

The reason one could get this from Aquinas is the fact that moral goodness and evil resides in an act of the RA. Therefore, if an act of the RA is going to be morally defective in any absolute, categorical, nonhypothetical way, the goodness or evil of the act must be intrinsic to the act. And it can be intrinsic only if measured by the act's own finality.

Aquinas calls the commandments to love God above all things and love our neighbors as ourselves first, common, and self-evident precepts of the natural law (ST I-II, 3 ad 1). The obligations expressed by these commandments are the very obligations explained by the RA's finality of valuing things according to reason's knowledge of what they are. It is self-evident that a choice to love the infinitely perfect being above all else values Him according to what He is. And it is self-evident that a choice not to love a being equal in nature to us as we love ourselves does not value the other being according to what her nature is. Likewise, it is self-evident that, if we do not give another being who sets her own ends the place in our evaluations of someone directed to ends she gives herself, what she is in our evaluations is not what she is in reality. Thus, my analysis justifies giving the precepts to love God and neighbor the pride of place they deserve in ethics, while many discussions of Aquinas's ethics do not.

The first thing to notice here is that, while ethics is practical knowledge, the study of the foundations of ethics is speculative knowledge. For example, the statement "Ethics is practical knowledge" is itself an instance of speculative knowledge, not practical knowledge. Likewise, the statement "The precept 'God should be loved above all other goods' is a principle of practical knowledge" is an instance of speculative knowledge about practical knowledge.

To love God above all is our good because it fulfills the finality of the RA as an appetite oriented to valuing being. And to know the truth of the last sentence is to have speculative knowledge. But speculative knowledge about the RA, as opposed to speculative knowledge about God, does not enter into our practical knowledge that God is to be loved above all, as I will explain in a moment.

Hence, without our awareness of the existence of desires (in the broadest sense of the word), we could not have the concept of goodness and attribute goodness to being. Because "good" means being insofar as it terminates relations of appetite, when reason formulates judgments about what is or is not good, reason is formulating judgments about the conformity of things to appetites.

And since our choice making ability is an appetite oriented to valuing things to be what they are as known by reason, the speculatively known truths that objectify what things are in themselves determine what choices are good or bad for the RA to make. For example, a choice not to love God above all evaluates Him as if He were not an infinitely perfect being. Hence, speculatively known truths determine the truth or falsity of practical judgments about the goodness or evil of choices.

"Conformity with right desire" in the definition of practical truth refers to the RA's conformity with what reason believes, even though falsely, to be speculatively true about what things are at the level of speculative knowledge.

To have practical knowledge of that obligation, we need the speculative knowledge that God is what He is, but we do not and cannot need the speculative knowledge that the RA's finality is what it is. As Grisez and Finnis point out against Hume himself, speculative knowledge of finality does not make practical knowledge practical. To the speculative knowledge that God is what He is, the practical knowledge of the obligation to love God does not add our speculative knowledge of the RA's finality.

What then does the practical knowledge of our obligation add to our speculative knowledge of God? It adds, not reflexive awareness or conceptual awareness of the RA's orientation to value being as known by reason, but the existence of that orientation.

The practical function of the intellect presupposes this orientation as that which gives that practical function its reason for being and its nature, since the intellect's practical function is just the intellect providing direction for the RA's choices.

When practical reason asks "Should we love God above all?", practical reason is, in effect, asking whether loving God above all fulfills the finality of the RA, or equivalently, whether loving God above all fulfills our finality as makers of choices. But practical reason is not literally asking that question, for the question is speculative. The question asks for the relation between what speculative reason knows of God and of the RA. And since the question is speculative, its answer does not explain how the "should" comes into our practical knowledge that God should be loved above all. The answer to that speculative question explains why "God should be loved above all" is a truth, but explaining why a statement is true does not explain how it is known, either speculatively or practically. (Conversely, however, the fact that the truth of an item of practical knowledge can be explained speculatively does not render practical knowledge speculative. As said above, speculative reason has the job both of defending and explaining the truth of propositions known to practical reason and of explaining practical reason's knowledge of those truths, without practical reason's mode of knowing being that of deduction from speculatively known truths.)

