

Why consent does not make sex moral and immoral sex is "dirty" or degrading

Nature has chosen that human life would come into existence as a result of the physical desire of one person for the pleasure that another person's body can give. If so, how can the value of human life not be merely that of an accidental product of a purely physical desire? Human life can have the dignity it deserves and needs only if the use of sexual desire is made part of a relation of committed love and committed self-giving of each other's bodies between those who will create human life through their desire.

Persons should be brought into existence by an act that itself values our partner in the act not for her ability to bring something other than herself into existence but values her as an object of committed love. The object of the act that brings a person into existence must be an object loved for her own sake, an object of a love that values her for her own sake. So if we make our sexuality into a machine for making persons, rather than an act of love that makes persons . . . (And we evaluate ourselves to be machines for making persons.)

How does the sex act express, signify, the status of the partners as worthy of committed love? By being the means by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence. (By being the means, in our evaluations, by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence.)

How does the sex act express, signify, the status of the partners as worthy of committed love? By being the means by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence. So if we choose to use our sexuality in a way in which it cannot be the means of procreation, we are choosing to use it in a way that it cannot express the value of the partners as worthy of committed love. So our choice does not evaluate the person as something worthy of committed love for its own sake. The sex act expresses that value not only by being an act of desire for another person but by being an act of desire that can give existence to beings for the sake of which everything else exists. If we do anything that would cause a sex act not to be in our evaluations such an act we are not evaluating the person as the absolute value. And we are causing the sex act not to be a natural sign expressing the status of the partners as beings worthy of

committed love.

If the use of the life faculty is not based on committed love, then human life itself is not (cannot be) the object of committed love, something worthy of committed love for its own sake.

Consider this. Human persons are the products of acts that are mere playing's. If so, what is the value of a person? If a person is the product of an activity that is essentially trivial, were essentially for the sake of pleasure, is that product really something we can describe as that for the sake of which everything else exists? Or if a person is an accidental product of a romp of physical passion, is the existence of that product the existence of the absolute value to which every other value is relative? If the greater cannot come from the lesser, the answer to these questions must be no. Then why should we not give the same answer to the question whether the product of a mechanical means of person making is absolute value?

In artificial conception, we make our sexuality into a machine for making products. But our person making ability is not a machine for making persons. Our person making ability makes persons by acts of love. They are byproducts of acts of love for another person. The fact that they are byproducts of an act of committed love for another person allows us to be able to make persons and at the same time allow persons to be valued is that for the sake of which everything else exists.

In other words, we do not value our sex partner for her ability to make persons. If we value her for her ability to make persons, we would not evaluate her as an end in itself. If we fail to value her as an end in itself, we cannot value our sexuality as existing for the sake of ends in themselves. So we must produce persons as a direct result of valuing our sex partner as an end in itself.

Sexual love is person making love. As person making love, it must be a love that honors, values, persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists; otherwise it is unworthy of being person making love.

Does it help to put it this way? As it is now, at least prior to artificial conception, producing another person required a desire not just for the new person but a desire that relates us to the partner in person making.

But that desire relating us to the partner in person making has two interesting characteristics. One is that it is a desire for her for the sake of attributes which as a matter of fact constitute her person making ability. But the other is that this desire for her because of those person making attributes cannot be a desire, morally, that values her person making ability just for the sake of making a new person. As things are now, it has to be a desire for those attributes because of what they are and what they make her not just as a means to the existence of another person, but what they make her with respect to being a person love for her own sake. Or they make her a person worthy of love for features she possesses independently of whether those features are means to any other end than making her an object of our desire or love.

And it is that last characteristic that is the key to morality, sexual morality. Is it also the key to the immorality of artificial conception? That is the question.

Is it morally correct for me to so evaluate the use of my sexuality that it does not exist, sexuality or the use, for the sake of a union of love between ends in themselves? Is it morally correct to evaluate my sexuality as if it does not exist for the sake of uniting me in love with another absolute value, another being for the sake of which everything else exists? In other words, is it moral for me to separate the use of my sexuality from all the psychological and intimately interpersonal aspects of my sexuality that go into the use of my sexuality in normal sex? For those aspects of my sexuality exist precisely for the sake of sex acts being love acts between two beings worthy of committed love for their own sake.

An act of using someone's food making ability or laundry doing ability does not exist for the sake of a union of committed love with another and in itself. It does not exist for the sake of giving myself to another and in itself for her own sake. All I have to do to ensure that I am treating her as Foodmaker or the laundry due her as an end in itself is to make sure that she is acting voluntarily and being treated fairly, that is, equally. But to respect the status of our person making ability as existing for the sake of making ends in themselves, the chosen use of someone's person making ability, unlike the use of their food making nor laundry doing ability, must be an act of love for her sake as an end in itself, an end in itself having ability to making ends in themselves. Because to truly evaluate the product of that ability as something for the sake of which everything else exists, I must evaluate someone who has that ability as

worthy of love, of committed love for her own sake.

So it is a 2 way Street: a choice to use my person making ability must be a choice evaluating the product of that ability as that for the sake of which everything else exists, including the ability; and a choice to use my person making ability must be the choice that evaluates that ability as existing for the sake of an act of love for the other person maker as something for the sake of which everything else exists. Otherwise, we are not consistently evaluating ends in themselves as ends in themselves. (It must be a choice evaluating the product as an end in itself, and a choice evaluating the object of the desire that produces the child as an end in itself.)

In the case of morally done sex, however, we evaluate the act both as existing for the sake of producing an end in itself and as an act of love that respects an existing end in itself as an end in itself, an act of love for an existing end in itself. Evolution designed intercourse for the sake of producing a being that is in fact something for the sake of which everything else exists.

A sex act should not only be an act of desire (love of concupiscence) for another person, but can only respect that person as an end in itself by being (chosen as, evaluated as) an act of desire that gives existence to beings that are that for the sake of which everything else exists. Conversely, a sex act should not only be an act resulting from the desire for another person (the child) but an act evaluated as an act of love of friendship for an existing person maker, an act treating an existing person maker as an end in itself.

At the Film Institute's tribute to James Stewart, Dustin Hoffman asked what happened to the America portrayed in It's a Wonderful Life. That American was based on love. For a society to be based on love, we have to train people, especially the young, to love. We can't do that without telling them that chastity is expected of them. Without chastity, our most important and fundamental (fundamental, i.e., others depend on them) love relationships won't work: the spousal and parental relationships.

If we put an absolute value on human life, it follows that we have the attitude that sex is a vehicle for committed love. So if we don't view sex as a vehicle for committed love, we cannot put an absolute value on human life. Choosing not to make marriage the norm amounts to choosing against marriage, not being neutral. Marriage can perform its necessary functions only if it is taken seriously as the norm.

Sexuality is not, like our food-making ability, something whose use contributes only a relative and contingent value to end-in-themselves; sexuality contributes that without which there would be no other values, persons, that without which there would be no persons, their existence. denying that the other is worthy of committed love just because the act in question is not an act of complete giving of myself?

Prior to test-tube babies, human existence came from one person placing a value on another person. Specifically, one person places a value on another person's person-making-ability, or places a value on another person insofar as she has an ability that is in fact a person-making-ability. That act of valuing is an act of love, an act of appreciating, of desiring union with, of desiring oneness with her insofar as she has an ability that is de facto a person-making ability. What if the value we place on the other person as a sexual being is less than that of being an object of committed love? Then, the existence of human persons results from placing a value on another person that is less than the value of being worthy of committed love. The existence of X results from placing a value on something, Y. If we value Y as less than worthy of committed love, can the existence of that which results from that evaluation be worthy of committed love?

