

This file contains vocal transcriptions of handwritten notes. Much of this could be useful for A RE-introduction to Philosophy

xxx Thing -- object as source of error, March 7, 91

Characteristics of objects as objects are often not only different from but contradictory to characteristics of things as things, for example, abstract versus concrete, universal versus individual. As a result, many statements can appear necessarily true because their opposites appear contradictory, although the statements are indeed false. For example "universal concepts cannot tell us what individual things are." Or, "reality is individual so universality cannot put us in touch with reality." Or simply, "concepts cannot be true universals." Or, "metaphysics of being is not an abstract science because existence is concrete." Such statements can appear self-evidently true or close to it.

One reason it happens so often that cisobjective properties contradict transobjective (as opposed to merely being different from them) is that they are often opposite terms of relations, logical relations, like universality -- individuality, abstractness -- concreteness. And see the other examples (genus -- species, etc.) mentioned by Poinsot in the de Signis where he explains the nature of the logical beings of reason and says their opposite correlatives are not real beings but other logical beings of reason.

Also, the appearance of self evidence comes from the identity of that which is, say, universal and that which is not universal in truth. How can we express the distinction without appearing to break the unity? if I say "universality is a characteristic of the manner in which something is known" I risk ambiguity. "Manner in which it is known" can refer to what it is known to be outside the mind. Existence is concrete. Abstraction is a "property of t.. if the universe is one substanceh

change is ur knowl chnes changesdge of existence." Then don't we know that existence is concrete, so that concreteness would be a property of our knowledge also? (see the ambiguity in question 13 of the first part of the summa concerning "knowing something otherwise than it is.)

How do we express this distinction? Awkwardly and potentially ambiguously. Even Aquinas, as the last citation shows, did not find a smooth way of expressing the distinction. Another bad way of expressing it: "universality is a property of the means of knowledge, not the goal." "Means" can refer to the entitative means, the psychological concept, but no, it should refer to the object as object. This inability to find a means of expression that is not either ambiguous or awkward (that is, conceptually awkward) shows why it is not the distinction of thing and object that is the knob of the critical problem; it is the problem of thing and object that is the nub.

The thing is "abstract in the mind" can mean we think of it as being abstract. "Abstract metaphysics" does not judge existence to be abstract; it judges existence to be concrete. But the epistemology of metaphysics judges existence to acquire the logical property of abstraction when we know such things as the fact that it is concrete, and it acquires that characteristic for the purpose of our knowing that existence is concrete.

June 22, 89

A belief holds that things exist "the way they are expressed in statements," "the way they are stated to exist." The quoted phrases are ambiguous. "A way they are expressed or stated" can refer to the manner of objectification, characteristics of objects as objects.

October 21, 87

Dennehy and Russell show the absurdity of treating the principle of non-contradiction as if it were of Law of thought and not thing. They show this in terms of the claim the principle actually makes and the consequences of denying that specific claim. So their opponents are not focusing on that claim, not concentrating their attention on it. But they think they are talking about that claim. So how can they think this? And what are they focusing on instead?

They are focusing on the mental construct, the proposition in the psychological or formal sense, or even on the sentence, not on what is objectified by the proposition, intended by it. Or they are focusing on the objective proposition as object, not as it is identical with a thing or state of affairs. They are thus at one remove from focusing on what is objectified by the proposition. But how can they think they are focusing on what is objectified by the proposition? Because there is a kind of identity between the construct and the object, namely, the construct is the object in intentional existence. This is another proof for the object's existing intentionally, namely, that we are able to confuse the mental construct with the object intended.

And this kind of error occurs repeatedly in philosophy. We say all truths are relative, but exclude that proposition from relativity. We say concepts are cultural constructs that do not tell us what things are. But we think that proposition tells us what concepts are. We do not focus on the the content we are denying and see that that content applies to ourselves and our very act of denial. We focus on certain mental constructs not on that which they objectify.

The person who says there is no objective truth because we always impose a subjective conceptual framework on things, or the person who says that all truth is relative, etc., is in effect thinking in terms of a template, for example, "S is P" or "Ex (Fx & Gx)", a template representing the alleged truth. And she is saying that no matter how you fill in that template, you're using a conceptual scheme that does not reveal what things are in themselves, or something to that effect. What she is not doing is looking at the content she has just put in the template. For she is not willing to admit that her own proposition uses that template. For then she would see that her own proposition is self defeating.

How can she fail to see this? The question becomes how can she focus on the mental construct (represented by the template) rather than on what is objectified by means of the construct (represented by the content filling the template). The answer is in terms of the fact that the mental construct is the object intentionally. Therefore she can think she is talking about the content. This intentional existence is what makes thing -- object identity possible; that is, it makes possible the fact that the thing now is an object.

No date

The thing -- object distinction is a source of endless ambiguity and confusion. Every statement true of things as things is also true of objects; but it is not true of objects as objects, and vice versa. The question is what is the cause of the truth of the statement? The answer will be that the thing is a thing or the thing is an object.

Another example: the two existences of the De Ente is a case of the thing -- object distinction. But when the same case occurs in another context, that is, the indeterminacy of translation, is not recognized for what it is. In the latter, we do not have to do with what we attribute to the absolute nature but what we attribute to things as things in predication. But the same thing -- object principle is at work.

Another example: the subject of metaphysics is not "being as common" but "being as being." The first description concerns being as an object of knowledge. But both statements about the subject of metaphysics are made by the logician, not the metaphysician, both appear in context of discussion of metaphysics as a mode of knowing and a discussion of the objects of metaphysics as objects of a mode of knowing.

So it is easy to forget the fact (and confuse) that the "being as being" statement attempts to name that feature of things as things that attracts the attention of the metaphysician, while the "being as common" attempts to name the feature of things as objects that is true of the subject of metaphysics insofar as it becomes the object of that kind of knowledge. So the two kinds of statements can be confused with one another.

"The object of metaphysics is common being; hence the metaphysician must know that being is separable from matter in order to do metaphysics." But being "common" is a logical characteristic. And we substitute that logical characteristic for the characteristic of being as a thing, namely, that it exists, that defines the metaphysician.

November 27, 79

The intuition of being is a necessary condition for good metaphysics, but not a sufficient condition. You can not have good metaphysics without it, but you can have bad metaphysics with it. Why? Good metaphysics requires it to be conceptualized properly, unlike Spinoza, Plato, etc.. To conceptualize it properly we need the distinction between things as things and things as objects.

September 16, 81

The extensional equivalence of thing descriptions and object descriptions, due to the identity of things in objects, makes it easy to substitute the latter for the former, especially when doing epistemology. In epistemology, the description from the point of view of knowledge seems most appropriate. And in all areas of philosophy, not just epistemology, we are always asking "how do I know this is true?" So the epistemological point of view is always hanging around. If a U-turn

is also made, then object descriptions from the point of view of the kind of knowledge with which we make the U-turn can seem perfectly sufficient.

Interested only in seeing the rings on the inside of the limb, we saw the limb of the tree forgetting that we are sitting on the limb.

September 7, 81

"I am studying metaphysics." Ambiguities abound. Does that statement mean I am acquiring knowledge of things as things or that I am studying metaphysics as a type of knowledge and acquiring knowledge of things as objects? In other words does that statement mean I am doing metaphysics or doing a branch of logic

"I am investigating the subject of metaphysics." That statement can refer to investigating the subject of metaphysics to see what pertains to it as a thing or to see what pertains to it as an object of knowledge.

The physicist studies the objects of physics to learn about them as things.

"I heard a lecture about physics." A lecture about a branch of knowledge as they type of cognition? Or a lecture composed of truths belonging to that branch of knowledge?

xxx Thing and object as source of error, April 28, 2005

On the level of sensation the other is present precisely as a reality which dominates the act of knowing it; it dominates the act of knowing even in the order of exercise. I am a cause of the act of seeing in the order of exercise, but just one cause. For as I turn my head to look in a different direction, not only do I not know what I will see, but there might not be anything they are for me to see that all, even though I am doing everything I can do to cause the act of seeing in the order of exercise.

At the level of sensation reality is present as a force exercising its causality on my knowledge. Reality, the cause in the order of specification, is also the cause of the order of exercise on this level. The same thing is true on the level of pre-reflective self-consciousness.

I can imagine one sense object acting on another. But in sensation the object is present as fully capable of acting on me and affecting me just as I am present to myself as a reality. That this is a real as opposed to imaginary object means that this object is present as having sufficient existence in itself to be able to actually act on me and on others. It has the ability to act on that which I know to really exist, consciousness, so consciousness does not cause it. It has the ability in itself to act, really not just in imagination, on me. Before I am reflectively aware of my own existence in explicit self-consciousness, I recognized in the table that which I (later?) Call existence.

xxx short book, April 29, 2005

Alternative subtitle: the metaphysical foundations of empirical knowledge; or of empirical science.

Or, "foundations: a re-introduction to philosophy"

xxx Kripke, April 19, 83

Why couldn't the table not be wood, not be composed of molecules, etc.? Because the material cause is the cause of individuation. In the case of Socrates not being human or not being a philosopher, the question is whether there is in Socrates a potency who is actualization would preserve his identity in other respects. If humanity is a substantial characteristic of Socrates, there is no such potency. Is Socrates in potency for losing the characteristic of being human while remaining what he is another respects? Not if humanity is his substantial nature.

xxx properties, logic, Plantinga, May 2, 2005

If the kind of properties Plantinga lists on page 60 to 62, especially 62, are "real" properties, we all have an infinite number of properties; these can't be ontological properties. Is being snub nosed in world W a property? No, it is a logical construct.

By "property" he seems to mean anything that can be predicated truthfully. That would be an epistemological fallacy.

Linguistic theory of the analytic, May 2, 2005.

We can know the word function of "bachelor" and "unmarried adult male" without knowing that they are equivalent. "All bachelors are unmarried men" can express a contingent relation between the meanings(L). But the word functions of "bachelor" and "unmarried" or "adult male" are not the same. "All bachelors are unmarried" expresses a logical relation between the word functions, a relation of greater precision to less precision; and so it is a necessary truth.

On "Cicero is Tully" see Kripke page 101 and following.

Names, May 2, 2005

Perhaps it is better not to say that an individual is the word function of a name; instead say it is that which is objectified by a name. For example, "Could Socrates be inanimate?" That depends on what set of characteristics we associate with the individual Socrates. There could be many such sets. Which set is the word function of Socrates? None of them. Socrates is that which is objectified, but the word function of a name is not the same as a set of characteristics. So naming is not essential to necessity. Something which is now Socrates could be inanimate.

xxx common premise of rationalism and empiricism important, May 5, 2005

I should not say that experience gives only contingent truths. I should say experience does not allow us to know that a truth is necessary, though the truth may be.

xxx Rosenberg book page 260

They quote Hume saying that causal relations are not cognition constituted. But universality is cognition constituted. By saying that Hume's view is that causality is mind dependent, I do not mean that necessity is mind dependent. I do not mean that it is mind dependent for Hume. I mean that universality is mind dependent.

The use of logical constructs in thing descriptions must be consistent with what the things being objectified are. Nor can they add anything extra objective to what is being objectified. So universality can add nothing extra objective to continuity and succession in the definition of causality.

Hume says causality is "out there". And similarity is indeed out there. But similarity out there is not enough to define causality. To use Hume's definition of causality we must know that similarity holds in all cases. Yes, we can use logical relations in thing descriptions, but the only way not to reduce causality to universality is to say that the universality is an effect of causality.

Page 282: supposedly causality is a relation in thing's. But universality (regularity) is not in particular thing's. Similarity can be in particular thing. But similarity does not make to similar things both causes or both effects of the same kind of causes. Similarity only makes us think that there may be a causal relation and it does so only if it gives rise to universality.

My statements referring to the word functions of names are statements about the truth conditions for name; not about a theory of how it names name as opposed to how descriptions describe.

Kripke, August 4, 83

Kripke is right that we take the individuals we encounter not simply as successions of phenomenal properties but as beings, entities, of a certain nature, a certain internal structure, that has a causal relation to these properties. As we investigate the nature, certain external properties become more important because they are more connected with the interior nature, and hence those exterior properties are more revealing of the interior nature.

Cats are animals; Gold is a metal; light is a stream of photons; water is H_2O . Whether such statements are necessary truths can be looked at in two ways. Once we establish that there is a substance with the atomic number of 79, we know that the substance we happen to call gold has that number. We can ask could a substance with the atomic number 79 not have that number, or we could ask could Gold not have it. If the word function of "gold" makes reference to some property of gold, like behaving a certain way in a certain experiment, that has as its cause the fact that the substance has the atomic number of 79, then Gold must be 79. But if it asks could that

which is of atomic number 79 not have atomic number 79, we are taking something that now has that number and asking whether it could retain other characteristics while losing that one; the answer is yes.

Kripke, May 2, 2005

Is "animal" logically included in "cat"? Couldn't cats be automata? The objection presupposes that we have acquired a word function for "animal" independently of our experience of cats and then put cats in the pre-existing category. But where did we get the word function of "animal" from to begin with? From some experience like that of the experience of cats. Perhaps we even got it from an automaton. In that case it would not be opposed to automaton as our present concept of animal is but would express something automata share with things that our present concept of animal applies to, properties like self motion, etc..

The point is that some word functions are logically included in cat.

Are tomatoes fruits or vegetables (Putnam)?

XXX pain, consciousness of pain, May 18, 86

Refer back to "sensation" pages of this month. If a physical thing can be said to have an immaterial status as an object of sensation, because it is not received as a mode of being making the sense faculty this kind of thing physically (physically red or green, physically at rest or in motion, physically of the shaper that, etc.) pain can be said to be IMmaterial in the same sense. Pain exists in us as a quality but one that participates in the status that physical things have when known, that is, pain exists in consciousness. And the physical self therefore it exists in consciousness. In addition to its physical qualities, it has a quality, consciousness, by which other things exist in an immaterial way and he exists in a mode that is more than material. He relates to himself in a way such that the self has an intentional as well as entitative existence. And to exist intentionally is to exist in a nonmaterial mode.

He may not yet be a reflexive object of consciousness, but he exists in a way in which he is potentially a reflexive object. He does not become potentially (in a proximate sense) a reflexive object until he has non-reflexive awareness of himself, that is, until he exists in an immaterial mode.

Kripke, May 2, 2005

Kripke is right. We know that x is something with a certain internal structure. That does not by itself substantiate the fix the reference versus connotation view. However, that internal structure is the causal structure that explains why the thing appears in this way and these circumstances, for example, why it is able to reflect light. But we discover properties that are more revealing of the internal causal structure of things than others. The ability to reflect light tells us little about the internal structure of things that we call tigers and gold. The fact that they have this property in common is enough to show that tells little about what is specific to the internal structure that is

what each one is, that is, what each of tigers and gold is.

What reveals the internal structure is a combination of common accidents that is not shared with others and that we find it together frequently.

Fix the reference might apply to name, but I do not see the problem with the meter stick. The problem with the meter stick is an epistemological fallacy.

Possible worlds, May 2, 2005

"There is a possible world in which" is ambiguous. It should be "a world is possible in which" or "a world in which . . . would be a noncontradictory world."

The "there is" in "there is a possible world in which" is like the "there is" in mathematics. It does not assert extra objective existence but asserts a predicate of an object, a cognition constituted object.

Socrates in another world is a cognition constituted object which is identical with our Socrates (not a counterfeit). Our Socrates could not exist in another world.

A possible world is simply one that satisfies all the necessary conditions, where necessity is not defined by the opposite's being impossible -- that would be circular -- but by "the opposite would hold if and only if something both was and was not what it is." Whether or this helps modal logicians in talking about possible worlds, I do not know. What I do know is that metaphysics does not depend on modal logic to talk about necessary truth. Metaphysics judges the foundations of logic; not the other way around

Kripke, page 75 and 76: in all possible worlds Aristotle must have at least one of the cluster of properties that Q associates with the name, that fixes the reference, but it does not follow that Qa is necessarily true. So being true in all possible worlds is not the same thing as being necessarily true. Or the cluster describes the *causal* process by which the reference is fixed. But Aristotle could not still be Aristotle without at least one property. Still that is stipulation, not necessity. Necessity arises when we ask whether something with property F must have property G in all possible worlds.

xxx Hume, concept of cause, April 17, 83

Hume. and does not account for our belief that a cause exists in cases where we recognize an event as an effect but do not know what the cause is. By Hume's constructed definition of cause, we can recognize something as an effect only if we first know that it is the subsequent event in our regularly occurring sequence of events of certain types. That is just what we do not know on this hypothesis. Nor does Hume give us the faintest reason for thinking that there is a cause of his kind to be searched for. For even though we are aware of such causes in a few cases, and the vast majority of cases we have been ignorant of the causes for most of our history. And most human

beings still are ignorant of them.

xxx Rosenberg book, May 3, 2005

Page 131: the major issue is not to distinguish law like regularity from accidental regular. Because regularity is not the issue. It's not the regularity is law like and therefore causal, but the regularity is causal and therefore law like.

I am not agreeing with Hume that necessity is an essential part of the definition of cause. There are contingent causal relations. But I am dealing with a necessary truths and with causality in so far as it gives rise to necessary truths. Those are the causal relations I am calling necessary.

Page 304: they sharply distinguish the covering law theory of explanation from the regularity theory of causality.

xxx Plantinga pages 17 and 18

God, good critique of the set theory definition of numbers.