But in recognizing that God should be loved above all, practical reason is recognizing that the choice to love God fulfills the finality of the RA. That recognition does not take place by practical reason's considering the truth of "The end if the RA is such and such," but by practical reason's considering the truth of "God is the infinitely perfect being." To say that the latter truth is considered practically is to say that it is considered by reason undertaking the task of directing the choices of the RA to the end of the RA. But the RA's relation to its end does not enter practical reason as a truth to be objectified; it enters as the extraobjective state of affairs existing prior to practical reasoning that makes practical

reasoning necessary. The RA's finality is presupposed by practical reason, where "presupposed" does not refer to a logical premise but to the existential state of affairs that causes there to be such a thing as reason functioning practically.

What this mode of presupposition means is that, when we ask if we should to love God above all, it would be irrelevant for us to also ask "Should from what point of view; by the standard of what finality?" If the point of view, the finality, determining what "should" means were not that of the RA, reason would not be asking this question practically.

To put it another way. When practical reason asks, "Should I love God above all?", it would be irrelevant to also ask "Should from whose point of view; by the standard of whose finality?" The person whose finality provides the standard by which the question is to be answered is presupposed in the asking of the question. "Should I love God?" amounts to "Does loving God fulfill my finality?" But insofar as I am a choice maker, my finality is the finality of the RA. Therefore,

How then does the fulfillment of the RA's finality by loving God above all become known practically? As a result of knowing (speculatively) that God is the infinite being, we know (practically) that God should be loved above all, because the RA's finality enters practical knowledge but as a conscious orientation, a conscious inclination, the conscious inclination without which we would not be thinking practically. The RA's finality enters practical knowledge, not as that which is objectified directly, but as the means by which God's infinite being is objectified as a good to be loved. To ask how we become practically aware that God should be loved above all is to ask how we become practically aware of God's being as completely fulfilling the RA's finality. We become practically aware that God's infinite being fulfills the RA's finality by means of the existence of a conscious inclination to value being as known by reason's (speculative) knowledge, a conscious inclination provoked by the existence of speculative knowledge of what exists. For things are revealed as "good" by being revealed as ends to which desires are directed. And it is as goods that things are objects of practical knowledge.

Without our awareness of inclinations and desires, we would not have our awareness of things as good, since things become denominated good by their conformity to appetite, and we become aware of appetites through their acts. To be aware of something as a good is to be aware of it as that to which a desire is directed and, therefore, as conforming to the appetite producing the desire. Thus, our awareness of being as conforming to appetite comes from the existence of conscious inclinations. From this initial awareness of being as conforming to appetite, we derive our concepts of "good", "end", "fulfillment of finality", etc. Using those concepts we can achieve both speculative and practical knowledge about good (and evil). But our practical knowledge does not derive from our speculative knowledge of good. Our practical knowledge of good is practical because it derives directly from our awareness of good by means of the conscious inclinations that precede our concept of good.

What does practical knowledge add to the speculative know-

ledge of God's infinite being? The awareness of God's infinite being as satisfying the finality of the RA, which awareness practical reason has through the existence of conscious inclinations elicited from the RA by reason's speculative awareness.

Practical reason becomes aware of something as good, not by reflecting on the existence of the desire, but simply by the desire's existence being a conscious existence that does not require reflection to make it conscious. Reflection occurs after the existence of the desire and, therefore, after the existence of that which makes us conscious of what something is as good. When we reflect on the existence of desire, we are already aware of something as a good, because that is what a conscious desire does, namely, make us aware of that which is desired as a good.

Just as we are conscious of the act of sight through the act of sight itself, we are conscious of the RA's inclinations through the inclinations themselves, since they are conscious acts. And just as the act of sight is directed to the object seen, not to the subject seeing, practical reason is directed to that which is recognized as good, not to the inclination by which it is recognized as good.

