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Any comments or corrections should be sent immediately to Paul MacDonald at DICKNS::MACDONALD (DTN 223-3439). Thank you.

This file contains philosophical and theological ideas meant to be developed later into articles or books. Hardcopies of these ideas will be found among my papers. The hardcopies will either be with the notebooks labeled "Journal" or in the cardboard box labelled "Work". This file was created

dir
3-25-88.

We use different linguistic structures in making things objects of propositional knowledge. But our propositions need not assert of things the characteristics (like universality) attributable to things because we know them. Therefore, differences between languages need not prevent us from knowing what things are independently of our languages (Chapter 6). This answer is not meant to solve all problems about how we escape from subjectivity, but unless this answer is correct, we could not solve the other problems because there could be no escape from subjectivity.

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On one meaning of the question "How do we escape from subjectivity," the answer is by verifying that a statement is indeed true. Verification allows us to escape from subjectivity because verification is ultimately resolved in sensory awareness of extra-cognitional existence (Chapter 10) and in self-evidently necessary truths of the ontological (that is, concerned with extra-cognitional existence or functions of existence) type, especially the principle of non-contradiction (<emphasis> (passim)). On another meaning of that question, we escape from subjectivity because of psychological entities that embody both entitative and intentional existence (Appendix I).

<P>

On still another meaning of that question, we escape from subjectivity because Aquinas's solution to the problem of universals (in <emphasis> (De Ente and Essentia)) can be extended to the subjectivity problem raised by psycho-linguistics. We use different linguistic structures in making things objects of propositional knowledge. But our propositions need not assert of

things the characteristics (like universality) attributable to things because we know them. Therefore, differences between languages need not prevent us from knowing what things are independently of our languages (Chapter 6). but just as we can say that the objects of our concepts are universal without attributing universality to them in their extramental state, so in using language, we need not be attributing to things in their extramental state properties resulting from our linguistic structures.

Concerning Bruntrup's very thoughtful and knowledgeable review, let me say that I do not accuse all analytic philosophy of implying <emphasis> (esse est percipi). What I say is that certain common treatments of the question whether "exists" is a predicate unintentionally imply Berkeley's airiness to Bruntrup, it is very difficult to adequately handle

such distinctions in a brief review.) To the question what constitutes correspondence, my answer is that it is not a relation between a mental state, a <emphasis> (quo), and a thing but between the object we are made aware of by means of a mental state, a <emphasis> (quod) or an object, and a thing. Even a false proposition is a claim about how things exist, not a claim about our subjective states. And we judge truth by judging the identity relation between a mental state, a

<emphasis> (quo), and a thing but between the object we are made aware of by means of a mental state, a <emphasis> (quod) or an object, and a thing. Even a false proposition is a claim about how things exist, not a claim about our subjective states. And we judge truth by judging the identity between the claim and what exists, not between our subjective states and what exists.
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To the question how can we verify a claim about how things exist, -the question of logical conditions for

knowledge. (In fairness to Bruntrup, it is very difficult to adequately handle such distinctions in a brief review.) To the question what constitutes correspondence, my answer is that it is not a relation between a mental state, a <emphasis> (quo), and a thing but between the object we are made aware of by means of a mental state, a <emphasis> (quod), and a thing. Even a

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Our love, our union, is made possible by, is based on, our ability to procreate.

It is important that we use those organs whose primary purpose for being what they are is procreant, organs which are what they are for the sake of procreation.

3-24-88

Humor

The recognition and appreciation of humor is a property of an aptitude of, a spirit enforming matter, of a body which is what it is because its substantial form is subsistent. That explains why there is so much humor in life events, personal relations children require.

Still, physical sexuality in itself is something animal, and we are capable of experiencing it as such. And surely that is a great part of the humor found in sex by a spirit enclosing an animal body, by an intelligence that is not animal but spiritual. The humor is not that the animal aspect is bad but rather that this completely animal function is so natural and good for an essentially spiritual thing, namely, the subsistent form through which we are aware, "What is the relation between logic and metaphysics?"

This question can mean two different, even contradictory, things. It can mean: what metaphysical conclusions should we draw from logic; how should we go about getting a metaphysics from our logic= how should we base metaphysics on logic. This interpretation of the question assumes there is a relation between the kind of knowledge we call "logic" and the kind we call "metaphysics" that one should be based on, derived from, the other.

But what our sexuality is is *principally* a means to the procreation and education of human children. First, it is a "means" just as a hammer is an exerter of pressure. By being what it is, it is something that at times will produce new human beings. Second, the fact that it is something that at times will produce human beings is the reason why it exists even during those times when it cannot produce human beings. It is the reason from evolution's point of view and God's point of view, since exist3-88

We react against empiricism because we think empirical knowledge, the knowledge of the empirical sciences, does not do justice to our reflective experience of our subjectivity; it does not do justice to the meaning and value of ourselves as persons that we find in our experience of our subjectivity. So to counter empiricism as a philosophy of method, we look for a method that seems to be based on and to extend our reflexive self-experience. And we find technical ontological analysis aesthetically displeasing. That is, the aesthetic values we associate with abstract philosophical thinking seem to be contrary to the values of personhood and subjectivity that we are trying to preserve.

4-13-88

U-turn and/or Epistemological fallacy

Jack Caputo says he wanted to present Hermeneutics to make the scholastics change. Change how? Not, presumably, by recognizing that there was something that deserved emphasis that was not receiving enough emphasis; if so, the scholastics would not have to change any of their views. Caputo was clearly talking about change of views. He wanted them to discover that some of their theses were wrong. And the strong suspicion has to be that the incorrect theses have to do with truth or our ability to know it.

But if so, his conclusions cannot follow from his premises. The fact that our means of knowing the truth are linguistic and cultural does not imply that the truths that are so known are linguistically and culturally bound. Jim Risser hoped the scholastics learned "that we have to interpret". But who denies this? Either he and Caputo have correct views on truth but incorrect views on what the scholastics teach about truth, or they have incorrect views on truth. If the latter, they are drawing false conclusions from otherwise sound premises.

Why would they commit the epistemological fallacy of thinking that, because our means of knowing the truth are cultural, the truth known is cultural. One motive could be the U-turn.

But notice that this kind of mistake keeps repeating itself in different forms. It has been well refuted in its earlier forms, but many thinkers do not seem to be able to transfer the earlier refutations to the new forms even though the same principles are involved. How many times are we going to have to go through this again?

4-14-88

Ethics

In the epilogue, maybe bring up Grisez and Finnis and explain why they are not dealt with. Actually, this would be best done in a footnote in the epilogue. The footnote would still get their names into the index.

4-14-88

Sexuality

The fact that sexuality is what it is in order to be a means for procreation is indicated by the following. There are times when there is a better than 50/50 chance for conception to take place. We would use contraception then because sexuality is more likely to be a means to procreation than not. But there are also times when the chances are less than 50/50 but more than 0. We would still use contraception at those times. If sexuality has the chance of producing a human being, its main purpose and meaning is as an instrument for producing human beings, since (1) our existence is more fundamental to us than any other purpose sexuality might serve and (2) the existence in question is the existence of an ethical absolute.

4-14-88

Ethics -- man as an end in him or herself

For those who know that God exists, man is an absolute value in a sense more precise than the possession of freedom of choice. Reason extends to the fulness of being. For example, we are able to have the idea of an infinite being. Therefore, by reason, we can attain the infinite perfection that is the goal of the rational appetite. This is more fundamental than free choice, because every free choice, even defective ones, has that perfection as its inherent goal. In other words, free choice is ultimately a *means* to the perfection attained by reason.

4-14-88

Ethics

Perhaps move the "rational appetite as a common belief" section to immediately after either the "falsehood as intrinsically defective" section or the "intrinsic finalities and defects" section. Along with the common-belief section, bring in the argument that we plan future goals on the basis of rational knowledge, etc. from the rational-appetite section. The idea would be to show the reader early on that our everyday ethical judgments treat ethical defects as exactly like falsehood. In other words, our ethical judgments treat decisions as acts with an intrinsic finality. In particular, they have *an* (no 'the') intrinsic finality that makes them inherently defective if they do not deal with things as if they existed as they are known by reason to be.

4-15-88

UPS

It is not the Eucharist or any other sacrament that creates Christian community.
It is Jesus and His Spirit Who create Christian C°,,@ðpðñðpÁÂF@@CÃðpðp~f,

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are related as values. In other words, we find the decision defective because the places it gives things in our system of values is inconsistent with the places they have relative to one another in reality -- just as the belief that they are not equal would be false for the same reason.

4-20-88

Ethics -- Abstract

What if there is an appetite governed by reason? How could there be such an appetite? Any appetite is an appetite for some cognizable mode of being. An appetite governed by reason is an appetite whose object is being as knowable by reason.

4-20-88

Short book

Must emphasize that both the identity theory of truth and the substance/accident distinction are independent of the subject/predicate, or any other, sentence structure.

4-21-88

Short book -- truth

There is an abiding temptation to relativize or subjectivize truth. The method of doing this can take the Kantian form, the Bergsonian form, the sociological (Compte) form, the psycho-linguistic form, the cultural linguistics form, the hermeneutical form, etc. All of these forms can be shown to fail. But more than that, we can know that all future forms must necessarily fail. How?

One way is by self-referential inconsistency. If all truth is relative or subjective, the "all truth is relative or subjective" is relative or subjective and hence, capable of revision or rejection.

(Another way is by the proper analysis of correspondence as identity of a thing with itself, that is, identity between what is asserted and what exists.)

But why the permanent temptation? There is a focus on the activity of the conscious subject in knowledge, a focus on the fact that the knower must do work, that she must use linguistic and conceptual tools, that knowing is an activity of a limited, culturally conditioned subject, etc. But to conclude from these impressive facts to the result that we can't know the truth is to say that because we must make an effort in order to know, we therefore cannot know. Because we use tools to know, we therefore do not know. Because knowing is an activity, we therefore do not perform it. Because we must use means to achieve our end, we therefore cannot achieve our end.

It is also like saying that because we must use a camera to take pictures, we can't take pictures. The reply will be that my use of this analogy highlights the weakness of my position. They are saying that we can't know truth precisely because knowing isn't just taking pictures; and my position implies that it is like taking pictures. But first, the fact that knowing is not like taking pictures does not imply that knowing isn't knowing.

Secondly, even taking pictures isn't "just" taking pictures. The camera is an excellent analogy for the subjective and relative aspects of the knowing process. The result of snapping the shutter is an image that is upside down! In fact, the result is not even an image. It is a piece of chemically treated film that has reacted to light. Think of the complex chemical processes that must take place to develop the film. And the result of those chemical processes is a *negative* image. To get a positive image, still more chemical processes must take place.

Yet the result is a picture recognizable as a picture of an object. The objection that primitive people may not recognize it mixes the metaphor. The comparison was between the creation of a photograph and a mental process such as the recognition of a photograph as resembling an object. The comparison was not between the recognition of the photograph as resembling an object and our grasp of other truths.

Yes, we may have to learn to recognize a photograph. And yes, much mental work is required to achieve the grasp of a truth. Likewise, the picture is imperfect. But who ever said true sentences were perfect, only that they are true. It is either true or not true that the Statue of Liberty has one and only one arm raised above her shoulder. A picture does not have to be perfect to allow us to discern that the object is pictured as having only one arm raised above its shoulder.

The relativist is impressed with how difficult it is for us to know the truth, how limited is the truth once known, etc. Those facts are facts worth being impressed by. But it is also worth being impressed by the *impossibility* of concluding from such facts that we cannot know truth. The *necessity* of the falsehood of that conclusion is also something exciting, something stunning. A Cambridge mathematician was overwhelmed that 319 was a prime number whether we liked it or not. Likewise, whatever our subjective disposition, it necessarily is either true or false that the Statue of Liberty either does or does not have at least one arm raised above her head.

4-22-88

Sex, Society, and Rights

How to shorten it: What do children get from wett5fuvv'qonivg fam©liâs? L6e, examples of self-sacrifice, etc. These things are necessary for personas as those that are -- or at least appear to be -- amenable to a functional or technological solution: set up a cabinet office to deal with children's affairs, etc. Problems that do not appear to be approachable from this point of view are just ignored as problems, as if they had been defined out of existence.

Then how do we solve them if not functionally? By, for example, supporting the family by making it the moral norm. That is, we support them morally as opposed to technically.

5-2-88

Ethics - punishment

The guilty party deserves to be deprived of ends in proportion to his depriving of another even if the other cannot benefit by receiving what is taken away from the guilty party. The first the primary good accomplished by punishment is not restitution but justice, that is, equality. This is a good for the rational appetite. That is, the primary good to be achieved is the restoration of equality because that is the good demanded by the rational appetite, namely, that the two be treated equally. Their equal treatment accomplishes the finality of the rational appetite, and so is a good for us and the primary good for us that punishment attains.

Does this make punishment an obligation so that forgiveness would be immoral? The injured party or one socially responsible for acting in their stead can forgive.

Men are the injured party is sin, and a man, Christ, can forgive.

5-3-88

Short Book -- ontological analysis

Don't forget the distinction between ontological and empiriological analysis is not meant to be exclusive. The ontological is the more inclusive. Ontological regulative principles are always operating in the background, and ontological concepts are always logically included in empiriological. Hence any way of expressing the difference between these two modes of analysis must allow for overlap and mutual penetration.

5-3-88

Ethics

The question of treating others as equal to us in respect to being pursuers of goals does not add anything to the question of a common human nature. If there is a common human nature and there is evidence for it, then the ability to make rational decisions is a characteristic of that nature. That is, if we have a common nature that gives us the ability to achieve the degrees of intelligence we call rational, the human degree of linguistic ability, the human ability to conceive of an after life and immaterial existence, then certainly the ability to make rational decisions accompanies that common nature rather than only characterizing a subset of those with that nature.

5-3-88

Short book -- difference of man

It violates simplicity to postulate awareness in a computer. The response will be that the kind of causal factors in a computer are generically the same as the causal factors in ourselves where awareness does exist. But more than simplicity is at stake here. The kind of causal factors in question, namely, the kind we can observe in both men and computers, do not and cannot explain awareness. Philosophical argument can show that. Therefore, there must be other kinds of causal factors in us. But we are responsible for putting into computers whatever kind of causal factors exist in them. Therefore, it would violate simplicity to postulate further causal factors in them, while it is necessary to do so in us.

5-5-88

SSR

Could there be other means of fulfilling the needs of children for a supportive environment? Perhaps. But any method of providing for their needs must satisfy certain requirements. The first requirement is that the means be reliable. That is, it must be a means we can reasonably expect to succeed often enough to ensure that few children will not be deprived of a supportive environment. As a matter of fact, the family must be our first line of defense for children. Without the well functioning family, we cannot reasonably expect the needs of children to be provided for often enough. Other methods must be available when the family fails. But these methods cannot pass the test of reliability if they are meant as replacements for the family.

Why? 1: Relying on the family builds on the parent's natural tendency to love their children. That tendency is not infallible, but we have nothing more reliable to build on.

2: In a democracy, we must recognize the right of the parent's to bring up their own. To simultaneously honor parent's right to bring up their children and the children's need for a reliable provider of support, we must do what we can to make the family work.

3 (or 4): Other methods require a supply of loving, self-sacrificing people, since children require self-sacrifice on the part of the adults responsible for them. Therefore, the adults bringing up children can be expected to have these dispositions on a reasonably reliable basis wvly if these adudts have had the kind of environment that fosters these dispositions, namely, the family.

4 (or 3): The kind of "support" child chapter

If the universe did not always exist, why must it have been created by God? Because otherwise it would be cause of its own existence. So the existence of something that does not exist forever must be a caused existence. Why? Or maybe focus not on the fact that it would be a caused existence but on the fact that it would be cause of its own existence. It would produce or ground its own existence. Its existence would be produced or grounded by it. Why? Its existence would be sustained by itself; it would sustain its own existence. Why?

Without an agent for change, a component cause of change causes itself to change. A passive potency for change would be the cause of its own change. Why? Otherwise, *this* change at this time would be uncaused. The component cause is the total cause of the change and so is the total cause of this change occurring at this time. But the component cause is insufficient for this change at this time. So the change is caused and uncaused.

Back to existence. Why does *this* existent occur and not some other?
This question is different from the allegedly unanswerable "Why is there something rather than nothing?"

Is *this* equivalent to an existence as opposed to a capacity for existence?
Why can't it be an existence? One reason: it is finite. Another reason, it is subject to change. While it remains in existence, it can undergo change. Another reason, it can cease to exist.

5-13-88

Limitation of act by potency

Why must act be limited by potency? The question translates to "Why cannot a pure act be measurable by mixed act/potency combinations?" One approach to an answer: The highest in a genus constitutes the standard by which the others are measured. They are measured by their relative distances to the standard. Why cannot a pure act constitute a standard for act/potency mixes to be measured against?

5-13-88

SSR

The opponent is basically saying she is willing to accept a less reliable means than the family of providing for the needs of children.

5-18-88

Ethics

Opening

The example will assume that neither of the competitors has a special need or purpose, e.g., feeding her starving children or gaining a position in which she can spy on the Nazi's. That is, we assume the competitor's needs and purposes are *equal*. In that situation, the obligation not to cheat consists in a factual state of affairs. The evil of cheating consists in a factual situation. That situation is knowable and results necessarily from things being what they are.

Common nature

We will see that commonness is not the central issue. If some other species possesses a different underlying nature, but one which gives them the power to make rational decisions, our natures are equal in this respect. The foundational or underlying character of the nature is what is important. Our rational decisions are achievements. Achievements come from somewhere. Perhaps our rational knowledge differs only in degree from animals. It does not follow that we fail to share a common nature that animals do not share. Achievements are results of processes that have their roots in our possession of characteristics other than the achievements themselves. Nature is a causal concept. For ethical equality, those characteristics do not have to be the same. But the evidence of experience makes it unreasonable to believe that our common achievements do not come from some common set of underlying characteristics, due to the similarities in the causal processes that bring beings with these achievements into existence, that is, due to the fact that beings with these achievements come into existence through similar causal processes, namely sexual generation by members of the same breeding pool, and due to the fact that beings with these achievements share so many other characteristics in common (bi-pedal, featherless, having roughly similar shapes, etc.). So even though commonness is not necessary for ethical equality, it is a fact of experiences.

The existence of exceptions to all the common features is not evidence against a common nature. The underlying cause may not be able to produce its normal effects for any number of reasons. More importantly, when common achievements and features do occur, for example, when someone with six fingers can also reason, it is unreasonable to believe the underlying foundations of his reasoning are not the same as they are in us. For we were brought into existence by causal processes involving beings whose natures are similar enough to allow them to breed and thus pass onto us whatever foundational characteristics underly our achieved characteristics.

The same reasoning would apply to exceptions, unlike having six fingers, more directly related to our ethical equality, e.g., the inability to achieve rational knowledge. We have to assume that the underlying causes

are there but cannot achieve their normal effects. Why? because whatever underd is the use of a faculty whose primary purpose is as a means to something of absolute ethical value.

5-19-88

Ethics - Equality of nature

The real point about equality of nature is that we are not equal "as pursuers of goals" on the level of achievement. For example, we each have different degrees of rational intelligence. The question is whether these differing degrees of achievement argue for a difference in the underlying foundations of these achievements. Or rather, are the underlying foundations equal as a common nature explaining the commonness of our achievements, while differences in degree are explained by factors outside of our common nature.

There could theoretically be differences of degree at two levels, the level of achievement and the level of underlying foundations. Let's talk about the second level only. Even if there are differences of degree there, the different degrees presuppose something common. They are degrees of something. That something is a common nature. Why is the common something more important than the difference in degree for the rational appetite? Because reason is capable of knowing that differences of degree exist only as degrees of something. Reason knows that differences of degree exist as attributes of the something that exists. Modalities of the nature that exists. Quantity as such does not exist; quantified natures exist. Does the fact that the nature cannot exist without quantity make the quantity more basic? Not the specific quantity that constitutes the difference of degree, since the nature can exist without that specific quantity but the specific quantity cannot exist without it.

5-20-88

Ethics - intrinsic defects

How can the defect in a belief or desire be intrinsic if it depends on conditions extrinsic to the belief or desire? Because the belief or desire are relations to the those extrinsic conditions. That is what a belief or desire is, a relation to something or somethings other than themselves. That is what conscious states in general are.

5-26-88

Formal Systems

The problem of universals is not the problem of whether we should quantify over sets. In fact, the realist treatment of universals, diacritical realist, implies that we should NOT quantify over sets. Sets are logical entities; they have no extramental existence. Neither do universals; or neither does universality.

Natures exist only as natures of individuals. But our concepts relate to those natures in such a way that the characteristics those natures owe to matter, to component causality, are irrelevant to the relationship, do not enter into the relationship. Thus the kind of component causality that individuates natures must not enter into the subject who forms the concepts (psychological entities) by which we relate to natures such that what the natures owe to component causality does not specify (as a specifying cause) the relationship, or does not characterize the nature precisely as what terminates this relationship. Concepts are individual also, but not material. The only thing that "is" universal, is something that has existence as a cognized object only, because it has existence as a relation holding between cognized objects as a result of different ways in which they are cognized and as a result of differences between what the nature owes to matter and what characteristics of the nature enter into or terminate the relation by which concepts cognize those natures.

5-31-88

Birth Control

From: MTWAIN::CAHALAN "Jack Cahalan, 223-2528, MLO21-2/T64, 5b" 26-MAY-1988
12:34
To: cahalan,CAHALAN
Subj: b control

<<< BRIANE::LISPW\$: [NOTES]CATHOLIC-THEOLOGY.NOTE;2 >>>

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Note 182.1 Birth Control 1 of 3
PCCAD2::RICHARDJ 18 lines 25-MAY-1988 12:57
-< Reap What We Sow >-

Society reaps what it sows. Yesterday on the news I heard that as the baby boomers become senior citizens, the number of retired people verses working people will be 4 to 1. The need for nursing homes will be four times as great as it is now. The numbers of nurses and doctors needed will be five times as great because of illnesses related to old age, such as broken hips, etc. With the baby boomers limiting their family sizes to none or one child, the future working society will not be able to support the numbers of people who are to old to work. As society has hardened its conscience towards birth control, and is hardening its conscience on abortion, euthanasia will become common place, followed by forced euthanasia. So as the people are not having children in order that their lives are lived easier today, their lives will become unbearable later on. Of course a nuclear holocaust could change all this.

Your Friend In Christ
Jim

5-31-88

Ethics - circularity

Ethical decisions are decisions based on a certain kind of awareness. Awareness of our equality with respect to ethical decisions is awareness of our equality with respect to this kind of awareness. What kind of awareness? Ethical decisions are based on an awareness of our equality with respect to awareness of our equality with respect to our awareness of equality.

