

Truth, Dummett, Jul. 16, 96

The question of whether we have a concept of truth apart from a way of determining truth is less important if in fact we can know the truth.

Course idea, Jul. 16, 96

Have a course showing what is unique to Thomism in the solution to philosophical problems. I.e., a course showing the alternatives that Thomism offers but no one else offers. Use Adler's list (see Deal) and Maritain's Introduction to Philosophy. Also use the similarities between The Degrees of Knowledge and current philosophies of science to show the superiority of Maritain's approach, e.g., he can say with Quine that scientific truth applies to theories as a whole, because he has another absolute standard of truth. And he can distinguish the aspects of quantum mechanics that do and do not have ontological weight.

Spatial Relations, Jun. 1, 96

Does it makes sense to speak of a particle, or any body, as "capable of being in such or such a place"? Is there any place a particle is not capable of being in? What potency of the body is fulfilled when it comes into a certain place? One is the potency of being at rest. But are rest and motion only relative? Relative to what?

Perhaps the apparent relativity of place makes no difference. I am trying to replace spatial relations with something else, because a mere change in place does not seem to affect a thing internally. It doesn't matter to the apparent superfluity of spatial relations whether they are or are not only relative. Therefore causal relations can be relative in the sense that the same effect would occur by the universe's moving relative to me, me moving relative to it, or each moving relative to the other. The important thing is that any one of these three models for change can bring about an "internal" alteration in the sense that the environment now has different effects on me, and I on it.

Smith, Mar. 19, 96

Smith is scary not just because you can't base theology on his methods, you can't base life, society, and moral life on any kind of standards.

Ben Cogen questions, Rity questions, science questions, May. 14, 96

In General Rity, does the unity of space and time in one continuum depend on multiplying by an imaginary number or on some other mathematical trick?

Abort 3, AA May. 14, 96

Mulcare: change "fetus" to "embryo" on p. 21

If Z's weren't oriented to human ends, contra Ford, we wouldn't be and couldn't be. If Z weren't oriented to the end of making itself into an "ontological" individual, the ontological individual could not exist. The ontological individual is just a mature state that the Z makes itself into. If the Z weren't oriented toward acquiring an "intrinsic" finality, that kind of finality could not come into existence.

Rational knowledge explanation may need beefing up.

Explain that what makes an "ontological individual" for Ford is that twinning is no longer possible (but why not say when having split personalities is no longer possible?).

Add DeMarco to the acknowledgements in the published proofs. And add C. before Kischer's name. Add Warren Kay.

Replace "However, I am not arguing about other species. . ." with "However, I do not need to argue about. . ." in footnote 7.

Replace "Pain is negative. . . other things being equal" with "Pain is usually considered of negative value"

First sentence: When do human infants acquire the kind of value for ethics that makes killing human adults wrong?

replace "that is, I am not discussing cases where two lives of equal value" with "or any case where two lives of equal value"

What does the fetus depend on outside help for? For making itself into. . . Contrast the chimp who depends on outside help for the ability to make itself into.

(Ford) These are all stages called for by the design that exists in the zygote.

Twinning: It is oriented to produce too few daughters to be oriented to making itself into one and only one human adult....too few daughters before the ZP ruptures to continue to be oriented to the eventual achievement of only one set of human ends.

A glance at the nature of value shows that. . .

She is just as responsible for the death of the F as she is of the violinist.

The mother only determines that the cell produce this kind of protein or that. She doesn't put the control genes that she puts on there, nor does she put the control gene that produces this kind of protein there.

When does it become wrong to kill a twinning cell or group of cells? When conditions occur that. . . or when it begins acting toward its own. . .?

The first unit whose causal dispositions embody a design for producing a complete human being.

Human Nature, Mar. 19, 96

Human nature governs what the zygote can become, what we can become. There is a structure in us and in the zygote governing what we can become, a structure defining what we can become, controlling what we can become.

Even after we have become it, or in some cases have failed to become it, the structure governing what we were designed to become remains, the structure defining what we were designed to become remains. And we remain what we have actually become only as long as the underlying structure supports what we have become, only as long as the underlying structure is there supporting what we have become and governing our ability to continue in existence as what we have become, governing our ability to maintain ourselves in existence as what we have become.

That structure is not just the genome, but the structure of being a whole causal system, a unit causal system, whose most fundamental causal dispositions embody a design for maintaining itself in existence as an entity oriented to human ends at the most basic level.

Human nature = Being a unit causal system whose causal orientations orient it to, whose design as a unit orients it to. Human nature is the nature of being a unit causal system whose most fundamental causal dispositions orient to be, to maintain itself in existence as . . .



Abortion article, thoughts to go back to before finishing it, Jun. 23, 95

Feb. 1, 96

Is it conceivable that reality impose any limit on the value of our choices? If the existence of the orientation to human ends cannot impose such a limit, nothing can. If an ethician wants to hold that reality cannot impose such a limit, then all things are allowable.

After Archiving: Aug. 16, 95

Jim O'Rourke's reader: Bob Augros

Do my statements about the presence of the genome contradict what I say about fertilization being the start?

Tape worms - fragmentation. Mushrooms - spores. Some weeds put out shoots. Can take clippings from some plants; put it water; the clippings will sprout roots; can plant the sprouted clippings and they will grow.

Shorten the paragraph about the fetus being, like us, in a life-threatening condition called "life."

Take out the Tchaikovsky quote, and maybe that whole paragraph.

The question is whether a 5-year old's future achievement of ends is less important than a 10-year old's future achievement of ends. Is one's achievement of end of less value than the other's.

The opponent will say that value is measured by the ends they can achieve now. The 5-year old can't achieve the ends a 10-year old can, but they both can achieve personal ends. So as soon as personal ends are achievable, they have moral value. But that is just a decision on the part of the opponent, a decision achieving some end to which the zygote is also oriented.

Start off consciousness section be referring to "some degree" of consciousness, or some form of consciousness.

Delete the paragraph at the end of the consciousness section contrasting the subject of consciousness to the deliverances of consciousness.

Is something the same entity as before? The real question is, for what purposes shall we consider something the same entity. What should our criteria be, and what purposes define the "should." We can have different purposes in different contexts. The opponent will grant that zygotes share all the same purposes. She will try to say that only some purposes are relevant for deciding if the zygote is a moral peer. For example, the zygote certainly is not now a great violinist, even if she is oriented to become one. Maybe there are purposes for which we can say that the Z is not now a moral peer. Sure there are, but they are self-interested purposes, not moral purposes. And even if not "self-"interested, they are not moral, since they serve the interests only of a selected group.

Concerning a universal definition of "complete causal system . . .". Move the

sentence about its being the facts summarized, not the usefulness of similar phrases elsewhere, that is important up next to the sentence about we need not do that here. Then start the sentence about clear cases with "And."

The position that memor makes us the same agent confuses the means of knowing, memory, with that which is known. Memory makes us aware of past conscious states, but we have conscious states only because we are pre-consciously oriented to them.

Possibly footnote the "speculative question" paragraph. But if so, watch out for the later use of that phrase, introduced as "another" speculative question.

The possession of more abilities to achieve ends does not make a 10-year-old's achievement of ends more important, or of more value, than a 5-year-old's.

Additional abilities do not make my achievement of ends of greater value than someone else's. The ends may be of greater value in some respects, e.g., artistic value, but those respects are not the measure of moral value.

Refer to the mechanisms, plural, not singular, of twinning. And concerning the "and" or "or" theories of active dispositions for twinning. Perhaps put a footnote at the end of the discussion of both possibilities. The footnote would say that the way we could tell the difference between them would not be that we could identify one twin as the continuation of the original fetus, since the twins are identical after the split. Rather, the distinction would come from the kind of mechanism that existed before the split and produced the split or produced the primitive streak. All you have to say is that even though the twins afterwards are identical, we might be able to distinguish the "and"/"or" cases by the previously existing mechanism that produced the effect of twinning or of the primitive streak.

Jul. 28, 95

One more thing that a preamble can say about a hypothetical complete ethical system. To be consistent with the presuppositions of any ethics, the system must make the risk of unjustly killing a possible complete human agent a greater risk than that of unjustly depriving a woman of choice over her own body. How it assigns these relative values would be a test for any ethical system to pass before it need be considered any further.

The issue here is the evil of treating something of equal moral value as if it were not of equal moral value. The precise reason why killing is wrong is not a future like ours. Even equality is only a sufficient reason. A complete ethics need not make equality the most important reason.

The dependence of the rape child on the mother only increases the baby's claim to the mother's help.

If an adult chooses to kill a zygote, the adult is saying that her orientation to ends is more important than the zygotes orientation to ends. Whatever means do, they do not make my orientation to ends more important than the zygotes, because the only measure of importance is the orientation to ends, and we have the same orientation to ends.

Concerning rational choice as the central feature: Whatever features the adult has in addition to choice, they cannot justify abortion, if the future value achieved by killing the Z is no greater than that the future value the Z is oriented to. And no matter what other features the adult has, the Z is oriented to features of equal value. Also, rational choice presupposes all the features necessary for rational choice.

Not only is a definition of a complete causal system that would exclude the zygote arbitrary, more importantly, it is not needed for purposes of deciding the ethical value of the zygote. The facts about the Z that I have summarized by the phrase "complete causal system" are decisive for ethics, whatever the value of that phrase elsewhere.

Utilitarianism might justify killing a fetus, but it cannot justify the fetus's not being a moral equal until later in its development. Even utilitarianism must count the fetus in the number for which the greatest good of the greatest number is calculated.

Same causal system, unlike the sperm-ovum-mother: don't say the ends are its; say the mature features are its and are not features of the sperm-ovum-mother.

Utilitarianism: how can killing the fetus be the greater good, when we are cancelling a whole normal human lifetime of achievement? Answer: alleged external conditions, such as economic conditions, make its attainment of ends cost too much for others. But unless it is killing others, how can the cost be too much? And where is it actually killing people? Maybe the predictions of over-population may someday come true, but while people have tried to justify abortion on those predictions, the history of the past two-hundred years shows that those killings were tragically unjustified even on utilitarian grounds.

I am approaching abortion from the viewpoint of things that any ethical theory must presuppose at the most fundamental level. I could not credibly do this if my case depended on casuistic distinctions.

After violinist and F are equal before the V gets attached: The dependence of the F on the mother is the reason Thomson does not consider their equality before the mother takes the action that will certainly kill both.

We would be willing to put up with nine months of torturous labor, if that were required to finish work on the mine that would make us rich.

If the zygote were not oriented to the future achievement of human ends, we could not be so oriented.

Where is that line that used to start "There are only two possibilities; either . . . .

Can the opponent claim to measure the sameness of the temporally extended causal system only by its so-called "immediate" effects? How does one measure that?

Can the opponent say that memory defines the "same" causal system? In addition to the arguments against consciousness, there is the following problem for the opponent: memory tells me that the same being preconsciously oriented to my current conscious states was oriented to the conscious states memory makes me

aware of. If that is not what memory claims to tell us, then memory has nothing to do with the sameness of the causal system, because the conscious states memory makes us aware of are not the same as my present conscious states. The only thing that could be the same is what memory claims to be the same, namely, the preconscious subject of the conscious states. It is understandable that our philosophical training gives us a professional bias toward the epistemological over the ontological. But to define the deliverances of memory in terms of the means by which they are delivered, namely, by consciousness, is a reflection of that bias.

"Why be moral?" can have a speculative philosophical meaning. It can also have the practical meaning of how serious should we be about basing our behavior on what we know about the moral equality of others. For example, some opponents of the death penalty reluctantly prefer it in situations where the possibility of parole exists. They would say that those who would parole first-degree murders aren't sufficiently serious about affirming the moral value of justice by making that the rule of their decision. Their point, whatever its merit, is not just that rehabilitation is more important than justice to those who would parole. Their point, whatever its merit, would be that no one is truly rehabilitated in the moral sense unless they can see the justice of life imprisonment, and so they are not really rehabilitated if they seek parole. And the failure of the parolers to see that such prisoners are not rehabilitated demonstrates the paroler's lack of sufficient concern for justice.

And if being moral is not what's guiding our decision to, for example, kill fetuses but not adults, what is guiding it? Personal preference of some kind.

Before Jul. 28, 95

Perhaps start the last section this way. How does my argument address those who justify abortion even if the fetus is a person? Is it possible to evaluate their arguments without leaving the preamble to ethics and following the causistic disputes down all the labyrinthine ways generated by the problem of when we are permitted to kill our moral equals? Or rather, the casuistry comes from attempts to find moral significance in the asymmetry between the mother and the fetus. Here's one way out. Since the working hypothesis is that the fetus is a person, we can put the following words in her mouth.

What if it was the woman who put the V in danger of death by her knowing choice to do something that would, if not kill him, at least put him in the danger of death that he is now in. So before this deliberate act on her part, the V was not in danger of death. Would the woman have the responsibility to keep him alive? Yes. But the F is not now in danger of death. In that respect, the F is exactly like the V before the woman acted against the interests of the V. Since the moral value of the F's life is equal to that of the V's, the woman has just as much responsibility not to act against the F's interests now, and therefore to keep the F connected to her, as she did not to act against the V's interests before the V was connected to her.

Since the assumption is that the F is a person, we can imagine the F saying the following to the the mother: In what way are you treating my life as if its value were the moral equal of yours. You say that the mere fact of our equality does not mean that you can't expel me, even though that means my certain death. Is that doing on to others what you would have them do onto you? You say I am

an intruder, a parasite. But so were you. You only have the ability to kill me now because another former parasite, your mother, did not let your being a parasite prevent you from living. In what sense are you treating me equally if you don't let me live? You say that the equality of human organisms does not give one the obligation to be a good Samaritan to another. But we're not talking about the obligation to, for instance, let me develop my musical talent by giving me violin lessons. We're talking about my very life.

You say you don't have to go to extremes to save my life. You ask what if I already were a great violinist. But you would have the obligation to go to extremes, if you were responsible for the violinist's being in danger of death. You could even be locked up for much more than your example's hypothetical nine years. If you were not obligated to go to extremes when you were responsible for his condition, in what way would his life be the moral equal of yours. Well, I am like the violinist before you attacked him, because my life is not now in danger. I am much more like a siamese twin than like the violinist. Like a siamese twin, I am not doing anything that would be unjust if I were fully rational, as the violinist would be doing if you were not responsible for his condition.

You say I am unlike a siamese twin because I am the result of rape. But do you have the right to kill the rapist now that the rape is over and self-defense is not an issue? Then why kill me? I am part of the burden the rapist inflicted on you. But if that burden does not call for the death penalty against him, why does it call for the death penalty against me. Perhaps you would have had the right to kill him at the time of the attack [BUT NOT IMMEDIATELY AFTER, WHICH IS THE HYPOTHESIS HERE. THE F ONLY EXISTS IF THE RAPIST WAS SUCCESSFUL. NO, THE SELF-DEFENSE COULD TAKE PLACE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RAPE, AFTER THE RAPIST PLACED SPERM IN THE VAGINA]. Likewise, after the attack, you would have had the right to prevent my conception. But if you tried to and failed, my existence is part of the continuing burden he inflicted on you. For example, even if you succeeded in killing him, he may have left psychological scars that last for life. But you have the right to try to get rid of those scars, because doing so would not be correcting a horrible wrong by another horrible wrong, killing me.

In assuming that the woman is responsible for the violinist's condition, I am assuming that what she did to put him in that condition is the same thing that abortion does to the F. So how is the F's life of equal moral value to the violinist's, ie., before the violinist was harmed.

We can invent other tricky cases that appear to justify the mother's killing the fetus. But as long as the mother's life isn't being saved, we know beforehand that, as in the case of the violinist, we are in some surreptitious way suppressing the moral equality between the mother's life and the fetus's. Either that, or we are accepting a "the interests of those who have the might" ethic. For the mother will be doing something she would not want others doing to her.

The casuistry only comes up if the mother's life is at stake. And if the casuistic distinctions can't do the jobs they are intended to do, as Thomson and Davis seem to think, then, contrary to Davis, we can't kill the fetus to save the mother. (That is Davis's big assumption, namely, that abortion opponents must permit the mother to save her own life by taking the fetus's.)

Millions of lives have been lost because philosophers did not recognize beforehand where the benefit of the doubt must lie. The answer to that question derives, not from the metaphysical question of whether the fetus is a person or not, but from an analysis of the only nonarbitrary basis for moral values.

How can biological categories bestow value? If they can't, then the abortionist can't use biological facts to justify killing. But that is what the abortion defender does.

Calling the fetus an intruder or parasite is analogous to the old curmudgeon's attitude toward children: he refuses to acknowledge that the once deserved the kind of treatment he would now deny to children.

The rapist is like an intruder who destroys your property in a search for gold. When he leaves and you justly punish him for the intrusion and destruction, you also have the benefit of the gold mine that he built on your property. For since the fetus's moral value is equal to that of ours, the value of the fetus is equivalent to that of the "gold mine" that the value of an adult human being amounts to.

And unlike the rapist, it is not unjust for the fetus to be there. Is the rapist like someone who trains a child to trespass? A Fagan? But we do not kill trespassers. Thomson does not treat the child as a moral equal or treat his life as having binding dignity.

Why is equivalence of moral value measured by the "kind" of ends, the sameness in the "kind" of ends? The alternative is to measure the moral value of the fetus against the concrete individual ends the decider of the issue "what value does the fetus have?" has chosen to seek in answering that question.

Maybe bring up the fact that you are not arguing for the personhood or the humanity of the fetus at the end of the section on consciousness. For appeals to consciousness as determining moral value usually come up in discussions of whether the fetus is a person or not. I am not arguing that the fetus is a person, but my argument against the relevance of consciousness would apply if instead of speaking of personhood, they were speaking of the moral equality of the fetus.

Go back over Davis, Cudd, and probably Thomson for points you should pick up on and for references. For example, Davis or Cudd talks about "conflicts of interest" between the mother and the fetus in a way that may appear to nullify the way you set up the problem in the introduction, i.e., if we can settle conflicts of interest between ourselves and an adult by killing the adult . . . , and minimal ethical standards concern conflicts of interest, etc.

I am not just arguing that it is the same individual (Grisez). I am arguing that this same individual is already, from the beginning oriented to the future achievement of the same kinds of ends that give whatever value they have to an adult's future choices.

And see blue paragraph in Grisez, p. 37 on whether the sperm, ovum, and the mother constitute a causal system.

It could be argued that the rights of infants extend to whatever ends they are capable of pursuing at their stage of development.

Since all I am showing is the hypothetical that zygotes have the right to life in adults do, the question for ethics proper, not just the preamble, is whether human adults do indeed have the right to life. Make that statement in the last section and say the answer involves our beliefs about the dignity of the person.

If I choose a point after conception, I am valuing the infant by the ends I am achieving by that choice, not by her ends. So I am subordinating my ends to her own. Opponent: but what if the end I am seeking is truth or conformity of decisions with reason's knowledge? Well, isn't the zygote oriented to those ends also? If I mistakenly think that the zygote isn't, my subordination of her ends is inculpable. But if I know she is oriented to those ends and still choose a point after conception for her moral value, then I am culpable of subordinating her ends to mine.

The moment before conception, the ovum is surrounded by many sperm. Only one complete human causal system will result, or if the ovum is not fertilized, no complete human causal system will result. But which complete human causal system will result depends on which sperm fertilizes the ovum. If sperm A fertilizes the egg a different complete human causal system will exist than if sperm B fertilized the egg.

The humanness of the organism is complete in the decisive sense that everything specifically human about the way the present and future causal dispositions of the organism will respond to the influences of its environment will be the effect of the active causal dispositions the organism possesses when it exists at the zygote stage (from the moment of fertilization). By having those causal dispositions, the organism is oriented to make itself into a being with mature human characteristics. It causes itself to acquire those characteristics, and so those characteristics are effects of the dispositions that exist in the zygote.

Like all causes, the zygote's causality is a response to causal influences in its environment. But everything specifically human in the organism's responses to its environment come from the set of causal dispositions that exist completely in the zygote and not before.

This answers a question posed by my statement that neither the sperm nor the ovum is just an environmental condition necessary for the complete human causality of the other gamete. It could be asked how we can distinguish the causality of the sperm or ovum from just being an environmental condition for the causality of the other. We can make the distinction because each contributes specifically human causal components to the other.

A complete human causal system: It lacks none of the active dispositions it needs to be the first stage in (an organism needs at the first stage in) the existence of a causal system that causes itself to become an achiever of human ends (just as we cause ourselves to become achievers of human ends). It causes itself to become an achiever of human ends by means of the design for a complete human being that it embodies. The structure (design) of the zygote constitutes a design for a complete human causal system, a causal system designed to cause itself to become an achiever of human ends.

Every tissue in the body, not just specifically human ones, will be produced by . . . , will be the effect of . . .

If the possibility of twinning shows that the zygote is not an agent oriented to human ends, then adults are not either. For any of our cells could be cloned.

I need not discuss whether "innocence" discusses such cases as sleepwalkers, the insane, or children who unknowingly and involuntarily threaten others. The concept of innocence at least extends to the rational, voluntary behavior of adults. If those adults have the right to life, so do infants.

I need not discuss many questions about human "ends", not just the question of specifying what they are. I am not presupposing that there is a predefined set of human ends, or that there is an ultimate end, etc., etc.

Last section: We constantly hear "The embryo is not a person," "Human life does not begin until . . .," "The beginning of human life is a religious question." (I have not relied on the concepts of person or human life.) These justifications for abortion imply that there is something morally special about personhood or human life. What the pro-abortion rights person should say is that the reason abortion is alright is that there is nothing special about a human being. Nothing in what a human being is imposes restrictions on our choices.

We might not want to tell that to the general public. We might not want to disabuse them of the idea that the reason the woman has the right to choose is that being an adult human being bestows on her a value that restricts our choice concerning the value of her unborn infant. Not to worry. There is nothing wrong with allowing her to be deceived. If we can kill her, surely we can lie to her.

Maybe start last section this way: Many of the justifications offered for killing the Z, even if the Z is a person, would justify the Z killing the mother, if it could. Likewise, some of the justifications for its being ok to kill innocent adults would justify the Z's killing the mother, if it could. Of course, these are not just contrary to fact conditionals, they are contrary to possibility conditionals. But the reason they are contrary to possible is facts about the Z, fact's about the assymetry between the Z' and the mother's assymetry which give us more responsibility to the Z, since the Z cannot protect its own interests.

The justifications are those of the technical or causal guilt of the Z. But maybe these only come up when the mother's life is at stake. And when the mother's life is at stake, does Aquinas's "you can do what is necessary to preserve your own life without intending to kill the other" apply to justify the what the mother does?

Maybe begin last section this way: I have not shown that innocent adults have the right to life. Of course, not all writers on abortion assume that it is unjust to take the life of an innocent adult. E.g., Thompson, and maybe Davis and Gillespie. But those who do not make it unjust to kill an adult still give the preference to the woman, as if she had the greater right to life.

Maybe begin last section: Some say mature features are not the key to the right to life but whether or not the infant is outside of the mother's body. Respond that life is more important than choice. Then say an objection more relevant to my argument is that even if the Z were a person, we can kill it, because of assymetry with the mother. Respond that we have more responsibility to the infant because of the assymetry. This does not mean we have to prefer the infant's life to the mother's, when both lives are at stake. For when both lives are at stake, the very existence of moral value is at stake.

Maybe conclude that the abortion dispute is really about the nature of ethics: are values absolute or relative, i.e., is the value of the human being absolute or relative, is the adult's right to life absolute or relative? If relative, there could be two different reasons for saying so: either there are absolute



values, but the life of an innocent adult is not one of them; or there are no absolute values. But if human life is not an absolute value, there can be no absolute values. So the real question is are all values relative to something else?

Other ways of putting it if the abortion dispute is really about the nature of moral, that is, human, values: are all imperatives hypotheical, or are some categorical; is choice itself the highest value -- as it must be if choice is more important than life?

Can I say that what I am really doing is clarifying the nature of the dispute for both sides?

Maybe begin the last section: For example, deontologists and utilitarians can hardly be expected to be swayed by all of the same arguments on abortion.

For a person who says it is always unjust to kill an innocent adult, it is enough to establish the Z's equality. But for a person who permits killing innocent adults for some reasons, the Z's equality is not enough.

If utilitarianism is correct, the value of an individual human being is her contribution to the greatest good of the greatest number of human beings, whether or not she is included in that number.

The anti-abortionist can point to the mother's relationships, when preferring her life to that of the unborn's. But the utilitarian has a hard time justifying sparing a short time of human accomplishment by terminating a life time of human accomplishment. (Quote Finnis to this effect.)

Maybe sum up the "is it the same organism" section, not with the question: what more could it do to be an organism that makes itself into . . . ", but with the statement that if these facts don't make it the same organism than either an adult is not the same organism or being the same organism is not necessary for being an agent oriented to human ends for the purposes of our question.

Must explain that my disclaimer about rights means that I need not worry about the logic of "rights talk."

Need a footnote (to Gewirth and perhaps to Simon) indicating that I know the ends/means distinction is not absolute, i.e., the fact that it is not does not affect my argument.

Ask Chris Watters and/or Peter Cataldo:

Names of plants that can be divided in to and then grown. Also names of worms?

Can we call a one-celled living thing an organism? Can we call the Z that?

Where can I get the latest on twinning?

Is there a word that covers the conceptus from fertilization to birth? I.e., something more inclusive than "fetus" or "embryo."

Do red blood cells produce protein?

Are both twins within the amniotic sack?

Science and Rity, Jan. 1, 96

Why can't we guess at the hidden essence of physical things? Because to do so would require ontological concepts, and ontological concepts do not descend to that level of detail. The cannot get to the detail of phenomena because of the causal opacity of empirical concepts (see Causal Realism).

Internet, Alice Phalen, Aug. 11, 95

Software Tool and Die, Brookline

Ethics, murder, suicide, value of life, Jun. 12, 95

On the morality of suicide, notice that a murderer does not have the right to take his own life in self-punishment.

Self-consciousness, Jul. 28, 95 2nd last paragraph BIG

Our conscious states make us aware of the existence of other things and of ourselves. They make us aware of ourselves, however, as the agent from which our conscious states emerge. They make us aware of our conscious states as emanating from the being who is aware of them, because awareness of our conscious states, unlike awareness of things other than ourselves, consists of awareness of their relation of emanation from their source. Awareness of that emanation is the reason why we are aware of ourselves and is what constitutes the difference between awareness of things other than ourselves and awareness of our conscious states. Since our awareness of ourselves as conscious beings consists of our awareness of the active producer of our conscious states, conscious states makes us aware of ourselves as preconsciously oriented to the existence of conscious states. For we are unconscious before causing the conscious states through which we are aware of our existence.

If this were not what our self-consciousness consists of, we would have to ask how we know that the being who is (1) aware of X (something other than ourselves) is the same being who is (2) aware of awareness-of-X, since X is not the same thing as awareness-of-X. Awareness (2) reveals the existence of the being who has awareness (1). But why must the being who has awareness (1) be the same being who has awareness (2)? The answer must lie in the way awareness (2) makes us aware of awareness (1), as opposed to the way awareness (1) makes us aware of X. X is not the same thing as awareness of X. But awareness of awareness-of-X must be part of the same thing that is awareness-of-X. Awareness (2) must be just a development of a consciousness already present in awareness (1) a development therefore necessarily possessed only by the same being that possesses awareness (1). Otherwise, the way awareness (2) makes us aware of its object would not be such that the object of awareness (2) has to be the same being as the subject of awareness (2), the being from whom awareness (2) emanates. "Self"-consciousness must consist in essential part, of awareness of the necessary connection between the object and subject of awareness (2), or, in other words, between subject of awareness (1) and the subject of awareness (2). The word "self" must refer to a being who possesses consciousness of another being. But that consciousness must be also include an awareness of its subject precisely as its subject. And that awareness of subject as subject must be such that it can develop into an awareness of the subject as object, a developed awareness that includes the same awareness of the subject as subject that the original awareness of the other included. How is it that awareness (1) makes us aware of the subject of awareness (1) precisely as being the subject of that awareness and does it in such a way that when the subject of awareness (1) makes awareness (1) the object of awareness (2), its awareness of itself as the subject of awareness (2) is the same awareness of itself as subject that it had in awareness (1)? The state of possessing awareness (1) must be a state that includes awareness of itself, and further awareness of the state of possessing awareness (1) must be only a development to the awareness of itself included in the state of possessing awareness (1). But a development needs to be caused. And awareness (2) could not include the awareness that the subject and object of awareness (2) were the same, if awareness (2) were caused by a different agent from awareness (1). Nor is it sufficient that it be the same agent, since an agent can produce acts with no connection to one another except that of having the same agent. So the causality of awareness (2) must be so connected to the causality of awareness (1) that it is an extension of the causality by which awareness (1) came about. Therefore the subject not only possesses these awarenesses, but possesses them because it causes them.

For us to be aware that the subject and object of awareness (2) are the same, awareness (2) must be a conscious development of awareness (1). It must be consciously developed from (1). It must develop from (1) consciously. For we must be aware that it is a development of (1) just be having (2). So the causing of that development must be conscious. And for the awareness of the causing of that development to avoid all the same problems, the causing of (1) and (2) must be conscious and our consciousness of it must be included in awarenesses 1 and 2 as constitutive parts. So awareness 1 and 2 must consist, in part, of awareness of their own causal emanation from a subject.

The reason why I know that the being who is aware of X is the same being who is aware of the awareness-of-X is that both my awareness of awareness-of-X and my awareness of who has that awareness-of-X consist of my awareness of the emanation of awareness of X from that being, whom I happen to call "myself."

Aug. 4, 95

To find the lost handwritten notes, look in computer-related folders, e.g., Carroll's Paradox and Formal Systems folders, places where you would have argued against computers having consciousness.

Self-consciousness, computers, Adler-U, Aug. 4, 95

How ask the computer questions to get true answers: If there is an . . . , say yes. E.g., is there an existent that is square? Yes. Among the kinds of things whose existence you know, is there something that is square? Yes.

Then ask about consciousness. Is there something that is self-reflexive? Is there knowledge? Is there knowledge of knowledge? Is there knowledge of knowledge that is not separate from the knowledge of which it is knowledge. Is there a knowledge that a computer causes knowledge? Yes. But is that knowledge of a computer's causality something that is not separate from the causality itself? Something that needs no other computer states than the knowledge itself?

Are there matter-form unions? Yes? Are there states of affairs involving matter form unions as the basis and terms of relations, but which relations go beyond being matter form unions?