No, because, although X in fact is worthy of committed love, the existence of a person cannot logically have that status in our evaluations. For in our evaluations, the existence of X is a result of valuing a person as something less than worthy of committed love. But if X should not result from

an evaluation of a sexual being as something less than worthy of committed love, should X result from anything less than an act of committed sexual love between two persons?

Why is extra-marital sex "dirty" or degrading? What does it degrade? It degrades the value of human life.

Pornography, casual sex, etc., trivialize our person-making ability. They do it even though, e.g., the woman in the pornography is not fertile at the time. The features of her we are trivializing are the features by which we make persons, when we can make them, the features necessary for making children, when we can make them.

My argument also shows why it is not just prudishness to consider pornography "dirty." The value of the human person is degraded, if sex is valued as a mere means to something less than human existence; for then the person is no longer that for which everything else exists.

But the value of persons transcends their ability to perform functions as the absolute transcends the relative. So the ability to perform functions cannot be placed on a par with the ability to make persons without implicitly reducing the place of the person in our system of values. But if the woman's person-making ability is disconnected from its relation to an ethical absolute, since that which was formerly absolute is no longer absolute, a different value will inevitably be placed on women's sexuality. It will be valued for the relative goods it can provide, and women will inevitably tend to become sex objects.

The reason why even consensual extramarital sex is exploitation is that you are reducing the value of human life and so reducing the value of even the consenting partner -- and of yourself. The reason why you are reducing the value is that the value we place on sex will be the value we place on human life, and vice versa.

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Why is extra-marital sex "dirty" or degrading? What does it degrade? It degrades the value of human life.

The pinup model who did not want to pose nude because she did not want her future children to see the pictures. Why worry if a child sees her mother nude? To be nude is to expose and give away her ability to be a mother. For her ability to be a mother is her ability to stimulate the male. And the male's ability to be a father requires his being stimulated by the female.

Pornography, casual sex, etc., trivialize our person-making ability. They do it even though, e.g., the woman in the pornography is not fertile at the time. The features of her we are trivializing are the features by which we make persons, when we can make them, the features necessary for making children, when we can make them.

The brain is an instrument for thinking, even when we are sleeping. It still is what it is, because evolution selected it for thinking. The stomach is still an instrument for digesting, even when we are fasting. What the stomach is, its design, its nature, is an organ selected for digesting; etc.

SSR, Woman's lib, Pew, 3-19-96

"I don't want my body to be respected for its ability to carry children." Then you inevitably making your body into a sex object. "No, I want my body to be respected as belonging to a person, an end-in-herself." But you canceled the value of a person when you refused to let your body be respected as the place where *persons* come into existence and are nurtured. Once that value is rejected, reduction to being a sex object is inevitable.

Do we have the right to tell someone else: I consensual give you permission to use my person-making ability in a way that prevents the absolute value of the person from being affirmed?

I do not deal with a person's capacities apart from the person. If I hire a comedian to give me pleasure, I am hiring him or her, not just his or her capacities. But I am hiring him or her AS a being with certain capacities. I can deal with those capacities, which are merely capacities for performing functions, according to justice. I can give money in return for making me laugh. When I do, I treat the capacity under which I am relating to the person as a capacity for making effects that are less than the existence of persons. And I am treating the person, insofar as he or she possesses that capacity, as less than a maker of something of absolute ethical value. (See Gallagher on justice and persons.)

So I can choose the end of pleasure as long as it doesn't interfere with the end of procreation. But why can't it interfere? Aren't I *always*, in every choice, selecting between ends to which I have an inclination prior to choice? Yes, but pleasure is just an end for me; a child exists for its own sake.

And see Notes², SSR, of this date. The structure of the human act is that we choose means in view of an end, and we do so on the basis of knowledge of the connection between a means and an end. So we cannot avoid placing a value on our sexuality that either does or does not value the product of sexuality, human persons, as ends-in-themselves. So this is one of those areas where we cannot avoid evaluating a thing to either be or not be what it is, i.e., cannot avoid "treating" things as if they are or are not what they are. (We can say we "evaluate" human persons a certain way in deciding for sex; can we say we "treat" them as if they are not what they are? We can't treat a nonexistent one way or the other, but we can treat ourselves and our sex partner as if we are not what we are, ends-in-ourselves.)

Human life is the product of an act of animal passion. What then is the value of human life?

Human life is the product of committed love between persons. What then is the value of human life?

If only animals existed and not persons, all values would be relative to the arbitrary subjective desires of animals (if we prevent conception, sex is an arbitrary subjective desire, and we are products of arbitrary subjective desires).

For we have no aspiration or ability to produce anything more glorious and wonderful than what an animal can produce.

Human life comes from an act of love between persons. The meaning, the value, of human life is that of the committed love of one person for another, from which life comes. If it does not come from committed love, what is the value of human life?

In marriage, human life comes from one person's complete giving of him/herself to another person. The meaning of that coming into existence is one person's believe that another is worthy of his/her complete giving of him/herself. Anything less than that, and we are not evaluating another to be worthy of complete giving of ourselves. We are not evaluating the other to be that, but are we denying it? When I enter into an ordinary business or social exchange, am I denying that the other is worthy of committed love just because the act in question is not an act of complete giving of myself?

No, but in such acts, I am not using, and placing a value on, the other's person-making ability.

Children come from, are the direct result of, valuing another person, placing a value on another person. If the valuing of another person from which children come is not that of valuing her as object of committed love, if persons come from placing a value on other persons, but not placing a value on them as worthy of committed love, then ...

What brings persons into existence is a love of some kind, a desire of some kind. So what brings persons into existence is a valuing of some kind of another person, a placing a value of some kind on another person, an evaluation of some kind of another person. Persons are the direct result of a valuing of some kind, of a placing of value of some kind. If the valuing from which persons result is not an affirmation of the person as worthy of committed love, a recognition of a person's deserving of committed love, can we consistently judge the result of that valuing as something worthy of committed love? Society requires that sex be confined to relationships of committed love. That means that the meaning of sex is giving love to another being, sharing life with another being, who is worthy of committed love for their own sake, i.e., a person. But can't we affirm the value of the person without a sexual permanent commitment? Not when we use their pma, rather than their fma, lma. For in making babies we are not just evaluating a person but her pma.

The meaning of a child's existence is that of being worthy of committed love for their own sake. Persons are worthy of evaluation as objects of committed love for their own sake. If the evaluation of another person that brings children into existence is not evaluation of her as an object of committed love for her own sake, ... If the love for a person that brings children into existence is not love for a person as a being worthy of committed love for her own sake, ... then is the existence of that which results from this valuation, the existence of that which results from this love, the existence of something worthy of evaluation as an object of committed love, then is the existence that this love produces the existence of a being worthy of committed love for its own sake?

Nature has designed it so that things for the sake of which everything else exist result from a desire for a union between two persons. The first effect of that desire, that valuing, that love, is a union between two persons, the second effect is the existence of a new person. That second effect is something worthy of committed love for its own sake, something worthy of evaluation as an object of committed desire.

Society requires that sex be confined to relationships of committed love. That means that the meaning of sex is giving love to another being, sharing life with another being, who is worthy of committed love for their own sake, i.e., a person.

If our use of the life faculty is not based on committed love, then human life is not (cannot be) the object of committed love, be something worthy of committed love for its own sake.

Just as our faculties of desire include an ability to make moral absolutes, our faculties of desire include an ability to commit ourselves to love another person for their own sake. And just as we cannot consistently value persons as ends-in-themselves while using our person-making ability in a way that contravenes the making of persons, so also we cannot consistently value persons as worthy of committed love if we use our person-making ability in a context in which our ability to have committed love for our partner is contravened.