Do the conscious inclinations I am speaking of really exist, or are they a philosopher's invention, generated by the dictates of theory rather than reality? The consciousness of the RA's orientation to its end is not some special tingle or twitch. It is our awareness of ourselves as oriented to valuing what things are as known by reason, our awareness of ourselves as beings who use what reason knows about things to direct ourselves toward ends. That awareness is a constant part of our nonreflective self-awareness.

What practical knowledge adds to the speculative knowledge that, for instance, an infinitely perfect being exists, is an awareness of that existence as terminating the RA's inclination to its end.

Thus, practical reason decides that God should be loved above all on the basis of what is known speculatively about God, not what is known speculatively about the RA.

The truth of principles like "The infinite being should be loved above all" or "Equals should be treated equally" is self-evident to practical knowledge. If they are not true, then what fulfills the RA's finality is not to be done and what frustrates its finality not to be avoided.

But the process of discovery is one thing; the processes of verifying that something is true and explaining why it is true, as well as the process of explaining our knowledge of its truth, are other things.

the obligation to be fair to other human beings. For many, that is the whole of obligation: if it does not hurt someone else, it is all right.

The other person is owed fairness from me because what she is owed a certain place in my values, not because some other good is owed a place in my values. If unfairness is evil because

directed against some aspect of my flourishing other than the aspect of valuing other persons for what they are, then the evil of unfairness does not consist directly in the failure to give other persons what they are due by being what they are.

And persons are owed nothing from my dog!

On the other hand, the RA analysis makes fairness a relation to what other persons are at the same time and in the same way that it is a relation to our own ends. The RA's end is to give things the value of being directed to ends they set for themselves or to ends we set for them, according to what reason knows about whether things are directed to ends they set for themselves. Thus, the RA analysis makes the obligation to be fair a matter of human flourishing and a relation to what other persons are for the same reason: our end as rational deciders is to value things according to what they are.

my RA's orientation to value things according to reason's knowledge of what things are with respect to the rational valuing of things,

Another way to put it is that the reason I am wrong if I treat another unfairly is not that I am failing to fulfill my own inclinations, unless it is the inclination to evaluate her according to what she is,

for the reason we have to make choices is that existentially incompatible values confront us.

An analysis of the RA's own finality is what has been missing from Realist accounts of ethics. This work is meant to begin to make up for that omission.

In other words, the definitions of some terms, like "suicide" or "murder," or "artificial contraception," happen to include conditions sufficient to render the choice of any act so defined defective by the standard of the RA's finality. As defined, the acts are always opposed to the RA's finality.

But as defined, telling a falsehood always needs a justification.

Do not confuse an "intrinsic" like suicide, a "relative," evil like lying, or a "neutral" act like playing loud music at 4 a.m. with the evil in the choice to perform such acts. In normal circumstances, the conscious choice to play loud music at 4 a.m. is intrinsically evil as an act of RA, even if the effects which make it evil are not included in the definition of "playing loud music at 4 a.m." And finally, there are greater and lesser degrees of intrinsic evil in acts of the RA, just as there are greater and lesser degrees of the values to which those acts are opposed. Reason knows, if it knows anything, that ill-timed music does not interfere with another person's pursuit of goals as much murder does.

Such an act would prevent us from achieving our ultimate end, not because the value of the opposite act derives from being a means to that end. Rather the opposite act is a necessary condition for achieving the ultimate end because the opposite act has an intrinsic perfection, the achievement of the will's immediate end, that is a necessary condition for the union with God that is our ultimate end. Achieving that ultimate end requires that we be in the condition that our acts of will have the value that is due them.

Ethics is concerned with rational knowledge to the degree that such knowledge is required for culpability. Once we are equal in that respect, any further degrees are ethically superfluous.

Some act-descriptions are such reason can know, from the description alone and without any further description of circumstances, that the act would be defective. But not physically defective in absence of knowledge from the description. Rather, reason sees that the act would be defective if done knowingly. And that raises the above question about what is the defect it possesses prior to the defect in the choice. Maybe none, maybe it's just the fact that we can know universally that all such choices would be defective. Then the perceived defect in the exterior act would be inherited from the recognized defect in the interior act choosing it. Knowingly shooting an innocent person is always wrong because choosing to do so would require evaluating things as if they were other than they are known to be.