No, ethical decisions are based on our equality with respect to nature. That is why there is no ethics if abortion is permitted. If ethical decisions were based on our equality with respect to the proximate ability to make ethical decisions, they would be based on our ability to know our equality with respect to knowing our equality with respect to making decisions based on knowing our equality with respect to making decisions.

6-3-88

Ethics - circularity

Equality is not the main thing. Unequal treatment simply implies we are not treating them according to what they are. But what is this "what they are" and why is it important. In fact, what does it mean to ask why and whether something is "important"? To ask whether something is important is equivalent to asking whether it is important from the point of view of the finality of the rational appetite. That is what it means to ask whether something is important. And this is the meaning we use whenever we call it "immoral" to treat something as more or less important than another, that is, this is the meaning of "immoral" we use.

But if equality is not what is directly important, what is this "what they are" that is important, and why is it important. What they are are rational beings, beings with rational appetites. Why is that important? Because in subordinating their pursuit of goals to ours, we are depriving a rational appetite of its ends it has chosen, the end not being the winning of the job but, at least, the end of pursuing the job, of trying to get the job. A rational appetite is evaluating goals chosen by a rational appetite as not worthy of pursuit, where worthy means desirable by a rational appetite.

Also, what they are amounts to being entities capable of recognizing their equality in nature to us. That is, beings with rational knowledge. Why should that be important for a rational appetite, if equality as such is not the issue? Why should it be important for a rational appetite to evaluate rational beings differently from subrational beings? Why is what a rational being is higher on the scale of an appetite which evaluates things according to what they are? Here we can simply answer, perhaps, that the reason is that rational beings are higher than subrational.

Perhaps, however, freedom of choice is the only way out of the apparent circularity, in the last analysis.

Or maybe this is all a pseudo problem. The fact is that there is such a thing as unequal treatment of things that are equal from the point of view of the rational appetite, equal because they each possess rational appetites. If we don't treat them equally, we can't be treating them according to what they are. So the question why "what they are" is important really can become why they are "equal" from the point of view of the rational appetite. That is, if we are treating them unequally, and their natures as pursuers of goals is equal, we can't be treating both of them according to what they are, since what they are as pursuers of goals is equal.

But why should what they are as pursuers of goals be important from the point of view of the finality of the rational appetite? Because not to treat another rational appetite equally is to frustrate a rational appetite, is to evaluate your own ends as if they were not those of a rational appetite since you are evaluating ends chosen by a rational

appetite as to be frustrated. When I frustrate an end chosen by a dog, I am not frustrating an end chosen by an appetite that evaluates things according to knowledge of what they are.

6-8-88

Ethics -- epilogue

Both Grisez and I want to make a concession to Hume. But he makes too much of a concession, or does he just make it in the wrong place. We both want to concede that values presuppose appetite. But he concludes that speculative knowledge cannot prescribe to appetite. Therefore, our actions are not governed (their goodness is not measured by, determined by) by speculative truths or by practical truths allegedly derived from speculative truths. Rather, he concludes, are actions are governed by relations to goals that happen to be part of our nature, and he concludes that practical truths express conative relations to goals that we happen to experience (that happen to belong to our nature). But what is important about their belonging to our nature is not the speculative truth that they do so. No practical truth derives its truth from the speculative truth. The practical truth derives its truth as an expression of a desire, not as a description of a desire.

7-13-88

Short Book

At end of Kripke Chapter, or maybe in an introduction, give examples of questions that are really causal questions, not logical questions, e.g., universals, mental entities and propositions.

7-13-88

Ethics

I am valuing A more highly than B even though there is nothing in What A is that makes A more fulfilling of the end of the rational appetite. I am valuing A more highly than B even though what A is in itself is equal to what B is in terms of the finality of the faculty of evaluation. And in this case, to say "in terms of the finality of the faculty of evaluation" is just to say in terms of what A and B are in themselves, since the finality of the appetite is to value things according to what reason knows of them, and reason knows what they are in themselves.

7-21-88

Ethics

If I evaluate myself to be a better musician than Horowitz, my evaluation is defective by the standard of what the realities being evaluated are, just as the belief that I am better is defective. (So is evaluation really belief?) To evaluate X is to evaluate X to be something.

If I desire good music and evaluate Myself to be more of the kind of thing that supplies good music than is Horowitz, my evaluation is defective as an evaluation of a means to an end. Maybe that is why it is not intrinsically defective in the ethical sense to so evaluate Horowitz. I am defectively evaluating him as a means to an end that I am not intrinsically related to. The problem this may solve is why is not every defective evaluation morally evil by the standard of failing to evaluate things as they are, since the intrinsic finality of the will is to evaluate things as they are.

Point out somewhere that there are also intellectual acts of evaluation. For example, my judgment that I am a better musician than Horowitz. That judgment can result in a desire that also defectively evaluates us, a desire for means to (conditional and hypothetical ends).

7-25-88

Abortion and Ethics

The abortionist says the child does not acquire unconditional value until it develops reason. But value for whom or for what? From what point of view? Value for another human being, specifically, for an adult human being making the choice of killing the child or not. That is, for a being with a rational appetite. So the child does not acquire unconditional value for a rational appetite until it develops a rational appetite. But why should the child's RA be a value for another RA unless the child's RA is a value for the child itself. That is, unless the child's RA is part of the fulfillment of the tendencies of the child's nature. And unless, the child is the cause of the development of her RA, etc. If so, then the adult's RA, having being for its object, must evaluate the whole being of the child as the kind of being for which an RA is natural, and must evaluate the underlying being *as of the same worth* as the adult's underlying being.

Ethics

9-16-88

When we abuse instead of kill, we are willing, valuing, the continued existence of a being conscious of the deprivation of its ends. The metaphysics of consciousness is not well enough developed to allow me to say what it is about the conscious being that makes it defective to place a higher value on an unconscious object like a movie than on a conscious thing's consciousness of its well being. Perhaps it has something to do with the fact that a conscious being's ends are *its*, not an end-in-itself, but in the sense that it not only has certain things as ends, but is oriented to awareness of itself as having or not having the things that fulfill its appetites. Why is it defective for a rational appetite to will the consciousness of deprivation as a means to the existence of an unconscious thing? The answer lies in what consciousness and hence conscious beings are. Even without having that answer, we can know that the answer must lie in what consciousness and conscious beings are; for only what things are can measure the act of a rational appetite as successful or defective. If the answer does not lie in what things are, then the question at issue, the success or defectiveness of a decision, is not a question of the achievement of the finality of a appetite oriented to consciousness of what things are.

10-26-88

Ethics - Existence of the Rational Appetite

Does the rational appetite as I have described it exist? The alternative is to say we have an ability to *use* rational knowledge in making decisions, but this ability need not have the finality of valuing things according to what they are as known by reason. Reason doesn't govern it; it uses reason.

But the fact is that we do make decisions. Therefore these decisions must be produced by a faculty with a finality, because causes act as a result of their dispositions to act. Do decisions result from a faculty with some particular object, like the objects of sensory appetites? First, there is no evidence for this. Second, if so we would not be free to avoid unethical behavior.

If they do not result from a faculty with a particular object, is the finality of the faculty just to make decisions, any decisions whatsoever, indiscriminately? In a way, that is the finality of the rational appetite insofar as it is free. That is, the will cannot avoid a conscious preference for this or that, even though what its preference will be is not determined in advance. Even the fact that the will is free not to decide, not to act, does not release it from the necessity of having one conscious preference as opposed to another. For non-acting amounts to a conscious, intentional preference for the status quo.

But can it be that in making any decision whatsoever, the will is only using rational knowledge and not evaluating things as if that was what rational knowledge knew them to be? Then we must ask, using rational knowledge for what end? The end of making decisions or, on the other hand, the end chosen by a decision. If the latter, rational knowledge does not come into play until an end has been chosen; then rational knowledge serves the chosen end. But if so, the choice of ends is blind, not affected by rational knowledge. And that contradicts the minimal finality necessarily granted to the will in order to make *conscious* decisions. For the will must have a conscious preference for this end as opposed to that. If rational knowledge does not come into play until after the end is chosen, the preference for the end is unconscious.

But if rational knowledge is being used in order to select an end, the finality of the decision-making faculty must be to select ends according to our rational knowledge of what things are. That is, its finality is to have conscious preferences for ends, where "conscious" refers to having preferences for ends chosen under rational knowledge of what things are. The fact is that we have a faculty for making conscious decisions. Those decisions bear on ends. So we have a faculty for deciding for ends based on rational consciousness of ends.

10-26-88

Ethics and Short Book -- The Nature of Rationality

What distinguishes human from animal and machine consciousness is the grasp of the *necessary* truth of a judgment. The only acceptable hypothesis is that water freezes at 32 F because of what water is; it is not acceptable to believe that water may sometimes do it and sometimes not.

So Kripke gives us a new way to define rationality.

10-26-88

Ethics -- Value of Human Life

Why is it in the overriding interest of the state to preserve human life rather than give people freedom of choice to kill their comatose loved ones? Because if human life does not have an absolute ethical value, nothing does. If human life does not have a value for our decision making faculty because of what it, human life, is, there is no morality, nothing that obligates our decision making faculty because of what it is.

The alternative to human life having value by being what it is is the belief that human life acquires value when it develops the decision making faculty. Hence, if we decide to terminate life, we can. For it is the decision making faculty and nothing else that bestows value on human life. But value for whom and for what? Value for the decision making faculty? No, because we have just eliminated any finality prior to decisions by which the value of the decisions would be measured. All value derives from decisions; value does not precede decisions. But then why does the fact that another human life has developed its decision making faculty impose any obligation on my decision making faculty. If value does not precede decisions but derives from them, why can't I decide that another human with the ability to make decisions does not have any value for me? Because we are equal as decision makers? But why should equality have any value for me?

So if the value of human life is bestowed by the ability to make choices, there is no obligation.

10-26-88

Why consciousness of X must be an existence for X

Unless it is X itself that exists in consciousness, then consciousness of X is a relation to X of which we must always ask what makes this relation, distinct from the existence of X, a relation to X and not to something else. What makes the consciousness a consciousness of X. Wittgenstein was right. The only way to establish the connection non-arbitrarily is to make the relation to X an existence for X.

Can we ask why 2 feet has the relation of being the double *of* one foot and not the double of something else? Because of what 2 feet and 1 foot are in their entitative existence. But what is the relation between the entitative existence of the consciousness of X and X that makes the consciousness a consciousness of X. 2 feet is also half of ..., quarter of ..., and so on, without any change in its being 2 feet. But when I go from being conscious of X to being conscious of Y, there is a change in my consciousness.

Truth - Pena
3-27-89

Objections to Bi-valence. Sure "big" is vague and imprecise in each usage that we give it. But that does not prevent it from expressing a vague and imprecise truth in each usage. In fact that vagueness and imprecision may be just what saves bi-valence. Of course, "big" is used for different purposes in different contexts. "He has a really big house." "A really big show." "A really big salary." We are using big differently in each case. But in each case it objectifies a state of affairs, and we use it to objectify a state of affairs. In each case it objectifies a comparative state of affairs, a comparison between the absolute "size" of, say, a salary, and other vaguely mentioned or indirectly mentioned salaries. We are objectifying the fact that the size of the "big" salary is larger than that of most others and larger by a degree that, in the context in which we are speaking, is significant for the purposes for which we are speaking, significant as measured by some assumed goals shared by those conversing.

Sure, "big" acquires its ability to objectify from the context. So do all words. That does not imply that sentences do not possess truth as units. To say that big acquires its meaning from the context, is to say that it does possess a meaning in this context. Hence sentences using it are true as units. If it were not true that "big" possessed a meaning in this context, it would not be true that it acquires its meaning from the context. It cannot be true that it has acquired a meaning unless it has a meaning.

Thing and Object - Pena - Paralogues
3-27-89

Pena objects to the use of terms like "as" "insofar as" and other reduplicative terms. But the analysis of parageneric abstraction in Chapter 12 of Causal Realism shows that reduplicative expressions are unavoidable in philosophy.

I use reduplication to describe logical relations in Chapters 3 and 4. Pena would object, of course. Can I give a cash value to this usage. Logical relations pertain to objects as objects. What does "as" mean here? What resources do I have to explain it? Causal relations. Logical relations are relations *resulting from* making things objects. They are also (2) relations pertaining to objects and (3) relations perceived to pertain to objects, i.e., relations that exist in apprehension as themselves objects and exist in apprehension as modifying other objects. Further they modify other objects as a result of the other objects being objects. For they are perceived to be ways of being objects, one way of being an object as opposed to another way, or they are perceived to be ways of making things objects (e.g., the identity relation). The causal relations involved are both efficient (resulting from things being objects) and final (characterizing objects for the sake of making them objects).

Formal Systems - philosophical limits of
3-27-89

The formal approach to philosophical problems has no successes. Not one. Hempel's disproof of the verification principle? First, I do not accept it as proof. Second, If it is proof, it is a proof that another attempt to apply formal methods in philosophy is unsuccessful.

Rorty admits in *The Linguistic Turn* that there have been no successes. His later work can be interpreted as the claim that we shouldn't look for any successes, i.e., the reason there have been no successes is that there shouldn't be any, and we shouldn't look for them.

The point in his earlier work was that all the linguistic turn had done was to put all previous philosophy on the defensive. But the burden of proof had always been there, so what's new? Perhaps what's new is that "putting on the defensive" means all philosophy must henceforth be done this way even though this way has not yet achieved anything, i.e., the belief that if there is anything to be achieved, it will be by these methods. But when and how has that belief been demonstrated. It's not a demonstration, it's a program; it's an act of faith in a program, an expression of a preference for a program; that's all.

Rorty's later work, *"The Mirror of Nature,"* says, in effect, if there were anything to be achieved, it would be this way, but this very method shows there is nothing to be achieved.

It's time once again for philosophy to bury its skeptical undertakers.

SSR
3-27-89

Children have a right to love. Hence they have a right to more than justice, if it is true that justice concerns the things given to or taken from persons and not directly the persons themselves. If that is true of justice, then rights precede justice.

Children, in other words, don't just have a right to supportive goods and services; they have a right to loving personal relationships.

They also have a right to a society that does the things necessary to minimize child sexual abuse. They have a right to be protected from sexual abuse. Therefore, they have a right to a society that does the things necessary to protect them from sexual abuse.

Roles
3-29-89

Women's ordination is *rarely* discussed from the point of view of the family. This is a lacuna. Women are dissatisfied with their roles in the Church and need more than the statement of fact that Christ freely choose to ordain men exclusively. They need to know why He would do such a thing, if not for merely cultural reasons. They need to know what purpose is served by confining ordination to men. This paper attempts to supply that explanation.

There is a forest-for-trees problem here. That is a major part of the reason why we fail to discuss men's and women's roles from the point of view of the family. Why should there be different roles for the sexes? Our sexual differences exist, according to Christianity, for the sake of the family. If there is a reason for different sexual roles, these roles should primarily exist for the family. Different sexual roles elsewhere should relate to the different sexual roles in the family. If not, it will be hard to see the purpose of different roles elsewhere.

*use the phrase "According to Christianity," or "According to the Church" or similar phrases.

According to Christianity, the Church is an association whose purpose is unity between persons, unity between persons modelled on the family. (Give a scripture quote.) An association with the purpose of unity between persons differs from an association that exists for the sake of performing tasks, for example, a business.

Or

According to Christianity, the Church is not an association that exists for the sake of carrying out tasks; it is an association that exists for the sake of unity between persons. The distinguishing characteristic of the Church is supposed to be unity between its members, a unity modelled on the family.

As philosophers like Marcel and Maritain have pointed out, ...

As many others have pointed out, the Church is often a religious service station.

notice that to "prove" "lofty generalizations" you need other "lofty generalizations". E.g., to prove that common expectations are necessary in marriage, you have to say something like: In human affairs in general, conflicting expectations cause major problems. That's why we have written contracts, job descriptions, laws, etc.

Maybe say something like this: The person who denies that roles are useful in marriage has to deny that common expectations are important in human affairs.

To explain the function of sexually based roles, we have no other recourse

but to get down to a fundamental level, a level so fundamental that the truths can either appear trivially obvious or be hard to discern. This will involve philosophical generalizations about human nature and community. You may not like to get to that level, but there is no other way to do it, because the reasons for not ordaining women are fundamental.

Start this way: the reasons for not ordaining women are fundamental to the nature of or sexuality and of the Church. They are so fundamental that they can either be very difficult to discern or can appear trivially obvious. In any case, they are so fundamental that some analysis of a philosophical type is necessary. You may not like this kind of analysis, but there is no other way to do it, if, as I intend to show, the reasons for not ordaining women are so fundamental.

You may not like this kind of analysis because of its abstraction, but it is abstract for a reason. The more fundamental a truth is, the more we need to abstract from the less fundamental to expose the truth. A lot of us would like mathematics more if it was less mathematical.

The reasons why, and the fact that they are so rarely mentioned in this context, also tell us a lot about our society.

Ethics 6-1-89

People want the freedom to choose their own values, to decide for themselves what is important. But our nature has ends by the standard of which somethings are important and other things are not. If we fail of those ends, we fail as human beings, fail as beings with the underlying nature -- underlying relation to ends -- that we have and cannot avoid having.

Grisez and Finnis say we don't have to achieve the "good" of play (hence, play is not an "end" that determines our success or failure as human beings), but we have to respect the good of play in every act. So not play but respecting the good of play would be an end which must be achieved if we are to be successful as human beings.

SSR

6-27-89

Why the child has a *right* to the family. The parent has the obligation to see that the child's needs are fulfilled. What are those needs? Just some supportive environment? No the child needs friendship, not just justice. Justice governs the exchange of things external to the person. Friendship concerns the person.

BRING THE PRODUCTION-LINE-VERSUS-THE-FAMILY EXAMPLE INTO SSR!

The child needs an environment that values him or her as a person. The parent who brings the child into existence has the obligation to see that this need is fulfilled.

Ethics - Sex
6-29-89

If a product of sexuality has value because she is wanted, the product of sexuality is not an absolute value for the rational appetite. She is wanted in view of some other end, e.g., personal satisfaction for the parents. Hence she is not an end-in-herself. Preventing the occurrence of conception because we do not want the child, makes the product of sexuality something whose value depends on whether we want her or not, i.e., whether she satisfies some other goal for us than the goal of allowing a means to an end-in-itself produce an end-in-itself. Whether she satisfies some other goal for us than the goal of the existence of an end-in-itself.

Short book - 6-29-89

Is it too strong a claim to say that knowing the meaning of a word is knowing what some feature of our experience is? Is it that easy to know what something is? All that this claim says is that a cognitive relation terminates in what something is, is a relation to what something is, that what something is is that which enters cognition as the object of cognition. What something is can be the term of a relation of cognition in many different ways, wholly or partially, clearly or confusedly, distinctly or vaguely.

But sometimes acquaintance with what something is is sufficient to enable us to know truths about it. Why is such acquaintance sufficient? How can it be sufficient? Good questions. But we do not need to know the answers to these questions to know truths made evident by the acquaintance with what things are that we express in language. Nor do the answers to these questions express criteria for judging these truths.

I know that it is impossible that a thing be and not be in the same respect at the same time, and I do not know that by means of some criteria. Nor do I need to be able to answer how acquaintance with what these words are used for is sufficient to make that truth evident. In fact, the verification of the answer to that question would presuppose knowledge of the truth of self-evident propositions. That knowledge could not wait for the answer to that question.

In fact, acquaintance with what things are, the kind of acquaintance expressed in predicates, often involves an awareness of logical or cognition-constituted relations between meanings of words. And awareness of what these relations are often is sufficient for knowing that the opposite of some proposition is contradictory. For example, red is not a color. Why this knowledge of relations terminated by what things are is sufficient will be explained later.

8-10-89

PUL

Possible article: The Sacraments and the Gospel. On coming into ecumenical circles, the Catholic is surprised to find that there are two kinds of Christian denominations, sacramental and evangelistic.

I will not enter that theological dispute. Instead, I want to point out that there are pastoral insights they can gain from each other. To gain those insights, lay aside the concern with the differing theologies.

In my experience, a greater percentage of people in evangelistic churches have experienced initial conversion and met the Lord in a personal way. But among those from both kinds of church who have begun to walk with the Lord, a greater percentage of people in sacramental churches achieve a deep degree of spirituality. The evangelistic churches do not as often produce the likes of C. S. Lewis, T. S. Eliot, Mother Teresa, Jean Vanier as do the sacramental churches, but the sacramental churches do produce that kind of Christian nearly as often as they should.

I suggest that the evangelistic churches know how to lay the foundations of God's building, but they don't know how to erect the walls and roof, while the sacramental churches try to erect the walls and roof without laying the foundations.

To change, the sacramental churches need to know that bringing people to the sacraments is not the same as bringing them to a conversion that gives them a personal relation to the Lord. The evangelistic churches don't have to agree with sacramental doctrine, but they do have to realize that God has a serious purpose for the sacraments and that whatever that purpose may be, none of us appreciate it fully. Recognizing our ignorance of that full purpose, we have to repent of the lack of seriousness with which we may have taken them and ask God to work through them with the faith that God wants to do something through them that is beyond our full comprehension.

The sacramentalist must repent of relying solely on his sacramental powers.

The evangelist must realize that the success of our evangelization depends on the depth of our Christian life (John 17). The sacramentalist must realize that the unity called for requires the Church to be more than a sacramental service station.

"I was not sent to baptise but to preach the gospel.

.....

10-23-89

Infanticide/ethics

Move section on granting, not acquiring rights up to intro. If so, then an adult's right to life is just a matter of my preference. If I prefer the opposite, that preference is just as 'good' as the other; for that is all 'good' means, by hypothesis. But we all know that ethics has the job, at least, of resolving conflicts between such personal preferences. And we know that some ways of resolving such conflicts are defective just by being what they are. We know this, not intuitively, but by knowing reflectively what decisions based on reason are, what goals they have just by being what they are.

We know, for example, that someone who prefers to take the life of another necessarily implies that someone else has as much 'right' to take his life. There is a necessary *ontological*, not just logical, connection between my preferring to take his life and the fact that someone's else's preference to take my life has as much worth, whatever worth may be - may consist of, as my preference.

The opponent may reply that the reason for this equality of worth is that worth can consist of nothing more than preference. But then the worth is equal only in the sense that, as much as my life means to me or my decision to take another life means to me, someone else's decision to take my life means to him. Still, we have not made room for ethics adjudicating this conflict in desires in a way that distinguishes good from bad adjudications.

The opponent will reply that a good adjudication occurs when both our desires come into agreement. That is a definition of a good adjudication. But what if they don't come into agreement. If they don't, that adjudication would not be a good one from my point of view.

11-9-89

Maritain and Science

Toulmin, in the NY Review of Books review of Teilhard, accuses Maritain of "Anti-scientism." Ironically, Toulmin is correct, but for a reason opposite to his. Maritain is not anti-science; he is only anti-scientism.