Sex is too essentially and uniquely connected with human life for sex not to be part of a permanent sharing of life with another. If we use sex outside of such a permanent sharing, we are diminishing the value of human life, because human life is so essentially connected with sex.

We view a bastard as a product of a defective cause, something ill-conceived, something misbetgotten, a lemon, a botch, a dud, a flop.

Children deserve to be brought up in an environment of a loving relationship between their natural parents, so that they learn without being told it, that the meaning of their existence as persons is love between persons, the self-giving of one person to another. That is where their existence comes from. So they learn the dignity of themselves and other human beings as persons, because persons are beings worth another person's giving their whole life to.

A child is worthy of committed love. Therefore, she should be brought into existence through committed love, and it is an injustice to her if she is not. And it is an injustice if we use our person-making power for less than committed love, thereby weakening the institution that can create and nurture the child with committed love.

Morality governs behavior toward persons. But the source of the behavior is also a person, and so the source of the behavior must respect her own personhood. I cannot acknowledge the value in another's personhood without implicitly acknowledging the value in my personhood, a value that binds me as much as the other person's value binds me. For if I do not respect that value in myself, I implicitly disrespect it in the other. If I do not respect the value of personhood in myself, I imply that personhood anywhere does not have a value that I am defective if I do not recognize.

In the phrase "another person," as used in the claim that morality concerns behavior toward another person, it is the word "person" not "another" that has the moral significance.

When we use our sexuality, we are not just using our life producing power, but our life caring-for power, our life nurturing power, and really our life affirming power; for the family is where our value as worthy of committed love is recognized, i.e., is made concrete and actual.

I think the argument shows that the value we place on sexuality will inevitably determine the value we place on life, and vice versa. That logical link shows that it was not a mere sociological fact that the sexual revolution resulted in a devaluation of human life. The value society places on sex results in abortion, in encouraging youth to behave in ways that will spread lethal disease, no matter how "safe" our practices are, and in making euthanasia an obligation, since birth control deprives us of enough young to

take care of our old, while still maintaining our materialistic lifestyle. These phenomena are not accidentally connected to the value we place on sex; they are logical consequences of the place human life has in our system of values, given the place our means of producing human life has in our system of values.

My argument also shows why it is not just prudishness to consider pornography "dirty." The value of the human person is degraded, if sex is valued as a mere means to something less than human existence; for then the person is no longer that for which everything else exists.

I would suggest that the argument can even explain why pornography and other forms of abuse of women have increased simultaneously with the growth of the woman's liberation movement. In its radical forms, feminism says, in effect, "We don't want to be valued just for our ability to make persons; we want to be valued *equally* for our ability to perform functions, tasks. But the value of persons transcends their ability to perform functions as the absolute transcends the relative. So the ability to perform functions cannot be placed on a par with the ability to make persons without implicitly reducing the place of the person in our system of values.

But if the woman's person-making ability is disconnected from its relation to an ethical absolute, since that which was formerly absolute is no longer absolute, a different value will inevitably be placed on women's sexuality. It will be valued for the relative goods it can provide, and women will inevitably tend to become sex objects. So the results of radical feminism will be in direct contradiction to its intentions.

Another way to put it. Radical feminism says, in effect, "We don't want our bodies valued for their ability to make babies. We want our bodies valued as belonging to already existing things, ourselves, who, because we are

persons, are that for the sake of which everything else exists." But they implicitly cancel the value of the person, and hence their own value, when they declined to have their bodies respected as the place where persons come into existence and are nurtured. Once the value of the person is implicitly canceled, there is nothing to prevent the reduction of their person-making ability to the state of a pleasure-making ability in our system of values.

In this regard, it is worth noting the difference in the roles of men and women in the making of persons with respect to the person of the opposite sex being an object of evaluation. The desires of the man have to be aroused by the sexuality of the woman for human conception to take place; the corresponding desires of the woman do not have to be aroused. So nature has, for good reason, made it easier for a woman to become a sex object for a man than vice versa. And so nature has, for good reason, designed us so that there is more danger of a man *reducing* a woman to being a sex object than vice versa.

Feminists think they are taking account of this difference in correctly opposing pornography. But their only protection against being reduced to sex objects is respect for their value as persons. And they implicitly deny the morally absolute value of the person, when they ask for their performance of functions to be valued on a par with the personal relationship of motherhood.

My argument also explains why consent between adults is not sufficient to justify my making use of a person's sexuality, while it is sufficient to justify my making use of other faculties the person possesses. When I place a value on a person as, for example, a food maker, the way I ensure that I simultaneously treat her as an end-in-itself is by asking her consent and/or by paying a price that is fair relative to the value of the food I get from her. Why doesn't using another person's sexuality work the same way?

If a person freely chooses to sell me the use of her sexuality, why isn't that just like her freely choosing to sell me the use of her food-making ability?

Given that it is possible for persons to come into existence through a sex act that results from two persons valuing each other, as sexual beings, to be worthy of committed love, would any other way of making a person be morally worthy of a person, since the value of the new person is that of an entity worthy of committed love? Is it possible to consistently value children as ends-in-themselves if we consensually use our person-making ability without valuing our partner, as a sexual being, to be worthy of committed love?

But to place a value on sexuality is to place a value on the other person's person-making ability. So in valuing the other's sexuality the value of a person as such is involved in a way it is not involved when we value, for instance, their ability to make us laugh or to feed us. We pay people for the use of their laugh-causing ability or their food-making ability. As long as the use of their abilities is consensual, there may be no moral issue involved. But valuing another person's person-making-ability involves the value of the product of that ability, the value of that which that ability can make. And one of the things that ability can make is a moral absolute, something for the sake of which all other values exist.

I do not deal with a person's capacities apart from the person. If I hire a comedian to give me pleasure, I am hiring him or her, not just his or her capacities. But I am hiring him or her AS a being with certain capacities. I can deal with those capacities, which are merely capacities for performing functions, according to justice. I can give money in return for making me laugh. When I do, I treat the capacity under which I am relating to the person as a capacity for making effects that are less than the existence of persons. And I am treating the person, insofar as he or she possesses that capacity, as less than a maker of something of absolute ethical value.

Children come from one person's desiring another, and so placing a value on another, as a sexual being. In marriage,

When I enter into an ordinary business or social exchange, am I denying that the other is worthy of committed love just because the act in question is not an act of complete giving of myself?

No, but in such acts, I am not using, and placing a value on, the other's person-making ability. Nor am I preventing the other's person-making ability from being that.

Using the other person's laugh-making ability does not require me to cease valuing the other person as an end-in-itself. I could be doing that, but I do not have to. However, if I use their ability to make that for the sake of which everything else exists with the intention of preventing that ability to make that for the sake of which everything else exists, what is the place of that for the sake of which everything else exists in my system of values? And if it does not have the place it deserves in my system of values, can I be valuing the other person as an end-in-itself?

In something I read recently, Gore Vidal was quoted as saying that making another person into a (sexual) object was joy, and as long as it was consensual on the part of the other person, it was all right. But one can hardly call marriage make another person into an object. In marriage, one gives one's body to the other permanently, completely. That is hardly making an object out of the other. Nor is it giving the other permission to make an object out of you.

Sexuality is not, like our food-making ability, something whose use contributes only a relative and contingent value to end-in-themselves; sexuality contributes that without which there would be no other values, persons, that without which there would be no persons, their existence.