The other kind of description of acts are such that reason cannot know, without further description of circumstances, circumstances with no necessary connection with the rest of the description, that the act would be defective. This still leaves us with the question of what kind of defect the act including the circumstances would have prior to the defect in the choice. If it can be argued that such an act would have no defect prior to the defect in the will, then neither would the acts described in the first kind of description. For in each case, the description was characterized by whether or not reason could judge the act defective from the description alone; so the defect in each case is of the same kind.

We can even know the truth of some general statements about ethics, which could not be the case if those statements did not concern objective matters. For example, peace is better than war and love between people is better than hate, all other things being equal. Of course, there could be something better than peace, something that would necessitate war, not as better than peace in itself, but as a means to something that is better than peace in itself, for example, the defense of those who are unjustly attacked and who cannot defend themselves. The fact that the "all other things being equal" clause often makes decisions about what is or is not the right action difficult does not diminish the fact that those decisions are important precisely because they concern things that are in themselves objectively better or worse than the other.

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The concept of a person's having "rights" is an attempt to express what is just, i.e., what is "due" to the person. In some circumstances, we have the "right" to yell "Fire!", in other circumstances we do not have that right. That is, in some circumstances this is just; in some circumstances, permission from us to yell "Fire!" is \*due\* him, because of what he is and what we are.

But "having a right" is not a having special quality over and above the other qualities making her what she is, i.e., the qualities because of which something is due her from beings with the qualities making us what we are.

"Rights" are a being of reason, like "the average man" or "being known by," which serve to sum up the existence of real qualities and the real causal relations of those qualities to certain effects. The effect in question is the presence or absence of a defect in an act of the rational appetite. In some cases, that effect depends on very few factors. That is, the nature of certain qualities of actions are such that a combination of a very few of them in an action renders the action defective. Such the relation of those qualities of actions to the defectiveness of an act of the will can be expressed in relatively simple

formulas. E.g., killing of the innocent is always wrong; use of sexuality outside of marriage is always wrong. These moral laws are comparable to physical laws like the dependence of water's state (gaseous, liquid, or solid) on only two factors, temperature and atmospheric pressure. In other cases, the defectiveness of an action depends on a complex combination of many factors. Such cases are comparable to more complex physical laws, like those of hydrodynamics.

Finally, there are cases comparable to the application of laws, like those of hydrodynamics, to individual circumstances. Such applications are not themselves expressible in general laws, but they do not need to be. Their occurrence does not in anyway contradict or restrict the truth, the causal connection, expressed by the general law.

For example, the law of induction tells us that similar causes have similar effects ALL OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL. In a given case, we recognize that the falsehood of a statement causes the act of choosing to tell it to be defective. But later we see that other factors can enter in that make telling a falsehood the right thing to do in those circumstances. Those other factors are too numerous to express in one law; in fact, there are indefinitely many KINDS of circumstances in which telling a falsehood might be the right thing to do. But in each case, we could express the reason why lying was correct in some law expressing a causal connection with the effect of defectiveness in the will. For example, saving a life is more important than telling a truth. That is, not saving the life by lying would cause a defect in the act of the will.

But that law is also accompanied by a *\*ceteris paribus\** clause. Saving the life might not be the only thing at stake. For instance, saving the life might require one to lie about being a Christian. Or the lie could potentially lead to other lives being lost. Etc.

Knowledge that a lie is wrong in this case is knowledge that moves from cause to effect, from the absence of truth to the absence of the end of the rational appetite in the choice. We know that falsehood produces this effect unless impeded from doing so by other causes, or unless other causes make up for what the absence of truth removes from the act of choice. This is sort of the reverse of recognizing that an electric current causes a magnetic field. It is the reverse because in the latter example, we move from effect, the compass's needle moving, to the cause, the electric current. But the cases are similar in that both are premised on the awareness of the absence of any other cause that could alter the effect, in the case of lying, or be the cause of the effect, in the case of the needle.