Concerning Quine's definition of Aristotelian essentialism in Plantinga's appendix. It leaves out the crucial fact that the property allegedly necessary to individual A is really distinct from A. How? Two ways. As a part is distinct from the whole or as an accident is distinct from a substance. If the first way, the question of causal necessity concerns the relation of the part to the other parts, that is, the causal relation. Is it such that the others would not exist without the part in question existing? Or if the other exist without this part, one or the other, or both parts both exists and does not exist. Same with the second way. Otherwise, the only necessity is that of a thing's identity with itself, a logical necessity.

xxx essence, May 5, 2005

Explain that by "essence" I do not mean properties that a thing has necessarily or essentially.

Essence does not mean that which is necessary. What is necessary is what follows causally from essence. That even applies to an individual's necessary accidents that derive from the causality of matter.

xxx Kripke, May 5, 2005

The question "could gold not have the atomic number 79" could mean does a collection of subatomic particles now arranged into something with the atomic number 79 cease to be so arranged? The answer is yes.

xxx ontological analysis, December 12, 89.

In ontological analysis being is not just logically included; for being is logically included in any concept. Rather the elements of which the concept is constructed, the elements whose arrangement constitutes the concept, are elements distinguished from one another as differences causally specific to the common ground of being or existence.

Even though red is a distinct relation to existence, as is every distinct mode of being, the way existence is logically included in the objective concept of red is the same way it is logically included in the objective concept of green. But the way existence is included in the definition of substance is not the same way it is included in the definition of accident; the way it is included in the definition of essence is not the way it is included in the definition of cause, of necessity, of contingency, of truth, of form, of matter, etc.

The information about how red and green are relations to existence that is logically included in their objective concepts is the same information, that each is a possible way of existent. How they differ as possible ways of existing, as possible relations to existents, is not expressed by the way the objective concept of being is logically included in their objective concepts.

November 12, 79

On an even divide things in so far as they are numerically quantified, insofar as they display that property, not insofar as they display the property, being. Odd/even is not a per se division of being as such, nor a per se division of any previous per se division of being as such.

And notice importantly that it is self-evident that odd/even is a division of integer as such, and self-evident that it is not a division of being as such. It is self-evident that odd and even have as their proper subject, their proper logical component cause, integer. That means that they have as their proper subject nothing more universal than integer or less universal than integer, and that is self-evident. It is made self-evident by the way integer is included in the word functions of "odd" and "even." It is made self-evident by the relation between integer and the other elements of their definitions.

What is a per se division of a dividend? A division of the dividend as such, a division the divisors of which have the dividend as their proper subject. Another way to put it, a per se division of a dividend is when the divisors pertain to things precisely as having the dividend as a property. And what does that mean?

In order to be capable of being odd or even, in order to have either of these characteristics or be eligible for them, a number of other characteristics must be true of the thing. The total set of other characteristics that must be true of the thing to be so eligible, the set of causal conditions necessary for being odd or even, are the proper subject for the characteristic odd or even. Odd and even pertain to things precisely insofar as things have that set of characteristics. Odd and even are a per se division of that set of characteristics as such.

Among that total set of characteristics, there may be characteristics shared by things that are neither odd nor even. Odd and even are not a per se division of that set of characteristics. But

there are characteristics necessary for being odd or even that all things odd or even possess and which cannot exist unless the things that have that subset of characteristics are either odd or even. Odd and even are a per se division of that subset of characteristics.

(Take every characteristic necessary for something to have the capacity to be red. Then take the least universal of that set of characteristics, that is, the characteristics things with that total set of characteristics share with the fewest other thing's. That is the proper subject of a red. In other words, among the total set of characteristics necessary for something to be red, there are characteristics that presuppose other characteristics. The characteristics that are presupposed by others are able to be more universal than others. So they are not strictly the proper subject of red.)

Now all subjects of division and all divisors are modes of being. But not all divisors constitute per se divisions of being as such. Nor are all dividends either per se divisions of being as such or per se divisions of previous per se divisions of being as such. If we start off with a per se division of being as such, that is, a division that self-evidently has being as its proper subject (for example, exists in another/does not exist in another), and follow with per se divisions of the preceding per se divisions every step, we would eventually reach all things.

But we could only accomplish this if we could use ontological analysis and each step. For as a characteristic that has being itself as its proper subject, the initial divisor must be an ontological word function. So the per se divisors of the initial divisor are also ontological word functions, since they have for their proper logical subject something defined by reference to being as its logical subject. The initial divisor is defined as the fulfillment of a logical potency belonging to the word function of "being" as such, and the subsequent divisor is defined as the fulfillment of a logical potency belonging to the fulfillment of a logical potency belonging to the word function of "being" as such. So each step the word functions with the ontological word functions.

Devise or is of being as such fail a logical potency a longing to being considered simply, with no further addition; so the divisors are functions of being and so are ontological word functions. And the subsequent divisors are functions of functions of being.

To say that something is a being is to say that it has everything necessary and sufficient to be either a substance or accident. It is not to say that it has everything necessary or sufficient to be red, or even, or Protestant, or animal, or vegetable, or mineral, etc.

November 6, 86

Is not just that "integer" is more universal than "odd" and "even." But these specific, less universal word functions objectify things as having a logical or causal relation to that which happens, in this case, to be more universal. And they do that self-evidently. Likewise self-evidently, they do not objectify things as having a logical or causal relation to some other sub-concept of number, some other less universal concept of number.

Likewise, being is the most universal concept, and of the specific, less universal concepts, in another existent and not in another existent, in itself or not in itself, objectify things as having a

specific relation to the word function of "being," as related to the word function of "exists" in a certain way namely, as having the word function of "being" as their logical component cause, and not as having any other less universal concept than "being" as their logical component cause. And they do these things self-evidently.

June 15, 2005

An ontological word function is one that distinguishes the things it objectifies from other things by the way the word function includes a reference to existence or some *cognate* of existence.

xxx empirical as opposed to ontological analysis, February 22, 91

empirical definitions have to show how to pick out the defined in experience, because it is through experience that we verify the connection of the defined with its properties. Ontological definitions don't have to tell us how to pick out individuals in experience, because they allow us to verify by resolution into being as such. Because of their generality, there are ontological facts, for example, change exists, logically included in any empirical fact.

xxx example of an ontological word function, November 20 5, 79

A capacity is a capacity for being something or other, or a capacity for bringing something into being. The word function of "capacity" refers to a causal context, the relation between an efficient and material cause. A capacity is either a capacity to receive something from an efficient cause and so now exist in a certain way, or for being an efficient cause and hence ringing something into existence in a material cause.

xxx freedom and predictability, June 11, 90

We can predict that most people at work will be nice to one another; that most people on the highway will drive carefully. Why? In such cases we are dealing with means to already chosen an is. If we don't drive carefully, we can't get the ends we want to get. But once in awhile a conflict between the means we would ordinarily use and at least one of our ends arises. Then a new decision has to be made. Do I sacrifice of that and and continue to be nice at work, that is, are the ends I will achieve by continuing to be nice more important to me then the ends I would achieve by not being nice or not driving carefully?

But predictions resulting from polls must be on the level of subordinate means, that is, what we perceive as means to already chosen goals, for example, liberals and conservatives don't see their positions to be like being nice at work or driving carefully.

Then do we have no freedom regarding means except in our root choice of good or evil? Not necessarily but for the sake of argument let us assume so. If so, how was Christ free? He was free

to choose the lesser good, the means to the salvation of mankind that was not preferred by the father. That is not relevant to what is measured by polls. I don't choose liberalism or conservatism by deciding for the lesser means to an end I have chosen. But in fact either means might fulfill the end Christ chose, but one would do it in a less perfect, though adequate, manner. The conservative thinks liberalism is not adequate, and vice versa.

November 2, 88

Once my ends are chosen, my choice of means is determined by my nonfree intellectual judgments. So predictability in, say, political matters can be explained in several ways. First, political choices as such usually are not relevant to the differences between our ends. That is, regarding things within the powers of government, we almost all have the same ends. Then, having the same ends, the external causes of our nonfree intellectual judgments about means to ends determine our choice of means. And since those causes are the same for the whole population (though producing different effects in different people because of the predispositions of the people) our decisions concerning means are rejectable.

Or we have different ends but political choices usually do not create a conflict among our ends which requires us to revise our choice of ends. So political choices only concern means to already chosen ends. Then the choices of a sample will be determined by the intellectual judgments concerning means. And those judgments will be determined by causes that are common throughout the society. (But why should the ends chosen by the sample reflect the ends chosen by those outside of the sample?)

xxx Wittgenstein, private language, real existence, January 31, 88

The real existence of its primary objects is more basic to language than their public character. Being public is an effect of the fact that sensory objects, as such, are real existents. For as my notes on time and private language show, what Wittgenstein's private language argument really proves is that language needs objects that our conscious states do not cause, that are what they are, and are known to be what they are, not as a result of the influence of our subjective states. For example, a time interval appears to be what it is not as a result of the dispositions of the perceiving subject but as a result of the action of the environment external to the perceiving subject.

xxx ontological analysis, dispositions, potency/act, December 26 79

An ability is either the ability to bring something into being or to become something.

xxx intellect and sense, June 19, 86

By the senses we know that two things have the same color, speed, etc.. The senses alone do not inform us that they have the same nature, what that nature it is. There is a nature objectified by the senses, but what it is beyond acting on us is not objectified by the senses. This shows what it

means to say that the intellect knows natures and the senses do not. The senses both to and do not paragenric). And there is a different manner of knowing natures that the intellect has which the senses do not share.

The history of metaphysical disputes does not show metaphysics to be invalid. It shows something that can be demonstrated from the nature of metaphysical questions: our subjective grasp of metaphysical truths is delicate and precarious, as is our old on heroic virtue. Our knowledge of metaphysical truth is subject to instabilities other kinds of knowledge are not subject to.

xxx science and relativity, May 5, 2005

Questions for a physicist: does General relativity have a finite set of assumptions, as special relativity does, so that General relativity can be deduced from them, as special relativity is deduced?

In general relativity do you deduce the constancy of the speed of light as a limit case, that is, does General relativity contain an explanation of the constancy of the speed of light to observers, the epistemological constancy of light?

How does the law of inertia apply to subatomic particles? Specifically, is motion the natural state of photons? Of other particles? If not, what causes the motion of photons? Of other particles? In other words, have we come full circle from Aristotle, where rest is the natural state, through Newton, where remaining in either rest or motion is the natural state, to Einstein, where motion would be the natural state if photons move without being caused to move. In Aristotle, motion requires a cause, but rest does not. Perhaps the change from motion to rest requires a cause, but rest itself does not. And the change from rest motion requires a cause, but the motion continues to require a cause as long as it exists. Rest does not continue to require a cause as long as it exists

If motion is the natural state at the most basic level, perhaps rest would be the result of combined conflicting forces that separately would cause motion producing an equilibrium. Could that be why projectile motion does not need a cause, that is, why motion at the highest level, as opposed to motion at the lowest level where photons exist, does not need a cause?

Does General relativity need space -- time to be one of mathematical continuum, and if so, is a mathematical trick like multiplying by imaginary numbers necessary to get it? In other words, general relativity explains gravity by the curvature, not of space -- time, but of the geometric laws of space -- time. Does that require the assertion of the existence of the space-time continuum, or simply require that the laws behave as if there were a space-time continuum?

Can the general relativity be represented the way Gamow represents special relativity on his bicycle grid (see "1, 2, 3, infinity")? After Gamow's grid, the question is: can we have a way of deciding which measurement is right, or that one of the measurements is the correct measurement? So special relativity focuses on the diversity of measurements. Is there also such a diversity in general relativity, and if so, does it depend on the constancy of light, as the diversity

of measurements appears to depend on the constancy of light to the observer in special relativity? How so, if light is not constant relative to accelerating frames of reference, as it is not constant relative to accelerating frames in general relativity?

xxx short book, August 21, 88,

This is the connection between Hume and 20th-century philosophy. We have spent a great part of this century trying to account for our empirical knowledge of the (external) world by means of sensory inputs and logical relations, or at least "logical constructs," that is, cognition constituted objects. The 20th-century discussion of causality has been a subset of this endeavor in terms of contrary to fact conditionals, mobile necessity, covering laws, etc.. So the central role of June's rejection of the epistemological necessity of every change's having a cause does not appear to us. We think we derive from Frege. But Frege was just giving us a new set of logical relations or cognition constituted objects.

Why did there appear to be no alternative to accounting for knowledge by means of sensory input and logical constructs? Because there appear to be no way of getting anything else out of the meager sensory input.

The post Fregean philosopher wants to say "but if we do not base metaphysics or philosophy in general on logic, what do we base it on?" This commits the fallacy of many questions. The philosopher is assuming that in fact the only thing he bases his philosophizing on our the methods of logic. In fact, the previous paragraph shows that he unknowingly also bases his philosophizing on June's rejection of the epistemological necessity of events having causes.

xxx sensation, July 27, 90

Sensation is an act of the animal soul alone, but unlike the intellectual soul, the animal soul uses the body as an instrument; for the power of the principal cause exists in instrument intentionally. But an instrument for what? Not for a transitive act of efficient causality, but for an immanent action. How can something be an instrument for an immanent action? By receiving the form from the physical agent acting on the sense organ, the sense organ allows the received physical form to take the place of the expressed species that would be virtually produced by the immanent action, were it a higher form of immanent action. The act of sensation does not produce the physical modification of the organ; sensation just gives the form that modifies the organ and additional intentional existence, as the modification would have were it and expressed species.

xxx ontological analysis, February 3, 88

In normal concepts the way existence is logically included does not express how the objects of the concepts differ. The way existence is logically included does not objectify the objects as different; for it does not objectify them differently. Ontological concepts to objectify things such that the way existence is included in the concepts does distinguish the various things objectified by the concepts. The way existence is included in the concept does objectify how the things differ. Or, the way existence is objectified does distinguish them.

The way existence is objectified when it is logically included in the concept of man, dog, rosebush, etc. does not distinguish these things.

xxx causality, Hume, August 21, 88

When the change we have not seen before occurs, we look for a cause. We assume all changes must have causes, and we look for a cause. Hume cannot explain this. At most he can explain the forward-looking belief that events of type A are followed by events of type B, or that events of type B are preceded by events of type A. That is, he can explain belief in universality confined to certain types of sequences. But he cannot explain the belief that all changes, even new kinds of changes, will be preceded by events of an unspecified type such that all events of that type will be followed by those of the new type, or vice versa. The reason he cannot explain this is that it is not our experience that all new changes can be so explained. Most of changes we experience our unique historical events. Investigation sometimes reveals universal connections. But investigation rarely explains the unique event exhaustively.

Hume wanted, desired, causality to be "out there." But his theory belies his instincts. For universality is a logical relation, and the only thing that distinguishes Hume's analysis from the Post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy is universality.

Hume affects us by omission. And it is not that, because of accepting Hume, we explicitly exclude the correct solution on the grounds of explicit post-Humean assumptions, although that may sometimes happen. Rather the problem is that the correct solution never even occurs to us and cannot occur to us, cannot arise for consideration. And we can't reject what does not even occur to us. A concept of cause has not been even considered as a way of approaching, or as in the background of, a whole range of problems which have been intractable for the 200 years since Hume.

It is a mistake to think that denying epistemological necessity to causality is one of the main premises, pillars, of empiricism, one of the reasons for being an empiricist. It is the reason. For it is the denial of epistemological necessity to causality that prevents us from seeing human knowledge, at all levels, for what it is. The denial cuts us off from the tools we need to analyze various kinds of knowledge and various questions about knowledge properly. It imposes on us a priori categories which create false dichotomies because it limits the categories in which we allow ourselves to think about philosophical problems and about philosophy itself. It arbitrarily limits the possibilities available to us for the solutions to problems.

Lacking an adequate understanding of causality we have had inadequate conceptual equipment to even frame our questions. We have attempted to state and answer philosophical questions with an inadequate conceptual apparatus. It does not even occur to the empiricist to bring in causal relations to understand knowledge, to solve problems like those of Goodman and Hempel, the problem of induction, the problem of simplicity, etc. These are not looked at from the point of view of causal relations, necessary causal relations. Necessity is dealt with only through logical and epistemological tools, modal logic, universal laws, contrary to fact conditionals, etc.

An understanding of causal relations is necessary for keeping thing-object relations straight. For thing-object relations are causal relations: formal, final, means of objectification (efficient cause), logical relations (result from the objectification of things).

March 22, 80

My analysis of necessary truth, which permits causal as well as logical necessity, does something those who only admit logical necessity have never been able to do: explain logical necessity itself; explain why and how logical relations generate necessary truth. So the account which actually explains logical necessity also permits nonlogical necessity.

Hume's concept of causality and Kripke's attempt to deal with necessary truths in terms of possible worlds are fabrications created in the apparent absence of anything better, created to fill a void. But soon the problems that these fabrications are created to solve become defined in terms of the fabrications. "This is what the problem really is." As a result, where regular succession of events is not at stake, we don't think in terms of causes.