In his first article, Maritain criticizes the limitations of the scientific *mode of thinking* for not being appropriate for giving us knowledge of things like God. Maybe the scientific mode of thinking contributes to the abortion mentality. Not science itself, i.e., not that which science informs us about babies; but the scientific mode of objectifying, mode of signifying, that which science knows about the real. Maybe that mode contributes to our ability to substitute circumlocutions like "product of conception," "genetic material," "mass of cells" for more appropriate descriptions of the baby.

These descriptions stop at the phenomena.

11-9-89

LOT

When I started teaching, I was unable to find articles I could use in anthologies of competing views of philosophical questions. And almost all the articles I could find were by Maritain. This after the hundreds of thousands of pages the Thomistic renewal had produced.

11-10-89

Cause and ED

One way to ask the question, why cannot an already existing substance begin to change accidentally without an efficient cause? Answer: because the result of the change would come **from** nothing, **out of nothing**. Why? We are talking about the actualization of an already existing potency. That's what change and the result of change are, fulfillments of potencies. That's what they exist as. A potency's fulfillment is caused, caused by something other than itself, the form. The form does not just connect externally to the thing. Just as in substantial change, the matter now **is** a substance, the body now **is** warm or red. Yes, it **has** warmness or redness, but having these forms is not like being physically contiguous to them or externally attached to them. These forms exist as fulfillments of capacities in the substance; otherwise, warmness and redness are being conceived of as little substances. Warmness and redness only exist as something **of** a substance. They cause something that was not red or warm to **be** red or warm. They cause a way of being for the substance.

To think that the new state as just **happening** to the substance is to think of the new state or the change as already existing someplace and coming to newly reside in the substance.

Redness is not identical with the substance's being red.

Or take the substance plus redness as a two-part composite. But unlike an ordinary composite, they are not 2 things potentially combined. the relation is that one is the potency, the other the fulfillment of the potency. So it is not just a matter of the substance having redness, as if redness were not a cause relative to substance.

But this causality is circular unless there is an efficient cause.

And if redness plus the substance were just a composite, they would be two substances that previously had the **potency** for the **relation** of being joined, and being-joined would be an accidental form fulfilling their potency.

11-13-89

Trinity

What does Aquinas mean by "logically identical" when he says that transitivity applies only when things are both really and logically identical. He can only mean that transitivity applies only when things are not logically distinct of necessity -- only when there is not an irreducible logical distinction. Note, however, that the irreducible distinction is "only" logical, i.e., the Father **is** really identical with God. But because the Father is irreducibly logically distinct from God, something else can be identical with God also.

What does this all mean? The foundation of the Father's logical distinction from God, the Father's relatedness, requires another relatedness that founds another logical distinction. Each of these relatednesses is only logically distinct from God, but they are logically distinct in a way that posits or constitutes or requires an irreducible....

Or, the basis of the logical distinction between the Father and God is not like the relation of identity, a mere logical relation, that permits transitivity. The basis of the logical distinction between the Father and God is a relatedness that is both a real, not logical, relatedness **and** really identical with God. When you have that kind of foundation for the logical distinction, you have a condition beyond what you have when you just have a logical distinction (e.g., identity) but you have less than what you have when the foundation for the logical distinction is a real distinction. Because the foundation is not in some real distinction, you can not only say X is God, but the foundation for the distinction between X and God is God, is what God is.

The last 2 sentences look big!

11-14-89

Epistemological Fallacy

Why don't modern philosophers focus on change as the Greeks did? Because consciousness is not a state of change; it is an action contradistinguished from change. Consciousness is immanent action; change is transitive action. And modern philosophers are focussed on consciousness. Consciousness comes into existence through change, as any thing else does. But consciousness is itself the contrary opposite of change in the "genus" of action.

12-1-89

Definition of a Person

A person is an entity that not only has being but can share being with others. But any cause shares being. A person has a world, a universe that is the whole of being. A person can share the world, the universe, the whole of being with others. Other whats? Other entities? Not just any other entity, but entities that can also share the world. So the definition so far is redundant.

Because a person has a universe, a world, it follows that a person can also share that universe if there are other persons capable of receiving what the first shares.

The conclusion I want to get to is that the individual is defined in opposition to the community, but the person is not. Community follows from the definition of a person. So if a society upholds the value of persons, it must uphold the value of the communities, especially the family, that the person is related to be being a person.

12-14-89

Cause and ED - BIG

The contradiction occurs in "A thing is caused and has no cause" or "A thing is cause of itself". If there is an ED problem, it shows up in those formulas, or should show up in those formulas, before their application to change and its subject. "A thing is caused or has a cause": a thing is so related to what is other than itself that without this other being what it is, the thing is not what it is. Change requires its subject to be what it is. But what its subject is is different before the change and during the change. That is what a change does, makes something no longer what it was before.

Change requires another thing to be what it is while the change exists, not just before. While a change exists, it is so related to what is other than itself, that without this other thing being what it is, the change would not exist. Before the change, the thing is in a condition that *excludes* the existence of the change, that is incompatible with the existence of the change. For the thing is only potentially changing. That thing other than the change without which the change does not exist, is not something with which the change does not exist, is not something with whose existence the change does not exist (be*cause* of whose existence the change does not exist).

The thing other than the change without which the change does not exist is the subject as it exists when the change exists. But this subject is made to be what it is by the existence of the change. The change is something without which the subject would not be what it is then. For the change actualizes a potency of the subject. The change and the subject do not just form a composite of discrete elements juxtaposed to one another. By being united to the subject, the change fulfills a potency of the subject, makes

the subject be in a way it was not before, makes the subject exist in a way it did not exist before. So the change causes the subject to be what it is so that the subject can be that without which the change does not exist.

If the change just occurs, it comes *from* nowhere; it comes *out of* nothing. It is *from*, but from nowhere; it is *out of* but out of nowhere. If is from or out of because the being of the change is that of an actualization of a preexisting potency. The change has its existence as a relation to a potency; it has its existence as a fulfilling of a potency. It has its existence as a *replacement*, a substitute for, an alternative to, a state of nonbeing. And this not just as mere succession of unrelated things. Change is a replacement or substitute *relative* to that which it replaces, since it is a fulfillment of the preexisting potency. So change is from or out of that which it replaces. But since that which it replaces is only potential, and since what is in potency only does not exist, change comes from out of nothing.

If, in addition to being potential, the preexisting thing is also actual in ways that provide something for the change to come from, then the principle of efficient causality is satisfied. The thing is in potency is some way but in act in another way such that by one part of itself it causes a change in another part. But these must be existentially distinct parts. If not, again, something is cause of itself, i.e., is cause and effect in the same respect. Or something is only potentially X and is actually X by the same feature of its reality being what it is. By being F it is only potentially X, but by being F it is also actually F. That is, by being F, it is a potentiality for X, but by being F, it is not only a potentiality for X, because it is actually X, since it cannot be F without also being X.

12-14-89-2

Cause and ED

A change is not a mere replacement or substitution. Nor is it a mere *addition* to what already exists. If so, it would not be a change but creation "out of nothing", which here means "not *out of* anything preexisting." But could an opponenet claim this, i.e., that there is no change as I describe it, only creation? Then we have the existence of something that can be or not be. That is, the existence of something whose nonexistence does not require what it is to not be what it is, does not require what it is to be what it is and not be what it is. Can what it is be identical, when it exists, with its existence? When it exists, what it is is an existence. But what it is, an act of existing, can not exist. Then it would cease being an act of existing or, to begin with, would become an act of existing. But here "become" and "cease being" not imply that it was something else before or became something else after.

We know that God does not just happen to exist because we know that, if He could be and not be, He would be caused. Since He cannot be caused, He cannot exist contingently, cannot be or not be. So whatever can be or can not be must be caused. Why?

Maybe another angle. If something is a pure existence, it cannot have an

efficient cause. Why? It's efficient cause must be a pure existence; otherwise, it, the efficient cause, would have a cause, ad infinitum. We must stop at a pure existence. Could anything else be a pure existence? The other existent must be distinguished from the first somehow. A cause causes its like, so the first cause communicates existence, but must communicate it to something. If there can be only one pure existence, everything else is composite and has an efficient cause. God is therefore the uncaused cause.

If something is a pure existence, it has no potentiality. Why? Existence is the act of all acts. If existence is all you have, all you have is act. Then you would have no change. So the universe is not identical with its existence. The features that make the universe what it is do not constitute the act by which the universe exists, the act that is the existence of the universe. Hence the universe is caused.

All we know is that God exists necessarily, *if He exists.* If a pure existence exists, or if a first cause exists, He exists necessarily. Why? Because if he existed contingently, He would need a cause. The first cause is a pure act of existence, if He exists. The objection supposes that a contingent being is a pure act of existing if and when it exists. Can we ask why the contingent being exists rather than not exists? Can we not ask why the contingent being exists *now* rather than does not exist now? Even if the contingent being exists eternally, we can ask why it exists now, since, by hypothesis, when the present exists, eternity coexists with it.

If the contingent thing is other than its existence, there is a potentiality for not existing, i.e., there is something that is capable of losing its existence. So here "Capable of not existing" means capable of losing an act of existence, capable of ceasing to have an act of existence. Otherwise, it means "capable of no longer being an act of existence," where this does not imply being something else instead. But the latter capacity is now a *logical* possibility only; for the possibility no longer corresponds to a reality functioning as a component cause of existence. It is logically possible for an existence not to exist, *so far as we know*, just as it is logically possible for God not to exist, so far as we know, if we only know that He exists necessarily if He has existence.

Can it at one time be true that a thing is a pure existence and another time be true that the thing no longer exists? That is, can the previous sentence be true without there being a *change* in which something survives? The truth of the sentence has changed without there being a change in reality? The truth of the sentence, which remains in existence, changes because reality now differs from before as a result of something other than a change; one state of reality has been replaced by another. The new state of reality causes the truth of the sentence to change, without there being a change to account for the difference in reality.

Still, if something new is created or something old ceases to be, is there not a change relative to everything else.

Why does X exist *now*? But *now* is an extrinsic denomination. Yes, but it is used to objectify a real state of affairs.

12-14-89-3

Cause and ED

The fact that "Existence exists" is not a self-evident truth is irrelevant to the question of whether a pure existence could be contingent, so that a contingent being would not need a cause. For a truth can still be necessary even if not self-evident. What needs to be self-evident is only a hypothetical proposition of the form "If a being is an act of existing, then ..."

In fact, a contingent being that is other than its existence has potentiality for non-existence. A being that is a pure existence has no potency for nonexistence in itself. The proposition "A exists" appears to be potentially true or false; hence we think A potentially exists or does not exist. But the appearance that "A exists" is potentially false may result solely from a limitation of our knowledge. In fact, it may be necessarily true, even though we do not or cannot know this.

So the question "Can A exist or not exist" may mean two things. It may mean, "Does A have a potency for nonexistence in itself (is its essence distinct from its existence)?" or "Does a being that is a pure act of existing have a potency for nonexistence in itself?" The answer must be no. But the question can also mean, "Is it possible for the statement 'A, a being that is a pure act of existing, exists' to be true or false. As far as we know, it can be true or false, but in itself it may be impossible for it to be false.

Or "If a being that is a pure act of existence exists, is it possible for the statement 'That being does not exist' to be true?" No, for in itself, that being has no potency for nonexistence. The conclusion: a contingent being (a substance), is distinct from its existence and so needs an efficient cause.

What if there is only one substance? If its essence is an act of existing, it can have no potency. The act of existing cannot be in potency to anything else. If there is only one substance, that substance does not change accidentally, nor does it even have any accidents. Therefore, the universe is not identical with its existence.

The denial that a contingent being needs a cause is a result of an epistemological fallacy. We (1) focus on the question of whether a statement, "A exists," can be true or false, and we (2) answer in terms of our knowledge of whether "A exists" is necessarily true or not. A double epistemological fallacy.

12-15-89

Ontological Analysis - BIG - Short Book

A way to show that there is such a thing as ontological analysis as a distinct means of objectifying things and to show what its nature consists in, that is, how it differs from empirical analysis.

As soon as a metaphysician introduces concepts like, substance and accident, essence, cause, necessity and contingency, potency and act, he is accused of taking "exists" for a predicate. When a scientist or mathematician defines her terms, she is not accused of taking exists as a predicate. Clearly, metaphysical concepts use the concept of existence in ways that nonmetaphysical concepts do not. This way of using existence is what I mean by ontological analysis. The opponent says ontological analysis is a fallacy, a fallacy based on using "exists" as a predicate. I say ontological analysis, the practice of ontological analysis, is what is needed to solve problems the opponent cannot solve.

But why should metaphysical definitions be any different from others if existence is logically included in all concepts? The fact that existence is logically included in all concepts means that we ordinarily do **not** make reference to it in defining a concept. Reference to it would be superfluous.

But more: the fact that existence is logically included in all concepts means that other concepts involve only a logical relation to existence. Metaphysical definitions express a relation to existence (material or transcendental relation) that is more-than-logical. I would have to call it ontological, but I would be using "ontological" in a more general sense; otherwise, my explanation of ontological analysis would be circular.

Also, the logical inclusion of existence in other concepts is a particular kind of logical inclusion. The logical relation of all concepts to existence is just their ability to be used in judgments of existence, just the fact that they so objectify things as to be able to be used in judgments of whether something exists or not. So the logical inclusion of existence in other concepts is a concepts relation of possibly having whatever it is that is objectified by judgment, and before we make a judgment we cannot objectify what this is, i.e., existence. The relation to existence is always there, but we cannot objectify it until we make a judgment and objectify existence.

The logical relation of a nonontological concept to the elements of its definition are of another kind, for instance, the logical inclusion of the elements of a genus-difference definition in the concept of the species. The latter kinds of logical inclusion are not a relation to the object of a distinct act of knowledge, the judgment. Because the logical inclusion of existence in other concepts is their relation to the object of a certain kind of knowledge act, it can appear that the meaning of "exists" is simply that of an object of a certain kind of knowledge act, that is, it can appear that what "exists" expresses is an epistemological or logical value, or even that to exist is to be known. And it can appear invalid to put "exists" in a definition the way we put other concepts in

definitions, i.e., it can appear that "exists" is not a predicate.

So be it. It remains that some of us will work out the *consistent* logical implications of a view of existence which does not idealize it. We want to know what follows from the view that to be is not to be known, not a logical or epistemological value.

Animal suffering/SEX/Suicide - BIG

1-3-90

An animal's reason for existence is to serve man. An animal's greatest fulfillment is to serve man, to be used for the betterment of man. But this means to serve man's *needs* or to serve his *legitimate* interests, his *true* ends.

An animal also possesses a certain degree of intrinsic perfection as a being. It is a reflection of God in itself, even if it would not exist if it did not serve a higher purpose than its own reflection of God, i.e., the purpose of man's reflection of God. Still, in evaluating an animal, we must evaluate its intrinsic perfection. But evaluate that perfection in relation to what ends? In relation to the ends of man. But the most important end of man as a rational animal is the contemplation of being, the valuing of the intrinsic perfection of things as an intrinsic perfection.

We cannot contemplate what an immanent action like animal consciousness is without recognizing that unnecessary animal suffering is a violation of, a privation of, the intrinsic perfection of things. Hence we should not will suffering as such and should permit it only for a legitimate human end.

The point is that the rational appetite evaluates the intrinsic perfection of animals relative to man's ends other than the ends of the rational appetite itself. But those ends include man's end as a contemplator of being and a valuer of that which he contemplates, a valuer of the intrinsic perfection that he can contemplate in things. Speculative knowledge precedes practical and defines the practical, i.e., defines the end of man.

So the rational appetite evaluates things by making them ends or means. Thus it either evaluates something as an end or relates it to another thing that is an end. So the rational appetite relates things to the (other?) ends of man. Isn't pleasure an end to which I am oriented by being what I am prior to choice. Yes, but procreation is also an end to which I am oriented prior to choice by being what I am. So I can choose the end of pleasure as long as it doesn't interfere with the end of procreation. But why can't it interfere. Aren't I *always*, in every choice, selecting between ends to which I have an inclination prior to choice?

But procreation is the primary end to which I am related by what my sexuality is prior to choice. If I choose pleasure over procreation, procreation is not my personal primary end, but it remains the primary end of what I am as a sexual being. But why does that fact constitute a misvaluation of anything? I am evaluating procreation as if it were not the primary end of my sexuality; in my evaluations, it is not what it is in reality. In my evaluations, in my relating things to ends, procreation is not the primary end of my sexuality, of my sexual acts. (It may not be the end of a particular sexual act when I am infertile, but it is certainly the primary end of my sexuality.) In my evaluations, the relation of procreation to my sexuality is not what that relation is in reality.

In choosing suicide, I am relating things to other ends but to ends less than human life itself. I make some other end greater than human life. But what about saving the race by committing suicide? I can risk my life for it but not take my life. In one case I do not fail to treat my life as an end in itself. In the other case, I do. What is the difference? The difference comes in whether my decision is the cause of my life's ending. I cannot will to be the cause of my life's ending. Why?

3-1-90

Cause in SB - BIG

Contrary to Hume, we dwell in a world saturated with ontological, not logical, causality. The child experiences the environment acting on her before she leaves the womb. Outside the womb, she knows that her pleasure was caused by seeing the light or color, tasting the food, being held and played with. She knows that her actions cause changes. She manifestly does not wait until years of experience have shown her that certain events obey universal laws to think that those events have causes. Nor does she think that the vast majority of events which display no apparent regularity are uncaused.

Furthermore, we know that all changes have a relation of dependence on their material cause, and we know that some changes also have a relation of dependence on an efficient cause, ourself or our inner states. Can some changes only have one such relation of dependence and not the other? (Have a footnote listing other *possible* ways of arguing that a change must have an efficient cause.)

Change and the result of the change can be described in a variety of ways. But whatever the description, we cannot eliminate a mutual causality between the form and matter. Form needs the matter. And the form is not just juxtaposed to the matter to make a collective whole. Form is an actualization of the matter, causes an actualization of the matter. The union with form makes the matter itself to be different; that is what change is.

But maybe all change is a change in external spatial relations, which are really beings of reason. Every change is in fact a change in causal relations. If I move to another part of the universe, I exert a causal influence at the spot that I did not exert before. My electro-magnetic and gravitational fields modify the fields at that spot. Sure an equivalent modification might have been achieved in other ways. So, what; dissimilar causes can have similar effects. But they still have effects, and the nature of the effect is what we are talking about. If the effect has no nature (is a being of reason) similar causes can't have similar effects.

So it is irrelevant that the same effect could be produced by other changes. The fact remains that a change in place is a change in the causal influence that a body exerts. But I don't have to assume the body has a causal influence in order to argue for the existence of causality. Some new reality must result from change, or change would not be change. I can postpone till later saying what that new reality is.

A matter-form union is not just a juxtaposition, not just a compound. The form does something to the matter. To become hot, the matter must acquire a form, but the form is not just placed next to the matter, like to distinct bodies. It dwells in the matter by actualizing the matter so that the matter now is hot as opposed to being potentially hot. But what is the effect of the form other than the matter's being united with the form? The matter's union with the form is not the effect of the form; it

is the effect of the efficient cause. But if there is no efficient cause, the matter's union with the form is the effect of the form. But what is the difference between the form (the existence of the form) and the matter's union with the form? There is also the fact that the matter is no longer potential.

3-6-90

Referring and Truth

No matter how much I intend, I can't make a sentence true. The logical relation of truth does not come to a sentence from my intentions, from what I am trying to do in forming and asserting the sentence. I don't cause a sentence to be true; I perceive that it has the logical relation of truth; I find that the logical relation of truth is a characteristic of the sentence. So truth is still a logical relation since, among other things, it is relation that obtains only in consciousness, perception.

Likewise, I may intend to objectify an existing individual by a name or description (to "refer to" an existing individual). If that is what referring is, namely, something I intend, something I am trying to do with certain language-forms, then the actual existence of anything named or described has nothing to do with whether I am referring or not. The language refers even though nothing exists; for "referring" expresses my intention to objectify, expresses my attempt to do something. The ambiguity comes because we can say "My attempt to refer was not successful," as if I failed to produce an act of referring, instead of producing an act of referring that did not accomplish my intentions for that act. Compare "The operation was not successful"; that is the sense in which referring, in this sense, can be unsuccessful.

Or, "referring" can mean, not acting with the intention of objectifying an existing individual, but succeeding in that intention. If so, the logical relation of reference does not come from my intentions; I could refer accidentally. I find that a name refers; I discover that it has such a relation to a real existent. But that relation is not part of what I do; not a characteristic I put in any of my acts insofar as they come from me.

But much philosophy has traded on that ambiguity. For truth there has to be reference (in the second sense). It does not follow that we have to succeed in referring in the second sense in order to use language for the purpose of objectifying existents (referring in the first sense). So it does not follow that in order to refer we have to be acquainted with the existent we are objectifying, much less that there must actually exist some individual to be the term or our relation of referring.

Either referring is, like truth, in which case it is independent of what I do or try to do; or referring is something I am doing. What I am doing might be trying to objectify a real existent, intending to. If so, referring does not need a real existent to occur. If it needs a real existent, it is not something I do.

Was a previous theory referring (intending to objectify) what my theory refers to? Who cares? The important thing is whether they contradict one another.

<<< IOSG::LIB0: [NOTES\$LIBRARY]CHRISTIAN.NOTE;1 >>>

-< Be ready for The Day >-

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Note 997.22

MY OPINIONS ON DECplus

22 of 29

WORDY::CAHALAN "Jack, TAN Pubs, LKG2-2/T2, 226-5710" 34 lines 8-MAY-1990 20:13

Bob,

Work will have to temporarily interrupt my participation in this discussion,
but....

>What the studies can't show is whether heterosexual marriage is such a
>desirable goal that all other rights become irrelevant. That's a value
>judgment, and you and I have fundamentally different values.

>You also have to show that the harm to
>the other people outweighs the rights of the homosexual. In my opinion it
>does not.

The more basic point is this: after the right to life, the first right of
children is to be brought up in a loving environment by their natural
parents. But that only happens if marriage works, and marriage only works -
as our society demonstrates by default every day - if society makes marriage
a moral commitment. Children have no more rights than adults, but we have
more responsibility toward their rights, because they can't defend their own
rights. We either make monogamous heterosexual marriage the moral norm, or
we ensure that millions of children will be deprived of their most basic
after life. Do I have a logical proof for that? Yes, but it's too long
for a note. Just consider the fact that
children in our free love society today are the most underprivileged minority-
more so than blacks, woman, gays, etc. Why? Because more than 20% will grow
up in single parent homes. And many others will grow up in unhappy homes.

That is why extra-marital sex is anti-social. It makes it less likely that
our children, who cannot defend their own rights, will have the families
they deserve.

