objectifying what does not have real existence? The necessity for postulating intentional existence is causal, and the behavior of objectifying nonexistents linguistically, for example, talking about unicorns, requires no causes over and above the causes required for objectifying real, entitative, existents.

Appendix

[Sept. 23, 2006. "Appendix" here refers to an appendix to a chapter, not to the entire book. The material here might be folded into endnotes of a chapter, if the book ever gets prepared for publication.]

These are thoughts on the post-Fregean "logical" interpretation of existence and the Fregean numerical interpretation. I also include thoughts on the psychology behind this dispute.

The idea is that Fregean existential quantification makes "there is" into a second order "predicate," a predicate relative to another kind of predicate that modifies the variables over

which "there is" ranges. "There is" says that the first kind of predicate has an application, that there is an instance of the first kind of predicate. So "there is" statements are statements about the logical realities called predicates (or concepts). "Predicate" is a logical term because its purpose is to communicate about elements of the equipment we use to linguistically objectify things. "Concept" in this context would have a similar logical, as opposed to psychological, meaning.

Another way of putting it, which I believe Pugh attributes to Kenny, is that existence is a property of a property. But this way of putting it begins to bring out the fallacy of the second-order interpretation of "there is." A property is not something logical; it is something extraobjective. Properties are modes of being, ways of having existence. In "There are trees," the value objectified by "there are" is relative to the extraobjective value objectified by "tree," not to the value objectified by "the predicate 'tree'" or "the concept of tree." When we say "There are trees" in a sense equivalent to "Trees exist," the meaning of "there are" and "exist" pertains to the extraobjective value, tree, not to the linguistic or logical values, the predicate "tree," the concept of tree, or the kind tree. What it is to be a predicate, a concept and a kind are specifically gnoseological values; what it is to be a tree is not a specifically gnoseological value. When we say "There are predicates, concepts and kinds" or "Predicates, concepts and kinds exist" what is expressed by "there are" and "exist" does pertain to gnoseological values, but not when we say "There are trees" or "Trees exist."

Another way to put it is that values like being a predicate, a concept, or a kind do not pertain to the value, what it is to be a tree, considered absolutely. They do not enter the latter value considered in itself but only pertain to it according to a particular mode of existence the latter value becomes associated with when it is linguistically objectified. But that mode of existence is precisely the contrary of what we assert when we assert that trees exist, as opposed to asserting that the concept of tree exists, the species tree exists, etc. In order for us to be able to assert that trees exist, we have to give them a mode of existence that is other than the existence trees enjoy in themselves. But when we assert that trees

exist or that there are trees, we are not attributing to them any property of the gnoseological equipment we use in order to be able to make that assertion. If we were making such an attribution, our assertion would be false.

Geach says (Pugh, p. 265) that individual existence is the "actuality" that is attributable to individual existents. But that actuality is the cause of the truth of "There are trees." The existence of individual trees is the cause of the truth of "There are trees." And that actuality is the cause of the truth of Frege's "The quantity of trees is non-zero." Knowing the truth of these two statements includes having knowledge that the extraobjective causes of their truth, individual existences, hold. So the Fregean and post-Fregean have accomplished no more than to rearrange the furniture by their second-order and quantitative interpretations of "There is . . .". Nor do "specific existence" and "individual existence" constitute "radically different orders of reality" (265). They are the same extraobjective existence to which the properties of universality or individuality attach but do not enter.

For the sake of argument assume that "There are trees" does mean "The predicate 'tree,' or the concept of tree, has instances. Still, since language is public, our primary predicates and concepts have "instances" if and only if what they express really exists, where "really exists" means having a status that is other than merely being conceived, or imagined, or described by a predicate, etc.