20th-century philosophy was an attempt to solve the problems bequeathed to us by pre-Fregean philosophers. 20th-century philosophy was the heir of free Freudian philosophers. And we accepted there a fallacious ways of stating the problems. So even though we thought we were using radically new methods, the fundamental mistake was already made and the radically new methods were doomed to fail.

xxx mathematical abstraction versus ontological abstraction, June 25, 88

Why can I read a philosophical sentence and so easily miss the mistake while in comparison it is easy to find a mistake in a mathematical formula? The meanings of the terms in the mathematical formula are specific physical operations with symbols. Those operations either yield the required result or they do not. If not there is a mistake. The meanings of philosophical terms are not specific physical operations with symbols. The truth or falsity of a philosophical sentence implies the truth or falsity of other formulas. Those other formulas are produced, like all formulas of language, by operating with symbols, operations on symbols. But the test of the formulas produced by operations on symbols is not certain physically determined results but truth. For example, not truth table structures.

Also the implication of the other formulas in philosophy relies on definitions of symbols made independently of the philosophical system. So this is not just a church -- like point about undecidability. Church's symbols are defined within the system, not from outside the system. That is, he must use a metalanguage. But he uses the metalanguage to construct artificial definitions.

xxx metaphysics not based on logic, January 31, 88

Examples: potency is not defined by counterfactuals. "Accident" is not defined by "predicate" as

in Harre. The problems of mental states and intentional existence defined in terms of criteria for the use of mental words rather than in terms of causality.

xxx some other alternative subtitles, February 24, 86

"The fourth way: an alternative to empiricism, rationalism, Kantianism and of their heirs." ".
The Platonic premise: the common assumption of empiricism, rationalism, and Kantianism."
Reminding people that the common premise is really Plato's shows that the problems we are dealing with go all the way back to the beginning. That is, the problem of doing metaphysics in terms of logic because necessity cannot come from experience, that is knowledge of the necessary cannot derive from experience, therefore it must consist of knowledge concerning logical entities. So the fundamental dichotomy is still between Plato and Aristotle. Even after all these centuries. This could be said in the epilogue.

Another: "ontological analysis: a reintroduction to philosophy." Or "ontosophical analysis:" these advertised "ontological" or "ontosophical" analysis as an alternative philosophical method to the establishment that is to linguistic analysis.

December 9, 86

There is such a thing as truth and we are sometimes capable of knowing it. To justify that statement Plato had to postulate a separate world; the world of the senses could not justify it. Kant had to make knowledge relative to objects as opposed to things.

June 29, 89

In restoring causal necessity we are returning to Aristotle. Plato, not Aristotle, is the empiricist. But returning to Aristotle is not returning to so-called Aristotelian essentialism, at least not as this is ordinarily understood. Nor is it a return to Aristotle with no historical development. We need Aquinas's focus on existence as what is most formal and being. We need Aquinas's distinction of the nature absolutely considered from its mode of existence. We need Poincaré's formal signs, intentional existence, and doctrine of the concept. We need Cajetan's distinction of things as things from things as objects. We need Maritain's concepts of ontological analysis and the thing-object identity theory of truth. And we need Simon's concept of order in analogical sets.

xxx short book, May 8, 82

First establish causality. Then, with the concept of cause I can talk about existence as having causal priority over objects of knowledge. That is, that the real existence of things as a causal priority over their being objects, over the things being objects. Then with the concept of existence I can distinguish ontological from empirical analysis. Then I can talk about reduction to self-evidence or to sense experience as the causes of certitude. Then I can talk about paralogues as causes of our difficulty in reducing to self-evidence. End by pointing out how crazy it is to seek the meaning of life in philosophy.

Emphasize somewhere that substance is not a featureless entity. This is probably best explained when explaining that metaphysics is not based on logic.

Have an appendix titled "a second course in philosophy: what your first course did not tell you; that is, the alternatives your first course did not tell you about." In the appendix list the articles the course could use.

xxx foundations of empirical knowledge, February 18, 84

Kant was right. Empirical knowledge has foundations if it only if we have access to necessary truths by which we can interpret sense experience.

Together with experience, ontological truths allow us to know that it is irrational to believe the opposite of an empirical hypothesis. Not irrational in a subjective sense of irrationality, but contrary to reason in its character as a means of understanding reality; contrary to reason's goal of understanding reality.

The belief that the validity of a branch of knowledge depends on its ability to produce long lasting consensus among "experts" is a causal belief. That is, the long-lasting consensus is believed to be caused by the independently existing reality that a branch of knowledge has been able to grasp.

Yes, empirical knowledge as opposed to metaphysical knowledge achieves clarity and consensus, but the philosophy that empirical knowledge is all there is does not achieve any more clarity and consensus than does any other philosophy.

The question is not whether everything begins in sense experience. It does. The question is what we can do with what we get from sense experience. How far can we take it? Or how far can it take us? The question is what are the limits of what sensation gives rise to? But the question of limits cannot be settled of priority. We must take each philosophical argument, for example, arguments for the existence of one agent intellect or a transcendental ego, on face value and ask those of the conclusion follow from knowably necessary truths.

xxx truth, February 18, 84

if language requires public objects, it requires really existing objects. It follows that the goal of sentence making is measured by its relation to real existence. Hence logical relations and logical necessity (the opposite of which prevents sentences from achieving their goal) is also so measured.

May 13, 85

Relativism gives an iconoclastic, rebellious thrill, a giddy sense of freedom from a constraint.

But freefall ends in a crash. We need to restraint of a parachute. Relativism likes to pretend that there is no parachute, but it wants to take for granted that it is there. If it did not take that for granted, it would either the crash at the end of the freefall.

xxx causal knowledge, circularity, June 2, 89

A is described by its causal relation to B; B is described by its cause a relation to A or C. Even if the relations are material relations, are we not in an infinite regress or circle?. No, A exists. That statement does not relate A to B. A. is something; A. is something with potencies; A moves, etc.. A is a substance; as accidents; etc.. So the circle can be broken by viewing A ontologically and using the ontological concepts implied in and derive from all our other ways of knowing A, because those ontological concepts are always logically included.

March 3, 84

That knowledge of the premises causes knowledge of the conclusion, that getting the joke causes laughter, that hearing of the death produces sadness is as much a given as that I am now appeared to redly. No, I don't have a clear idea of how these causes produce these effects any more that I have a clear idea of how appearing to takes place. But don't tell me I can't investigate what such producing is; don't cut of the investigation a priori. Don't legislate "thou shall not question."

March 11, 82

One sensory object results from multiple causes. We cannot learn the nature of any one of the individual causes from acquaintance with the sense object. Why not? Acquaintance with the effect does not allow us to distinguish the natures of the individual causes within the set of causes. The fact is a unit with causal relations to different causes in the set. But the senses do not make us acquainted with the effect adds a multiplicity of relations to diverse causes but as a unit, a simple object. Sensing the object does not tell us its relation to cause A any more than to cause B, and hence does not reveal the nature of A or B.

August 25, 85

Hume's concept of causality is like a prejudice; you have to be taught it.

May 27, 86

most features of most events are irrepeatable; that is, most events are combinations of irrepeatable features. Universal laws only govern certain connections between features of our experience. So belief in causality before hand, that is, the belief that causal conditions must exist even if we have not yet identified them, is not the result of habituation by past experience to the working of universal laws. In fact, that belief is not primarily a belief in laws. It is a belief in causes which, in consequence, laws can express, that is, they can express the working of causes.

March 7, 79

The structure of our knowledge of extramental reality is causal. And there are two kinds of causal analysis: downward toward empirical theory and upward toward metaphysics. The second is a very precarious but not epistemologically invalid in principle.

The issue is more than the validity of metaphysics. It is the nature of the human mind and therefore human life. For human beings to be rational animals is for human beings to be metaphysical animal's.

December 8, 87

Electricity may appear to be a counter example to my statement in "causal realism" that it is not grammar that gives essence; causality gives essence. The idea is that by knowing the causal relations into which something enters, we know what it is, because its causal capacities are, ultimately, identical with what it is. But in the case of electricity we know everything about it -- especially everything about the causal relations it enters -- except what it is. Why does this not this proves my point about causality giving essence?

Neither I nor Maritain deny that science knows essence. It's a question of how science knows essence. Science does not know quiddity quidditatively.

And we lack in ontological analysis of electricity. That is, we are unable to distinguish modes of being from one another by a series of per se divisions of being and of its preceding divisions, such that when we arrive at one level of these divisions, it is knowable by reduction to the self-evident that this level is electricity. Two reasons are combined here. 1) the lack of ontological analysis to arrive at electricity's level; and 2) the inability to connect the analysis of electricity self-evidently to the sensible data by which we define and verify electricity's causal characteristics.

December 8, 87

Although red is a relation to existence, concepts whose subject (per se subject, as number is the subject of odd and even, number is their logical material cause and mediate material cause), whose appropriate subject is existence enters the description of and concept of red only to objectify, to express, what red has in common with other beings, not what diversifies red. And the same is true of electricity.

All we know about electricity is defined by reference to sensibly distinguishable objects. And the most of these objects can give us are definitions expressing unique (electricity-specific) combinations of elements, which elements are common to other causes (gravity also produces motions measurable by rods and clocks). For example, featherless biped distinguishes man but does not reveal his essence causally. Because many different essences can fail to be causes of feathers, or can be causes of things describable as feet, causes of things that appeared in 2s. We can describe men uniquely by his relation to these combined effects. But it is entirely accidental to each effect taken separately that it is caused by human nature.

Thus sensible definitions, that is, definitions by sensibly distinguishable objects as opposed to ontological definitions, cannot reveal essence except very generally. For example, a featherless biped is an animal; electricity is a force, is a characteristic of electrons, does occupy space, does take time to work, etc.

January 31, 89

Does causality really give us knowledge of nature, of what things are? Look at electricity and gravity, the two basic modes of causality; we don't know what they are.

Yes, but take electricity. In a sense, we only know its effects. They are what we know about what electricity it is, that is, electricity is that which produces these effects. But really we know a lot more about "what things are" as a result of examining electricity's effects than that. The structure of the atom is basically known from electric effects. Even more deeply we know about "nature" of subatomic particles from electric effects. For example, "this particle carries an electric charge."

The opponent says we don't know what electricity it is. But we know the mass of the particle, the number of the particles in the nucleus, the speed at which the particle moves, the length of its life outside of the nucleus, its spatial dimensions. Each of these statements is an answer to a question of the form "what is ...?" "What is the mass of the particle," etc. so without knowing what electricity is other than that it produces such and such effects and makes particles behave in certain ways, from the effects of electricity we learn almost all we know about what things are. And that knowledge adds up to a lot.

Still, because this knowledge is not ontological analysis, it yields perinoetic knowledge, not Dianoetic. And so we cannot express what electricity is as we can express what rational, animal, and vegetative life are, in ontological terms, that is, what distinguishes electricity from other modes of being. (Maybe we could if we could make certain assumptions about what changes in nature are substantial and which ones are not. If we make such assumptions, perhaps we could describe electricity in terms such as Maritain uses to describe physical substantial changes in "a process to metaphysics.")

So instead of this proving the causal analysis of our knowledge of what things are, electricity illustrates how that analysis works out from the perspective of the ontological/empirical and Dianoetic/perinoetic distinctions.

Electricity is also a good example of the fallacy about "dormitive power" being uninformative. All we know about the "force of electricity" is that it has certain effects. But from such effects we learn that chemicals are composed of atoms composed of different numbers of electrons and protons, that electrons and protons have certain motions, etc.. "dormitive power" is like "rational animal" meaning a being with certain abilities; both concepts express a first, rudimentary, but essential and powerfully heuristic moves.

December 17, 89

Causal knowledge tells us what a thing must be in order to cause such and such an effect, what nature it must have. For example, for water, hydrogen, and oxygen to behave the way they do in experiments (to have the effects they have and to react as they do to outside action, for example, electrolysis) water must be made of two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen; hydrogen must have one electron, etc.. Quasars must be collapsing galaxies. Jupiter must be gaseous, etc.. Changes in tone must be proportional to different lengths.

We don't know any of these natures exhaustively. But take electricity. We don't know what it is. But we know that its existence is that of properties of particles that make up the atoms that make up elements. We know that there are two such properties with opposite effects. We know that one of those properties, identifiable by its effects, is a property of a particle on the outside of the atom; another a property of a particle on the inside of the atom. We can measure the relative amount of that property on a particle. From the particle's possession of that property we can learn more about the particle: that it has weight (that is, that it is something that reacts in such and such a way), and how its weight relates to the amount of weight in other things. That it is in motion and has speed; and how its speed relates to other speeds. Here "how it relates" means that it has a measurable, quantitative, way of behaving in certain measurable circumstances, that the way it behaves and produces effects is quantitatively conditioned.

June 29, 89

Scientific knowledge is valid but incomplete. It is incomplete because its foundations are outside of scientific knowledge; its foundations require ontological analysis.

June 4, 90

If all we knew about prime matter was its transcendental relation to form and all we knew about form was its transcendental relation to matter, this causal knowledge would be circular. But our knowledge of matter is not just its relation to form; we know it as a relation to, a potency for, substance. Likewise for form. And our knowledge of substance is its relation to existence, not just its relation to accidents.

Such non-circular knowledge is the ontological background of the apparently circular claim that empirical knowledge of nature is knowledge of causal relations. Compare this to Simón's statement about Maritain's theory solving a hitherto unsolved logical problem about science and its definitions that arises in the absence of the concept of essence as underlying scientific concepts. See Simon's article on Maritain's philosophy of science.

May 8, 90

When we know a material relation or know something else as the term of a material relation, we are knowing something "absolute," something whose claim on existence is not just that of a respect to another, a way of referring to another. That is what a material relation is, something absolute.

March 8, 80

We learn the natures of things by discovering what they *must* be to perform the activities they perform. We discover the nature by causal necessity; we discover the causal factors necessary for them to behave as they do.

June 1, 82

The classic objection that explaining sleep by the dormitive power of a pill is nugatory is one that has little to respond to. Describing a pill as having the formative power is the bare beginning of a long development, each step of which is causal. At some point of the development we recognize that causality is subject to quantitative conditions. Then we describe the effects as events in space and time. Then we recognize we can include time in our quantitative description as a quantity on the same footing as space. Then changes in geometric laws governing this space-time continuum explain in causal relations. The place we have arrived at is very far from ontological causal connections.

xxx examples of paradoxes generated in analytic philosophy, March 3, 84

Think of Quine's position that classes exist; that there is nothing to scrutate; that noncontradiction is expendable. Think of the grue and a raven paradoxes, other minds, sense data versus physical things, personal identity, statements about the past. And empiricism does not let us know that a reasonable belief is a reasonable belief, though we surely do know this in many cases.

We are all willing to accept our own paradoxes as either ultimately resolvable or at least acceptable in the sense of inevitable. But unlike others I have an explanation for the constant occurrence of paradox.

xxx linguistic theory of necessity, August 25, 98

The truth conditions of analytic true is our what their objective concepts are as possible existents. What those objective concepts are ground logical and causal relations.

xxx causality and time, Rosenberg book pages 241 to 243

The directionality of time and causality comes from the same source, the nature of existence. The past, past existence, is that which brought present things into existence; the present brings the future into existence. That's what we mean by the past, what brought the present into existence; and that's what we mean by the future, the effect of what exists presently. For the relation of dependence of an effect on a cause is a relation to another existent. Once previous changes have brought into existence sufficient causes for a no change, the efficient cause is as such no longer undergo change. What undergoes the new change is the component cause. So the past is that which brought into existence sufficient causes for what exists right now. This of course assumes

that we are talking about the causes of change, of coming into existence; we are not talking about the creation of existence out of nothing. Concepts of time do not apply to creation.

To believe in causality is simply to believe that what things are has something to do with how things behave; what things are determines what happens, how things behave. What the things are that X contacts in its environment, the things that contact X, that X comes in contact with, have something to do with the changes X undergoes.

xxx objection to my analysis of causal necessity, May 21, 86

"If B exists without A, B both is and is not what it is." Using this formula, do I run into the problem of the material conditional? No, because the consequent of the conditional is never true. And I could also rewrite it as "B exists without A only if B both is and is not what it is."

xxx tank, September 29, 87

It is unreasonable to believe that things are not disposed to produce colors and hence to believe that we do not have a body, because that is all the evidence for actual existence that we can have.

xxx existence as an object of knowledge, March 2, 82

When we attribute existence to something, we attribute to the thing the causal condition by which things have a causal priority over objects. Not that this is what "exist" means, but that is a true statement about what existence is.

xxx for the bibliography: May 5, 2005

Gilson's books on language and final causes. Adler's "10 philosophical mistakes" and the chapter "philosopher at large" from his autobiography; that is chapter 14. Dennehy, book and articles. Stephen Theron. Rutz. goldstein on abstraction? brook Smith's book on Maritain. Heinz Schmidt. Francis Parker. Dan O'Connell.

xxx epilogue, October 1, 89

Perhaps use the title "the condition of philosophy," or "the human condition of philosophy," or "philosophy's condition." Distinguish the condition of philosophy from the nature of philosophy. Maybe, "the state of philosophy." Can 50 million philosophers be wrong? It is better to ask whether 50 million philosophers can ever be right. The answer is that only a few of them are likely to be more right than wrong at any given time.

xxx short book, December 24, 88 the analogy chapter could be titled "language and philosophy."