Love,

Jack

From: WORDY::CAHALAN "Jack, TAN Pubs, LKG2-2/T2, 226-5710" 14-MAY-1990
12:18:26.86
To: me
CC:
Subj: Notefile CATHOLIC-THEOLOGY Note 408.1

<<< SMURF::USERA:[NOTES]CATHOLIC-THEOLOGY.NOTE;2 >>>
-< Catholic Theology >-

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Note 408.1 Priest Shortage Hits Home 1 of 3
CALL::SWEENEY "Patrick Sweeney in New York" 7 lines 9-MAY-1990 21:03

Actually, around the world vocations are up. They are only down in
North America and some countries of Europe.

I pray for more vocations, but I'll concede as many bishops do that in
contemporary American culture, devoting your life to God contradicts
everything that one is exposed to from birth onward except at Mass on
Sunday.

6-4-90

OG

Start: Defenders of the Church position point to Jesus' freedom respecting his culture's treatment of women. But that does not explain why He only ordained men, what purpose is served by that. Without that explanation, the Church's position will continue to appear arbitrary.

But if my explanation is right, more is at stake than the ordination of women or the Church's failure to make its case. That failure is a sign of a deeper problem. If my explanation is right, the Church's failure to point it out indicates that *both* the critics of the Church's position and Church officials have been conditioned by our culture, have accepted the biases of our culture, to the extent that they both fail to see the fundamental human realities that constitute the basis of the Church's position. The failure to make the case indicates just how much everyone in the Church is subject to the influences of the quite contingent attitudes of a passing culture, the kind of attitudes Christianity is supposed to present an alternative to.

But are different roles really that important? Well do we or do we not now know how fragile marriage is if it doesn't get social support?

Communication and Difficulties/ and Logic - entailment
7-30-90

After talking to Deely about paradoxes associated with conditionals. To avoid paradoxes, we need an Archimedian solution. That is, we need a place to stand; we need a foothold. For example, to talk about "entailment" or "Logically following from," we can't start by offering a definition that supposedly covers all cases. That only gets us into paradoxes. Rather we can say: the following *sometimes* occurs, namely, that logical relations between p and q make it impossible for p to be true and q not to be true. That occurrence is what we have the phrase "logically follows from" in our language for. And such occurrences are what we study in logic. We use another definition of "if...then" as an aid to studying entailment, but entailment is what we are interested in.

Likewise, it sometimes happens that "if P then Q " is used to assert a necessary connection between P and Q , even if each of p and q is false. We don't need to say there is one use for counterfactuals, some Platonic essence of them.

These are examples of places to stand, footholds. The problem is that to find a foothold enabling you to avoid a paradox, you have to dig through 2500 years of manure (paradoxes). And once you find the foothold, you have to stand in the manure (i.e., you have to do the de jure unnecessary work of showing how the paradoxes, which de jure should not exist, can be avoided.)

In other words, you have to find the right place to take a stand, the right place to fight, and not waste time fighting the wrong battles. Once you have a foothold, the trick is to go out from it only as far as you are justified in going *and* that you need to go. The opponent will try to say that to do what you want to do or say what you want to say, you need to go farther out from the foothold than you are justified in going. The problem is that we can accept the opponent's statement of the problem and try to show that we are justified in going further than we really need to go. Thus, we might try to come up with a criterion for recognizing entailment in all possible cases, or with laws that entailment follows, etc., because we think we need to do this to answer the opponent. The reality is the opposite. The reason for the paradoxes in the eyes of the opponent is precisely that she thinks we need to go out further from the foothold than we really need to go.

Logic - Entailment
7-30-90

The paradox of contradiction entailing anything results from a use of SUBSTITUTION, a use that violates the laws of logic. Substitution is one of the operations essential to the use of formal methods in logic, that is, proving logical truths by using formal languages and abstract formulas on which you operate according to rules, rules which save the truths of logic. If you can't use substitution, you can't get anywhere. But if you can substitute a contradiction, you violate the rules of logic even if you do not violate a rule explicitly formulated for the formal system. This shows a limitation on formal method. There is nothing wrong with it, only it cannot capture all of what logic, that kind of knowledge called "Logic," is.

UPS
7-30-90

Dear Brian,

This will sound strange, but I have mixed emotions about your decision to enter the seminary. What could be more wonderful than a call to share in Jesus's ministerial priesthood? Still, I can't ignore the reality of what the priesthood means today, as opposed to what it is supposed to mean in theory.

I am not the only one who has seen such bad things happen to men between the time they enter the seminary and their ordination. And I am talking about theologically orthodox seminaries, not the intellectually bankrupt heresy emporiums of which there are now so many. A mature adult with his feet on the ground can enter the seminary and come out a person seemingly unable to recognize and understand the pastoral realities around him.

In a nutshell, today's priests do not know what to do to make sacramental graces effective in the lives of the faithful. The sacraments are not bearing their intended fruit, and the ineffectiveness of the sacraments is the central pastoral problem in the orthodox church. Seminaries seem to give priests two methods of making the sacraments effective.

The first method is to celebrate the sacraments as meaningfully and enthusiastically as possible. No one can argue against well celebrated liturgies; we need them. But the twenty-five years since Vatican II should have taught us that they are not the answer. Active lay participation in the liturgy is the result of something much more basic than a priest's attempting to celebrate meaningfully along with exhortating the laity to participate more fully.

One thing wrong with this approach is that it puts the focus of the priest's pastoral work on the act of celebrating the sacraments, the event of exercising his sacramental powers. But if "pastoring" means facilitating and encouraging the *ex opere operantis* effects of sacramental grace, then the focus of priests' pastoral work must be outside the act of celebrating the sacraments. The *ex opere operato* effects of sacramental acts take care of themselves, so pastoral work begins where sacramental acts end.

You might object that participation in the liturgy is the highest act of the Christian, so that pastoral work doesn't just begin where the liturgy ends but has for its goal, its end, the quality of our participation in the liturgy. Certainly, the Sunday liturgy should be the focus of the Christian life of both priests and laity. But the Sunday liturgy is chief among the sacraments whose ineffectiveness needs to be cured. To making the Sunday liturgy and other sacraments meaningful is the problem, not the solution.

That brings us to the second tool in the priest's pastoral kit: preaching that the individual has the responsibility to respond to grace. Nothing could be truer, but the need for each of us to appropriate grace leaves two questions unanswered. First, how do we appropriate grace; what does it mean for me to cooperate with grace?

Concerning the first question, what it means to appropriate grace, the priest usually leaves the seminary with a theology that, while perfectly good as far as it goes, creates a conceptual screen between the priest and what we need to hear first in order to respond to grace. A protestant minister once told me that you can tell when someone went through the seminary by listening to his sermons. How true that is.

For example, about 25 years ago, a lot of priests focussed their energies on preaching about responding to grace by loving. And isn't that what responding to grace means. "God is love. And he who abides in love abides in God and God in Him." A perfectly true statement. But after a few years, it was clear that preaching love didn't produce love (not even in many of those--laypersons included--who were preaching love). And if we understand the basic message of Christianity, we should not have any reason for thinking that preaching about the need to love should produce love.

We can see what's missing if we look at another theological phase some went through.

Second, grace presupposes and works with nature; is it consistent with human nature than all I need to respond to grace is to have someone exhort me to do so?

P&CG

3-8-91

Who has a higher view of human nature, liberals or conservatives? Allegedly, liberals have a naively optimistic view of human nature. For example, they assume that welfare cheats will be few enough to justify welfare for those who are not cheating, while, so the conservative believes, welfare is just another temptation for human nature which will jump at any chance to get something the easy, if dishonest, way.

But conservatives also believe that human nature is such that if people are forced to rely on themselves, forced to fend for themselves, they will learn how to do it successfully, i.e., successful at least to the extent of maintaining subsistence for themselves and their children. Recall when that conservative couldn't believe the report (of another conservative) that people were starving in Latin America. Isn't that a naively high view of human nature? Also, that view justifies the belief that if people don't succeed in maintaining subsistence, it's their own fault; for it isn't human nature's fault, since nature gives us the ability to learn to fend for ourselves.

And does human nature do that? Especially in today's world where we don't need strong backs anymore, we need strong minds, i.e., technically trained people.

Pena - BIG

3-8-91

Somewhere I say that part of the bi-valence problem is explained by the imperfection of human knowledge. Tie this in with what Maritain says about

the different stages undergone by the human intellect, ie. the "magical sign" stage. He talks about this in "Sign and Symbol" and maybe his other sign article; see also "On the Philosophy of History." The point is that the principle of non-contradiction is always true; the nature of the human mind does not change. But the human mind operates under different conditions. Maybe in the "magical" stage the P of NC just isn't relevant (directly) because truth or falsity is not at stake. Maybe some of the magical stage is still left over in our use of language. And maybe other uses of language don't involve truth or falsity in the strict sense because they don't achieve the kind of conceptualization, even vague and imprecise conceptualization, necessary for truth.

And there are poetic uses of language expressing connatural awareness that has not achieved the level of conceptualization. To achieve conceptualization, we would have to have a concept of the affective state that gives us the connatural awareness in the first place. Forming such a concept implies that we are explicitly, not implicitly, reflecting on our previous awareness, because that previous awareness took place, not through a concept, but through an affective, conative, state. We were implicitly non-reflectively aware of ourselves in that previous state, but ipso facto, we were not aware of ourselves by means of a concept of ourselves. For connatural knowledge to take place by means of a concept (McInerney), we would have to have a concept of ourselves, and such a concept comes about only through explicit reflection.

Maritain

3-8-91

Maritain

Be sure to point out that Maritain has implicit, concomitant self-awareness, self-awareness not requiring a distinct act. See your comments on such a text (in a footnote?) in the DK section preceding "Common Sense" section. This may appear to contradict Aquinas, who seems to require a distinct act for the soul to be aware of itself. However, there is at least one text in Aquinas which seems to affirm a concomitant self-awareness without a secondary act. That text is the one Simon quotes at the beginning of his section on truth to show that the knower always has some self-knowledge but not necessarily the kind of self knowledge involved in the grasp of truth.

But if Aquinas does affirm the need for a second act, he is wrong, as the problem raised in that appendix to DK (how do I know that the object of the second act is the same being performing the second act) shows.

Poinsot

3-22-91 AA

Duck-rabbit and other "seeing-as" examples in relation to signs. I just looked at a series of marks I had previously made and saw them as a "W" when I had originally intended them to be the word "IN." This shows that we see the meaning of the sign *in* the sign, just as we see the duck or the rabbit in the drawing.

So Poinsot is correct. The sign does substitute for the signified. We see the signified in the sign. We can do this in 2 ways. We can see the signified in seeing the sign; this is how we see the signified in instrumental signs. Or we see the signified in a sign that is not seen but is that through which we see something else. This is how we see the signified in formal signs, i.e., the signified is "in" the sign in the sense that what the sign is enables it to make the signified present to consciousness. Thus the sign is a presenter of the signified. And as presenter of this signified rather than that, the presenter contains the signified, the signified is in it as the content that the presenter brings with it to consciousness.

Poinsot

3-22-91 AA

It is amazing that Wittgenstein, Kripke, and others have failed to see Wittgenstein's problem of sameness as a reformulation of the problem of universals. Or is it amazing? If you think there is no such thing as universality, or if you define it and think of it *solely* in terms of sets and set membership, maybe it is easy to misidentify the problem, even when it hits you in the face.

Poinsot is at a deeper level than set membership. At that level, he made important contributions. Contributions that solve a problem brought against his master, Aquinas, by contemporary thinkers cited by Patterson and Edwards.

Poinsot made important contributions to the diacritical theory of universals. Concerning the issue of sameness, he says that things are only *similar* outside the mind, but sufficiently similar to be specifically or generically *identical*, identical with reference to a metalogical feature that happens to acquire the logical feature of universality in the mind. In order to be something with respect to which similar things are specifically or generically identical, Poinsot says that before acquiring the relation of being a genus or species, something previously existing outside the mind acquires the negative characteristic of nonrepugnance for being in many. This nonrepugnance is a state of separation from the extramental existence in which it is, or can be, many, ie, in which it is only similar, not identical, to another.

Poinsot

3-22-91 AA

Universals and the repeatability of the same problem. Memory does not enter into the problem of universals. The three things I am seeing now are oranges. But later, the thing I am seeing now, is it the same kind of thing that, as far as I can remember, I called an orange earlier? How prove that? This thing has properties a, b, and c now; and what I called oranges earlier had properties a, b, and c. That relies on memory, but what other possibility is there? Does the public nature of language really help? A, b, and c are publicly observable features, but they are each universals.

Because they are universals, I can confirm now that they are what other people call oranges now. So I can confirm now, the the memory of other people agrees with mine concerning what we called oranges in the past. This is strong CAUSAL evidence that the set of universal features I am now calling "orange" is the same set of universal features I and others called "orange" in the past. Not only is this strong causal evidence; it is the only kind of evidence possible. And not only is it the only kind of evidence possible; it is the only kind of evidence needed.

A necessary condition for this kind of evidence is that language is public, i.e., that a, b, and c are publicly observable. But that does not count at all against the necessity for mental states to explain our ability to use language; for mental states are necessary to explain our awareness of what a, b, and c are (in the universal) and to explain our awareness of their instantiation in present experience (apart from any considerations of memory).

SSR

3-29-91 AA B I G

The factual claim made here can be supported by statistical evidence. But I have not; I have relied on reasoning. Nothing is more undependable than reasoning of this kind. Just look at the reasoning of Marx, Mill, Freud, the social Darwinism guy, population control, etc., etc. Why should my reasoning be taken more seriously than any other?

My reasoning should be taken more seriously than any other. What we must take more seriously than their counterparts are the rights of those who cannot defend their own rights, and who are not only those who cannot their own rights but who are also those we are responsible for because we brought them into existence and gave them their needs. The burden of proof **must** be on the person who would jeopardize their prima facie rights.

The person who says we don't need to worry because there are many ways to satisfy the need of children for care is **balancing** the rights of children against the rights of adults to, say, free speech. He is treating our obligation to the rights of adults as if it were **equal** to our obligation to the rights of children. That is the FIRST mistake.

How Faith Works

3-29-31

A woman justifies the abortion of a child conceived out of wedlock: "otherwise, two lives would be ruined." She ignores the scores of millions of bastards and their mothers living meaningful lives, and she does it in apparent sincerity and innocence. She is self-deceived not just about herself and her inner states and dispositions. She is self-deceived about publically observable facts so obvious that it takes little effort to confirm them.

Julian Simon sights facts almost as obvious about increases in population resulting in increases in the standard of living. These facts are available to all, but in apparent sincerity, august experts go on denying them. Again, they are self-deceived about the most objectively determinable matters.

Our ability to admit facts into our set of beliefs depends on our conative dispositions, our desires, what we want. Yes, at the beginning of consciousness, awareness of facts precedes desire. But at some point in the development of consciousness, our ability to recognize certain facts depends, to a greater or lesser extent, on our wills, on the relationship of those facts to what we will, to our commitments.

So to with recognizing facts like the resurrection and miracles, even though there is evidence to support them.

Maritain

3-29-91

In a sense, there IS a method of projection. We become aware of shape through an analogue of the shape being physically imposed on our sense organs. Shape is very important for discriminating other things by means of the senses, e.g., motion. Relative size is also sensed by an analogue method.

But what allows our intellect to do more than tie together sensible qualities by means of logical relations (instrumentalism) is that in addition to the sensible qualities, we can recognize the existence of the sensed object and form the notion of being. And what enables us to recognize existence is the implicit reflection on our own acts that takes place in judgment. For it is through judgement that we get the idea of existence, and the implicit reflection is necessary for judgement. More, the implicit reflection is not just necessary for judgment in general; it is necessary for that aspect of judgment which is objectifying existence in a concept. That is, we have to see that the sensed object is more than an "object of consciousness"; and we introduce a word for the preobjective value we are then aware of: existence.

SSR

3-29-91 AA

The meaning of my existence is that of a product of conception, i.e., a product of a relationship between two persons. That relationship can be complete giving of one person to another, in the belief that a person is worth the complete giving of self or commitment of self on the part of another person. If that is the relationship of which my existence is the product, then what is my value? I am also a person who deserves complete respect, commitment, and dedication just by being what I am.

Or the relationship of which I am a product can be one, not of complete giving, but of agreeing to use one another for mutual benefit. Then the meaning of my existence is what I can get from you and what you can get from me. The meaning of my existence is not that of a moral absolute that deserves full commitment.

This is especially true if the meaning of my existence is that of an accidental product of the pursuit of pleasure on the part of others. And that is what my existence becomes if my conception was a mere choice by my parents affecting one of their pursuits of pleasure (as opposed to refraining from that pursuit rather than making the conception of a person an option). The meaning of my existence becomes something desired by my parents for their own purposes, whether convenience, pride, individual fulfillment, etc.

How Faith Works

4-3-91

Follow up to 4-21-88:

The relativist is impressed with how difficult it is for us to know the truth, how limited is the truth once know, etc. Those facts are facts worth being impressed by. But it is also worth being impressed by the *impossibility* of concluding from such facts that we cannot know truth. The *necessity* of the falsehood of that conclusion is also something exciting, something stunning. A Cambridge mathematician was overwhelmed that 319 was a prime number whether we liked it or not. Likewise, whatever our subjective disposition, it necessarily is either true or false that the Statue of Liberty either does or does not have at least one arm raised above her head.

The relativist is so impressed by certain facts that he doesn't want to give up his relativism in the face of other facts. He places an IMPORTANCE on his facts. In other words, he makes a RELIGIOUS commitment to them. And there is nothing wrong with that. We cannot not make religious commitments. So the question is, how do we make good ones and avoid bad ones. The issues is NOT whether or not the commitment goes "beyond" reason. The issues isn't whether it's beyond reason, but simply that it's OTHER than reason. That is, the religious aspect of it is a commitment of WILL, not reason, a volitional commitment to the importance of those facts. So in asking what is a good religious commitment, we are asking what volitional commitments are REASONABLE, are consistent with reason, not contrary to reason, and more than that are indicated and supported by reason.

Given a typical secular university education, for instance, Catholicism is a priori off the list as a potentially reasonable religious commitment. Given a once typical Catholic university education, on the other hand, Catholicism is the reasonable religious commitment.

In neither case is it a matter of absolute proof any more than we have absolute proof that the earth is round. It is a question of what beliefs, which if true would require a religious volitional commitment to their importance, are more reasonable on the evidence.

The fact is that disordered desires, e.g., greed, can blind us to the relation of a factual situation to our true end or ends (think of John Houston movies about greed). That relation is itself a fact, but the disordered desire prevents us from perceiving our true end and hence the relation of the facts to our true end. So disordered desires can blind us to what we need to know to make reasonable judgments concerning religious commitments, ie., judgments about matters which, if true, would require a volitional commitment to their importance.

(Of course, disordered desire, if culpable, must be the result of freely ignoring some other piece of knowledge that we have.)

On the other hand, the person with ordered desires can have *knowledge* that a particular set of facts has a certain relation to his true ends and, thus, knowledge that the other person's judgment about how to pursue his ends is incorrect. "Knowledge" here means knowledge that a particular belief is the only reasonable one in the situation. For his desire results from not ignoring other things he knows.

The most optimistic liberal knows there is *something* WRONG. E.G., "Why can't our leaders see that war doesn't solve anything, when that fact is so obvious?" Something has to be wrong somewhere. Not ignoring the evidence for Jesus requires us to admit that we are part of the something wrong at our deepest level. Not our deepest ontological level; we are something good there, but at our deepest free volitional level, the deepest level of the exercise of our sovereignty over our lives, our personal autonomy, our "Lordship" over our lives, at that level where we exercise mastery, exercise our status as universes unto ourselves, our status as gods. In other words, at that level which is most sacred to ourselves because it alone is the level that is ours, that we do not receive from outside causality. There is something wrong in the most ultimate sense in which there could be something wrong, since beyond that we are necessarily good. There is something wrong in the only sense in which there could be something wrong, since beyond that we are ontologically good.

Not wanting to admit that, we reject the evidence for Jesus. Even if we have disordered desires, we must be able to see the evidence. Otherwise, rejection of Jesus would not be a sin, and otherwise Jesus could not call sinners to Himself by showing them the evidence that makes faith reasonable. But at that point we can freely ignore the evidence in our decisions, not make it the rule that forms our decision.

So whatever the answer to the question, what is the REASONABLE religious commitment, we can freely ignore the evidence for it because the religious aspect comes in the volitional commitment which is free and, hence, need not be ruled by that evidence.

Truth - Referring

4-10-01

Is there a problem about referring? Crosson says we can think we are referring but fail to do so? What can this possibly mean? "The present king of france is bald" The truth of that sentence depends on how it words used, the meanings of its words. It so uses "the", "present," "king," etc that it is not true unless there is something that is now the present king of france. Or what it uses "the present king of france" for is something that, if it existed, would be the present king of france. It uses "the present king of france" for an object and individual, that would be the present king of france if, in addition to being an individual object, it were also a thing. Or it so uses that phrase that, for it to be true, there would have to be something that was the present king of france.

So if I believe that sentence true, I believe there is a present king of france. If that is what "referring" means, then not to succeed in referring means to believe falsely that there is a present king of france.

Does refer mean I *intend* to so use the phrase that it "picks out" an existing individual, "designates" an existing individual? But it already picks out an individual (i.e., if there is "a" king of france, there is only one). So I succeed in *intending* to designate an existing individual. The only failure is the failure to accomplish what I intend. But what can that mean other than that the individual I believe to exist doesn't. To succeed just in intending to designate an existing individual, I must believe such an individual exists. And what more do I need to succeed just in intending? Now to accomplish what I intend, the existence of the individual is required, but that is totally outside of my control, outside of what I am doing or not doing.

Paralogues

4-10-99

See yesterday's handwrittin note about the differenc logically including the sameness. Maybe it's the other way around. Maybe the sameness logically includes the difference. I.e., the sameness in A logically includes the way the sameness exists in A. The way it exists in A, and which differentiates it from B, is included in what we assert when we assert it of A. No it has to be the other way around, as yesterday. When we assert it, e.g., of God, we do not assert yet the way it exists in God; that comes second. And what is logically included has to be at least as general, not less general, than that in which it is included. But the difference is less general.

The bottom line is that just as a universal has the logical properties of nonrepugnance for being in many and of predicability of many, a paralogue, P, has the logical property of being able to SUFFER a restriction or amplification after it is predicated of more than one. It has the logical property of being able to be denied of one and of being predicable of another reduplicatively to express difference. The logical property of being able to express difference. As with univocals, outside the mind there is *only* similarity, not identity. But similarity outside the mind sometimes is sufficient to ground specific and generic identity, sometimes only parageneric identity.

The reason is that the way the paralogue exists constitutes a restriction on what the paralogue is in another instance. The differences between the ways the paralogue exists derive from potencies that are not pure potencies, and so derive from a cause that is other than the cause of the similarities. But in each case, the cause of the similarities is a transcendental relation to a *non-neutral* differentiator. Therefore what the similarity is in a given case is so related to the way it exists in a certain case, that the way it exists cannot be abstracted from as a specific difference can be abstracted from. The paralogue is the way it exists in a particular case. So the paralogue not only has the logical property of predicability, it has the logical property of expressing the way it exists in a certain case, which happens to differ. If a genus could express the way it exists in a certain case, that way would not differ.