Another argument for this is that "There are trees" gives us information about the world, the extraobjective world. And it does not tell us about the human world. It tells us about the pre-human, even sub-human, world. If someone tells us that "There are diseases, or geological faults, or carnivorous animals, etc." should we say, in the wake of Frege, "Whew, for a moment there you had me worried. I thought you were telling me something new about the actual extralogical world, something that I should fear. Now I know that you weren't telling me about the world at all. You were only making a logical statement, not an ontological one. You were at most talking about the specifically "human" world, that is,

talking about things whose only status is that of our logical equipment, and so things I need not fear. So again, even if we interpret "There are trees" to mean the concept, predicate, or kind, trees, has instances, knowledge of its truth still includes knowledge about the non-logical world.

The fallacy here is strictly comparable to the fallacy that statements whose truths are known merely from knowing the meanings of their words are linguistic statements in the sense of statements about language as opposed to being statements about the extralinguistic things communicating about which is the reason we have language to begin with. To see the justice of the comparison, notice that instead of saying (A) "He is dying of cancer" we could say (B) "He is dying of the meaning of the word 'cancer'," or even (C) ". . . the meaning of the word 'c-a-n-c-e-r'." The latter two formulas are just as true as the first. They communicate a bit more than the first, but only do so because knowledge of them includes knowledge of the first, and their truth is caused by the same extraobjective states of affairs as the first. (The causes of the truth of the first are both extralinguistic, namely, what is going on in someone's body, and linguistic, namely, the facts that we are using noises like "he," "is," "dying," "of," and "cancer" as we do.)

When we say "He is dying of the meaning of the word 'cancer'," we are not saying that he is dying of something linguistic; the meaning of the word "cancer" is not something linguistic; it is something physical, chemical, and biological. If someone is dying of the meaning of that for which we use the word "cancer," the cause of his death is biological as opposed to being merely linguistic. Of course, once cancer is made that for which we use a linguistic device, cancer can be called something linguistic, and so the cause of his death can be called something linguistic. But the sense in which cancer is something linguistic is totally incidental to the sense in which it is a cause of death. Likewise, we could say "He is dying of the disease mentioned on the evening new last night," but the fact of its having been so mentioned is totally incidental to the fact that it is the cause of someone's death.

We are, of course, much more apt to use formulas like (B) and (C) to teach someone

who already knows what a person is dying of the fact that English refers to that disease as cancer, and so add to someone's knowledge of English but not to any of his other knowledge about the world, than to use it to newly inform him of the cause of someone's death. The reason we would be more apt to is that it would usually not be useful to use formulas like (B) and (C) to communicate with someone who already knows English and its spelling. But we can think of circumstances in which the latter two would be useful for communicating what the first communicates. For example, we often use spelling in the presence of little children. ("Don't talk about s-e-x in front of her. And I'm not just saying don't use the word 's-e-x' in front of her. I'm saying don't even talk about that for which we use the word 's-e-x' in front of her.") For emphasis or sarcasm we use constructions like "It's called a 'turn signal,' you jerk!" And imagine a conversation in which the riposte to a flippant remark like "He doesn't even know the meaning of the word 'cancer'" is "No, but he knows what it is to be dying of the meaning of the word 'cancer'." Etc.

So the fact that "All singular existential propositions which appear to treat existence as a real property can be rewritten to form 2nd order propositions about properties of concepts" (Pugh, p. 264) does not prove the post-Fregean point. It proves the opposite, namely, that the primary objects, the primary values, to which logical, linguistic and other second-ordergnoseological values pertain are not themselves logical, linguistic, or second-order but must have an existence that is other than the merely objective, other than merely being objectified in cognition. For what is primarily objectified in language must not only be public but really "existent," where "really existent" means as opposed to merely being imagined or conceived, that is, as opposed to merely being expressed in predicates or in concepts to which the property of universality pertains (kinds).

The post-Fregean is imposing a metaphysical interpretation on what is merely a useful syntax. She is trying to get metaphysical mileage out of a computational syntax the way Whorf tried to read metaphysical positions into normal syntax or the way that Hanson and many others held that "active" verbs must be saying something active (Causal Realism, ch.

1). That syntax, or a particular kind of syntax, has such metaphysical significance is a belief for which there is no "objective," really existing, extraobjective, evidence. Then why is the belief so commonly held and, certainly in the case of many post-Fregeans, so adamantly held?