When we consciously place a value on our sexuality, we are placing a value on ourselves as sexual beings. We cannot place a value on any of our faculties, or any other human being's faculties, without simulataneously

placing a value on ourselves or the other party insofar as we possess the faculty we are evaluating. Our faculties do not exist in separation from us, and so they cannot be evaluated as if they existed separately from us. (A person-making machine can be evaluated as if it existed separately from us.) When we hire a chef because of her ability to make food, we are placing a value on her, not just on her food-making ability. We are valuing her insofar as she has the ability to make food. Thus, we cannot treat her as if she were a machine for making food. We must treat her as a person, an end-in-itself, when we relate to her because of her food-making ability. We do not have to treat a machine as an end-in-itself, when we relate to it because of its food-making ability.

When I evaluate someone for having a food-making ability, I am evaluating them for the ability to produce something less than a moral absolute. Food is not an end-in-itself. But I do not thereby evaluate the person as something less than a moral absolute. Nor am I reducing them to being a mere means to something that is less than a moral absolute. I am evaluating them as if they were less than a means for making a moral absolute. But I am not denying that they are means to making a moral absolute; I am not reducing them to that level.

But if I evaluate her person-making ability as if it were a means to something less than a moral absolute, I am evaluating the person as if she were less than a moral absolute. For I am evaluating a means for bringing into existence a person (the means being a person with sexual ability) as if the existence of a person were not that for the sake of which the means exists.

In the case of humans, the means for bringing a moral absolute into existence is itself a moral absolute. For the means is not solely our sexuality, as if our sexuality existed separately from the rest of us. The means for bringing a moral absolute into existence is another moral absolute acting sexually. In the case of the machine, the means for bringing a moral absolute into existence is something less than a moral absolute acting

asexually.

When I evaluate the machine acting asexually as less than a means to a moral absolute, I am not evaluating a moral absolute as a means to something less than a moral absolute. When I place a value on myself acting sexually and I so evaluate myself as less than a means to a moral absolute, I am evaluating a moral absolute as, at that time, less than a means to a moral absolute. So I am not evaluating myself acting sexually as existing for the sake of that for the sake of which everything else exists. So I am not evaluating myself as that for the sake of which everything else exists.

But in the case of placing a value on the machine acting asexually as less than a means to a moral absolute, I am not evaluating the machine acting asexually as a means to that for the sake of that for the sake of which everything else exists. So whatever else I can say about the machine, I cannot say that the machine itself is that for the sake of which everything else exists.

In marriage, another person results from an act placing a value on another person's person-making ability, placing a value on another person insofar as she has a person-making ability. So the child not only comes from persons, she comes from an act of love between persons, an act evaluating another person as worthy of committed love precisely insofar as she has a person-making ability, i.e., insofar as she has the ability to make the child that results.

X is worthy of committed love, and X comes into existence through a form of love. Should the love through which those worthy of committed love come into existence be committed love? If not, desiring another person insofar as she has a person-making ability is like desiring her insofar as she has food-making ability. That is, in desiring her for her food making ability, I am not desiring her for anything that puts an obligation on me to give her committed love. I am only obligated to be fair. But also, I am only desiring her for her ability to perform tasks, to produce relative goods.

Valuing her as having a person-making ability must always subordinate other aspects of her sexuality to its being a person-making ability.

If I do not evaluate myself as a maker of that for the sake of which everything else exists, I cannot evaluate myself, my partner, my children, etc. as that for the sake of which everything else exists.

I am a person-maker only in union with another person-maker, but that union is oriented toward making something worthy of lifelong committed love.

Using sex while thwarting the making of a person reduces the use of our person-making ability to a power for performing tasks, functions. For tasks bring into existence things that are not worthy of committed love for their own sake. And to the extent that we are valued only for (and if we were valued only for) our ability to perform tasks, we are not valued as worthy of committed love for our own sake (think of the robot cook). To equate making a person with the performing of tasks is to equate value of a person and the value of things that are less than absolute values.

We are valuing someone precisely as a sexual being, insofar as she has sexuality. But sexuality exists for the sake of being a person-making ability; sexuality exists for the sake of an AV worthy of committed love. So we can desire someone as a sexual being the way we desire someone as having food-making ability. (The food-making ability does not produce an AV and so does not involve the issues of treating them as AVs, but our acquiring the use of their AV does involve that issues, for it involves their freedom.) Or we can value the other as a sexual being to be, for that reason, worthy of committed love. If we do not value the other as a sexual being to be worthy of committed love, are we valuing the other person to be an end-in-itself?

We perceive illegitimi this way: You were brought into existence, not because your value as a person is such an absolute moral value that love between 2 other persons for each other's person-making ability should not interfere with

making you but should be allowed to be the cause of you.

When I enter into an ordinary business or social exchange, am I denying that the other is worthy of committed love just because the act in question is not an act of complete giving of myself? No, but in such acts, I am not using, and placing a value on, the other's person-making ability.

Prior to test-tube babies, human existence came from one person placing a value on another person. Specifically, one person places a value on another person's person-making-ability, or places a value on another person insofar as she has an ability that is in fact a person-making-ability. That act of valuing is an act of love, an act of appreciating, of desiring union with, of desiring oneness with her insofar as she has an ability that is de facto a person-making ability. What if the value we place on the other person as a sexual being is less than that of being an object of committed love? Then, the existence of human persons results from placing a value on another person that is less than the value of being worthy of committed love. The existence of X results from placing a value on something, Y. If we value Y as less than worthy of committed love, can the existence of that which results from that evaluation be worthy of committed love?

No, because, although X in fact is worthy of committed love, the existence of a person cannot logically have that status in our evaluations. For in our evaluations, the existence of X is a result of valuing a person as something less than worthy of committed love. But if X should not result from an evaluation of a sexual being as something less than worthy of committed love, should X result from anything less than an act of committed sexual love between two persons?

Children come from one person's desiring another, and so placing a value on another, as a sexual being. In a well functioning marriage, the child comes from two persons valuing each other, as sexual beings, to be worthy of committed love. So in marriage, the meaning of the child's existence is that

the value of persons, as having person-making ability, is to be worthy of committed love. In a healthy family, a child learns just from observing her parents relationship, that the meaning of her existence, and hence that of other persons, is that human sexuality causes effects that are worthy of committed love for their own sake.

Given that it is possible for persons to come into existence through a sex act that results from two persons valuing each other, as sexual beings, to be worthy of committed love, would any other way of making a person be morally worthy of a person, since the value of the new person is that of an entity worthy of committed love? Is it possible to consistently value children as ends-in-themselves if we consensually use our person-making ability without valuing our partner, as a sexual being, to be worthy of committed love?

We value the other person's sexuality. If we value it as a means to the existence of an end-in-itself, must we not value the other person as an end-in-itself, and so value her as worthy of committed love?

Children come from, are the direct result of, valuing another person, placing a value on another person. If the valuing of another person from which children come is not that of valuing her as object of committed love, if persons come from placing a value on other persons, but not placing a value on them as worthy of committed love, then ...

What brings persons into existence is a love of some kind, a desire of some kind. So what brings persons into existence is a valuing of some kind of another person, a placing a value of some kind on another person, an evaluation of some kind of another person. Persons are the direct result of a valuing of some kind, of a placing of value of some kind. If the valuing from which persons result is not an affirmation of the person as worthy of committed love, a recognition of a person's deserving of committed love, can we consistently judge the result of that valuing as something worthy of committed love?

The meaning of a child's existence is that of being worthy of committed

love for their own sake. Persons are worthy of evaluation as objects of committed love for their own sake. If the evaluation of another person that brings children into existence is not evaluation of her as an object of committed love for her own sake, ... If the love for a person that brings children into existence is not love for a person as a being worthy of committed love for her own sake, ... then is the existence of that which results from this valuation, the existence of that which results from this love, the existence of something worthy of evaluation as an object of committed love, then is the existence that this love produces the existence of a being worthy of committed love for its own sake?