There are cases where a defect in the choice derives from a defect



in the exterior act. Often injustices happen BY ACCIDENT, i.e., without being chosen. E.g., someone is given a prize or promotion, etc., unjustly but through honest mistakes. In such cases, we still call the exterior act "unjust." But equally important, these examples illustrate that the question of whether the defect in the interior act can derive from a defect in the exterior act is NOT the same as whether we can formulate a universal law saying that all exterior acts of this kind necessarily cause a defect in the will.

The examples given, e.g., someone being rewarded unjustly, are INDIVIDUAL cases. In them, we see an injustice preceding the injustice of the choice. Now we can formulate some sort of universal law, as we can in the case of lying. E.g., it is unjust to let a man die rather than lie to save his life. But from what we have said above, any such law will have a *\*ceteris paribus\** clause. In every individual case, we will need to know that no other mitigating factors are present, and we cannot list those mitigating factors exhaustively. So the exclusion of lying is not like the law against murder or fornication, where we can see that no other factors are relevant to the defectiveness of the act, because of the causal connection we see between the factors named and the end of the rational appetite. Yet the non-universal injustice of a given exterior act can cause a defect in the interior act. So the question of whether exterior acts can cause defects in interior is not the same as the question of whether we can sometimes formulate a universal law saying that a certain kind of described exterior act will always cause a defect in the interior act.

And the converse is also true, the laws saying that the choice of a certain kind of act is always defective do not necessarily derive the defect in the interior act from a prior defect in the exterior act. The exterior act can have a positive character that only implies a defect in its relation to the ends of the rational appetite.

For example, a decision for artificial contraception, drunkenness, and suicide would be intrinsically defective regardless of its consequences in a particular situation. In other words, the definitions of some terms, like "suicide" or "murder," or "artificial contraception," happen to include conditions sufficient to render the choice of any act so defined defective by the standard of the will's finality. As defined, the acts are always opposed to the will's finality. No matter what good effects such acts may have in addition to the effects by which they are defined, the conscious choice of those acts would evaluate things as if they were other than they are. For example, the choice of murder or suicide always require evaluating an end-in-itself as if it were not an end-in-itself, and the choice of artificial contraception always requires making the value of a means to an end-in-itself to be something less than an being a means to an end-in-itself.

The definitions of other terms, like "knowingly telling a falsehood," happen to include conditions sufficient to render the choice intrinsically defective unless other conditions occur that involve something the will should value more highly than the communication of the truth in question, given that human nature is what it is. For example, it would be wrong to send a person to an unjust death rather than tell a lie. Communicating truth is a good by the standard of the rational appetite, but not an end-in-itself. Only persons are ends-in-themselves; all other goods are relative to the goals, especially the prevolitional goals, of ends in themselves. The possession of most truths is such a relative good, as is freedom from pain. (If the same cannot be said for truths like "God exists" or "Human life is immortal," the reason is that values for persons other than the value of truth alone are at stake.) Since truth is a relative human good, "lying" is defined by an effect that is an evil. And lying, considered just as such, is an evil act, as is inflicting pain. But since lying is a relative evil, other effects that are more important for ends-in-themselves can render telling certain lies the ethical thing to do, just as the correct ethical decision can require us to inflict pain.

The definitions of still other terms, like "playing loud music at 4 a.m." do not include conditions sufficient to render the choice of the act so defined either successful or defective by the standard of the will's finality. Human nature's orientations to ends does not make loud music at 4 a.m., considered just as such, either a relative good or a relative evil. Effects other than those by which "playing loud music at 4 a.m." is defined must be examined to decide whether the decision to play music then would be good or evil (see Section 4.4.1).

The conditions that render suicide always wrong and lying wrong in default of more important values do not depend on custom. Custom might determine that a particular lie would be justified in one culture though not in others, due to the relative unimportance of that lie and the relative importance of some other value in the culture. But as defined, telling a falsehood always needs a justification. On the other hand, it is possible that the customs of all human societies render playing loud music at 4 a.m. ethically evil, in default of more important values. But it is not necessary that that all societies have customs rendering loud music at 4 a.m. evil; human nature does not demand such customs.