In the absence of objective evidence, the motivation for the belief must be subjective. But "subjective" can be confusing here, and not only because "objective" is itself ambiguous. What we call subjective is always a relation to an "object," a relation to what some at least possible extraobjective thing is objectified as extraobjectively being. When two of us look at the same painting, your reaction and mine can be entirely different. Those reactions are how we use the word "subjective" in this context. But each of these reactions is nothing other than a conscious relation to what that painting is, at least insofar as our sense of sight presents the painting as being this or that. So instead of using "subjective" to describe the non-evidential basis for the belief that Fregean syntax has metaphysical significance, I will say that the basis for the belief is psychological rather than evidential. "Psychological" can be as imprecise and ambiguous as "subjective," But since it is even more generic than "subjective," its imprecision can have the advantage of not being as apt as "subjective" is to create the illusion that what we call psychological is not a relation to what objects of cognition are.

The basis, then, for the post-Fregean's belief in the metaphysical significance of Fregean syntax is the psychological impact of the perceived logical power of that syntax. I say "perceived" logical power, because it was once believed that Fregean syntax revealed the true "logical form" of language, since it enabled us to justify all the intuitively valid forms of inference that traditional "two-term" syntax apparently could not justify. Fred Sommers, of course, has shown that traditional syntax could be used by a computational system just as probatively powerful as systems using Fregean syntax. In Sommer's system "being" and "thing" can be used as first-order predicates, as they are in non-computational language but not in Frege's computational language (which as Sommers notes can be

considered a defect in Frege's language, and why not? All languages are imperfect). From a computational point of view, many logicians still find Fregean syntax more intuitive than traditional, that is, they find it easier to do computational work with the Fregean than the traditional syntax. But that still does not constitute evidence supporting the view that Fregean, or any other kind of syntax, has metaphysical significance. In fact, Sommers points out many advantages his computational system based on traditional syntax has over Fregean systems. Some of Sommers' devices have been considered paradoxical, but they are hardly more paradoxical than implying that to be is to be known. And in general, a modern logician is the wrong person to be criticizing others for being paradoxical.

Although Sommers does not go so far as to conclude that traditional syntax reflects the genuine "logical form" of truth-bearing statements, he does hold the belief that there is such a thing as the genuine "logical form" of statements. In this he agrees with many and perhaps all of those who thought that the probative power they thought was exclusive to Fregean syntax was evidence for basing metaphysical beliefs, beliefs about existence, on it. So behind the issue of the metaphysical significance of one kind of syntax as opposed to another is an even more fundamental fallacy: that if there was such a thing as the genuine "logical form" of statements, that logical form would impose metaphysical positions on us in the sense of constituting evidence for drawing metaphysical conclusions. In other words, even deeper than the fallacy of the exclusive logical correctness of Fregean syntax is the fallacy that if it were the sole logically correct syntax, it would tell us all we need to know about the existence signified by "There are trees." The latter fallacy is not something specific to the post-Fregean era; it is one of the oldest fallacies in philosophy, going back at least to Plato: the fallacy that logic determines metaphysics, the fallacy that the truth of statements requires that logical properties of statements reflect or "correspond to" real properties of things.

In committing this fallacy, the post-Fregeans are committing the same fallacy as those who thought the substance/accident distinction depends on the traditional subject/predicate

syntax. The idea that the substance/accident distinction is based on traditional syntax is shared by both some defenders and some critics of that distinction. Some, though certainly not all, defenders of that distinction incorrectly tried to base it on the subject/predicate syntax. And some critics of that distinction incorrectly believed it must be a projection of that syntax. Not only is the post-Fregean second-order interpretation of existence no better than this interpretation of the substance/accident distinction; it fails for exactly the same reason: You cannot derive conclusions about the nature of existence and that which exists from logic, not even if there were such a thing as an exclusively valid logical syntax.