Why Thomists Misunderstood Maritain - ABSTRACT - 4-22-91

(A little too long. Shorten the stuff about the relational character of the concept of "object" and emphasize, instead, the reflective character of the knowledge that something is an object.)

In the essay "Critical Realism," Maritain told us that "The problem of thing and object is the nub of the critical problem." Since that time the thing/object distinction has been almost totally ignored, except for the enlightening discussion in Simon's **Introduction to Metaphysics of Knowledge**. Either Maritain and Simon were very mistaken, or we have been missing something very important. This paper will attempt to show the importance of the thing/object distinction by showing that its misunderstanding by many Thomists has resulted in their misunderstanding several other points in Maritain fundamental to the nature of Thomistic philosophy as a mode of knowing.

Maritain tells us that by "thing" and "object" he means the material and formal objects of knowledge, respectively. That statement is true, but does not reveal Maritain's contribution. He asks us to consider what it means to call something an object of knowledge and what conditions are necessary for us recognize an object of knowledge as such. "Object of knowledge" is a relative concept; it describes something as term of a knowledge relation. But if what is first known about something is that it is an object of knowledge, the term of the first knowledge relation is another knowledge relation, since that is what it is to know that something is an object of knowledge. And what is the term of this other knowledge relation? Short of infinite regress, therefore, what is first known must be known as something other than "an object of knowledge."

Recognizing that something is an object, therefore, is a reflective act bearing on a prior act that recognizes something that is more than an object, i.e., recognizes it as a thing. After we reflect, we can call what is first known an extra-objective or metalogical thing, to distinguish what we first know about it from what is known on reflection. But that which is first known and that which is reflectively known as a object are identically the same thing. To be a thing and to be an object are really distinct. But that which is a thing is only logically distinct from that which is an object.

And when a thing is known, predicates accrue to it describing its status as object that are other than the predicates that describe its status as a thing. For example, the same human nature is universal in its status as object of conceptual consciousness and individual in its status as the nature of Socrates. This distinction between what is known to be true of something as a thing and what becomes true of it as an object when it is so known is necessary for understanding what Maritain's description of the object of metaphysics as possible and abstract and as belonging to the "degrees of abstraction.

Gison says metaphysics "is not an abstract science of possible being." But the reasons for saying this, namely, that **esse** is maximally concrete and actual, are truths about **esse** as a "thing" (not as a "res" but as a first-known, metalogical value). When those truths are known, other things become true of **esse** as an object, and these other truths are what Maritain is talking about. For example, "Esse is maximally actual" is a statement about esse as possible. What Maritain means by a statement being about its object "as possible" is that the statement is a necessary truth. Esse becomes

associated with to such things as "statements" and "truth" only as object of knowledge; for statements are instruments of knowledge and truth is a property of statements. Therefore, describing the object of metaphysics as possible describes the object as object, namely, as known by means of statements whose truth as a certain logical characteristic, and does not contradict what those statements say about that object as a thing.

Likewise, the fact that esse is first known by judgment has led some Thomists to deny that metaphysics differs from other sciences by a "degree" of abstraction. But Poincot, from whom Maritain derives the degrees of abstraction, explicitly states that by "abstraction" in this context he does not mean the psychological process by which we know things but a logical property attaching to what is known as a result of its being an object. It is no more contradictory for us to know concrete esse abstractly in this sense than it is to know the natures of individuals by means concepts that are universal. In neither case does what is true of something as an object interfere with what is known about it as a thing.

Relativism and Tolerance

4-23-91

Is relativism really needed to achieve tolerance? If so, how can a relativistic society tolerate those who believe in dogmas and absolute truths? The relativist will reply that he can tolerate them so long as they don't use coercion to impose their views on others. But if it is possible for them to avoid doing so, their position does not necessarily imply intolerance, and so relativism is NOT necessary for tolerance.

If not necessary, is relativism more likely to achieve tolerance? The current P.C. problems in universities shows that relativism need not be more likely. And why care about tolerance, if all values are subjective. Why is a tolerant society better than others?

Why isn't the position most likely to achieve tolerance the position of the religion that teaches we must love our enemies and allow them to kill us rather than return evil to them?

Truth and Beings of Reason

4-23-91

For any BOR, we must be able to state its truth conditions without using BORs, i.e., we must be able to relate the BOR to predicates that are not BORs. Examples of how to do this are "known by A" as related to "A knows" and the explanation of BORs in science in Causal Realism. Also, the explanation of evil as a privation.

Cause - BIG - AA

4-29-91

In the introductory section, before the demonstration of efficient causality.

We know that

1. A thing cannot be the cause of itself.
2. A thing can be a (not the) cause of its existence, if it differs from its existence. In fact, if it differs from its existence, it must be a cause of its existence. To be a cause is to be a cause of existence, and to to something other than the existence without which the thing would not exist.
3. A thing cannot be the sole cause of its existence. If so, the thing would be cause of itself. It causes its existence, and without existence it is nothing. So by being the sole cause of its existence, it is the cause of its being whatever it is.

PCG - BIG

5-6-91

Personal fulfillment and happiness comes from loving something greater than yourself, serving something greater than yourself, for its sake, not your sake. So, enlightened selfishness means searching for something that, when you find it, deserves your commitment for what it is, not for your desire for fulfillment, ie., enlightened selfishness means being willing not to put your desire for happiness first. The selfishness that cannot be enlightened, on the other hand, is a desire for happiness that refuses to acknowledge any greater reason for acting.

If we do server anything greater than ourselves, we have chaos, as we have now. But since we are persons, whatever is greater must have something to do with persons. E.g., we can commit ourselves to the social common good, because it is a common good for persons. Thus, we can sacrifice our lives for the social common good.

But achieving the common good requires restraints, because we are not just persons, we are also material individuals. That is, we need SOCIAL SUPPORT to make our decisions for the common good, e.g., the decision to marry, work. Because we are material individuals, we need that support, e.g., censorship of pornography.

Start

If Edwards were aware of P's influence, she should have referred. And if she were familiar with the more prominent modern Thomists, she would have been aware of P's influence, and also have been referred to P....

It will be helpful to reflect on the factors that may have contributed to the historical approach becoming so dominant. There is no doubt that Aeterni Patris was a stimulant to the historical approach. Quote McCool. But it is doubtful that the authority of Aeterni Patris alone can explain the degree of interest in studying the texts of Aquinas that previously existed. (In particular it cannot explain how the historical approach could so dominate that modern Thomists were neglected.) For one thing (here quote McCool). Aeterni Patris imposed no obligation on Catholic philosophers to be followers of Aquinas, and there were prominent Catholic philosophers aware of Aeterni Patris who were not Thomists.

For another thing, Aeterni Patris had further effect and one that itself can explain the previous degree of interest in studying the texts of Aquinas. In response to AP, thinkers like ... did Thomism philosophically. These men provided a reason for studying Aquinas that Church authority alone did not. They were arguing with persuasion that Aquinas had a great deal to say to us today. They were explicitly inviting their readers to study Aquinas but they were giving their readers a reason for doing so that went beyond Church authority. They were supporting their claim that Aquinas should be studied with persuasive arguments, purportedly based on Aquinas, that claimed to solve modern philosophical problems. Students need a reason for devoting much of their careers to studying Aquinas, and together with AP, the work of these men provided a sufficient reason.

And their work was a stimulus to the textual study of Aquinas in a different way. As thinkers tried to deal with modern problems Thomistically interpretations of Aquinas multiplied. The existence of multiple interpretations supplied another reason for putting more emphasis on studying the texts. If you were already interested in Aquinas, you would have wanted to know what the correct interpretation was. And if you had an interpretation, you had to do textual analysis to justify it as the correct one.

As time went on imbalance...But something was missing necessary for the historical approach itself. If you were already interested in Aquinas, you wanted to know the correct interpretation. But the existence of multiple interpretations would not supply a reason for the historical study of Aquinas if you were not already interested in Thomism for some other reason. Having the correct interpretation would not generate new interest unless there were people around showing philosophically how Aquinas's position solved modern problems. In order for there to be such people, graduate students have to be trained in something in addition to historical method.

However, the question of whether AP alone, and not the existence of Thomists using the philosophical approach, stimulated the interest Aquinas formerly enjoyed is academic for us today. If it was ever the case that Church authority was a sufficient stimulus, it is no longer the case in the post-Vatican II world. Today we have to earn that interest by making Thomism work as a living philosophy. For that, we have to train students to do Thomism philosophically, and for that, they have to study models for doing Thomism philosophically.

SSR - B I G

5-29-91

How to start the "Communist Manifesto" or the "Relationalist Manifesto."

We have produced a world in which relationships do not work; in which relationships are miserable. In which we cannot look forward to successful committed relationships. ("We" in this case are, for the most part, the intellectuals.)

The consequences for ourselves are many and deep. But there are also the consequences for our children.

Intellectuals forgot to include successful personal relationships and the needs of children in their theories. But we now know that successful personal relations need social support. Therefore, we all have the right for society to provide that support, and especially our children have that right. But intellectuals forgot to include our right to that support in their theories.

The rich can distract themselves from the consequences by buying pleasures. The rest of us have to suffer for their lack of support of the family.

PCG

5-29-91

Both liberals and conservatives want their idea of freedom, but freedom for selfishness. Reagan wanted a country where anyone could get rich. Feminists want natural differences between men and women to be ignored except when it comes to their ability to bear children. Then they want the fact that children are in their bodies to permit them to kill the children. So both left and right want freedom for the selfish individual, not for the sake of justice or the common good.

I feel more betrayed by the left than by the right in this. I always knew the right was for selfishness and was unconcerned for the common good. But I grew up thinking the left's call for freedom/big government was for the sake of justice and the common good. I should have known better when so many union members who wanted justice for themselves during the forties and fifties showed they did not want it for blacks during the fifties, sixties, and seventies.

Universals - Poinset - Logic

5-29-91

Does "red" signify the set of red things as opposed to a meaning that each member of the set possesses? Then is it the set of existing red things, and not future red things. If so, then when a new member is added, what makes it a member of this set and not some other? If the answer is that it is the set of all present and future things similar enough for us to consider members of the same class, then they must be similar in a certain respect as opposed to others. For a group of things can be similar in an indefinite number of respects. Here "respect" just means, of course, a feature present in each, e.g. color, size, shape, etc. Or is it the set, not just of present and future red things, but all possible red things. Yes, but what determines the possibility that we would consider things things similar? The opponent would say that the phrase "all possible" rules out all those other respects in which they might be similar. It's all possible things we would consider similar to X. But X is a member of infinite such sets. Again, the opponent presupposes some "respect."

Each objective concept is one objective concept as opposed to others. What individuates it? It derives its individuation, whatever individuation it has, from its corresponding psychological concept, which itself is an accident individuated by its substance.

Ethics - AA - BIG

5-30-91

The traditional Thomist wants to say that an act of the will is defective because the exterior act selected is defective. The act of the will inherits its defect from the defect in the act chosen. But in what sense is the exterior act defective if it is not done knowingly. At most, it is physically defective and maybe not even that. But an otherwise non-defective act acquires a new defect if done knowingly. The act of aiming a gun and shooting at a target may be perfect from a physical point of view. And the shooter may not know that she is shooting at a real person. But the act of choosing to aim and shoot becomes defective if she knows she is shooting at a person. What the rational knowledge does is to engage the end of the rational appetite and the end of the rational appetite's acts.

We can consider the act exterior to the will's act, the act chosen, to encompass the rational knowledge. Then the defective exterior act is shooting at the target in the knowledge that the target is a person. Then it is true that the will's act inherits its defect from the exterior act. (But still what is the defect that precedes the defect in the will? Probably the failure to fulfill the other ends a rational being has prior to the end of the rational appetite. But does that answer really work, given Simon's dialectic of ends and means?) THAT IS PROBABLY WHAT AQUINAS MEANS! RE-READ HIS SECTION ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY WITH THIS IN MIND. But if that is what he means, there are no "morally neutral" exterior acts. And he does say there are no such morally neutral acts. But if we leave out rational knowledge from the description of the exterior act, there are two kinds of descriptions we can give.

Some act-descriptions are such reason can know, from the description alone and without any further description of circumstances, that the act would be defective. But not physically defective in absence of knowledge from the description. Rather, reason sees that the act would be defective if done knowingly. And that raises the above question about what is the defect it possesses prior to the defect in the choice. Maybe none, maybe it's just the fact that we can know universally that all such choices would be defective. Then the perceived defect in the exterior act would be inherited from the recognized defect in the interior act choosing it. Knowingly shooting an innocent person is always wrong because choosing to do so would require evaluating things as if they were other than they are known to be.

Such an act would prevent us from achieving our ultimate end, not because the value of the opposite act derives from being a means to that end. Rather the opposite act is a necessary condition for achieving the ultimate end because the opposite act has an intrinsic perfection, the achievement of the will's immediate end, that is a necessary condition for the union with God that is our ultimate end. Achieving that ultimate end requires that we be in the condition that our acts of will have the value that is due them.

The other kind of description of acts are such that reason cannot know, without further description of circumstances, circumstances with no necessary connection with the rest of the description, that the act would be defective.

This still leaves us with the question of what kind of defect the act including the circumstances would have prior to the defect in the choice. If it can be argued that such an act would have no defect prior to the defect in the will, then neither would the acts described in the first kind of description. For in each case, the description was characterized by whether or not reason could judge the act defective from the description alone; so the defect in each case is of the same kind.

Maybe the defect in the exterior act is something like this: The exterior act should not be described as aiming at the target and pulling the trigger correctly but as killing someone. Now if death is an evil, there is a physical defect in the act prior to the defect in the will. And the defect in the will could be inherited from the defect in the act. But still we have the question why this defect in the exterior act puts a defect in the act of the will. An exterior act can have all sorts of defects that do not make the the will's act defective. Is it that the exterior defect, if known, would go against some end we possess other than the end of the will. So we would be choosing some act that would be contrary to some prior end. And the choice would be defective because the act chosen was contrary to some end other than the end of the will.

But then the reason the exterior act was good or bad would be that it was a means to some end, not good or bad in itself. And morality would be a matter of whether or not I achieve my ends. It is that, but is that its essence?

Also, the act is contrary to some end of the than the end of the will. But does the act deprive me of that end unless it is done knowingly? What end does shooting the person unknowingly deprive me of? And if it deprives me of an end only if done knowingly, what end does it deprive me of if not that of the rational appetite.

Accidental birth control would deprive me of an end, but not in a moral sense. Intentional birth control deprives me of an end as a rational person. But it does so because I have failed to choose correctly.

But think of the compulsive person who consciously, but not freely, does wrong, e.g., kills. That person is in a defective state, not just because his will is compulsively defective, but because he must consciously violate his nature, fail to fulfill the ends of his nature. The ends he fails to fulfill is not that of evaluating others properly; he wants to treat them correctly. But he fails to fulfill the end of performing acts that treat them correctly. The acts he performs knowingly are defective acts. But still the defect may concern the malfunctioning of his will or his powers to carry out his will. The matter of the will's direction is ill-disposed for that direction.

Still we know his exterior behavior is wrong, defective, even before we know whether it is compulsive or not. It is defective for a rational being, but not for an animal, for example. Still, this does not eliminate the rational appetite itself from the defect.

PUL Course

5-30-91

Third class: What not to do.

Why focus on not celebrating the sacraments? If the Church is in a pastoral crisis, those who are making pastoral decisions must not be making the correct decisions. So they must not have been trained to make the correct decisions. What have they been trained to do? What pastoral strategy do we actually use? Answer: rely on the celebration of the sacraments.

Also, contrary to Fr. Martin, I hear it all the time. "Jesus, present in the Eucharist, is our savior, is God, etc. I.E., its the presence of Jesus in the sacraments that we should focus on.

Also, we need to be an environment, but what are we instead of being an environment? A service institution, but what kind of services? Sacramental services.

Also, wherever we have the mass, that becomes our focus, of necessity. So we have to be very discerning about the decision to have optional liturgies. We have to be sure they will not interfere with our MAIN pastoral objectives, which are NOT to get people to more liturgies, but to do what is necessary to improve the QUALITY of the Sunday liturgy.

The third class may also be the place to bring in the issue of Jesus's pastoral methods as opposed to ours and the whole question of whether it's the sacraments that take the place of Jesus's methods. Maybe that should be the focus of the class.

Communalists Manifesto - BIG

5-31-91

Marx could define happiness in terms of alienation in the performance of tasks at a time when personal relationships, which affirm our value as persons, were basically working. Likewise, Mill could define liberty and rights in terms of the individual at a time when the success of communal relationships for the person could be basically taken for granted. But we now know they could only be taken for granted because social support was there.

Ethics - AA - BIG

5-31-91

The concept of a person's having "rights" is an attempt to express what is just, i.e., what is "due" to the person. In some circumstances, we have the "right" to yell "Fire!", in other circumstances we do not have that right. That is, in some circumstances this is just; in some circumstances, permission from us to yell "Fire!" is *due* him, because of what he is and what we are.

But "having a right" is not a having special quality over and above the other qualities making her what she is, i.e., the qualities because of which something is due her from beings with the qualities making us what we are. "Rights" are a being of reason, like "the average man" or "being known by," which serve to sum up the existence of real qualities and the real causal relations of those qualities to certain effects.

The effect in question is the presence or absence of a defect in an act of the rational appetite. In some cases, that effect depends on very few factors. That is, the nature of certain qualities of actions are such that a combination of a very few of them in an action renders the action defective. Such the relation of those qualities of actions to the defectiveness of an act of the will can be expressed in relatively simple formulas. E.g., killing of the innocent is always wrong; use of sexuality outside of marriage is always wrong. These moral laws are comparable to physical laws like the dependence of water's state (gaseous, liquid, or solid) on only two factors, temperature and atmospheric pressure. In other cases, the defectiveness of an action depends on a complex combination of many factors. Such cases are comparable to more complex physical laws, like those of hydrodynamics.

Finally, there are cases comparable to the application of laws, like those of hydrodynamics, to individual circumstances. Such applications are not themselves expressible in general laws, but they do not need to be. Their occurrence does not in anyway contradict or restrict the truth, the causal connection, expressed by the general law.

For example, the law of induction tells us that similar causes have similar effects ALL OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL. In a given case, we recognize that the falsehood of a statement cause the act of choosing to tell it to be defective. But later we see that other factors can enter in that make telling a falsehood the right thing to do in those circumstances. Those other factors are too numerous to express in one law; in fact, there are indefinitely many KINDS of circumstances in which telling a falsehood might be the right thing to do. But in each case, we could express the reason why lying was correct in some law expressing a causal connection with the effect of defectiveness in the will. For example, saving a life is more important than telling a truth. That is, not saving the life by lying would cause a defect in the act of the will.

But that law is also accompanied by a *ceteris paribus* clause. Saving the life might not be the only thing at stake. For instance, saving the life might require one to lie about being a Christian. Or the lie could potentially lead to other lives being lost. Etc.

Knowledge that a lie is wrong in this case is knowledge that moves from cause to effect, from the absence truth to the absence of the end of the rational appetite in the choice. We know that falsehood produces this effect unless impeded from doing so by other causes, or unless other causes make up for what the absence of truth removes from the act of choice. This is sort of the reverse of recognizing that an electric current causes a magnetic field. It is the reverse because in the latter example, we move from effect, the compass's needle moving, to the cause, the electric current. But the cases are similar in that both are premised on the awareness of the absence of any other cause that could alter the effect, in the case of lying, or be the cause of the effect, in the case of the needle.

BIG - BIG -BIG

There are cases where a defect in the choice derives from a defect in the exterior act. Often injustices happen BY ACCIDENT, i.e., without being chosen. E.g., someone is given a prize or promotion, etc., unjustly but through honest mistakes. In such cases, we still call the exterior act "unjust." But equally important, these examples illustrate that the question of whether the defect in the interior act can derive from a defect in the exterior act is NOT the same as whether we can formulate a universal law saying that all exterior acts of this kind necessarily cause a defect in the will.

The examples given, e.g., someone being rewarded unjustly, are INDIVIDUAL cases. In them, we see an injustice preceding the injustice of the choice. Now we can formulate some sort of universal law, as we can in the case of lying. E.g., it is unjust to let a man die rather than lie to save his life. But from what we have said above, any such law will have a **ceteris paribus** clause. In every individual case, we will need to know that no other mitigating factors are present, and we cannot list those mitigating factors exhaustively. So the exclusion of lying is not like the law against murder or fornication, where we can see that no other factors are relevant to the defectiveness of the act, because of the causal connection we see between the factors named and the end of the rational appetite. Yet the non-universal injustice of a given exterior act can cause a defect in the interior act. So the question of whether exterior acts can cause defects in interior is not the same as the question of whether we can sometimes formulate a universal law saying that a certain kind of described exterior act will always cause a defect in the interior act.

And the converse is also true, the laws saying that the choice of a certain kind of act is always defective do not necessarily derive the defect in the interior act from a prior defect in the exterior act. The exterior act can have a positive character that only implies a defect in its relation to the ends of the rational appetite.

But this also implies that we use "injustice" to refer to more than acts of the will. Yes, but such injustices are not **MORAL** injustices.

HU - AA

5-31-99

This man Jesus has the SAME relation to the Father that the Son of God has; Jesus is IN the same relation to the Father that the Son has. Now the Son's relation is not really distinct from the divine nature. So this man Jesus also has the divine nature. But it is not the fact that the Son's nature verifies the notion of "nature" that enables Jesus to have the same relation to the Father that the Son has. It is the fact that the Son's relation to the Father verifies the notion of "relation." Or, it is the fact that the Son's relation verifies the notion of "subsistence." But it verifies the notion of subsistence because it is a relation. For it is by being a relation of filiation that the Son terminates the Father's relation of Fatherhood.

If I am right, then subsistence takes the place of physical pre-motion. Both are supposedly something over and above bare creation, something over and above bare creation needed to explain the fact that creatures act. But subsistence is at a deeper level.

When a body is in motion, it is "acting" on its environment, i.e., its environment is undergoing changes because the body in motion is what it is. Subsistence is like the motion, only at the level of substance. Like the motion, it is something over and above the thing's existence and essence which enables the thing to produce effects; only this time the effects are within the thing, its necessary accidents, not outside the thing, as in the case of motion.

Being as first known, as logically included, as goal of intellect, etc.

And: To "exist" does not mean a concept has an application.

6-6-91

Another possible argument that being is first known, is logically included in all other concepts, and is teleonomic cause of conceptual knowledge: Quine's canonical notation shows that we can do away with names for individuals. Perhaps the success of that notation shows, by implication, that we cannot do away with existential quantification.