Do not confuse an "intrinsic" like suicide, a "relative," evil like lying, or a "neutral" act like playing loud music at 4 a.m. with the evil in the decision to perform such acts. In normal circumstances, the conscious decision to play loud music at 4 a.m. is intrinsically evil as an act of will, even if the effects which make it evil are not included in the definition of "playing loud music at 4 a.m." And finally, there are greater and lesser degrees of intrinsic evil in acts of the will, just as there are greater and lesser degrees of the values to which those acts are opposed. Reason knows, if it knows anything, that ill-timed music does not interfere with another person's pursuit of goals as much murder does.

This account of moral value gives an objective, measurable way of knowing the truth of 'This choice is morally defective.' Reason can give us more information pertinent to the RA's finality than the fact that our natures

make us ends-in-themselves. For example, biological facts about human nature reveal that some physical conditions are normally necessary for our pursuit of goals, and that some physical conditions are more necessary for our pursuit of goals than others. Also, facts about the environments in which we pursue goals make some things normally necessary for the pursuit of goals that might not otherwise be necessary. On this planet, for instance, we usually need to earn a living to pursue other goals, unless our goal is to die of exposure or starvation. Finally, observation of human behavior reveals the relative importance of different goals to different individuals and cultures.

When our interests are in conflict with the interests of others, we have to evaluate the relative importance of the conflicting goals and/or of the interfered with means to goals. Reason's knowledge of human nature, human behavior, and the environments in which we live provides criteria for judgments concerning the relative importance of conflicting interests. Failure to evaluate the conflicting ends or means in conformity with what their relative importance is as known by reason amounts to failure to give the interests of other ends-in-themselves the place due them in our evaluations.

For example, does my desire for loud music at 4 o'clock in the morning make it justifiable for me to keep the person in the next apartment awake? Our knowledge of the needs of human nature shows that this is not the case. A choice that would evaluate my listening to loud music as equal or higher on a scale of priorities to his sleeping would give these things relative places in my evaluations in conflict with the relative places of their contributions to needs established by human nature. If it is just to keep others awake with loud music, then at least one horn of the following dilemma must hold: either his interests are not equal to mine (he is not an end-in-itself) or loud music is as necessary for our ability to pursue our ends, given the makeup of human nature, as is a good night's sleep. Someone can have loud music at 4 a.m. as her goal, unless pursuing that goal puts her interests above those of others. And reason knows from experience whether depriving other of sleep does that.

Empirical evidence also provides a standard by which we can judge that some individual needs are pathological and do not impose moral obligations. We could know that, if someone has a psychological need for loud music twenty-four hours a day, that need could not be fulfilled without depriving others of their needs. And we could know that abandonment to that goal would deprive a person of means the human condition makes necessary to pursue other goals she can reasonably be expected to have, at least in the future. So we would have no obligation to let her fulfill that need, but those with the appropriate social relation to her would be obligated to help her overcome that need.

Among the conditions we need for the pursuit of our ends are social arrangements and institutions like commitments given us by others. If in the pursuit of some end I break a commitment, I am putting my interests ahead of another person's, unless breaking the commitment provides for a need that observation shows to be more important to us as pursuers of goals than is the commitment itself. Normally, breaking a date to play golf for the sake of watching a cartoon on television would be treating the other person unequally as a pursuer of goals; for breaking the date would evaluate watching cartoons to be as important a goal, or a means to goals, as keeping the commitment. We know that is not normally true from observation of human behavior, of the time, energy, and resources we invest in differing pursuits, of the way we complain when deprived of different ends or means to ends, etc. Contrast this to breaking the date for the sake of taking a sick child to the hospital. It would be defective act of the RA to evaluate keeping the date to be a condition equally or more important to the human pursuit of ends than is health; experience shows that health is in all normal circumstances a more necessary prerequisite for the pursuit of ends than is keeping appointments. So keeping the date would deprive the child of an equal opportunity to pursue her ends.

