

Artificial Conception Notes

aa, start, TT, June 19, 1998

God wants the act that creates persons to be the same act that unites people in committed love.

Perhaps start TT article this way: There are unjust ways of making babies. Then describe marriage as a moral way because it makes babies by an act of love that values persons and ends-in-themselves and so as worthy of CL. Then ask whether anything short of that could also be moral.

Not every way of making a person does justice to the value of a person. And an act can appear to do justice to the value of a person when it really doesn't (e.g., saving my wife's life by artificial contraception).

We are not obligated to intend to procreate. But if that is our intention, the good of the offspring must be primary in our intention. For example, before conception it would be immoral for me to alter my jeans so that the offspring will have cystic fibrosis for the sake of an experiment. You might reply that a nonexistent person has no rights. That is correct. But whatever we think of "rights talk" once we intend to create a person, it is immoral for us to do anything prior to that person's existence that does not take the benefit of that person into account. So there are ways of bringing human offspring into existence that are immoral even if the immoral acts occur prior to the existence of the new person.

But is the good of that person served if we separate the generative function of our person making ability from its unitive function? Does it serve her good to be the product of a mechanical act? Does it serve her good if we use our person making ability outside of an act of love and for the other already existing person

who is our partner in the act? Outside of an act of love for our partner precisely as having a person making ability, an act in which the existence of one person making organism is constituted by the love of the two already existing persons for each other as having person making abilities.

In artificial conception, the product does not come from the existence of a unified person making organism, an organism the meaning of whose existence is love of one person for another person. Is the existence of such a product the existence of an end in itself worthy of love as being something for the sake of which everything else exists?

In artificial conception, I "use" or person making ability, but not as an object of love, not as a feature because of which I love her. I use it as a pure means to something other than itself or than her. I separate her person making ability from its role of being an object of a love act, or from its role of making her the object of a love act. I am making her person making ability a mere tool.

Sexual love is not just a person making act. It is an act of love that is person making, an act that loves the whole person of the partner because of the partner's person making ability. In artificial conception, the person making ability of the other is a mere tool. So the existence of the product of the person making ability is the existence of something that comes from the use of a mere tool, rather than from an act of love that at the same time constitutes an act of the person making ability, the ability to make that product.

Artificial conception is person making but is not a person making act of love. It uses another person's person making ability, but does not treat her person making ability as a feature because of which she is loved, because of which she is an object of love an object of love for her own sake, not just for the sake of making something else. Or, it does not treat her person making ability as itself an object of love, but as a mere tool not loved for its own sake. And if the product of our person making ability is the product of a mere tool not loved for its own sake, can the value of that product be that of something for the sake of which everything else exists?

Human life is the product of an act of animal passion. What then is the value

of human life?

Human life is the product of committed love between persons. What then is the value of human life?

Consider this. Human persons are the products of acts that are mere playthings. If so, what is the value of a person? If a person is the product of an activity that is essentially trivial, were essentially for the sake of pleasure, is that product really something we can describe as that for the sake of which everything else exists? Or if a person is an accidental product of a romp of physical passion, is the existence of that product the existence of the absolute value to which every other value is relative? If the greater cannot come from the lesser, the answer to these questions must be no. Then why should we not give the same answer to the question whether the product of a mechanical means of person making is absolute value?

In artificial conception, our act of choice is a choice for the greater to come from the lesser. But to so evaluate the greater that in our evaluations it comes from the lesser, is to evaluate the greater as if it were not the greater and the lesser as if it were not the lesser. In other words, and so choosing, we are evaluating a child to be something that has the kind of value that a machine is able to produce. It has the kind of value that does not require an act of love of one absolute value for another absolute value, an act of love one for the other precisely under the aspect of their being absolute values.

I am a product of masturbation. I am a product of using the person making ability as an object of utility, like a food making ability or a laundry doing ability. I am a product of using a person making ability as if it could be replaced by a machine, as if it were an ability that could be replaced (as opposed to the irreplaceable value of the product) by a machine.

The value we place on sexuality will determine the value we place on human life. So if we make sexuality into a machine for making persons, rather than an act of love that makes persons, then...

As of now, life comes from an act of love. And the meaning, the value, of human life is that of committed

love one person for another, the committed love from which life comes. So what is the meaning of human life if it comes from a mechanical process, rather than from an act of love? The giving of existence is not an act of love in which two people give each other their life-sharing power. The process of creating human life is not identical with an act of love between two people.

It is an injustice to the child unless the cause of its existence is committed love for persons as such, and so unless the cause is an act of committed love for persons as such. It is an injustice to the child if her existence is not the result of an act that is an act of love between two persons.

To make artificial conception the moral equivalent of natural is to evaluate conception by an act of committed love of two persons for each other because of their sexuality to be morally equivalent to making persons by a machine.

From the point of view of the injustice done to the child, being a test tube baby is much like being a child of rape or a child born illegitimately. Because of person is worthy of committed love for her own sake, because it is the meaning of her existence to be something worthy of committed love, she should come into existence in a way consistent with that meaning. Bringing a child into existence the way mere things come into exist, mechanically, is an injustice to the child the way bringing a child into existence the way mere animals come into exist, as a result of blind passion, is an injustice to the child. The child's existence should be the result of an act of placing of value on another person, and because of the other person's feature of being someone with a person-making ability, as being worthy of committed love.

Children deserve to know that the meaning of their existence as persons is love between persons, the self-giving of one person to another. So they deserve to know that their existence, is, not from a machine, but from acts in which persons value each other, as beings with person-making ability, to be worthy of committed love.