Nature has designed it so that things for the sake of which everything else exist result from a desire for a union between two persons. The first effect of that desire, that valuing, that love, is a union between two persons, the second effect is the existence of a new person. That second effect is something worthy of committed love for its own sake, something worthy of evaluation as an object of committed desire.

Another point: the value we place on human life is the value we place on sex. Note that in this formula, the value of human life comes first. So if we put an absolute value on human life, it follows that we have the attitude that sex is a vehicle for committed love. And therefore, if we do not view sex as a vehicle for committed love, we cannot put an absolute value on human life.

If our use of the life faculty is not based on committed love, then human life is not (cannot be) the object of committed love, be something worthy of committed love for its own sake.

Just as our faculties of desire include an ability to make moral absolutes, our faculties of desire include an ability to commit ourselves to love another person for their own sake. And just as we cannot consistently value persons as ends-in-themselves while using our person-making ability in a

way that contravenes the making of persons, so also we cannot consistently value persons as worthy of committed love if we use our person-making ability in a context in which our ability to have committed love for our partner is contravened.

Nature has chosen that human life would come into existence as a result of the physical desire of one person for the pleasure that another person's body can give. If so, how can the value of human life not be merely that of an accidental product of a purely physical desire? Human life can have the dignity it deserves and needs only if the use of sexual desire is made part of a relation of committed love and committed self-giving of each other's bodies between those who will create human life through their desire.

Also, my relationship to one of my children is describable as "for better or worse, until death do us part." E.g., if a child develops a debilitating illness, the parent is responsible for caring for her. But my marriage partner is responsible for my having children, so she is responsible, along with me, for my having this life-long, for-better-or-worse relationship. The only just thing for marriage partners to do, therefore, is commit themselves to each other, to their mutual support in bringing up their children, in a life-long, for-better-or-worse relationship.

So the value we place on sexuality will inevitably determine the value we place on human life and vice versa. The way we evaluate human life has logical implications for that which causes human life, that which is the sole way of getting human life. If human life is that which is not only most valuable (a relative description) but of absolute value, then the cause of human life, the sole source of that which is of absolute value, deserves a certain kind of evaluation, a certain kind of place in our system of values. What kind? A kind determined by the following logical link: If we evaluate the necessary means for the existence of human life as a *mere* means to

pleasure or a *mere* means to the production of things less than the absolute value, we are not valuing human life as the absolute value. And if we choose to interfere with procreation, we are valuing sex, not just as having ends in addition to the end of procreation, but as merely a means to something less than the existence of an absolute value.

The value of the human species is the value of sex, the source of the species. The value we place on sex will be the value we place on that mode of existence of which sex is the source and the essential source, that mode of existence which is nothing but a product of sex; that's all human life is. It is not an accidental product of sex like, e.g., venereal disease. It is essential in the forward looking direction (from cause to effect) and in the backward looking direction. Concerning the latter, all human life is an result of sex. Maybe somewhere in the universe human life is produced in some other way, but here all is a result of sex. And artificial means would imitate sex, would have to imitate sex (a la Aristotelian art). Even test-tube babies show that our attitude toward sex is our attitude toward human life. If human life should not result from an act of giving between two persons, if sex is not the act of giving from which human life should result, human life is something that can be mechanically manipulated.

I think the argument shows that the value we place on sexuality will inevitably determine the value we place on life, and vice versa. That logical link shows that it was not a mere sociological fact that the sexual revolution resulted in a devaluation of human life. The value society places on sex results in abortion, in encouraging youth to behave in ways that will spread lethal disease, no matter how "safe" our practices are, and in making euthanasia an obligation, since birth control deprives us of enough young to take care of our old, while still maintaining our materialistic lifestyle. These phenomena are not accidentally connected to the value we place on sex; they are logical consequences of the place human life has in our system of

values, given the place our means of producing human life has in our system of values.

And what is the alternative to being in awe of sex because it is the person-making ability? That pedophile was in awe of it because it can give us the same kind of pleasure that animals can have, because having the same kind of pleasure that animals can have makes *human* life glorious and wonderful. In other words, the alternative to being in awe at sex because it can produce ends-in-themselves is to reduce the person, including ourselves, from being an absolute value, in our estimations, to having a value no higher than that of an animal. For what makes our life glorious and wonderful, that is, what gives our life *value*, is an ability that produces nothing higher than an animal can produce.

Sex has that link to human life not just in the sense that at certain periods of the month it can cause human life, but in the sense that its role in our lives is to make us person-producers and person-rearers. That is its role in the human species.

The greater cannot come from the lesser. If I treat a person under the aspect of a-sexual-being the way I treat a person under the aspect of a-being-who- can-perform-function-X, I am treating a procreator as a thing maker, as an agent with a capacity for making things. A person (the higher) does not come from a mere capacity for making things.

In marriage, human life comes from one person's complete giving of him/herself to another person. The meaning of that coming into existence is one person's believe that another is worthy of his/her complete giving of him/herself. Anything less than that, and we are not evaluating another to be worthy of complete giving of ourselves. We are not evaluating the other to be

that, but are we denying it? When I enter into an ordinary business or social exchange, am I denying that the other is worthy of committed love just because the act in question is not an act of complete giving of myself?

No, but in such acts, I am not using, and placing a value on, the other's person-making ability.

Children come from, are the direct result of, valuing another person, placing a value on another person. If the valuing of another person from which children come is not that of valuing her as object of committed love, if persons come from placing a value on other persons, but not placing a value on them as worthy of committed love, then ...

What brings persons into existence is a love of some kind, a desire of some kind. So what brings persons into existence is a valuing of some kind of another person, a placing a value of some kind on another person, an evaluation of some kind of another person. Persons are the direct result of a valuing of some kind, of a placing of value of some kind. If the valuing from which persons result is not an affirmation of the person as worthy of committed love, a recognition of a person's deserving of committed love, can we consistently judge the result of that valuing as something worthy of committed love?

The meaning of a child's existence is that of being worthy of committed love for their own sake. Persons are worthy of evaluation as objects of committed love for their own sake. If the evaluation of another person that brings children into existence is not evaluation of her as an object of committed love for her own sake, ... If the love for a person that brings children into existence is not love for a person as a being worthy of committed love for her own sake, ... then is the existence of that which results from this valuation, the existence of that which results from this love, the existence of something worthy of evaluation as an object of committed love, then is the existence that this love produces the existence of a being worthy of committed love for its own sake?

Another point: the value we place on human life is the value we place on sex. Note that in this formula, the value of human life comes first. So if we put an absolute value on human life, it follows that we have the attitude that sex is a vehicle for committed love. And therefore, if we do not view sex as a vehicle for committed love, we cannot put an absolute value on human life.

If our use of the life faculty is not based on committed love, then human life is not (cannot be) the object of committed love, be something worthy of committed love for its own sake.

Just as our faculties of desire include an ability to make moral absolutes, our faculties of desire include an ability to commit ourselves to love another person for their own sake. And just as we cannot consistently value persons as ends-in-themselves while using our person-making ability in a way that contravenes the making of persons, so also we cannot consistently value persons as worthy of committed love if we use our person-making ability in a context in which our ability to have committed love for our partner is contravened.

Sex is too essentially and uniquely connected with human life for sex not to be part of a permanent sharing of life with another. If we use sex outside of such a permanent sharing, we are diminishing the value of human life, because human life is so essentially connected with sex.