So even before Summers showed that traditional syntax has as much computational probative power as Frege's, we should have been able to see that the success of Fregean syntax offered no evidence for basing conclusions about existence on it. In the absence of evidence, the psychological impact of the power and usefulness of Fregean syntax was all that motivated the post-Fregean attempt to reduce the existence expressed by "There are trees," to a merely logical value. But not everyone who understood modern logic and its probative power was so psychologically overwhelmed by that understanding to believe we could reduce existence to something logical. Why not?

At the very least, the belief in the negative truth that syntax does not as such determine metaphysics was strong enough in those philosophers to constitute a psychological counterweight overcoming any psychological impact the power of Fregean syntax may otherwise have had. I say "at the very least" because the belief in the negative truth that syntax does not inform us about existence may or may not be based on good evidence. First, it may simply be based on the recognition of the absence of any evidence for drawing metaphysical conclusions from the mere fact that something is logically useful, even if the thing has an exclusive claim to logical usefulness. It is understandable, however, that unless it gets positive support from somewhere, the psychological impact of this merely negative recognition is not enough to overcome the psychological impact of the success of modern logic. Second, the belief that syntax does not determine metaphysics might be

based on apparent evidence but evidence that is only apparent; that is, in a particular person this psychological counterweight to the post-Fregean position might exist for the wrong reason. I mention this case only for the sake of completeness, however, since there are two ways that this counterweight can exist in a person for the right reason, that is, as caused by awareness of evidence sufficient to exclude the opposite from truth.

Third, a person may believe that existence is not, indeed, cannot be, a logical value on the basis of an intuitive grasp of the evidence to the contrary, namely, what existence is, a grasp that is genuine but which they are not able to turn into an adequate philosophical argument, that is, an argument explicitly revealing the evidence to be sufficient to exclude the opposite from truth. They know evidence that is sufficient to exclude the opposite from truth, but they do not recognize it as being able to provide a sound philosophical argument that the opposite is contradictory. This is the situation of the vast majority of the people who are confronted with the claim that to be is to be an object of cognition. Even if they have never heard that claim before, they intuitively believe that it cannot possibly be true, and that belief is in fact caused by awareness of evidence sufficient to exclude the opposite from truth, awareness of what that for which we use the noise "existence" is. (Whether this intuitive recognition deserves to be called the "intuition of being" is a question I do not want to get into; it all depends on what we mean by "intuition of being.")

Fourth and last, a person may believe that existence cannot be a logical value on the basis of an intuitive grasp of the evidence to the contrary that they recognize as being able to provide a sound philosophical argument that the opposite is contradictory, as being able to be expressed in reasoning from premises for which it is self-evident that the opposite is contradictory. These people certainly have the intuition of being in the sense of an "eidetic" intuition even if they have yet to develop such a sound argument and even if they fail in their attempts to articulate such an argument, as long as they recognize that their failure does not constitute counterevidence to their intuition because they recognize on the basis of that intuition that nothing can constitute actual, as opposed to apparent,

evidence against it.

Between the third and fourth cases there are probably many degrees. The interesting degrees, for our purposes, would be people with a genuine intuitive grasp of the evidence that a formula like Berkeley's cannot be true but who are able to be sufficiently distracted from the actual issues involved to fail to see that the post-Fregean view is just idealism in more sophisticated form. The psychological impact of their grasp of the impossibility of Berkeleyan idealism is not sufficient by itself to cause them to attend to the fact that the post-Fregean position is impossible for the same reason. They are like the person who thinks that the principle of non-contradiction need not be true. All that denying the PNC can accomplish is to change the subject. Once ordinary negation is part of our mental equipment, we cannot fail to know the truth of the PNC when we are sufficiently attentive to the relevant factors; we can fail to grasp its truth only by not being attentive to what negation is, which is the cause of the truth of the PNC. Likewise, a third-case person can fail to see the (or the falsehood of the) crypto-idealism in the post-Fregean view of existence only by ignoring the relevant evidence. There can be many reasons for having one's attention distracted from the relevant evidence. Once such reason could be a relatively weak psychological impact of the third reason for believing that existence cannot be a logical value when in conflict with a relatively strong psychological impact of the power and perceived exclusive genuineness of Fregean syntax.