Semantic assent has not worked.

xxx science, Maritain, June 4, 89

Maritain describes the conceptual structure of science more profoundly than others because he has a more profound grasp of the conceptual structure of human knowledge in general and of nonscientific knowledge in particular. To analyze the conceptual structure of science you need to know what ontological concepts are, what structure they have, as a background against which you can describe the conceptual structure of science. In other words, the very questions are different for Maritain because he knows more about human knowledge to begin with.

xxx logic, Pena, January 19, 92

Pena says we cannot use "as", for example, being as being, in reasoning because no formal logic (that is, no computational system of logic) has been worked out for them. But the amplification and qualification logic of the tradition is a theory of univocity and equivocity. Why should there be a formal science of univocity and equivocity? And could there possibly be a formal system science of that?

xxx short book, May 6, 79

The opponent says he only wants to use formal methods to simplify our conceptual scheme. OK, there is nothing controversial about this. But when the further claim is made that traditional philosophical problems can be solved this way, there is controversy. The claim itself is controversial. And the belief that there is nothing more to philosophical problems than this is a belief that cannot be established by the use of formal methods, as Hempel showed with reference to the verification principle. (By the way, that is another good example of the irrelevancy of formal methods.) It is a belief about the use of formal methods, not a belief resulting from the use of formal methods, that is, not a belief that is a conclusion from a formal proof. It is an act of faith, or a decision of will not to do anything else or ask any other kind of questions. And even among those who agree on the claim that traditional philosophical problems can be solved this way, there is no more agreement on details how to do it than there has been at any other. In the history of philosophy. Nor is there any less paradox. We always expect problems to be solved tomorrow. And it has always been that much agreement at every period in the history of philosophy.

xxx formal systems, February 27, 89

A clear example of the irrelevance of formal systems for doing philosophy comes in Pryor's discussion of a correspondence theory of truth in the Encyclopedia of philosophy. Among other things, he says that "there are facts" is equivalent to "for some p, p," using Ramsey's assertive-redundancy theory plus propositional variables. But propositional variables don't work here; they don't work at all. It has to be "for some "this is the case," this is the case." But that only works if we understand "this is the case" to be an assertion. And that is the whole question; what makes an assertion true. It wouldn't work if we substitute for "p" "sentence": "for some sentence,

sentence." It would work if we said "for some sentence, that sentence is true." But truth is what is at stake.

Or try, "for some assertion like, or some assertion of the form, "this is the case," this is the case."

xxx entailment, January 5, 85

"p implies q" means that knowledge of "P" causes knowledge of "q", or a belief in "p" causes belief in "q". But can't causing be accidental?

Belief in "P." causes belief in "q" by perceived logical or causal relations between "p" and "q", relations which cause "q" to be true if "P." is. Or, belief in "p" and "q" is sufficient to cause belief in the truth of "r," whether or not we advert to that connection, that is, sufficient to cause belief when we advert to that connection.

May 6, 92

Because I know the truth of p and q, I know that r must be true. My knowledge of what P and q are cause the knowledge that r must be true. That is entailment.

For Lewis, if p is necessarily true, all other necessary truths entail it. But it is not knowledge of those other truths that causes my knowledge of the necessary truth of p. So entailment must be defined by knowledge. This does not make entailment epistemological as opposed to logical. Because in logical relations, at least one of the terms must also be the term of a knowledge relation, must also be an object characterized by relations that pertain to objects as objects.

Of course, a cognition constituted relation like negation does not essentially they are on a cognitional term, a term describable as known, that is, a term having the formality of being the term of the knowledge relation. Yes, a thing must be known in order to acquire the relation of negation. But that causal fact does not make negation formally a relation pertaining to cognition under the aspect of being cognition.

Notice that the phrase "under the aspect of" is a synonym for "as". When we use "under the aspect of" an argument, we often use it at the level of things as things, not things as objects. That is, it does not pertain to what we are talking about at the purely logical level, the way qualities like universality and abstraction and a univocity do. This is an even more important reason why Pena's criticism is irrelevant.

xxx bivalence, paraconsistency, Pena, April 14, 89

Paraconsistency may be a form of nominalism. Pena's assumption that if A is a little less fat than B, A is still fat is a true assumption. But it does not follow that everything is fat. Not everything a little less than B is a little less fact than B. it can be the case that something with a little less bulk than B is no longer fat. Fatness is a range of bulk. Bulk is a universal quantity capable of indefinite instantiation. Some of those instantiation's are fat. What range constitutes fatness? That

is vague. Is fatness a species of bulk, or set of specific ranges, or a vague species?

At least, the problem could be handled by considering fatness a species of bulk. That does not prove that the logical relation between them is that of the genus to species, nor need to prove that. All I need is a counter example. There may be many logical relations other than genus to species that we have not named yet; the relation of bulk to fatness may be one of them.

Also, our understanding of paraconsistent "logics" assume the necessity of contradictions being false. Pena says that what is partially true is also partially not true. But he cannot say that p is partially true and not partially true (that is, partially true and wholly true.)

His formulas have to be interpreted as laws of logic. Does this mean that laws of logic need to be expressed in natural, not symbolic, language? No. But it means they need to be interpreted as other than well formed formulas of formal systems and as other than rules for manipulating symbols, or other than the result of using rules for manipulating symbols. Why? They express a *meaning* capable of being multiply instantiated. We see the identity between what is expressed in what is instantiated in a given case.

Back to "why?" Because formal proofs, that is proofs by applying formal rules, require us to recognize a step as an instantiation of a rule; that recognition is more than manipulating symbols according to a rule. It is other than that. It is recognizing the truth of the statement that this step instantiates this rule. If that recognition is constituted by taking another step according to a rule, either we recognize that this other step obeys the rule or we do not so recognize it. Still, what recognizing is differs from what manipulating Mark's is. So the other step would not be "formal" in the sense of manipulating Mark's. Some other "mechanism" is involved. The nature of the latter mechanism is the important thing.

October 22, 89

April 10, 90

Bivalence, vagueness, Pena, "as," June 12, 90

August 18, 87

In formal systems what are the operations that one performs? the construction of strings of "well formed" strings; and of strings derived from, that is, constructed from, previous strings by rules. Among the well formed strings, those whose construction is derived from others by rules are the valid ones.

xxx formal systems, computers, artificial intelligence, June 6, 86

The symbols of a formal system are like instrumental sign's. Not that they stand for something

else, but that they must be interpreted. For they do not have to belong to a formal system. For example, the column on the right gives one of those interpretations (for example, "from steps 1 and 2 by rule 3"), but the interpretation itself consists of a series of marks that themselves need interpretation. On Wittgenstein's account, as interpreted by Kripke, we not only go through the steps of a formal system blindly, we also interpret the interpretations blindly.

Dretske (APA presidential address) says machines don't have a natural signs (except for patterns). But they don't have formal signs relating them to objects either. Why? The marks of a computational system are objects (just like other instrumental sign's). To relate consciously to these objects we need formal signs. In other words, to be aware of the validity of computational steps, we relate to each step as an object. Do so relate we need signs that are unlike those marks themselves in that th the signs must not be objects.

Are the processes gone through by computers similar to relating to the marks in a computational system as objects? Perhaps, perhaps not. Those who point to computational systems are no doubt thinking of the processes gone through by computers as analogous to what we do in arriving at an answer by computational methods. But we relate to the marks of the system as objects. To do so there must be formal signs within us explaining the awareness. That is, the processes going on within us are not analogous to the steps of a computational system themselves. But we think of the steps inside the computer as analogous to the mechanical steps of the computational system. If so, there is no awareness, no relation to objects, in the computer.

No doubt our consciousness is based on processes that are not themselves relations to objects. Knowledge presupposes unconscious processes, but knowledge itself is not one of them; nor is it entirely the effect of such processes. Why? Because part of consciousness is the awareness of consciousness as itself an act emanating from a cause. As an act, not just as an effect, knowledge is conscious; otherwise we would not be aware of it as emanating from a being which is its cause, that is, of which it is an act. Consciousness is itself a causal act.

Whatever unconscious processes are going on in us, they must lead to something more than such unconscious processes. They must lead to a relation to objects accounted for by formal signs. There is no evidence computers have such processes or such signs. And the occurrence of mechanical processes is not sufficient for them. Why not? Because the steps of each such process (that is, at each higher-level) need to be interpreted. So by multiplying mechanical processes, we are just putting off to infinity the explanation needed for such processes as they go on in us, namely, formal signs accounting for our conscious relation to the steps of those processes.

xxx Grue, disjunction, August 19, 86

See "truth" for May 14, 86. The mental state relating me to green also relates me to color but not to the word function of "grue". Does it follow that my explanation of the word function of "or" by logical inclusion does not work? No, the logical question is not the same as the psychological question. The analysis of "or" depends on the fact that "or" is used for a logical relation. When I understand that word, psychologically, and when a sentence like "p or q" is proposed to me, then I can know, by logical inclusion, that when I know "p", I know as much as I know what I know

"p or q" and I know more. Why? Because of the logical relation that happens to be the word function of "or", because that's what the word function of "for" happens to be.

This kind of logical inclusion differs from "red is a color" only in that neither "red" or "color" is a word for logical relations, while knowing the necessary truth of $p \rightarrow (p \vee q)$ follows from awareness of a word for logical relations, "or".

The word functions of "or" "and" "if then" etc. are linguistically constituted relations that are not dependent on features peculiar true their languages, and they are relations affecting the truth value of sentences, affecting the relations between the truth values of sentences. It happens as a brute fact that there occur linguistically constituted objects that are relations between truth values.

May 14, 86

Unlike "color", "grue" makes reference to something really distinct from green, namely, grue. As a result the mental state relating me to green does not necessarily relate me to the word function of "grue". So with the concept of green I can use the word "green" to say that a thing is green today and the same thing will be green tomorrow. I cannot say "the thing will be grue tomorrow" if it is green tomorrow. So the mental state explaining my present use of "green" is not identical with the mental state explaining my use of "grue". The word function of "grue" is not logically included in the word function of "green", and I need to the mental state for green and the mental state for something really distinct from green to have the mental state for "grue".

Kripke is further confused and thinking that "grue" illustrates Wittgenstein's problem with rules. For the same problem applies to "grue" itself, as well as to "plus" and "green". The skeptic can say "how do you know you should apply "grue" this way, maybe I should apply it to things that are purple today.

Also, Kripke's example of using an image of green when applying "grue" is illustrative of the difference between concepts and images. Both concepts and images intend objects, but a concept relates me to what it is to be something green and to nothing else, while a green image could be used in conjunction with the concept of what it is to be something "grue" and to nothing else.

Whatever is green is also green or x. I don't need a conscious relation to something really distinct from green to know the truth of "green or x". The nature of the logical relation expressed by "or" is such that anything can fill in that blank. And by knowing what that logical relation is, I can know that anything can fill in that blank.

When I learn the word "green," I may have never seen blue; so grue is not logically included in the word-function of green.

October 13, 82

"If p is true, then one member of every group of sentences including p is true." That statement is self-evident because "a member of every group including p" differs from "p" only by logical

relations. It also differs only by logical relations from "one member of every group ..." or "at least one member of every group..."

The above gives you an answer to the objection: "member of a set of sets of truth value assignments" seems to differ by more than logical relations from assigning T to p, because each act of assigning truth values is really distinct from the others.

Multi-valued formulas work the same way. That is, if assigning M to p did not necessitate that ... some truth table entry would both be and not be what it is. And either the truth table entry is what it is or it is not what it is; that is, we must know there is no third possibility.

If even stroke beard; even, so stroke beard.

Asking if there are fuzzy realities is like asking whether a color red is even or if the number two is red. The answer is no, but not because red is odd or the number two has some other color.

Paraconsistent logic's may not have "p and -p" implies q, but that is not the real value of the principle of noncontradiction.

The phrase "logical inclusion" covers a number of different kinds of cases. Perhaps the word "abstraction" does too, as long as we disassociated from its psychological connections. Sometimes the psychological process is pulling out (abstraction in the psychological sense); sometimes the psychological process is soft focus (vagueness); sometimes it is a set construction (as in the case of disjunction); sometimes anticipation (as in the case of being, where we do not acquire the concept of existence until we make a judgment using a predicate, but the word function of the predicate includes a logical relation to the existence that we will not be able to name as such until we make a judgment).

"p or q" refers to something really distinct or potentially really distinct from "p", namely, "q". Likewise being refers to something really distinct from essence, namely, existence. The reference to something really distinct does not eliminate the necessity or make the necessity something other than logical. I am thinking of a necessity such as p implies p or q. Diversity in the objectification can result from logical relations, reference to the really distinct, or some combination of the two. Only when it is all reference to the really distinct is there a problem about necessity, a problem solved by the fact that in this case only causal relations ground the necessity. The really distinct can combine with logical relations to generate necessity because it is the nature of logical relations to terminate in real existents.

A difference between the kind of logical inclusion illustrated by disjunction and the kind illustrated by abstraction in the logical sense of abstraction. In abstraction, one word function is logically included in another and the included word function, for example, color, makes no reference to something that is really distinguished from that in which is included, that is, distinguished from that in which it is included by more than the logical relations of including and being included in themselves.

Thus, between "p is true" and "p or q is true" the second is logically included in the first, but the second makes reference to something really distinct from the first by more than a logical relation of inclusion, namely, "q". Even if p and q stand for any propositions whatsoever, to be objectified by q. is other than being objectified by p.

"Being" is still in other kinds of logical inclusion. It makes no difference whether we call these three kinds of logical inclusion or call only one of them logical inclusion and the others to different kinds of logical relations. Still, in all three cases, whoever knows what is objectified by the inferior knows what is objectified by the superior but knows more than what is objectified by the superior.

xxx necessary truth, linguistic theory of be a priori, December 15, 90

There are cases where knowing the meanings of words is knowing something mental or logical or linguistic, etc.. The meanings of words like "concept" "truth" "proposition" etc. our mental and/or logical. When we know their meanings, we know something logical, or mental, or linguistic etc.. But when we know the meanings of words like "motion", "change", "place", "body", etc. what we know are not mental or logical in nature. These concepts can be used in contingent truths about the physical world.

xxx mathematics, necessary truth, January 12, 88

Why mathematical truths are necessary and can be known as such prior to knowing their truth. For example prior to knowing whether 5 is a prime number we can know that it necessarily will be either/or prime or not prime; and we can know that if it is one or the other, it is necessarily that one and not the other. Why? Being the number of the fingers on the human hand is not necessarily true of 5.

The answer must lie in the relation between the word functions of 5 and "prime", as opposed to the relation between the word function of "5" and "the number of fingers". "Prime" must be so defined, that is, the word function of "prime" must be such that, it has a causal relation or logical relation to any number defined arithmetically, for example, 5 as defined in arithmetic as opposed to being defined as "the number of fingers", such that "prime" is either necessarily true or necessarily false of any number. "Divisible by two". Given what numbers are as defined in arithmetic, the word function of "divisible by two" is either necessarily true or necessarily false of any number.

xxx identity, May 11, 2005

xxx negation and necessity, November 6, 86

Why is "A is not non-A" necessarily true? That translates to why is the nonidentity of A and nonA necessary? Why does negation make the relation of identity necessarily hold or not hold?

given that we use negation in the word function of "nonA", "noA" objectifies something to which the relation of identity with A does not hold, because that is what we mean by identity not holding. And what we mean by identity necessarily not holding is that the use of negation in one of the objectification's excludes identity from holding between the diverse objects. For identity, when it holds, holds between objects of diverse objectifications.

We do not have to use negation in objectifying what is other than a; we can say "B" rather than nonA. But since identity and not identity holds between objects, we cannot use negation with the objectified value A without also using it for the value "what is objectified by "A"." And therefore we cannot use negation without canceling the relation of identity between what is objectified by "press A" and "non-press A". The necessity of the not identity simply amounts to the fact that using negation with the objectified value A also cancels the relation of identity with A. that is, identity fails to hold because of the way we objectify one of the terms even though that way is not by means of the use of the relation that is intrinsically logical relation. (Just as logical relations are transparent relative to things, negation is transparent relative to objects.)

To say that the non-identity of A and non-A is necessary is to say that positing non-A thereby excludes identity with A, while just positing B does not thereby exclude A. if contradiction could be true, then what exists could be identical with what is not exist, but given what we happen to mean by "not", identity with what exists is excluded by objectifying what is nonidentical with what exists as "not existing".

Identity between objects as more than objects of these modes of objectification cannot hold on the condition of the contingent fact that we so use negation, because that fact assumed, lack of identity is also assumed. This is just what we mean by necessarily "non-A", that is, a particular kind of relation just happens to hold between what is objectified by "A" and "non-A". The relation is such that our means of objectification do not objectify the same extra objective value. And they do not objectify the same extra objective value not because of some reference to some real distinction but because of the way we use negation as a means of objectification. The term of the relation of negation is a something objectified, for example, by "A", that is more than just something objectified by "A", namely, A. and the job of negation is precisely to cancel, to deny, extra objective identity, to deny that the distinction between what it is objectified and some object is only logical, only cognition constituted.

A does not terminate the relation of not identity with itself without negation both being in not being what it is, or without A both of being and not being what it is. To call this necessary is just to say that it both posits and removes existence.

November 14, 86

A word function can be both an object and a means of objectification. The word function of negative signings is not a logical relation, but the word function of "non-F" is a means of objectification, of objectifying what it is for something not to be an F., or to be other than an F., or for objectifying what ever is other than something that is an F.