In the questions, replicate the way we become aware of philosophical truths about consciousness, e.g., the truth that self-awareness is not a distinct act from other awareness; that awareness begins where matter-form unions end. We go through a process of steps to learn these things. The steps can be represented by yes/no questions. Those questions can be asked a computer. Eg. we can give the computer definitions which we learn before being able to analyse consciousness and which we negate to analyse consciousness correctly. But the negation is based on positive awareness of consciousness, an awareness that delivers the evidence on the basis of which the negations are required.

Authority, Simon, Common Good, Jul. 25, 95

Maybe all the Simon proves (but perhaps all he needs to prove) is that in a perfect society, e.g., in heaven, anyone could hold the office that decides the common good materially considered, since everyone would reach the same conclusion about the common good materially considered. Since they are perfectly virtuous and perfectly intelligent, they would all have to reach the same conclusion. Still, the judgment about the common good materially considered has to be made. So either everyone gathers and spends their time on it, which would be a waste of time, or a subset spends their time figuring out where the material common good lies. That frees the rest of them to pursue the individual goods on which the common good depends.

HU, Jul. 8, 95

Why can't existence be that which makes essence a cause? Because the problem began with a need to get a distinction between the feature by which essence is an efficient cause and the feature by which it is a material cause, and both features need to be existents. They need to be something which exists, not existence itself. For in any case of causality, the efficient cause needs to be "something which exists" and so does the material cause. In fact, the problem could have been originally stated in those terms. The need for an efficient cause is the need for something, some existent, some that which exists, distinct from that which exists when the material cause exists.

But maybe the problem is: why isn't subsistence just another accident, the first accident from which all others follow? Would that reduce the hypostatic union to something on the accidental level, and is that ruled out? Maybe the answer is in something like Maritain's treatment of subsistence. Essence is a cause of its effects in the order of specification and materiality. Subsistence makes essence a cause in the order of exercise. Specification and materiality are consistent, perhaps, because the specification takes place by essence's being a material cause for certain accidents and not others. Essence is also a material cause and cause in the order of specification relative to existence. But it cannot receive existence and have its material and specifying causality toward its necessary accidents not exercised at the same time. So it must not only receive existence but must be in a state of exercise relative to its accidents. That state is a state of causality on the substantial level, a state of causality preceding the accidental level because essence receives the state of exercise the way it receives existence. That is, its being material and specifying relative to subsistence is on the same side as its materiality and specificity relative to existence, the side that precedes the actuation of its materiality and specificity relative to accidents.



Self-consciousness, memory versus imagination, Jul. 7, 95

In remembering event X, I not only remember X, I remember myself experiencing X. That is what distinguishes memory from imagination. Also, I can remember myself imagining X; that is different from remembering myself experiencing X. For "self," put something like: in remembering event X, the agent that consciously causes the act of remembering not only remembers X but remembers the agent that now consciously causes the act of remembering consciously causing the act of being aware of undergoing the action of X.

AI, Alder-U, Turing Test, Jun. 2, 95

I need a question to ask a machine about consciousness to get an honest answer.  
"Are you (the machine) capable of having a relation to X that is more than a matter-form relation to X (e.g., to a shape on the retina)? Are you (the machine) equipped to be able to answer a question like the last question?

Also, see Henle's New Scholasticism article on scientists who deny the existence of consciousness. One wants to ask them what is this consciousness whose existence they are denying. Can we ask a machine to tell us whether they are right; does any consciousness exist? And can we ask a machine what this thing they are denying is; or can we tell the machine what it is so that the machine can tell us whether those scientists are right? Maybe the very inability to so formulate a question for a machine tells us something about consciousness and about whether consciousness is something a machine can have.

Ethics, Aquinas, object specifying acts, innocent life, intrinsic evil, Mar. 14,  
95

See evilacts file

Substance, substantial form, form, discrete quantity, continuous quantity, Feb.  
24, 95

Just as form can be multiplied by discrete quantity, when form is "present in every part of a substance," the form is spread out by continuous quantity, but the form is of the same character at each point in the spread. So we can either say that it is the same form at each point or that at each point there is now a part of the form with the same character.

Italian article, Feb. 19, 95

Things that can be deleted: The intuition of being paragraph. The paragraphs on "logic: having the same basic meaning for W and M. But make sure those paragraphs are not where you define "objectify." The clause "Although W does not emphasize. . ." Then change the rest of the sentence to refer to "this point."

Delete: "Nowhere in these discussions does he. . ."

Induction, probability, logic, logical knowledge, Feb. 14, 95 BIG

I discover a new mathematical or logical proof today. If it is short enough, then at the time that I discover it, I know its validity and the truth of its conclusion. The next day I may wonder whether it really was a proof, so I go through it again. Now, I again have knowledge of its validity and of the truth of its conclusion.

At some point, I will acquire another kind of knowledge. I will know that it is unreasonable to believe that yesterday and the days before I did not have knowledge of the validity of the proof and the truth of its conclusion. At some point, I will know that it would be pathological not to believe that yesterday and the days before I had that mathematical or logical knowledge. I do not have to be able to say when this other kind of knowledge began, however. That is, I need not be able to say when the point in question was reached.

But before that point, there is still another kind of knowledge possible. I can know that it is probable that I had that mathematical or logical knowledge the day before. That is, I can have certitude, caused by awareness of sufficient evidence, that it is more likely than not that I had that mathematical or logical knowledge yesterday and the days before. And as time goes on, I can have certitude that the likelihood of that knowledge having occurred has increased. And I can have knowledge that, as far as the evidence of which I am aware is concerned, even though I know there may be contrary evidence of which I am not aware, it is more likely than not, and more likely today than before, that the math or logical knowledge in question occurred.

This certitude can be caused by awareness of causal factors, i.e., causes and effects, whose existence makes the occurrence of the knowledge in question (M) more probable. This kind of evidence, and the awareness of it, is strictly comparable to the evidence that, if I flipped a coin a thousand times yesterday, the results are more probably close to fifty-fifty than to, say, eighty-twenty. In both cases, it is awareness of sufficient causal factors that causes my certitude.

And as my certitude of the probability of M grows, another kind of subjective certitude can grow. I can believe more and more strongly that M actually did occur. Perhaps "probable" and its cognates can be used with reference to this subjective certitude. But the probability described in the previous two paragraphs is probability as part of the content of the object of my subjective state. It is objective probability.

That our certitude of that objective probability is subject to the same kind of evidence as any induction is and does not add anything to the problem of induction. I can have certitude caused by evidence sufficient to exclude the opposite from truth that some non-probabilistic proposition is true, e.g., that all water boils at 100 degrees centigrade. Or I can have certitude caused by evidence sufficient to exclude the opposite from truth that some probabilistic proposition is true, e.g., that it is more likely than not that M occurred yesterday and that the likelihood of M's having occurred the day before has grown.

But is it the objective probability that grows or the subjective? Does the probability of the coin flip being fifty-fifty change, or my judgment of it? The probability of the coin result grows (changes) relative to the evidence. That is, as I acquire new knowledge as to how many times the coin was flipped, I acquire knowledge of a new proposition as to how likely the fifty-fifty result was. Similarly, as each day passes, the causal conditions making it likely that M occurred on the previous days increase. My awareness of the newly increased causal conditions is sufficient to cause certitude of the truth of the proposi-

tion that the likelihood of M's occurrence has increased.

If I check the proof successfully for twenty days, the causal factors contradicting the chance of M's not having occurred increase.

Jun. 11, 96 Big

Maybe this is the way to put it: We can know that "p" is sufficiently justified by evidence that it is unreasonable not to believe it or to believe that "-p". This formula distinguishes the concept of justification from that of being reasonable, but at the same time it relates them in a way that avoids having to get into justification to this degree or that.

Ordinati, UPS, PUL, Dec. 6, 94

Tell priests: beware that lay people will ask you to perform a liturgy (i.e., write it as if the burden were on lay people).

Jun. 11, 96

If you have the liturgy, everything else becomes secondary. That means meeting our most important pastoral needs becomes secondary. Activities that can meet our most important pastoral needs become secondary.

We have sometimes gone to the other extreme.

Not that the world is evil, not that it's the world versus us, but we have to consider those features of our society that create obstacles to our pastoral goals, and we have to deal with those features of our society. I guess I made the mistaken assumption that my readers would know that if was a false dichotomy to oppose Christian environments to the view that the world is not all evil. Is that what you are suggesting?

For O'Donnell:

Generals are always magnificently prepared to fight the last war. It is demonstrable that the education of most of our pastoral leaders did not equip them to fight the new war. Demonstrable because we are losing that war, therefore, we are not equipped to win it. The last war includes correctly opposing the world-versus-us view.

Evangelicals are meeting people where they are at everyday all around the world. That's not a theory. That's a fact demonstrated by their results. They wouldn't be as successful as they are at taking Catholics away from the Church, if they were not meeting people where they are at.

How can we influence the world around us, if we cannot influence Catholics?

Isn't community and fellowship exactly what people need and are longing for, even if they do not understand the cultural changes that keep them from having it. The cultural attitudes the prevent them from having it? I live in an apartment complex where 600 or 700 people live in proximity to one another. The complaint I hear? "We don't have any friends." Some of the people with that complaint are among those who come to meetings for an enthusiastic liturgy and leave afterwards. No one ever told them that their craving for friends would be alleviated if the Church saw itself as a brother/sisterhood, not as a post-modern service organization. Doesn't my proposal go exactly to what their deepest longings are?

There are two possibilities. If you agree with these thoughts, then the article failed to communicate them, and what I need to do is not change its substance but simply to explain clearly that my proposals do meet people where they are at. If you disagree with these thoughts, then I need to find out where you think they fall short.

This is a tremendous opportunity for the Church to go back, not to its past as such, but to its spiritual roots.



I put Dave Carlin's comments in the New Ordinati folder in the fire cabinet.

Move "We haven't responded because of individuation" to the start of the "We on the contrary," paragraph. So go right into "In default of." And in the other paragraph, move "We define . . ." to after "The reason we haven't responded and changed our methods is . . ."

It was clear that the leaders of those meetings had not grasped that evangelizing and building community was more important for achieving the goals of the Sunday liturgy than attendance at optional weekday liturgies. (Either that, or they thought that . . .) . . . are an after-thought to the liturgy. They had not grasped the nature of the obstacles to the Christian life that our new pastoral circumstance had created.

Don't say demise of natural community is the most profound change simpliciter; say it is the most important for understanding pastoral crisis.

Among the good purposes that leaders have, one stands out . . .

Those who made those decisions must have thought . . .

We are over liturgized. . . We rely on the liturgy to the point where . . . Movements rely on it to the point where it interferes with the movements.

I have spent so much time on this because our love for the liturgy will lead us in the future to do just what we have done in the past. So explanation is needed to avoid . . .

Leaders must ensure that members understand the goal and the means to it.

The renewal is meant to fulfill needs not being met, we put fulfilling those needs second, but what is first is experiencing an uplifting liturgy.

The Church is out of balance, because it focuses on the sacraments at the expense of things necessary for their effectiveness. By focusing on the liturgy, movements fail at their job of restoring the balance. To restore the balance, we need to . . .

It's all been said before, but few drew the right conclusions from it. They didn't change their previous pastoral thinking, they added new ideas to it without realizing that this analysis calls for some radical revisions in our pastoral thinking.

Our sacramental celebrations have been separated from their goals, especially the goal of supporting fellowship among Christians.

Step-by-step approach: After the section on why we can't evangelize: How then do we renew the Church? Movements, but renewal will require more priests getting involved in movements. But (1) not all priests; (2) not all who do get involved

will necessarily be leaders; (3) not involved for sacramental celebration; (4) don't dominate.

Leaders, both clergy and lay, thought we could just use movements as extensions of sacramental celebrations. This will not work in post-modern society. First, it interferes with the focus of evangelization which is Christ's presence in me, not in the Eucharist. Second, our society gives us little discretionary time. Third, we already view groups as functional, not as families; focussing on sacramental celebration at a time when brotherhood does not exist reinforces this. It reinforces the Church's lack of BALANCE, because the sacramental celebrations become our most important reason for gathering as a body.

In a world in which we have been using sacramental celebrations to accomplish things they can't, movements are needed to restore the balance to the Church's life. But they can't do this, since the mass becomes the most important reason for gathering as a body. Out of balance in two ways: presence in the Eucharist as opposed to presence in each of us and in the community; (2) service organization rather than a family.

There is a time and a place for everything. Social changes could occur that make our gatherings as a family such that mass would not interfere, as in Acts 2. In our world with the nature of our problems, there is no time or place for anything that detracts from the pastoral work evangelizing and building community.

By default, and almost by osmosis, we have acquired an incorrect idea of the pastoral role of sacramental celebration. We have inadvertently . . .

We not only use the Eucharist instead of evangelizing and building community, we use it in ways that interfere with that necessary pastoral work.

Our training does not just lead us to errors of omission, by omitting things necessary for the fruit of the sacraments. It leads us to errors of commission, by using the sacraments in ways that interfere with the things necessary for the fruits of the sacraments.

This may be difficult to understand for those who have not observed it in practice, as I have for 30 years. So I need to share the results of that experience. It is because of what that experience shows that this article was written. All of my points up till now have been made before. It is not that they fell on deaf ears. They fell on ears who did not know how to respond to them, because of the default attitudes toward the pastoral role of the sacraments that their training left them with. We have to learn from the mistakes of the past, to take full advantage of the movements God will raise up.

My point may not be easy to see. So I will explain how I arrived at this conclusion. So let me illustrate it from actual experience. I arrived at this conclusion from thirty years experience . . .

I couldn't have articulated my fears then, but knowing what I know now, I should have feared: (1) mass will become more important than the pastoral work needed to make already ineffective sacraments effective. (2) People will come more for the uplifting experience of an enthusiastic liturgy than for evangelical brotherhood. (Last point) Priests won't learn to change their pastoral priorities; they won't learn that the mass isn't the most important pastoral instrument and that their non-sacramental involvement is needed. Or, when they

do lead, they will dominate. (3) We will continue to focus more on the Lord's Eucharistic presence at a time when a focus on His two more fundamental presences is needed.

CHECK FOR TWO FILES PREPARED FOR COMMUNITY WHERE I TALK ABOUT BALANCE.

Opening or near opening: (1) pastoral crisis exists; (2) Vatican II's world was dying at the very time of Vatican II. This leads to (3) The history of the Church shows how God solves problems like this: through movements. But to cooperate with God, we need to understand the nature of what we lack, to understand what it is that movements are meant to accomplish. I am writing this so that future movements can learn from the mistakes we have made with current movements. One way to say what our problem is: the ineffectiveness of the sacraments.

Later: The history of the Church shows that this is not the first time that we have misunderstood the pastoral role of the sacraments. Since we know that that has happened before, can we be so certain that we are not making a mistake of the same kind in the wake of the heady, and long overdue, triumph of the liturgical movement?

Back to top: After first mention of environments. So part of the problem of the ineffectiveness of the sacraments is that we are relying on the sacraments to do things they were not meant to do. Later: not only doing things they were not meant to do, we use them in ways that interfere with what we need to do. And that is my reason for writing this. This won't be easy to swallow. But this is not the first time we have misunderstood the pastoral role of the sacraments. So let me first explain what the nature of the problem is, and then explain why I think our use of the sacraments contributes to the problem inadvertently.

In the environment paragraph: The Sunday liturgy is subordinate to nothing; nothing can take its place as a pastoral instrument. But sacramental celebration is not the answer, when the effectiveness of the sacraments is the problem.

As a result of our default training, the training we receive by default, in default of . . ., by omission of . . ., as a result of that, we use the sacraments in ways that actually interfere with . . ., with the pastoral work that needs doing for the effectiveness of the sacraments.

Before Vatican II, had I mentioned the liturgical movement as an example, most readers would have been alienated. My purpose in writing is so that we can avoid the mistakes current movements have made and so cooperate more effectively with the Spirit in the future.

The priesthood is primarily, though certainly not exclusively, sacramental. But part of the sacramentality of the priesthood is fatherhood in a family that is itself a sacrament.

Teachers teach the way they were taught. Current seminary teachers came from the Vatican II generation, the generation of the welcome and long overdue triumph of the Liturgical Movement.

"Doctrinal" challenges

Title: The Pastoral Crisis in the Catholic Church. The Contemporary Pastoral

## Crisis and the Church's Spiritual Life

Why, then, is orthodox Catholicism failing to evangelize?

What is now called the "post-modern" world is the demise of natural community.

Look for too frequent uses of the words "support" and "response."

Why aren't we evangelizing? We have misunderstood how to evangelize. But perhaps don't say that the evidence is that the sacraments are our main pastoral tools. Just say that there is evidence in the way we rely on the sacraments, the way we use them pastorally. Paul said, for example, "I was not sent to baptize. . . ."

We have to give the Eucharist the chance to bear fruit. The eucharist itself call us to do this and empowers us. We have to create the contexts where the Eucharist can bear fruit.

Vatican II brought the Church uptodate with the modern world. But that world was dying at that very moment. Now we are in the post-modern world. But the training of our priests has not caught up. (Don't say "of priests" say "in our seminaries".) Seminaries still train people as if they would be ministering in the modern worlds, where we could still hope for the contexts that the sacraments call for would exist. As a result, we unintentionally use the sacraments as if they would create the evangelical context that the sacraments themselves call for. But St. Paul said, "I was not sent to baptize . . . ."

Maybe the section about pastoral wisdom is redundant.

If outside of the Sunday liturgy we make optional liturgies our focus, who will do the work of making the Sunday liturgy bear fruit? (no other choice?)

Evangelicals: still, they lay the foundation while we put up the walls and the roof without laying the founHdation. Or: We . . . before laying the foundation, while evangelicals sometimes lay the foundation without being able to build on it.

You will be fulfilled when your Eucharists are the source and summit of . . . .

Church attendance declines every year.

We have not learned how to replace the environmentally-based methods of evangelization we can no longer rely on. For example, the home is invaded by anti-Christian values in the media. The home is no longer a shelter from those values. So whatever evangelizing goes on there does not get supported by the children's environments.

We are using methods that presupposing evangelization has already taken place trhough environmental structures that no longer exist. We have not learned how to evangelize in the absence of environmental instruments of evangelization that we can no longer rely on. By default, then, the sacraments become what we rely on. This happened without our consciously thinking about it.

Feb. 4, 95

Maybe a rewrite should include those specific examples of priests and others putting too much emphasis on the liturgy. Add to those examples Father Aridas telling me not to compare Christ's Eucharistic presence and His presence in us as to importance. He is right. The difference between their importance is incomparable. You cannot compare the infinite to the finite. And His presence within us is infinitely more important.

Feb. 7, 95

After sending to Crisis:

By default, then, . . . hence the ineffectiveness of the sacraments.

Feb. 14, 95

is the foundational step in the spiritual life, and so the most important pastoral need is contexts where that foundation is laid and cultivated.

All priests are not pastors and not all pastors are priests. But the majority of priests are pastors, and almost all Catholics live under pastoral decisions made by priests. So we must train priests to be pastors of flocks, not just hierarchs. In default of that pastoral training, we unintentionally train priests to think that the exercise of their pastoral powers is the best pastoral method. By omission of any balancing training.

Does my suggestion sound like nit-picking, just a miniscule refinement? Then we have not grasped how desperate the situation is.

Does my diagnosis sound implausible? My fallible diagnosis? But is it not the case that the sacraments are, de facto, our main pastoral tools, that they are our main means for overcoming the influence of environments, and that therefore the ineffectiveness of the sacraments is our main pastoral problem?

Possible deletions:

Take out the "complex and mysterious" sentences.

Other groups can consider a special Sunday liturgy or a monthly liturgy.

Still they practice our doctrine . . . , while we practice theirs.

Take out one of the two clauses on the sacraments in the first paragraph. Leave in the "fruits" clause, because the next paragraph begins with a sentence using "effective".

Take out the two sentences after "We just go to the other extreme. Start the next paragraph: We act as if Jesus's Eucharistic presence took the place of. .

Take out "Now especially, the liturgy is not the solution"

Take out the stuff after baptism is most important, the stuff about all must agree.

Take out the sentence after "not traditional piety".

Take out "We need uplifting . . . , but not at the cost . . ."

Change "Some suggestions for including . . ." to "For example"

Take out: Do not look for perfect or uncontroversial movements.

Change to "The causes of our pastoral problems are supposed to be complex . . ."

Move "reflect lack of response to sacramental grace" to Ezekial paragraph?

Possible rewrite as an essay:

Opening: The Church is in a pastoral crisis. . . Second paragraph: These problems reflect a lack of response to sacramental grace. The sacraments are not bearing their intended fruit (or are scandalously ineffective). What must we do to make them effective? (Leave out the stuff about seminary training, so that it is no longer addressed to priests directly.) Response to grace is the individual's responsibility . . . At end: Priests will often have to restrain their desire to serve, if my experience is any indication.

Feb. 21, 95

There is a difference between the acts of celebrating the sacraments and acts that realize their fruits. Our problem is that the meaning of priest's existence is wrapped up in the first, but not the second. For it is in the first, they perceive, that they are alter Christi.

Mar. 14, 95

Take out: "I am not suggesting that," "Nor do I disagree," opening of next paragraph.

Change to: We unintentionally go to the other extreme, we do it by default, unconsciously, as a result of prior failures of omission.

Take out what follows after, "We just go to the other extreme."

Take out stuff about perfect or uncontroversial movements.

Rewrite as: ...so few that there won't be time to use the sacraments inappropriately

Take out "and repeatedly" sentence.

Take the "roof/foundation" sentence out of its paragraph and put it in the evangelical groups paragraph. In that paragraph, delete the sentence about limited growth and about our doctrine on the visible Church. Replace those sentences with: They know how to lay the foundation, but lacking integral doctrine and those sacraments that require orders, they cannot sufficiently build on it. We, on the other hand, are in effect trying to put up the walls and the roof without laying the foundation.

Rewrite as: Did not receive proper leadership, lay and clergy, at the local level.

If you are not tempted to . . . , you are not human.

May. 30, 95

Sacramental celebrations are meant for the already evangelized -- adults.  
Sacramental celebrations are not meant to be instruments of evangelization.

By default and unintentionally, priests are trained to minister in a fantasy land where the context called for by the sacraments exists.

BIG:

Vatican II brought us up to date with the modern world. But the world it caught up with was in the process of dying at that very moment. Now that world no longer exists, yet our pastoral thinking has not changed with the world.

There is pastoral work that needs to be done for the effectiveness of the sacraments. But the sacraments have often been used in a way that interferes with that work.

Priests haven't learned how to lead us to a personal relation to Jesus. Instead, they have learned that sacramental celebration will do it. 2 examples of priestly training: the one who had just discovered how important the personal indwelling of Jesus was; the one who forgot to list it in his catalogue of ways the Lord is present to us.

There is a conflict between...

ipso facto...and the call for Christian environments is no novel doctrine.

This is not traditional Catholic pastoral ascetics, which did not even have evening liturgies for centuries. This is the post-modern view of groups as existing to perform tasks rather than for personal relationships -- except that sacramental tasks are the greatest conceivable. Not the the sacraments are mere tasks in essence, but at the practical level, that is what they have too often become.

The "spiritual family" is the result of the unconscious acceptance (by osmosis) of the post-modern individualism that views groups as performing tasks for the benefit of individuals, not as united for the sake of relations between persons. It is basic Christian pastoral ascetics versus something we have picked up from secular culture.

In using movements, we were guided by the post-modern model of the Church as a service station. We used them as venues for the sacraments. That interfered with their pastoral function of fulfilling what the sacraments call for, because the sacramental celebration became the important part. And so we just perpetuated the ineffectiveness of the sacraments.

By pastoral "methods" I do not mean mere techniques. I mean pastoral ascetics that either do or do not fulfill the intent of the gospel, that can be measured by the pastoral commandment and the gospel.

We know our current methods are not working. So how have we changed them, or even just tried to change them, recently?

By default, then, and unintentionally, we have wound up... we wind up... we have fallen into...

We have missed Jesus's pastoral principles.

We prove the existence of God by arguing from effect to cause. If this mode of argument is valid, we must conclude that the training of our pastoral leaders...

Jun. 14, 95

The reason for our pastoral problems is obvious. People respond to their environments and there are no Christian environments.

Why aren't there any Christian environments?

Because the old ones died, and we didn't do anything to make new ones.

Why didn't we do anything to make new ones?

Because we thought the most important thing was to celebrate the sacraments.

Jul. 10, 95

When making use of a movement, we must use extreme caution about anything that distracts us, takes our focus of . . .

The problem is not merely distraction, however. The fact that we permit the distraction reflects a deeper problem: our failure to see what the Church's needs really are, the failure to see what is important, as defined by what the Church's needs really are. This failure results from a training that makes assumptions no longer true in our era.

Also, pastoral "method" is not just technique. It refers to basic pastoral ascetics as defined by the requirements of the gospel. The gospel requires brotherhood and a personal relation to Jesus Who dwells within us as a result of baptism, and only as a consequence to Jesus's Eucharistic presence.



Short book, Dec. 2, 94

Philosophy took a wrong turn in the 18th century, at the end of the 18th century. Specifically, Kant took a wrong turn responding to Hume, but probably the only turn available to him as a result of the epistemological turn of previous modern philosophy. He recognized that sense experience needed to be supplemented by necessary truths, for empirical knowledge to be founded. But the epistemological turn of modern philosophy prevented him from seeing those truths as ontological, as centered on existence and the conditions for the possibility of existence.

It was in Kant that the concept of truths known by knowing the meanings of their terms were called "analytic," and it was as a result of the epistemological turn of modern philosophy that that concept came to mean that necessary truths were conceptual or logical or linguistic. My efforts to find out when the concept entered philosophy have been unsuccessful. But it is certain that that concept was a going concern by the high middle ages. And at that time, as well as for centuries before and after, it did not have an anti-realist sense.

But it would be pointless to debate the merits of the realist and anti-realist interpretation of necessary truths in the abstract and apart from any examples of such truths based on more than logical relations.

Jan. 18, 95

Subtitle: A Non-Kantian Response to Hume

It might appear that in order to establish that knowably necessary truths can solve our problems, I need to refute the linguistic theory of the a priori. That is not the case. Hume talked about "relations of ideas" (where we would talk about the meanings of words), but that was not the crux of his attack on necessary truths advancing our knowledge of what we experience. The crux was the fact that "intuitive certainty" required a denial of something's identity with itself, whereas a denial of causality was a denial of a thing's relation to something other than itself.

All it take to see the fallacy of the linguistic theory of the analytic is for the scales to fall from our eyes. For example, it is non-linguistically analytic that if a truth is known from the meanings of its terms, it is not known by applying some criterion stated in other terms. The reason why the scales have not fallen from our eyes and the LTA has seemed so plausible is that most examples of necessary truths have been the kind that were logically necessary and did not advance our knowledge of the world. And the reason for that was Hume's critique of the analytic necessity of every change's having a cause.

Jul. 10, 95

Maybe the subtitle should be something like: What Has Been Missing from 20th-century philosophy. Or, What Was Missing . . . Or, What Has Been Missing from Modern Philosophy. Or, the Overlooked Alternative to Rationalism and Empiricism.

The idea would be not to say how bad things really have been. Address the person who thinks they have been wonderful. Say to him that you are just adding the frosting to the cake. You are putting the finishing touches on. But to do

that you have to go back to the beginning. That's why it's called a reintroduction to philosophy.

What does it mean to go back to the beginning? It means going back to the idea that all knowledge derives from experience. Rationalism, Empiricism, and Kantianism share the common premise that . . . Then, go into the argument for "Every event has a cause" as soon as possible. The common premise has disastrously limited our means for solving philosophical problems by limiting the ways we can verify empirical statements. In fact, we can know that, when change A occurs, preceding changes must have brought into existence sufficient causes for change A. We can know that when causes similar to those that caused A, with respect to the features that made them sufficient to cause A, come into existence in the future and are not interfered with by additional causes not present when A occurred, a change similar to A will occur.

Then go into the argument that every event has a cause as quickly as possible. Perhaps bring in the Hume quote immediately after discussing the common premise, and use it as a springboard. Kant saw that this passage, not Descartes, was the turning point in modern philosophy.

Also, immediately before or after the proof, state that showing this bypasses the entire discussion of whether "analytic" truths are linguistic, conceptual, mental, etc. in some way that ordinary empirical truths are not. That whole discussion is based on the false belief (not false "premise"?) that truths like the principle of causality cannot be shown to be necessary in the sense of showing that their opposites are contradictory.

"Known from the meaning of its terms" is itself a causal analysis. But interpreting it to mean that the content of the truth was itself something linguistic in some exclusive sense, led to such distortions as Quine's interpreting the description, not a causal analysis of how they are known, but as a criterion for identifying individual instances of truths with such content, even though the description itself necessarily and analytically rules out knowledge of these truths by means of the causality of such a criterion. For if they were made true by the meanings of terms (Quine), they are known true by the meanings of terms, and not therefore by a criterion.

SSR, P&CG, personal versus functional value, Dec. 2, 94

Mar. 2, 96

If we claim that the human person is the highest worth, must we not value sexuality primarily for its ability to bring into existence that which is of the highest worth. We value anything for what it can bring into existence. Sex can bring into existence pleasure and human beings, which result is of more worth? So if we do not value sex primarily for bringing human beings into existence, how can we say human persons possess the highest worth? And if we place a value of sex that excludes the bringing into existence of a human being, how can we say that the value of a person is an absolute value, the value of an end-in-itself, something worthy of committed love, not for its function, its ability to bring something else into existence, but for its own sake. We value things other than absolute values for what they can bring into existence. If sex is the only way to get X, but we explicitly decline to value sex for bringing X into existence for the sake of bringing something else into existence, can the existence of X be the value that measures all other values, a value that all other values must at least be consistent with?

So the value we place on sexuality will inevitably determine the value we place on human life.

Committed love implements the value of the person.

Jan. 24, 95

A PBS reporter asked his interviewee, after the Jonestown murder/suicides, where the loneliness comes from. The short answer is "The birth control pill." Before the birth control pill, sex was the glue of society. We exploited our most powerful, non-coercive, interpersonal force for the maximum happiness of all.

Now instead of being the glue of society, sex is what drives us to be isolated individuals. Sex is the isolated individual's most fiercely guarded private possession. Sex is what drives us into being isolated individuals.

Feb. 8, 95

Human life comes from an act of love between persons. The meaning, the value, of human life is that of the committed love of one person for another, from which life comes. That is why illegitimate children have always been (unfairly) scorned. The meaning of their coming into existence was not the value of a person as worthy of committed love.

P&CG

Since there are no rights without God, from the point of view of society's interest in protecting and preserving human rights, all religions are not equal, i.e., secular humanism is not of equal social value to theism.