But we could also recognize cases in which it would not be unfair to break the date for the sake of watching cartoons. There could be an espionage or science fiction situation where watching the cartoon would save other persons from destruction or from some debilitating disease. If so, observation could inform us that keeping the date would deprive others of a condition

necessary to pursue any end, life, or a condition normally necessary for the pursuit of ends, health. So observation would inform us that keeping the date would treat others unequally as pursuers of ends. Or, there could be a culture in which the chance to watch cartoons was a rare and highly prized event, much more so than playing golf. Observation could show us that people there would not expect someone to keep a date for golf, if the chance to watch cartoons came up. If I criticized such a person for not keeping the date, I would be treating her differently from the way I would expect to be treated in the same circumstance. So I would be treating her unequally as a pursuer of goals.

The fact that experience provides evidence for moral judgments does not mean that these judgments are always easy. Differences in needs and abilities, and differences in natural and social relations, between human beings often make it difficult to judge what constitutes putting one person's interests ahead of others. But the existence of unclear cases does not disprove the existence of clear cases. So difficulty does imply that moral judgments are subjective and relative to egocentric interests, nor does it imply that moral judgments are not made on the basis of experiential evidence. Rather, a theory implying that such difficulties should not exist would be inconsistent with the evidence. What these difficulties show is the complexity of human nature and the complexity of the situations in which objective moral values are at stake. Sometimes, complexity may make the laws of acoustics and hydrodynamics difficult to apply in practice. Complexity does not make them subjective.

A different kind of example. The difference between drug-induced states such as drunkenness and drug-induced unconsciousness is that while drunk we continue to perform activities that would otherwise be under the control of reason and the RA. But drunkenness restricts our ability to exercise freely chosen rational direction over those activities. Either we cannot make choices based on rational knowledge, since rational judgment is lacking; or we can make rational choices but cannot carry them out, since the RA's control over other faculties is impaired. If a person is isolated on a remote island, is her choice to get drunk morally neutral, because the possibility of injustice to another is nil? No, the place our orientation to ends, while drunk, would have in the evaluations we make in choosing to get drunk would be the place of an orientation to ends not determined by the being that has those orientations. So in choosing to get drunk we are evaluating ourselves to be less than what we are as ends-in-ourselves. In fact, we are evaluating ourselves in the same way that we evaluate others when their value for us is not that of beings whose action is directed to ends they set for themselves. For the sake of some goal like pleasure, we would sacrifice our ability, while drunk, to pursue freely chosen goals. And that is what we do when we treat another person unfairly: deny them the opportunity to pursue a freely chosen goal for the sake of some goal we have chosen. And just as unfairness to others is defective for not valuing them as ends-in-themselves, so the choice to get drunk is defective for not valuing ourselves as ends-in-ourselves. In one case, we use others as means to some goal of ours without allowing them to pursue their goals; in the other case, we use our faculties as means to a goal that will prevent us from having free control over the pursuit of other goals.

For choices to evaluate persons as ends-in-themselves, choices must evaluate persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists. But when our choices give a means for making persons the status, in our system of values, of not existing for the sake of making persons, the person does not have the status of being that for the sake of which everything else exists; for it does not even have the place of being that for the sake of which a means of making persons exists. And when we deliberately use sex in a way that thwarts conception, we are knowingly refusing to evaluate sex to be a means to the existence of a person. So we cannot use sex while deliberately preventing it from making a person without diminishing the value of the person.

But refraining from the use of our person-making power can be a way of honoring that value of the person; for our choice to refrain can result from the fact that persons have the status of ends-in-themselves in our evaluations. We sacrifice other values rather than evaluate our person-making ability as if it did not exist for the sake of making ends-in-themselves, and so evaluate the existence of persons as if it was not the existence of that for

the sake of which everything else exists.

The RA can no more avoid treating things as if they existed the way they are evaluated than belief can avoid being an assertion that things exist in certain ways. Both belief and evaluation have the finality of identity between the way things exist and the way they are believed or evaluated to exist.