The question of logically necessary identity or not identity concerns whether necessity results, and how results, from means of objectification considered as such. That is, given that something is objectified in the manner "A" cannot fail on this hypothesis to be identical with what is objectified as "identical with A"? That is, hypothesizing that objects differ only in this way, can they failed to be identical as what is more than objectified in these ways?

Likewise, given that something is objectified in this manner: "non-A", is it possible that it differs from what is objectified by "A" only in what pertains to the means by which is objectified? No, because the use of negation as our means of objectification is the hypothesis, and that hypothesis is the same as the hypothesis that we are excluding diversity only as objects of these means of objectification. On the hypothesis of these objects differ in this way, that is, as A from non-A, they do not differ only as objects of these modes of objectification. Perhaps they do not have to be objectified as "A" and "non-A", but as long as they are so objectifiable, they do not differ merely as so objectifiable.

Notice that in the last sentence I say "do not", rather than "cannot". "Cannot", "possibility," "impossibility", these are what are to be explained. The explanation is simply that identity as more than objects is what is excluded by the means of objectification, just as identity as more than objects can be the result of how objects differ as objects. In one case, by hypothesis, there is no more than the difference in means of objectification; hence there is identity as more than objects as long as the hypothesis is true. In the other case, as a result of how objects differ as objects, the hypothesis is that there is more than the difference pertaining to objects only as objects. As long as that hypothesis is true, there is no identity between the objects as more than objects.

Actually, the explanation is not just "simply" that, but that the opposite holds only if things exist and do not exist, that what exists is not what it is.

Negation diversifies word functions by more than logical relations. To be non-F. is not to be a logical relation to F. negation is not a logical relation. It is a cognition constituted object. Adding it to "F" says non-F differs from F by more than logical relations (or by other cognition constituted objects).

xxx formal systems, May 11, 2005

"Syntax": rules for deriving arrangements of marks from other arrangements of marks. (This is only partially true.)

The word function of "->": a set of rules for deriving other arrangements of marks from arrangements in which "->" appears.

Actually, syntax might be better confined to describing the rules governing allowable arrangements of marks rather than relations between various arrangements of marks as they

appear in sequence. The latter are rules of inference. Sometimes the inference is made "syntactically" sometimes "semantically" using well formed formulas as defined by syntax rules in this narrower sense.

xxx logic and math, March 28, 84

When a thinker uses logic, she does not do logic, does not become a logician. Yet a scientist does mathematics when she uses it; a biologist does physics or chemistry when she uses it. That is, a premise from mathematics, physics, or chemistry is part of the arguments that the scientists make. A rule of logic is not a part of the argument in the sense of being a premise. The truth of mathematics, physics, or chemistry is part of the argument as a premise; the truth of logic is not part of the argument as a premise. So mathematics is not logic. It is first intentional, not second intentional. Its relations are not relations of objects as objects of objects as more than objects.

xxx identity, September 5, 86.

To be the term of an identity relation, a thing must first be distinguished from itself. How is it so distinguished? How is it possible for it to be so distinguished? Only as an object. So the thing must first terminate diverse relations of objectification. So identity pertains to things only as objects, since it pertains only in so far as something has been distinguished from itself as an object. Negation also does not pertain to things until they have been distinguished as objects, not just distinguished in reality.

xxx ontological abstraction versus symbolic abstraction, December 22, 79

To treat something as purely a term of a relation is to treat it as term of a relation to the other. For to recognize that a thing may be a term of a relation to itself is no longer to consider it purely as term of a relation but also as a bearer of a relation. First, that which is considered purely as term of a relation is at least logically distinct from the relation and the bearer of the relation. Second, the fact that it can be a term of a relation to itself is precisely what is abstracted from in order to consider it purely as term of a relation. So in so far as it is so considered, it is considered in relation to another.

This is contrary to the ontological point of view. But whoever thinks quantitatively as opposed to verbally thinks this way. To learn symbolic vocabulary, we must associate the vocabulary with relations to terms that are no more than terms of relations. Terms having no characterizing content of their own.

April 15, 80

Remembering of mathematical formulas is remembering sets of instructions to perform operations. Other kinds of language may trigger the memory of operations in your mind

subconsciously, but what you are conscious of is not instructions to consciously perform a certain operation.

In set theory we must remember relations between terms understood purely as terms of those relations, as nothing more than terms of those to-be-remembered relations. And the relations in question must be formal not material relations, because even the things that may be or may bear a relation that something else terminates are themselves understood only as terms of relations that the other things have to it. Ontological thinking does not deal with its objects as pure terms of relations.

xxx Kripke on necessity

On page 19, note 18, of "naming and necessity", Kripke says that the model theory approach to modal logic does not give the nature of necessity.

xxx Quine on quantifying over classes, February 23, 79

How do I prove against Quine that classes are only cognition constituted objects? In explaining how logical relations become objectified, I show there is a logical relation of being predicable of more than one that pertains to objects as a result of being made objects. This proves that I do not need more than a cognition constituted object to explain universality and extension. So the burden of proof is on Quine to show that something else is required, something else to which we must attribute real, extra objective existence.

There is more to the notion of set than simply the universality of a predicate, as the book "a philosophical introduction to set theory" argues. But once you have the cognition constituted object called universality, you can then go on to construct the broader concepts of sets that can be members of themselves, or sets that have no members, or sets that have only one member, etc. because once you have the idea of a predicate having extension, you have the idea of something's being a member of that extension. You can then abstract the notion of membership and use it to construct this broader notion of set membership.

The reason we must use quantification when discussing sets (for example, "there is a set such that"; or are there is a cognition constituted object such that) is that the truth of the attribution of a characteristic to one of the individuals for the sake of objectifying which language originally and primarily exists is caused by, requires, the real existence of those individuals. So attributing a characteristic to an individual cognition constituted object requires our *being able to* use existential quantification, as a logical or grammatical form, of that individual. But no logical or grammatical form as such (that is, as associated with objects only as objects) attribute real existence to objects or is relevant to the real existence of objects.

I say "being able to" because logicians may have ways of doing away with quantification, but still we must be able to use quantification because of the primary goal for which language exists.

June 16, 2005

We look to bound variables in connection with ontology not in order to know what there is, but in order to know what a given statement or doctrine *says* that there is.

xxx indeterminacy of translation, March 5, 1979

What can Quine intend by saying that there are no fixed *mental* relations to meanings? Is he saying that I am not *aware* that I am using some language-form for rabbits rather than rabbit-parts? No, but what *is* a mental relation to meaning other than such an awareness?

The only other reasonable candidate would be some psychological disposition *by means of which* I am using a language-form for one thing and not another. And the existence of such a disposition is a reasonable hypothesis that cannot be ruled out a priori. If he is thinking of a theory that would *identify* the meaning of a language-form with such a mental entity, he is correct. But to reduce our mental relations to meaning to that kind of theory is to be unaware of other theories about our awareness of the way we use words that the history of philosophy makes available to us.

xxx logical necessity and natural necessity

Natural necessity is supposed to be some unclear entity as opposed to logical necessity, which is supposedly clear. On the contrary, that there is such a thing as logical necessity is clear, but what it is and why it exists has not been made clear before. And the analysis of logical necessity itself that answers those questions makes natural necessity possible on the same grounds. For logical relations terminate in that which exists and the logically necessary is that which does not exist.

xxx Maritain, Richard Rorty, truth, pragmatism, February 8, 91

"Concepts and judgments aren't true; they just help us cope." But is that statement true? "That statement is not meant to be true; it just helps us cope to consider concepts and propositions as AIDS to coping." But (1) "to consider concepts and propositions as AIDS to coping" means to believe that they are AIDS to coping. And (2) is it true that it helps us cope to consider concepts and propositions as AIDS to coping?

If those statements were true, practical signs would be efficient, not formal, causes, contrary to Poincaré. Poincaré holds (does he argue?) That even practical signs are formal not efficient. A fortiori, speculative signs, that is, propositions and judgments, are formal causes and hence not just AIDS for coping.

January 5, 91

Those calling belief "justified" make the concept of justified belief a quasi-ethical term (Chisholm)? Don't forget, "true" is a value judgment; so value judgments occur in speculative judgments before practical. "Justified" is another speculative value judgment; it concerns the

state of belief. To say that a belief is justified is to say that it would be contrary to the finality of reason as a faculty to believe the opposite.

xxx the memory, May 26, 91

How do we verify that an object is an object of a memory and not just an object of imagination? In the same way that we decide that an object is an object of sensation as opposed to hallucination. If we have only one way, that is, induction, of knowing that an object is an object of sensation, then a fortiori we can have no other way of knowing an object is an object of memory. And that should tell us what we are doing when we remember.

For when we verify that we are not hallucinating, we verify that in our experience we are aware of the action of the environment on us. So a memory is an awareness of the past action of the environment on us. A memory is an awareness of the past action of the environment as action; for an image also makes present, or can also made present, a past object of sensation, but the image does not make it present as action. In memory we are aware that the environment did act on us.

But we could have such an awareness by deduction, that is, I can deduce from the effects of radiation that in the past I must have experienced radiation; that is not memory. Memory is awareness of past action as action; or perhaps the object of memory is reflective, the awareness of a past sensation, that is, awareness of a past awareness of action as action. If the latter, memory involves an awareness of the self is now a being who in the past had this awareness of action as action.

Either that or it has the same object as the sensation, for example, the action of the sun's light on my eyes. But if it has the same object, what gives it its existential character, since and imagination can have the same object of a sensation? One answer: it is the same object because of their is an awareness of the self as undergoing (or as having undergone) the act. Not that self awareness comes before the awareness of the sensed object, but that self-awareness comes into existence with and because of the action sensed.

In asking whether I am remembering something or imagining it, I ask is my present awareness of nonexistent X the effect of my past awareness of the existent X? I answer that question by induction. But the use of induction does not imply that my realism is in direct. Induction is based on the causal nature of sense experience, awareness of action as action. Is my present awareness of X as if acting on me in the past the effect of the fact that X did act on me in the past, and the effect of the fact that in the past I was aware of X as acting on me?

Memory is an awareness of myself, now, as something that is now what it is because it underwent this remembered action then. It is an awareness of a non-present sensory object as an action upon us; for sensation itself is aware of action as action.

xxx self-consciousness, May 20 8, 90

Concomitant awareness of ourselves as aware of other things is causally dependent on awareness of other things in the same way that sense awareness is causally dependent on the physical presence of the object or that "abstractive," as opposed to "intuitive," awareness is causally dependent on impressed and expressed specifiers to make a non-existent object present. The primary consciousness is the cause of the secondary both as specifying it and in the order of exercise.

I not only know what the primary consciousness is but also that it exists.

xxx linguistic theory of the a priori, February 24, 91

Aquinas in the summa, part one, question 85, article six and in the commentary on the ninth book of the metaphysics, lecture 11, strongly implies that "knowledge of terms" in knowledge of self-evident truths is knowledge of extramental essences, not linguistic relations.

xxx thing object, identity theory of truth, existence as known by judgment, June 11, 89

It is the goal of judgment to be awareness of truth by being aware of the intellect's identity with what exists whether or not all judgments are disguised judgments of existence. That is a different question.

xxx essence as nonlogical, January 9, 91

There is an argument that essence is something "logical" because it is that by which beings are known, defined, intelligible. For Maritain, that by which of beings are known, are objects, are identical with what the things extramentally are, what exists extramentally. If things are not known, not defined, by what they extramentally are, they are defined by what is other than their extramental being (think of Plato's later arguments against the forms). Of course, "known by," "that by which things are intelligible," can be defined to refer to psychological or logical entities, for example, a definition. But if such psychological and logical entities do not relate us to what exists extramentally so that the notes of the definition are identical with what exists extramentally, then we do not know what exists because what so exists is not the object we are related to by these cognitional entities; those entities do not render what things are our objects; they do not render what things are the terms of our knowledge relations.

Also, what this view is really saying is that our soul is something logical, because our soul is part of our residents. The same with prime matter; the same with any substantial form.

xxx ontological analysis, March 20 1, 91

Once we have ontological language and express ontological truths in it we can see that those truths apply a universally and therefore can serve to ground empirical reasoning universally.

xxx Simon on sensation, June 27, 91

How can Simon say so confidently that hallucination is imagination gone wrong? We postulate hallucination as a mental state in which we are not aware of action as action because the presence of the object is not caused by external action. So the presence is caused by our action, but that is the same thing we do in imagination. So it would violate the simplicity to say anything other than that hallucination is imagination gone wrong.

xxx being as that which is first known, May 1, 91

The object of sensation says to me "I exist," "I am not nothing." Just as it says to me "I am green, moving, oblong, etc." in saying "I exist" it says "I am independent of view end of this sensation; I dominate over this sensation."

The object of concept says to me "I am a capacity for existing, a way of having existence," where the "existence" it is a capacity for is something independent of the act by which it would be known, just as the existence of the object of sensation is independent of the sensation and the existence of the primary knowledge act is independent of the secondary knowledge act by which it is known.

September 15, 86

We not know the existence of an immaterial being. But when we study objects like causality, goodness, truth, unity, existence, essence, substance, accident, etc. existing in material things, we are studying material things not insofar as they are material but insofar as they are beings. And so whether we know it then or not, we are abstracting entirely from matter, since matter is not imply a them the essence of any of these values. Although the only things we know objects such as these to actually exist in moot a material things, as objects they are immaterial, even if we do not explicitly know that yet..

xxx sensation, February 21, 90

Another causal term describing the object of a sense experience: "resistance" as the object of touch.

xxx humanistic methods, May 22, 89

To defend humanistic and personal as values, we must defend the possibility of truth in the possibility of reason's knowing truth. And to defend truth and reason, we need ontological analysis.

xxx from my small Notre Dame notes of February 17, 60

Answer to positivists on things: see Van Steenberghen's epistemology book on "objective presence."

xxx Wittgenstein on language, June 3, 89

Does the utility of a word require that we be related to one object of concept for which the word is used? Why can't the utility of a word consist in the fact that our ability to use the word relates us to different things (individuals?) In different contexts for different reasons, ratios?

Perhaps, but we are concerned with the awareness required to know the truth of sentences employing words. That is a different question.

xxx humanistic conclusions versus humanistic methods, October 5, 87

Freedom of will is based on the intellect's orientation to extra objective being. To define the value of the person by freedom while denigrating the objectivity of the intellect is to deprive freedom of its basis and of the only way we have to escape from the very powerful arguments for determinism.

Moral values must be based on a knowledge of what things are. If all values are relative to the subjectivity of the person whom we claim to honor because of his subjectivity, the value of one person for another is entirely relative to the subjectivity of the other.

To place the human person in a hierarchy of persons with God at the top, we need a knowledge of God based on a knowledge of the being persons share with non-personal things. A knowledge of the exclusively human cannot give us an understanding of the cause of common being.

And is knowledge of the exclusively human possible unless we recognize common being as the object of the human intellect and will?

Consciousness itself cannot be understood except as a type of existence (intentional existence) contrasted to common existence (entitative existence). To be understood consciousness must both be seen as an embodiment of common, an entitative existence and as contrasted with it.

The personalism of intention and the personalism of fact. But humanism of intention and the humanism of fact.

Personalistic and humanistic conclusions are one thing; personalistic and humanistic methods are another.

Phenomenological method is perfectly valid as an examination of objects as objects and of our relation to objects considered as such. But this is not metaphysics, by hypothesis. And metaphysics is more than the moral or psychological reflection.

Without the objectivity of concepts, we are self referentially inconsistent.

August 6, 89

Humanism needs the defense of reason, and the defense of reason needs metaphysics conceived as being as being, ontological analysis. Humanism without absolutes cannot defend itself theoretically or practically. That is, it cannot resist the forces of collectivism, of technology used for profit (for example, pornography). We can't understand the justification for free speech. For example, Skokie: no one has a right to say those things, a moral right, but we give them a political right as a calculated risk. That is, it is not that the right of free speech is in violation but that there is a greater risk in preventing Nazis from speaking and from permitting them.

January 20 7, 88,

you cannot understand human beings without understanding the objects toward which we are directed by our powers. We are not our own object; our powers are not their own measure. The object of our powers is being. But understanding man from the perspective of being seems to run counter to what the humanistic method wants to accomplish. It wants to understand the unique dignity and value of human beings. Being is the opposite of what is unique since it is the most common of objects. It is the opposite of what bestows dignity and value on human beings, because it is possessed by the lowest of objects.

To reply is: first, to understand of the uniqueness of man, we have to understand whatever it is that distinguishes him from other things. But to find that, we have to find it against the background of what is common. We have to understand what is common to be able to separate what is unique from what is common, or to understand how what is unique is distinguished from what is common..

Second, the reason being is the object of our powers is not that it is most common. What is the reason that it is most common? Because it is most fundamental, most basic. We need to understand being to understand humanity because we need an understanding of what is most basic, as opposed to empiriological or perinoetic understandings. Men has a unique way of relating to what is most basic. All things share being. Man is unique because he has a way of being all things (intentional existence). We need an understanding of being as common and fundamental to realize this, even though this understanding is abstract and requires logical apparatus and logical operations.

xxx hermeneutics, October 20, 91

We can have the same evidence for interpreting texts in other cultures that people in those cultures have. For we can reproduce the way children and those cultures learn the language to begin with, and so can reproduce the way they acquired the background beliefs on the basis of which they interpret texts in their cultures. If anything, we have more evidence than they do. We can compare their literary forms through the literary forms of others; we can stand above the way they learn and compare what they learn to what other cultures learn.

xxx word functions, August 15, 85

The critic or just the reader of "causal realism" will ask what are word functions? Mental entities? Concepts?