The history of philosophy is full of, and probably always will be full of, such psychological impacts substituting for evidence.

Notes

Outtakes

awareness of the agent, the surface, insofar as the surface is something to which red belongs as a feature. By being an awareness of the surface as an agent, awareness of red as the way a surface acts on us is awareness of red as a feature of the surface. To be aware of red as a feature characterizing the surface's action on us is to be aware of red as a feature characterizing the surface insofar as the surface is an agent. And

1. Aquinas used the terminology "intentional existence" only infrequently. But *De Veritate*, 2, 2 shows how significant the concept was for him.

2. De Veritate, 1, 1.

3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, rev. ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), p. 334.

4. In conversation, Hilary Putnam told me that "exists" is a logical word. For a critique of this view, see Barry Miller, The Fullness of Being: A New Paradigm for Existence (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002). Any apparent support for this view from Frege was disarmed by Fred Sommers, The Logic of Natural Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).

5. Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1919) 164.

6. Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, 5, 1.

7. Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Scribners, 1959) 98.

8. *Ibid.*, 96f.

9. De Vertitate, 1, 1.

10. This point concerns psychological genesis of the concept of existence; so Geach's criticism's of Gilson do not apply. See P. T. Geach, Logic Matters (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972) 263ff.

11. Aquinas does recognize a second-order meaning for est, to "signify the truth of a

proposition." S.T. I, 48, 2 ad 2.

12. John C. Cahalan, Causal Realism: An Essay on Philosophical Method and the Foundations of Knowledge (Lanham Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1985) 95f.

13. A language need not have anything explicitly corresponding to the existential quantifier, but existence is logically included in the attribution of predicates to the primary objects of any natural language. And since the rest of language derives from language for real existents, logical symbolism that eliminates variables of quantification can eliminate them for the real existents that are our primary objects, as well as for objects that cannot really exist.

14. Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, 4, 1, 540.

15. On what causes the identity of nonreal objects as more than terms of this or that objectification, see Cahalan, Causal Realism, pp.145-154, 218-219.

16. John C. Cahalan, "If Wittgenstein Had Read Poinsett: Recasting the Problem of Signs and Mental States," The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (1994) 297-319.

17. Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (MacMillan, 1958).

18. Wittgenstein, The Blue Book (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958) 36.

19. John Poinsett Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Phil. Nat., 4 p., q. 4, a. 1, Reiser ed., III, 104.

20. Maritain, Degrees of Knowledge, 112-114. Maritain's work appeared in 1932; The Blue Book lectures began in 1933.

21. Roderick M. Chisholm, "Intentionality," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, v. 4, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: MacMillan, 1967) 201-204.

22. Is intentional existence superfluous for truth because judgment is concerned about how things exist in reality, not in the mind? Judgments are also concerned about the sentences in which actual or possible real existents are objectified. Knowing the truth of sentences requires knowing how the words of the sentences are being used. Awareness of the

meanings of words is another of relation that requires the intentional existence of the term of the relation, so that judgment can be a relation to the extracognitional existence of this and not that.

23. Aquinas, S.T., I-II, 9, 1. Yves R. Simon, Introduction to Metaphysics of Knowledge, trans. Vukan Kuic and Richard J. Thompson (New York: Fordham University Press, 1990) 6-9.

24. Hilary Putnam, The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 10, 16, 22 and passim.

25. Aquinas, S.T. I, 84, 3. Yves Simon, "An Essay on Sensation." in Philosopher at Work: Essays by Yves R. Simon, ed. Anthony O. Simon (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999) 94-96.