But the value of persons transcends their ability to perform functions as the absolute transcends the relative. So the ability to perform functions cannot

be placed on a par with the ability to make persons without implicitly reducing the place of the person in our system of values. (And if an ability to perform functions cannot be placed on a par with the PMA, the PMA should not be placed on a par with performing functions, but doesn't artificial conception do that?)

Nature has chosen that human life would come into existence as a result of the physical desire of one person for the pleasure that another person's body can give. If so, how can the value of human life not be merely that of an accidental product of a purely physical desire? Human life can have the dignity it deserves and needs only if the use of sexual desire is made part of a relation of committed love and committed self-giving of each other's bodies between those who will create human life through their desire.

Persons should be brought into existence by an act that itself values our partner in the act not for her ability to bring something other than herself into existence but values her as an object of committed love. The object of the act that brings a person into existence must be an object loved for her own sake, an object of a love that values her for her own sake. So if we make our sexuality into a machine for making persons, rather than an act of love that makes persons . . . (And we evaluate ourselves to be machines for making persons.)

In intercourse, the partners must not just will to be fair to one another about sharing goods of concupiscence, as they can when they share their food making ability. They must not just evaluate their mutual use of their person making ability as just sharing a good of concupiscence with one another fairly. They must evaluate the use of their person making ability, their mutual use of their mutual person making ability, as requiring to be part of an act of love for, an act of committed love for, another end in itself making end in itself. It must be love for another end in itself making end in itself for her own sake, not just for the sake of making a product. This is the only way to avoid treating the results as a good of

concupiscence.

In artificial conception, I agree to share a good of concupiscence, and I agree explicitly not to share an act of love of friendship. I explicitly agree to exclude an act of love of friendship.

Does it help to put it this way? As it is now, at least prior to artificial conception, producing another person required a desire not just for the new person but a desire that relates us to the partner in person making. But that desire relating us to the partner in person making has two interesting characteristics. One is that it is a desire for her for the sake of attributes which as a matter of fact constitute her person making ability. But the other is that this desire for her because of those person making attributes cannot be a desire, morally, that values her person making ability just for the sake of making a new person. As things are now, it has to be a desire for those attributes because of what they are and what they make her not just as a means to the existence of another person, but what they make her with respect to being a person loved for her own sake. Or they make her a person worthy of love for features she possesses independently of whether those features are means to any other end than making her an object of our desire or love.

And it is that last characteristic that is the key to morality, sexual morality. Is it also the key to the immorality of artificial conception? That is the question.

Is it morally correct for me to so evaluate the use of my sexuality that it does not exist, sexuality or the use, for the sake of a union of love between ends in themselves? Is it morally correct to evaluate my sexuality as if it does not exist for the sake of uniting me in love with another absolute value, another being for the sake of which everything else exists? In other words, is it moral for me to separate the use of my sexuality from all the psychological and intimately interpersonal aspects of my sexuality that go into the use of my sexuality in normal sex? For those aspects of my sexuality exist precisely for the sake of sex acts being love acts between two beings worthy of committed love for their own sake.

An act of using someone's food making ability or laundry doing ability does not exist for the sake of a union of committed love with another and in itself. It does not exist for the sake of giving myself to

another and in itself for her own sake. All I have to do to ensure that I am treating be Foodmaker or the laundry due her as an end in itself is to make sure that she is acting voluntarily and being treated fairly, that is, equally. But to respect the status of our person making ability as existing for the sake of making ends in themselves, the chosen use of someone's person making ability, unlike the use of their food making nor laundry doing ability, must be an act of love for her sake as an end in itself, an end in itself having ability to making ends in themselves. Because to truly evaluate the product of that ability as something for the sake of which everything else exists, I must evaluate someone who has that ability as worthy of love, of committed love for her own sake.

So it is a 2 way Street: a choice to use my person making ability must be a choice evaluating the product of that ability as that for the sake of which everything else exists, including the ability; and a choice to use my person making ability must be the choice that evaluates that ability as existing for the sake of an act of love for the other person maker as something for the sake of which everything else exists. Otherwise, we are not consistently evaluating ends in themselves as ends in themselves. (It must be a choice evaluating the product as an end in itself, and a choice evaluating the object of the desire that produces the child as an end in itself.)

n artificial conception, I separate person making from an act of love for another absolute value. I separate my use of my person making ability from an act of, an act expressing, committed love for another end in itself. I can morally use a food making or laundry doing robot and so separate my use of a food making ability or laundry doing ability from an act of justice for another end in itself. So my use of another entity's food making ability or laundry doing ability does not require a relation to another end in itself considered as such. So if I use a person making robot, would I not have to place a value on the robot, unlike the value I place on a food making machine, as if the robot had an absolute value?

Can I morally separate my use of my person making ability from a desire for another already existing person because of her person making ability? In that case, the offspring is not the results of a desire for another already existing person because because of the features that maker of person maker; nor is the offspring the result of a desire to give my person making ability to another already existing person because of her person making ability.

The use of another being's person making ability requires an evaluation of an already existing person by its very nature. The use of a food making ability or a laundry doing ability need not. The latter abilities could belong to robot's. Does artificial contraception require that our use of our person making ability relates us to another person as an object of evaluation? Now it does, but not necessarily in the future. For example, ova might be made in artificial ways rather than taking from a woman's womb.

In artificial conception, the cause of another end in itself's existence is an object of mere love of utility. For it is a mechanical process. If the cause of entity 1's existence is an object of mere love of utility, is a mere tool, a mere mechanical process, can entity 1 be an end in itself, an absolute value, something for the sake of which everything else exists? How can it be if the greater cannot come from the lesser? Compare to: we are product of a mere desire for pleasure.