Mar. 14, 95

Because sexuality is our person-making ability, the context in which we use it can either affirm the ethically absolute value of the person as such or deny it. Do we have the right to tell someone else: I consensually give you permission

to use my person-making ability in a way that prevents the absolute value of the person from being affirmed?

Mar. 24, 95

Why is extra-marital sex "dirty" or degrading? What does it degrade? It degrades the value of human life.

The pinup model who did not want to pose nude because she did not want her future children to see the pictures. Why worry if a child sees her mother nude? To be nude is to expose and give away her ability to be a mother. For her ability to be a mother is her ability to stimulate the male. And the male's ability to be a father requires his being stimulated by the female.

Human life is the product of an act of animal passion. What then is the value of human life?

Human life is the product of committed love between persons. What then is the value of human life?

May. 30, 95

There is an alternative to making sex an affirmation of the value of human life by making it a vehicle for committed love between persons. That alternative is death. If we do not tie sex to the value of human life, human life loses its value to the point where we justify killing. Why? You might think I am talking about abortion. But first consider euthanasia. Birth control prevents there being enough people in the younger generation to economically take care of the older generation. The solution? Encourage the older generation to commit suicide and even take their life from them without their consent, if we judge that their life is not worth continuing. This is actually happening.

Book mentioned on "The Abundant Life" on EWTN: [Saving Your Marriage Before It Starts](#).

See "Journal Graphics" transcript of [Frontline's](#) "The Vanishing Father." McLanahan shows that the effect of the absent father is independent of economics and class. Whitehead has a good statement about the liberal's (false) dilemma of choosing between parental happiness and the child's welfare.

Big

If we separate our life-giving faculty from committed love, we are separating the life we give, human life, from being deserving of committed love. We can choose the spousal-parental relation. We can't choose the child-parent relation. If the latter is not by essence, by nature, a relation of committed love, our existence of the offspring, is not that of a being worthy of committed love by being what she is, as opposed to receiving committed love by the gratuitous choice of someone else to love us, if they want to, as the spousal-parental relation is, i.e., the spousal relation is the a chosen relation of committed love for someone else. The child-parent relation is ontological, our being, what we are, is included in it. Is what we are worthy of committed love?

So in seeking freedom from the connection between sex and committed love for the sake of pleasure, we are devaluing our own existence. We are "choosing" to live like animals (who cannot choose it; they have to live that way). That

is why extra-marital sex is "dirty", because of what it does to the value of human life.

Possible title: "Sexual Alienation," i.e., alienation from our meaning as persons.

In choosing a mate, is sex like other activities we would want to observe the potential mate perform beforehand? If so, we are treating sex like a task, a function to be performed -- not as the instantiation of a personal relationship. We are not viewing our partner as an object of committed love but as providing a service, and we are measuring their value as a provider of services, not as a person.

We say that we are teaching people to do anything they want with their sexuality as long as they do it responsibly, i.e., without hurting or coercing someone else. (Notice the addition of "or coercing." What if someone said that it is all right to coerce as long as you don't hurt?) But does it really work out that way. Are we not really telling pedophiles and other deviants to pursue their own pleasure, as long as they can get away with it. Why? Because we are really telling the rest to pursue their own pleasure as long as they can get away with it. Most cannot pursue their own gratification without in fact behaving in a way others would call "responsible," because they need the others for their gratification.

In other words, the motivation for "Do anything you want as long as it does not hurt others" can be selfishness: you need the help of others, but you won't get it if you hurt them, or, at least, you are much less likely to get it. But there is more to it than the possibility that the motivation will be selfishness. If there is no more to morality than "Do anything you want, as long as it does not hurt others," then there is no basis for having any motive other than selfishness. Equality is not enough; morality must be based on the dignity of persons.

And so, when we apply "Do anything you want . . ." to sexual behavior, we can expect that people, including pedophiles and abusers, will do what they perceive they can get away with. Because everyone else does. Do I have any proof for this other than "logical" argument? Not directly. But there is independent empirical evidence that "Do anything you want . . ." is applied selfishly in other matters. So the burden of proof must be on them who believe it will not be applied selfishly in sexual matters.

What does that independent empirical evidence consist in? In the absence of prior investigation of what the effects will be on children, as for example, in Sweden or, in America, the effects of divorce.

Permanent Commitments, Jun. 3, 95 BIG

While we are not under immediate pressure to break-up our own marriages, we pass laws, binding on ourselves and others, making it very difficult to back away from our marriage commitment. Why? Because we are doing ourselves a favor by passing those laws. We know how easy it is to succumb to the temptation to sacrifice something that will more likely lead to the long-range happiness of most people for the sake of short-range happiness. Or, we know how difficult it is not to succumb to that temptation. So we pass laws making it very undesirable to succumb to that temptation.

Pew, Oct. 25, 94

Possible recommenders: Ashley, Veatch, Crosson, McInerny, Dougherty, G. Matthews. MUST have a social scientist. Ask Dan O'Connell. Have a social scientist, a philosopher, and a theologian: Ashley? Peter Berger? Ask Kevin Ranaghan for a theologian who can back up my interpretation of the prayer for unity. Finnis, Grisez.

Possenti. Burrell. Stanley Hauerwas. Nicholas Capaldi. Rescher. Ralph Nelson (as a "social scientist"?).

For the sake of the philosophical reviewers, refer to the influence of 19th-century thinkers on our century and their lack of attention to the place of personal relationships (but not in the sense of G. E. Moore!). What will the next century take from us? Hopefully, the need for and need to support committed personal relationships of the sexually-based kind.

Also explain why the proposal belongs in philosophy. The empirical evidence has existed for some time. What is needed is a philosophical framework, including conceptual clarification, etc.

In the proposal or the cover letter, call attention to the fact that unlike almost all University Press Books, this was awarded a grant in support of publication from the ACPA.

Why philosophy and not just social science? Phil insight needed to form a clear argument out of facts that have been there all along.

Why Christian? The value of the person and personal relations have been lost even to sacramental Church's, which tend to become providers of services.

Pew, Dec. 2, 94

Concept of personal versus functional value comes from a Christian philosopher, Gabriel Marcel.

May. 30, 95

Read and respond to The Way We Never Were.

Many other books on this topic, perhaps. But most present it in terms of the dichotomy between the parent's happiness and the child's. The way to overcome the dichotomy is to prevent or minimize beforehand the need for the parent to seek happiness elsewhere, i.e., to minimize beforehand the occurrence of unhappy marriages.

Not opposed to affirmative action as long as it doesn't benefit women at the expense of black males, as long as it does not seek diversity at the expense of correcting past and present discrimination, as long as it does not define diversity selectively, to the exclusion, for example, of orthodox Jews and Christians, as long as it does not include chosen behavior among the criteria for diversity.

For evidence that women's liberation has hurt affirmative action for black males, see the Globe, 5-21-95, p. 30, and the next 4 days. Also, see the article you clipped out of the Herald a month or 2 before.

What university presses have chosen similar books?

Endorsers: Veatch, ask MacIntyre for a protestant name, ask Deal Hudson for a Protestant name, ask Rasmussen and Peterson how Veatch is, ask Rasmussen for a protestant name.

Must answer the objection that the sexual revolution is not an attack on the family, because it does not prevent people from choosing the family. The response has several elements. First, there is sociological evidence that it prevents large numbers from choosing the family successfully. But Second, why should we be concerned if it prevents them from choosing the family successfully. For example, equality of opportunity does not require equality in results. Why are we justified in taking steps to ensure more successful results here. One reason is that we need the family for the sake of children. And there is sociological evidence here. But also we need the family as the locus for the recognition of an implementation of the value of the person.

Christian inspiration: 2 places. First, the value of the person depends on theism. And without the value of the person, cannot have anything other than an arbitrary ethic anyway. There will be a tendency to justify things like euthanasia in terms of the good of the whole human species. But there really won't be any reason to prefer the good of the species. So when it suits our purposes not to prefer the good of the species, we won't.

Second, change at the media level can only result from a deep change in convictions on the part of the large majority of people. Such a change can only be religious. But for such a change to occur, both the sacramental and evangelical churches have to stop making the same mistake, i.e., the effectiveness of both of their ministries requires Christian brotherhood at the local level. People interpret the prayer for unity in terms of ecumenicism. I do not deny that dimension. But an equally important, though ignored, dimension is the need for local Christian groups to be brother/sisterhoods. This fits in with the Pew fellowship's reference to analysing the mission of the Church as a valid topic.

For the text, but not for the proposal:

This position is not opposed to liberalism. I am not a liberal in the sense of believing that all values are relative. I am in favor of a government activism because I believe values are objective. But relativism is supposed to encourage openness to new ideas, non-dogmatism. Too often, liberals are not open to new ideas, the opposite of the effect advertised for relativism (and this is an argument against relativism).

What could be more rational than Mill (though he was not the first): do whatever you want as long as it does not hurt someone else. But again, the effect is often the opposite of always seeking the greater good instead of your own good (which is what Mill intended). The proof is that we ask about the consequences for children last.

But it is a false dichotomy to see a conflict between the parents' happiness and the children's needs.

Liberal/conservative, saving liberalism from the liberals, Dec. 2, 94

Liberalism is the center, the mean between conservatism and socialism. But L must not let ideology get in the way of caring for those in most need of our support, our children.

By condoning abortion, liberals are supporting a form of selfishness as great or greater than that of the robber barons or arbitragers.

I am not for moderate liberalism, but more liberalism -- more true to its principles and consistent in their application. E.g., capital punishment and freedom of expression. The alternative is pushing good ideas to illogical extremes. In some cases, the effect will be moderation, but that is not the point. In other cases, the effect will be far from moderation.

Many liberals do not realize that they were taught a religion in college. For example, the belief that communism is benign, just another political system, and that Russia was well intentioned.

Dec. 6, 94

The most radical forms of feminism are the latest form of male manipulation of women. The proof is that more men than women have consistently favored the radical feminist agenda, e.g., on abortion. This is not a case of calling for less liberalism but calling for more. Abortion violates the liberal principle of defending the defenseless, and it does so in the name of a selfishness more universal than capitalist selfishness. Not everyone can relate to the selfishness of the entrepreneur, but everyone can understand sexual selfishness.

Jan. 18, 95

The only way to save opposition to the death penalty is to save it from those who go beyond that opposition all the way to giving killers furloughs and paroles.

That we don't study the effects on children first show that it's not really justice that we want. It's really: I'll give you freedom because I don't want my freedom interfered with. So we look for ways our freedom is potentially interfered with. And being adults, we overlook the ways the interests of children are interfered with. It's not justice; it's "enlightened" self-interest. Our goal is not to help others but to achieve self-gratification, not as an effect of the object aimed at, but as the object aimed at. I help others to the extent that I see it help me.

This started to become clear in the labor movement's refusal to give blacks jobs. They wanted justice - so long as they benefitted from it.

May. 30, 95

Do not ask: what is the primary function of government. Ask: what has government actually accomplished for good or for bad. Then ask, on the basis of past experience, what can we expect government to accomplish in the future.



Ethics, RA, Dec. 2, 94

The relation of what things are to what we are as choosers of ends and of means to ends is such that some choices cannot avoid evaluating things as if they were not what they are. E.g., to treat another person as a means evaluates them as if they were not masters of their ends as we are.

Is there such a thing as desiring that something was not what it is? Certainly, in sin, we desire that God was not what He is.

Feb. 28, 95

In evaluating another to be equal to us as capable of the future achievement of human ends, or as an end-in-itself, we must evaluate what they are at the most fundamental level beyond which they no longer are beings with the capacity for that future achievement. That level is the cellular level.

What is the cash value of saying that we evaluate things to be what they are? One answer could be that we volitionally direct actions by causing intellectual assent to true or false practical judgments. Another answer could be that our actions treat people as if they were not ends-in-themselves and that we do this knowingly. Another answer could be in terms of the comparative places their relations to ends and our relations to ends have in our evaluations. And all these answers could be equivalent.

My analysis does justify "Love your neighbor as yourself" as a moral principle. But it can also recognize that this principle is not enough; it does not supply enough direction. What constitutes hurting your neighbor and what does not. The same thing answers that question that grounds my moral theory: what my neighbor is, her nature.

May. 30, 95

Personalist/communalist versus individualism. A person as such, i.e., as opposed to an individual, is a being who, through reason, can recognize the value of the other as an end-in-itself and of the common good, etc., and who, as a person, has the end of evaluating things to be what they are as known by reason.

BIG:

We place values on what things are. That may sound like a pleonasm; what else is there to place values on? But it has important implications if we are able to evaluate things as if they were not what they are. If so, we miscalculate them, and our evaluations are defective.

How is it possible to evaluate something as if it were other than it is? To evaluate something is to make it an end or a means to an end. So the question is: how can we evaluate something as if it were not what it is in the act of making it an end or a means to an end?

When we worship, for example, a statue, we do that.

When we complain about unfair treatment, we imply that we are in some relevant sense equal to the wrong-doer. That means that what we are is in some relevant sense equal. So the wrong-doer is not treating us as if we are what we are. What we are in reality is not what we are in her evaluations.

What is the relevant sense? We are capable of pursuing human ends as she

is. But I am not capable of writing a symphony. No, but that is not the morally relevant sense.

What could possibly be wrong with an act that produced the greatest good for the greatest number? Answer: If choosing that act forced us to value an end as if it were a means or vice versa, to value a being that is an end as if it were a means or vice versa.

Jun. 19, 95

As an example of an intrinsically evil act, start with worshipping an idol. That would be a defective decision even for an atheist or agnostic.

RA: My answer to the question how do decisions "conform to" reason's knowledge or "accord with" reason's knowledge may look extremely abstract, subtle, and remote. But why should we expect it to be otherwise. Consider the same question in the context of the correspondence theory of truth: what does it mean for reason to conform to or accord with reality; what does the relation of correspondence consist in, and what are the terms of the relation? Should we expect the answer to that question to be anything less than abstract and subtle? In fact, the answers to both questions are the same.

RA, belief has intrinsic end, Jul. 4, 95

It's not: well if you want your beliefs to be true, then you want them to conform to reality; or, if you want your beliefs to have the goal of truth or the goal of conforming to reality, then your beliefs are defective if they do not. Similarly, a blind eye is defective, but only if you want the goal of sight. No, you might not want sight, but you cannot have a belief without being oriented to the goal of truth or conformity to reality. Having a belief is the same as being in a certain relation to that goal, namely, having a belief is being in the state of certitude that a certain goal has been reached. Having a belief is being in a state consciously related to that goal such that, if that goal is not in fact attained, the conscious state is a failure by the standard of a goal it cannot avoid having.

Mike Pakaluk says that the belief is not a failure by all goals. For example, it has achieved the goal of being a full-fledged psychological state of belief. Perhaps. But there is at least one other goal intrinsically involved, if that psychological state exists.

Ashley, analogy, being as first known, being not a genus, metaphysics and immateriality, Dec. 2, 94

Who says being is not analogical to begin with? To grasp the argument that being is not a genus, do I need to know the existence of immaterial beings? Where does the assumption of immaterial existence appear in the premises of that argument? And would being be generic if all beings were material? No.

Self-evidence, analytic truth, Dec. 2, 94

In Metaphysics 4, 4, 1006a @11, the translator of the Oxford edition uses "self-evidence".

LTA, analytic truth, necessary truth, Dec. 2, 94 BIG

The difference between "Bachelors are unmarried men" and "Tully is Cicero." In the second, there is only the contingent, lexicological relation differentiating objects. In the first, in addition to the lexicological relations, there is the fact that each of the lexicological parts is associated with a word-function that has a logical relation to the word-function of "bachelor," a logical relation making the identity necessary. So knowing that bachelors are unmarried men is not like knowing that Tully is Cicero.

Both "man" and "unmarried" are logically included in the word-function of "bachelor."

Ethics, double effect, moral value determined by nature of acts, Dec. 2, 94

What does it mean for moral value to be determined by the nature of acts? For acts, try substituting causality. E.g., the Crisis masturbation example versus William Buckley's ectopic pregnancy example. In masturbation for the purpose of getting sperm, masturbation is not a side-effect of directly intending to cause some other effect. I have directly intended to cause masturbation in this example. "Directly" does not refer to the primary end for which I undertake this action, i.e., the ultimate end in this sequence. It means I have to choose to cause the act of masturbation to get to that end. In the ectopic pregnancy example, the death of the embryo is an unintended side-effect of directly intending to cause the removing of the uterus. So replace the intended "act" with intended "causality."

Any and every act has effects far beyond those intended. And even when some such effects are pre-known, they are not necessarily intended. But could it be said that the process of masturbation is not a direct conscious effect of my volitional causality but is a side-effect of some other causal process? No, to get to the chosen end, I have to choose to cause the process of masturbation. There is no other way to cause my chosen end to exist other than as an effect of masturbation.

Logic, math, metalogic, formal systems, principle of non-contradiction, Trinity  
Nov. 24, 94 BIG

In what sense are multi-valued logics governed (Causal Realism, p. 199), the same common principles that govern our discourse about extralogical things? For one thing, our knowledge of the truth (or validity or whatever) of statements within (or about or whatever) multivalued logics, presupposes the principle of non-contradiction as the term of a reductio ad absurdum. And our knowledge so presupposes that because those statements could not be true (or valid or whatever evaluative concept we use) if they did not conform to the PNC.

Formal systems do not capture the centrality of the PNC, as my critique of the argument that everything follows from contradiction shows. Quote Russell about formal systems showing that the PNC is just another principle. My argument shows that many and perhaps most of those other principles do not work without the PNC.

Jan. 20, 95

One person can have exactly the same representative content in two different experiences and yet know, through what is represented by "This is a unique, unrepeatable, individual," that what she knows through each of those experiences is a unique, and hence distinct, individual. What makes this possible is the fact that "unique, unrepeatable, individual" is a universal concept, or rather a combination of three universal concepts.

As the above paragraph illustrates, logic is like metaphysics in that its concepts apply, or can be applied, to any object. Precisely because they can be applied to any object, their intelligibility does not depend on the content of this object or that, the features interior to this object or that. So we can understand these logical concepts without understanding the interior features of any specific object to which they apply. And since we can so understand them, we can represent them, express them, as relations to terms, which terms have no content other than being terms of these relations.

In this logical relations are like the objects of mathematics, where we can represent the terms of relations as unknown quantities. But in math, the goal is to make the values represented by those variables known. That is not the goal in logic.

Still the objects of math and logic are alike in another respect. We not only can represent the terms of logical relations as pure terms, represented as nothing more than terms of those relations. But also, in both math and logic, the relations "correspond" to operations, operations leading to results. And getting to those results by such operations is the business of these disciplines.

Other relations, e.g., similarity, can be understood without understanding the specific features of their terms other than as such terms. Thus we can say, "Assume that A is similar to B." But we cannot make progress concerning similarity by defining operations "corresponding" to this relation and then performing those operations. But that is what we do in math.

The operations, of course, and the roles of these operations in math and logic, are different. In math the relations are imagined causal operations. These

imagined operations are used to objectify different quantities. We do not objectify two as the number of eyes a normal human has but as the result of adding one to one. It is this method of objectifying quantities, ie., as the result of these imagined causal operations, which operations are defined solely by their relation to quantitative values that abstract from all other features, that defines math and makes the truths of math all necessary truths.

In logic the operations lead to the production of formulas, strings of marks, that "correspond" to truths about logical relations. They only "correspond" to truths about logical relations, because formulas play a different role in logic than they do in mathematics. The formulas of math are a tool in physics, but they are not a tool in mathematics. Rather, they and the knowledge of their truth is what constitutes mathematics. The formulas of formal systems and their derivation do not constitute logic. They are a tool of logic the way the formulas of math and mathematical derivations are a tool in physics.

But can we abstract from the use of formal systems in logic, consider the construction of formal systems for their own sake, and compare that activity of construction and the knowledge associated with it to the knowledge of mathematical formulas. Yes, and that is important, but we must keep in mind that this study does not directly inform us about the nature of logic anymore than the study of math directly informs us about the nature of physics.

In formal systems, we define operations that result in combinations of marks. In math, we define operations that result in certain quantitative values. In the resulting formulas of formal systems, variables are not replaced by constants. The purpose is not to replace a variable with a constant. If that were the purpose, formal systems would no longer be useful for modelling and representing logical relations. They can represent logical relations precisely because logical relations abstract from the specific content of their terms and thus apply or can be applied to all objects.

In math, the goal of the operation is to replace variables with constants. Math also uses formulas abstracting from specific contents, quantitative contents. But math does so in order to arrive at formulas containing specific quantitative contents. The quantity still abstracts from any association with non-quantitative characteristics, and so is formal relative to the characteristics studied by physics. But in math, the formulas express causal operations leading to results whose nature are not themselves causal. Because their nature is not themselves causal, ie., because they abstract from all causal characteristics except for these imaginary ones, the truths are necessary. No other causal factors are present to change the results. That which they abstract from and that which physics studies are precisely causal conditions producing changes that are irrelevant to mathematical causal relations, changes which therefore are not changes affecting math truths. So math truths are not subject to change.

Unlike the formulas of math, the formulas of formal systems do not express causal operations (just as quantitative values are not causal relations). The rules of the system express causal operations resulting in formulas.

$3 \times 3 = 9$ . This is necessary while "The number of the planets is 9" is not necessary. Why? In the first case, the diverse objectification comes from the hypothesis of the carrying out of an imaginary causal operation, a causal



operation whose positing does not require any physical causes whose existence is contingent, a causal operation that knowably cannot not yield one definite result (even before we know what that result is) because the components used, the operation of addition and numbers defined by the operation of counting, are knowably such that they must always yield the same value, even if we do not know what that value is. And Goldbach's hypothesis must always be either true or false, because we know in advance that a prime number must always be a prime number, and an numbers factorials must always be what they. Once they are X, they must always be X.

Jan. 21, 95

Non-contradiction article. What kind of knowledge do we achieve when we grasp the truth of my argument? Validity of my argument and the truth of its premises? Logical knowledge, since formal methods are only a tool ok knowledge and not the whole of it.

We think that, as philosophers, we get back to foundations, but the example of the treatment of non-contradiction shows that we do not get back to our own foundations. For Quine, Putnam, etc. assume they are saying something, while Aristotle shows that they are not.

Feb. 14, 95

Trinity, Logic, Formal systems, BIG

Assume my discussion of the Trinity works. The discussion is essentially metaphysical and ontological, not logical. But our knowledge, which we are capable of having, that my argument works shows that we have an implicit grasp of logical principles that permit what would otherwise be violations of the transitivity of identity. We need not be able to articulate those principles, anymore than a person, say a child, who recognizes the validity of a syllogism (can chimps do this?) need be able to articulate a law expressing the validity of syllogisms of that structure.

The next step would be to try to articulate this principle. This would be entirely comparable to coming up with concepts like supposition and ampliation to express different causes of the truths, and our knowledge of the truths of apparently similar sentences, so that invalid inferences are known to be blocked by fallacies of equivocation. These concepts would be employed in the formulation of logical laws.

A final step would be to try to construct a formal system in which these laws could be arrived at by rearrangement of symbols according to rules of formation and detachment. This would probably be the kind of thing Chuck Kelly is doing. While this would be a very interesting and even important thing to do, doing it would not be necessary in order for us to possess the kind of knowledge described in the previous two paragraphs. And that illustrates the relationship of constructing formal systems to logical knowledge and ontological, metaphysical knowledge.

PNC, Formal Systems, Mar. 25, 95

The most fundamental form of the PNC for logic is that it is impossible for some object (quod) to be or not be (to have or not have) of some character (some characteristic). The impossibility of a sentence's being both true and false is just a case of this. A sentence is one kind of object and truth or falsity is

one kind of characteristic. This thought comes out of reflection on the fact that a multi-valued logic or "paraconsistent" logic only works if a sentence cannot both have and not have the additional value, M, i.e., the value allegedly in addition to truth.

The opponent will say that the sentential form is more fundamental. Why? Because logic is supposedly the most fundamental. And logic is about the truth of sentences, since the truth of sentences is the goal of intellectual endeavor. But the preceding statement only holds if it is talking about sentences, period, not about sentences in language L or L1. The opponent's idea would be that the PNC holds for any language for which the formulas of system L hold. But what must be the case for any system L is that the PNC hold for the so-called "metalanguage," whether or not the PNC appears as a formula in L.

The PNC must hold for any metalanguage because it must hold for any sentence in any language that can have a truth-value. And it must hold in any system, not in the sense that the system contains it, but that the assignment of any value within the system cannot be accompanied within the system by the simultaneous non-assignment of that value. The formulas of any formal system constitute, together, just a model of the logical relationships that hold where the values of truth or falsity are possible, i.e., hold for the sentences of any language.

It is correct that knowledge of the truth of sentences is the final cause. But it is the final cause because, in sentences, we objectify objects other than sentences and objectify those objects as having or not having characteristics. The reason contradictory sentences cannot achieve the goal of truth is that the objects they objectify cannot both have and not have the same characteristic. It is not that those objects cannot both have and not have the same characteristic because, if they could, the sentences objectifying them would be both true or false. That is putting Descartes before the horse.

It is correct that the necessity of the principle arises from the use of the cognition-constituted relation of negation. But there is no reason why that relation cannot be used in the objectification of objects other than sentences and so used before it is used for sentences. In fact, that relation arises (causality other than final causality is the analysis here) as soon as we are aware of two objects that are in fact not the same: two fingers, two trees, a finger and a tree, etc.

Check out the truth table for negation signs in multi-valued logics. If the negation sign has the same meaning, i.e., still means the relation of negation, than the PNC holds, and the signs for the affirmed and negated values do not mean what "true" and "false" mean.

May. 30, 95

Why is what can correctly be objectified as other than X necessarily non-identical with what can be objectified as X (or by "X")? If by "necessarily" we mean why does it not have to stay objectifiable as other than X, maybe it does not have to stay objectifiable by "other than X." But it is necessarily the case that if and when something is indeed objectifiable by "non-X" that it is not also what can be objectified as X. Why?

Because if not, the what is objectifiable as non-X would at the same time not be objectifiable as non-X. It would not be identical with itself (so identity is primary). But that seems to just reduplicate the principle. And perhaps it does reduplicate the principle. The point is that that is just what negations do, that is their function, e.g., to negate what is objectified as X or what is objectifiable by X. As long as that negation holds, the opposite

does not, by hypothesis; for negation amounts to the hypothesis that the opposite does not hold.

To really deny the PNC, a principle would have to allow a proposition to have value M and not have value M.

BIG:

My argument against contradiction implying everything has many implications. Think of how Chuck Kelly laid out the arguments as steps in a formal proof. Impeccable. That shows that awareness that the a formula resulting from such a proof is a logically valid formula is not caused by our awareness that each step in the proof satisfied the rules. For Kelly showed that that argument satisfied the rules, and we were both aware that it satisfied the rules. Yet we could still be aware that the conclusion was not logically valid. Why? because we were aware that one combination of premise (contradiction) and rule (disjunctive syllogism) was not logically valid. Rather, awareness of logical validity is caused by awareness of the fact that the primary rules are logically valid and are consistent with the premises.

Jun. 9, 95

The formal language approach makes models representing logical relations, not propositions true of logical relations by identity. These models are good, but there value is limited.

PNC, Jun. 9, 95

The formal system approach does not capture the fundamentality of the PNC. I.e., the PNC is not just one formula among others.

Logical truth, logical relations, logical inclusion, alternation, Jun. 27, 95  
BIG

Maybe the necessity of  $p \rightarrow (p \vee q)$  does not derive from logical inclusion but from the fact that  $p \vee q$  differs from  $p$  solely by the addition of a CDO " $\vee q$ ". This way out, though, would have to explain the fact that  $q$  may make reference to a reality other than  $p$  does. We would have to say that the reality referred to enters the differentiation of objects in an incidental, a non-essential, way. The logical relation expressed by " $\vee$ " makes it incidental what follow next. That is just the nature of what we express by " $\vee$ ". where "nature" means: that just is what we happen to express by " $\vee$ ". That is, alternation happens to be an open-ended logical relation where what comes next does not matter as far as content goes (assuming that the content is a content, and not a contradiction, i.e., assuming that the content does not violate some other logical relation; so it is non-logical content that is in question, since we are contrasting that to the logical relation of alternation). "Or" is the exact equivalent for "or something," where "something" this time is a logical placeholder for, by hypothesis, any ontological content.

Logic versus ontology

Is "something" a logical variable, or is it an ontological variable? Yes and no to both questions. Since it belongs in language it is logical and grammatical.

But since logical relations terminate in non-logical values, the word-function of something is equivalent to "any non-logical value; any value that can terminate a logical relation, including especially non-logical values".

Logical Relations, Jul. 21, 95 BIG

The theory of logical relations in Causal Realism is meant to do two things.

(A) Imply that if such logical relations occur, some truths cannot not be true.

(B) Imply that, when we are aware of some objects, we cannot not know the necessity of those truths. I.e., (A) if there are relations with such and such properties, then truths diversely objectifying things in the following way cannot not be diversely objectifying the same thing. And (B) we are aware of certain objects, we cannot not be aware of relations with those properties holding between them; so that we cannot not be aware of the necessary truth of the identity of those objects.

PNC, formal systems, Aug. 11, 95 BIG

Formal systems are models that cannot capture the fundamentality and centrality of the PNC. In the propositional calculus, the PNC is just one proposition among others

The formal system approach makes models representing, sybolizing, logical relations; it does not make propositions true of logical relations by identity. To know the truth of propositions about logical relations, we do something more than construct and understand models. Those models are good things; they have value, but limited value.

Oct. 30, 95

Bochenski/O'Rourke dissertation: Peter Rutz (Basel Switzerland Opus Dei priest), Zweiwertige und mehrwertige Logik (Bivalent and Polyvalent Logic), defended July 7, 1970 at University of Friburg ("free-burg"). Many libraries in Switzerland will have it. Look for it through the internet.

Saving Liberalism from the Liberals, Nov. 15, 94

Because Clinton went too far, we do not have health reform. See Sunday Boston Globe, Focus section, p. 3, September or early October, 1994.

I am not counselling "moderation". Often, we need to be more liberal, more consistent with liberal principles. One of those principles is the obligation for government to help those who cannot defend their own rights. That principle should make us opposed to abortion and gay rights. In those examples, ideologies extraneous to justice, to the common good, to defending the defenseless, have overruled those liberal principles. One of those ideologies, for example, is sexual freedom, which really means selfishness of a kind equal to that of any free marketeer who does not want to pay income taxes. For we do not even ask what effect that sexual freedom will have on the rights of the young (the dog did nothing in the night time).

Another example of not being consistent with liberal principles, letting killers off with less than life sentences. This is a violation of the principle of justice.

Other evidence that we need to save liberalism from the liberals, to save the country from conservatism: compare the lenient sentences liberal judges give to those that conservative judges give.