26. Later dual act self-consciousness must grow out of and depend on, because it must take place within, a prior self-consciousness that does not require a second act of the subject but is an awareness of the existence of the sensing subject in the background through and by means of the same act by which we are aware of something other than the sensing subject in the foreground. If not, when you produce explicit "self"-consciousness through secondary acts that are distinct from the primary acts they objectify, how would you know that conscious subject you are now aware of in the foreground as performing that distinct primary act is yourself, the subject you are now aware of in the background as performing the secondary act? Why couldn't the "primary" awareness you know by means of your "secondary" awareness be someone else's awareness? Could you answer by defining "myself" as the foreground object you are aware of by means of cognitive act B when act B makes you aware of something producing any prior cognitive act A? That would make dual act self-consciousness the only way of being aware of our "own" existence at the price of solipsism. By definition "I" (that is, you) would be the only thing of which you could be aware, as a foreground object, that it produces a cognitive act.

In fact there are different ways for a knowing agent to be aware of herself as a

producer of an act of cognition, an objective way and a subjective way. A cognitive agent is always be aware of herself and her production of acts of cognition subjectively, that is, always aware of her own existence in the background of and by means of her active state of being aware of something else, an object in the foreground. The "something else" in the foreground can be a prior, already existing cognitive act and herself as producing it. Knowledge starts with the object of a primary, direct act, not the act itself or its subject, present in the foreground. But present to knowledge in the background is the primary act itself as an act produced, and so the existence of the knowing subject as the producer of the primary, direct act. We can then perform an explicitly reflexive act on our direct act. When we produce a reflexive act, we re-present what was originally in the background but now in the foreground. But when we re-present it, the original background awareness of ourselves as the producer of our cognitive acts still exists. When the secondary, reflexive act comes into existence, our background awareness of ourselves as producer of cognitive acts is not entirely new. There is a new background awareness of the reflexive act, just as there was of the original primary act. But if the emergence of the secondary act required an entirely new background awareness of the subject producing the secondary act, when we then convert our background awareness of the secondary act into a foreground awareness with a tertiary act, there would have to be a third, entirely new awareness of the subject producing the tertiary act.

Perhaps contrary to expectations, the problem this causes is not an infinite regress. We can always stop trying to produce cognitive acts by which we are aware of producing prior cognitive acts by which we are aware of producing yet prior cognitive acts. The real problem is the identity of act producer in the foreground of any reflexive and with the act producer that is in the background, that is, the identity of the producer of the prior cognitive act with the producer of the act that knows the prior cognitive act (see Maritain, Degrees of Knowledge, p. 446). How is the conscious subject present in the background aware that it is the same subject that is present in the foreground. After all, the subject present in the

foreground is identified as the producer of act A, but the subject present in the background is present as the producer of a different act, act B.

In order to recognize them as direct and reflexive acts, respectively, the subject present in the background of each act must be able to recognize herself as the producer of both acts. The subject present in the background of the secondary act as the producer of the secondary act must be aware of herself as the subject that is also present in the background of the primary act as the producer of the primary act. So the subject must be aware that the awareness that constitutes the secondary act, the awareness that makes the primary act's causing by its subject the foreground object, is causally just a development of, an outgrowth from, her original background awareness of the primary act's causing by its subject. The secondary awareness must be just a re-focusing of primary awareness, a re-focusing that is a conscious converting of what was originally in the background to the foreground while the original background awareness continues to exist. When we reflect, we must be conscious that we are just producing an explicit awareness from what was, and still is, an implicit awareness. We must be conscious of the secondary act as a re-presentation of something that continues to be present in the original way.

Evidence that we are conscious of it as a re-presentation of something that continues to be present in the original way is that we call the secondary act a "reflexive" act. Our calling it that is an effect of the fact that we know that the secondary act, in contrast to the primary, is a turning back on what was present in the primary; for in order for us to know that the second act turns back on the primary, the primary background awareness must continue to exist. Further evidence is just the fact that we do recognize an essential connection between the subject in the foreground of the second act and the subject in the background. We could not do that if the awareness of a cognitive agent in the object of the second act were not just a development of, an outgrowth from, the awareness of the cognitive agent in the background of the primary act. The causal production of the reflex act, and so the existence of the agent of the reflex act, are in the background of the

reflexive act, but the causal production that is in the foreground is present there as a development of the causal relation that is still in the background, as an outgrowth from the causal relation that is still in the background. For we do not get a new background awareness of ourselves every time we produce a reflex awareness of ourselves. That is not the way self-consciousness works. We can newly identify the background agent as the producer of the reflexive act, now that the reflexive act exists, but we could not identify the new act (act B) as "reflexive" if the original background awareness of the subject (the background awareness of the subject in act A) did not still exist.