Let's say that out of love for my wife, I want to give her baby and choose artificial conception to do so. The process I choose I choose Out of love, but the process itself is not a process of love. And a process that is not itself a process of love exists as a means to the end of already existing persons. So in choosing an act that is not a process of love we are evaluating the product of the act as existing for the sake of already existing persons. Why? Because a process that is not itself a process of love can only be chosen by evaluating it as an act that exists as a means to the end of already existing persons, by evaluating it as a means that exist for the sake of the end of already existing persons. And so we must consistently evaluate the product of the act that way.

The process is chosen and exists only because its product is wanted by me, that is, the process exists for the sake of producing a baby only because the baby is wanted by me. That same process could be used for other scientific goals.

In the case of morally done sex, however, we evaluate the act both as existing for the sake of producing an end in itself and as an act of love that respects an existing end in itself as an end in itself, an act of love for an existing end in itself. Evolution designed intercourse for the sake of producing a being that is in fact something for the sake of which everything else exists.

A sex act should not only be an act of desire (love of concupiscence) for another person, but can only respect that person as an end in itself by being (chosen as, evaluated as) an act of desire that gives existence to beings that are that for the sake of which everything else exists. Conversely, a sex act should not only be an act resulting from the desire for another person (the child) but an act evaluated as an act of love of friendship for an existing person maker, an act treating an existing person maker as an end in itself.

How does the sex act express, signify, the status of the partners as worthy of committed love? By being the means by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence. (By being the means, in our evaluations, by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence.)

How does the sex act express, signify, the status of the partners as worthy of committed love? By being the means by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence. So if we choose to use our sexuality in a way in which it cannot be the means of procreation, we are choosing to use it in a way that it cannot express the value of the partners as worthy of committed love. So our choice does not evaluate the person as something worthy of committed love for its own sake. The sex act expresses that value not only by being an act of desire for another person but by being an act of desire that can give existence to beings for the sake of which everything else exists. If we do anything that would cause a sex act not to be in our evaluations such an act we are not evaluating the person as the absolute value. And we are causing the sex act not to be a natural sign expressing the status of the partners as beings worthy of committed love.

In artificial conception, we separate the person making function, the generative function, from the unitive function.

Persons are now made by an act of an organism, a person making organism constituted by an act of love of one person maker for another because he or she has a person making ability.

An act of using another person's person making ability cannot be just a matter of fairness, the way it using

her food making ability or her laundry doing ability can be. But artificial conception uses another person's person making ability in the same way that I use her food making or laundry doing ability, that is, using those abilities does not require an act of love of friendship, an act of committed love for the other as an end in herself. So using her person making ability must require that kind of commitment.

The act by which I create a thing for the sake of which everything else exists, the act which I choose to be act creating a thing for the sake of which everything else exists, must be a chosen act that is itself an act of love for my partner person maker. Why? Because the existence of the organic unit that makes persons is an act of love in which persons are united, or by which persons are united. To choose to become a person maker without choosing an act of loving union with another thing for the sake of which everything else exists is to evaluate my person making ability to be other than what it is: a way of creating things for the sake of which everything else exists by a loving union between things for the sake of which everything else exists, by a unity between ends in themselves that is a loving relation of friendship, not just cooperating in a task.

The value of the product depends on the value of a producer. To choose to replace creating ends in themselves by a loving union between ends in themselves is to evaluate the creation as the product of something less than a loving union between ends in themselves and so as less than something itself worthy of love as an end in itself.

In sexual person making, what makes the 2 partners into one person making organism is an act of love between them. So what makes the person is an act of love of persons for persons. What makes the two partners into a person making organism is an act of love for another end in itself precisely as being an end in itself with an end in itself making ability. That end in itself making ability is an ability to love another end in itself for the sake of that ability.

As of now conception results from an act of desire for the sake of an ability to produce that for the sake of which everything else exists. Artificial conception comes from the ability to make AVs but does not come from that desire for another AV because of that ability to make AVs.

In artificial conception, we make our sexuality into a machine for making products. But our person making ability is not a machine for making persons. Our person making ability makes persons by acts of love. They are byproducts of acts of love for another person. The fact that they are byproducts of an act of committed love for another person allows us to be able to make persons and at the same time allow persons to be valued is that for the sake of which everything else exists.

We would desire the contribution of the partner, perhaps, solely for her contribution to the product to be made. We could desire the contribution of the partner solely for her contribution to the product to be made. In sexual reproduction we cannot do that. In sexual reproduction we must desire, that is, we must have a desire, for our partner for the sake of some of her own attributes other than just her contribution to the new person to be made. Those attributes do in fact constitute her partial person making ability. But to make a person we have to have a desire for what those attributes themselves are, and a desire for her because of what those attributes are. In other words, in sexual reproduction the partner cannot be desired just as a means to the end of bringing another person into existence.

Desiring her just as a means to the end of producing a new person may seem to better than just desiring her as a means to the existence of our own sexual pleasure. But that is not the moral alternative that we face here. Since we're talking about her person making ability, to value that ability for some other end than the creation of a person to the exclusion of the end of creating a person would be to value the person as if the person were not that for the sake of which everything else exists. So the issue is not whether we can morally compare desiring her as a means to sexual pleasure as opposed to desiring her as a means to producing a new human being. The question is only the question of the morality of desiring her solely as a means to the existence of a new person.

But from a psychological point of view that is what we cannot do now. To get a new person, we have to have a desire for her because of what she is. So in sexual reproduction, on the one hand, we cannot desire her solely for her contribution to the existence of a new person, but we can immorally desire her solely for the sexual pleasure she can give us. so the situation we are in, or were in, prior to artificial conception is that in order to produce a child we must have a love for our partner which does not reduce

the partner to being a means to our sexual pleasure or a means to the existence of a new person. In other words, to produce another person, we must have love for our partner that is consistent with valuing our partner's status as an end in itself. To do that while valuing her her fore her person making ability, we cannot value the person making ability simply as a means to our sexual pleasure. If we are valuing her person making ability as a means to our sexual pleasure, we are not valuing the person as that for the sake of which everything else exists. But neither can we succeed in making a person if we value her person making ability merely as a means to making a person. We must value her person making ability as something that makes her an object of love.