This analysis may appear to contradict the maxim that we cannot derive ought from is. But I am not sure that I have derived 'ought' from anything. In explaining the foundations of science, how science derives beliefs from its foundations, and why these beliefs are justified, the philosopher of science does not usurp the scientist's role of being the one who does the deriving. The deriving belongs to a different kind of knowledge from the philosophy of science; it belongs to science. Likewise, the philosophical examination of the foundations of ethics is not ethics. For one thing, ethics is practical knowledge, while the examination of its foundations and of how the ethicist builds on those foundations is speculative knowledge.

On the other hand, if in what follows I do derive ought from is, I can only say that it has ipso facto been demonstrated that there is something wrong with arguments showing that one cannot derive ought from is.

I accepted (and do accept) 'Treat equals equally' as a principle not in order to treat it as the foundation of moral choice but to treat it as something in need of foundation. The foundation was located not in a further principle from which 'Treat equals equally' and other principles would be derived but in certain factual situation. The obligation to treat equals equally is not derived from that situation but consisted in that situation. (If my analysis has been correct, then one who has followed it derives his philosophic understanding of the obligation to treat equals equally from the analysis of that situation, but deriving our philosophic understanding of this obligation from X does not imply that the obligation stands to X in a relation of logical derivation from prior principles or of causal derivation. How we derive our understanding of obligation is an epistemological matter; what obligation consists in is an ontological matter.)

Likewise, in the examples to follow, I will not be deriving moral consequences from a principle but will be pointing a factual situation like that I pointed to in the case of justice, namely, a culpable defect in placing evaluations on things, a defect measured not by any standard external to the act of choosing but by a choice's intrinsic finality of treating things as if their existence was identical with the way they are evaluated.

In short, ethics depends on metaphysics. But it does not follow that one derives ought from is anymore than the truths of science are derived from metaphysics. Metaphysics explains and justifies the methods of science, but one does not deduce the results of that method from metaphysics. So with ethics.

the first principles of ethics may be both self-evident and practical. But metaphysics and the philosophy of man can and must defend them indirectly by showing that if they are denied, some truths about human nature are denied also (e.g., that we have free will, can know what things are, have certain natural ends, etc.). This indirect method is how philosophy defends the self-evident truths of logic, math, and the philosophy of nature.

For example, we know that the only reasonable belief is that other humans have conscious states like our own;

In the case of other persons, it is the belief that underlying the external actions I perceive is a consciousness like that which I experience in myself.

Also, the evil of an unfair choice consists in the choice's failure to achieve an end it is oriented to, but the evil of the choice does not consist in a failure to achieve an end of the chooser as opposed to a failure to aim at the other's achievement of her ends. An unfair choice of mine is not wrong because it hurts me as opposed to hurting her. An unfair choice is wrong be-

cause it conflicts with the end of giving her interests the place in my values that conforms with what she is. Other persons deserve or are due a certain kind a evaluation by my choices, "deserve" and "due" being defined in terms of a choice's end of evaluating things to be what they are. And for a person to "have" a right to something means that the obligation to make a particular choice concerning her is determined by what she is, since a choice to the contrary would fail to achieve the end of evaluating her to be what she is.

In taking innocent life to save the world, we are imposing our chosen ends on another end-in-itself and so are reducing the others value to being an means to our chosen ends. Why can't an intention make an act good? For example, killing an infant to save a city? Well what makes the intention a good intention; what criterion does the intention satisfy to be a morally good intention? What else but the fact that the intention evaluates things to be what they are. But an evaluation that makes evaluates oneself to be the cause of the taking of an infant's life does not evaluate you and the infant to be what you are. So that evaluation contradicts the condition that makes the supposed good intention good.

The opponent may say that what makes the intention good is the fact that it aims at the greatest composite satisfaction of human interests. But to arrive at an estimate of what the greatest composite satisfaction of interests would be we would have to have a standard by which to put an order of priority into a multitude of conflicting interests; that standard would have to allow us to give different weights to those interests.