When a memory is genuine, a person must have a subjective awareness of herself as producing the act of remembering, as she has of herself as producing all her cognitive acts. But when she is remembering, she is aware of objects that are not now acting on that cognitive power and aware of a conscious subject (herself) as having performed a prior cognitive act as a result of passively receiving the action of those objects. But remembering is not a reflexive act; it does not convert what was originally in the background to the foreground. In addition to being a re-presentation of the originally sensed foreground object, memory is a re-presentation of the past background awareness of the sensory subject as a background awareness of the subject producing an act of sensation under the causal influence of the foreground object. Like reflexive acts, however, remembering presents the subject of the past act of sensation as if it is identical with the subject in the background of the current cognitive act. That is how memory differs from imagination in claiming to be awareness of the actual past existence of the foreground object.

Remembering does not present the foreground object as now acting on us but presents the background subject as having been acted on by the foreground object. And in doing that, remembering must present the past background subject as identical with the now existing background subject. For we can in addition to remembering we can also imagine what it is for a subject of sensation to undergo the influence of the environment, but imagining is a mode of presentation does not claim an essential connection between the imagined subject

and anything that really exists or existed.

How does remembering succeed in making a claim (I do not say succeed in making an accurate claim) of identity between the past and present background subjects? In reflexive acts, the identity is manifested by the fact that the foreground awareness of the subject is a conscious development of and outgrowth from the always present background awareness. In memory, the former background awareness is presented as if it is on a temporal continuum with the current background awareness, and the existence of the subject of the former background awareness is presented as if it is on a temporal continuum with the existence of the current subject. (The former background awareness is presented as if belonging to a continuum that is the enduring in existence, the temporal extension of the existence, of the subject of the current background awareness.) Awareness of continuity is awareness of a continuum as a continuum, an awareness of it as a potentially but not actually divided multiplicity, a multiplicity whose parts share the same limits, as opposed to a multiplicity having parts whose limits are in contact but are not identical. Awareness of the absence of actual division is a negative awareness. But the negative awareness is not simply an awareness of absence; it is a negative causal awareness, awareness of something as if only potentially, not actually, divided. And so it is an awareness that is a suitable target of inductive reasoning to establish whether or not the memory is genuine, whether or not it is reasonable to believe that the parts are not on a continuum with the current existence of the background subject, i.e., that the parts are not component causes (material causes) of an undivided whole which is the enduring in existence of (the temporal extension of the existence of) the subject of the current background awareness.

The perceived existence of the background subject throughout is the form that makes the different though undivided parts (yesterday is different from today though today is continuous with it) into component causes of a perceived unified whole. Is the perception accurate? Inductive, and therefore causal, reasoning can establish that it is unreasonable to believe the opposite. It is unreasonable to believe that the cause of this perception of

continuity is not the fact that there is genuine continuity, that is, absence of actual division. It is unreasonable to believe that the cause of the perception that these different parts share the same limits is not the fact that they do share the same limits. But that the limits are the same amounts to the negative fact that while extended part A is different from (does not share any extended parts with) extended part B (the past is really distinct from the future) the ending limit of part A (the present, which is not itself an extended part of either) is not really distinct from the beginning limit of the future.

27. Chisholm, op. cit.

28. Yves R. Simon, Metaphysics of Knowledge, 141-148.

29. Aquinas, S.T. III, 25, 3.

30. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) 289.

31. Op. cit., 49-68 and passim.

32. See for example, W. V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969) 26-68.

33. See for example, Stephen Neale, "Descriptions," in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2000).

34. Willard Van Orman Quine, "On What There Is," in From a Logical Point of View (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961) 1-19.