The fundamental character of existential quantification, and hence of existence as an object of knowledge, also follows from the Thomistic answer to Frege's point reported by Geach (where? In "Form and Existence"?): We can say "there is a . . ." followed by a universal concept. We cannot say "There is Fred." But we can say "An F exists" and "Fred exists". So the conclusion seems to be that "There is a . . ." functions somewhat differently from "exists." But the Thomist would say that what first falls under the apprehension of the intellect is the universal ("F"), not the singular ("Fred"). "There is a . . ." is used to assert existence of something falling under the nature that is grasped in a universal mode by a concept. The reason we can't say "There is Fred" is that to get to the intellectual objectification of a singular, Fred, we have to have already passed through the area where "There is a . . ." functions, namely, the grasp of something in a universal mode. That is, to get to the grasp of something in a singular mode, the prior grasp of something in a universal mode has to be presupposed. That presupposed grasp is where "There is a . . ." functions.

Ontological Analysis - BIG

6-6-91

Everything that is not existence itself is a transcendental relation to existence. So why is not every definition an ontological definition, since every definition will be constructed of elements that are transcendental relations to existence? Since they are relations to existence, existence is logically included in their concepts. So why are definitions constructed from their concepts not ontological, ie. definitions of the defined as functions of (transcendental relations to) existence).

Existence is logically included in every concept, but the relation to existence included in every concept is the SAME. I.e., red and green are different relations to existence, but the way in which existence is logically included in the concept of each is the same. I.e., each of them are instances of that which exists, and the information about how each relates to existence that is logically contained in their concepts is the same information: that each is a possible way of existing. How they differ as possible ways of existing, as possible relations to existence, is not expressed by the way concepts being is logically included in their concepts.

Ontological definitions, on the other hand, are ontological because they use DIFFERENT relations to existence to construct the definition, relations to existence that differentiate the defined from one another.

Infanticide - AA

6-6-91

Abortion treats the embryo as an intruder, like a parasite, bacterium, or virus. But not being a virus, etc., what is it? A human organism. An organism distinguished from other organisms by being a set of causal dispositions oriented to the production of human ends, the accomplishments for which we value members of the human species. And oriented to the productions of ends whose existence is not not something distinct from the existence of the organism producing them, but ends whose existence is in the organism producing them, since they exist as features of the organism producing them. The zygote is a set of causal dispositions oriented to the causing of effects that will be features of the organism causing them, therefore, features of the causal system that the zygote IS.

This causal system is a **temporally** existing and, therefore, **continuously** existing set of causal dispositions. And the zygote's existence belongs to that continuum. In fact the zygote's existence is essential to the existence of that continuum, since it is the necessary first stage of that continuum. The existence of the set of causal dispositions is continuous because (a) the effects it produces include continuously existing changes which require (b) a subject of the change which continues in existence for a period of time. But this subject of the change is not external to the causal system the way the nail is external to the hammer. Why not? Or why not consider the nail and hammer one System?

In the zygote, the DNA breaks up, and so is matter for the change. But the DNA is also an agent of the change, since its FORM, the genetic code, determines how the change takes place and what result it produces. Also, all the changes take place within the one membrane. And the membrane is essential to the causal system, where being "essential" is measured by its relation to the final end produced. The final end requires these processes taking place between elements that remain enclosed in this membrane. The agents must be elements enclosed in the membrane, and the patients must be enclosed in the membrane. And both must remain enclosed in the membrane throughout. And among the things enclosed in the membrane, some that are agents for certain processes are patients for others, and vice versa.

Also the patient must at all times have causal dispositions actively orienting it to the ultimate result.

Back to the intruding human organism, if we kill it, what value are we placing on human life. If we kill it, we are placing a value on human life, i.e., on an organism with a set of causal disposition for the production of human accomplishments that remain in the organism.

Can we say we will start valuing the organism as human only after it has achieved **some** of the accomplishments for which we value human life? But as Simon shows in the Review of Politics article, unless we are dealing with an absolute ultimate end that is in no respect a means to something else, all prior accomplishments are valued, ultimately, for their relation to a further

end. So if we select anything short of that end as the basis for valuing a human being, we are being arbitrary.

Universals - Poinset - AA

6-6-91

We start with the recognition that something human is identical with something white in this individual case, i.e., an individual human is identical with an individual white thing. We work back from there to the recognition that what is first known by the intellect is something universal. Recognizing the identity of an individual human and an individual white thing requires recognizing a relation between the objective concept "something human" and this individual and between the objective concept "something white" and this individual. What is the relation we recognize between "something human" and this individual? "Something human" is what this individual is objectified in part, ie. objectified in a manner that does not express all that this individual is but also DOES NOT EXCLUDE this individual's being more than what is expressed in this objective concept. "Humanity" and "whiteness" express features this individual has which exclude other features in the sense that humanity is not whiteness but "something human" can be "something white."

To answer the question, "What is the relation between 'something human' and this individual?" contrast that relation to the relation between "humanity" and this individual. The reason we cannot predicate humanity directly of the individual is that its being humanity would exclude predicating whiteness directly of it. So in predicating "something human" or "something white" directly, we are implying an identity, where "implying" means an identity is required for the truth of the predication. This does not mean that the "is" of predication is the same as the "is" of identity. Only that the relation I am here calling identity is required. That relation is a lack of a real distinction between what a given individual is and what the objective concept "something human" is.

Ethics - AA - BIG

6-11-91

We can commit injustices toward ourselves. Our decisions can be defective not just because of their *relation* to what something else is but to what we are.

Maybe this is the way to start: Our beliefs are true or false because of their RELATION to what things are. That relation may be hard to define, so what else is new in philosophy. The fact that it is hard to define does not prevent us from knowing that what things are determines truth or falsity because of the way in which truth and falsity are related to what things are.

Likewise, what things are determines the success or defectiveness of our decisions because of the way the goal of our decision-making ability is related to what things are. So just as we can say a false belief would be true, IF THINGS WERE NOT WHAT THEY ARE, so we can say that for a bad decision to be good, THINGS WOULD HAVE TO NOT BE WHAT THEY ARE. Therefore, a bad decision treats things, relates to things, as if they were not what they are, while what makes a decision good is that it fulfills the goal of decisions which is to relate to things as if they are what they really are.

Furthermore, the goal of decisions is to relate to things is to relate to what things are KNOW TO BE BY REASON, since we are not culpable if the defect in a decision results from bad information.

Aside: a kind of evil not accounted for in the earlier discussion of moral evil deriving from evil in the act chosen. To *deliberately* take a human life on the basis of misinformation, i.e., deliberately but inculpably, is a great physical evil, though not a moral evil.

Back to main thought: So we can express what makes decisions good or evil by saying that they have the end of evaluating things to be what they are. We can express it this way because (1) decisions have the end of evaluating things; that is what decisions do, or better, what they are, and (2) they have the end of relating to the evaluated things as if they really are what they are as known by reason, the end of so relating to the evaluated things and acts that the the decision succeeds or fails depending on what things are as known by reason.

Now back to the VERY first point. My decision can be defective as an injustice to WHAT I AM, i.e., as treating me as if I was not what I am. There can be non-moral injustices in external acts. For instance, if I have a low self-image, I may rate myself to low on a questionnaire, or may fail to strive for some achievable goal, etc. There can be moral injustices in acts of decision. For instance, I can choose to become the agent cause of my own death.

For the will to choose its own death is to choose to cease seeking ends. So unless death itself is the goal to which we are related by nature, the will is violating its own finality by deciding not to continue seeking its ends! The decision implicitly evaluates itself not to have an end of seeking ends of other faculties, ends other than death.

Poinsot - Universals - BIG - AA

6-11-91

The reflective analysis starts with the identity between this human thing and this white thing. But that identity cannot hold unless there is identity between one of the things describable by "something human" and one of the things describable by "something white." That latter, however, is a reflective description, an object-description. Prior to it we can say: but the first identity cannot hold unless there is identity between something white (one thing that is white) and something human (one thing that is human). But the last two descriptions are universals. "One thing . . ." is a universal concept and is equivalent to "something human" or "something white."

PUL Course

6-18-91

The problem isn't the mass; it's adding things to God's agenda that interfere with it. It's trying to have our cake and eat it too. There are other examples.

Many of our most gifted leaders left to start a parish group in Chelmsford. They failed miserably. Why did they do that even though they had been warned not to?

The ballet at the penitential service.

The half-hour pastoral team installation at the evangelistic prayer meeting.

Using the Cursillo for social action or other goals.

Using Vatican II as an excuse to emphasize social action or whatever.

If it hadn't been the liturgy, it would have been something else: the rosary, the stations of the cross, music, scripture studies, etc.

Also, Martin's claim that my examples don't represent a true sample:

What about the randomly selected group at Chelmsford, with super leaders, who didn't want to have a meeting if they couldn't have a mass that night.

PUL - AA

6-21-91

Dan O'Connell says drawing them to the Eucharist will draw them to an awareness of Christ dwelling in their souls. No, John 14 says it is the Spirit who makes us aware of the indwelling of God. Baptism and Confirmation, not the Eucharist, are the sacraments that bring about the indwelling of God and our awareness of it. But how make baptism and confirmation effective? In practice, it is the presence Christ's charismatic powers, gifts, in other Christians, not in the Eucharist, that makes the sacramental grace of awareness of God's presence effective. That is, is through the teaching, prophesying, etc. of the members of Christ's body that we are brought to experience the graces of those sacraments. It is Christ present in the members of His body who does this, not Christ present in the Eucharist.

SSR - AA

6-24-91

After talking to Owen O'Neil about giving an SSR talk for "Valuing Differences". Why does making free love socially acceptable weaken marriage for those who choose marriage, whether or not they engaged in pre-marital sex?

Two separate (?) points: 1)they know that if they choose not to make the sacrifices necessary for marriage to work, they can still satisfy their sexual desires in socially acceptable ways. 2)they are constantly challenged by the allure of the other lifestyle as offering advantages marriage does not offer. They are constantly challenged, e.g., by the allure of freedom from commitment.

Also, they lack the psychological support of knowing that all the socially acceptable members of the society are working making sacrifices to keep the same commitment.

Zygote and Ethics - BIG - AA

6-26-91

There are two possibilities. One is that moral standards are completely arbitrary. That is, they are based on the prior selection of ends, which selection has no standards intrinsically pertaining to it or prior to it so that the selection can be defective or not. The other is that our decision-making faculties are related to an end or ends like the eye is related to seeing, such that if that end is not achieved, our decisions are bad.

For example, belief is a conscious state that involves a relation to an end, the end of truth. For a belief evaluates a proposition as having achieved the end of truth. If a belief is incorrect, that conscious state is defective by its own standard, by the standard which it consciously aims at. But belief is not a state or act that our cognitive faculties can avoid, given the nature of our cognitive faculties. We cannot avoid believing, for example, that the sun is shining out or not right now.

Likewise decisions based on what we believe are conscious states or acts we cannot avoid. And it may be that, given the nature of our decision-making faculties, decisions cannot avoid being so related to some end or ends that they are defective or successful by their own standard. For example, some would say that we cannot avoid having the end of choosing the greatest good for the greatest number, or the end of evaluating things to be what they are, etc.

But whatever such end or ends might be that make decisions intrinsically defective or successful and objectively defective or successful (where "objective" means based on what decisions are, not what the beholder would like them to be), the zygote is an agency oriented to the accomplishment of the same ends. So if there are any objective, nonarbitrary moral standard whatsoever, it is just as wrong to kill a zygote as an adult. And if there are no such standards, it is just as allowable to kill an adult as a zygote, since neither makes any difference anyway.

Concerning the person who says the end is the accomplishment of SOME rational act, so that when that has occurred, the person acquires moral value, but not before. But if that is our final end, why not kill the person then, since she has reached as far as she can go? Also, by what standard is that our final end, an arbitrary standard? The opponent at least owes us a reasoned account, ie., an account FOUNDED on something, as to why we should consider such an act our final end and not a means to a further end. Is being able to add 2 and 2 our final end or a means to still further ends? See Simon's Review of Politics article.

Maritain - T/O - AA

7-9-91

What is the relation of T/O to the formal/material object distinction? One way to investigate: how does the t/o question arise in Simon and what does t/o have to do there, in Simon, with the f/m object distinction?

Another approach. Maritain gets behind the f/m object distinction to what it presupposes, ie, what it means to call something an object. How do we get from what it means to call something an object to the f/m object distinction? To be an object is to be term of a knowledge relation. If we assume something is an object, we are assuming it is term of a knowledge relation. Or, if we assume there is a knowledge relation, we are assuming it has a term. Now go from this abstract description to a concrete knowledge relation, like seeing. For a relation of seeing to exist, there must be a term for this relation, something must be attained by the relation. But certain things are true of this term that are not true of other terms (epistemology evaluates what is attained by different knowledge relations and compares them), e.g., it is individual and colored. What is attained by conception, on the other hand, is univesal and need not be colored. But in both cases, what is attained must be more than an object. So what is attained cannot include features, like individuality and universality, defined solely by reference to objects as objects.

Also, the fact that seeing requires color to be attained does not mean color is the sole thing attained. For a knowledge relation to exist, something must become an object in some way, by some means, through some feature. But the intrinsic causal structure of that feature may require that, if it is attained, other aspects causally related to it are attained at the same time. And the causal structure of the act of sensation requires that the real existence of the object be attained.

Maritain transforms the t/o distinction the way Aquinas transformed the act/potency distinction. In Aquinas, t/o may be equivalent to the f/m object distinction. In Maritain, the latter is subordinate to the former. I.e., when there is an object of a certain kind of knowledge relation, the object must possess certain properties to be the object of that kind of relation. I.e., that kind of relation needs a certain kind of object as its extrinsic formal cause.

Maritain - T/O - BIG- AA

7-10-91

Quote Simon on the difference between the correspondence between thought and thing and the correspondence between object and thing. That is the point Maritain learned from Noel's article on the Intelligence and the Real! To know the truth requires knowing the relation between the objects thought about, not the relation between thought and the objects thought about. If we know the relation between the objects thought about, the relation of our thought to those objects follows!

So Maritain starts with a definition of truth in terms of a conformity between thought (i.e., a construct of thought, a proposition) and things. But then how do we know truth? He realized between Reflexions and DOK that knowing the truth required knowing that the object thought about, not the thought, was identical with a thing. So that is why, in DOK, he says a new problem, the problem of thing and object, confronts us. Why does it confront us? Because that is how the truth is KNOWN! This interpretation is confirmed by Simon's treatment.

But of course, objects are not always identical with things, because propositions are not always true. But the next sections of DOK look at this from different angles. First, from the angle of what is "analytically" first in intellectual knowledge. Objects are not always identical with things. But in the case of the principle of non-contradiction, there is no possibility of lack of truth, i.e., of lack of identity of objects with things. Likewise, there is no possibility of our primary concept, being, not being identical with things, at least with possible things.

Next, if and when sensation occurs, there is identity between the object and an actual thing.

Next, the argument can be extended to intellectual knowledge in general, not just our "analytically first" intellectual knowledge. Every concept represents a possible being. And every judgment requires identity between object and things. So the end of that section goes to prove the assertion made at the beginning, namely, that truth requires thing/object identity.

In all these cases, he is saying that there is a formal object attained. If not, the consciousness to be evaluated in terms of the goal it reaches would not even exist to be evaluated. But in each case, analysis of the formal object and the way it is attained will show that the formal object is attained as a feature of a material object. We can distinguish the formal object only as a means by which something more than itself is attained.

But also note that when Maritain justifies his claim that the t/o problem is the nub of the critical problem, he does not make use of the f/m object aspect of the t/o distinction. He only makes use of the more-than-an-object aspect of the distinction. That is more basic than the f/m object aspect, because it is presupposed to calling f/m objects objects. But the f/m object distinction is itself a case, an instance, of what is an object being more than an object. For what is describable in relation to a mode of consciousness

as "formally attained by that consciousness" is never attained by that consciousness in isolation so that what is attained by that consciousness is solely what is formally attained by that consciousness. It is never attained as it is described when called "what is formally attained." For as so described, it is distinguished from what is more than so attained. And the formal object is always more than what is describable as formally attained; for the formal object is always attained as an aspect of a thing, a more-than-formal-object.

It's almost as if Maritain saw the importance of the t/o distinction from Noel and then looked for a traditional "justification" for using the distinction. He found that justification in the f/m object distinction. But the latter distinction he gone far beyond Aquinas by the time of Cajetan and Poinsoot. Poinsoot, in particular, emphasized the "logical" character of the abstraction that distinguishes the sciences. That is, by Poinsoot, the logical nature of the characteristics objects acquire as objects was recognized. So the t/o distinction was the one Maritain needed to express Noel's insights, and the t/o distinction developed, historically, out of the f/m object distinction. But the t/o distinction went beyond the latter distinction, even by the time of the commentators.

Try this: what is objectified must be more than an object. But is it the whole thing? Yes and no. What is attained as object need not be described as the whole thing, if and when we are describing it as object. Blue or a patch of blue cannot exist separately from a blue thing. But it can be considered separately and described separately without distortion, when we are describing it as object *in specific opposition to describing what is true of it as a feature of a thing. But even the preceding statement needs the qualification that one of the things true of blue or a patch of blue as an object is that it is objectified as a feature of a thing.

The object must be more than an object, but can it be less than a thing? Only in the sense in which the formal object is less than a thing, but the formal object is never the whole object. The whole object is always more than an object. But the formal object is that about it by means of which it becomes an object, by means of which it is term of a knowledge relation.

Infanticide and Life - AA

7-12-91

What is human nature? It is our most underlying, fundamental, casual orientation toward human ends. Specifically, it is an underlying causal orientation to achieve human ends through cellular division, the result of which division is the existence of a multitude of cells each of which has a diverse function with respect to the whole, but a function given it by the presence in it of the same set of rules that exist in other cells resulting from the division. So the underlying causal orientation achieves human ends through cellular division the result of which is designed to combine unity and diversity in defined ways. The resulting cells each have diverse functions, but these diverse functions contribute to the final result, so they are unified in working together for the final result. Also they are unified by each having the complete set of rules that orients the whole to the final result. Each stage is new, but the orientation of each stage to the same ends as the preceding is not just an accidental fact. Each stage is oriented to the end by the presence of the same set of rules that defined the end at the beginning. The continued presence of these defining rules constitutes a unifying factor.

Many causes can accidentally contribute to an end, e.g., a comet's striking the earth. But the fact that human ends result from the cooperation of diverse cells is not accidental. Each cell does so because it obeys rules from the set that other cells in the system also share, and that preceding cells in the system shared. So there is a design of the whole process written into each cell.

For example, one human end is seeing. The cells in the eye contribute to this end, but not accidentally. Each cell cooperates with others as a result of a specific design selected by evolution. Each cell does not possess human nature. Human nature is not the set of rules in each cell. But human nature calls for human ends to be achieved by the production of cells possessing this code, production through division of previous cells.

Does talk of human nature so defined add anything other than verbally to empirical biological facts that can be described without this language? It does not have to add anything. As long as the statements made with this language are true and verifiable, this language can reveal a moral significance to the known facts that other language does not reveal. This is, zygotes have the same underlying causal orientation, orientation to the active production of human ends, that we have. And that orientation to ends is the ultimate basis of moral evaluations just as it is the ultimate basis for human activity.

Simplicity and theology, etc. - BIG

7-18-91

Simplicity. The real issue isn't why rational belief is confined to experiential and causal evidence (or whether belief, to be rational, is confined to ...). The real issue why belief should be confined to EVIDENCE. And the reason for that is the lack of identity between being an object and being a thing. A belief is rational only when we have evidence that an object is also a thing. Only to the extent we have CAUSE for believing the goal of reason, truth, has been achieved, i.e., only when that believe has a cause of the kind consistent with the goal of truth, which cause is awareness of real existence or of what is necessary for real existence. That evidence is the only kind available. So a being that knows its objects need not be identical with reality, knows that believe unsupported by evidence need not be true. And it knows that it does not advance the goal of reason and may equally well frustrate that goal, to believe where there is no evidence. It also knows that the only evidence available is experience of existence and necessary causal connections. So it knows that where that evidence is lacking, it should not believe. So it can know that one side of a contradiction should not be believed, while another side has some evidence in support of it. (Sometimes evidence does not cause knowledge of a proposition but knowledge that the only evidence available supports one side but not the other of a contradiction.)

Faith

7-18-91

What if God wants to communicate something above reason? He will provide rational evidence that someone's testimony about God is worthy of belief. Included in that rational evidence will be the consistency of revealed truths with reason. But there will *necessarily* be some apparent contradictions to reason. Why? Because even within the confines of reason, human language generates apparent contradictions when talking about God, even though the propositions it asserts are necessarily true. Here paradoxes are generated by concepts even though our knowledge of the concepts is sufficient to reveal that the assertions are necessarily true. What about a connection like that between relatedness and God's essence. There the connection is necessary but understanding of the concepts is not sufficient to reveal it. A fortiori, these assertions can appear contradictory, if even known necessary connections can appear contradictory. For in the former case, there is an additional factor in the concepts that blocks us from seeing their identity. If concepts whose identity is seen can appear repugnant, a fortiori concepts with something that blocks us from seeing their identity can appear repugnant.

T/O as Source of Error

7-23-91

Notice the apparent contradiction that can arise from describing a "thing" as "other than" or "more than" an object. "Object" means "what is known." So these phrases can appear to mean "other than known" or "insofar as it is more than what is known. But "other than known" means unknown; "more than what is known" means beyond what is known. So it appears contradictory to say we know something as more than an object.

Really, what these phrases are trying to say is "other than having the characteristic of being that which is known, i.e., having other characteristics than the characteristic 'being known'; or, "having more predicates true of it than the predicate 'known'."

Thing/object

7-25--91

When I attribute "man" to an individual, universality is a characteristic attaching to what I attribute but not entering into what I attribute. For it attaches to what I attribute from a perspective that differs from the perspective in which I am attributing it. Universality is a logical relation describing what is known from the point of view of the knowledge relation by which it is known, describing the term of a knowledge relation from the point of view of the knowledge relation, not describing what the term must be in itself in order to be the term of a knowledge relation.

Universality is a logical relation attaching to what is known in order that it may be what is known, but it does not belong to what the term of the knowledge relation is prior to being known. It does not enter into what the term is known to be in itself. Abstraction is a logical relation characterizing being as term of a knowledge relation, but it does not enter into what the term of the knowledge relation is nonreflectively known to be, what it is known to be in itself. Therefore it is not in contradiction to the concreteness that we know being necessarily possesses whenever it is actually exercised. Abstraction is a logical relation attaching to what is known in order that it may be what is known, but abstraction does not enter into what the term of the knowledge relation is known to be when it is so known, i.e, when it is known in the way characterized by abstraction. Otherwise, the term would never be the term, for it would be altered by the knowledge relation; and the term of the knowledge relation would be something else, the result of the alteration.