In effect, we are saying that our use of her person making ability does not require us to value her in anyway other than we value her when we use her food making ability. She does not have to be an object of desire or love for any other reason than her contribution to that object of desire or love which is the new person. That is, she does not have to be an object of desire or love in anyway other than in the general sense in which we must ensure that any other persons contributions to our ends are voluntary on the other persons part.

The use of our person making ability requires exclusivity. Unlike the use of our food making ability, the choice to use our person making ability involves the value we place on the person essentially. The value of the person is that of someone worthy of love for their own sake, not for the sake of their function. And so involves the value of the person as irreplaceable and unique. For insects that I am relating to a person making being as an object of love precisely for her person making ability. So I cannot evaluate my PMA as if its value were equivalent to that of a machine.

So the partners must not just will to cooperate fairly with each other in sharing their food making ability) but must have committed love for each other. That is, they must have love for each other not just for the sake of making a product, even though the product will be something for the sake of which everything else exists. Precisely because persons are that for the sake of which everything else exists a love from which persons come cannot be love just for the sake of making a product. When we cooperate for the sake of making food, in our actions are compatible with our love in each other just for the sake of making a

product. The nature of the act of making food is not such that the act requires to be an act in support of committed love for the other. Likewise, the nature of the act of artificially conceiving is compatible with loving each other just for the sake of making a product. The nature of the act is not such that the act requires to be an act in support of committed love for the other person for her own sake.

In other words, we do not value our sex partner for her ability to make persons. If we value her for her ability to make persons, we would not evaluate her as an end in itself. If we fail to value her as an end in itself, we cannot value our sexuality as existing for the sake of ends in themselves. So we must produce persons as a direct result of valuing our sex partner as an end in itself.

If we do anything that would cause a sex act not to be, in our evaluations, what it is for the sake of the existence of persons, we are causing the sex act not to be in our evaluations a natural sign expressing the status of our partner as a being worthy of committed love.

The meaning of my existence cannot be duplicated by machine generation. The meaning of my existence is that of the committed love of two person makers for the other as a person maker, as having a person making ability. The meaning of my existence is their love for the other as having features that become person making features by being objects of desire, of love. The meaning of my existence is that of a product of an act of love of one person for another person precisely for the sake of their person making ability.

Even if two committed people use a machine, they are using a method that does not require love of another person for their PMA. They are using a method that does not imply a need for a . . . that is not an act of love for another person maker as a person maker . . . using an act that would be the same even if it did not require the love of one person for another as having a PMA.

Using a machine does not require that specific kind of love that unites two people precisely by means of their PMAs. . . the specific kind of love

that is the desire by which one person's PMA unites her to another person with a PMA. So using a machine does not require that specific kind of love that is person making love. The specific kind of love that unites the mutually unites the two parents to the common child precisely as the product of their act of mutual love. The specific kind of love that affirms the value of persons as worthy of committed love by being a sharing of their AV making ability that is an actualization of their commitment to each other as AV's who have AV making ability. So we just have to ask why that kind of love is morally necessary for making persons. And the question almost answers itself.

Who owns that life in the petry dish? The conceptus owns it. And the conceptus has the right to develop, if possible, in his mothers womb, the right not to be a bastard, etc. The right not to be treated as property, as chattel.

For the mother or father to conceive with another partner is just as immoral as having sex with another partner would be.

Even test-tube babies show that our attitude toward sex is our attitude toward human life. If human life should not result from an act of giving between two persons, if sex is not the act of giving from which human life should result, human life is something that can be mechanically manipulated. Artificial conception proves that separating sex from procreation and procreation from sex demeans human life; for we are willing to kill the conceptus.

For we are saying that the use of a machine is morally equivalent to what we do now.

Our faculties do not exist in separation from us, and so they cannot be

evaluated as if they existed separately from us. (A person-making machine can be evaluated as if it existed separately from us.) When we hire a chef because of her ability to make food, we are placing a value on her, not just on her food-making ability. We are valuing her insofar as she has the ability to make food. Thus, we cannot treat her as if she were a machine for making food. We must treat her as a person, an end-in-itself, when we relate to her because of her food-making ability. We do not have to treat a machine as an end-in-itself, when we relate to it because of its food-making ability.

Likewise, we cannot value ourselves as if we were machines for making moral absolutes, a machine that was not also a feature of a moral absolute, a machine that did not also belong to the being of a moral absolute. (To the extent that we did so we are evaluating ourselves as if our value were that of a good of utility.) We might find a technological means of getting visual information that allowed us to use our eyes for some purpose other than seeing while frustrating their ability to see. We would be evaluating our sight-making ability, and ourselves as having a sight-making ability, as machines for performing acts of sight, machines that we do not have to use for that purpose. But in assigning an end to the act of using our sight-making power, so that we can frustrate our ability to make sight, we are not valuing that which brought us into existence, sexuality, as if it were not a means to the existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists. Everything else does not exist for the sake of beings making acts of vision; everything else does exist for the sake of that which we can bring into existence by using our sexuality.

Can we consistently evaluate ourselves and our partner as beings for the sake of which everything else exists and not evaluate our sexuality as existing for the sake of producing beings for the sake of which everything

else exists?

We can consistently value the machine as not existing for the sake of producing that for the sake of which everything else exists. For in so valuing the machine, we are not simultaneously placing a value on a person; we are not simultaneously evaluating a person with respect to their person-making ability.