Another example: taxing businesses is regressive, is a hidden sales tax.

Intellectual fads, course idea, Nov. 20, 94

Example: values clarification, I' Ok-You're OK, Games people play, Co-dependency, Freudian analysis, cognitive therapy, Marxism, biofeedback.

Can make opposition to an intellectual fad appealing to students by making the opposition appear avante-garde, which it is.

Eugenics, Marxism, Freudianism, Progressive Education, over-population, relativism enhances tolerance, deconstruction, existentialism, structuralism, no differences between men and women.

Chesterton says someplace that England wanted the morals without the faith, or better, thought they could have the morals without the faith. But next it was: maybe we don't need those morals. But after that came a loss of any standards, much less moral standards. We don't even have educational, intellectual, or artistic standards. Paintings by four-year olds still win awards. Silly articles in silly scholarly journals still are considered valuable contributions that count toward tenure, promotion, and salary increases. Etc., etc.

We no longer defrock clergyman for sodomy.

Abortion article, Nov. 20, 94

I am not committed to an ethics of "rights." In whatever way we want to talk about the ethics of killing innocent adults, I want my discussion to apply to killing fetuses. So my talk of rights can be translated into any vocabulary used to describe the killing of innocent adults as wrong, evil, etc.

Jan. 18, 95

We think that the acquisition of mature features bestows some value. But what is value? In judging moral decisions, we assume that our dispositions for making decisions so relate us to what other people are that decisions have the end of treating other people a certain way, that if we do not treat other people a certain way, we fail of an end our dispositions for decision give us. How can they so relate us to what other people are. If they are related to what other people are and if we can fail to achieve this end, our decision does not treat them (evaluate them) as if they are what they are, does not place the value on what they are that our relation to what they are requires. (What is that relation?), does not conform to what they are.

If innocent life does not impose a restriction on choice, nothing does. If our dispositions for choice are not of such a nature that innocent life imposes a restriction on what choices fulfill that nature, nothing external to our dispositions for choice can impose such a restriction.

We say we want to do that which increases the over all amount of human good, or at least that we will seek our own good until it decreases the good of others. But this human good can be nothing but the accomplishment of ends for which humans have the capacity. And zygotes are organisms with the capacity for the same ends.

Abortion and Ethics, and RA, Jan. 21, 95

When we judge that some mature characteristic bestows value, we are declaring it a value by measuring it in relation to by ends we are pre-volitionally related to, ends we did not choose. And the zygote is related to the same ends.

Our values either result from blind, irrational choice or they result from pre-volitional ends. If they result from pre-volitional ends, they result from the relations between those ends and what the things we must deal with are. If values are not imposed by what things are (given our pre-volitional relations to what things are), they are purely the result of irrational choice.

But they cannot result from what things are if what human life is does not impose values, or restrictions on our values.

Jan. 27, 95

We evaluate the other as a cause of actions bringing about human ends. We are must fundamentally such a cause, both at the xygote stage and continuously thereafter, at the cellular level. That most fundamental level is the one that counts. For if we stop at some other level, we have no criteria for doing so other than arbitrary criteria. And arbitrary criteria both violate our end of being rational and ignore the fact that the zygote's accomplishment of its ends are of equal value to ours.

The most fundamental level is the one that counts. And it is at that level that we are oriented to human ends because, for instance, we are rational because cells . . .

Feb. 7, 95 BIG

Maybe move to the end the part about arbitrarily making a zygote less than an end in itself by measuring its value relative to the ends of others than herself.

Feb. 15, 95

On the RA and maybe for the last section of the Abortion article: Utilitarians implicitly recognize the rational appetite. Assume I face a choice of A or B. A will increase the satisfaction of my desires, but decrease the sum total of the desires of other human beings. The last statement imposes a restriction on the value of my choice, according to utilitarians, consequentialists, and or proportionalists. But that statement imposes such a restriction because and only because that statement expresses what things are. It expresses the fact that what I and other human beings are includes our having desires, and it expresses the fact that what some states of affairs are satisfy those desires more than what some other states of affairs are.

To believe that we are obligated to seek the greatest satisfaction of desires for the greatest number is to believe that our decision-making faculties orient us to evaluate the greater good to be what it is and the lesser good to be what it is. It is to believe that making an immoral decision is evaluating a lesser fulfillment of human desires as if it were a greater fulfillment. Or at least this, it is to believe that what things are does impose limits on the values of our choices. And so it raises the question how it is possible for our knowledge of what things are to impose limits on the value of our choices.

The answer is that our decision-making dispositions orient us to evaluate according to our knowledge of what things are, insofar as what things are relate them to ends and means to ends, including relating them to being ends and being means to ends for other beings with ends. Where "according to" means evaluating them to be what they are with respect to being entities with ends and with respect to being either ends or means to ends for decisions of a rational appetite. I say "a" rational appetite because our rational appetite must evaluate them as if they were ends relative to the nature of the rational appetite, since they have their own rational appetites and through if direct themselves to things that are ends for them because they have chosen those things to be ends. Therefore, we do not evaluate them to be what they are unless we evaluate them to be ends-in-themselves, just as we are.

On the question of whether some positive orientation to human ends, not just a potentiality for human ends, is necessary. Even a mature human being depends on the action received from external agents for the future achievement of ends to which she is oriented, and for the future actions which she causes to achieve those ends. So how can we draw the line? There is no hope for the pro-abortionist to find any dispositions to future action which are entirely internal in the sense that they would not depend on the contribution of external causes. On the other hand, the pro-lifer does have a clear-cut criterion.

Consider a race horse. There is absolutely nothing in its make up that is naturally, or other than accidentally, related to the winning of the Kentucky Derby. There is much in the horse's makeup that is naturally and specifically



related to such things as speed and endurance. We can look at the horse's makeup and read those things there. But if the horse were given all the environmental contributions it would need to develop all its natural, internal, dispositions to the fullest, when they were so developed, there would be no features in the horse relating it specifically to winning the Kentucky Derby. Winning that race is entirely adventitious to, accidental to, external to, what the horse is, its makeup, its nature.

The zygote's nature, on the other hand, includes features directly, specifically, and necessarily relating it to the eventual achievement of human ends. In fact, the zygote's human control genes have everything to do with the eventual achievement of those ends. "Everything" does not mean that no external causes are necessary, but that is true of every cause, as Causal Realism shows. But human achievements result from the fact that external causes switch on genes internal to the fetus's cells which switched on genes make those cells producers of the kinds of protein and tissue necessary and sufficient for human achievements. But those control genes were by nature directly and specifically related to those achievements before being switched on. Just as eyes are a readiness for seeing, before our eyelids open in the morning. The production of human ends is not accidental to what those genes are. The relation to human ends is "naturally necessary" in the sense that those genes will be switched on and human tissue result, unless something interferes with those natural processes.

We cannot rationally ask for a stronger criterion than this, since all causes require the cooperation of external causes.

The zygote is not like just any cell. Not any cell is a complete human organism oriented to the eventual achievement of human ends. But a zygote lacks nothing of what a human organism naturally is at that stage of its development.

Feb. 14, 95 BIG

The feature relating a zygote to human ends is not just any kind of feature, and the feature does not just give the zygote any kind of relation, even any kind of specific or direct relation, to the eventual achievement of human ends. The feature gives the zygote a specific causal relation to human ends. In fact, human control genes, are the cause of the eventual production of human ends. We do not have to know how those control genes get switched on to know that. We know that only the human genome leads to the eventual production of human ends. And we know that almost all zygotes with that genome will, if given a normal environment, lead to that production. But just knowing that the human genome is a necessary condition is enough, as long as we know that the organism develops itself, with the help of the environment, by the division of cells, the result of which division is directed by the genes contained.

Human genes are the directive causes of human development. (Architectonic causes; formative or forming causes; designing, shaping, structuring, aiming causes.)

At end, any further conclusions about the morality of abortion would depend on further development of one's ethics, beyond the introduction laid out here. Still, there is one more thing that can be said about the further development of one's ethic, if it is consistent with its foundations. Where there is a doubt about whether the choice of abortion would take the life of a being whose nature gives it the potentiality for human ends, an ethic must give the benefit of the doubt to that being, rather than to the being making the choice of an abortion. Without the existence of a being with such a capacity, choice itself would be impossible. Moreover, the choice only derives its value from the pre-existing capacity for human achievements. So where there is the

possibility of taken the life of such an innocent human organism, a consistent ethic must declare the act of taking such a life to be unethical.

This is just another way of saying that life is more important than choice, or that if the existence of a complete human organism does not place any restrictions on the value of our choices, than nothing can place any such restrictions. For the only thing that can place restrictions on the value of choices is the pre-existing potentiality for the future achievement of human ends. So a consistent ethic must place a higher value on the existence of a being whose nature, if not its development, gives it an orientation to human ends than on the fulfillment of an end aimed at by any particular choice.

Feb. 14, 95 BIG

Mereological sum of the sperm and ovum (see one of the respondents to Marquis's article): The zygote is a unit whole human causal system. Each of the words "unit" and "whole" have a job to do. Previous to conception, a causal system consisting of the sperm, ovum, the mother's organs, or even the entire universe, exists. The zygote also can be considered just a part of that causal system which is the entire universe. But when we consider the zygote as a part, we are considering it as a unit, a unit causal system. As a unit causal system, the zygote has the following characteristic: it is a whole human causal system, a complete human causal system. That unit is completely equipped to now have whatever it needs to have to be an organism with the potential for the future causing of human achievements. It has everything an organism needs to have, at that stage of its development, to be an organism with the capacity for the eventual production of human ends.

The zygote is not like other human cells, which we may one day learn how to turn into clones of a zygote. When we develop the technology to clone a zygote, the clone will be the same kind of causal system the zygote now is, with one possible caveat to be mentioned in a moment. But even now, the zygote is not like its two successor cells in crucial respects. The two successor cells reside within the same membrane as the original cell. The successor cells do not share their own membranes with their successors, but share the same original membrane with their successors. Also, there appears to be differentiation between the successor cells at a very early stage. That differentiation would crucially distinguish the cells from the zygote. For it would make those successors different stages necessary in the development of one organism, with the zygote being the necessary first stage.

And don't forget, an organism, including an adult aiming at future achievements, is nothing but a process of development, that is, a process of change.

A possible caveat on a clone cell being a complete human causal system the way a zygote is: perhaps to be such a system, the clone would have to exist, for at least one instant, in whatever kind of environment is necessary for the zygote to develop itself, normally, into a mature human organism. It only needs an instant, since action is simultaneous with passion. But if there is a need for such an environment on the part of the zygote, and if the clone could come into existence without being in such an environment, there might be reason for saying that the clone was never able to begin the kind of causal process leading to normal human development. And so the clone would never have been put in the state of act making it an actual, complete human causal system.

Feb. 19, 95

The real conclusion you want to get at in the article: If the beginning of human life is a matter of choice, then all moral values are a matter of personal preference. Unless some objectively observable state of affairs imposes restrictions on the value of my choices, all moral values are a matter of subjective preference. And if human life does not provide such an observable state of affairs, nothing does.

Moral values have a specifying, formal object, the interests of others. If we can choose who the others are, even though they are potential future achievers of the same ends we are potential future achievers of by our choices, then our choice dominates over everything, over any conceivable candidate for value.

If we can kill other innocent adults, on the basis of our chosen values, all values are a matter of our preference. For without life, the other whom we kill cannot achieve any further value.

If we can choose who the others are, and so can kill on the basis of our choice, the other is not an absolute value, an end-in-itself. Nor is the other's life an absolute value.

Rather, the value we put on life is the value we put on our sexuality. Just when our knowledge of the genetic code taught us about human life, the sexual revolution occurred. The latter determined the value we put on life. That value is what we evaluate human life to be, that is, we evaluate it to be the existence of some mature characteristics. But in so doing, we are evaluating those characteristics relative to our ends, not the ends the being with those characteristics has the future potential for.

Feb. 20, 95

When we complain about unfair treatment, we imply that we are in some relevant sense equal to the wrong-doer. And that means that what we are is in some relevant sense equal. And that means the wrong-doer is not treating us as if we are what we are; what we are in reality is not what we are in her evaluations. But what is the "relevant" sense? Our being capable of human ends as she is. I am not capable of writing a symphony, but that is not the morally relevant sense.

RA, Feb. 20, 95 BIG

In the New Oxford Review for Jan-Feb., 1995, p. 27, the reviewer of Janet E. Smith's new book says that in her earlier book she crushingly critiqued the moral view that "evaluates choices rather than acts." First, this looks like a false dichotomy. We evaluate the act as capable or not capable of being morally chosen. The morality is still in the choice, but it occurs in the choice because of the nature of the act chosen.

But are there possibly two evaluations here, whose confusion may be important for the theoretical problems about the nature of ethics. A decision is an evaluation of something other than itself. But the decision may itself be evaluated as a good or bad evaluation. Who does the second evaluating? Not the

will, short of circularity, but the intellect. So there is an evaluation of conscience prior to the decision that says that a certain kind of evaluation on the part of the will is to be evaluated, by the intellect, as good or bad.

Feb. 28, 95

If it is a matter of choice when human life begins to acquire moral value, or when human life begins, or a matter of choice when to kill, or when there might be a human life, then reality imposes no limits on our choices. If reality imposes no limits, there are no limits.

Mar. 14, 95

Outside causes: The real questions are: 1) does an outside cause have a specific relation to the ultimate effect we are talking about, or is it a general cause (Aquinas's generic causes, like the sun) related to a variety of different effects, as a necessary background condition, in addition to the effect in question; and 2) is the interior cause or causes that depend on these outside background conditions actively related to the ultimate effects we are talking about.

In fact, everything that will be specifically human about us comes about as a direct result of the human control genes that are already present in the zygote. The control genes already present will be the cause of everything specifically human.

But maybe even if the fetus were passive with respect to receiving, e.g., intelligence from the mother, that might be enough. The fetus's genes would give it this passive potentiality, as proven by the near-universal occurrence of intelligence in human children of all cultures. By its genes, it would be designed to receive intelligence from the mother, and by her genes, she would be designed to give it.

May. 30, 95

In the case of the zygote, we know that the features that are specifically related to human ends are so related as the features that will make the organism the cause of the achievement of such ends, are so related as the cause of our ability to achieve those ends. So I do not have to formulate a general description that will serve as a criterion for deciding other cases. I don't have to generalize.

One way to put the conclusion: If who is a human being is a "religious" question in the sense of "arbitrary" or not decidable by reason, then everything else is also.

What is all this ontological stuff doing in a work on ethics? If standard assumptions are true, what things are shouldn't count in ethics. But obviously they do count; so the standard assumptions must be false. In fact, ethics must be based on what things are. And the fact that guilt depends on knowledge shows that ethics must be based on reason's knowledge of what things are. How can this be? Answer: We hold, people, including ourselves, to the end of behaving in accord with reason.

Whatever else a completely developed ethics will do, we can know at this introductory stage that ethics will require decisions to conform with reason's knowledge of what things are. That happens to be an end we are capable of

achieving. If we do not achieve it, we are immoral.

Why be moral? If in addition to being capable of that end we are actively and positively oriented to it, we need to be moral to achieve our ends. We cannot achieve all the ends we are oriented to, so we must choose between them. But all such choices use the RA, and so we cannot avoid having to achieve the end of the RA, if we are to be happy.

Are we positively oriented to that end? There is empirical evidence that we are: the existence of conscience, of guilt, of holding others to be wrong, etc. The fact that we consider "Why be moral?" to be a horrible question. Etc. At one level, the positive orientation to that end consists of the existence of conscience, etc.

I am not saying that the reason it is wrong to kill is that it prevents something from having a future like ours. I am talking about the introduction to ethics, where the nature established for ethical value determines the extension of ethical value. Preventing a future like ours is just one kind of value under the general heading of ethical value (is at most one kind of value under . . .). The full development of ethics may well assign specific reasons under the general heading of the nature of ethical value, may well assign a different reason why it is wrong to kill human beings. But if it is wrong to kill people, we know in advance that it is wrong to kill the fetus. We know that in advance of any specific reason we assign for not killing.

Two possible defenses of abortion: A zygote is a human being and it is ok to kill human beings; it is not ok to kill human beings but a zygote is not a human being. These views really amount to the same things, because they both say that human life as something worth saving, as something it is wrong to kill, develops later; human life as something imposing a moral obligation comes later. Also, these views are the same because the second judges the value of features developed later relative to our ends, not the other organism's ends.

But what kind of obligation is it, absolute or relative. If human life imposes only a relative obligation, we can morally take the life of an innocent adult. And can it impose an absolute obligation, if we decide by reference to our ends, not its? But my argument seems to presuppose that every decision gets its value from one of our own ends. Yes, but that end may be the end of evaluating things to be what they are.

According to Curtis H., the first person to argue that what is wrong with killing is that it prevents a future like ours was to co-author of his ethics book, Randy Feisel (sp?) in The Southern Journal of Philosophy (or the South-western?)

We evaluate the other as a cause of actions that will achieve human ends. We are most fundamentally such a cause -- both at conception and now, continuously -- at the cellular level. And that most fundamental level is the one that counts.

Jun. 3, 95

If we are choosing when human life begins, what standard beyond and outside of our choices are is our choice going to conform to? If the choice is "religious" because there is no rational standard, there can't be any rational standard for anything.

The opponent replies with a challenge: then what standard is there? The question really answers itself. The choice will achieve some human end. So any organism capable of future human achievements must be included.

Twining - BIG

The question is does the organism's capabilities for future achievement already include causal factors specifically related to different sets of human achievements, or to sets of human achievements to be achieved by more than one organism. If yes, then there are two human causal systems already present, from the purposes of morality. If not, then there is only one already present, but one with the potentiality, but no specific causal relation, to yield two morally human causal systems.

Jun. 9, 95

What if someone figured out a way to upgrade a chimp's DNA to make it a potential musician. Not doing so would not be a misfortune for the chimp, since it is not an organism whose nature now gives it that capacity. (But it would have the capacity to have that capacity. Yes, but one is an active potency, the other a passive potency - and an obediential potency, a potency for that which or nature does not call for or deserve.)

Jun. 12, 95

Is my argument pro-life? Actually, my conclusion intends to make both the anti-abortion rights and pro-abortion rights positions more logically stated, and it will do so in a way that will not please many in both camps.

My brief statement of an ethical position solves the problem of "equality" by assuming that man has free choice. A distinguished position in ethics, going all the way back to Plato's "virtue is knowledge," holds that free choice is not necessary for ethics. It is perfectly logical for those who hold that man is not free, that there are no objective values, etc., to arbitrarily choose to let adults kill infants; for human beings have no special value, for nothing has any special moral value. Enlightened selfishness then supports giving women the choice, since fetuses will never get back at us in this life. Or at least, enlightened selfishness supports giving them the choice until there is a sufficient reason for the majority or the power establishment to want to rid us of rights or even of life.

Similarly, defining ethical value in terms of the greatest good of the greatest number, instead of in terms of the person being an end-in-itself, reduces the value of the individual to our contribution to the whole. So each of us is totally expendable. Those who hold utilitarianism need to state this implication explicitly and clearly, to make this implication clearly explicit. Otherwise, people think they are defending woman's choice because of some intrinsic dignity she possesses as a person with "rights."

Conversely, pro-lifers don't realize that their position requires that there be something important about being a human being. And pro-choicers don't realize that their position requires the opposite. But the pro-life position does not require them to answer the question about what is species-specific to a human being.

Do I support pro-life? In fact, my arguments put a stronger burden of proof on them and a weaker burden of proof on the abortion rights position. I show that abortion is just as unfair to the fetus as is killing an innocent adult. But what of it? Being fair isn't something absolute or objective. It's a matter of enlightened selfishness.

Even before we can answer certain moral questions, it is often possible to judge

which question is more important. For example, it is more important to know whether nuclear war can be justified than to know whether it is justified to go through a red light, when there are no other cars at the intersection. That having been said, which of these questions is more important: Does this action risk taking an innocent human life; does this action risk depriving a woman of a choice over her own body?

My reason for mentioning this is that someone will argue that I have discussed the morality of abortion in terms of the mature features of the fetus, but not by whether the fetus is yet independent of its mother's body.



SSR, Nov. 20, 94

In criticizing the condoning of extramarital sex for making successful marriage more difficult, am I illegitimately going beyond the right to opportunity to the right to certain results? False dichotomy. The opportunity we need is an opportunity for a successful marriage, not just the opportunity to try to have a successful marriage. It is an injustice to diminish the opportunity for a successful marriage. Likewise, it would be wrong to say "You have the opportunity to try to succeed economically," when we are depriving someone of the conditions necessary for the attempt to succeed. So not guaranteeing success, but guaranteeing conditions needed (normally) for the attempt to succeed (*ceteris paribus*). Not guaranteeing sufficient conditions, but necessary conditions.

Jan. 18, 95

It's easy to be a parent, so easy that one person can do it as well as two.

Ethics, RA, Nov. 20, 94

How get to the fact that we evaluate things to be what they are in a perspicuous way? Start with the fact that we can treat things as if they were not what they are. And we do this consciously. This is a fact of experience. Establish that fact before moving to the rational appetite.

Another approach: Can we formulate an argument this way: If we are not oriented to the end of valuing things to be or not be such and such, then . . . That is, can we draw a necessarily false consequence from that contrart to fact assumption?

Another approach: We can no more prove that the existence of the rational appetite with the end of valuing things to be this or that than we can prove the existence of the state we call "belief" with its end of identity with what exists.

The acts of the rational appetite must treat things as if they were this or that in relation to other human ends, or in relation to our ends. And those acts can do this incorrectly.

Jan. 18, 95

The RA must conform to what things are just as the intellect does. In whatever way the intellect fails of its end if it does not conform to what things are, the RA fails of its end, if it does not conform in the same way the intellect does.

Thing-object, material and formal objects, Nov. 20, 94

Maritain wants to argue that the object is a feature, an aspect, of something more than an object, of something that is more than an object. But that it is a feature is given. He argues that by this feature something more than an object is given or is reached. So at least it is a feature of something that potentially has more features, because it, that which is so objectified, is a possible possessor, exercizer, of an existence that is more than being an object, and hence more than what is objectified in this way, and hence potentially has more features.

May. 31, 95

Maritain introduces the thing/object distinction immediately following his discussion of the nature of truth. Now he is talking about whether we can know the truth. In effect, he is saying: If (hypothetical) we can know truths about things, we certainly can't do it if we have to know things completely; for we can't know things completely. So if we can know any truths about things, our objects must be objectified as, knowable as, aspects of possible things. The question of actuality does not arise yet. All we have to know at first is that this object is presented as an aspect of a possible thing. Hence our formal objects are presented as aspects of possible material objects.

Jan. 18, 95

What does Maritain mean by saying that being is our "analytically" first object? Whatever may have been temporally first, something red, something hot, etc., it was necessarily something. Our temporally first object necessarily included being, because being is the goal at which all our concepts aim, all our causally primary concepts. Even now, being is analytically first in any new primary concepts we form (where "primary" means referring to public objects).

Ethics, animal suffering, Nov. 20, 94

After reading Marquis on abortion. Wanton infliction of pain on animals evaluates pain not to be a misfortune. But pain is a misfortune. So the wanton infliction of pain evaluates pain not to be what it is. True, the pain of animals is not a misfortune for us. But pain can be justly inflicted on us to acquire a good greater than the misfortune constituted by the pain. Likewise, we can inflict pain on animals, if we acquire a good greater than the pain. For example, we cannot justly inflict pain on animals for sport. But otherwise, pain is an ontological misfortune to a being that is what it is independently of our thoughts and desires. We would be evaluating the being not to be what it is, if we evaluated wanton pain not to be an evil independent of our wishes.

Jan. 24, 95

We are capable of feeling sympathy for suffering animals. If we permitted unnecessary suffering, our feeling of sympathy would be dulled, and we might not have sufficient sympathy for suffering humans.

Ethics, SSR, quality of life, birth control, Nov. 20, 94

What constitutes the "quality of life" should be measured by moral values, e.g., courage. Instead, moral decisions are now made in terms of a concept of the "quality of life" defined by non-moral features.

Feb. 8, 95

Human life comes from an act of love between persons. The meaning, the value, of human life is that of the committed love of one person for another, from which life comes. That is why illegitimate children have always been (unfairly) scorned. The meaning of their coming into existence was not the value of a person as worthy of committed love.

When I employ sex in a way that intends to avoid procreation, I am placing a value on my partner, even my imagined partner if the sex is autoerotic. I am using her person-making features. But I am not only putting a value other than person-making on those features and hence on her, I am trying to suppress those features. E.g., what she is in my values is a source of pleasure for me, not a person-maker. If so, what is a person in my evaluations? A person is no longer an absolute value, by which all other values must be measured.

The opponent says I commit a fallacy by talking about a non-existent person, an abstract or merely potential person, i.e., the person who will not result from this sex. But no; there is an actual person involved here, my sex partner. If I value her person-making ability to be something less than that, to the point of trying to exclude the making of a person, can I consistently evaluate her to be an end-in-herself, an ethical absolute? NO. If a person, she, deserves to be valued as an end-in-herself just because she is a person, then our person-making features must have the status, in our evaluations, of person-making features.

In marriage, human life comes from one person's complete giving of him/herself to another person. The meaning of that coming into existence is one person's believe that another is worthy of his/her complete giving of him/herself. Anything less than that, and we are not evaluating another to be worthy of complete giving of ourselves. We are not evaluating the other to be that, but are we denying it? When I enter into an ordinary business or social exchange, am I denying that the other is worthy of committed love just because the act in question is not an act of complete giving of myself?

No, but in such acts, I am not using, and placing a value on, the other's person-making ability.

Also, in certain contexts, the act that brings a human person into existence is an act of committed love and complete self-giving. If from a moral point of view, that act, sex, can legitimately take place in a context where it is not an act of committed self-giving, then is the value of the offsprings of such acts the value of something worthy of committed love? They do not come from committed love, and morally need not come from committed love, so how can the meaning of their existence be the fact that persons are worthy of committed love for their own sake? So the unfortunate scorn of bastards is a recognition of the fact that if sex is not used in the context of committed love, persons are not worthy of committed love. For to use sex outside of the context of committed love is to use our person-making ability outside of the context of committed love. It is to actuate the source of persons, to implement the source of persons, to exercise the power that makes persons outside of the context of committed love for a person, where outside has a privative, not just negative, meaning: it is to exercise the power to make persons in a context where commit-

ted love is deliberately excluded. And so that which is made by this power is not something whose existence bespeaks the person as worthy of committed love, where, again, the "not" is privative, not just negative.

Jun. 12, 95

Society requires that sex be confined to relationships of committed love. That means that the meaning of sex is giving love to another being, sharing life with another being, who is worthy of committed love for their own sake, i.e., a person. And since sex is also the way we share existence itself with beings worthy of committed love for their own sake, we cannot frustrate the latter function of sex without contradicting its meaning of being a relation to a being worthy of love for her or his own sake.

Artificial insemination, in vitro insemination, surrogate motherhood, Jul. 4, 95

If we are responsible for the existence of a being worthy of committed love, we are responsible for giving it committed love. Who else would be responsible if we are not? To assign that responsibility to someone else is to confuse personal value with functional value. For replacability is the ethic of functional value.

Ethics, Universality of laws, Nov. 20, 94

Is there any hope in making a law universal by formulating it this way, for example: It is wrong to lie except for a reason that is not selfish or biased or prejudicially preferential, etc.

Ethics, Double Effect, Nov. 15, 94

Do I really need the principle of double effect? It happens to be the case that some combinations of features make an act immoral, and some do not. If an act is immoral by the principle of double effect, the decision to do it is just as immoral, just as contrary to the end of the RA, as an act described universally as immoral. In fact, we can describe the double effect case universally as an intrinsically immoral decision.



Abortion article, Oct. 23, 94

Studying the DNA of fossils, we learn what the dead organism was capable of. If we recreated an extinct organism, we would have an organism capable of capable of what the extinct organism was capable of.

Our genes code for us to have the active capacity to be musicians. The chimp's genes do not. It has the capacity to passively receive genes that make it a musician. In addition to our genes, we have to passively receive exterior influences. But our genes now code for us to become active musicians as a result of those exterior influences. The chimp's genes do not now code for that.

SSR, Ethics, Oct. 23, 94

In something I read recently, Gore Vidal was quoted as saying that making another person into a (sexual) object was joy, and as long as it was consensual on the part of the other person, it was all right. But one can hardly call marriage make another person into an object. In marriage, one gives one's body to the other permanently, completely. That is hardly making an object out of the other. Nor is it giving the other permission to make an object out of you.

Sex is too essentially and uniquely connected with human life for sex not to be part of a permanent sharing of life with another. If we use sex outside of such a permanent sharing, we are diminishing the value of human life, because human life is so essentially connected with sex.

Nature has chosen that human life would come into existence as a result of the physical desire of one person for the pleasure that another person's body can give. If so, how can the value of human life not be merely that of an accidental product of a purely physical desire? Human life can have the dignity it deserves and needs only if the use of sexual desire is made part of a relation of committed love and committed self-giving of each other's bodies between those who will create human life through their desire.

Jan. 24, 95

We cannot use our sexuality, even auto-erotically, without coming into an evaluative relation with other persons, even persons represented in or imagination.

SSR, Ethics, Equality not enough, Sweden, rights of children, more responsibility to children, G and L, Oct. 23, 94

How does such and such a development affect children? Why do we ask this question last. not first? E.g., in Sweden, where there appear to have been few "studies" on the questions I want answered. What does that tell us about our values? It says that "Do anything as long as it does not hurt another" really means "Get away with as much as you can and don't go out of your way looking for others you might actually be hurting. Our principle is not "Aim at the greater good" but "Aim at your own good until someone complains; that is, aim at your own good without looking for the good of others.

Jan. 18, 95

Masters and Johnson have a very small sample. Feldman and McCullouch have a very short follow up period.

Jun. 12, 95

Studies show that many homosexuals can adapt sufficiently to have a satisfying heterosexual life in marriage. But studies also show that premarital sex in youth is a predictor for considerably less chance for success in marriage. One might expect, therefore, that premarital sex would make success in marriage even more difficult for homosexuals. In fact, many clinicians, who practice those therapeutic techniques that almost everyone would find acceptable (unobjectionable on moral or aesthetic grounds -- see what terms the Sexual Brain guy uses), report that the difficulty of heterosexual adaptation increases with the amount of prior homosexual activity. (Note that "who practice those . . ." excludes both Masters and Johnson and Feldman and McCullouch.)