My purpose was only to say as much about them as was necessary to, to the extent necessary to: 1) justify my theory of truth; 2) justify my theory of ontological necessary truth; 3) use ontological truth to justify our knowledge of empirical truths. If mental entities are required at any step they are required either as a conclusion from stated principles (and what is wrong with that if the principles are defended independently) or as unexpressed assumptions (and what is wrong with that if the assumptions are capable of proof by independently justified principles?)

As far as I am concerned, the burden of proof is on whoever says that my theory (1, 2 and/or 3) depends on mental entities in some invalid way.

xxx induction, October 19, 91

We can also know that it is unreasonable to believe either a proposition or its opposite given the evidence or lack of evidence at hand. We can know that it is unreasonable to give more than a cautious assent, or to do more than assent that something is probable, while not certain that the opposite would be unreasonable to believe. Etc.

The only specific example for which I used induction in "causal realism" was the proposition that I am not now hallucinating.

xxx universality as a distinguishing mark of intellectual knowledge, July 30, 89

Most of Thomists distinguish the intellect from sense by the universality of concepts. Universality does not enter into the content of what is objectified by means of concepts. Universality is a logical property attaching to that content, not entering into that content or altering. So how is intellectual knowledge superior to sense? Is it just a matter, for instance, of the intellect of being necessary to communicate what sense experience gives us by means of language? No, animals have language but they don't have what the intellect does for us; what is that?

The importance of universality is not just for language. For one thing, universality makes what we have derived from sensation eligible to enter into reasoning. To connect one content of a concept with others, we must express that content in truths using universal concepts. For reasoning depends on the universality of concepts to connect the content of one premise with the content of another. And through reasoning we advance our knowledge of the nature of what concepts present to us by advancing our knowledge of their necessary causal dispositions.

(What ever is red as the ability to be red, this is the first step in non-circular causal knowledge. The knowledge is non-circular because red is not an explicitly causal concept. So universality allows penetration of nature. Universality: first communication, then the knowledge of inner nature by reasoning.

It is not as objectified in sensation that something is eligible to be reasoned about. It is as expressed in a proposition using at least one universal concept that something is able to be reasoned about.

February 20, 91

Reasoning requires that objects be connected through universal concepts, the same concept appearing in more than one premise. But of course, prior to universal reasoning, concepts are required for knowledge of the laws that express the natures of things. Without laws, our knowledge of the nature of water would be confined to something like "this body of moist, fluid stuff froze this time at 32 degrees." In fact, our knowledge of the nature of water would be confined to even less than that.

It happens that the natures of things ground necessary causal connections, are the locus of necessary causal connections. And learning the natures of things consists of grasping those connections. Unless an individual judgment like "this is wet" had at least one universal concept, those judgments could not help us get to further knowledge of nature. But the presence in those judgments of universal concepts, at least one universal concept, allows them to lead to further knowledge of nature in judgments expressing the laws that become the premises of reasonings.

April 19, 91

also, the object of a concept is objectified as what some possible being is, as what it is for something to be red, for example. Because a relation to possible existence is thus logically included in what we conceptually objectify, we can apply ontological causal truths to that object. So is not just that the form of correct reasoning is potentially satisfied by this concept, since it is a universal concept, but the conditions for reasoning on the part of the matter are satisfied, that is, that object can be the topic of a causal reasoning.

Notice also that the insight into nature expressed by "whatever is red as an ability to be red, that is, to visually manifest itself this way, would be true both on earth and on twin earth.

November 16, 91

because we are aware not just of sensible features but of what it is to be a thing having these features, the objects of our concepts can potentially grow into what it is to be a man, an animal, a mineral, etc., etc. the relation of more developed concepts to earlier is not that of "logical constructs out of the earlier" as for the logical positivists. First there is the logical inclusion of more universal concepts; second, because of that, there is Association and reasoning producing awareness of objects that are not just logical relations to sensory properties but are causal relations. And our causal reasoning reveals more about identically the same beings that we knew from the beginning in sense experience.

September 6, 81 in their attempts to construct a language expressing all knowledge derivable from the senses without any metaphysical language, the logical positivists did not notice 1) that

being is logically included in all word functions drawn from experience, and numeral to) ontological necessary truths are needed for verifying empirical hypotheses.

xxx induction, October 28, 92

Putnam uses the phrase "rationally acceptable." That could be taken as equivalent to what I mean by "reasonable to believe". I mean something different by the latter phrase. I am talking about the standard for acceptability. That standard is reason's goal of conformity to what exists on the basis of evidence independent of reason itself.

December 9, 86

"Probably" does not mean "probability." Mathematical probability can be certain, not merely probable; for example, he can be certain that the odds are .5 four heads coming up. "Probably" refers to the degree of certitude, and epistemological concept, not the ratio of opportunities for existence. "Probably" means either 1) one proposition is more likely true than its opposite or 2) it is more reasonable to believe one proposition true than its opposite. (1) and (2) are not the same.

And notice that I can know it is unreasonable to believe that Newton's theory of gravity is true or that it is unreasonable to believe that its opposite is not true, without knowing that it is unreasonable to believe the opposite of Einstein's. But with Einstein's in existence, it is no longer reasonable to believe Newton's. And it is, or because it is, *more* reasonable to believe Einstein's. Not that Einstein's is "closer to the truth," but it is more reasonably believed than Newton's, and so it unreasonable to believe Newton's

This is not to say that the causes of the truth of Einstein's have a greater probability of having occurred than the causes of the truth of Newton's. Maybe they do not have a greater probability. But given what we know, it is more reasonable to believe that the causes of the truth of Einstein's theory hold than the causes of the truth of Newton's.

June 6, 89

Probability in the epistemological or a logical sense is not the same as probability in the mathematical and scientific senses. We can have inductive *certitude* that a physical probability is such and such. In the epistemological sense, we can *know* that something is more probably true without knowing that it is unreasonable to believe the opposite. It may be improbable that contrary evidence will occur without it being known that it is unreasonable to believe that contrary evidence will occur. It can be certain that contrary evidence is (physically and mathematically) improbable without its being certain that it is unreasonable to believe that contrary evidence will occur.

April 11, 88

We can know that one empirical hypothesis is the only reasonable one given the present evidence. We can also know that the present evidence is insufficient to make it one of the

hypothesises the only reasonable one or that the president evidence makes one somewhat more reasonable than another. Why? How?

On simplicity, see the note for "science" of August 13, 86.

xxx is substance a featureless entity? March 24, 89

"Spiritual" names a property of the soul that is not really distinct from the soul. Same with "material," etc. so not all features of substance are accidents.

xxx Pena's criticism on reasoning using the qualification "as such," January 14, 82

"X is that which terminates a relation of ..." but this can be understood extensionally; X has many features which are irrelevant to the relation of "..." why irrelevant" because the relation is a causal connection. So I need "as" constructions to disambiguate between co-extensive causal relations. So the content, the intension as opposed to the extension are causal relations. (And "on order an analogical sets" shows that philosophy requires the reduplicative use of predicates.)

The description objectifies X as that which is the cause term or the effect term of the relation. It is not by any of its features that X terminates a given causal relation. The nature of the relation requires certain features and not others in the terms of the relation. So it is not a Dodge to use phrases like "X considered as," "considered under the aspect of," "taken from the point of view of."

June 12, 90

Every relation is founded on (caused by) a particular formality in one thing in respects, is terminated by, a particular formality in another. So causal relations are expressed by designating which formality respects which other, that is, by describing the cause and/or effect as having such and such a formality.

March 9, 89

The thesis of extensionality may appear to work for predicates describing the natural kinds and their "natural" attributes. But what about human "intentional" terms? For example, someone says to me "I'll see you after lunch." Then I pass it onto someone else and say "he'll see us at one o'clock". Here are "after lunch" and "one o'clock" happen to coincide extensionally, but only happen to. Did he "mean" one o'clock or after lunch? What if lunch is "accidentally" delayed? He could say "I meant to say one o'clock," or "I should have said one o'clock."

xxx meaning as utility, July 3, 88

There may seem to be an illegitimate jump from talking about "concepts" to talking about "what

a substance is," " what an accident is," " what a logical relation is." But really that move is not made at all. Talk of "concepts" is a move that comes after the fact that we relate to what a logical relation is, what a thing is, etc. concepts come into explain the fact that we do relate to what some quod is.

The reply will be that the fact to be explained is the behavior of using words, not relating to what some quod is. True, but relating to what a quod is comes into the explanation of the usefulness of language independently of and prior to the entrance of concepts into the explanation of language. Concepts enter in, formal concepts, not to explain the physical act of using language but to explain our understanding of the usefulness of language. The usefulness itself requires a relation to what some quod is.

xxx post-Fregean existence, May 20, 2005

Post-Fregeans say that existence is a second order concept, that is, it says that a concept is instantiated. But if the objective concept is an extra objective value, like human, mineral, galaxy, motion, etc., then to say that this value is instantiated is not something second order at all. For the concept of humanity to be instantiated is not something second order; it is for a human being to exist in the real world.

xxx suobjectivism and relativism, July 9, 89

How can finite, material, desire-driven intellects achieve the objective truth? We do it in mathematics everyday despite the fact that mathematicians are heavily influenced by aesthetic desires and sensibilities. If you respond that aesthetic subjectivity is not as much an obstacle to objective truth as biological and psychological desire, I respond that mathematics grew out of the need to eat. That is, it grew out of Egyptian surveying. Yet that biological need lead to a science of objective truths.

Also, the opponent is not just saying that organisms don't know necessary truths. She is saying that we can't know necessary truths, that is, that it is necessarily true that we can't know necessary truths.

xxx metaphysics and language, July 22, 82

To do metaphysics and ontology, I don't need answers to the philosophy of language questions asked by Frege, Dummett, Kripke, etc.. It would only appear that I need to know such answers to those who think that metaphysics or ontology depends on language. In fact, it's the other way around. The verification of their answers depends on metaphysics for its foundations, as any kind of knowledge, including there's, does.

xxx statements about the past and of the future as necessary and contingent, respectively, September 8, 90

The necessary truth of statements about the past is based on causality. Specifically, the realities

these truths are objectifications of cannot change because change requires an existing material cause, and by hypothesis, the appropriate material cause no longer exists. That is, the material cause required for that particular change no longer exists. I still exist, but I can no longer grow through childhood. Or, if I could go through childhood, that change would be future, not past.

Still, the basis of past truths about the future is not a contingent event occurring in the past to a then-existing material cause; it is a contingent change in the future. So the truth of past statements about the future are not causally necessary as are statements about the past. Consider "it will be true that I did not go through childhood again." For that statement to be false, a future extramental change would have to take place to a then existing material cause. But that would not be a change occurring in the past relative to now.

October 13, 90

"Future" and "past" happen to refer to objects that are not currently things; that do not currently exist. Because they do, it is a necessary truth that "the truth of "Joe walked yesterday"" cannot change. The necessity is causal necessity change require is an existing subject. The absence of one of the causes required for the change makes this change impossible. That causal necessity makes it a necessary truth that the truth of "Joe walked yesterday" cannot change. But it does not make the statement that Joe walked yesterday a necessary truth.

The cause of the truth of that statement, namely, Joe's walking yesterday, can be a contingent event, even a free event. If it was not free, it involves necessary causal relations, that is, followed necessarily from certain posited causes. But not all truths whose causes involve necessary causal connections are necessary truths. At that rate, all truths might be causally necessary. To say that there are necessary truths based on necessary causal connections is to say that necessary causal connections render some truths necessary, that they sometimes render the identity between objects such that, if the objects were not identical as things, they would not be what they are.

But the necessary causal connections are never the same as the necessary truth; they are the cause of the necessary truth. A necessary causal connection can hold between causes and effects, and effects and causes. The connection between cause and effect can be necessary without the effect, for instance Joe's walking, being a necessary existent. So "Joe walked yesterday" is not a necessary truth. Likewise, the connection between effect and cause can be necessary. If Joe walked yesterday, sufficient causes for that event must have existed. But that does not make the existence of those sufficient causes, and of their effect, necessary.

The truth value of "Joe will walk tomorrow" will not change, whatever that truth value is. It is necessary that it will not change. But the necessity of its not changing is not the same as the necessity of its truth. Its truth has no necessity, since its truth is the effect of a free act. The necessity or contingency of a truth depends on necessity or contingency of the cause of the truth.

xxx non-black ravens and grue emeralds, August 25, 90

A necessary causal connection: X would not exist without Y. The logical device of the

subjunctive or of the conditional allows us to make true statements about causal connections but does not discriminate the truth conditions of those statements. For example, X could be the cause of Y, or X could be the effect of Y.

Likewise, logical devices allow us to make true statements about non-black ravens and grue emeralds. But those statements do not reveal the causal connections that are the truth conditions we are interested in. Or they do not reveal the causal connections whose truth conditions we are interested in. Or we are interested in the truth conditions of those statements as evidence for causal connections those statements did not reveal, do not discriminate.

xxx a short version of "causal realism"

The following appears to be a partial attempt to direct readers to specific sections without their having to read the whole book. But apparently this attempt only got to chapter six. Read: chapters 1 and 2; chapter 3, the introduction and 3. 1, 3. 2. 1, 3. 2. 3, 3. 3. 1, and 3. 3. 2; chapter five, the introduction and 5. 1, 5. 2. 2, 5. 2. 3, 5. 2. 4, 5. 4, 5. 5. 2; chapter six, apparently the whole of it.

So that leaves out: 3. 2. 2, 3. 3. 3, 3. 4; chapter four; 5. 2. 1, 5. 3, 5. 5. 1, 5. 5. 3.

xxx humor, March 20 7, 85

Humor isn't just the juxtaposition of the incongruent; it is the pleasing juxtaposition of the incongruent. The beautiful juxtaposition. What makes the incongruent pleasing and not ugly or insensitive? Is it the congruent juxtaposition of the incongruent? Intelligible juxtaposition? A joke is told "to set up" a pun, to make the punning use of the word emerge "naturally", "reasonably," "logically". The joke is told to place the punning use in a context where the punning use *should* appear, where it belongs.

A cow that says "ca-moo" is not funny. And existentialist cow saying "ca-moo" is funny. In the second case, the incongruous has a right to be there given the nature of the situation, given the causal relations defining the nature of the situation. (Also this incongruity is not harmful; the juxtaposition is not harmful. It is "good" relative to the natures of things involved in a situation. And it is intelligible relative to the natures of those things.)

We must be able to see why the ordinarily, expectedly, incongruous juxtaposition has a right to be there, why it fulfills and perfects the tendencies of the natures involved in the situation. Humor is a union of elements which in itself is "irrational" but in this context is rational. That is, in this context the ordinarily, expectedly, irrational emerges rationally out of the context.

Why is the thought of a bird leaving a dropping on a top hat funny? The elements of the situation in themselves are so opposite, so aesthetically opposite. This assumes the genus, aesthetics, as given, understood. But why not? The problem comes with what is specific to humor as a type of the aesthetic. Why is it bird waste on a top hat a pleasing juxtaposition of the incongruous? It is not pleasing to the one it happens to.

It is intellectually pleasing abstracting from the harmful elements, pleasing as an object for a spectator, not pleasing as undergoing it. It was a kind of intellectual good, but not good from other points of view. Hence the genus. And intellectually we know that it is not really harmful, just annoying.

humor is the juxtaposition of what ordinarily and expectedly shouldn't go together than human purposes and intentions for example our intentions for top hats, our goals for top hats.

April 2, 85

Humor shows that beauty is paragenetic. One of the notes of beauty is proportion, and humor Springs from disproportion. So humor is a disproportionate proportion.

xxx necessary truth, May 3, 79

Necessary truths primarily express exigencies of existence and of that which exists as such, as existence, not exigencies of thought or objects of thought as such.

xxx pain and evil, October 23, 86

Pain is not just consciousness of an evil; it is self-consciousness of an evil. It is a subjective consciousness of an evil. It is not awareness of an evil as an object distinct from the knower. It is part of a knower's consciousness of himself in the act of knowing, a consciousness of himself as a knower who is lacking, deprived.

April 20 5, 84

Is pain evil? Pain is not evil; it is awareness of evil, that is, a state of consciousness resulting from a lack, not a consciousness of a lack as if the lack were the object, but awareness of the conscious subject, the subject's awareness of self that results from the subject's being deprived of something -- a necessary result in the sense that, although deprivation can occur without pain, for example, under anesthesia, pain cannot occur without deprivation.

So pain appears to be evil because of its necessary connection with evil and because the evil is necessarily connected with is an evil necessarily happening to the same being that is aware of the pain. The same being that is the subject of the pain is necessarily the subject of some evil, some privation.

This is a time of testing, in the test must consist essentially of how we handle suffering, not enjoyment. If this is to be a time of testing, there must be suffering. There would be no test if there were nothing to struggle against, no obstacles to overcome or difficulties to deal with.

xxx speculative and practical knowledge, May 20, 2005

There have to be better terms for this. How about Factive knowledge and directive knowledge?

Since the distinction is paragenic, how about using reduplication, for example, cognitional knowledge? How about disinterested knowledge as opposed to teleological knowledge?

How about evaluate of knowledge versus non-evaluate of knowledge? Neutral knowledge versus interested knowledge?