Abstraction and universality do not enter into what is FIRST known about the term of the knowledge relation that endows the term with abstraction or universality. For if they entered into what is first known, there would be an infinite regress, since they are logical relations resulting from a knowledge relation. So if they are first known, there is another knowledge relation preceding the first.

They are features we can attribute to the known resulting from its being the term of a knowledge relation. But what is first known does not result from its being the term of a knowledge relation. So they do not enter into what is first known. They do not enter into what it must be in order that it become the term of a knowledge relation, namely, something other than what is described by "a term of a knowledge relation."

Maritain - t/o - AA

8-6-91

There is a few that anything expressed in language (concepts) reflects an interpretation imposed on what we are trying to express by the background features of the language. It is possible for a language to illegitimately impose an interpretation on things. But that is something that must be shown in particular cases. For language is a means of making things terms of cognitional relations. As such, different languages necessarily impose on objects diverse features pertaining to them as objects. For example, one language might use verbs of action where another uses adjectives and the copula exclusively. But characteristics pertaining to objects as objects are not, or need not be, what we attribute to things when we use language to communicate about things. And if our statements do attribute to things as things characteristics with which they are associated only as a result of being objects, those statements are false.

It may be claimed that we cannot distinguish between what features we attribute to things as things, when we use language, and what features accrue to them as our objects as a result of our using language. But if the evidence for the truth of statements from different languages is the same, there is no reason to assume those statement differ in what they attribute to things as things. The opponent reply that her intent is to impeach the very notion of evidence as something capable of adjudicating between conflicting opinions. But to establish that statements are genuinely in conflict, one must do more than point to differences between them that derive from language. In fact, statements cannot be in conflict unless there words mean the same thing. And sameness of meaning seems ruled out if words from different languages attribute to things features unique to each language. The only way to show a genuine conflict between statements is to show that the evidence for the truth of one rules out the truth of the other.

The opponent will reply that it is the realist who is in the vicious circle. To count as evidence for or against a statement, experience must be expressed in language; as soon as it is expressed in language, it is no longer raw experience but experience interpreted through concepts. Maritain would reply that we can adjudicate between (genuinely) conflicting interpretations of experience on the basis of necessary truths that constitute nonKantian regulatory principles for our empirical beliefs. For example, we know as a necessary truth that when a change occurs we can look for a cause. And we can identify the cause through investigation because we know as a necessary truth that similar causes have similar effects.

Such regulatory principles are nonKantian because they are ontological in the sense that they express, not conditions for the possibility of experience, but conditions for the possibility of existence, that is, conditions of possibility, period. As employing the concept of existence, they are, when necessarily true, true of whatever satisfies the object of the concept of existence, so there is no danger of their falsely interpreting reality. Where the evidence of neither necessary truths nor experience can distinguish between two statements, the differences between the statements belong to the category of what belongs to objects as objects, not to what is asserted about objects as things.

So ontological necessary truths enable us to use the thing/object distinction in response to the relativist. There is room for all sorts of

relativity pertaining to objects as objects without implying any relativity in what we believe true about things as things. It does not matter whether all languages can express ontological truths, that is, whether they can express existence as an object of concept. It only matters that at least one language can. Einstein was able to introduce relativity into scientific theory by situating the elements of relativity properly with respect to something absolute, the combined spatial-temporal interval between events. But Einstein only succeeded in that project by using a specific language, the language of tensorial calculus.

Similarly, Maritain needs a specific language, ontological language to be able to situate the elements of relativity in language on the side of objects as objects while preserving the absoluteness of what is true of things as things. But as a result, where Kant gave us an idealistic Copernican revolution, Maritain makes possible a realist Einsteinian revolution doing justice to the relative without forsaking the absolute.

SSR - AA - BIG

8-27-91

Maybe start by describing the world as it already is, the world that we have already created.

We have created a world in which 50 percent of couples getting married can assume that their marriage will fail. We have created a world in which success in marriage is completely a matter of chance. We have created a world in which 50% of those getting married are deprived of the social support necessary to make marriage a success, and in which many other marriages will have only enough social support to "succeed" in the most minimal sense.

The trauma of divorce is so bad that after going through it, 75% of divorced people say they would have been better off putting up with the marriage they thought they couldn't take anymore than going through the divorce. Yet our world guarantees that 50% of marriages will have to go through that trauma only to find out it wasn't worth it.

We have created a world in which 25% of children live for a significant length of time with only one parent and where millions more go through the trauma of divorce. We have created conditions which force children to go through this.

We have not taught people how to love. We have not created the social conditions necessary to teach people how to love. We have acted on the basis of the extraordinary proposition that we can both teach people how to love and teach them to view sexual pleasure as a means to casual entertainment rather than view sexual pleasure as a device to support a very difficult relationship, but a relationship normally necessary for the happiness of adults and the rights of children.

Or we have acted on the basis of the extraordinary proposition that sexual pleasure can both be used a means for casual entertainment and serve the purpose of being a support for our most important relationships. Or it is the proposition that sexual pleasure can serve that latter purpose even though it cannot create that emotional and psychological relation to one partner as he or she who exclusively means sexual fulfillment and its emotional accompaniments to you. Even though couples can no longer have that emotional and psychological sense of their shared sexual pleasure as something exclusively their own, something just between them. And even though the other partner can no longer be the one who has the emotional relationship formed by being the first to share orgasm with you, the first to share the experiences that formed your first sexual memories and your expectations of future experience, the experiences that come back in your dreams.

Ethics - AA

9-4-91

To choose to kill a human being is to put my desires in opposition to what things are, in opposition to the natures of things. To choose to kill oneself is to put ones desires in opposition to the natures of things. Why? Choice is not an end in itself; it is a means to ends previously set for the will by nature. To choose to cease to exist is to choose to cease achieving the ends that nature has set for the will, ie., to choose to not achieve the ends that it is the will's nature to achieve.

Thomism

9-16-91

We approach Aquinas with a willingness to find an interpretation of an apparently false or inconsistent text that makes the text true or consistent. So we work at finding such an interpretation. When we find a text in Cajetan, Poinsett, or Maritain that is apparently false or inconsistent with Aquinas we do not give them the same courtesy. We accept the falsehood or inconsistency at face value and look no further for an interpretation that might prove them not incorrect or inconsistent with Aquinas.

SSR - AA

9-16-91

After opening about something has gone wrong, the theory isn't working. Please, please do not have the attitude that Marxists had to the facts that its theory didn't work. Over and over again, Marxism was shown not to work, but its adherents refused to give up the theory. They either denied the facts or denied the the theory was to blame. The result was untold human misery. In a sense the theory was not to blame, at least the intentions of the theory. The intentions were human happiness and justice. But those are the intentions of most theories. We cannot judge a theory by what it is in the intentions of its framers, but by what it is in fact. Likewise, conservatives judge Adam Smith's theory by its intentions. We might commit the same error regarding the theory, i.e., religion, we have gotten from our culture. If we do, we will ignore and perpetuate human misery.

Infanticide - AA

9-19-91

It would be a private decision if it were one biological agent against another biologically distinct agent that was not a human agent. But it is one human agent against a biologically distinct human agent. Both are human agents because both are agents oriented as wholes to the achievement of a complete set of human ends. Any criterion other than this orientation for determining humanness is a sub-moral criterion, ie., morally arbitrary, since the decision to apply that criterion is based on ends other than those determining morality, and the decision is contrary to the ends determining morality.

Adler-U - Animal Language

9-23-91

We form our concepts by moving from the general to the particular. 2 examples:
As Aristotle said, children first think "daddy" refers to everybody, or at least to all males. And the 3-year old in the apartment building asked "Where's your mother?" She thought everyone had a mother.

Do animals form concepts this way? If not, *some* of the effects of their mental apparatus are the same as the effects of our mental apparatus. But if the apparatus produce these effects in different ways, then they are different causal powers.

Infanticide - AA - BIG

10-3-91

The development of free choice is an accomplishment, an end of some sort. Is there any further end to which we are oriented "by Nature"? If so, then the zygote is likewise so oriented.

If not, then there is no end imposed on our free choices such that any could be successful or defective by the standard of that end. As a result, any choice is as good as any other, including the choice to kill adults!

Ethics - AA - Start - BIG

10-15-91

The title of Curt Hancock's book: "How Should I Live?" That is not the question we ask. It's "How should I decide?" How do I decide what I should or should not do? (Notice that a meaning for "should" is already given when we ask the question. Likewise, in "epistemological", the person in the street asks "Is that true?" "Is there such a thing?". He doesn't wait for epistemology to provide a meaning for these terms. Rather, epistemology gets them from experience. Similarly, the person on the street knows that there is a difference between what he should and should not do.) The answer is: I should make the decision that gives things, actions, situations, and persons what is due them, that gives them their due. I should do what is good, what is right. But what is good or right? The answer: what is due. But what is it to be "due"? Given what X is (some action, person, thing, or situation), what is "due" X is determined by what X is and the relation of what X is to the ends of my decision-making faculties. So it comes down to what X is and what my decision-making faculties are. For what the latter are determines what their end(s) is.

But still, how does that tell me what to decide? Do that which gives things their due. Must translate that into: do that which treats things as they are, which treats them as if they are what they are. I.e., the nature of the decision-making faculty is assumed, we are implicitly aware of it by the fact that we are making a conscious decision. That implicit awareness is the source of our knowledge of what "should" etc mean.

Also, another way to get to the conclusion that we evaluate things to be what they are. The function of the will is to cause adherence to practically-practical judgments. These judgments are either true or false, and their truth or falsity is determined by what things are. Even so-called "practical truth" is determined by what things are *as far as we know it by our reason*. E.g., "X is good for me." Is either true or false. What does "X is good for me mean?" "X fulfills the ends of my being" or at least "X is consistent with the ends of my being."

Ethics - AA - BIG

10-16-91

Follow up to yesterday's note:

Also, the question can be: how do I decide *what to do* or what is *good* to do. The concept of goodness is presupposed by the very asking to the question, since in deciding, I will be aiming at an end, or since I am deciding only because I have faculties of choice which, by hypothesis, are aimed at the accomplishment of end(s). How do I decide what is good means how do I decide what fulfills my ends. What ends? First of all it means, how do I decide what fulfills my ends as a *decider*, as someone oriented to pursue ends by making decisions, someone whose pursuit of ends, whose actual pursuit of ends as opposed to mere tendency toward ends, primarily comes from the making of choices based on rational knowledge. How do I decide what is good to do = how do I decide what fulfills my ends as an agent oriented to directing myself toward ends through producing choices based on rational knowledge?

Math/Logic/Formal Systems

10-21-91

Why philosophical abstraction differs from mathematical. Ask, why is it so hard to do arithmetic in your head? To do that requires operating on symbols. You can do metaphysics in your head, but you cannot do metaphysics by operating on symbols. Metaphysics requires *understanding* that which words are used for, not just understanding rules for manipulating strings of words. Doing arithmetic in the head requires no understanding beyond the memory of mechanical rules for combining, replacing, and detaching strings of marks.

Symbolic logic is like a model, map, relative to logical essences, where "logical essences" means relations to objects of knowledge "as" objects of knowledge or terms of knowledge relations, where "as" means relations resulting from and for the sake of objects of knowledge being objects of knowledge. Or symbolic logic *deals with* objects that are models or maps relative to logical objects. As such symbolic logic can reveal many important aspects of logical objects, just as maps can. But to think that that is what the understanding of logical objects consists in is to think that geology consists of cartography. Cartography can be very useful, even essential, in geology, but geological understanding does not consist in cartographic understanding.

Maybe I should say formal systems are like models or maps and by studying formal systems, symbolic logic studies something that relates to logical objects the way maps relate to the objects of geology.

Ethics and Infanticide - AA - BIG

10-28-91

It's not just that we perceive that cheating would be "unfair"; we also know that being unfair is bad and that being fair is good. The connection is so self-evident that we fail to see the distinction. If failing to see the distinction, we fail to see the connection. There is an answer to "Why be moral?" The answer is that it is good to be moral and bad to be immoral. And there is an answer to why it is good to be moral and bad to be immoral. The question to which there is no answer is: why do the good and avoid the evil. That is why those principles are the first principles of functional reason.

Thus, in explaining to nonenculturated minority youth why society has laws against, for example, mugging, we can ask them how they would like being mugged. They instinctively see the unfairness of wanting to mug others and not wanting to be mugged. And it is self-evident that the unfair is bad. That is why justice is the obvious example of morality, we immediately see its immorality and don't need any more argument to see its evil. But there are other cases of immorality just as bad, e.g., birth control. But its immorality is not as self-evident. If it were as self-evident, its evil would follow automatically.

On euthanasia to relieve pain: why is it moral, a good thing, to relieve someone else's pain? Unless the human person is a morally valuable thing, a morally valuable existent, relieving her pain is just a matter of preference. But if she is a morally valuable existent, it is morally worse to deprive her of existence than to fail to deprive her of pain.

Also, it would be unfair to want our own pain relieved and not relieve hers. But why be fair? Why is it good to be fair? Unless the human person is an existent that has the status of an end in our evaluations, there is no reason in the last analysis why being fair is good to do.

To select any point other than conception when the human organism acquires moral value, one must assign a reason for selecting that point. But there can be no objective basis for assigning that reason other than the ends to which the zygote is oriented by being what it is. So to assign any other point than the zygote is to deprive oneself of any moral basis for assigning that point.

Rorty says we give one another rights. If so, we may as well decide when to give one another rights.

Infanticide - BIG

11-1-91

Follow up to note (somewhere) about whether the action of parts of the zygote (e.g., organelle's) are instrumental relative to the ends of the whole or whether the organelle is just doing its own thing. Maybe the question of whether the existence of a whole cell with that structure is accidental is irrelevant. All contingent existence is accidental. Maybe the question is just, given that this structure has occurred (for whatever reason), is the action of the organelle instrumental toward higher ends or is the achievement of higher ends an accident of the action of the organelle? The organelle's action produces a higher end only because the organelle happens to be part of a complex with this structure.

If the organelle is not an instrument because it just happens to be part of this structure, then our fingers are not instruments because they just happen to be part of our body, because our body just happens to be structured that way. An ape's fingers are instruments regardless of how accidental the whole is. By accident, a part serves as an instrument for a whole of which it happens to be a part. By accident, a whole exists of which the actions of its parts serve ends of the whole which are beyond those of the part alone.

True, every agent acts within a complex structure that gives its actions accidental effects beyond those it aims at alone. That complex structure is the whole universe. How do we cut out zones of the universe and call that zone a whole structure in which an agent acts? We cut out a whole zone by specifying certain effects and tracing those effects back to the structure from which they come. Some of those structures we do not count as units, why not? In this case, the answer is fairly direct. We define the structure by the effect that is accidental to the action of the part. The effect in question is the existence of a new structure aimed at a similar effect by similar means (notice how close to circularity this is: we define the structure by the effect, but how define the effect, by the fact that it is similar to the preceding structure, and similarly related to the production of effects! The fact that this circle must be nonvicious should reveal something important.)

In nonliving things, if a complex productive of a certain kind of effect frequently occurred, we would probably have a name for that complex, i.e., treat it logically as a whole. Start there, at that fact in the non-living domain, to explain the non-circularity above.

And why do we consider this worm to be the same worm that existed yesterday even though we know it has undergone changes. (We could ask the same question about machines.) We take some features to be more important basic or fundamental than others. Those features remain. So two questions, at least. One: why do we consider them the same individual features as opposed to a reproduction of the features that existed a moment ago? Material continuity must have an important part of the answer to that question. Two: why do we consider them more fundamental than the features that have changed? Causality can be the only answer to this question. The changes are superficial because the underlying causal dispositions remain. And the zygote shares those causal orientations at the most fundamental level, the level which we

are talking about because we count it as the same worm because we take the continued features as more fundamental.

SSR - AA

11-4-91

We try to make arrangements so that we have to rely on the morality of other persons as little as possible. E.g., everyone in the office has their own lockable desk with their own key. Likewise, we might try to provide for the rights of children by "technical" means that do not rely on morality. E.g., by government or private service providers. But in the last analysis, my happiness depends mostly on having moral companions, and the well being of society depends on having responsible members. And to achieve that requires moral, not technical means. That is, it requires relations between persons that are governed by morality, especially, the relation between a child's parents.

Infanticide - AA

11-5-91

When there is a risk (not a certainty) that value X might be violated, do we leave it up to the individual? If society says "Leave it up to the individual," what is society saying about value X, about the importance of value X to it? Society is saying, value X is not a high priority for it. If value X was a high priority, society would not leave it up to the individual.

What if I said "I am committed to the infallibility of the Pope, but I decide when he is infallible and when he is not?" "I am committed to the rights of women, but I decide if and when they have a right and when they do not." "I am committed to the value of life, but I decide when life begins and when it does not." At the very least, there is something more basic to me than the value of life, namely, whatever criterion I use for deciding when life begins and when it does not.

Ethics - AA

11-5-91

Can we tell people to be committed to their own pleasure, to fulfilling their own desires for pleasure AND tell them to be equally committed to the rights of others. Can that really work?

SSR - AA

11-8-91

The phrase "the family of humankind": When I speak of men and women's roles in the family of humankind, I mean that the individual family, where those roles are practiced, is providing an essential social function, a function essential to the well being of the community of all men. In other words, human society in general needs to be family based, so the roles we play in the individual family are essential for the family-based larger human community, the family of mankind.

Thing/Object - AA - BIG

11-12-91

See the handwritten note of this weekend (11-9 or 10) about the relation between the thing/object and material object/formal object distinctions. What I say there about how the relation is developed in Maritain and Simon is correct, but the relation can be put even more simply.

Idealists and Skeptics grant that our awareness has objects. So the only question is the (known or knowable) relation of those objects to extramental things. To ask that question amounts to the same thing as asking, in Scholastic language, whether we know material objects by means of knowing formal objects. Why? because to ask the relation of objects to extramental things is to ask whether they are identical, in whole or part, with what extramental things are, whether they are identical with one of an extramental thing's ways of being a thing. It is to ask whether they are aspects of what a thing is, in whole or part. And when we translate those ways of asking the question into scholastic language, the "aspects of things" become "formal objects" and the things become "material objects."

Still, that is not to say that the scholastic language is helpful in the sense of providing the logical foundations for refuting idealism and skepticism. It is really only helpful in the sense of relating the question to issues that Maritain's scholastic readers would be familiar with as issues in their tradition.

So Maritain is saying, in effect, look, when I am asking (dialectically) about the relation of objects to things, and when I am arguing about the identity of objects to things, I am talking about something you should be familiar with even though what I am talking about may *seem* unfamiliar. To start from the fact that skeptics and idealists grant that we have objects and to argue that these objects are known to be identical with ways of being extramental things (actually or possibly) is in effect to ask and argue whether the formal objects of our acts of knowledge, which the opponents admit that we have, reveal material objects because they, formal objects, are always known as identical with what actual and possible existents are.

And those existents are extramental existents, because existence is the primary element in "more than objects" making them more than objects. Actual or possible existence is a feature they possess as more than objects, because every other feature of that kind they possess includes a relation to existence, a capacity for existence, as part of its identity, as part of what constitutes its being more than an object.

SSR - AA - BIG

11-14-91

Most social philosophies view society like a highway in which each person is going to her own destination, and the problem is: what are the minimal number of rules we need to keep us from interfering with each other's pursuit of our destinations?

No, the problem is: how do we achieve the common good, more specifically, how do we achieve communion with one another, union with one another? For that is what human happiness consists of this side of the grave, and that is what the most helpless among us, children, need.

Libertarians forget that we are individuals who, as such, are subordinate to the common good. They do not recognize the existence of, or they misunderstand the nature of, the common good.

It is not sufficient for someone to say, "I chose not to pursue communion with another person." We have the obligation not to interfere with and weaken other people's pursuit of communion by behavior that experience shows to weaken the family. We know from experience that true communion is very difficult; so we have the obligation not to make it more difficult than it already is.

Infanticide and Ethics - AA

11-18-91

The point of both the argument against infanticide and against birth control is the same: a person who violates either moral prescription can CHOOSE to respect life in other ways. But she has taken away the logical ground, the rational ground, or any ground for her choice. She has no basis for saying her choice to respect life in this case and not in another is "Ethical," where "ethical" means determined by what things are and our finality of valuing things according to what they are.

Big: we *always* value things according to what they are when it comes to valuing things as means to already chosen ends; for we want a means that will actually accomplish the end we have chosen. But is there also such a thing as valuing things according to what they are when it comes to valuing them as ends? Yes, because desires are desires for *something*, for some state of being that answers the question "what is it?" The only questions are whether we have predetermined desires for states of being that ignore what other things are relative to what we are and whether those predetermined desires rule out free choice. They are consistent with free choice if and only if they are desires for the infinite object of reason. So our determined finality has to be the finality of valuing things according to what they are known to be by reason and hence according to what their being is relative to what our being is.

Back to the first point: the person has no basis for saying her choice is ethical because it satisfies a prior finality for choices that is determined by what we are and what things are. The person can have no basis for the choice other than private preference for some chosen end. That is the person could have no basis for the choice that could invalidate killing adults, no basis other than private preference a la Rorty.

specifically, by whether their objects include features that result from the causality of matter. Those features can abstract from the individuating effects of matter, the common sensible effects of matter, or from all effects proper to matter. The diverse immateriality of these objects depends on something true of them as things, their relation to the causality of matter. But that feature of things as things enters the distinction of the sciences only as a foundation for diverse immateriality in scientific objects; for ...

the fact that objects are identical with things, that their distinction is not a separation,

Ethics and SSR - AA - BIG

11-19-91

The greater cannot come from the lesser. If I treat a person under the aspect of a-sexual-being the way I treat a person under the aspect of a-being-who-can-perform-function-X, I am treating a procreator as a thing maker, as an agent with a capacity for making things. A person (the higher) cannot come from a mere capacity for making things. I do not deal with a person's capacities apart from the person. If I higher a comedian to give me pleasure, I am hiring him or her, not just his or her capacities. But I am hiring him or her AS a being with certain capacities. Regarding those capacities which are just capacities for functioning, I can deal with according to justice. I can give money in return for making me laugh. When I do, I treat the capacity under which I am relating to the person as a capacity for making effects that are less than the existence of persons. And I am treating the person, insofar as he or she possesses that capacity, as less than a maker of beings of absolute ethical value.

The way we evaluate human life has logical implications for that which causes human life, that which is the sole way of getting human life. If human life is that which is not only most valuable (a relative description) but of absolute value, then the cause of human life, the sole source of that which is of absolute value, deserves a certain kind of evaluation, a certain kind of place in our system of values. What kind? A kind determined by the following logical link: If we evaluate the sole cause of human life as a mere means to pleasure or a means to the production of things less than the absolute value, we are not valuing human life as the absolute value.

Sex has that link to human life not just in the sense that at certain periods of the month it can cause human life, but in the sense that its role in our lives is to make us person-producers and person-rearers. That is its role in the human species.