The above paragraph would be a good strategy for a short piece, e.g., an op-ed piece. For a book, do the following. After presenting all those who testify to "the longer in, the harder out," make the statement that there are a variety of methods, not all of them acceptable to everyone. Then, describe Master's and Johnson's method and explain why it would not be acceptable. Only then say that they make the claim that their method works as well for the longer in as for the shorter in. Even if this were true, it would not help most homosexuals. But it is far from certain that it is true.

Then move on to Feldman and McCullouch, first quoting the Sexual Brain guy. Quoting him first will set up F and M perfectly. The most that they could show would be that their method works as well for both, but their method is objectionable and does not work for exclusive homosexuals.

Ethics, RA, Double effect, Oct. 23, 94

Ethical standards come from the natures of things (acts, events, etc.) and from the nature of our decisions. Conscious decisions take things to be of certain natures. To take something to be X while knowing that it is not X is a defective desire.

How is it possible that a choice of ends or means takes something or some things to be other than it is? Can I take a rock to be other than it is? If I worship it, yes. This is possible because I evaluate something that by nature is an end to be a means, or vice versa. A rock is "by nature" a means because of the relation between its nature and ours, i.e., ours is that of an end-in-se and its nature is not.

Approach double effect this way. Do not start off enunciating a big universal principle. Take a concrete example of intending an evil act as a means to some good and show how doing such an act knowingly amounts to the will's evaluating something to be other than what it is.

Ordinati, UPS, PUL, Sep. 18, 94

The problem isn't the tendency to rely on the liturgy per se, rather that tendency is a symptom of deeper problems: A failure to understand (1) pastoral ends, (2) the necessary means to those ends, (3) the contingent circumstances the prevent obstacles to attaining those ends by those means.

Episcopoi, episcopon?

We tend to rely on the Eucharist to do things it is not intended to do.

Why is Orthodox Catholicism failing to evangelize? Reasoning from effect to cause tells us that our pastoral leaders have not learned how to evangelize. The fact that the Eucharist is our main pastoral tools shows that we think celebrating the Eucharist properly will evangelize and create community. The Eucharist is Jesus; so bringing people to the Eucharist is bringing them to Jesus. But the history of the catechumenate shows that the Eucharist is not a means of evangelization, and it is baptism and confirmation that create community. Concerning baptism, though, Paul said.

The Eucharistic celebrant acts in persona Christi. But the Eucharist was not Jesus's main pastoral tool. The sole time he offered the Eucharist before His resurrection, Jesus did it for those who already had a relationship, not to His sacramental presence in the Eucharist, but to the person who was to be present.

As further evidence of our not knowing how to evangelize and create community, I point to the experience of movements. They could have done this had their leaders used them for that purposes and known how to achieve that purpose.

Jan. 18, 95

Take out "world-wide".

The ministry of leadership and unity is not as essential to the sacramental character of the priesthood as is the sacramental ministry. But the former ministry is needed for the effectiveness of the sacraments. Creating environments requires leadership. Someone with the necessary authority has to also have the vision to allow God to use him to create environments.

Musicians used their gifts to the point of interfering with others use of their gifts, point of preventing others from having the freedom to use their gifts. Musicians used their gifts so over-eagerly that . . .

Jan. 21, 95

Take out the lines offensive to evangelicals, to save space. Also it gives you room to add something about the Church not having influence on the world when it cannot influence its own. Leave in the sentences "Look at the third-world countries . . . . There we . . ."

It is not enough to have the correct pastoral vision. We must be aware of the obstacles to the vision and know how to deal with them. We can have a good vision and be blind to the obstacles to it.

There are many more important things to do, in given circumstances, than celebrate the liturgy. Saving someone's life is more important, for example.

Ashley, Metaphysics and Immateriality, Analogy, Paralogues, Sep. 18, 94 BIG

Ashely's reply, in conversation, to my argument in "Metaphysics and Immateriality" is that "being" changes meaning and becomes analogical when it is applied, even hypothetically, to immaterial beings.

Who says, a la Ashely, that "being" is not analogical to begin with or only becomes analogical when we know that immaterial beings exist? Do I need to know the existence of immaterial beings to understand the argument that being is not a genus? Where does that argument include the premise that an immaterial being exists? And would "being" be a genus if all beings were material? Why? What argument shows that?

The being that is first known is analogical. I arrive at focussing on that being in its full (potential) amplitude by stripping away notes like materiality. But stripping away notes does not add any notes, so the result of stripping away must be to be left with something that was there all along. So the being that is analogical and is predicable of immaterial beings must have been there all along.

Feb. 19, 95

To some, a paradiifference will seem just like another specific difference. Is there a distinction between them or is there not? The answer is yes and no. In other words, "logical difference" is itself a paralogue fully affirmable of the specific difference relative to its genus, while affirmable and deniable of a difference dividing paralogates from one another.

The opponent says: You have not succeeded in distinguishing a paralogue from a genus, because the difference of two paralogages is just another specific difference. You have not distinguished the difference between two paralogates from a specific difference. I answer with an unequivocal yes and no. The difference between two paralogates functions as a specific difference, and it does not function as a specific difference.

Necessary truth, self-evidence, LTA, logical and linguistic relations, short book, Sep. 18, 94 BIG, Big

The difference between "Tully is Cicero" and "Every bachelor is an adult, unmarried, male." In "T is C" the diverse objectification consists solely of contingent lexicological relations; so the identity of objects is necessary but not knowably necessary, i.e., not self-evident. In "Every B is an a, u, m" there are diverse contingent, lexicological relations. But each of the lexicological units has a word-function with logical relations to the word-function of bachelor (a logical relation other than identity itself, as in "T is C". Such identity is not sufficient for self-evidence, the question is how is the necessary identity known?). Each of the lexicological units has a logical relation to the word-function of bachelor such that familiarity with each of the word-functions makes it impossible not to know that the identity of the things objectified by the word-functions is necessary by virtue of those logical relations.

In one of these notes files, in the last few months, I refer to Julian Huxley's statement that they, scientist's, accepted Darwinism before it was proven because Darwinism was perceived to get rid of God, and God was a great bother to their sex lives. As similar thing happened in the case of the value of human life. In the late forties through early sixties, one can find any number of statements in scientific literature stating that human life begins at conception. And one can find no, or almost no, denials. Now some scientists are denying that human life begins at conception. Why the change? The sexual revolution intervended, and the belief that human life begins at conception, or at least that innocent human life should not be taken, became a great bother to our sex lives.

But notice the connection between these two changes. If there is no God, then is the belief that human life begins at conception really a great bother to our sex lives? On the other hand, if there is a God, then the belief that human life begins at conception really should be a bother to our sex lives. Because, if there is a God, a human life is the life of an image of God.



UPS, PUL teaching, Sep. 16, 94 BIG AA

The Church urges us to go to weekday masses as often as our circumstances allow. But millions of people did not go to mass today. They went to work instead. Is work more important than mass? Yes! We are not talking about the Sunday liturgy, we are talking about optional liturgies. After work, they went home to their families. Again, that is more important. The purpose of the Sunday liturgy is to enable us to be Christians at work, to make our homes a Christian environment. If we let weekday liturgies interfere with our obligations at work or home, WE WOULD BE DEFEATING THE PURPOSE OF THE LITURGY.

I did not go to mass last Monday, I came to the Monday night prayer meeting of the community instead. Was it more important to spend that time at a prayer meeting, when it could have been spent at a mass done the street? YES, it was more important! The purpose of the Sunday liturgy, the reason for its existence, is to enable the Church to be a place where we do the kind of things we do at prayer meetings. The purpose of the Sunday liturgy is to give the Church the grace to be a place where sisters and brothers build one another up in the Lord, where sisters and brothers teach and admonish one another, by word and by example. Where sisters and brothers encourage and correct one another, by word and by example. Where sisters and brothers speak the words of the Lord to one another, where they rouse each other to love and good works, where they minister to one another.

Letting the Church be that kind of place takes TIME. If spending time at optional liturgies interfered with helping the Church be a place where we do the kind of things we do at prayer meetings, we would be DEFEATING THE PURPOSE OF THE LITURGY. We would be defeating the purpose of the liturgy just as we would if we let attendance at optional liturgies interfere with our work or home. In other words, more important than attending optional weekday liturgies is helping the Church be a family where sisters and brothers build one another up in the Lord.

My reason for sharing this is that I think that for some and perhaps many people in this community the liturgy on Thursday night is more important than the prayer meeting. For these people, the important reason for coming on Thursday night is not to make us a place where brothers and sisters build each other up in the Lord but to have an uplifting experience at the liturgy. For them, the main reason for coming is NOT to do the kind of things we do at prayer meetings.

(I am not worried about attendance at evangelical nights per se, I am worried about the life of the community, period. If committed members do not understand what our job is, can we rely expect to do that job?)

Liberal/Conservative, Saving Liberalism from the Liberals, P&CG, SSR, Empiricism, Predicament, C&D, Sep. 16, 94

Neither side is addressing the underlying issues. The number on welfare grew under both (or is it the number under the poverty line?) The rich/poor wage gap grew under both. The necessity of both parents to work to maintain the "same" standard of living. Now stress on the job is epidemic and reaching crisis proportions.

Neither side is serving us; they are serving their ideologies. Cs make it a government or else issue. They define it as "The purpose of government is not to solve such issues; so we have to let things take their course." Contrary to the way Cs perceive Ls, Ls don't wake up thinking "How can I expand the power of government today?" Any expansion of government (and a smaller percentage works for government than in the 1950s according to Kuttner in the Globe this week) is an unitended, not directly intended, side-effect. Instead of thinking as the Cs say they do, Ls ask, "Will this plan help this problem?" Cs should, but can't, argue that this specific plan is bad, not that government cannot help. Ls, on the other hand, should appreciate the need for subordinate entities, the family and business, to contribute and that government cannot replace them, cannot compensate for their loss. Ls should also appreciate the importance of supporting and promoting such subordinate and independent entities in indirect ways (indirect to preserve their independence from government). For example, it is incumbent on government officials not to undermine the family by coming out of the closet when they habitually practice extramarital sex.

In the absence of a religion meeting minimal rational standards (one God; a transcendent God, rather than a mother-God) L itself becomes a religion to fill the vacuum. The Humanists and the People for the American Way demonstrate this. Once it becomes a religion, a good idea, L, gets pushed to illogical extremes, in the absence of any higher principles to restrain it. For example, the judge who refused to let the library kick out the noisy, stinking, homeless person. The judge said get rid of the condition of homelessness, not the person. But contrary to his "religion," we cannot end all such conditions, only ameliorate them. Utopian Sweden shows that there are limits to what we can do. That judge and Ls like him are bad for L, because they are sitting ducks for C's criticism. Because they give L a bad name. And both they and Cs make some straight-jacket, false-dichotomy, either-or assumptions. They say to blame it on society's failure to do something it could do. They say that government cannot do such things (completely eliminate such problems), so don't let government do anything to such people but punish them. The truth is, that after our best efforts to eliminate homelessness and other such conditions, there are always going to be some people who need to be kicked out of libraries, in the name of the common good, for noisiness, stinking, etc.

The problem is bad metaphysics. Some are in love with the idea that society causes the problem, as if the idea that we are not responsible did not demean us. (Yet they unconsciously pride themselves on having and acting on such enlightened ideas, as if they could take credit for being responsible for acting in this enlightened way.) C's are in love with deducing "order" from eternal principles. We are victims of bad metaphysics because we can no longer draw on the interest from Judeo-Christian values, since we have spent the capital.

Empiricism did not get rid of metaphysics. It just replaced it with a disguised, and therefore a bad, metaphysics. But by disguising it, empiricism made us incapable of defending good metaphysics against the bad.

Empiricism, metaphysics, C&D, U-turn, Jun. 2, 95

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If there are standards for our choices, they can only come from one possible source: what things are, i.e., what we, other things, acts, events, situations, and the features of all of the above, are. For there is no other place for standards to come from. And note that while some philosophers may rule out standards a priori, a la Hume, most intelligent lay people who do not believe in standards do so for want of finding them. That is, they have tried to look for them assuming, contrary to these philosophers, that looking for such standards is a reasonable thing to do. (e.g., Jane Pollock)

But I am speaking to philosophers. So I must answer the question how can it be that what things are provide standards for our choices, standards which pre-exist those choices. I will first state the answer in a way that will sound, abstract, ad hoc, and artificial at first. Then I will show that nothing could be more commonnplace.

In making decisions, we give things the value of being what they are or of not being what they are. In our decisions, things acquire a value which is that of being what they are or not being what they are, a value which is identical with what things are or is not identical with what things are. Why is it that we can say this of our decisions?

(1) We are not obligated if we are inculpably ignorant, and we are culpably ignorant only if we previously possessed the relevant rational knowledge. So (2) moral decisions are based on the possession of the relevant rational knowledge of what things are. (3) Decisions based on rational awareness can either knowingly conform to what things are know to be or not. (4) The reason why decisions based on rational awareness knowingly conform to what things are or not is that decisions give things a status in our values that conforms or does not conform to what things are. (5) Conformity here means identity between what things are and what things are in our decisions.

(6) Not that our decisions conform or do not conform with what just any things are. But in choosing ends and means, certain things are so related to what we are as choosers of human ends, and so related to what human ends are, that we cannot avoid either giving them a value that conforms to what they are or not. Given the circumstances that we live in and the options that are open to us for choice, we cannot avoid either valuing the other human beings affected by our choices to be what they are or not. And we cannot avoid either valuing God to be what He is or not. So we need not look for what it is to value a pencil eraser, say, to be other than what it is. That possibility is not open to us (unless we worship them as idols!), but the possibility of misevaluating other persons, human or divine, certainly is.

(7) If we consciously give them a value contrary to what we know them to be, our decision is necessarily defective. Why? (8) We have the end of valuing things to be what reason knows them to be, because decisions cannot avoid being based on rational knowledge. Decisions cannot avoid treating things as if they were what our decisions value them to be, cannot avoid relating to things as if what they are in our decisions is . . . , or as if the nature we evaluate them to have is the nature we know them to be. (9) We are then defective as we are defective in false belief, which is a relation to things as if . . .

The fact that value comes from ends to which we are oriented prior to choice creates a problem for the is-ought theorist, the problem of creating such a thing as the is-ought dilemma for him to theorize about. Whatever they associate with "ought", it is a value or has a value only as one of the ends to which we are already oriented, only as a subset of our ends. So their "ought"

or "value" has to be based on what is already, namely, our orientation to ends. And why is there a dilemma about going from is to ought, but not about going from is to what is human, or tall, or red, or moving. "Ought" means is due, is owed, is obligatory, is the right thing, is the only right thing, is the only alternative to the wrong thing. Compare: is fair, is pleasing, is helpful, is just, is hurtful, is what is fair, owed, etc. Is appropriate for.

End of abortion article: If there is an orientation to an end, then relative to that orientation, the failure to achieve that end is a defect, is defective. So all we have to do is identify the orientation to an end that is what "ought" is associated with. That is, which of our ends is it that is associated with moral value? To find the answer to that question, go back to the instinct to say "Do whatever you want, as long as it does not hurt someone else." The person who instinctively says that is not just thinking in terms of equality. Dogs eat dogs. He is thinking of equality in a certain respect, the respect of being equal in a certain way, being equal with respect to our being what we are in a certain way, our being equal with respect to one of the things that constitutes our being what we are, namely, our being pursuers of human accomplishments, free pursuers of human accomplishments.

Abortion: We value a human fetus more than a canine fetus because of what the fetus is capable of becoming, where "capable of" means what potentialities are in the human fetus but not in the canine fetus. These are active potentialities, potentialities for actions it initiates.

Ethics, RA, Sep. 13, 94 BIG

When we choose ends and means rationally conscious of what we are doing, we place values on things; we give them values. In so doing, we are in a conscious state, a conscious relation to what things are, which state or relation calls for, by its nature, by being what it is, being measured by its conformity to what things are -- just as belief is a conscious state that is so related to what things are that what belief is calls for its being measured by its conformity to what things are.

Example: Anti-nuclear groups expelling pro-lifers. And health care by committee is not good, but where were the conservatives before the liberals proposed health reform legislation? Clinton's "weed out" statement (quoted by Hentoff) is a liberal outrage, but where were the conservatives before?

When they were liberals, the founders of neo-Conservatism were pro-Communist (see the letter about the Yom Kippur war in Crisis). Then they flip-flopped completely. Where is liberal flexibility versus conservative rigidity? The neo-conservatives showed that they had always been as rigid as the conservatives have always been. Thus, the neo-conservative phenomenon shows why we need to save liberalism from the liberals. Many so-called liberals are just as rigid as any conservative, so much so that they can switch and become conservative at any time, as the neo-conservatives did. The next time, the cause of the switch will be something else. E.g., when enough liberals realize that defending the defenseless means promoting the family for the sake of children and stopping abortion, many current "liberals" will jump on the old conservative "free choice" bandwagon.

Compassion presupposes justice. This does not necessarily mean that justice is more important than compassion, only that it is a necessary condition for compassion, a condition that prevents a good idea (compassion) from being carried to illogical extremes. You can't give the shirt off your back, if it is someone else's shirt. Today's liberalism seeks compassion without looking for guidance from justice. A good example of this is paroling murderers, or letting them have furloughs. The only just thing to do to a murderer is to lock him up and throw away the key. And second-degree murderers get out of jail ridiculously soon. We do this in the name of compassion. But it is not being compassionate to the rest of society not to affirm the value of human life by giving murder a just punishment.

Rational appetite, RA, Ethics, Freedom, Sep. 11, 94

Another way to describe the "non-consideration of the rule" in non-technical terms: bringing knowledge to bear on deciding whether to . . ., bringing a piece of knowledge to bear on what I will do in a situation.

My discovery, as opposed to verification, of the RA was partially a priori. Among other things, I asked "What can a decision's conforming to what things are mean?" Well, what must "conforming" mean in the case of truth?

And: A priori, things exist intentionally in desires. So as in cognition, what exists intentionally is either identical or not identical with what exists entitatively.

Logic, Logical relations, Sep. 11, 94

Gewirth, p. 279 ff., refers to "specification" as a logical relation distinct from deduction for relating the truth value of propositions. He offers no explanation, as if he expects his readers to be familiar with the concept.



Gewirth, ethics, Nozick, use of unequal abilities, duties to self, Sep. 11, 94

Gewirth, in effect, makes ethical evil into a form of contradictoriness. But can't we be contradictory in the same way toward ourselves?

On pp. 331,2, 378 he talks about the issue of our deserving our unequal abilities and refers to a critique of Nozick's against Rawls on this point.

Short book, U-turn, Sep. 11, 94

Our ways of doing philosophy all have the authority of other disciplines (e.g., Newtonian physics, in Kant). Yet we think of ourselves as rejecting authority in the name of reason. At the same time, we demean and criticize reason, and the only defender of the legitimacy of reason is the authority we hate (yes, that is the word) the most: the Catholic church.

Abortion, gene switching, Sep. 11, 94 BIG

Both human embryo and the chimp embryo will have control genes switched on by essentially the same chemical from the mother (or at least by some chemical from the mother). But the human control genes give this embryo the potential to become, say, a nuclear physicist; the chimp's control genes do not give it that potential. So it is not the mother's chemical that give the human embryo a potential lacking in the chimp. Start: the human embryo has a potential lacking in the chimp.

Abortion, ethics, value of life, quality of life, euthanasia, Sep. 11, 94

Measuring the value of life by the quality of life relativizes the value of life, i.e., human life is no longer the highest, the absolute, value. And if it is not such a value, nothing can be. So nothing is an absolute value. Do not hurt the other? But who is the other, and what standards tell us what hurts her?

Immanent action, Simon, IE, Sep. 11, 94

Why is thought an action, and not something passively received? First, we are aware of our own existence only because we are aware of conscious states as emanating from us, i.e., as actions. Second, their nature requires that they be actions. What is passively recieved, constitutes a form/matter union with the receiver. A form/matter union cannot account for what is unique to consciouness. Intentional existence begins where what is explainable by form/matter unions ends. So consciousness as intentional existence cannot be merely passively received.

The recent history of Sweden (as told by Popenoe) shows that shows that social engineers allowed themselves to be led by contradictory goals within a generation (tossed to and fro by every wind of doctrine). This is important because, while Burke is certainly wrong and some orders need to be overthrown because they are evil, the question remains how to measure when an order is so evil that overthrowing it is worth the very real risk of throwing out many goods along with the evil order. The answer depends on our value systems, and history shows that they can change with every new intellectual fad. We need permanent principles by which to judge things. But we do not need permanent principles that become identified, in our consciousness, with an existing order, so that it appears that overthrowing the order will overthrow the principles. The Catholic church has made that mistake many times. The principles must guide us in modifying existing orders.

Short Book, Aug. 31, 94

Beginning of first chapter: 20th-century philosophy was the heir of rationalism, empiricism, and Kantianism. We developed great skills of analysis, linguistic and phenomenological analysis. (I will talk about phenomenology in later chapters.) But those skills did not: end controversy and paradox in philosophy. We need an approach that will not reduce philosophy to being an extension of another method, nor will claim philosophy is invalid on the basis of a claim about the sufficiency of some other method. Empirical methods create long-standing agreement. Philosophies claiming that all knowledge is empirical do no better than the non-empirical philosophies they claim to be superior to. (Don't be negative on empiricism too early!)

At end of chapter, after the introductory discussion of causality, can bring in the causal definition of knowledge and rational belief.

Aside from the distinction between intellectual and sensory mental states, moderns want to know what distinguishes a mental state, of either kind, from a physical state. Aristotelians have an answer. But the answer is not a criterion for distinguishing the mental from the physical. It is a contrasting causal analysis. Specifically, a physical thing is analysed as a matter/form composite. But an intentional relation to an object is not a possession of the qualities making up the object as a form inhering in a matter, i.e., you. Your relation to the object does not result in the existence of a third thing, as a union of form and matter does. There is a third thing, when you go from not knowing to knowing something. But the relation of knowing itself is a relation to a set of qualities, which relation does not result in the existence of a third thing.



G and L, Aug. 31, 94 AA

More recent developments: Goldwater not a "social" conservative, at least not on this issue. Genetic infidelity (Time article and book The Moral Animal by Wright) contra my paragraph about sexuality chosen for monogamy. Poll claiming to show that gays are economically underprivileged. The cable show arguing for a pre-natal rather than genetic cause of homoseuxality. The Channel 2 show about treatments for homosexuality. The Focus on the Family ad about encouraging the spread of disease among our youth, which makes it look as if I am borrowing from them.

SSR, Ethics, P&CG, Abortion, Aug. 31, 94

If our use of the life faculty is not based on committed love, then human life is not (cannot be) the object of committed love, be something worthy of committed love for its own sake.

An op-ed piece in the Globe has a title about the need to "restore values." Is it even conceivable that we can restore values when the value of human life itself is relative to our choices, depends on our choices. Then what value does not depend on our choices? If human life does not provide a standard our choices must conform to, what is there for our choices to conform to? Is the standard of "As long as you do not hurt someone else" enough? But our choices decide who is someone else, and what it is to hurt them.

Life, abortion, Simon, Aug. 31, 94 BIG

Simon's definition of life as the non-fortuitous coincidence of mover and thing moved. There is life when agent and patient are not incidental parts of the same system. Part A is the agent; part B is the patient. But A could not be what it is before it acts and in order to so act, were it not already part of a system with B. And vice versa for B. A battery can be what it is without being part of the system making up a car. Heart and lungs cannot be what they are without being part of the same system. Or at least, the heart and the blood it pumps could not be what they are were they not part of the same causal system. The heart needs blood, not only as the object of its action, but also as what brings oxygen and glucose to the cells making up the heart.

So maybe we can save Simon's definition of life without making use of the notion of substance.

Maybe it is sufficient, not that A and B depend on one another for being what they are, but that they depend on one another for being part of this causal system. Thus, the parts of a cell can be what they are when separated from the cell. But their existence as part of that causal system depends on their interactions.

Pena, Aug. 31, 94

Good example to use against his position: Gewirth, Reason and Morality, p. 197.  
The dictator uses contradiction for his own purposes. But he does not countenance contradiction at the level of his own purposes.

The value things have in my volitions must be identical with what things are. Opponent: No, their value is that of being an end or a means. Yes, we make things ends and means to ends by choosing. But the result of so choosing is that the value things have is that of being what they are or is not that of being what they are. The result of so choosing is that things have the value of being what they are or do not have that value. The value a thing has is what they thing is or is not what the thing is.

Why must this be the case? Because our decisions make use of and are based on rational knowledge, which makes us aware of what things are. So our decisions are based on awareness of what things are, and cannot avoid being so based. But in making decisions, we can ignore parts of our knowledge that would be necessary in the context of the decision for the value of things to be identical with what they are. Why would those parts of our knowledge be so necessary? Because in the context, the decision knowingly treats something in a way contrary to its nature's relation to the ends of the decision. For example, in choosing to put cream in my coffee, I do not have to make use of my knowledge that what you are as a rational decider is equal to what I am. But in choosing to use cheating on an exam as my means to achieving the end of getting a job, ignoring my knowledge that you are equal to me results in your not having the value in my decision of being what you truly are. This result just happens to be unavoidable in that context. That is the nature of the context and of the things, you, I, the exam, etc., making up the context. That context does not have to exist. But once it does, I cannot avoid misevaluating you, if I do not use my knowledge of our equality as that which guides me to my end.

But why must the failure of my decision to give you the value of being what you are necessarily be a defect, necessarily be contrary to the end of my decision making power. That power has to use some of my rational knowledge, but not all of it. Yes, but I still remain aware of the truth, at the speculatively practical level. I am making a decision that I know to be invalid.

We cannot use reason and fail to have the end, among other ends, of identity between what we believe and what exists. The question is, if we use reason in making decisions, can we fail to have the end that the value we give things is that of being what they are, that the value things have in our volitions is what they are. (And is the alternative to the value being that of their being what they are that of their being something other than what they are?) If false judgements, commitments to false judgments being true (as opposed to playing with them, pretending, using them to write fiction, etc.) is involved in decisions, we cannot fail to have that end. Can we know that x is an F and consciously treat x as if it were not F without being defective, defective by the standard of an end we cannot avoid having?

Gewirth, abortion, principle of proportionality, dialectically necessary method,  
Aug. 31, 94

G does not show that it would be contradictory to violate the principle of  
proportionality.

Aquinas, Ethics, C and D, Scandal of Thomism, Laziness of Thomists (LOT), Aug. 31, 94

Title: Non-Thomistic essays. We have created a monster. Does Deal's list mention Deely, Adler, Veatch, Peterson, Causal Realism, does he mention even his own Maritain books? The point is, if you do philosophy right, you get ignored by the Thomists, because you are not doing "Thomism." You do not get considered by them. If you make it explicitly Thomistic, you do not get considered by the rest of our contemporaries because they rightly see you as doing textual analysis, not philosophy. To get considered by Thomists, you have to write in a way that will not be considered by anyone else, and rightly so. This title is one more attempt to get Thomists to see the point. Adler said it along time ago.

For the article "What Aquinas did not tell us about his ethics": Aquinas's ethics and ethical theory are not anywhere near as well developed as are his metaphysics and epistemology, because ethics were not under dispute at his time. This is another example showing that we need to do Thomism philosophically in order to do it the way it should be done. Specifically, we need the help of error as an occasion to discover the truth. But we have had plenty of error about ethics. Why have we not discovered more truth? Because we are reading the texts of Aquinas for the answer, but not approaching them philosophically.

Feb. 4, 95

Title of book "Non-Thomistic Essays." Examples in introduction: Knasas saying "But Aquinas didn't use that formula." Dewan and others attacking me for daring to add something to Aquinas's solution to whether God changed in deciding to create. What I added was perfectly consistent with what Aquinas says, still they did not want me to add anything. And Aquinas says God decided from all eternity, so he didn't undergo change. But what if he hadn't decided? Would he have been different? No, because not deciding would have been a non-act. (Check out the exact wording Aquinas uses before citing this example.)

Saving Liberalism from the Liberals, Liberal/Conservative, Aug. 31, 94

Check out that letter to Crisis on the origins of neo-Conservativism in the Yom Kippur war. Liberalism for many meant sympathy for Communism. Another reason to save Liberalism from the Liberals. For that view forced them to adopt Conservativism, whent they lost their sympathy for communism. No sympathy for Communism, no Liberalism. And Conservatives gave anti-Communism a bad name by defending Senator McCarthy.

Why oppose Conservativism? Conservatives make you think that to defend the family you have to oppose welfare, hate-crime laws, that you have to use censorship stupidly, have to use law to impose religion, e.g., prayer in the schools, etc.



IE, Chisholm, Brentano, Aug. 31, 94

Concerning the Gasendi objection as cited by Chisholm in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The upholder of intentional existence is not denying that, the theory of intentional existence is not saying that, the being we are concerned with is the being that exists entitatively. Rather, the upholder of the IE theory is giving a causal account of how it comes about that we are consciously related to entitative existence in the way(s) that we are.

SSR, P&CG, G and L, Hentoff, Rights, Free Speech, Censorship, Aug. 21, 94

Contra Hentoff (in the Eagle Tribune this week): When expression is a socially harmful act and when the means of opposing it do not take away free will in the sense of voluntariness, or inflict violence, or are not immoral in themselves (because of the harm they would do even in other contexts), then we are obligated to oppose that use form of expression, obligated to, for example, used boycotts to end that form of expression.

The alternative would be that we are obligated to permit that socially harmful behavior.

Ethics, Equality, Use of Equal Abilities, Rawls, Nozick, Gewirth, Aug. 21, 94

Rawls is right that Putman, for example, did nothing to deserve greater intelligence than mine. But it is equally true that I do not deserve to have intelligence equal to his. Nothing I did or will ever do can make me deserve that.

And there cannot be multiplicity without inequality. Even in sheer "numerical" multiplicity, there is inequality. It may seem that, for example, the peas in a pod or sands on a shore are just diversified by different positions in space, and that mere diversity of spatial position does not impose any inequality. But to be at point A in space is to be closer to point B than to point K, that is, the things at point A and K have an unequal distance to B.

Ethics, Rational Appetite, Ethical principles, Aug. 21, 94

Is "Act in a way that treats your recipients as if they are what they are" or "Act in a way that evaluates them to be what they are" too general to be a principle of action? Yes, that is precisely why moral principles do not take that form. For that form leaves out the most important issue of all, what things are. For principles, we don't argue from the nature of the rational appetite; we argue from the nature of things. E.g., because God is what He is, He deserves all our love. We argue from what human beings are that we should love them as ourselves, etc.