Nature has chosen that human life would come into existence as a result of the physical desire of one person for the pleasure that another person's body can give. If so, how can the value of human life not be merely that of an accidental product of a purely physical desire? Human life can have the dignity it deserves and needs only if the use of sexual desire is made part of

a relation of committed love and committed self-giving of each other's bodies between those who will create human life through their desire.

Using sex while thwarting the making of a person reduces the use of our person-making ability to a power for performing tasks, functions. For tasks bring into existence things that are not worthy of committed love for their own sake. And to the extent that we are valued only for (and if we were valued only for) our ability to perform tasks, we are not valued as worthy of committed love for our own sake (think of the robot cook). To equate making a person with the performing of tasks is to equate value of a person and the value of things that are less than absolute values.

We are valuing someone precisely as a sexual being, insofar as she has sexuality. But sexuality exists for the sake of being a person-making ability; sexuality exists for the sake of an AV worthy of committed love. So we can desire someone as a sexual being the way we desire someone as having food-making ability. (The food-making ability does not produce an AV and so does not involve the issues of treating them as AVs, but our acquiring the use of their AV does involve that issues, for it involves their freedom.) Or we can value the other as a sexual being to be, for that reason, worthy of committed love. If we do not value the other as a sexual being to be worthy of committed love, are we valuing the other person to be an end-in-itself?

But the value of persons transcends their ability to perform functions as the absolute transcends the relative. So the ability to perform functions cannot be placed on a par with the ability to make persons without implicitly reducing the place of the person in our system of values. But if the woman's person-making ability is disconnected from its relation to an ethical absolute, since that which was formerly absolute is no longer absolute, a different value will inevitably be placed on women's sexuality. It will be valued for the relative goods can provide, and woman will inevitably tend to become sex objects.

Children come from one person's desiring another, and so placing a value on another, as a sexual being. In a well functioning marriage, the child comes from two persons valuing each other, as sexual beings, to be worthy of committed love. So in marriage, the meaning of the child's existence is that the value of persons, as having person-making ability, is to be worthy of committed love. In a healthy family, a child learns just from observing her parents relationship, that the meaning of her existence, and hence that of other persons, is that human sexuality causes effects that are worthy of committed love for their own sake.

I do not deal with a person's capacities apart from the person. If I hire a comedian to give me pleasure, I am hiring him or her, not just his or her capacities. But I am hiring him or her AS a being with certain capacities. I can deal with those capacities, which are merely capacities for performing functions, according to justice. I can give money in return for making me laugh. When I do, I treat the capacity under which I am relating to the person as a capacity for making effects that are less than the existence of persons. And I am treating the person, insofar as he or she possesses that capacity, as less than a maker of something of absolute ethical value.

Children come from one person's desiring another, and so placing a value on another, as a sexual being. In marriage,

When I enter into an ordinary business or social exchange, am I denying that the other is worthy of committed love just because the act in question is not an act of complete giving of myself?

No, but in such acts, I am not using, and placing a value on, the other's person-making ability. Nor am I preventing the other's person-making ability from being that.

Using the other person's laugh-making ability does not require me to cease valuing the other person as an end-in-itself. I could be doing that, but I do not have to. However, if I use their ability to make that for the

sake of which everything else exists with the intention of preventing that ability to make that for the sake of which everything else exists, what is the place of that for the sake of which everything else exists in my system of values? And if it does not have the place it deserves in my system of values, can I be valuing the other person as an end-in-itself?

The greater cannot come from the lesser. If I treat a person under the aspect of a-sexual-being the way I treat a person under the aspect of a-being-who- can-perform-function-X, I am treating a procreator as a thing maker, as an agent with a capacity for making things. A person (the higher) does not come from a mere capacity for making things.

Feminists think they are taking account of this difference in correctly opposing pornography. But their only protection against being reduced to sex objects is respect for their value as persons. And they implicitly deny the morally absolute value of the person, when they ask for their performance of functions to be valued on a par with the personal relationship of motherhood.

In this regard, it is worth noting the difference in the roles of men and women in the making of persons with respect to the person of the opposite sex being an object of evaluation. The desires of the man have to be aroused by the sexuality of the woman for human conception to take place; the corresponding desires of the woman do not have to be aroused. So nature has, for good reason, made it easier for a woman to become a sex object for a man than vice versa. And so nature has, for good reason, designed us so that there is more danger of a man *reducing* a woman to being a sex object than vice versa.

My argument also explains why consent between adults is not sufficient to justify my making use of a person's sexuality, while it is sufficient to justify my making use of other faculties the person possesses. When I place a

value on a person as, for example, a food maker, the way I ensure that I simultaneously treat her as an end-in-itself is by asking her consent and/or by paying a price that is fair relative to the value of the food I get from her. Why doesn't using another person's sexuality work the same way?

If a person freely chooses to sell me the use of her sexuality, why isn't that just like her freely choosing to sell me the use of her food-making ability?

Even when we are infertile, temporarily or permanently, to conform to what reason knows about human sexuality, a rational appetite must value everything else associated with sex as existing for the sake of making persons. Our cognitive faculties are what they are primarily for the sake of giving us knowledge of truth even when we are unconscious and so cannot exercise the ability to know truth. Our cognitive faculties do not entirely cease being what they are when we are unconscious, and the primary reason why they are what they are at that time is knowledge of truth. The existence of the first rational beings may have been an accidental product of blind forces of nature, but even if reason was selected for reproduction because, at some time in our evolution, it contributed something other than knowledge of truth to our survival, reason itself is not blind. And by reason itself we can recognize that it is rational knowledge of truth that makes us ends-in-themselves and that, therefore, what reason is deserves to be valued, even when it is not functional, primarily for being that which makes persons absolute values.

For persons do not cease being absolute values when reason is not functional.

When we judge brain damage, of any kind, to be a misfortune, by what standard do we judge it to be a misfortune? By the standard of whatever goal

the damaged part of the brain could formerly achieve that it can no longer achieve. By implication, then, we are saying that, other things being equal, we should value what that part of the brain is in terms of what it formerly could contribute. Other things might not always be equal; something that is a disadvantage from one point of view might turn out to be an advantage from another point of view. But if the value in question is an absolute value, or a necessary condition for an absolute value, other things can never be equal.

Likewise reason knows that, even though someone is infertile, to the extent she can perform sexual functions at all, what the features that constitute human sexuality are deserve to be valued as existing primarily for the sake of the coming to be of new persons. Even when we become naturally infertile, as at menopause, the primary reason that the faculties we continue to have exist at all is so that, at another period of our life, we could make beings of absolute moral value. If we refuse to value human sexuality in this way, persons are not, in our evaluations, that for the sake of which everything else exists.

[s taking a mate selecting a vehicle for satisfying your sexual desires? No, satisfying your sexual desires is a vehicle and support for a relation of self-giving to your mate, a relation of committed love, a relation of personal union

The value of the human species is the value of sex, the source of the species. The value we place on sex will be the value we place on that mode of existence of which sex is the source and the essential source, that mode of existence which is nothing but a product of sex; that's all human life is. It is not an accidental product of sex like, e.g., venereal disease. It is essential in the forward looking direction (from cause to effect) and in the backward looking direction. Concerning the latter, all human life is a result of sex. Maybe somewhere in the universe human life is produced in some other way, but here all is a result of sex. And artificial means would imitate sex, would have to imitate sex (a la Aristotelian art). Even test-tube babies show that our attitude toward sex is our attitude toward human life. If human life should not result from an act of giving between two persons, if sex is not

the act of giving from which human life should result, human life is something that can be mechanically manipulated.