February 6, 85

Ontologically and speculatively, we are saved by love, not by faith. But how do we bring love about? What action do we perform to bring it into existence? This is the practical perspective, and the answer is faith.

But distinction is paragenic. The practical is not unconcerned with the nature of things and with objective truth. And the speculative is not unrelated to activity, irrelevant to activity.

July 20 9, 87

In describing our spiritual lives in relation to the working of grace, we can say that our job is just to allow God to work and not prevent him from doing what he wants. "Just allowing" might sound as if we do nothing, the counterpart of Nihilation; "preventing him from doing what he wants" might sound as if we do something, the opposite of Nihilation. So non-acting can appear to be associated with good and acting with evil, contrary to Maritain's analysis. The apparent contradiction is resolved by the distinction between speculative and practical vocabulary.

The object of an act of the speculative intellect is nothing other than the intellect's state of awareness of what exists. The act of the practical intellect directs the coming into existence of a state outside of this act itself. So these modes of thinking have contrary relations to that which is the object of all intellectual acts, being. (Contrary to, not contradictory to.) Speculative knowledge brings the intellect into conformity with what exists or can exist. The goal of practical knowledge is to bring what exists into conformity with the intellect.

These opposite relations to being result in opposite forms of speech for the same thing. Speculatively, we fail to cooperate with grace by non-acting rather than by acting. Yet in failing to cooperate with grace we are taking a first initiative, the first initiative of evil. That first initiative is described practically in positive terms as preventing grace from working. Speculatively we cooperate with grace by acting. But we do not take the first initiative of acting. When we act, we are just allowing God to produce the act. Practical knowledge looks at things from the point of view of our of initiative. In good we do not have the initiative; we non-initiate. In evil we initiate, but we initiate by non-acting.

xxx principle of noncontradiction, May 21, 2005

Three forms of the principle. Metaphysical: a thing cannot be and not be in the same respect at the same time. The epistemological or psychological equivalent: the same thing cannot be

affirmed and denied at the same time. The logical equivalent:
a statement cannot be both true and false.

xxx infinite regress arguments, October 8, 85

Infinite regress is our contradictory because it is contradictory for a regress to be infinite and be completed. But as an explanation of something which is hypothesized to be actual, the contradictory theory requires the regress to be completed. Since the theory also requires the regress to be infinite, the theory is contradictory.

Start with the existence of entity 1. Explain entity 1 by the existence of entity 2. But this way of explaining entity one requires a similar explanation for entity 2, and so on to infinity. So the theory can explain entity one if and only if an infinite regress can be completed, so that the series produces entity one.

May 24, 2005

In an infinite regress, what is required of the series is required of any one step in the series, and vice versa. That is, each step has the properties of the whole series, specifically the properties that make the step, and hence the whole infinite series, inadequate as an explanation.

xxx to be is not to be known, May 21, 2005

To be is not to be an object of knowledge. But what if the knowledge in question is a thing's knowledge of itself? Why can't a thing's knowledge of itself be identical with the thing's existence? If so, the thing's existence is not a mere term of a relation of knowledge but is the relation, is not just to be known but is to know.

In other words, what sort of thing must it be? Aristotle and the medievals showed that such a thing must be the uncaused cause, God. To be the uncaused cause, this being must lack the characteristics that would make it require a cause: finitude, complexity, changeability, incompleteness, etc. Only of such a being can we say that it's to be is to be known, for only of such a being can we say that it's to be is to know.

To be for a thing can be to be known if and only if the knowledge is the thing's knowledge of itself, not something else's knowledge of the thing. And if the thing's knowledge of itself is identical with its existence, then knowledge is not just that which exists, it is the existence. And there must be no real distinction between that which exist and its existing, that is, its knowledge of itself. The thing must be an act of knowing itself which is the same as the thing's existence. Necessary causal principles show that only for God, namely, an infinite, all-perfect being, can to be be the same as to be known. For only God's existence is the same as his knowledge of himself.

xxx necessary truth, possible worlds, March 15, 83

Necessary truth is true in all possible worlds because existence would not be possible if it were

not true. A contradiction cannot be true in any possible world because the existence of the thing objectified would not be possible in that world.

xxx language and ontology, April 30, 86

"Being lukewarm, the man re-heated the coffee." By the grammatical rules we have learned, we expect the participle to objectify a characteristic of the subject of a sentence. But from the sense we know that it is the direct object that is lukewarm. So the grammatical rule does not determine our beliefs about the possible reality objectified by the sentence, about the possible existents objectified. Grammatical rules are rules for expressing what we *want* to say. So we must be able to distinguish what we want to say from the grammatically correct and incorrect ways we say it.

May 6, 86

"To enter IBM mode, bit 1 is set to 0." Despite the grammar, we know it is not bit 1 that is entering IBM mode but the system by means of the setting of the bit.

xxx Quine's indeterminacy of translation, May 11, 86

In the second half of the "ontological relativity" essay doesn't Quine say that all we can do is translate from one frame of reference into another? OK, but doesn't this show that the frames of reference are not opposed after all, as rabbit-parts are not opposed to rabbits? That is, the existence of rabbit-parts is not opposed to but is implied by the existence of rabbits, and vice versa.

And since translating from one frame of reference to another must be done "at home," doesn't it still make nonsense of reference at home -- the problem the essay is attempting to solve. That is, he avoids the problem of nonsense at home by implicitly admitting that we do in fact exceed in referring to rabbits, not rabbit-parts. He would say that referring to rabbits, not rabbit-parts, is just one of our non-absolute frames of reference. Still, it *is* a frame of reference, that is, we would be referring to rabbits as opposed to rabbit-parts.

The only question is whether one of those frames of reference conforms to reality in some "absolute" sense. He says no. I say they both can conform to reality since they are not absolutely incompatible.

March 1, 84

Within one frame of reference there is a difference between referring to rabbits and to rabbit-parts. Quine seems to admit this about translation at home. But what constitutes this difference? . Something behavioral or something mental? If mental, the possibility Quine thinks he is rejecting, maybe reference and translation are inscrutable, since there is something to be inscrutable about. But if behavioral, then why is translation indeterminate? There is no indeterminacy at home when home is such a frame of reference that there is a behavioral difference between referring to rabbits and their parts. And if there is no indeterminacy at home,

how can it go traveling?

May 23, 2005

Quine admits that translation at home would amount to saying that it makes no difference whether we referred to rabbits or rabbit-parts. But then what does the ontological relativity he wants to arrive at from the indeterminacy of translation amount to? It amounts to there being no way of deciding between two different translation schemes. But if there are neither empirical nor philosophical (ontological in my sense) reasons for deciding, the conflict is not a genuine conflict unless we attribute features of language to things. Not only would that be an epistemological fallacy, but it is the very thing that linguistic ontologists accuse others of doing.

Quine's ontological relativity comes down to the mere fact that one grammatical structure does not give us grounds for preferring it over another. The fact that we use one is not a sufficient reason for preferring it to another.

xxx criticisms of "causal realism," May 23, 2005

Is there a place for your work which explains classical metaphysics to the empiricist in the light of the objections of the empiricist? If so, this work can not be expected to be brief. To think that can be both a brief and adequate is not to appreciate how deep and entrenched are the difficulties which prevent the empiricist from understanding metaphysics as it is. It is not to understand how deep, how far reaching and how numerous those difficulties are. Those difficulties have been compounding for 200 years since Hume.

If it could be done adequately and briefly, it would have been done long before now. To ask it to be brief is to ask for it not to be done. In other words, it is to say that it is not worth explaining metaphysics from that point of view. But if we don't, our students will continue to read contemporaries and find there questions for which they find no direct answers in classical realism. And what ever answers they do find, they will not see any way of justifying in an unambiguously valid way.

If such a work does not deserve to be written, Thomism does not deserve to exist as a viable alternative philosophy appealing to the minds of our colleagues and students.

It must communicate to the unconvinced, not just to the already convinced. So it must be aware of the problems, pseudo or genuine, that philosophers trained in analytic philosophy will have. And it must meet those objections in a way that analytically trained philosophers can understand, but without watering down the doctrine to please them. It must be aware of the potential misunderstandings the analyst's training will lead him into. Dealing with this indefinite potential for misunderstanding takes time. But not dealing with it means that the book would not be written to communicate with those who need it is intended to solve.

Our contemporaries are sincerely seeking for truth; so are their students who would otherwise come to us. A defense of metaphysics must be credible in the light of all the apparently decisive

difficulties (objections) and empirical literature with which the empiricist is familiar and which he takes to be decisive.

xxx Ingham's review of "causal realism," June 14, 87

I appear to have unnecessarily exposed my flank by choosing to speak of necessary truth rather than notably necessary truth relative to Hume in chapter one. The big test of how important this criticism is is this (and also the test of whether he read the rest of the book or not): how much of the rest of my book what I have to change if I made that change about Hume in the first chapter? Answer: absolutely nothing; it would have no impact whatsoever on the rest of my argument.

(Also, I may sometimes seem to speak as if he was only recently recognized that the two, necessary truth and notably necessary truth, are distinct. If so, why? Because I was striving to avoid the epistemological fallacy in my account of necessary truth;, for example, in my account of logical relations in chapter three, in my account of why sensible necessity is not knowable in chapter nine. Wherever possible, I want to avoid the question "how do I know that this individual is an F Western art" with reference to the various concepts, "F," I introduce in the book.)

July 8, 86

Ingham uses "analytic" to describe Hume's position. But what does "analytic" mean? With reference to Hume's text, page 71, my closest phrase would be "self-evident or derivable from the self-evident." But at the end of the review, Ingham distinguishes three positions, among which "analytic" is distinguished from mine. So by "analytic," he must mean something not as well supported by Hume's text as my "self-evident or derivable from the self-evident." Again, what evidence is there that he read the whole book?

And if I asked a friend to write a review that would reply to Ingham, what would I have him do? Nothing Ingham says undermines any of my arguments against Hume. Even if valid, his point would be a quibble extraneous to the main thrust of my argument. For it is obvious to any reader that I explicitly tried to show that the principle of causality is derivable from the self-evidently necessary, that is, that its opposite is self-evidently contradictory.

July 11, 86,

Ingham is so uptight about rapprochement between *persons* that he cannot see that our slight "differences" on the interpretation of Hume do not affect the truth of my philosophic position nor the philosophic validity of my arguments one iota.

Rapprochement between persons is desirable, between philosophical positions is neither desirable nor undesirable in itself. The question is whether they are logically compatible. If not, rapprochement between them is not desirable. If there logically compatible, rapprochement between them already exists, but not between persons. To achieve rapprochement between persons, it is necessary to minimize the apparent logical incompatibilities. That means to achieve an explanation of one position so that the other can understand it. Where do empiricists

understand even what classical metaphysics was *trying* to do; where do they not bring to their analysis of classical metaphysics alien and inappropriate categories, for example, analytic/synthetic, that they consider necessarily true.

In other words, how can even mere understanding, much less agreement, be achieved without at least bracketing the other party's most fundamental assumptions, or some of those assumptions, assumptions without which the rest of his position does not follow?

May 25, 2005

"Degrees of knowledge" page 57: philosophy "Judges and criticizes" because as a wisdom it can defend its own principles, even justify (indirectly) the value of sense perception itself.

xxx ontological versus empirical, July 22, 82

There are sources for a word functions other than abstraction from sense experience and judgment of existence. There are also logical, psychological, mathematical, moral, social, political, and aesthetic word functions. But causal analysis in such fields tend either toward empirical or ontological explanation. For example, "self-evident" is a psychological word function. But if the explanation is empirical, the deiniendum disappears. The explanation is toward the ontological (via the logical, for example, the logical notion of truth, but logical concepts are explained ontologically; truth is a relation to existents, and logical word functions are subordinate to word functions about extra logical existents.)

Psychological, moral, social, political, and aesthetic word functions derive from our awareness of ourselves. Mathematical word functions derive from construction in the imagination.

xxx empiricism versus metaphysics, April 19, 84

The issue is not whether all knowledge derives from experience but what we can do with what we get from experience.

March 25, 79

What kind of knowledge is a philosopher claiming to have when he claims to know that God, on the one hand, and evil or freedom, on the other, are incompatible? Causal knowledge, not just logical knowledge, and ontological knowledge, knowledge about conditions of the possibility of extra objective existence.

May 23, 2005

The fact that all knowledge derives from experience does not imply that causal connections are contingently known. The necessity of a cause for an event is imposed on us by our knowledge of objects given in experience, change and the subject of change.

xxx science and mathematics, May 23, 2005

Pythagoras found that changes in pitch are numerically measurable by the ratios of lengths of strings. Certain ratios determined the musical intervals: octave, fifth and fourth. If the ratio was 1 to 2, the note of the shorter string is an octave higher. See Maritain's comment, in "an introduction to philosophy," about the intellectual excitement that must've been caused by the discovery that a sensibly experienced change could be expressed mathematically. Notice also, that the comparison relates one kind of sensibly observable change, the change in pitch, to another kind, the relative change in length.

xxx self-evident to the learned, April 17, 79

considerable background may be necessary to become acquainted with the ways the words of a self-evident truth are being used.

xxx difference of man, December 29, 83

What are the causes necessary for the creation, as opposed to the mere use, of language? A consciousness of cause and effect that machines cannot have. Machines cannot have it because Carroll's Paradox shows that knowledge, such as knowledge of cause and effect as necessary for language, is not going through the mechanical steps of an algorithm.

A computer cannot *create* language, since this requires consciousness of the relation of signification, a consciousness which is other than grasping a universal in a particular.

March 18, 84

Even if a Turing machine could produce the answer to all answerable questions, that would not do this one I owe to toward evidence that machines think. Perhaps they don't think. But producing answers by means of all the rhythmic processes is nothing to do with it. Why? Because Carroll's Paradox proves it has nothing to do with the awareness that the answer is the correct answer.

The opponent will complain about my invoking awareness. But behaviorism is irrelevant here. First I know from my own case what awareness is. And second I know from Carroll's Paradox that going to the steps of an algorithmic process to get an answer does not explain at all what awareness that the answer is the correct answer is. So it offers no evidence that machines are aware. I know that if awareness is a material process, it is not analogous to an algorithmic procedure.

Imagine a retarded person attached to a computer that allowed him to go through all steps of all possible recursive functions but was never aware that any step was a step made valid by a rule. What do we lose here? Knowledge itself. Or call it by some other name; whatever we call it, it is all important. (Is this like the Chinese room argument?)

May 25, 2005

Can animals learn words by description? That is, in the absence of perceivable instances of the things being described, can they learn the meaning of the names for these things by understanding combinations of words that they have already learned? For example, a human child could learn the meaning of the word "kindergarten" by being told that "it is a place where children go to play with other children."

May 6, 86

Also, knowing is not making, is not a transitive action. (See Francis Parker's article "a realistic appraisal of knowledge" in the anthology "philosophy of knowledge" by Houde and Mullally.) But a mechanical process is a transitive action or a series of transitive action's resulting in a product which is a matter-form union, that is, an arrangement of marks or an arrangement of on/off states in a computer's memory or CPU. Neither the process nor the resulting state is knowledge of an object. Knowledge is not a relation of constructing its object; that is not the term of the activity. But a mechanical process does instruct an object.

The "interpretation" of a computer's "marks," that is, bit settings, is performed by the machine instructions. But machine instructions only produce transitive action's resulting in new bit settings, matter-form unions. Still, a machine could be programmed, that is, machine instructions so combined, that a machine could invent a "language." This still would not be how we produce language.

We invented language based on awareness. Awareness requires immanent action. No amount of transitive action can result in an immanent action. Likewise, machine code "interpretation" is not interpretation by formal signs, that is, conscious interpretation, because machine instructions only produce transitive action's.

Setting bits causes a transitive action; it does not signify to the machine as an instrumental sign signifies to a conscious agent. For human language, formal signs must exist before the language exists. And formal signs "cause" the immanent action of consciousness.

xxx mathematics, April 15, 82

Mathematics does not concern causal relations. It just uses certain (those in generating abstract quantities) causal relations to objectify non-causal relations.

xxx inference and logical relations, June 8, 2005

In "philosophy and the unity of the sciences," Maritain says that "reasoning is a transference of evidence which makes the intellect see the necessity of the conclusion by virtue of what is seen in the premises." In inference, there are logical relations between the premises by which the truth of the premises makes the truth of the conclusion evident.

xxx evolution, June 8, 2005

On page 49 of "philosophy and the unity of the sciences," as well as elsewhere, Maritain refers to living organisms using nonliving compounds as "instruments". In the ordinary examples instrumental causality, for example, the examples from art, the instrument produces an effect that is a greater effect than the instrument is capable of achieving on its own power because the instrument is being used by a higher power. This would also be true of the lower instruments used by a living being to achieve living effects.

But could living beings have evolved to begin with otherwise than by the action of a higher power than the powers of the nonliving things then in existence in the universe? Don't forget that instrumental causes alone might produce an effect of a higher order by accident. The example of art shows this. A brush cannot produce beauty by its own nature. But by accident a number of brushes might fall off a table and produce something of beauty. Likewise by accident a multiplicity of chemical agents might produce a living agent that henceforth uses such chemical agents as instruments.

xxx word functions and objective concepts, October 6, 87

The distinction between ontological analysis and empiriological analysis is a distinction between different ways of constructing definitions. Definitions and word functions in general express what things are. Do we construct what things are? Yes, insofar as what they are as not become an object of a certain kind of knowledge. Causes of the entitative existence of essence construct instances of those essences; the intentional existence of instances of those essences, or just of those essences, requires a different kind of construction.