Maritain, truth, thing-object, formal objects and material objects, Aug. 21, 94

Maritain seems to immediately identify the thing-object distinction with the material object/formal object distinction and to take the latter for granted. As I point out in "The Problem of Thing and Object in Maritain," what he is really doing, when he introduces the concepts of material and formal objects is to begin an argument(s) that concluded to the identity of formal objects with material objects. Taking a cue from that footnote in The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas, that I quote in TPTOIM: maybe the argument goes this way:

First, truth requires that objects be identical with things that are more than objects. But that means that objects are not, or need not be, the whole of things. In fact, in human knowledge, our objects could not be the whole of things. If an object were the whole of a thing, we could not identify it with another object, which is what humans must do in order to know the truth. So human knowledge of truth requires what the Scholastics expressed by the doctrine of formal and material objects. The formal object must never be alone; it is always known as an aspect of something more than an object and so something (at least potentially) more than the way it is objectified by the formal object.

It is conventional wisdom that one of the main results of modernity was to dislodge man from being the center of the universe in his own perceptions. This happened in two ways: Astronomy showed that we are not the center of the universe and indeed are just a speck in the universe. Animal psychology allegedly shows that we cannot find anything, e.g., language, that definitively distinguishes us from lower animals.

While in an important sense, it is true that that man no longer views himself as the center of reality, in a much more important and profound sense the result of modernity is the opposite. The result of modernity is that we think we are the center, where before we would not have thought that. Before we considered ourselves subordinate to a supreme being. We considered that our judgments had to be measured by his purposes for things, including ourselves, purposes expressed by the natures we found in things. We were not the measure of all things. Our judgments had to be measured by something greater than ourselves.

The result of modernity is well expressed by the title of a philosophy book, which title answered a question of Plato to the Sophists: Man Is the Measure. Judgments, e.g., of value, merely express our contingent and subjective interests. Even scientific judgments just express conceptual frames through which we interpret otherwise unintelligible and chaotic experience. Humans are in effect the supreme arbiter of right and wrong, good and evil. Humans are beholden to no one, answerable to no one.

And does modernity exalt reason? Perhaps earlier it did. But now it tells us reason is not an instrument for knowing what is. Only Catholicism defends reason. Modernity has fulfilled Maritain's prophecy, as quoted by Frankel, that without something above reason, reason itself would fall prey to forces below it.

P&CG, SSR, DEMocracy, Aug. 21, 94

Can we really keep our religious values (e.g., secular humanistic values) out of our public decisions. In that sense, can we really make religion something "private"? I doubt it. Secular humanists make decisions based on their secular humanism all the time.

Abortion, Aug. 21, 94

How do we choose between the existence of a potential for achieving human ends and the existence of an actual orientation toward human ends, when we are considering whether to treat the zygote as a human being? Maybe that is the question I have to face.

Every potency is an actuality looked at from another point of view. Whatever end I achieve by preventing a zygote from achieving that kind of end, the zygote's achievement of it would be of equal value to my achievement of it. Whatever value there is in my achieving it, the zygote's achievement of it would be of equal value.

Perhaps the key is to contrast the zygote, not to its own later stages, but to non-human zygotes that are not potential achievers of human ends. Even though not all of a zygote's specifically human genes are yet switched on, human zygotes have those genes, not by accident, but because they contributed to the survival of past human zygotes. The original coming into existence of such a set of genes was an accident. But given their existence, their survival in their normal environment was not an accident, and so the presence of these genes in the new zygote is not an accident. They are there because they serve a purpose. To serve that purpose, they need the mother's help to be switched on. But so what? The actualization of all potentialities needs outside help. The zygote has actual specifically-human characteristics that already orient it toward human ends. They actually orient it toward human ends, because they are present there only because they serve, in normal environments, to achieve those ends, only because they are suited in this environment to achieve those ends.



Liberal/Conservative, Saving Liberalism fromt the Liberals, Aug. 16, 94

We need to save liberalism from the liberals in order to save America from the conservatives.

What is liberalism, this thing I want to save? It used to be defined by a concern for justice over order. Now it is defined by compassion, which is really just a different kind of order. Ls need to know that compassion presupposes justice. The concern for compassion more than justice is much like opting for relativism for the motive of encouraging tolerance. But if there are no absolute values, why be for tolerance? Well tolerance minimizes conflicts and violence. But why be against conflicts and violence.

This may seem self-evident. But in fact, without principles to guide us, today's tolerance becomes tomorrow's intolerance. That is not just rhetoric. A good example is those whose interpretation of religion being a "private" matter no longer defines privacy against government interference, but would use goverment to prevent what until now all "reasonable" people would have considered freedom of speech, as well as freedom of religion.

Without principles, even apparently "liberal" laws become what Marx said, instruments for the ruling ideology of the day.

But then why save L? One reason is that it is the only alternative to conservatism. But why be against conservatism? For many reasons. They do prefer order to justice. And they prefer tradition to justice. They are laissez-faire. They cannot see the great amount of good that, for example, the ACLU does. They are not concerned with defendants rights. They do not want to use the military for humanitarian purposes. They cannot see the many good things about, for example, Swedish society.

Another example of why save liberalism: We may be about to get a very bad health plan. But where were the conservatives on this issues until the liberals actually proposed legislation to deal with it. Now the conservatives present a plan, as if they had always been concerned with health care, but they weren't.

Another reason: they do not want to use government to help people.

SSR, P and CG, Ethics, G and L, Aug. 16, 94

At the Film Institute's tribute to James Stewart, Dustin Hoffman asked what happend to the America portrayed in It's a Wonderful Life. That America was based on love. For a society to be based on love, we have to train people, especially the young, to love. We can't do that without telling the young that chastity will be expected of them. Without chastity, our most important and basic (fundamental, ie., others depend on them) love relationships won't work: the spousal and parental relationships.

Another point: the value we place on human life is the value we place on sex. Note that in this formula, the value of human life comes first. So if we put an absolute value on human life, it follows that we have the attitude that sex is a vehicle for committed love. And therefore, if we do not view sex as a vehicle for committed love, we cannot put an absolute value on human life.

UPS, PUL, Feb. 3, 94

The effects of the sacraments are supposed to be, not just in the life of individuals and families, but in the life of the Church, in fact, their full effect in the lives of individuals and families depends on their effects in the life of the Church.

SSR, P&CG, Feb. 3, 94

Why so much wife beating and child abuse? We need to teach children that they will be expected to love. But we can't teach them, successfully, to love and fail to teach them that their sexuality is supposed to be used as an instrument of committed love, a vehicle and support for committed love. If we let them think their sexuality is a means to private gratification, and that marriage is just one kind of "set up," "arrangement" in which their desires for self-gratification can be fulfilled, they will not successfully achieve a love relationship in marriage.

P&CG, Conformity, Individuality, SSR, Jan. 28, 94

James Bourke, on Connections, asks what's become of our individuality? We've heard that worry for at least a century. The result? We haven't paid a bit of attention to the breakdown of community and, in particular, of personal relationships. Consequently, we now have a population of isolated, lonely, "sort-of-a-good-partner" individuals, and individuals who conform to what the media tells them to conform to, which is the least common denominator.

Meaning, Putnam, Linguistic theory of the analytic, Jan. 28, 94

P's discussion of meaning presupposes the linguistic/and or psychological account of analytic truth. [And he sometimes seems to confuse the "necessary," in the sense of necessary conditions for being aware of what a word is used for, with the necessary in the sense of necessary conditions for being X (where X is that which a word is used for).] But to be aware that "Red is a color" is necessarily true, I need an awareness (a psychological state) of what red is and what color is. But I do not need any other awareness of what these are than the awareness I need to be aware, e.g., that "the color of blood is red" is true, or even just means what it means. And I sometimes have such awareness of what red and color are, because that awareness is a necessary condition of the awareness, which I sometimes have, of the meaning of, or the truth of, "The color of blood . . . ."

But "necessary" in the last sentence does not refer to analyticity; it refers to a causal condition for awareness of either necessary or contingent truth. There seems to be a confusion in P of where the adjective "necessary" enters the discussion, is to be placed in the discussion.

And the whole discussion of necessary and analytic truth is after-the-fact in philosophy. P refers to philosophers who still try to make something of analytic truth, to do something with it. But that is, in the first instance, irrelevant. I do not have to first prove or justify their existence, and then use them. In fact, I could not do that first, and it would be irrelevant, if I could. I first show that the opposite of some proposition is contradictory. Only later can I be interested in how the kind of knowledge described in the last sentence comes about.

Jan. 18, 95

It is precisely by means of what is represented by his concepts that Putnam himself can know that his twin means something else by "This" when both say "This is an individual unique in the univers." Here "by means of" (quo) is not the quo of psychological concepts being quo's not quod's, but an objective quo, a phenomenological quo. By means of one object (a quod), another is presented, as by means of color, extension is presented.

The scholastic doctrine that corresponds to Putnam is the formal object/material object distinction.

One person can have exactly the same representative content in two different experiences and yet know, through what is represented by "This is a unique, unrepeatable, individual," that what she knows through each of those experiences is a unique, and hence distinct, individual. What makes this possible is the fact that "unique, unrepeatable, individual" is a universal concept, or rather a combination of three universal concepts.

SSR, G and L, Jan. 28, 94

Promoting the avoidance of self-control (and calling the lack of self-control, the inability to control oneself, to control one's desires, "freedom," rather than "compulsion.")

Choosing not to make marriage the norm amounts to choosing against marriage, not being neutral. Marriage can perform its necessary functions only if it is taken seriously as the norm.

Sweden, SSR, P&CG, Jan. 28, 94

Questions to ask: how long to extra-marital relationships last, i.e., how much stability do they provide people, how often must people look for another "sort of a good" partner? How lonely are older women? What is the rate of venereal disease? How is it that are committing suicide and why? How often are infants killed outside the womb? (See that Eagle-Tribune op-ed piece, or rather the Register op-ed piece.



Abortion, Jan. 26, 94

Is it the mother's chemical that gives us an orientation to human ends, by causing the switching on of the genes for brains? All primate mothers, and probably all mammal mothers, probably secrete the same chemical. There is nothing specifically human about the chemical. There is not even anything specifically neurological about the chemical. Because a certain amount, a certain quantity of the same chemical reaches one part of the embryo, brain genes switch on, because another amount reaches another part, digestive genes switch on. If the embryo got turned the wrong way, what would happen?

P&CG, Ethics, SSR, Jan. 25, 94

The connection between the functional approach to value and reducing the person to the individual: If each of us is just an individual, we are each tiny specks in the mass of humanity, and our claim to rights cannot stand up against the claims of the mass. Then, what becomes of our value? Our value is our contribution to the mass, other than the contribution we make just by being what we are (persons); in other words, our value is our function, the function by which we contribute to the mass.

Abortion, Jan. 25, 94

A 5-month old human agency is supposedly more valuable than a 5-day old one; but by what standard are they more and less valuable?

By many standards, perhaps; e.g., the 5-month old one can do more things. But in addition to valuing by function rather than as a person, this values her by our ends, not hers.

P&CG, Ethics, Harvard speech, SSR, Jan. 25, 94

How foreign it is to think about, e.g., whether human life means what sex means, etc., when nothing matters as long as you don't hurt someone else. Nothing intrinsically matters to you, as long as you don't hurt someone else; nothing has a claim on you, as long as ... If everything is pure personal preference, as long as you don't hurt someone else, life really doesn't mean anything, no end is worth living for, is worth seeking for its own sake.

Is there such a thing as seeking an end for its own sake, as opposed to seeking it because it satisfies a desire we have? But what if our desire is to have the kind of relation to something that appreciates it for what it is?

C and D, another mock speech, Jan. 4, 94

Write the speech about C and D in philosophy ironically from the opponent's perspective. E.g. "They accuse us of having just as much disagreement and confusion. But our confusion and disagreement is the right kind, the good kind, because it derives from the tools of Frege. Why are those tools good? Because they produce clarity, precision, and agreement."

"Simplicity is an unclear notion. Double effect is a quagmire. Of course, our concepts are concepts of quagmires, but they are good quagmires.

Causal necessity, Jan. 4, 94

Forward looking: A situation arises where it is necessary that A and B share something, some mode of being, e.g., the same surface, the same fact of being in motion. If they do not share it, then at least one of them is and is not what it is. But for them to share it, at least one of them must cease being what it is.

Is it demonstrable that if B loses a characteristic, it must be caused to lose it by another (i.e., not just acquire a new characteristic but lose an old one)?

Formal systems, Jan. 4, 94

A sentence, e.g., the principle of noncontradiction, conveys some extralinguistic value, some meaning<sup>T</sup>. Are the formulas of a formal system to be interpreted as conveying an extralinguistic value or not? If not, they are philosophically irrelevant, except as objects of study, just as any object can be relevant for philosophy to study. If so, it is irrelevant whether the formula is in the metalanguage, the language, or in some other language. It is what the language conveys that counts. And the logical p of NC conveys that contradictory sentences of any language cannot both be true, ie., that what contradictory sentences convey cannot both be true, where true is a value that is not confined to this language, its metalanguage, or any other language. True is logically fundamental, as Putnam says somewhere in "The Meaning of Meaning" or in one of the other essays in that volume that I glanced at this Christmas.

Remember true "in language L" is not part of Tarski's definition of truth for language L.

Analyticity, meaning, convention, Ashley, Phil of Nature, Jan. 4, 94

Analyticity and necessity have little, if anything, to do with convention, with stipulation, with invention and opposed to discovery. A proof is that the rules of a game, e.g., chess or monopoly, unlike the laws of logic and math, are not necessary and do not generate necessity. The laws of logic generate necessary consequences from the rules of games, but the rules of games themselves do not have, nor do they generate, necessity. So stipulation, as in making rules, is not what analyticity is all about.

Also, Ashley cites Harvey's syllogism as an example of demonstration in science. But the first premise, "Whatever fluid ..... circulates" is not a necessary or self-evident truth; it is just a verbal definition of the word "circulates."



NEA, National Education Association, speech, Jan. 4, 94

The officers invited me to give you a quick update, since we have discovered that so much of what you were taught and have been teaching reflects only the intellectual fads of the time; not scientific truth.

Civics: the meaning of the right to free speech is not to discourage "self-censorship." If so, the spirit of the constitution would be that publishers and exhibitors were required to present things, rather than free not to present them.

Sex education: we now know that there is only one socially responsible use of sex, marriage. And there is no such thing as value-neutral sex education. Marriage can perform its necessary social function only if it is taken seriously as the norm for sexual behavior. So choosing not to make it the norm amounts to choosing against marriage, not being neutral to it.

Diversity: It does not mean all values are equal; if so, why value diversity.

Relativism: if all values are relative, Naziism is as good as any other system.

Non-conformity: It is usually conformity to the subtle "authority" of the media, or the intellectual establishment, etc.

Religion: In the absence of explicit religion (an absolute value with the credentials to be such) something else without the credentials will, inconsistently, become our absolute value (e.g., free speech in the case of Salmon Rushdie who was not rebuked for being guilty of blasphemy). We can avoid this only by concluding through ruthless logic that nothing, not even, e.g., free speech or individual rights, should be absolute for us.

Also, without God, the rights of the individual cannot be inalienable. The individual is only a speck in the cosmos, and her interests will not way, ultimately, against the perceived interest of the majority.

Abortion: the real issue isn't a woman's control over her own body. We all agree on that. But thousands of women die each day who will never have choice over their own bodies. So the prior question is whether they are human beings, and whether we can kill them when there is a good chance that they are.

Euthanasia: When respect for life is gone, the floodgates are open. We know, because it happened in two of our most advanced societies, Wiemar germany and Demark.

"Meaning is what, is that which, is preserved through translation." Assume all I know about quasars is that they are that which scientists objectify by the instrumentality of the English word "quasar." I am capable of discovering that what Chinese scientists objectify by the use of the word "xxx" is the same as that which is objectified by the use of the English word "quasar." Is the meaning of "quasar" (circularly): that which is objectified by "quasar"? Is that my meaning for "quasar". No, I never believe the proposition "The meaning of 'quasar' is: that which is objectified by 'quasar.'" I.e., I never believe or assert that that which is objectified by "quasar" is the fact that something is objectified by "quasar." Meaning is a social thing. My belief about the meaning of quasar is the social belief that scientists do you "quasar" for something, even though I do not know what that something is. Whatever they use it for is the meaning and "xxx" may have the same meaning in Chinese.

Likewise, I believe biologists use "elm" and "beeches" for more complex combinations of notes than I have so far used them. Those combinations are the meanings of "elm" and "beech" and those meanings go beyond that for which I have used, beyond what I have meant, by these words, for I meant the same things by these words.

So the meaning of "quasar" does not include, circularly, a reference to the word "quasar." And I can know that I am ignorant of the meaning of quasar. Later I can know that I have learned part of the meaning of "quasar," e.g., I learn (know from evidence) it it refers to a celestial, extraterrestrial phenomenon, then learn that it refers to a type of star, etc. So I can know part of the word-function, and know that I know part, while still knowing that I need to know more to have a word-function with the same extension that "quasar" has in the use of scientists.

Same with "elm" and "beech." When I learn that my word-function for "elm" includes both elms and beeches in its extension and learn that these words do not have the same extension in the language, then "elm" does not come to circularly include in its meaning: that for which I use "elm." Rather, I have learned that I do not possess a word-function rich enough to give "elm" the extension it has among tree experts, while knowing, from causal reasoning from dictionaries, etc., that there is a richer word-function (maybe more than one) that is a meaning that will give "elm" the extension it has in English.

Is meaning something that is preserved in translation? If I successfully translate "quasar" by "xxx" while remaining ignorant of the meaning of either word, I have still "preserved meaning" in the sense that I have translated "Quasar" by a word which has, and which I know to have, the same meaning, even though I do not know what that meaning is.

Concerning "The Meaning of Meaning," p. 224. In 1750, "water" need not have 'referred' to different things on the to planets. Forget twin earth. Let's say we discover Putnam's xyz on some island surrounded by water. The natives of the island refer to both by "aaa". We translate "aaa" by "water". Later the natives and we both learn that xyz is not water. We can now say one of (at least) two things, both of which are consistent with our (not the natives') original word-function for water. That word-function in 1750 could have been: a thing with any underlying causal structure that produces this set of observable properties (... , the set possessed both by water and by xyz). Or, secondly, that word-function could have been: a thing with the underlying causal structure that gives the thing we call water this set of properties. In both cases, the meaning is a thing with a certain set of properties (by which the thing becomes an object). That need not imply "indexicality." Whether we judge

that there are two kinds of water or judge that "water" equivocally referred to different things depends on the relative importance we judge the properties to have vis-a-vis the specific underlying structure that causes the properties in each instance.

"Fish" or "mammals." Let's say the native's religion allows them to eat "fish," meaning creatures that live in water, but not other animals. To them, it would be important to keep living-in-the-water as the intention of "fish" and not to switch to the scientific intention.

The real question is whether our psychological state determines our awareness of the truth of sentences (Putnam postpones discussion of the meaning of sentences at the beginning.) and what our awareness of "meaning" contributes to it. To be aware of truth, I must understand the words of the sentence. Since I can sometimes achieve awareness of truth, I can sometimes achieve awareness of the meaning of sentences. Is meaning as extension sufficient? Supposition is what determines truth. I.e., when I say, "water has density X" (something twin earth's xyz might not have), I intend "water" to "suppose" for (stand for, do duty for, substitute for, be a vicar for) the liquid I know on earth, even if the extension of "water" includes things on other planets, because of the word-function that gives "water" meaning, things on other planets that may not have the property I attribute to water.

"There is a pen on the table behind you." I do not know whether that statement is true, because I do not see behind me. "There is an elm tree behind you." How much do I have to understand to be able to judge the truth? If I can judge the truth (e.g., learn that it is an elm, not a beech, a pen, not a pencil), I have a sufficiently detailed understanding of what it is to be an elm or a pen (or a sufficiently detailed understanding of other things that lead me to causally deduce that what I now see is what they call an "elm" or a "pen"). Is this just "extension"? I can know that X falls into the extension of "beech" or "quasar" without knowing the meaning of either word.

I can understand the sentence "There is an . . . behind you" before knowing its truth. When I understand its words, do I just understand them extensionally? But how can I understand them extensionally, if I do not yet know, am not yet aware, of the existence of this pen, this table, this elm, i.e., not yet aware of that extension which is relevant to the truth of this sentence, and to the "meaning" of this sentence, if meaning is extension?

Other earthly and actual examples, to replace twin earth fictions. Are penguins birds? Whales mammals? (Notice that at stake in these examples are beliefs about the realities objectified by these words, not just about the meanings of the words.) Washoe's "water-bird". Why not "Flying fish"? Why not ducks? What about extraterrestrial "Life"? how can we talk about it, if life differs in "meaning" or "reference" the way "water" is supposed to on twin earth? Won't ET life take a different form from ours, just as TE water is different from ours underneath? Same with extraterrestrial intelligence. Why do we say "intelligence" continues to mean the same thing, while "water" does not. Only because we take, judge, certain notes associated with intelligence to be more important than others, and we judge the phenomenal similarities of water and xyz to be less important than their chemical structure. But if our religion were different . . .

Other earthly examples, West "Indians," "prairie dogs," "water-horse (hippopotamus). ("Flying ants"???) Extra-sensory "perception"; why call it "perception"?

Actually, in addition to examples on earth, can have examples using the same person, the same representative content, and the knowledge that the unique thing objectified by that content now differs from the unique thing that was

objectified by it before.

Truth, Putnam, Jan. 4, 94

After listening to Don Asselin at the Nov., '93 Maritain meeting: Putman has a "picture", not a theory. But the picture is made up of propositions; that's the only way it conveys any content. And are those propositions true or false?

Abortion, Jan. 4, 94

Compare a zygote to an amoeba. Both are, in some sense, causal systems leading to the eventual production of intelligent acts, and in both cases their being such causal systems depends on the contribution of outside factors. Both begin causal sequences leading to intelligent acts, if outside factors cooperate. But it is purely accidental to the nature of the amoeba that it should lead to such acts. Its leading to such acts is not what selected it for reproduction, but the zygote's leading to such acts in the context of just these external factors is what selected it for reproduction.

Instead of causal system say "causal sequence". This expresses the fact that the system is always in a state of change. The amoeba is is a causal sequence such that the eventual production of intelligence is not only accidental to what it is; that eventual production is not an act of an agency perduring through the sequence. The zygote is a causal sequence such that perduring through the sequence is an essential orientation to the existence of intelligent acts as acts of the sequence unified by that orientation. In the case of the amoeba, it is the entire universe that is the causal system leading to intelligent acts. But that just means that the universe leads to the production of a human zygote which is a causal sequence that has intelligent acts as its own, even though it depends on help from the rest of the universe.

The child who is a potential musician needs air, food, sunlight, warmth, etc., to develop its potential. But she is still the active cause of her development such that the eventual production of music is her active accomplishment. Same with the zygote. In both cases, they were selected because, given an environment of air food, . . . ., (mother's prenatal chemical), etc., they would be the active causes of certain accomplishments. They had the potential to be the active causes of certain kinds of accomplishments. The active causes of development which achieves human ends as their ends (contrary to the sperm, etc., which does not have such ends as its ends). It is because the zygote is an active cause that is is a causal sequence with the potential for human ends.

If the same sperm had united with a different egg, you would not be you and I would not be I.

Also, say the mother does not give enough chemical to "trigger" the zygote to develop a brain. Is it the case that the zygote was never "oriented" to the end of intelligent acts; is it the case that the mother causes it to be so oriented after it is conceived? If the mother does not give enough chemical, you get an anencephalic baby. That baby is a being whose nature, structure, genetic structure, calls for a brain, is oriented to ends requiring a brain. It cannot survive, even in adulthood, without the help of others, as it could with a brain. A clone of that baby could have a brain, so that baby is genetically oriented to having a brain.

A woman's choice? What principles do we use to make the choice? Either reality imposes principles on us, principles the ignoring of which make our choice defective, or it does not.

The zygote's future is worth as much as my future. Bob Joyce "Every living individual being, with the natural potential, as a whole, for . . . is a person." A sperm does not have a potential, as a whole as a unit, for achieving human ends. Regardless of whether the mother's chemical gives the embryo its active orientation toward human ends, the zygote has a potential for achieving human ends. Joyce, "A person is a whole, individual being that has a natural potential to . . . ." To have such a natural capacity is to have a human nature.

Joyce: "The recognition of a person involves, in part, a moral decision. This point is made effectively by John Noonan, How to Argue about Abortion, p.

10 (New York, 1974)." "Neither a human embryo nor a rabbit embryo has the functional capacity to think, will desire, and self-consciously relate to others. The radical difference, even at the beginning of development, is that the human embryo actually has the natural capacity to act in these ways, whereas the rabbit embryo does not have and never will have it." Sperm and ovum "are parts of the boides of the man and woman, respectively. They are not whole-body cells as its the zygote cell. . . They are body-part cells. The zygote is a single cell that is a whole body in itself. From within it comes the rest of the individual, including the strictly inter-uterine functional organs of the placenta, anmion, and chorion, as well as the rest of the body that is naturally destined for extra-uterine life."

"The genetic differentiation of a zygote or blastocyst, however, must be reasonably acknowledged as the natural roots of a personality, not of a 'dogality' or of a 'rabbitality.' The human zygote is a member of a unique species of creature. It is not a genus, to which a species is gradually attached. Such a process of attachment can occur in the mind of the observer; but not it the reality of the observed."

The sperm or ovum was not me. It could have united with a different gamete to produce a different human causal sequence.

There is nothing specificaly oriented to this or that, to the brain or rectum, in the mother's chemical. Because a certain amount of the chemical reaches a certain location, a gene specifically related to the brain is switched on; because a diffferent amount reaches another location, a gene specifically related to the rectum gets switched on. If the mother does not give enough chemical, the result is not an entity that is not a human being; the result is a human being that is a brain damaged, or otherwise "monstrous," human being.

Can we place a value on the mature person, if not on the young agent with a potential for the same ends that are the standard of value for the mature person?

Everything else that the causal sequence existing in the zygote will eventually accomplish is nothing but the unfolding of potentialities, the fulfilling of potentialities, belonging to that causal sequence, present in that causal sequence. Is it the same causal sequence throughout? How do we measure the sameness of a causal system which, by hypothesis, endures through time? Since, also by hypothesis, it can undergo change through time and remain the same, there is some sort of material continuity. But the continuity of the matter is not that of a pure potency. The matter, as the matter for these changes, is characterized by actual and active characteristics, specifically: to be an active cause of its own changes, to be an active cause such that what remains in existence is an active cause (not, for example, that it causes changes putting itself out of existence), that it is an active cause oriented to cause the continued existence of a cause essentially oriented to certain ends, i.e., a cause to which the potentiality for certain ends is essential, not accidental.

Is such a sequential causal system is not the same sequential causal system, how could any sequential causal system be the same, unless the system was one that did not undergo change at all, and how could it be causal if it did not experience change itself?

If I can pick and choose when human life begins, I can pick and choose anything. Because reality places no limits on the value of choice. For if reality does not place limits on the choice of human life, it places limits on nothing else. But we need limits. Some think "Do anything as long as it doesn't hurt anyone else" is sufficient guidance. But what tells us what hurts or does not hurt someone else? The preferences of the other? Then helping

someone by dope for private consumption would not hurt them.

The abortionists implies that it is the mother who makes the embryo into an agent oriented to human ends. If so, that would be the reason she has the right to abort before that time.

Is the zygote oriented to human ends, or does she need chemicals from the mother? As long as these ends are in the zygote's potentialities, she is oriented to human ends, because those asleep or drugged or in comas are only ordered to human ends in their potentialities, and because children are potentially great musicians, etc. But mostly because, if these ends are in her potentialities, then her fulfillment of her potentialities is of equal value to your fulfillment of your ends.

How do I decide if a zygote is human or not? What ends do I appeal to for criteria? The same ends that are in the potentialities of the zygote.



The objects of math are not changeable, are not subject to change. The word-function of "president of the USA" can be what it is whatever the relation of the president to the word-function of "six-feet tall". The word-function of "square root of nine" could not remain what it is if its relation to the word-function of "cube root of twenty-seven." Without knowing the numerical value of either of these word-functions, I know that the relation between them, equality or inequality, greater to or less than, will not change. Why? Because I know that the causal relations between them are necessary; I know that necessary causal relations prevent the change. That is, if the relation were to differ, some cause or some effect would both be and not be what it is; some causal relation would both be and not be what it is. Squaring and cubing are causal operations. I know the square of X must be the same every time, because I know the value results from a set of operations such that, if the value were not what it is, some operation would both be and not be what it is. Why? Because I know that I have abstracted from everything but the value in question and the operation in question, when I describe some other value as resulting from this operation on the first value. Being president, on the other hand, has no knowable causal relation to being a certain height. Maybe there is such a causal relation, but one hidden from my knowledge. But in math, I know that everything I need to judge the necessity of the relation is open to my knowledge, because I have so constructed the word-functions, that I have put nothing else into the word-functions than what is needed to make certain results necessarily follow from certain causal relations.

And such knowledge is a big part, maybe the whole of, knowing what mathematics is. I.e., mathematics defines values by causal operations resulting in other values. I know what it means for a number to be the sum of two prime numbers. I know that if 246 is the sum of X and Y, it will always be the sum of X and Y, because that is what the word-function of "sum" is, and that is what the word-function of "X" and "Y" is. The word-function of "X" could be, for instance, "the number of the planets." But that is not the kind of word-function I use in math. And because I know that truths like "246 is the sum of prime numbers X and Y" cannot not be true without their word-functions both being and not being what they are, I know that Goldbach's hypothesis is either necessarily true or necessarily false.

The key is that I know that the word-functions that we choose to start from in math abstract from all features not causally related to other word-functions, the word-functions of numbers, which other word-functions are objectified, in math, as the results of causal operations on "1" such that, the word-function of "1" abstracts from all content, and the causal operations on it abstract from all features except those that give certain specific results, or else the causal operations both are and are not what they are.

Title: "What Numbers Must Be?" How formulate the question "What are numbers?"? Like this: what is 2? No, that makes "2" look like the name of a thing. "What is it to be 2?", as in "What is it to be red or moving?" But the "thing" which is 2 is a group. "What is it to be 2" in the sense of "having twoness" = what is it to be a group of two, a multiplicity of size 2. So the question of what is a number = what is it to be a group or a multiplicity? (If there is only one number 1 -- DeKonick -- can we speak of adding 1 and 1?)

To be a group or a multiplicity is more than a logical relation (universality, individuality -- logical relation in the strict sense, not just a being of reason). And it is more than the real state of affairs that is the cause of the logical relation of generality. It is the state of affairs that can cause

the logical relation of generality. The name for this state of affairs is manyness. To objectify it as such makes reference to, or at least uses, the logical relation of generality and commonality. But that which is objectified by this means is not the logical relation of commonality, but the extralogical cause of that relation, the state of affairs that causes it, e.g., that this is an apple and that is an apple; that this is an orange and that is an orange.