We can look on sex in two ways: it's a means to this mind-boggling pleasure; it's a means to the happiness that can only come from the family. But we can't successfully look at it in both ways at once.

Test-tube babies: the giving of existence is not an act of love in which two people give each other their life—sharing power.

Evolution selected sex as a means of getting you, the parent, into a lifetime personal relation with your child. Your action causes you to get into such a relation. But more, your action, your pleasure, causes another person, the other parent, to get into the same kind of relation. By mutually agreeing to practice birth control, you cannot change the fact that the pleasure you are experiencing was designed to do the above, has an essential relation to the above. I can choose to let the other party use my person-making power, but cannot choose that it cease to be a person-making power, or parent-making power.

And if we place a value on sex that excludes the bringing into existence of a human being, how can we say that the value of a person is an absolute value, the value of an end-in-itself, something worthy of committed love, not for its function, its ability to bring something else into existence, but for its own sake. We value things other than absolute values for what they can bring into existence. (So how can I reconcile the fact that my partner is worthy of love for her own sake, not just for her function, with the fact that in sex I am valuing her for her pma? Only by using our pma exclusively in the context of committed love.)

But valuing another person's person-making-ability involves the value of the product of that ability, the value of that which that ability can make.

Rather, the value we put on life is the value we put on our sexuality. Just when our knowledge of the genetic code taught us about human life, the sexual

revolution occurred. The latter determined the value we put on life. That value is what we evaluate human life to be, that is, we evaluate it to be the existence of some mature characteristics. But in so doing, we are evaluating those characteristics relative to our ends, not the ends the being with those characteristics has the future potential for.

If we claim that the human person is the highest worth, must we not value sexuality primarily for its ability to bring into existence that which is of the highest worth. We value anything for what it can bring into existence. Sex can bring into existence pleasure and human beings, which result is of more worth? So if we do not value sex primarily for bringing human beings into existence, how can we say human persons possess the highest worth? And if we place a value of sex that excludes the bringing into existence of a human being, how can we say that the value of a person is an absolute value, the value of an end-in-itself, something worthy of committed love, not for its function, its ability to bring something else into existence, but for its own sake. We value things other than absolute values for what they can bring into existence. If sex is the only way to get X, but we explicitly decline to value sex for bringing X into existence for the sake of bringing something else into existence, can the existence of X be the value that measures all other values, a value that all other values must at least be consistent with?

So the value we place on sexuality will inevitably determine the value we place on human life.

Committed love implements the value of the person.

Because sexuality is our person-making ability, the context in which we use it can either affirm the ethically absolute value of the person as such or deny it. Do we have the right to tell someone else: I consensually give you permission to use my person-making ability in a way that prevents the absolute value of the person from being affirmed?

If we separate our life-giving faculty from committed love, we are separating the life we give, human life, from being deserving of committed love. We can choose the spousal-parental relation. We can't choose the child-parent relation. If the latter is not by essence, by nature, a relation of committed love, our existence of the offspring, is not that of a being worthy of committed love by being what she is, as opposed to receiving committed love by the gratuitous choice of someone else to love us, if they want to, as the spousal-parental relation is, i.e., the spousal relation is the a chosen relation of committed love for someone else. The child-parent relation is ontological, our being, what we are, is included in it. Is what we are worthy of committed love?

So in seeking freedom from the connection between sex and committed love for the sake of pleasure, we are devaluing our own existence. We are "choosing" to live like animals (who cannot choose it; they have to live that way). That is why extra-marital sex is "dirty", because of what it does to the value of human life.

Possible title: "Sexual Alienation," i.e., alienation from our meaning as persons.

In choosing a mate, is sex like other activities we would want to observe the potential mate perform beforehand? If so, we are treating sex like a task, a function to be performed -- not as the instantiation of a personal relationship. We are not viewing our partner as an object of committed love but as providing a service, and we are measuring their value as a provider of services, not as a person.

We say that we are teaching people to do anything they want with their sexuality as long as they do it responsibly, i.e., without hurting or coercing someone else. (Notice the addition of "or coercing." What if someone said that it is all right to coerce as long as you don't hurt?) But does it really work out that way. Are we not really telling pedophiles and other deviants to pursue their own pleasure, as long as they can get away with it.

Why? Because we are really telling the rest to pursue their own pleasure as long as they can get away with it. Most cannot pursue their own gratification without in fact behaving in a way others would call "responsible," because they need the others for their gratification.

In other words, the motivation for "Do anything you want as long as it does not hurt others" can be selfishness: you need the help of others, but you won't get it if you hurt them, or, at least, you are much less likely to get it. But there is more to it than the possibility that the motivation will be selfishness. If there is no more to morality than "Do anything you want, as long as it does not hurt others," then there is no basis for having any motive other than selfishness. Equality is not enough; morality must be based on the dignity of persons.

And so, when we apply "Do anything you want . . ." to sexual behavior, we can expect that people, including pedophiles and abusers, will do what they perceive they can get away with. Because everyone else does. Do I have any proof for this other than "logical" argument? Not directly. But there is independent empirical evidence that "Do anything you want . . ." is applied selfishly in other matters. So the burden of proof must be on them who believe it will not be applied selfishly in sexual matters.

What does that independent empirical evidence consist in? In the absence of prior investigation of what the effects will be on children, as for example, in Sweden or, in America, the effects of divorce.

Permanent Commitments, Jun. 3, 95 BIG

While we are not under immediate pressure to break-up our own marriages, we pass laws, binding on ourselves and others, making it very difficult to back away from our marriage commitment. Why? Because we are doing ourselves a favor by passing those laws. We know how easy it is to succumb to the temptation to sacrifice something that will more likely lead to the long-range happiness of most people for the sake of short-range happiness. Or, we know

how difficult it is not to succumb to that temptation. So we pass laws making it very undesirable to succumb to that temptation.

In criticizing the condoning of extramarital sex for making successful marriage more difficult, am I illegitimately going beyond the right to opportunity to the right to certain results? False dichotomy. The opportunity we need is an opportunity for a successful marriage, not just the opportunity to try to have a successful marriage. It is an injustice to diminish the opportunity for a successful marriage. Likewise, it would be wrong to say "You have the opportunity to try to succeed economically," when we are depriving someone of the conditions necessary for the attempt to succeed. So not guaranteeing success, but guaranteeing conditions needed (normally) for the attempt to succeed (*ceteris paribus*). Not guaranteeing sufficient conditions, but necessary conditions.

When I enter into an ordinary business or social exchange, am I denying that the other is worthy of committed love just because the act in question is not an act of complete giving of myself?

No, but in such acts, I am not using, and placing a value on, the other's person-making ability.

Also, in certain contexts, the act that brings a human person into existence is an act of committed love and complete self-giving. If from a moral point of view, that act, sex, can legitimately take place in a context where it is not an act of committed self-giving, then is the value of the offsprings of such acts the value of something worthy of committed love? They do not come from committed love, and morally need not come from committed love, so how can the meaning of their existence be the fact that persons are worthy of committed love for their own sake? So the unfortunate scorn of bastards is a recognition of the fact that if sex is not used in the context of committed love, persons are not worthy of committed love. For to use sex outside of the context of committed love is to use our person-making ability outside of the context of committed love. It is to actuate the source of

persons, to implement the source of persons, to exercise the power that makes persons outside of the context of committed love for a person, where outside has a privative, not just negative, meaning: it is to exercise the power to make persons in a context where committed love is deliberately excluded. And so that which is made by this power is not something whose existence bespeaks the person as worthy of committed love, where, again, the "not" is privative, not just negative.