A pencil is a means to something less than a moral absolute. If I evaluate the pencil as a means to something less than a moral absolute, I have done no injustice to the pencil. Now the person-making machine is not itself a moral absolute. Like the pencil, it is something less than a moral absolute. Therefore, if I use the machine as a means to something less than a moral absolute, I have done no injustice to the machine. I can still consistently evaluate it, the machine, for what it is, something less than a moral absolute.

Likewise, sexuality is not a moral absolute. But it is an inseparable feature of a moral absolute and it is, in fact, a means to the existence of a moral absolute. The question is can I evaluate sexuality as something less than a means to a moral absolute without evaluating the being from which it is inseparable as something less than a moral absolute. Can I evaluate a person insofar as they have a person-making ability as thereby related to making something less than a moral absolute without valuing the thing that has the ability to make persons as something less than a moral absolute?

What the machine is is accidentally related to what its result is, a person. What a sexual person is is not accidentally related to what its result, a sexual person, is. The reason why I exist sexually, the reason for the existence of me acting sexually, is to cause the existence of another TFSW. AND THE PERSON-MAKER IS THE WHOLE PERSON, NOT JUST HER SEXUALITY. The means for causing the existence of a TFSW is not just our sexuality, it is the

existence of persons with sexuality. Artificial conception produces persons in a way that could be done without persons.

Thing X has a person-making ability. Can I evaluate that thing as if it were less than a means to making a moral absolute without evaluating the thing as if it itself were less than a moral absolute? The preceding sentence applies to both machines and persons. Both have the ability to make persons. But that sentence would not make it wrong to evaluate a machine as a means to something less than a moral absolute, because it is not wrong to evaluate the machine itself as something less than a moral absolute. But that sentence would make it wrong to evaluate a person's sexuality as something less than a means to a moral absolute, because it is wrong to make the person something less than a moral absolute.

When I evaluate the machine acting asexually as less than a means to a moral absolute, I am not evaluating a moral absolute as a means to something less than a moral absolute. When I place a value on myself acting sexually and I so evaluate myself as less than a means to a moral absolute, I am evaluating a moral absolute as, at that time, less than a means to a moral absolute.

Now take the case of a machine for making persons that is the product of human art. Once that machine exists, there would only be three moral possibilities. We could use it without interfering with its ability to make persons. Like our sexuality, we could refrain from using it. Unlike our sexuality, we could alter the machine so that it was no longer a person-making instrument.

But would the last possibility really be moral? That is, if it is immoral to sterilize ourselves, why would sterilizing the machine be moral? My argument does *not* depend on having a good answer to this question. If there is no moral distinction, then only the first two possibilities mentioned

in the preceding paragraph are genuine moral possibilities.

Since an existing person is an end-in-itself, altering the makeup of a person is not morally insignificant as altering the makeup of a work of art, which is not an end-in-itself, would be. Possibly, this line of thought could lead to a justification for sterilizing the machine that would not justify human sterilization. But, again, my argument does not depend on this possibility.

As it is now, the makers of persons are other persons with PMAs. So the alter our PMA for the sake of not producing persons devalues and damages existing persons. Sterilizing a machine does not devalue or damage an existing person, does not make a person-making person into a nonperson-making person.

Before test tube babies, the meaning of our coming into existence was that we resulted from an act of love, of desire, of evaluating, toward another person.

In marriage, another person results from an act placing a value on another person's person-making ability, placing a value on another person insofar as she has a person-making ability. So the child not only comes from persons, she comes from an act of love between persons, an act evaluating another person as worthy of committed love precisely insofar as she has a person-making ability, i.e., insofar as she has the ability to make the child that results.

Human existence comes from an act in which one person places a value on another person, specifically, one person places a value on another person's person-making-ability, or places a value on another person insofar as she has an ability that is in fact a person-making-ability, an orientation to the existence of the absolute value, TFSW, should come from an affective act

worthy of a TFSW. That act of valuing is an act of love, an act of appreciating, of desiring union with, of desiring oneness with her insofar as she has and I have a de facto person-making ability. So the existence of a person should come from an act of love between persons. The use of my person-making ability is less than worthy of a person if it is not an act of love toward another person. If I use my person-making ability mechanically, I am saying that it is alright for persons to come into existence as a result of mechanical acts. (See Grisez.)

The use of my person-making ability is less than worthy of a person if it is not an act of committed love toward another person. But if I use a mechanical means of procreation instead of my person-making ability, I am saying that it is alright for persons to come into existence as a result of mechanical acts; I am saying that mechanical acts of production are worthy of products that are worthy of committed love. But if coming into existence through a mechanical process is not an injustice to a person, why should coming into existence through a sex act not based on committed love? So the existence of a person should come from an act of love between persons.

What if the value we place on the other person as a sexual being is less than that of being an object of committed love? Then, the existence of human persons results from placing a value on another person that is less than the value of being worthy of committed love. The existence of X results from placing a value on something, Y. If we value Y as less than worthy of committed love, can the existence of that which results from that evaluation be worthy of committed love?

No, because, although X in fact is worthy of committed love, the existence of a person cannot logically have that status in our evaluations.

For in our evaluations, the existence of X is a result of valuing a person as something less than worthy of committed love. (And when I choose to use a mechanical method, I am placing a value on the method, I am desiring the method, in the same way.) But if X should not result from an evaluation of a sexual being as something less than worthy of committed love, should X result from anything less than an act of committed sexual love between two persons?

For the child is not the direct result of an act valuing another person as an end-in-itself.