Jan. 18, 95

Math references from Jon Ruby. Jacob Klein, Greek Math and the Origins of Early Modern Algebra, Dover Books. Two articles by someone named Nagel in two journals published by Columbia U in the thirties and forties, Isis and Osiris. The Development of Scientific Method in the school of Padua (is that an article or book title?)

Deconstructionism, post modernism, Jan. 4, 94

Thoughts after Greg Kerr's talk at the Nov., '93 Maritain meeting. There is aesthetic deconstructionism (valid, at least to a certain extent) and philosophical or metaphysical deconstructionism (invalid, Derrida), as there is for mechanism and behaviorism. This is another case of U-turning on aesthetic values, as in the appeal of Teilhard, the philosophy of Neitzche, and the philosophy of Caponigri's man (Gentile?, some early 20th century Italian philosopher). They start off applying an aesthetic model, and never get out. If you start off with a genuine philosophical model, you do not have to be a reductionist.

Ethics, phenomenology, G and L, Jan. 4, 94

See Pam Hall's paper at the Nov., '93 Maritain meeting. She wants a phenomenology of natural inclinations to be a factor in moral decisions. But a decisive factor? Phenomenologically, homosexual desire may be the same as heterosexual. But the inclination to heterosexuality is, non-phenomenologically, an inclination to preserve the species, just as the desire to eat is phenomenologically a desire to satisfy a craving remove a discomfort, but biologically it is an inclination to self-preservation. Not all ways of satisfying a baby's, for instance, desire to eat are good. Poison can satisfy the desire to eat phenomenologically.

G and L, Jan. 4, 94

In heterosexual marriage, your spouse is the one who fulfills you by complementarity.

Artificial Intelligence, Adler-U, Jan. 4, 94

The true test is not the Turing test, where the machine can lie. Ask it questions it must answer truthfully, questions about consciousness as philosophically analysed. E.g., do you have a relation to the meaning of a word you just used such that that meaning exists within you, is part of what you are, without making you that kind of thing, without that form being united to you as to a material subject? Are you so related to X, about which you just made a true judgement, that if X were not what it is, you would not be what you are? Are you so related to X that, if the relation had been the same in all respects except that it was a relation to Y, you would have been different from what you were? Are you so related, e.g., to moving-round-cloud, that what it is to be a moving round cloud is part of what you are even though you are a stationery, rectangular solid? Are you capable of that kind of self-awareness that does not require a second act of awareness whose object is a first act of awareness? Are you capable of acts whose subject is your substantial form alone, not the union of form and matter?

Jan. 24, 95

The video tape windup machine "knows" whether there is a tape in it, because it does not run its motor unless there is a tape in it. And it "knows" when the tape is rewound, because it stops its motor and opens its door, when the tape is rewound.

Liberal/Conservative, Jan. 4, 94

Liberal betrayal: labor unions who turned against civil rights for African-Americans; sixties radicals who turned against freedom of speech for their opponents in the eighties.

Sensation, relations, Deely, Jan. 4, 94

Position (something relative) is a common sensible.



Is taking a mate selecting a vehicle for satisfying your sexual desires? No, satisfying your sexual desires is a vehicle and support for a relation of self-giving to your mate, a relation of committed love, a relation of personal union.

The value of the human species is the value of sex, the source of the species. The value we place on sex will be the value we place on that mode of existence of which sex is the source and the essential source, that mode of existence which is nothing but a product of sex; that's all human life is. It is not an accidental product of sex like, e.g., venereal disease. It is essential in the forward looking direction (from cause to effect) and in the backward looking direction. Concerning the latter, all human life is a result of sex. Maybe somewhere in the universe human life is produced in some other way, but here all is a result of sex. And artificial means would imitate sex, would have to imitate sex (a la Aristotelian art). Even test-tube babies show that our attitude toward sex is our attitude toward human life. If human life should not result from an act of giving between two persons, if sex is not the act of giving from which human life should result, human life is something that can be mechanically manipulated.

We can look on sex in two ways: it's a means to this mind-boggling pleasure; it's a means to the happiness that can only come from the family. But we can't successfully look at it in both ways at once.

Test-tube babies: the giving of existence is not an act of love in which two people give each other their life-sharing power.

Evolution selected sex as a means of getting you, the parent, into a lifetime personal relation with your child. Your action causes you to get into such a relation. But more, your action, your pleasure, causes another person, the other parent, to get into the same kind of relation. By mutually agreeing to practice birth control, you cannot change the fact that the pleasure you are experiencing was designed to do the above, has an essential relation to the above. I can choose to let the other party use my person-making power, but cannot choose that it cease to be a person-making power, or parent-making power.

Ethics, value of life, abortion, euthanasia, Jan. 4, 94

Equality is not enough. Respect, reverence, etc. for some value, e.g., human life, is necessary. This is shown by the experience of Weimar Germany and Denmark with euthanasia: give Drs. the power to take human life in some cases, and the floodgates are open. As soon as reverence for life is gone, the floodgates are open.

Is respect for choice, rather than life, sufficient? No, choice needs guidelines provided by reality as it exists prior to choice, or choices, including the choice to respect the choices of others, are arbitrary.

Abortion, SSR, P&CG, family, premarital, sex, Oct. 23, 93

Unless we seek sexual gratification in a way that subordinates it to the goal of supporting committed love, we will conceive children in conditions unjust to them. (Remember that evolution selected human sexuality, in all its psychological dimensions, as a method of reproduction for offspring who would be dependent on the care of others for years; and abortion is the only sure means of birth control.)

So if we use sex selfishly, we will have to abort babies. So the opponent says, ok, I'll abort babies, if that is the price of not subordinating sex to committed love.

Remember that evolution selected human sexuality as a method of reproduction for offspring who would be dependent on the care of others for years. Reproductive acts outside of the context where that care was ensured would not be good from evolution's perspective, since they would produce offspring with less chance of survival. Further, the survival of adults for years after they had procreated would be reproductively significant, since reproductive success is not achieved until the young are raised. And the survival of adults would depend on cooperation with other adults consisting, not of instinctive behavior as in other species, but of moral behavior learned in their youth (and the cooperation would most often take place in small groups where unfaithfulness, if common, could be disastrous). Why, then, should evolution not have selected a reproductive method that would function, in all its psychological dimensions, as a support and vehicle for a moral relation of self-giving between parents that would greatly increase the chance of reproductive success? Such a method would compensate for our losing the tremendous reproductive advantage of instinct. If so, from an evolutionary perspective, our proficiency at sex acts would not be like proficiency at hunting or cooking, qualities we might look for before taking a reproductive partner; our sexual ability would be the means for the relation of self-giving that human mating "should" consist in. For seeking sexual gratification in a way that does not subordinate it to the goal of supporting committed self-giving would be detrimental to reproductive success and to long range, individual happiness, both because it would produce offspring in unfavorable conditions and because it would sanction an attitude opposite to the needed attitude of self-giving.

We want to try out someone's cooking before selecting them as a mate. But trying out their sex changes the meaning of sex in marriage and weakens its contribution to the success of the marriage. In fact, it changes the meaning of marriage itself.

Zygote, Gewirth, Oct. 11, 93

Gewirth verifies my view on the fundamentality of abortion to ethics. He discusses abortion in the PGC chapter, before he discusses the applications of the PCG. Also, I say the ends of the zygote are the only nonarbitrary ethical standard. G. has a lot to say on arbitrariness. See his index.

Zygote, Oct. 11, 93

The mother's secretion of the chemical is not independent of the presence of the embryo; it is caused by that presence. These are interdependent, not independent, causal series, sequences.

Ordinati, UPS, PUL, Oct. 11, 93

Our training, the training of both laity and clergy, is all against us. All our training says use every opportunity to celebrate the sacraments, take every opportunity as an occasion to celebrate the sacraments, use every occasion when Christians gather as an opportunity to celebrate the sacraments. The most important thing you can do when Christians gather outside of the Sunday liturgy, the most important thing you can do to further the cause of Christianity, is to celebrate the sacraments.

As a result, when God raises up movements that could create the kind of environments we need for the sacraments to be effective, we prevent them from doing so by putting the focus on celebrating the sacraments, rather than on the kind of environments the sacraments were meant to create and support, the kind of environments the sacraments need to bear fruit.

SSR, G and L, Oct. 7, 93

Another social cost of not supporting the family: health care. Those who live in a family have many fewer health problems, according to Don Feder in a Herald column in the last week or two.

Liberal, Conservative, Oct. 1, 93

The liberal social agenda: civil rights, women's rights, gun control, the rights of victims and the accused, health care, protection of the environment, etc.



SSR. G and L, Sep. 27, 93

It's almost as if evolution thought it had to provide for the survival of offspring that would be totally dependent on the care of others for years. Imagine that.

SSR, P&CG, 5-25-93

No one seems to have noticed that the triumph of [enlightenment, intellectualism, academicism, the academics, the intellectuals] has led to [a new form of . . . , to the breakdown of human relationships, to the loss of what is most important for human happiness, to an undermining of the foundations of social and personal happiness.

Ethics, rational appetite, equality, reason and appetite, 5-19-93

If I know the truth that another being makes decisions based on rational knowledge, any further degree of intelligence on my part over his intelligence would not make any difference. And if I know that that retarded person has an underlying nature orienting her to rational knowledge, her lower degree of intelligence does not make any difference.

My knowledge that lead paint puts children in danger imposes obligations on me. And the fact that I am slow at chemistry does not make that knowledge impose any less obligation on me than it does on a Nobel Laureate in chemistry. The knowledge that lead is bad for children may come easier for him than it does for me. But once I attain that knowledge, I am equally obligated by it.

And to the person who says that reason cannot dictate to appetite: Notice that it is knowledge that imposes obligations. Inculpable ignorance excuses from obligation. So obligation must stem from reason somehow.

G and L, 5-19-93

The objection may be that only a small number of gays want to be parents. In fact, there may well already be many parents with homosexual orientations, but who were able to become parents because they did not become habituated to homosexual activity. And many of them would not have been able to become parents had homosexuality been socially acceptable during their adolescence, since had it been acceptable, they would have become habituated to homosexual activity.

Family, SSR, 5-18-93

Make a list of hidden social costs resulting from lack of support of the family:  
prisons, security, economically uncompetitive children, etc.

Life, unique to earth?, 5-18-93

A television science show says that our sun is below average in x-ray output and that a tiny variation in the sun's energy could destroy life on earth.

Noncontradiction, Quine, Putnam, logic, truth, etc.

Belief in the necessary truth of the principle of noncontradiction is not a matter of making an unwarranted prediction about what future science will or will not tell us. It is a matter of our now knowing what we are saying when we use negatives. If we do not now know that the cat's being on the mat" excludes the cat's not being on the mat, we do not know what we are saying when now we say that the cat is not on the mat. Certainly, negative terms can acquire different uses in the future, but those very differences would prevent them from being revisions of what we now mean to say when we assert the principle of noncontradiction. (You can't know you are saying what you do say now by using negatives.)

If I know what I am saying when I say that the principle of noncontradiction is not true, I should say that it is not true and true.

Language, 5-18-93

Perhaps the purpose of L is not to communicate but to objectify. We can objectify both to ourselves and to others. Communication is that species of objectification where the objectification is to someone other than the objectifier.



Wittgenstein and Maritain, Intentionality, IE, 5-3-93 AA

On intentionality and the argument that it is superfluous in Gassendi against Descartes, see "Descartes' Theory of Objective Reality," The New Scholasticism, XLIX, 3, Summer 1975. By E.J. Asworth.

5-18-93

An image of Mr. Smith is not enough to connect it to Mr. Smith; any image could represent indefinitely many people. Language is needed to make the connection. But that does not make L prior to intentional existence (Chisholm), since intentional existence is needed for the concepts needed for language.

Logic, formal systems, Frege, existence, 4-23-93

Supposedly supplying a value for  $x$  in  $Fx$ , or quantifying over  $x$ , gives  $Fx$  the value: true or false. Actually, it only gives " $Fx$ " the value true or false. It gives  $Fx$  (or  $Fa$ ), without the quotation marks, the value of existing or not existing, or some other value than true. Maybe existence is not the appropriate way to describe the value. But if it is not, that only provides further evidence for the inappropriateness of the metaphor of considering a proposition a function of an argument. We cannot even name the value that the function  $Fx$  takes. And it should be  $Fx$ , not " $Fx$ " that takes a value, since whatever value " $Fx$ " has will depend on, as deriving from, the value  $Fx$  has, ie., what is expressed by " $Fx$ ."

Putnam, meaning, 4-23-93

"Knowing the meaning of 'cube'" can refer to the knowledge that the string of marks 'cube' is used for cubes. Or it can refer to the knowledge of what it is to be a cube, without reference to the word "cube," because the description "meaning of the word 'cube'" is true of what it is to be a cube whether or not we know that this description is true of what it is to be a cube.

5-18-93

Beeches/elms: The distinction between that from which the name is imposed ("the trees that botanists call 'beeches'") and that to which the name is imposed. We don't translate that from which the name is imposed. Every language is different here. We translate that to which the name is imposed.

Also, we translate that which is objectified, not the mode of objectification.

Course idea,4-14-93

Contemporary issues in theory of knowledge, in analytic philosophy.

Abortion, ethics, 4-14-93

Objection to the claim that the zygote is oriented to producing a human brain. Until several days later, every daughter cell of the zygote is able to produce any human protein, not just brain or nervous system matter. What makes the difference is the amount of chemical signal received from the mother. No, what makes the difference is the location of the cell relative to the uterus. The closer cells receive more of the chemical "signal" from the mother and so create the mesoderm. But it is the nature of the embryo to unite with the uterus and so to have some cells closer to the uterus than others. And the human genome was selected, that is, the human genome was so successful in reproduction, because some of its genes were of such a nature as to so react causally to the chemical signal from the environment in which it was selected, namely, the mother, that they produced a human brain. So in its natural environment (in the strongest sense of "natural" possible) the human embryo is oriented to producing a human brain, because it is oriented to uniting with the uterus and reacting to that particular environment in such a way as to successfully reproduce precisely because it is oriented to produce a human brain in that environment.

5-18-93, AA Big

The zygote is a machine, a factory, aimed at producing human ends, designed to produce human ends.

Our bodies behave differently in a vacuum than under pressure. Both potentialities are natural to our bodies in those environments and express and obey natural laws.

Those dispositions are normal (natural) to a zygote that are normally necessary for the agent to reproduce, not for the cell to reproduce, but for an organism, an agent, of a certain kind to reproduce, where the "kind" of agent is defined by orientations to ends which, when they are achieved, normally permit an agent with similar orientations to ends to be reproduced, and when they are not achieved put reproduction of such an agent at risk. The zygote has orientations to ends of those kinds, those orientations are its, because organisms that begin at the zygote stage reproduce similar zygotes because the first zygotes achieve effects of certain kinds and pass the ability to produce those effects onto the second set.

We need to know when an agent oriented to human ends first exists. Any criterion for this other than the scientific (evolution/environment) is arbitrary. (And if we are obligated to conform with reason's knowledge, we are obligated not to be arbitrary. "I will suggest a reason why we are obligated not to be arbitrary.") It is arbitrary because the whole issue, the whole problem, concerns when has an agent oriented to human ends been reproduced.

What are human ends and when do the dispositions for them exist? Not until a very late age do human children achieve the ends that ensure the reproduction of the species. "Human ends" should be measured by achievements normally necessary for human reproduction, because human reproduction has special needs due to the helplessness of the human child. Parents have to use intelligence, language, etc. to ensure the survival of the child until the child can (1) physically reproduce and (2) care for its own offspring intelligently. So it is arbitrary, measured by the orientation to human ends, not to take the normal reproductive environment of

the zygote into account when asking if the zygote is an agent oriented to human ends (normal reproductive environment contra, e.g., a vacuum, a womb with too much of a certain chemical, etc.) That is it would be arbitrary to say a zygote is not an agent oriented to human ends because it depends on a chemical from the mother to trigger its production of, say, a human brain.

Is it a loss for the zygote if the mother does not supply enough chemical for certain genes to be switched on? Yes, it is a loss for those genes and a loss as measured by (1) the ability the zygote has to make protein based on those genes (2) the ability it has to achieve certain ends, if those genes are turned on. It also has the ability to blow up if put in a vacuum. But that would not be a loss to us; it would not be a loss for us if that ability were not exercised. For it that ability were exercised, its exercise would prevent the fulfillment of all our (other?) ends -- just as the mother can prevent the fulfillment of the zygote's ends. It is a loss to a plant if . . . The point is it is just as much a loss to a zygote as to an adult -- AND FOR THE SAME REASON.

And recall Celia Wolf-Devine's remark about the mother's body mobilizing to become an environment for the embryo. The design of the mother's body survived to reproduce because it is oriented to so mobilizing.

On the personhood of the fetus: See Devine The Ethics of Homicide. Also, go back to Grisez and Boyle, Life and Death with Dignity and Justice for what they say about personhood. Also, check Grisez's book on abortion for personhood.

Since all agents depend on their environments in order to be agents, we have to take the environments in which they survived to reproduce as natural to them and natural to their causality and to what the ends of that causality are. For they reproduced a particular pattern (design, structure) because the causal dispositions of that pattern achieved certain ends, produced certain effects, in that kind of environment. That is even true of adults, and is just as true of adults. So for the moral purpose of determining the ends that X is oriented to, we have to include the environment where X survived to reproduce a being of a similar design.

We say lead paint in a toddler's environment is "bad" because it prevents the development of a potential for the development of which there is now an active disposition. Likewise, the "wrong" amount of a chemical from the wall of the uterus would be "bad" for the embryo, if it prevented the embryo from exercising its active disposition to develop a brain. (Same with the wrong kind of food for a toddler, etc.) "Bad for" means we consider the entity as oriented to ends that measure goodness and badness.

"My refraining from killing it is a sufficient condition for the actualization of the embryo's potential for caring relationships." Celia Wolf-Devine, "Abortion and the Feminine Voice," Public Affairs Quarterly, v. 3, n. 3, July, 1989, p. 93.

Abortion and Ethics, 3-2-93

The issue of an underlying human nature is, in part, this: what do I pass on to my offspring, and what does the zygote and each subsequent stage in human development pass on to the next stage. This is human nature in part because we also pass on accidental characteristics, e.g., the degree of intelligence.

In the published version state explicitly that there is no such thing as the correct syntactical expression of the inner nature of propositions. Their inner nature and their syntactical expression are two different things.

Of course, introspectible states really exist; so real existence of objects is not a sufficient condition for language. The nature of the objects must be such that, when they exist, they can be publicly accessed. But objects of such a nature can be imagined. (That is why Descartes made introspectible states his starting point; he knew they were not merely imagined.) And when such objects are merely imagined, they are not publicly accessible. Therefore, language requires really existent public objects.

Jan. 21, 95

Truth = thing/object identity. Skip analysis of logic. Go to p. 21: for judgment to be an awareness of thing/object identity, things must be objectified as capable of existing, as values having the capacity for cognition-independent existence.

The private language argument permits a different interpretation of the existential quantifier, i.e., permits an interpretation opposite that of "exist"'s being a logical predicate, one meaning that other predicates have referents. (Reference: what logical property must predicates have in order for us to know, before we can judge the truth or falsity of a proposition, that the proposition asserts something of an actual or possible extra-cognitive existent, rather than of a fictional or other cognition-dependent object? What logical property must we be able to recognize predicates as having? Once we name that property the only other one of any interest is the truth or falsity of the proposition. So what is left for "reference"? And maybe the property in question is not "logical," at least not in any narrow sense of that term, but semantical. That is, it is the meaning of the proposition that counts, i.e., our knowledge of what the proposition is saying, is talking about. Maybe all the "does 'F' refer?" discussion results from defining "exists" in terms of reference, rather than vice versa.)

Formal and material objects: diverse objects can be identical as things only if each object is an aspect (formal object) of something more than an object. (Maybe put in a footnote to Possenti how to justify the link between thing/object identity and material objects and formal objects.) So the question at the end of the first paragraph of the thing/object section, namely, how is it possible for us to know the identity of thing and object, which is required if we are to know the truth, links immediately with the material object/formal object analysis. Knowledge of thing object identity is not even possible unless objects are what the scholastics called formal objects and things are what they called material objects.

From there Maritain goes on to argue that formal objects do in fact present material objects and that they are unthinkable except as doing so for a variety of reasons, reasons which differ somewhat for intellectual and sensory objects. E.g., merely contemplating the truth of a statement requires understanding each object as presenting something potentially more than what is objectified in this way, and hence potentially identical with another object.

The private language argument requires mental states which, unlike pain, relate us to objects other than themselves. But mental states can do that and



still not be sufficient to ground public language. They must have objects, unlike imaginary objects, that really exist and are objectified as such.

Feb. 14, 95

Without cognition-independent objects, there is no control on our sentences, e.g., our calculation of time. The reason we need cognition-independent objects for control is that the grasp of such objects is the primary goal of our faculties of cognition (as opposed to affective faculties like the ability to experience pain). Because our faculties are designed the way they are, they have that goal, and so there is no measuring (control on) whether they are successful, whether they achieve the goal for which they are designed, without cognition-independent objects. There can be no evaluating them as successful, as good or bad, except by reference to cognition-independent objects.

Mar. 8, 95

Compare the reason why we cannot accurately measure time by the length of private mental processes alone (in contrast, say, to learning how to interiorly pronounce sounds whose length we can check publicly). We need awareness that the length of the process used as a measure is what it is independently of our mental states; otherwise, the measurement could be an appearance caused by our mental states.

Math abstraction, logic, formal systems, phil abstraction, 2-20-93 BIG

In math and logic, "abstraction" means, among other things perhaps, leaving aside the content of a term of a relation and viewing the term solely as term of a relation, and not as having any other content, i.e., no other content than as term of relations conceived as pure relations, relations that themselves do not have a content beyond that of being ways things other than themselves, things, whose content is left out, are related. In philosophy, we recognize that things are material relations and terms of material relations, but these terms are not conceived as pure terms having no other content. And where math and logic view the relations as pure relations, not primarily as entities that are more than relations, the objects of philosophy are precisely viewed as objects that are more than relations, objects with a content making them more than relations, which content is precisely not to be abstracted from on pain of intellectual failure.

Wittgenstein and Maritain, 2-15-93

For publication, make the first section into a separate article: Truth and Logic in Wittgenstein and Maritain, and use the article to do a bottom-up definition of logical relations and, hence, logic according to M. Note the alternative to the "Laws of thought/abstract objects" dichotomy; note that formal method is an indispensable tool, like math in physics, but only a tool, like math in physics.

Thing/object, EAP, Idealism, 2-15-93

It is not enough to say that objects are first known as "more than" or "other than" objects. What is first known about them must include a relation to existence. For they cannot be identical as objects; so we must be able to identify them as existents. So they must be objectified as possible existents from the start. And this existence, therefore, must be other than being an object.

Jun. 5, 95

What exists when our objects exist is other than what exists when awareness of the objects exists. (To assert that objects exist is other than to assert that awareness of them exists). But could the existence of what exists when our objects exist be the same as awareness, or is the existence of what exists when our objects exist other than what exists when our awareness of them exists? But the existence of those objects is itself one of the objects other than awareness, other than what we know when we know that awareness exists.

Wittgenstein and Maritain, and Truth, and Formal Systems, 2-15-93

In  $aRb$ ,  $a$  is objectified by " $a$ " and by " $Rb$ ,"  $b$  is objectified by " $b$ " and by " $aR$ ," and  $R$  is objectified by " $R$ " and as a holding between  $a$  and  $b$ .

What about truths of the form  $aRb$ ? Notice first that we do not assent to a mere complex concept like  $a$ 's Ring  $b$ , a dog named biff, joe seeing tom. We assent to claims that a dog is named biff, joe sees tom, or a  $R$ 's  $b$  in reality. We assent to something that can be put into the form of a question to which we can answer yes. Does joe see tom? Does Joe's seeing tom exist? Is it the case that Joe sees tom? From the viewpoint of the thing/object identity account of truth we analyze them either as identity between what is objectified as joe's seeing tom and as one of the states of affairs that exists, or as the diverse identification of an individual as that for which "Joe" is used and as something that sees Tom, or as the diverse objectification of an individual as that for which "Tom" is used and as something that is seen by Joe, or as the diverse objectification of a relation as something of which the meaning of " $R$ " is true and as something holding between Tom and Joe.

The important thing is that these are equivalent from the thing/object point of view, which is just another way of saying that the identity theory of truth is independent of the particular form of syntactical representation used to linguistically objectify a truth. Likewise, it is independent of any metaphysical projection of such a syntax. Therefore, the last form of analysis, which may seem to reify the relation  $R$  does not really do so.

The objection will be that "Joe's seeing Tom exists" is not equivalent in meaning to "Joe sees Tom," because the latter does not contain a word meaning what "exists" means. In other words, the first illustrates how "exists" comes into L; the second doesn't.

In reply, notice first that they are equivalent in truth value; the only question is "intensional" equivalence. (Aside: and notice that the first does not imply that reality, that which exists, is composed of states of affairs rather than things.) The equivalence in truth value shows that the relation to existence is logically included in all objective concepts which are the word-functions of thing-descriptions, not object-descriptions. "Exists" does not occur in the second, but in the first, it does not add anything of extraobjective value that was not known when "Joes sees Tom" was known, but not because the word-function of "exist" is not an extraobjective value, rather because that value was logically included all along.

And notice that "joe sees Tom" would be equivalent in truth value to "Joe's seeing Tom exists" in ordinary language, before any consideration of putting them into the artificial languages of logic. In fact, their meanings are equivalent in ordinary language.

Also notice that, contrary to the view Geach attributes to Frege in God and the Soul, "there is" is often equivalent to "exists" in the sense of actuality in ordinary language, which should not be the case if Frege's view were correct. For example, on the radio today, "I didn't know something like this existed." She could have said, "I didn't know there was something like this," or "I'm glad to know there is something like this, "I'm surprised to find that there is something like this." Are we to believe that "exists" in the first sentence does not refer to actuality, because it is equivalent to the "there is" in the other sentences? Of course, not.

May. 30, 95

Predication attributes a value, e.g., what it is to be red, and set membership results from possession of values that are similar. Need the values be precise? Even in strict preciseness, the two values are only similar, not identical,

outside the mind. But each is identical with the same value in the mind.

Can each be identical with the same vague value? Does it make sense to say something identical with a vague value? Why not? Paralogues show that things can be identical with the same non-univocal value; so why not with vague values? Vagueness is an epistemological concept or, at least, it is a logical property with the epistemological effect that it is not always easy to decide whether two things are identical with the same objective value.

In the language for our primary objects, there is no distinction between . . . as in Frege.

Truth, C and D, May. 30, 95

Is truth difficult? Consider: There are less than 10 billion people in this room. And notice that we don't have to be very precise about "in this room." It doesn't matter whether we are including the hallway, the vestibule, the kitchen what is only separated from the area we are in by a "room" divider, etc. That kind of precision may be necessary for truth in some cases. It is irrelevant to truth here.

Wittgenstein and Maritain, Truth, Existence, 2-12-93

The point is that "first order"/"second order," empirical/logical are not the only alternatives for explaining the power of, and drawing conclusions from the power of, existential quantification. Ontological analysis is a third possibility, but this possibility is a necessity on its own right, apart from whether it does justice to the quantifier. The private language argument shows that.

As Putnam said in conversation, Frege is not to blame for making "exists" logical. It is subsequent interpreters who did that.

In "John is thinking about a unicorn." "unicorn" does not designate any existent; nor is there any reason why it should. "John is thinking about a unicorn" describes a state of affairs that is constituted by a unicorn's having an intentional existence in John. But the reason for describing that state as an intentional existence of a unicorn in John is not that the word "unicorn" needs a referent; it does not need a referent. The reason for describing that state as an intentional existence is that otherwise John's state of thinking could not have for its object a unicorn as opposed to something else.

The correct or incorrect measurement of time requires awareness of a length of time, which length is what it is independently of my mental states, including the mental state of awareness of what the length is. It requires a length that I can check my states of awareness regarding length against. Say I hum a tune in my imagination. My awareness of that awareness of the tune may make it appear that the awareness of the tune lasted for two minutes. There is absolutely no way to check that that appearance is correct.

The opponent will respond that the act of imagining the tune really existed, so real existence is not the issue. But if I am listening to a tune instead of imagining it, the act of listening really exists, and the interior appearance of how long that act of listening existed is no more a good measure of its actual length than is the appearance of how long the act of imagining existed. What makes the difference is that the act of listening strictly correlates with an existent whose characteristics are independent of existents I become aware of subjectively, through concomitant self-awareness. To use those objects of awareness as measures of awareness would be to use awareness to measure itself. Awareness must have as its goal, the goal by which it is measured, an object known as existing independently of itself. Reflective self-awareness does not have an object that exists independently of itself, even though it has an object that exists, because it is just a development of that self-awareness that is not independent of, but is concomitant with, that awareness that has the existence of the nonself as its object.

The self that we are aware of in being aware of our awareness, say, of the movement of a clock's hands. is a self whose nature it is to be that which is aware of something existing independently of the self; the awareness that we are aware of is something whose nature it is to be an awareness of something existing independently of itself. And the concomitant self awareness is just an extension of that relation of dependence on the other. That is self awareness is an extension of that relation which requires measurement by a goal outside of itself. And the self we are aware of is a self whose nature is to be so related to what is other than itself that its acts, including acts of self-awareness, need to be measured by that which is independent of it.

True, I can know that I exist because I know that my act of awareness exists, whether or not I know that its object exists. But I can express that fact in L only because L came into existence to objectify objects existing independently of me. Self-awareness is suitable for measuring time only to the extent that the awareness I am aware of is suitable for measuring time. I say something like this in "If Wittgenstein Had Read Poincaré." Check it. There is something about acts that are easily measured because their objects are temporal, as opposed to act of self-awareness of original acts whose objects are not temporal.



Putnam, 2-10-93

"That for which 'elms' is used" can be taken in two ways, lexicologically and nonlexicologically. Taken lexicologically, it cannot constitute part of the meaning of "elms" and so does not survive translation and should not survive translation. Taken nonlexicologically, why shouldn't it survive translation. In knowing the intentional object "the intentional for which experts use 'elm'," in the nonlexicological sense, I am precisely aware of the intentional presence, in the experts, of an object into which the lexicological relation to "elm" does not enter.