In objectifying things by concepts we do not Entitatively construct what exists outside the mind. But a word function is both extra objective and intra-objective. In knowing things, We don't construct things in their extra objective state, but we make it an object of knowledge by our mental activity. That activity includes defining words by combining and relating word functions. The result of combining, relating, and negating word functions is the objectification of a word function not identical with the word functions that a combined, related, or negated in the word function.

xxx Hume on causality, June 16, 2005

Hume once to say that causality is "out there"; that is, he wants to say that causality is not just something intra-mental or something logical. But he cannot have it both ways. That all events of kind 1 have been followed by events of kind 2 may be an extra objective fact, a fact that is "out there." Still, on Hume's account, an event of kind 1 being the cause of an event of kind 2 amounts to each events being a member of the set of events of kind 1 and kind 2, respectively.

xxx intuition of being, April 6 82

All philosophers admit that their theory has to account for the word function of "exists" in some

way. But they think of it as a detail to be taken care of and then put on the shelf; so they can get on with the really important things. That is why they don't even *notice* it when they reduce being to being known. They aren't even that concerned about existence to examine the consequences of their theories thoroughly. If a theory allows them to put existence away on a shelf and get onto other things, they are willing to accept the theory with no criticism.

If it is pointed out to them that they reduce being to being known, they recognize the problem but consider it a minor flaw in their overall theory because existence as a place of minor importance in their hierarchy of things to be accounted for.

For statements reducing being to being known see page 116 of Sellars' "science, perception and reality." He uses the phrase "are different ways of making the same statement." Morris Lazerowitz in "philosophy and illusion," pages 49 and 50 quotes Russell, Principia Mathematica, volume one, pages 174 and 175, "existence is not a property of things but of propositional functions."

Russell is almost explicit in "logic and knowledge," page 232 of the 1956 edition, and in "mysticism and logic" page 176. "A propositional function is satisfied by at least one argument; a class is nonempty." See "mysticism and logic", New York, Barnes & Noble, 1959 (and Allen and Unwin).

Timothy L. S. Sprigge, "facts, words, beliefs," New York, humanities press, 1970, page 89: "to say "there are Fs" is to say that F-ness is exemplified."

xxx reference, names, etc., June 17, 2005

The following comments are random thoughts about a problem that as far as I'm concerned is poorly defined. So these are offered for what they are worth.

We sometimes hear question or statement made a person, or sentence, or theory, as "succeeded in referring. What if I say "the part is on the left"? The way "park" is used in that sentence, the sentence cannot be true unless a park exists. A park's existing is one condition for that sentence's being true. "Referring" often seems to refer (to use the word in the perfectly good non--technical sense, since the question we are asking is whether attempts to use it technically are good) to the fact that a word is so used in a sentence that a condition for the sentence's being true is that what the word objectifies really exists.

But that leaves at least two different possible meanings for what it is to "succeed" in referring (so-called technical sense). One meaning is simply that I have used the word in such a way that a sentence's being true requires that something objectified by the word really exist *and* that sentence is true. So "succeed" could mean to succeed in making a true statement. It is that what "succeed in referring" means?

The another meaning for "succeed" might be simply that I have succeeded in making an assertion whose truth depends on the real existence of something objectified by that word whether or not

the sentence is true and whether or not we know or can know that the sentence is true. In other words, I can look at a scientific theory and judge that the word "F" refers in this theory whether or not I know any press Fs exist. The theory succeeds in making a certain kind of assertion about Fs, where "kind" refers to identifiable internal characteristics of the assertion, rather than to anything external to the assertion that would make the assertion true or false.

The latter meaning for "succeeding to refer" is a valid meaning since I may intend to make an assertion whose truth would require the existence of an F, but the truth of the assertion I produce might in fact fail to require the existence of an F.

It seems to me that if we kept these two meanings for "succeeding to refer" distinguished, most of the dilemmas I have seen philosophers bother themselves with concerning "reference" would not exist. But I will not attempt to go through various philosophers showing how this distinction would help, because from my perspective discussion is just in too much of a mess to try to straighten it out rather than just start over.

One way to express the distinction is this. What a sentence intends to say is something that I have control over, and I have control over the linguistic and logical devices that are means for accomplishing that intention. Once I have succeeded in my intention to make a certain kind of statement, the truth or falsity of the statement depends on things that are outside of my control. Truth or falsity depends on things independent of me and of the statement I have made. While the same distinction can cover the way philosophers use the term "reference."

"Succeeding in referring" can refer to something that is in my control, something that I can accomplish by using certain linguistic and logical devices that satisfy my intention. Accomplishing that intention would not depend on anything outside of my control or independent of me. The way the world is, other than for the existence of this sentence, has nothing to do with whether or not this sentence succeeds in referring. "Succeeding in referring," on the other hand, can depend on something independent of me and the ways I have use words; it can depend on something outside of my control. Whether or not I have succeeded in referring depends on The way the world is, not on my intentions.

The sense of "referring" that is in my control seems much like the traditional issues surrounding supposition. To judge whether or not a sentence is true I need to know what kind of claim it is making. What kind of claim it is making is something independent of the way the world is, other than for the existence of this sentence. But it is not independent of my intentions and other things under my control.

But if that is what "referring" refers to, then once we know what kind of claim the sentences making, the question remaining is not whether it succeeds in referring but whether it succeeds in being true. The kind of claim it makes is one of the conditions for its being true. But it is a condition on the side of the sentence and the intentions of the one making the sentence, not a condition on the side of the way the world is otherwise. So it would be best not to use the question "does 'F' succeed in referring?" for the question "does an F really exist?" but only for the question "does 'F' succeed in making the claim that an F really exists?" For once that kind of

claim is made, the only question remaining is whether the claim is true. Whether or not "F" refers does not cause the truth of the sentence, and whether or not an F. exists does not cause "F." to refer.

But unfortunately, there seems to be more to the problem in the minds of many philosophers than the issues we have just discussed. In particular, the question of reference sometimes seems to become associated with the question of how so-called "names" rather than "predicates" acquire their usefulness in language. For example, it is sometimes asked whether names have a "sense" or only a "reference." And the question is asked with the assumption that having a sense and having a reference are two possible ways for a word to acquire its utility in language. Or being used with a sense and being used with a reference are two possible utilities for words.

But how a word acquires its usefulness, or how certain kinds of usefulness come into language, is at least in great part a psychological question. And it does not help to solve a potentially confusing psychological question by approaching it from the point of view of an already confused logical question.

For example, when I objectify my soup by saying "this is hot," "this" acquires its word function in the following way. I see a cup of liquid. Pick up the cup and taste the liquid. And while the cup of liquid is still in my immediate sensory consciousness, for example, because I see it or and touching it, I utter the sound "this" with the intention of communicating to someone that the sentence I am about to make concerns the cup of liquid that I can see and/or feel.

Now all psychological questions may be mysterious but is there anything mysterious in an unusual way about the psychological process just described? Is there anything uniquely mysterious about the way "this" acquired its utility in this example? The key thing here is not whether the utility of "this" is that of having a sense or a "reference." Where "reference" refers to the idea that the word function of "this" must be an actually existing individual known as such.

Or if "reference" has the latter meaning, there is no problem about "this" adding a reference in this context. But the reason there is no problem is not that reference is a logical relationship that can never obtain unless it is a relationship to something actually existing. Rather the psychological mode of consciousness we call perception is a relationship that can never obtain unless the objects objectified in this manner **appear** to be really existing.

Once we are perceptually aware of an individual object in such a manner that the object appears to be a real existent, we are psychologically enabled to use "this" in the hope that we will communicate to someone that the sentence we are making is used to objectify in a different way the same object already objectified in perception as an actual existent.

But notice that what is objectified by, "or" referred to" by, "this" need not be a real existent; it only needs to appear to be a real existent. I can use "this" for the really existing liquid in the really existing cup that I can still see and feel and that a moment ago I tasted. But I can also use "this" for the pink elephant that I now think I am now hallucinating about. The psychological conditions for using "this", for "this" adding the utility that it has, are the same in both cases.

Nor is the private language argument a problem in the case of using "this" for a merely apparent pink elephant. If the person I am communicating with wonders how I am using "this" in this circumstance, I can replace "this" with a description of a pink elephant, a description using predicates with publicly observable meanings. He and I would then both know how I am using "this". But he would know, by means of my description, that I'm referring to a non-existent, while I would still think, because of my hallucination, that I am referring to an existent. My ability to refer to the pink elephant would not be based on a description.

Having explained how we "referr" to objects of the kind of cognition because sense perception, we can explain how we refer to objects of memory in what ever way we explain the memory, as opposed to the mere imagining, of objects. That explanation is probably difficult and subtle, but the point is that referring to remembered objects introduces no new psychological facts to be explained that remembering objects does not required to be explained.

I can say "that was hot" about a liquid no longer present in my perceptual field, if I can remember what my perceptual field was like in the past. There are problems about the psychological causality and the epistemological validity of memory. But if I can succeed in remembering past events, I can succeed in using indexical terms or names or whatever for them. The use of language for remembered objects that are uniquely individual introduces no new psychological or epistemological problems that memory itself does not raise.

What about when I am simply imagining a pink elephant and am aware that I am only imagining it? The private language argument would definitely have a place here, but again the problems are basically psychological and epistemological. Given that something is objectified only in imagination, if I try to re-objectify it by using only names or indexicals, I cannot succeed in communicating what I'm talking about to anyone else and will have nothing public against which I can later test my memory of whether I did or did not use a particular noise to objectify that particular object.

In addition to using a name or indexical, I can re-objectified imaginary object by describing it and communicate the description to someone else. Then later I can verify my memory of what I imagined by asking another person to repeat my description. But describing it to another person would give my linguistic objectification sufficiently public character.

If as Kripke wants it, descriptions do not give proper names their meanings but only "fix the reference" a proper names, why isn't the same true of proper names for cognition constituted objects? If the function of a proper name is to pick out, select, an *object* for discourse, why can't that object to be a cognition dependent object. The objection would be that the function of proper names is to pick out a real existent. But doesn't that beg the question of why proper names have to pick out real existents? Allegedly of the reason is that proper names cannot have their usefulness otherwise. But why not? If a description can fix a reference to an object that happens to be a real existent, it can fix a reference to an object that is not a real existent. For the important thing is that, by hypothesis, what we are fixing a reference to is an object of cognition. Whether or not it is also a real existent is another question.

But a cognition constituted object seems to be constituted by the description through which we cognize it, objectify it. Yes but once objectified, we can give it a name. And the description is not the meaning of the name. It is that which fixes the reference of the name. For other descriptions can be true of the cognition constituted object as well. For example, the cognition constituted object I am thinking of right now, or that I thought about when I got out of bed this morning, etc..

Kripke's arguments against the theory that the meaning of the name is the description apply to cognition constituted objects as well. For example, the possibility of error argument, "a physicist," etc.. The same is true of "the first cognition constituted object I will think of tomorrow."

Names are used to pick out individuals, but why must they be really existing individuals rather than merely objects of cognition? For they at least have to be objects of cognition; why is it necessary to multiply entities and also require them to be real existents? Names do not refer in themselves. They are *used* or not used to refer, and so can general descriptions be so used. They can be used correctly or incorrectly to refer.

Even if it is not used for an individual, "the present King of France" is used for a *concept*, "refers" to a concept. If using language forms for nonlinguistic things requires of their existence, then concepts and universals must exist.

April 19, 83

Russell: names have sense but not reference.

Mill and Kripke: names have reference but not sense.

Cahalan: names may or may not have sense, but they do not have reference in themselves; they can be *used* to refer.

March 10, 83

Sometimes a name objectifies a real existent; sometimes it does not. When it happens to be the case that what is objectified by the name really exists, the name is said to "refer." The same with definite descriptions like "the so and so." So why is there a problem about referring to the nonexistent or about asserting or denying existence of something we "refer" to, if "referring" only means that the term of the relation of objectification happens to be, in addition to being a term of a relation of objectification, a real existent?

Being a real existent is other than being the term of a relation of objectification. So the relation of objectification is indifferent to whether the thing really exists. Not indifferent in the sense that we could begin by objectifying imaginary objects. But in different in the sense that as far as a relation of objectification is concerned, the term of the relation can be or not be a real existent.

We name nonexistence all a time. Why must names be said to objectify real existence or to

"refer," when "refer" is *defined* as objectifying a real existent? We can define names as so referring, but then ordinary names are not names. But neither our Russell's logically proper names; for "this" can refer to a cognition constituted object.

How do names objectify nonexistents? Cognition constituted objects are nothing other than how we use some words. So initially "Sherlock Holmes" objectifies by association with some description. But not all names need to do so. And after a name is associated with some description, the reference can be fixed in other ways. For example, "Conan Doyle's most famous creation," "the object of cognition that I just mentioned."

First, words objectify things. Then we use words to construct cognition constituted objects, which are nothing but the way words are used. Then we associate a cognition constituted object with a name.

If a general term can have meaning without its meaning existing, why can't a name? "But a general term as connotation, not denotation." But all you have done is constructed a definition of "connotation" and "denotation."

"If the referent of a name did not exist, the name would be meaningless." And does the meaning of a general term exist? "Without an existent, there is nothing for the name to pick out, to point to, to focus our attention on." And do the concepts pointed to, picked out, etc., by general terms exist?

March 17, 83

"If the meaning of a name is not a description, then what is its meaning, its referent if the "referent" does not really exist?" But we can ask the same question about general terms. What is their meaning, what do they objectify, if their meanings do not exist? Their existence in individuals is not what explains their being the meaning of general terms.

June 18, 92

Whether a sentence has the property of being true or false goes beyond what a sentence means and beyond any logical property I can give a sentence by intending it to mean one thing rather than another. In addition to intending that a sentence mean this and not that, I can intend the sentence to be true. But my intending the sentence cannot make it true, while my intentions can make it mean this or that.

The same is true of "reference." In the sense of intending I can successfully make a word objectify to this or that. I can also intend the word to objectify a real existent. But my intending the word to objectify a real existent cannot make me succeed in objectifying a real existent, while it can make me succeed in objectifying this or that. So "referring" in the sense of successfully objectifying a real existent goes beyond any logical property I can give a word by my intentions for using the word. It depends not just on my intentions but on the way the world is.

So successfully objectifying a real existent is not a logical property my use of a word to objectify can give a word, just as truth is not a logical property my use of a sentence can give a sentence.

Nov. 8, 89

There is a form of objectification such that, if it occurs, its object must really exist. That form of objectification is sensation, external or internal. But to say the preceding is simply to say that by stipulation if the state we happen to call "sensation" happens to occur, or if we "succeed" in sensing, then by definition the object must exist. But that simply means that we decide not to use the word "sensation" for a form of objectification unless the objectification happens to be characterized by having a real existent for its object.

Kripke and others say there is another such form of objectification called "naming." Now this way of deciding to use the word "name" seems not to be consistent with the ordinary sense of "name". It would not be correct in the ordinary sense, since in that sense we name objects that do not exist.

What Kripke and others are *trying to say* seems to be that in order for there to be truth, or in order for there to be some other desired cognitive goal, X (for those who want to do away with truth but not with "reference"), there must be a state of linguistic objectification that occurs if and only if the object really exists, that cannot occur unless the object really exists.

And indeed, I can choose to so describe a state of linguistic objectification in this way and choose to use some word for it, just as I can choose to use "sensation" for a similar state of objectification. That is, I can so define "naming" and/or "referring" such that by stipulation I do not use them unless the object of cognition in question happens to really exist. But the fact that I can so describe and name such a state does not mean that the existence of such a state is necessary for truth. In fact, no such state is required for truth. (A state such as described by "sensation" is required for the rest of our cognition on causal grounds, not on logical grounds or solely on grounds of the choice to use "sensation" for such a state.)

Xxx Names and supposition, the copula, Nov. 8, 80

(Continuing after the immediately preceding paragraph.) Truth does require that we distinguish between past, present and future existence, to determine the time at which the thing/object identity required for truth holds. Poincaré talks about the different kinds of supposition that occur "according to the requirements of the copula." The subject-copula-predicate linguistic form is one way to objectify the time of the existence for which thing/object identity is required.

But it need not be our only such method of objectifying the time of the thing/object identity required for truth. As long as we can objectify which time the objectification is relative to, we don't need names in Kripke's sense.

xxx Identity and universal concepts, April 22, 90

The identity of A and B means that whatever is true of A is true of B and vice versa. So if A is specifically or generically identical with B, whatever is specifically or generically true of A is specifically or generically, respectively, true of B. What does "specifically" or "generically" true of A and B mean?

It means that what is true of A insofar as, inasmuch as, a specific or generic concept is true of A. That is, whatever is necessarily connected with that specific concept. And mostly that necessity is causal. So mostly "insofar as A is an F" means "whatever is connected with the word-function of "F" by causal necessity.

xxx "Law-like" universals, June 25, 2005

For induction, experience must show universals between things of certain *kinds* of things, things objectified otherwise than as terms of the causal relation in question, as in "All ruminants have cloven hoofs." Experience reveals no such causal relation between things objectifiable as "a coin in my pocket" and "silver."

e way in which it is known" or just "a property of o accidental