If we created an artificial means of procreation, our own nature, our own psychology, would not change. As of now, when sex is the only means, the relationship of one partner to the other fully values the other partner as an end-in-itself if and only if we subordinate that relationship to the purpose of procreation. Given that the nature of our psychological makeup would remain the same,

Necessarily, we would be making the relation between ourselves and our partner (not to mention our children) something other than what nature designed it to be, and it would be something other than nature designed it in a way that was inconsistent with valuing persons as ends-in-themselves.

Now, we perform actions which can describe as being engaged in person-making." If we gave up using sex for procreation because we had an artificial means of doing so, we would perform the same action but that description would no longer true of it. The change in description reflects a change in reality, i.e., that action no longer has the kind of relation to an absolute value that it used to have. So, the place of sex in the scale of values in reality would radically change without any corresponding change in the psychological acts by which we now place values on our sex partners. And so the value of the relation to another person that I establish in sex would radically change; and

the value of an integral part of my own being would radically change. My own being would not have the value it had before; that value would be diminished, and not merely in a relative sense. The value of my being would be diminished in a way intrinsically related to the status of a person as an absolute value.

For we are saying that the use of a machine is morally equivalent to what we do now.

So in marriage, the meaning of the child's existence is that the value of persons, as having person-making ability, is to be worthy of committed love. In a healthy family, a child learns just from observing her parents relationship, that the meaning of her existence, and hence that of other persons, is that human sexuality causes effects that are worthy of committed love for their own sake.

Given that it is possible for persons to come into existence through a sex act that results from two persons valuing each other, as sexual beings, to be worthy of committed love, would any other way of making a person be morally worthy of a person, since the value of the new person is that of an entity worthy of committed love? Is it possible to consistently value children as ends-in-themselves if we consensually use our person-making ability without valuing our partner, as a sexual being, to be worthy of committed love?

If we stopped using sex for procreation and used only artificial means, it would still be true that every person that will ever exist will be the result of sex. For the artificial means will be first produced by products of sex and only by products of sex.

Can I change my evaluation of sex relative to an absolute value without

changing my evaluation of myself relative to that value, since the ability to produce that value is part of what I am? And since my existence is nothing but a product of the ability to produce that value? Must I not change my evaluation of my partner and others likewise?

Assume that a natural event occurs of which a chance result is a new mechanism with a specific relation to the existence of persons. Still the coming into existence of that new mechanism did not itself have a specific relation to the existence of persons. The coming into existence of our mechanism with a specific relation to the existence of persons did have a specific relation to the existence of persons. For our mechanism for creating persons was brought into existence by means of another person's specific mechanism for creating persons.

Call the new method B. Once B is in existence, it is specifically related to human persons. But the persons B makes do not have B as a power; they have sex as a power. So the power B makes is itself made by something with a specific relation to it. Our sexuality has a specific relation to persons and its coming into existence was not accidentally related to something with a specific connection to persons. B has a specific relation to persons but B's coming into existence is only accidentally related to the existence of persons. That is, the causes of B's coming into existence are only accidentally related to the existence of persons.

Why not have the abortion? You can always have *other* children. As if children were replaceable parts, the ethic of function rather than of relationship to a unique person. So to select the characteristics of the child places functional over personal value and reverses the ethic of

irreplacability in favor of the ethic of function. Ethically, we should take what we get. You can get another child, but not the one this sex act would have caused. (See the George Will cutout quoting Leon Kass.)

The way we evaluate human life has logical implications for that which causes human life,

The existence of our partner resulted from, and solely from, a previous act(s) of valuing another person. Can we devalue our partner's ability to make ends-in-themselves without devaluing the results of previous uses of the ability to make ends-in-themselves? In artificial conception, the product does not result from an act of valuing, desiring, the other person for their PMA.

I can deal with those capacities, which are merely capacities for performing functions, according to justice. I can give money in return for making me laugh. When I do, I treat the capacity under which I am relating to the person as a capacity for making effects that are less than the existence of persons. And I am treating the person, insofar as he or she possesses that capacity, as less than a maker of something of absolute ethical value.

Justice establishes an equality, a proportion, among goods external to persons. But the obligatory character of justice comes from the fact that the goods are goods of and for persons.

The greater cannot come from the lesser. If I treat a person under the aspect of a-sexual-being the way I treat a person under the aspect of a-being-who- can-perform-function-X, I am treating a procreator as a thing maker, as an agent with a capacity for making things. A person (the higher) does not come from a mere capacity for making things.

If we are responsible for the existence of a being worthy of committed love, we are responsible for giving it committed love. Who else would be responsible if we are not? To assign that responsibility to someone else is to confuse personal value with functional value. For replaceability is the ethic of functional value.

Test-tube babies: the giving of existence is not an act of love in which two people give each other their life-sharing power. To achieve the end of having a baby, I can choose, as a means, an act of love in which we give each other, not just our PMAs, but ourselves insofar as we have PMAs, or we can choose a use of our PMAs which use does not amount to giving ourselves to each other as PMAs, giving of our whole consciousness. We can choose a means which is an exercise, a manifestation, an actualization, an expression of our committed love for another person as having a PMA.

For me to succeed in treating persons as ends in themselves in situations where I hire a foodmaker or a laundry doer, all I have to do is ensure that the person I hire is doing it in pursuit of her own freely chosen ends. For me to succeed in valuing persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists in situations where I use another end in itself's person making ability, it is not enough to ensure that the person whose ability I use is doing it in pursuit of her own freely chosen ends.

Because I can replace a cook with a machine for making food, the value of the person is involved in my cook's consent to make food, but not in the use of her food-making ability per se. Therefore it would not be wrong for me to replace her with a machine. Consent is not enough to justify my using mine or my partner's PMA; for the same reason, not just any kind of use of our PMA is justified. In particular, we should not use it in a way that makes its value like that of a machine for making food. For then the product of the machine only has a value like that of food.