In something I read recently, Gore Vidal was quoted as saying that making another person into a (sexual) object was joy, and as long as it was consensual on the part of the other person, it was all right. But one can hardly call marriage make another person into an object. In marriage, one gives one's body to the other permanently, completely. That is hardly making an object out of the other. Nor is it giving the other permission to make an object out of you.

Sex is too essentially and uniquely connected with human life for sex not to be part of a permanent sharing of life with another. If we use sex outside of such a permanent sharing, we are diminishing the value of human life, because human life is so essentially connected with sex.

If our use of the life faculty is not based on committed love, then human life is not (cannot be) the object of committed love, be something worthy of committed love for its own sake. (So start with BC is always immoral. If so, we are always using our life faculty. If so, the value of human life depends on how we are using our life faculty.)

Why so much wife beating and child abuse? We need to teach children that they will be expected to love. But we can't teach them, successfully, to love and fail to teach them that their sexuality is supposed to be used as an instrument of committed love, a vehicle and support for committed love. If we let them think their sexuality is a means to private gratification, and that

marriage is just one kind of "set up," "arrangement" in which their desires for self-gratification can be fulfilled, they will not successfully achieve a love relationship in marriage.

Choosing not to make marriage the norm amounts to choosing against marriage, not being neutral. Marriage can perform its necessary functions only if it is taken seriously as the norm.

Even test-tube babies show that our attitude toward sex is our attitude toward human life. If human life should not result from an act of giving between two persons, if sex is not the act of giving from which human life should result, human life is something that can be mechanically manipulated. And that is precisely what we do in in vitro fertilization. We don't mechanically manipulate something whose meaning is the ecstatic joy we experienced in producing it.

Unless we seek sexual gratification in a way that subordinates it to the goal of supporting committed love, we will conceive children in conditions unjust to them. (Remember that evolution selected human sexuality, in all its psychological dimensions, as a method of reproduction for offspring who would be dependent on the care of others for years; and abortion is the only sure means of birth control.)

So if we use sex selfishly, we will have to abort babies. So the opponent says, ok, I'll abort babies, if that is the price of not subordinating sex to committed love.

Remember that evolution selected human sexuality as a method of reproduction for offspring who would be dependent on the care of others for years. Reproductive acts outside of the context where that care was ensured would not be good from evolution's perspective, since they would produce offspring with less chance of survival. Further, the survival of adults for years after they had procreated would be reproductively significant, since reproductive success is not achieved until the young are raised. And the survival of adults would

depend on cooperation with other adults consisting, not of instinctive behavior as in other species, but of moral behavior learned in their youth (and the cooperation would most often take place in small groups where unfaithfulness, if common, could be disastrous). Why, then, should evolution not have selected a reproductive method that would function, in all its psychological dimensions, as a support and vehicle for a moral relation of self-giving between parents that would greatly increase the chance of reproductive success? Such a method would compensate for our losing the tremendous reproductive advantage of instinct. If so, from an evolutionary perspective, our proficiency at sex acts would not be like proficiency at hunting or cooking, qualities we might look for before taking a reproductive partner; our sexual ability would be the means for the relation of self-giving that human mating "should" consist in. For seeking sexual gratification in a way that does not subordinate it to the goal of supporting committed self-giving would be detrimental to reproductive success and to long range, individual happiness, both because it would produce offspring in unfavorable conditions and because it would sanction an attitude opposite to the needed attitude of self-giving.

It's almost as if evolution thought it had to provide for the survival of offspring that would be totally dependent on the care of others for years. Imagine that.

No one seems to have noticed that the triumph of [enlightenment, intellectualism, academicism, the academics, the intellectuals] has led to [a new form of . . ., to the breakdown of human relationships, to the loss of what is most important for human happiness, to an undermining of the foundations of social and personal happiness.

The structure of the human act is that we choose means in view of an end, and we do so on the basis of knowledge of the connection between a means and an end. So we cannot avoid placing a value on our sexuality that either does or

does not value the product of sexuality, human persons, as ends-in-themselves. So this is one of those areas where we cannot avoid evaluating a thing to either be or not be what it is, i.e., cannot avoid "treating" things as if they are or are not what they are. (We can say we "evaluate" human persons a certain way in deciding for sex; can we say we "treat" them as if they are not what they are? We can't treat a nonexistent one way or the other, but we can treat ourselves and our sex partner as if we are not what we are, ends-in-ourselves.)

Another point: the value we place on human life is the value we place on sex. Note that in this formula, the value of human life comes first. So if we put an absolute value on human life, it follows that we have the attitude that sex is a vehicle for committed love. And therefore, if we do not view sex as a vehicle for committed love, we cannot put an absolute value on human life.

In one of these notes files, in the last few months, I refer to Julian Huxley's statement that they, scientist's, accepted Darwinism before it was proven because Darwinism was perceived to get rid of God, and God was a great bother to their sex lives. As similar thing happened in the case of the value of human life. In the late forties through early sixties, one can find any number of statements in scientific literature stating that human life begins at conception. And one can find no, or almost no, denials. Now some scientists are denying that human life begins at conception. Why the change? The sexual revolution intervened, and the belief that human life begins at conception, or at least that innocent human life should not be taken, became a great bother to our sex lives.

But notice the connection between these two changes. If there is no God, then is the belief that human life begins at conception really a great bother to our sex lives? On the other hand, if there is a God, then the belief that human life begins at conception really should be a bother to our

sex lives. Because, if there is a God, a human life is the life of an image of God.

The reason why I exist sexually, the reason for the existence of my acting sexually, is to cause the existence of another TFSW, to get me into a relationship with a new TFSW.

The means for causing the existence of an AV is not just our sexuality; it is the existence of whole persons with sexuality.

Because sexuality is our person-making ability, the context in which we use it can either affirm the ethically absolute value of the person as such or deny it. Do we have the right to tell someone else: I consensually give you permission to use my person-making ability in a way that prevents the absolute value of the person from being affirmed?

But the value of persons transcends their ability to perform functions as the absolute transcends the relative. So the ability to perform functions cannot be placed on a par with the ability to make persons without implicitly reducing the place of the person in our system of values. (And if an ability to perform functions cannot be placed on a par with the PMA, the PMA should not be placed on a par with performing functions, but doesn't artificial conception do that?) But if the woman's person-making ability is disconnected from its relation to an ethical absolute, since that which was formerly absolute is no longer absolute, a different value will inevitably be placed on women's sexuality. It will be valued for the relative goods it can provide, and women will inevitably tend to become sex objects.

I can deal with those capacities, which are merely capacities for performing functions, according to justice. I can give money in return for making me laugh. When I do, I treat the capacity under which I am relating to the person as a capacity for making effects that are less than the existence of

persons. And I am treating the person, insofar as he or she possesses that capacity, as less than a maker of something of absolute ethical value.

Justice establishes an equality, a proportion, among goods external to persons. But the obligatory character of justice comes from the fact that the goods are goods of and for persons.

For me to succeed in treating persons as ends in themselves in situations where I hire a Foodmaker or a laundry doer, all I have to do is ensure that the person I hire is doing it in pursuit of her own freely chosen ends. For me to succeed in valuing persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists in situations where I use another end in itself's person making ability, it is not enough to ensure that the person whose ability I use is doing it in pursuit of her own freely chosen ends.

Because I can replace a cook with a machine for making food, the value of the person is involved in my cook's consent to make food, but not in the use of her food-making ability per se. Therefore it would not be wrong for me to replace her with a machine. Consent is not enough to justify my using mine or my partner's PMA; for the same reason, not just any kind of use of our PMA is justified. In particular, we should not use it in a way that makes its value like that of a machine for making food. For then the product of the machine only has a value like that of food.