Ethics - AA - BIG

11-20-91

The question is: can there be actions that are good or bad regardless of the consequences. Should that question become: can there be decisions that are good or bad regardless of the consequences that are over and above the decision's being what it is. Can a decision be correct or defective regardless of the effects that may follow from the decision. The old answer, concerning decisions, was: yes a decision can be good or defective regardless of the consequences because the action decided on, the external action, was good or bad in itself. Thus, lying or cheating are always bad acts, and so the decision to perform them is always a bad decision.

I want to say certain actions, e.g., knowingly killing the innocent, are always bad because the decision to commit them must always be defective, i.e., must always require a misvaluation. The description of the act, the conditions stipulated in the description, are such that to knowingly decide for the act would require knowingly misvaluing some thing, person, event or action. Therefore, some describable actions are always bad regardless of their consequences because the decision to perform them would be defective as a decision, regardless of its consequences. A decision to perform such an act cannot not be a misvaluation, cannot not imply that the bad is what is to be done.

"The good is to be done and evil avoided" is so expressed as to imply that good and evil are principally in the external action, not in the act of the will, and get into the act of the will derivatively from the chosen external action. A decision is bad because it implies that this evil external act is to be done. I want to say a bad decision implies that evil is to be done because a bad decision is itself an instance of acting evilly.

A decision commits us to a true or false practical judgment: this action will be an effective means to my end. A decision is good or defective according to whether the practical judgment is true or false. (But the truth or falsity in question is *practical* truth or falsity; is there any circularity here? Practical truth is conformity to good desire! So goodness or defectiveness in the act of the will seems primary to the truth or falsity in the practical judgment.) Conformity with right desire (practical truth) means conformity with a decision based on the available evidence, available rational knowledge, a decision evaluating things to be what they are, as far as they are known by reason.

Let us assume the evidence we have is true and complete. Then the practical judgment, "This action will achieve my end," is either true or false. If it is false, the decision causing the judgment is defective. Why is it defective? One answer: because certain actions are such that they must always be opposed to my end. Their nature is such, regardless of consequences, that they are always opposed to my end. How can their nature be such? One answer: they involve a misuse of a faculty, a perversion of a faculty. My answer: the decision to perform them would violate the end of the rational appetite.

Why must the ends of reason and not our other ends be controlling? Because

the rational appetite is in control. It evaluates things according to reason's knowledge and therefore according to reason's knowledge of ITS OWN ends. This is not arbitrary, since reason knows what things are. So its evaluation of things in terms of its own ends is evaluation of them in terms of what they are.

Maritain - AA

12-2-91

The question whether a perceptual object is real or phenomenal is not the question whether the object is an aspect (formal object) of a thing (material object). It is the question whether the perceived object as a whole, the perceived thing, has an existence that is other than being known.

Maybe the strict idealist's problem, the problem of Berkeley and Husserl, should not be stated in the material object/formal object vocabulary. Maybe only the skeptic's problem should be so stated. The idealist does not deny that the immediate object attained is an aspect of a larger thing; she denies that the existence of this thing is other than being-an-object. She denies that its existence is other than being-attained. But Maritain would say that what is attained, strictly and formally, is always less than what the "thing" is alleged or believed or hypothesized to be. So maybe Maritain is saying that the idealist denies in fact, whether or not intentionally, that we attain a material object when we attain a formal object.

Truth - Maritain - AA

12-2-91

The relation is between this (thing) and what it is to be a cat or what it is to be a cold thing. (Don't worry about what the relation is NOT between; the important thing is what the relation IS between.

Poinsot - IE - AA

12-4-91

Wittgenstein recognizes that the only way mental entities could help explain conscious behavior was if those entities made objects really exist within consciousness. But that is absurd. Poinsot recognizes the same thing but avoids the absurdity by saying things exist in consciousness by a different mode of existence. But isn't that move just a dodge? And what do we gain if we say, on the one hand, that consciousness is a genuine existence for the object, that is, that consciousness is like the object's existence in that consciousness is itself an existence for the object, but, on the other hand, saying at the same time that consciousness differs from ordinary existence in being a different kind of existence. Are we not trying to have it both ways at the same time, trying to have our cake and eat it too; are we not giving and then taking away what we just gave?

No. Because *that which* exists is the same in both cases, we give what we need to give. But because it is a different mode of existence, we avoid the absurdity. But what do we gain by calling this different state an existence for the object? We gain the ability to say that the object itself, *that which* exists, is present within consciousness -- not something other than the object but the object itself.

Cause _ AA - Big

Maybe this is the way around the "unjustified" introduction of the concept of something causing its own *existence*. First introduce the contradiction of a thing's being cause of itself. (What does this mean? A cause of the fact that what it is is what it is? There is no cause for the fact that what A is is what A is.) A cause is something other than the thing without which the thing would not exist. But *assuming* existence is other than the thing we can ask, not about the thing, but about its existence. Can a thing be a cause of the existence of the thing. The thing is something other than the existence, so can it be something other than the existence without which the existence would not... Would not what? exist? In fact, a thing can be something other than the existence without which the existence would have nothing to be the existence of. So in some sense a thing can be a cause of its own existence.

But either here or previously, introduce the notion of material cause in the case of change. Then say a thing can be the cause of its own existence only in the way a material cause of a change is a cause of it. So the question is, when a thing is other than its own existence, can the thing be the only cause of that existence? If so, the thing would be the cause of itself in the contradictory sense.

Poinsot - AA

12-6-91

Is Wittgenstein a verificationist re universals, ie., is that his beef against them? Empirical verification is essentially a syllogism with one universal premise asserting a necessary connection and one particular premise asserting the existence of one of the connectees. The particular always grasps an individual or group of individuals under a universal concept. It does not matter whether or not we correctly remember what word we used for that universal concept or the other universal concepts in the past. What matters is that the concept is part of a necessary connection known now. And yes, we can later revise particular existential categorizations. But we do so under the guidance of necessarily true principles requiring simplicity. And those requirements are always applied by grasping some particular under some universal. If we are wondering which universal to put a particular under, we use simplicity based on the grouping of other particulars under universals. That requires memory, but the hypothesis that we might be remembering incorrectly is itself one that is governed by principles of reasonable belief. We cannot arbitrarily assume we are remembering incorrectly, ie., we cannot do so reasonably, where "reasonably" is definable by objective criteria - objective because necessarily true.

Cause - AA

12-12-91

In what way is a change the cause of itself? By being a cause of the whole union of the change and the subject of the change. In this regard, perhaps the following is significant. What if the opponent said the "union" is only a being of reason; the parts are all that are real.

That cannot be true in this case, because the change is an actualization of the subject's potency existing in the subject. Likewise, the result of the change is a state of actualization for a preexisting potency, e.g., the potency to be at rest.

Yes, a thing can cause its own change as, e.g., in immanent action. But if a subject has not **always** been causing this change, then this change results from a previous change, and so on.

Poinsot - AA - BIG

12-18-91

Introduction: Wittgenstein has been interpreted in conflicting ways. Kripke interprets many of Wittgenstein's arguments to be aimed at showing that interior mental states do not help explain linguistic behavior. (He interprets the same arguments as the core of Wittgenstein's rejection of private language, but that issue will not be my concern here.) For the sake of this discussion, I will follow Kripke's interpretation, which, aside from its claims about Wittgenstein's rejection of private language, I believe to be basically correct. But if that reading of Wittgenstein's intentions is not historically accurate, there remains the more important point that a philosopher of no less stature than Kripke has claimed that (whatever Wittgenstein's intentions) arguments found in Wittgenstein create "the most ... and original skeptical argument in the history of philosophy concerning the relation between mental states and the use of signs." That philosophical claim is logically embodied in Kripke's interpretive claims.

I intend to show that Poinsot's analysis of mental entities undercuts the arguments Kripke claims to find in Wittgenstein. If Wittgenstein's treatment of the mental is consistent with Poinsot's analysis, then I have no quarrel with Wittgenstein, only with Kripke. I doubt whether Wittgenstein is consistent with Poinsot, and therefore I believe Poinsot refutes Wittgenstein in advance. But I do not intend to get into a historical discussion of the proper interpretation of Wittgenstein.

Poinsot - AA - BIG

12-31-91

The opponent may say, "Sure you can have an awareness of what the operation of addition is. What you can't do is have any interior mental state that constitutes meaning addition by "+". It is the connection between addition and plus that cannot be explained by a mental state."

But can't I *intend* to get someone to perform addition by using "+"? Can't I use "+" with the intention of *causing* her to perform addition rather than quaddition? If this intention is not constituted by a mental state, how about my intention to cause the car to start when I turn the key. I turn the key because I believe the rest of the car is so disposed as to normally start when I turn the key. Likewise, I use "+" because I believe other people are so disposed as to normally relate consciously to what addition is rather than to what quaddition is.

It is true that I do not perform explicit, distinct, explicit acts of *belief* in the car's or the other person's dispositions when I intend to cause them to act in certain ways. But that is another issue.

My point is that for me to be so disposed vis-a-vis the car and for the other person to be so disposed vis-a-vis me, requires as certain necessary but not sufficient conditions mental entities of the nature described by Poinsot. Yes, the disposition also requires a connection or reference to something publicly observable, the behavior of the car or of the other person. But the real difference between the two cases, is the mental state in the case of the person, but not of the car. Otherwise, they are just two cases of causal analyses. Wittgenstein's arguments do not add much that is new or enlightening.

In fact, they have proven extremely misleading to the extent that they have led people to deny, whether contrary to Wittgenstein's intentions or not, that mental states are involved in meaning or intending.

It is true that the first part of the Philosophical Investigations ends by attacking the view that intentions, such as the intentions to cause addition or the starting of the car, are constituted by mental states. So the discussion of intentions is the real issue. And the new argument he adds there is one that has both been overlooked or misunderstood by his commentators and one that links him to Poinsot almost exactly: the argument that the intended itself would have to exist within the thought that intends it.

I.E. - Poinot - AA - BIG

1-3-92

How to understand the strange statement, too absurd to hold, that awareness contains the object itself, that awareness is an existence for the object:
The purpose of those statements is to express the *nature* of consciousness, awareness, to express what is distinctive about this mode of being, what distinguishes it from other modes of being, from other features. It is not only a feature but the existence of a feature. That is what makes awareness the unique kind of thing it is; that is what makes it so unlike *everything* else.

Poinsot - AA

1-3-92

If you title it "Poinsot's theory as an Alternative (or whatever) to W.", you can end the article by saying that if W would not disagree, then the article could be entitled "P's theory as a supplement to or completion of W." For the fact remains that after rejecting false pictures of mental states, W never bothers to mention that there is a correct one against which is arguments are not meant to be directed.

Maritain - Thobj Article - Class idea - AA

1-13-92

What if someone were to challenge my claim that the lines following the "Crux of the problem" statement are explanations of it. What if they said that the explanation of that statement came in the preceding section, that statement merely summarizes the preceding, and what follows is a new thought?

My answer: OK, delete that statement from the beginning of the new section and read the new section. Is the new section or is it not explaining the thing/object distinction (problem) and why it refutes idealism. You do not have to read very far, the second paragraph, to see him bring in thing/object as if it needed no introduction but was being discussed all along. He brings in again the same way, and in the context of idealism, a paragraph or two later.

1-24-92

Separatio

Article title "Do We Need to Know What Aquinas Meant by 'Separatio'?"

Aquinas never came back to that concept. Do we need to? Why? What will it tell us? All we can have are hypotheses, since Aquinas never came back to that concept. What will these hypotheses tell us? Does a judgment of separation tell us something we need to know in order to know other metaphysical truths? Not in Aquinas's metaphysics.

Is it needed to form the concept of being, the concept of that which metaphysical judgments are about, as if self-evident truths about being were self-evident only to the learned, those who had made a judgment of separation? Again, not in Aquinas's metaphysics.

Does it tell us how metaphysics proceeds as opposed to other sciences? Here "proceeds" does not mean something we need to know in order to know other metaphysical truths. It means what characterizes metaphysics' way of forming the concepts from which self-evident propositions are constructed differs from the way other sciences form their concepts. Why is there a science of metaphysics distinct from the other sciences, etc.

SSR - Mock Speech

1-26-92

As for those studies claiming to show that those who abstain from sex before marriage have more sexual happiness in marriage than those who try one another out: They can't be right; we're sure of it. They can't be accurate, because, if they were, that old view that it's better to abstain before marriage would be correct.

SSR - Permanent Commitments

1-26-92

What is the function of permanent commitments? What purpose do they serve in our lives? In fact, our long-term happiness depends on making sacrifices we might not want to make if we were not "forced" to make them in order to keep a permanent commitment. Marriages only succeed if the partners put aside other preferences for the sake of making the marriage work. In fact, human nature, or at least the human condition, is such that we would tend not to make the required sacrifice of our preference, if a commitment did not require us to do so. All other things being equal, it would not *appear* to us to be worth it to make the sacrifice. It truly is worth it, but it does not appear to us to be worth it, all other things being equal. But all other things are not equal, because we have made a permanent commitment that is very hard to get out of. Getting out of the commitment appears worse than making the sacrifice necessary to make the commitment work. So we make the sacrifice, and in the long run, we and the rest of society are *MUCH* better off for it.

Ethics - AA

2-20-92

The will makes things ends and means. So there must be a mapping, a conformity, an IDENTITY or lack of IDENTITY, between the way the will makes things, actions, etc. ends and means to ends and what things, actions, etc. ARE.

How can an act of the will conform or fail to conform to what reason knows about things? How can we tell whether a decision conforms or fails to conform to what reason knows about things? One way: the will causes a decision by causing an act of the intellect, a practical judgment: this is my good. That judgment is either true or false "speculatively," i.e., assuming that the speculative knowledge on which it is based is correct. The decision may lead to disaster, but it conforms to the speculative knowledge available to me.

So a judgment that X is good for me, that X will bring me to my ends, can be false. But that does not mean that morality is a matter of whether an act is self-fulfilling and perfecting. Morality measures, not X, the commanded external act, but the decision for X. The moral value of the decision does not consist in what it leads to outside of itself, but whether it conforms to its own finality of being in accord with reason. Now the fact that X is not in accord with the ends of a rational being produces the result that the decision for X does not conform to the ends of the decision-making faculty. But it is the latter nonconformity that constitutes moral evil per se.

SSR

3-6-92

Possible title: Sexuality: the Basis of Society. Or ... the Basis of Morality.

Poinsot

3-6-92

Wittgenstein criticizes some philosophical theories of how mental states explain linguistic behavior (including the behavior of talk about "meaning," "going on the right way in accordance with a rule," etc.). He criticizes some philosophical theories of mental states as explanations of linguistic behavior. But Poinsot's theory is designed to meet the very criticisms Wittgenstein raises. Poinsot's theory meets, either explicitly or implicitly, the very criticisms Wittgenstein raises.

Not that mental states are sufficient. We need empirical evidence of the connection between signs and that for which signs are used. I have discussed the nature of that evidence elsewhere. But for awareness of that evidence, mental states of Poinsot's type are sufficient.

Ethics

4-2-92

When I ask how I should evaluate something, what place it should have in my evaluations, I usually mean what place should it have in relation to my ends, what place should I give it in relation to my ends, what should it *be* in relation to my ends. The answer SHOULD be what place does it *have* in relation to my ends, what relation to my ends does it actually *have*, what *is* its relation to my ends, what *is* it in relation to my ends.

But does it make any sense to ask what my ends should be? That is, in the above paragraph, am I talking about my chosen ends and the place things have in relation to them or ends prior to choice? If there are no ends prior to choice, it seems there is no sense in asking what should my ends be, because there is no standard for them. If there are ends prior to choice, it seems there is no sense in asking what my ends should be, because I have no control over that anyway.

Actually, there are general ends prior to choice, and what they are together with what the possibilities for choice of concrete ends are determine what should be my concrete ends.

Describing ethics in terms of self-perfection appears to be counter-intuitive. Justice, for example, appears important because of what it does for the person who is owed something, not for the person who owes it. In fact, the paradox can be resolved and the self-perfecting character of ethics accounted for, but ordinary presentations of traditional ethics do NOT accomplish that.

Title: What Aquinas Did Not Tell Us about Ethics (Maybe he expected his self-proclaimed followers to think philosophically rather than to collate texts.)

SSR

4-7-92

Nature designed our bodies so that men and women could enter into a certain kind of union, could unite in a certain kind of way. Our function as men and women is to enter into a certain kind of union with our opposites. The union I am speaking of is not just that kind of union necessary for procreation. Nature designed our bodies to function in the union necessary both for procreation and the bringing up of children, the latter being the union that provides the years of necessary support when children are totally dependent on the care of others and the direction of others.

There is evidence that nature designed our bodies for that second union. People who refrain from using their sexuality before marriage have more sexual happiness than those who do not. The marriages of those who refrain from sex before marriage succeed and are thus able to supply the needs of children much more frequently than the marriages of those who do not refrain.

Could nature have designed it some other way? What other way? For example, could nature have separated the act of procreation from the attraction which unites people in marriage? Then the connection between the creation of the child and the support it needs would be accidental; it would not be guaranteed. Children would be born with no surety of having the support of their natural parents.

Given that nature has joined procreation with attraction between the sexes, could nature have designed us so that sex before marriage would not weaken marriage? To have done so would have been to disconnect sex from the emotional bond that forms between honeymooners, because that is one of the important things now lost by sex before marriage. But that connection is an important part of the connection between sex and the lasting union that provides for the needs of children. Designing some other way to create that emotional bond would, again, disconnect procreation from the support the procreated children need.

Where is the opposite evidence, the evidence against the proposition that nature designed us this way?

Infanticide

4-9-92

I have not found anyone who puts of the moral value of the child until it develops the ability to make rational decisions. But I will use that ability as my example for two reasons. One is that if the development of even that high level ability does not give the child a greater value than the zygote, then a fortiori the development of lesser abilities does not do so.

The other reason is that the issue we are dealing with concerns the ethical value of a rational decision, the decision to kill or not kill an infant. By hypothesis, the question is addressed to those who themselves have developed the ability to make rational decisions. So the question is the equality of the zygote with respect to those who can make ethical decisions. Even more, the standard by which we judge will either be one that our decisions must be measured against and so one that is independent of our decisions. Or, if it is not independent of our decisions, then the standard we use is a product of our ability to make decisions. So no other ability can be more determining of ethical value than the ability to make rational decisions, for if some other ability, e.g., reason, is more determining, then there is a standard prior to our choice.

If there is no such standard prior to our decisions, then what standard you use makes no difference. If the standard makes a difference, it must be applied equally to the zygote and the decider.

Ethics

4-9-92

Is an act evil because it prevents us from attaining the end of knowledge of God, or does an act prevent us from attaining that end because it is evil? Maybe this is a false dichotomy. The question arose this way:

A person does not need to know the theory of the rational appetite, etc., in order to make correct ethical decisions - any more than we need to know epistemology in order to make correct judgments. To grasp a self-evident truth, one does not have to go through the theory of self-evident truths in ones head. Ok what does one do when making an ethical decision? I want to say that a person non-theoretically and especially **non-reflectively** grasps that a decision would be an evil decision, would contradict the finality that is built into decisions. But what would she know explicitly when doing this?

Would she know, for instance, that this decision would contradict some **other** end, other than the end of the rational appetite as such, and therefore that this decision contradict the end of the rational appetite? That is, would she know that deciding for some act would prevent her from achieving the end of knowing God and therefore implicitly know that the decision for that act would be an evil decision?

I want to say that the decision is intrinsically evil and that the decision prevents us from knowing God because it is intrinsically evil; it is not evil because it prevents us from knowing God. But that can be still while the following is also true: the decision is intrinsically evil because the act decided on is evil; and the act decided on is evil because it prevents us from knowing God.

The problem with that is that no external act prevents us from knowing God. What prevents us from knowing God are voluntary acts; acts prevent us from knowing God only insofar as they emanate from the rational appetite and frustrate the end of the rational appetite. So I still need an account of what the person knows when she knows explicitly that this decision would be evil and so, implicitly, knows that the decision violates the finality of the rational appetite.

The frustration of procreation does not prevent us from knowing God, the voluntary frustration of procreation prevents us from knowing God. Why? Because a nature is a way of achieving a specific likeness of God. The perfection which a nature is oriented to achieving as its end is a specific way of being like God, and a nature is just as orientation to a specific way of being like God. So that if we voluntarily frustrate that orientation, we voluntarily prevent ourselves from achieving the likeness of God we are oriented to. Therefore, we voluntarily prevent ourselves from achieving the knowledge of God, because we voluntarily turn away from God as the end of the action of procreation.

So the fact that God is our end can enter the analysis of why the chosen act is evil without our making the evil of the decision external to the decision. The decision to frustrate procreation would treat the sex act, our nature, and God, as if they were not what they are. So that decision would also frustrate the finality of the will itself.

(She knows she is treating things as if they were not what they are. She knows she is not giving things the evaluation due them by what they are because she knows she is evaluating them to be other than what they are.)

What does she know? She knows that the sex act has the end of achieving a certain kind of perfection. If she uses the sex act contrarily, she treats the sex act as if it were not what it is. I.e., if she uses it for some other end, or in a way that frustrates that end, she knows she is treating it as if it were not what it is.

Liberal/Conservative

4-30-92

The riots after the Rodney King beating acquittal. One person says "This event is going to make a million converts for David Duke." Another person says "This is going to convince a lot of blacks and other people that the system doesn't work for blacks in this country."

Science and Rity

5-7-92

In the Boston Globe's 4-4-92 article on the COBE-Smoot big bang ripple discovery, it describes the inflation theory as saying the inflation went faster than the speed of light. And it says that this does not contradict relativity because the speed of light limits things in space, while the expansion affected space itself.

But doesn't speed not only limit things in space but *measure* things in space, so that it wouldn't make any sense to apply the same standard of measurement to space itself? Speed measures change within space, so how can it measure change that does not take place internally to space but affects space as a whole?

Short Book

7-25-89

This book is addressed to all graduate students in philosophy, perhaps to all first-year graduate students in philosophy. Perhaps it should bear the dedication: To all graduate students or first-year graduate students in philosophy. This book is what your undergraduate education did not tell you.

7-25-89

Have an appendix entitled "A Second Course in Philosophy: What your first course (as opposed to your undergraduate education) didn't tell you." The appendix would be for future teachers and would point them to articles they could use to supplement their introductory anthology, e.g., Gurvitch's article on the conceptual consciousness, that is, point them to non-Thomistic articles wherever possible.

7-25-89

Have another appendix with the most student-accessible articles for an advanced course in philosophy, e.g., Simon's article on Maritain's philosophy of science, my stuff on ethics, my intro to Causal Realism, Dennehy's stuff on Reason and Value, etc.

Your Responsibility to the Accuracy of this Schedule

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Any comments or corrections should be sent immediately to Paul MacDonald at DICKNS::MACDONALD (DTN 223-3439). Thank you.