Since persons are that for the sake of which everything else exists, I cannot love another person just as a

means to creating persons. A process done for love for but that is not itself a process of love exists as a means to the end of already existing persons. That's what it would be in our evaluations; that's what we would evaluate it, the process, to be. And so the product of the process exists only because the product is wanted by me, that is, the process exists for the sake of creating a person only because the person is wanted by me. I want to have the child. I could use the process, perhaps, to achieve other goods.

"All children should be wanted" now has come to mean that in order to be acceptable children should satisfy their parent's desires for the child's identity. We have stopped saying yes to whatever the child turns out to be. This is the reduction of a person to being an extension of another person's will. Instead, we should be in awe at every human life.

Sexual love is person making love. As person making love, it must be a love that honors, values, persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists; otherwise it is unworthy of being person making love. Artificial insemination is person making but is not an act of love that is person making. The person making an act should be a full communion of persons, that is, not just a sexual act but a marital sexual act. (The person making act should be a bodily act of love, since that is the kind of person being made and since that is the way we make a person namely by making a bodily entity.) And the person making act should not be just a marital act, but a sexual marital act.

If marriage is to be an intrinsic good (Grisez), that is, not just a means to some other good, artificial conception must be evil. If artificial conception is not evil, marriage must not be an intrinsic good.

Intercourse is a good given to another for her own sake, an intrinsic good given to another for her own sake. Removing a gamete is not an intrinsic good but an instrumental good.

Morally, exclusive coitus is the only sort of act that married couples can do and not married couples cannot do. this is the only act that is exclusive of persons committed to each other as that for the sake of which everything else exists. So conception by exclusive coitus is the only way of conceding that he is specifically marital. Only coitus transmits life in a marital way.

biologically most animals are complete individuals with respect to most functions. But the complete organism capable of reproducing sexually is the united pair. The mated pair is the organic unit that produces the offspring. So the meaning of the offspring, its value, is that of an effect of this organic unit. If this organic unit is not brought into existence by valuing the person as that for the sake of which everything else exists, by valuing persons as worthy of committed love for their own sake, what is the value of the offspring?

See page 60 on qualities (page of what: Grisez? Simon?)

In making any other product, we can will to cooperate fairly, without committed love, because the value of the person as such is not involved in the product of the cooperative act, but only in the two agents of the cooperative act. So as long as the agents make the product willingly the value of the person is respected.

Compare artificial insemination to an artificial food making ability.

When I choose to eat for pleasure, the value of the person as that for the sake of which everything else exists does not come into play beyond the fact that, in fact, it is a person choosing to achieve that chosen end. When I hire a cook, the value of the person comes into play, but only to the extent that the other person is also seeking a chosen end. But instead of hiring a cook, I could have a robot do it when I choose to use my person making ability, for example, by collecting sperm for artificial insemination, the value of person enters the nature of the end and of the act chosen as means to an end.

By nature's design, the existence of a person, that is, the existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists, is the result of a union of one person's partial person making ability with another person's. So the existence of a person is the result of the desire of one person to unite with another person because of the other person's person making ability. The existence of a person is the result of the desire of one person for another person because of the other person's person making ability. So the existence of a person is not just the result of my use of my partial person making ability and my partner's use of her

partial person making ability. It is the result of my partial person making ability causing a desire on my part to unite with another person because of her partial person making ability. It is the result of a desire for another person because of her person making ability. It is the result of a love for another person because of her person making ability.

A perhaps interesting way to approach the question of artificial conception would be to assume that from the beginning our means of person making was a mechanical one. That is, that we had been given some sort of mechanical methods, say, of extracting the sperm from the male and the egg from the female so that we could unite them in a test tube. How, then, would the morality of the act of making a person differ from what it is now? One thing to notice is that while the child to be conceived might be an object of desire, the partner in the process of person making would not be an object of desire in the sense in which she is now.

Let us to return to the case where our person making ability was originally mechanical. It is possible to use our person making ability without any other object of desire than the existence of another person. That is, our desire for our partner would be strictly limited to being a means to the existence of another person. Or at least our desire for our partner could be so strictly limited.

We can desire to relate to another person strictly for the sake of her food making ability, in the same sense. This is not incompatible with giving her the status in our values as that for the sake of which everything else exists, as long as we relate to her for the sake of her food making ability in a way that makes her use of that ability voluntary, that is, freely chosen for the sake of her own ends. But the question is whether we can relate to her for the sake of her person making ability and do so in a way that gives her the status in our values of an end in itself just by ensuring that her use of her person making ability is voluntary?

We can do so only if the way we desire the existence of the new person is consistent with valuing the new person to be an end in itself and not just a means to our own ends. Not just a means to our own personal fulfillment. In effect, we are saying that our use of her person making ability does not require us to value

her in anyway other than we value her when we use her food making ability. She does not have to be an object of desire or love for any other reason than her contribution to that object of desire or love which is the new person. That is, she does not have to be an object of desire or love in anyway other than in the general sense in which we must ensure that any other persons contributions to our ends are voluntary on the other persons part.

That is, the ability that serves our ends is, like her food making ability, not so related to that for the sake of which everything else exists that in order to give that for the sake of which everything else exists its proper place in our values we have to love her her in a specific, unique, Sense. We do not have to relate to her person making ability, or to her because of her person making ability, in a way that involves a love for her, or a desire for her, which is both beyond the love that any dealing with another person morally requires and beyond a desire for her just for the sake of sexual pleasure. If we don't have that kind of love for her when we use her for the sake of creating a new person, are we really able to value the new person as a person deserves to be value, as opposed to merely valuing her as something that will fulfill our ends. That is the question.

If we intend to create a person, we must simultaneously intend to serve the interests of that person as a being for the sake of which everything else exists. If when we intend to create a person we do not simultaneously intend to do whatever is necessary to serve the interest of that person as an end in itself, we are not valuing persons as ends in themselves. The person we intend to create is not an end in itself in our values.

When I masturbate or remove an egg from the uterus, there is no essential teleological connection between such an act and creating a person. Sperm and eggs could be used for other scientific purposes. In fact, without deliberate human intervention, the occurrence of conception would be entirely accidental to these acts. In normal sex, on the other hand, if conception is going to happen, it's going to happen, unless deliberate human intervention prevents it. The occurrence of conception, when it takes place, is a natural outcome of the act; it is an outcome naturally connected to the act. Human intervention would be necessary to prevent conception.

In normal sex, the act is naturally and necessarily procreative; so is naturally in conformity to the transcendence of the person making ability's goal of making persons over all other goals. In artificial conception, the acts performed are extrinsic to the person making ability's goal of making persons. So in choosing artificial conception, I am not evaluating an act of my person making ability to be what it is, that is, one with a natural relation to making persons.

Evolution gave the person making ability the goal of acts that are person making whether I want them to make persons or not, whether I want them to be person making acts or not. In other words are evolution designed my person making ability for acts that make things for the sake of which everything else exists, whether I want them to make things for the sake of which everything else exists or not. In artificial conception, on the other hand, an act is person making only because I choose it to be person making. The process exists for the sake of making a baby only because a baby is wanted by me, not because the nature of the act is ordered to something that has value whether or not I want it. So the baby would be a product of an act, not that produces something of intrinsic value no matter what other people want, but an act that produces something that has whatever value it has only because another person wants that.

An act that makes a baby should be an act that by its nature, by what it is, is an act of love of friendship for another person, not just the love of concupiscence for a baby, for pleasure, etc.

Artificial contraception and artificial conception both treat sexual beings as if sexuality were merely a way of performing tasks and so treat sexual beings as such as if they were makers of mere things. Only an act of committed love for another person as a sexual being can treat a sexual being as if the value of sexuality is not that of tasks for making things. Morally, if a human person may come from a mere capacity for making things, the person is not an end in itself.

When a child results from an act of marital love, she results from the fact that, beyond wanting the child in wanting each other, the parents value persons as worthy of committed love for their own sake. When human life comes from an act expressing committed love for each other as sexual beings, the meaning, the value, of the result of sexuality is that of committed love of one sexual being for another from which

the new person comes. So the meaning of the coming into existence of the child is not just that she was wanted by someone else but beyond that she is something worthy of committed love just for being what she is, a person.

To say that the value of the child depends on whether the child comes from an act expressing committed love amounts to saying that the act is understood as an actualization of their committed love, a manifestation of their committed love, an exercise of their committed love. So when human life comes from an act that is understood as an exercise committed love, understood as an actualization of committed love, and that is performed because it is so understood, then the value of the child is that of an end in itself. For the source of the child's existence is the very fact that the parents value persons as worthy of committed love for their own sake.

We value things for what they can bring into existence. But something we value for what it can bring into existence is not an absolute value, since its value is subordinate to and measured by that which it can bring into existence. Persons must not be valued for what they can bring into existence. The existence of a person is the value that measures all other values, that all other values to be consistent with.

Because of sexuality is our person making ability, the way in which we use it, and the context in which we use it, can either affirm the ethically absolute value of the person as such or deny it. We do not have the right to tell someone else "I consensually give you permission to use my person making ability in a way that prevents the absolute value of the person from being affirmed.

The meaning of my existence cannot be duplicated by machine generation. The meaning of my existence is that of the committed love of 2 person makers for each other as person makers, as having a person making ability. So the meaning of my existence is their love for each other as having features that become person making features only by being objects of desire, of love. The meaning of my existence is that of being the product of an act of love and desire of one person for another precisely because of their person making ability.

Even if 2 committed spouses use a mechanical method to procreate, they are using a

method that does not involve love or desire for another person because of her PMA. They are using an act that does not imply the need for a – that is not an act of love for another person maker as a person maker – using an act that would be the same even if it did not require the love of one person for another has having a pma.

Can we turn the passing on of human life into a technology, i.e., a process of making as opposed to doing (art versus prudence). Can you turn creating human life into a process of manipulating things? In natural reproduction, we are not making something, we are experiencing something.

The result, that is, the desired union, is the existence of a complete person making agency, a complete person making causal system. To say that my sexuality exists for the sake of the existence of persons is to say that, first of all, my sexuality exists for the sake of the existence of a complete person making causal system. So the fact that persons are that for the sake of which everything else exists means that my sexuality, as far as my values are concerned, must exist for the sake of the existence of a complete person making causal system. In my values, my sexuality must exist for that sake if persons are to have the status in my values all being that for the sake of which everything else exists. (What kind of causal system? A machine? No. A union of love, of self-giving, a union that is an act of love.)

Check out the traditional theory of transmission of original justice/original sin. Maybe there's something about our sexuality there that can be used to argue against in vitro fertilization, etc.

We would be evaluating our power to see, and ourselves insofar as we have that power, as if we were the moral equivalent of animals or of machines for acts of seeing, machines that we do not have to use for that purpose, because that purpose is not a moral absolute.

Below this line are texts moved from above to the end.

, a machine that was not also a feature of a moral absolute, a machine that did not also belong to the being of a moral absolute. ("belong," i.e., is a causally essential part of the causal structure that makes her a moral absolute.)

I cannot change my evaluation of sex relative to an absolute value without changing my evaluation of myself relative to that value, since the ability to produce that value is part of what I am and since my existence is nothing but a product of the ability to produce that value. And I must change my evaluation of my partner and others likewise.