In defining a necessacy causal relation, I use a contrary-to-fact conditional: If X exists and Y does not exist, X both is and is not what it is. Does this put me in the paradoxes of material implication, i.e., that a conditional is always true as long as the antecedent is false? No because the conditional would be materially true if the antecedent were false and consequent was false. But I am claiming that the consequent, that X both is and is not, must be true when the antecedent is false. Of course, that claim has to be justified. Even more fundamentally, can I say what that claim means without getting into material implication, since the claim uses a counterfactual?

What the claim means is that from the premise that X exists and Y does not exist, together with other true premises, it follows by the laws of logic that X both is and is not. For that is what has to be shown to defend the claim, i.e., that the opponent cannot avoid the conclusion that X both is and is not, where "cannot" refers to premises the opponent wishes to hold true and to the laws of logic. In order to say this, do I have to be referring to the laws of logic other than material implication? No, I am specifically referring to the case where the consequent is shown true, so I mean whatever laws get the consequence that the consequent is true, whereas material implication does not determine whether the consequent is true or false. Certainly, the burden of proof is on the one who makes such a claim, but if he cannot carry that burden, the fault is in his argument, not in his use of material implication per se.

But notice that there seem to be those in philosophy who would immediately jump on the occurrence of the counterfactual to criticize my position, for that reason, as being "scientifically disreputable." (The reference to science is like Frege saying that arithmetic totters, not that his theory of arithmetic totters; counterfactuals are disreputable by some theory of science. Science needs dispositions, tendencies, as Simon argues in Prevoir.) This only shows that they do not take the time to think about what their opponent is claiming.

Also, the "laws of logic" are supposed to be independent of the truth-value of the premises; they are supposed to say "If the premises are true, this conclusion is also true." Truth functional logic may appear to go against the spirit of this, but a truth-function, e.g.,  $p \vee q$ , only enters logic as a premise that is itself assumed to be true, even though no assumption is made with respect to which its components is true. The same goes for  $p \rightarrow q$ . What makes that formula interesting and useful as a logical tool is that we can assume it to be true, without needing to know whether p or q is true. So the usefulness of implication defined materially simply says nothing at all against the fact that logic concerns entailments in which the conclusion must be true if the premises are true.

Putnam, 2-5-93

Notice that "called 'elms'" and "called 'beeches'" are extrinsic denominations. Notice also that we use constructions like "what English calls 'awe'" "what the Greeks meant by charisma," (from The Godfather) "what Americans call "bus-i-ness." Surely, using these constructions does not commit us to including these noises in their respective meanings, so that we would have to include them in the translation of those meanings. No, we are saying "that meaning which the English associate with 'awe,' etc., so that the meaning, not that with which it is associated in English, would be what gets translated. We are saying "that which they are aware of when the use 'awe,' etc., the way I am aware of what death is, when I hear 'Your mother died today'." What gets translated is what I am aware of when I hear that noise, not its relation to the noise.

Perhaps start this way: Classical realists justifiably pride themselves on not making the false assumptions about concepts that have come down to us from the 17th century. (Reference, e.g., Adler, Ten Philosophical Mistakes, Deely, Tractatus de Signis.) But even though Putnam cites the 17th century as a source, he has offered fresh arguments. Therefore, we need to know whether the classical realist picture can still stand in the face of his arguments. We need to know how his arguments relate to the classical realist picture.

Wittgenstein and Maritain, 2-5-93

Maybe shorten it for publication this way: At the end of section 2, the intentionality section, say that the function of intentionality is not to justify the use of existential quantification over objects, like sets, that cannot really exist. The function of ie is not to provide an existence existential quantification to "refer" to. Then say that to see why this is true, we need to see another point of comparison between M and W; we need to see as aspect of W's private language argument that has been ignored but which supports Maritain's views on existence. Then go into section 3, but leave out that last part about ontological analysis and the justification of empirical knowledge.

And this shortening could take place in an article that leaves out the whole first part about identity and truth in M and W; that may be the least interesting part for an article in a nonThomistic journal.

The paragenetic affirmation and negation of the same in IE is not where I thought it was. I thought it was between "real" as applied to extraobjective existence and "real" as applied to intraobjective existence, so that I would have to find a way to make the second sense (real as genuine in opposition to apparent) a negation of the first (real as existing for itself as opposed to merely for another). And I couldn't find a way to make the second a combined affirmation and negation of the first.

In fact, the paragenetic set is between genuine as applied to extraobjective existence and a diminished sense of genuine as applied to intraobjective. Intentionally existence is genuine existence, but not fully genuine in the way extraobjective is. So the paragenetic set is composed of two instances of what I call the second sense of "real" in the last paragraph, not of what I call the first and second senses.

But this was an interesting philosophical mistake. What led me to look for the paragenetic affirmation and negation in the wrong place? The fact that the primary use of "real" for genuine had another sense of "real" associated with it, a sense that was not in anyway associated with the second use of "real" for genuine. It was the problem of three bodies. That third sense of "real" through me off. Maybe this too is a common occurrence in philosophy.

Resurrection, 2-2-93

Resurrection accounts in scripture. There appear to be inconsistencies. But this can result from failure to see the forest for the trees. For example, there is no disagreement that Mary Magdalene was first to find the tomb empty, or that she saw and spoke to angels. So the authors must have received and believed an account of the tomb being found empty by Mary. So the apostles did had down an account of Jesus rising from the dead, and his body's not being there.

G and L, 2-1-93

Social conservatives tell us that relative values alone are not enough. But then they expect us to intuit that their version of absolute values, or at least of the political implications of absolute values, is the correct one, (Remember "In your heart you know he's right"?)

Gays have no more right to come out of the closet than those who drink have the right to drive or those who smoke have the right to make others inhale their secondary smoke.

Cause, Jun. 11, 96

Sullivan distinguishes the concepts of "necessary for" and "derives from" in his critique of Hume. But "derives from" implies "necessary for" in his well founded limited sense of being necessary in these circumstances. For the relation of derivation from is either a formal or a material relation. It is hard to see how it could be a formal relation. To say that X derives from Y in this circumstance means that what X is is linked to what Y is. Could X be all that it is and exactly what it now is without being derived from something? If so, being derived from something is a formal relation exterior to what X is.

For if it is a formal, exterior, relation, what is the cash value of saying that X derived from something? The cash value of saying that what it is derived from something other than what it is?

Cause, 1-30-93

Certain conditions are necessary for change and the subject of the change alone is not sufficient to supply those necessary conditions.

A change is a material relation of dependence. But that on which it depends, the subject, is also a material relation to the change. Not every subject is capable of every change, so the subject is materially related to the change by being what it is. But the subject's material relation makes it only potentially that which terminates the change's relation of dependence. So the change has a material relation of dependence on a material relation of only being a potency for the change and hence only potentially that which terminates the change's relation.

Is actually terminating the change's relation of dependence something extrinsic to what the subject is? On the contrary, to actually be the term of that relation is, for the subject, to undergo a change, to cease being what it was, namely, potentially X, and become X. To describe the subject as actually a cause is to describe it as term of a relation that something else has to it, yes. But the relation is such that (the nature of the relation is such that -- just as chapter 2 of Causal Realism shows that some relations include the idea of features interior to their terms), the subject has to change for that relation to be terminated. And so not only is its relation of potency for the change not sufficient for the change, but the change itself brings it about that the change's relation of dependence on the subject is terminated. So the change causes itself.

Is this subtle, yes. But that is why causality has been hard to see.

Feb. 4, 95

Immanent Action, Aquinas on change remaining in the agent,

Aquinas does not talk about immanent action. He distinguishes change which remains within the agent from change which does not. What does he mean by this? He must mean, because he can only mean, change which remains within the same faculty, the same part of the agent, that causes the change. For if he meant change that exists in another part of the agent, the change would be no different from change that exists in something other than the agent. So he means "agent" in a very strict and formal sense, i.e., he means the substance and the faculty, the part of the substance, by which the substance acts. And that is the same thing that the later Thomists meant by immanent action.



So when a substance goes from not producing an immanent action to producing one, there are two new forms or states of act in the substance. Since the substance was not always producing this act, it can only do so if an external agent moves it from potency to act. But when the external agent does this, there are two new acts in the substance. There is the act received from the external agent and the immanent action the substance can now cause because it has been put in act by the external agent. The second act is not received, perhaps not even indirectly, from the external agent. I say not indirectly, because the substance may be ready to cause the act but form some condition supplied by the external agent, so that the proper causing of the second act is the substance's, not the external agent's. Or the external agent may just remove an obstacle to the causing that the substance is already prepared to do.

The second act resides in the faculty by which it was caused. But it does not reside in it as if it were passively received the way the first act was passively received by the substance. Hence the second act's "residing in" is not the actuation of a passive potency.

Putnam, 1-29-93

Is existence something logical? That it is not can be seen in the following way. When we use quantification for beings of reason, we do not attribute real existence to them. Yet it would be superfluous to have two different logical symbols, one for real existence and one for ideal. For the logical function played by using words like "there is a" in these two cases is the same. In fact, the fact that the logical function is the same in these two cases is the reason we use quantification in the case of ideal objects. But while the logical function is the same, the extralogical value quantification attributes is not the same in these cases. Therefore, the existence we assign by means of quantification to real things is not something logical.

Abortion, 1-29-93. AA

Instead of "It has been said that a mature horse is more rational than a human infant." say "Animal liberationist imply that mature animals, a horse, for example, are of more value that human infants.

Science, and Rity, and Putnam, 1-29-93

How knowledge by beings of reason can be legitimately (though paragenetically) called knowing what things are. The beings of reason of relativity and quantum mechanics can be said to be the "correct" beings of reason (as required by the ontological principles governing empirical hypotheses and the requirements of mathematical idealization) in the sense of being the only possible theories that will conform to the known facts. Their being the only possible theories will be an effect of physical causal relations that constitute the natures of things, especially, physical causal relations determining what facts are and are not available to our observation (simultaneity, absolute motion, absolute position or velocity). So, among other things, they make known natures by their effects. In other words, the natures of things determine what the only possible being of reason, the only possible fiction, is.

BORs, quantum mechanics, Jun. 12, 95

Does Maritain's BOR solution to the paradoxes of quantum mechanics invalidly require that we have a means of knowledge about nature other than science? Of course, Maritain holds that we do have other means of knowledge about nature. But does the BOR solution really require that belief? Why can't it just require the admission that there can be more to nature than we are capable of knowing scientifically?

In fact, in Causal Realism I argue that it is precisely to make up for the fact that our theories must be simpler than reality that we must use BORs. That was the question Maritain had not answered: why must we use BORs, when science is not symbolic by nature, as he says. We use BORs because our postulated causal explanations must be simpler than required by reality, because we cannot know the whole of reality scientifically. Science itself shows this, in the case of the uncertainty principle.

To somehow invent a rule making it invalid to postulate, e.g., that there might be simultaneity or both position and speed for particles, is so reminiscent of the verification principle, which was invented for a similar purpose. And notice that Hempel's arguments against the verification principle were the weakest of them. The fact that so many accepted only the weakest arguments shows that those people never got the point of how arbitrary the verification principle was.

Jun. 22, 95

Maybe relativity, and perhaps quantum mechanics, prove that, or at least illustrate perfectly why, science cannot give ontological, dianoetic, explanation, i.e., why science cannot know the intrinsic nature of matter. Relativity just describes behavior, as it must, in terms of 4 dimensions as if there were such a thing as the space-time continuum. Then it "explains" the behavior by saying that in the presence of so much mass, the geometric laws of the space-time continuum change in the following way. Einstein showed that that is all an empirical explanation of gravity should be. And since that is all it should be, an empirical explanation cannot tell us why mass causes such behavior. Once we describe the empirical facts mathematically, there is nothing left to do but say that one quantity varies in the following ways with another quantity. So we do not describe the relation of mass to its environment as Newton did. We know that the only way to describe the effect of mass on its environment is in terms of a space-time continuum, because that is the only relevant way to describe the environmental effects of mass.

But can we seriously think that when we get to heaven, we won't know more about why mass works that way (e.g., inversely to the square of the distance) and not some other way? It's not simply that God decided that it would work that way. He brought it about that it would work that way and not some other way by the design he put into the nature of matter.

What makes the difference between right and wrong, good and bad? This could naturally be expressed by asking what makes the difference between doing right and wrong, doing good and doing evil. So it can naturally look like right and wrong, good and evil are characteristics of actions deeds. And are not actions what I choose to do or not to do? And is not choosing what to do or not to do the locus of the question what makes the difference between right and wrong? So that the question would be what makes actions right or wrong; what makes the difference between right and wrong actions.

But what is an action? It cannot be the mere physical act, for example, the act of pointing a gun in the direction where an innocent person happens to be. It has to be the action done knowingly, the physical action done in consciousness of what the things involved in, affected by, the action are. So it must be the nature of the things involved in the action that makes actions right or wrong; more specifically, it must be our knowledge of what are the things involved in the action that makes it right or wrong for us to do the action, to behave that way.

So in choosing the action, we must be able to choose contrary to what we know things to be, and that amounts to our being able to choose as if things were not what we know them to be. "Doing the right or wrong action," "doing good or evil," for us means choosing to act in a certain way in consciousness of what we and the things involved in the action are. The action that is right or wrong is not just the action external to the choice, it is the unified whole conscious-choice-of-this-action. And in asking whether something is right or wrong, we are asking whether the choice of doing this, given that we know what we are doing, is right or wrong.

*Including the choice in the action opens the way for an answer to the question what it means to choose contrary to" what we know things to be or "as if" the things in our actions were not what they were. Just as we have to ask what constitutes the agreement between thoughts and what things are in truth, we have to ask what constitutes the conformity between a decision and what things are known to be.*

The intentional object associated with "water" on both planets is: something, some type of being, whose nature causes it to have these phenomenal properties. Is the preceding formula "indexical" enough? I.e., if it were anything whose nature causes it to have these phenomenal properties, then the extension of the intentional object would be both kinds of water. And to save P's view and my own, I want an intentional object such that what is logically included in it restricts the extension to the kind of water on the particular planet. Do I need: the kind of being, a thing with the kind of nature, that these samples of entities with these phenomenal properties have? Why not; for then the specific nature of these entities would be logically included, even if included only with the logical property of vagueness.

What makes it possible for the nature of things in the environment to determine reference, and the only thing that makes it possible, is that logically included in our concept of, say, water is: a thing of the nature that causes these phenomenal properties; a thing of the kind of nature that causes these phenomenal properties; something with the nature that causes the properties X, Y, and Z. If that were not logically included in our concept, the nature of what is in our environment would not determine reference.

Concerning elms and beeches and identifying the meaning of "elm" as that for which others are using the word "elm." We are often in a position of starting only from knowledge that a word used by others has some meaning, and until we come to know completely what that meaning is, we rely in part, for our use of the word or, at least, for our understanding of others when they use the word, on our knowledge that others are using "elm" for a meaning. This goes on all the time. When it does, and it does so even from the beginnings of language, we are partially in the same position translators are in, not completely, but significantly. All language users are partially in that position at all times.

Compare acquiring the meaning of "elm" to acquiring the meaning of "exists." To acquire the meaning of exists, we have to be aware of something not included in or even directly related to that meaning: we have to be aware that some thing of a particular nature, a tree, a man, etc., has been made object of concept. That awareness is necessary for our acquiring awareness of the meaning of "exists" but is not part of our awareness of the meaning of "exists" (otherwise, the meaning of "exist" would include an essential reference to being known). But that previous awareness that something else has been objectified is part of the way in which we make an object of the meaning of "exists," even though it is not part of that which is made an object in this way. Likewise, the fact that a sound like "elm" objectifies a meaning is part of the way we objectify what that meaning is, even though it is not part of that meaning. But the fact that awareness that the noise "elm" has a meaning is not part of that meaning, does not contradict the fact that our awareness that the noise "elm" has a meaning is a necessary and essential part of our objectification of the meaning of "elm," of the way we objectify that meaning.

Also, word-functions are both objects and means of objectifying things: intention and extension.

Cause, 1-6-93

While composing letter to Putnam. If C would not occur without S, C would not occur at this point rather than that without S. But while S satisfies C's relation of dependence on its subject, S does not satisfy any relation of dependence C might have for occurring at this point rather than that. Since whatever relation S terminate it would terminate at any point. So unless C would also not occur without something other than S, C does not have a relation of dependence with respect to occurring at this point or that. C would not occur without S now or then. So C's relation to what S is is not a relation that requires something other than C without which C would not occur now rather than then. So C does not require something other than itself for occurring this point in S's duration rather than than. But then C is caused and has no cause. For what S is is not the cause of C's occurring now rather than then. But C's dependence on S is only logically distinct from its dependence on S now. So C really would not depend on S.

logic is the same). C is identical with its relation to S (as in "the disposition is identical with the ground"). If the relation were like an Aristotelian accident of C, it would be a necessary accident, and C would have a necessary relation to the accident. If this further necessary relation is an accident, we have an infinite regress. But if S was not always undergoing C, S cannot be C's only cause. What S is is not a cause of C's occurring now and not then. So C's relation of dependence on what S is is not a relation that requires something other than C without which C would not occur at this point in S's duration rather than that. But if C does not have a relation of dependence on anything other than itself for occurring at this point in S's duration and not that, C does not have a relation of dependence on S; for there is only a logical distinction between C's being a relation of dependence on S, and its being a relation of dependence on S at this point in S's duration rather than that. Hence, C's relation of would-not-occur-without S is also a relation of would-not-occur-without something other than S (some configuration of things that a prior change brings about at this point in S's duration) requiring S to cease being what it is by undergoing change C.

But why is an efficient cause is necessary contrary to Hume? A change, C, instantaneous or continuous, occurring to something, S, that previously was not undergoing it is other than S but would not exist without S (a causal relation, but if this is yet too broad to speak of causality, call it something else, the logic is the same). Since C has this relation to S necessarily, C is identical with this relation (as in "the disposition is identical with the ground"). If the relation were like an Aristotelian accident of C, it would be either a contingent or necessary accident. Contingency would rule out the necessity. If the relation is a necessary accident, C has a necessary relation to the accidental relation, if this new necessary relation is an accident, we have an infinite regress. But if C is identical with its relation of dependence on S and S was not always undergoing C, S cannot be C's only cause. There would be no cause for C's occurring at this point in S's duration as opposed to some other point. If C does not have a relation of dependence on anything other than itself for occurring at this point in S's duration as opposed to that, C does not have a relation of dependence on S, since there is only a logical distinction between C's relation of dependence on S, and its relation of dependence on its S at this point in S's duration. Hence, C's relation of dependence on S is a dependence on something other than S, a configuration of things brought about at this point in S's duration by a previous change, requiring S to undergo C.



But why is an efficient cause necessary contrary to Hume? A change, C, instantaneous or continuous, occurring to something, S, that previously was not undergoing it is other than S but would not exist without S (a causal relation, but if this is yet too broad to speak of causality, call it something else, the logic is the same). C is identical with its relation to S (as in "the disposition is identical with the ground"). If the relation were like an Aristotelian accident of C, it would be a necessary accident, and C would have a necessary relation to the accident. If this further necessary relation is an accident, we have an infinite regress. But if C is identical with its relation of dependence on S and S was not always undergoing C, S cannot be C's only cause. There would be no cause for C's occurring at this point in S's duration as opposed to some other point. If C does not have a relation of dependence on anything other than itself for occurring at this point in S's duration as opposed to that, C does not have a relation of dependence on S, since there is only a logical distinction between C's being a relation of dependence on S, and its being relation of dependence on its S at this point in S's duration. Hence, C's relation of dependence on S is a dependence on something other than S, a configuration of things brought about at this point in S's duration by a previous change, requiring S to undergo C.

23 Pilgrim Circle, #E  
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January 5, 1993

Dear Professor Putnam:

The World Congress xeroxes are enclosed; thanks again for your time today.

Since you asked, here is how I handle quantum physics. (1) Assume for the sake of argument that particles have both definite position and velocity. Since physical causal relations prevent us from knowing both and rationality allows us to posit only what is observable and what is necessary to cause the observable, our theory must posit causal relations that are simpler than, or at least do not correspond one-to-one with, what really exists. So sometimes metaphysical regulative principles require that science use fictions that are "correct" in the sense that principles governing rationality require us to use them.

(2) Others have pointed this out, but has enough attention been paid to the fact that the conditions of mathematical abstraction are distinct from those of the physical reality we must use mathematics to describe? This disproportion creates anomalies resulting from the nature of the tool, not the reality described by the tool. (Some things we see in a painting derive from the subject or from

the painter's imagination, some things from properties of the brush.) For example, force fields decrease infinitely, but the universe is finite. Perhaps mathematical idealization, together with the "correct fictions" of quantum physics, can account for anomalies like zero particles with a range of energy, since from a mathematical, but not a physical, point of view zero is a "definite number" of particles.

Another example combining (1) and (2) could be simultaneity. "The clock is striking and something is happening on Mars" is true unless Mars is in a state of rest; therefore the clock's striking is simultaneous with something on Mars, although physical causal relations prevent us from knowing what. The corresponding mathematical fiction simpler than what exists could be Minkowski's uniting of space and time by multiplying with an imaginary number. (I am not sure how this might apply to general relativity.)

Still, experience and metaphysical regulative principles allow us to know that it is unreasonable to believe the opposite of many empirical propositions. But brains in a vat can know that it is totally unreasonable to believe that we are brains in a vat, since experience and causal principles are the only possible kinds of evidence for what exists. So this realism preserves many of the important insights of internal realism. For example, many empirical frameworks are possible; and the correct fiction example shows that various ways of "corresponding" with reality are possible. Metaphysical truth would provide a standard by which other ways of corresponding with reality can be evaluated, but these other ways would not aspire to be metaphysical truth. They just are what they are.

But why is an efficient cause necessary contrary to Hume? A change, C, instantaneous or continuous, occurring to something, S, that previously was not undergoing it is other than S but would not exist without S (a causal relation, but if it is too broad to be called causal, call it something else; the logic is

the same). C is identical with its relation to S (as in "the disposition is identical with the ground"). If the relation is like an Aristotelian accident of C, it is a necessary accident, and C has a necessary relation to the accident. If this further necessary relation is an accident, we have an infinite regress. But if S was not always undergoing C, S cannot be C's only cause. What S is is not a cause of C's occurring now and not then. So C's relation of dependence on what S is is not a relation that requires something other than C without which C would not occur at this point in S's duration rather than that. But if C does not have a relation of dependence on anything other than itself for occurring at this point in S's duration and not that, C does not have a relation of dependence on S; for there is only a logical distinction between C's being a relation of dependence on S, and its being a relation of dependence on S at this point in S's duration rather than that. Hence, C's relation of would-not-occur-without S is also a relation of would-not-occur-without something other than S (some configuration of things that a prior change brings about at this point in S's duration) requiring S to undergo C.

Efficient causality works this way. Assume two billiard balls now have a property that prevents them from occupying the same space. If ball A is put in motion and hits B, another change must occur; if another change does not occur, something both is and is not what it is. A may just stop; that is a change. A may enter B's space without B's moving; that is a change in the property just assumed. For thing 1 to cause a change in thing 2 means that 1's being what it is requires 2 to cease being what it is, where "requires" means that, if 2 does not cease being what it is, 1 and/or 2 is and is not what it is.

Thanks for listening,

Putnam, 1-6-93

January 5, 1993, p. 2

On meaning. Does the environment partially determine the referent of "water"? What if everyone had learned to use the word "water" the way we learn to use the word "unicorn, namely, from fiction. Say we learn to use "water" for a clear, odorless, etc. liquid. So far "water" means the same thing here and on Twin Earth. Then one day we encounter a liquid of that description and those on Twin Earth encounter a different liquid but of the same description. Do our meanings of "water" change? Putnam might respond that this is "reference by description," but does that make a difference here?

Liberal/Conservative 12-4-92

The Liberal says: don't say we can't find the money to do justice; it's the Lord's money; He will supply if we try to do the just thing. The conservative says: the environmentalist does not trust God to take care of things.

Ethics, 12-4-92 AA

Maritain says acts contribute to our end because they are good, have value, they are not good because they contribute to our end. But, as he himself would say, the transcendental good has the nature of an end, a final cause. The goodness of an action must come from an intrinsic end, an end that is not identical with our ultimate end, but the act contributes to our ultimate end, because it attains its end. The act in question has to be a rational act, not just an act physically considered. It is not just the act of pulling the trigger, but pulling the trigger in full knowledge of what the target is and of what will happen when we pull the trigger. So an act must have an intrinsic end as a rational act, and

that end must not be the quality of aiming at some further end; otherwise, the value of the act would derive from some further end, not its own end. So it is the act of doing such and such in full awareness, or sufficient awareness, of what we are doing. And that must mean the act of the rational appetite. Or start, it must be the act of the rational appetite. Why? Because it must be a rational act, not just a physical act.

Predicament, 12-7-92

Philosophers are constantly dealing with apparent contradictions; they are our stock and trade. Most of the questions classified as "philosophical" problems probably arise because of some apparent contradiction. But we do not seem to have asked Why there are so many apparent contradictions, why they arise so frequently and easily. Paralogues provide the answer.

Predicament - 12-1-92

Centuries of philosophical dispute lead to the shift to the epistemological point of view as a way of ending those disputes, for example, by setting limits to meaning, etc. Today, the epistemological point of view is expressed by problems about "reference." For example, where today we might ask whether to people with different theories are referring to the same thing by "leaf," we would formerly have asked whether and to what extent each of these people has knowledge of what a leaf is. For example, the child has a certain kind of knowledge of what a leaf is; the high school student has another kind of knowledge of what a leaf is; the Ph.D. in biology has an additional kind of knowledge of what a leaf is. Formerly, if it had been asked "Are they all referring to the same thing by 'leaf'?" the

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response would have been "Huh?", "Say what?" And notice that there is a necessary causal progression from the kind of knowledge the child has to the kind of knowledge the Ph.D. has. The Ph.D.'s knowledge grows out of the child's. Some of the Ph.D.'s knowledge may contradict the child's (but only if they mean the same thing by some of their words), but the Ph.D. could not acquire the kind of knowledge he has except by going through the kind of knowledge the child has.

And when we come to philosophical disputes, what do the results of our epistemological labors get us? Line up all the disputed arguments for and against the existence of God or free will or the immateriality of consciousness. Look at their premises. What kind are they? Not epistemological. They are statements about reality. And at the end of all our second-order epistemological statements about them, they have to be judged true or false on their own ground and by an awareness of the nonepistemological meanings that make them up. So the epistemological shift does not help us solve philosophical disputes, especially the shift in its "reference" form.

Causal knowledge - 12-1-92

What keeps knowledge of nature by knowledge of causal connections from being circular? We have noncausal knowledge to control and form our causal hypotheses, i.e., the senses give us number (number is big here), relative size, shape, motion and rest, as well as existence.

G&L 12-1-92

Gs who fail in their attempt to change, or who do not try to change for fear of failure, are trying to get teenagers to have the same problem they have.

Ethics - Abortion 12-1-92 AA

What enters the zygote through the membrane is acted on by what is inside the zygote. Of course, it also acts on what is already inside the zygote, but it does so after it is inside of, and so is part of, the zygote.

Beliefs about what is good are not justifiable by the principle that we should seek the greatest good of the greatest number. This shows the need for a nonutilitarian account of value. The justification of the belief that, e.g., the orientation to human ends is the measure of value, is not that this belief contributes to the greatest amount of good.

Unless the individual has a value not defined by her contribute to the greatest good of the greatest number, the majority has full authority and right to do anything it wants to the minority.

The value of an individual must not be relative to any ends other than her own, in some nonegoistic sense of her value being relative to her own ends. That is the kind of value the prolifer, and anyone who wants the minority protected from the majority, needs.

Abortion 12-1-92 AA

Meaning determines reference, as Putnam indicates.

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The argument about abortion is really over the nature of ethical value, not about when life begins, etc. First, does the orientation to human ends constitute the criterion of value. Second, is value so defined utilitarian (or relative) or not?

When we do not know whether the orientation to human ends exists: is the question ethics must answer the question of how to balance the risk of unjustly taking a human life versus the risk of unjustly depriving a woman of a choice?

If not mature characteristics, what characteristics do bestow value on an infant? Being an agent oriented to human ends. The opponent will say an infant does not have the right to life until it develops some "human" feature. But it possesses a human genome, and hence a set of human causal dispositions, from the beginning. Why not select that as a human feature? The opponent is using some criterion to make her selection. For example, what if the opponent said the infant does not have a right to life until it performs a specifically human action? Then why are actions more important than other features (causality is her answer) and why isn't reproducing a specifically human genome a specifically human action, i.e., why are other features of the action more important? What is the value of using that criterion as opposed to mine? The value can only come from an end to which the opponent and infant are equally oriented. Even an as unequivocally human feature as the ability to make a rational choice does not give us the right to kill infants, since the value of a choice comes from an orientation to future ends. And many human features are certainly more of value as means to ends the infant is already oriented to than as ends themselves. And the opponent is judging the value of that "human" feature by its relation to her ends, not the infant's, since all later achievements are of value to the infant from the point of view of her



ends. Further, the value of any feature, human or otherwise, is relative to the concrete individual of which it is a feature. Features have no existence on their own, they borrow their existence, and hence their value, from the concrete entity of which they are features. That entity is the human causal system that exists from the zygote stage on.

Abortion, 11-29-92 AA

A man in a coma versus a dog in a coma. Both have an underlying causal orientation to keep themselves in existence as causal systems of certain kinds. A corpse is a causal system that, by some definitions, is oriented to maintain itself in existence, since its parts will exist forever. But it is not oriented to maintain itself in existence, where "itself" is defined by a causal orientation to certain kinds of ends, as a living dog and man are. Their underlying causal orientations are that of causal systems oriented to canine and human ends, specifically, to maintain themselves in existence with an orientation to such ends, to keep in existence an agent with that underlying causal orientation.

Causality, 11-20-92

I need to generate a contradiction, e.g., X is caused and is cause of itself or X is caused and has no cause. But possibly many other contradictions could be generated if X is not caused: X is and is not a being whose existence is distinct from its essence; X comes into existence and does not come into existence; X is a result of change and is not a result of change; X undergoes change and does not

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undergo change; X is and is not composed of potency and act; etc.

A contradiction: a change is caused and has no cause, or a change is caused and is cause of itself. If the subject of the change is the only cause of the change, then the change is cause of itself, since

the change makes the subject that which is the cause of the change,

the change makes the subject that which the change has for its cause

A contradiction; something terminates the change's relation of having a cause and the change has nothing which terminates that relation, or the change terminates that relation, since

it is the subject's possession of the change that makes the change have the subject as that which terminates the change's relation of having a cause.

It is the subject's possession of the change that makes the change have something which terminates the change's relation of having a cause.

But if there is an efficient cause, the efficient cause is that which makes the change have something which terminates its relation of having a material cause.

THIS IS IT:

Also, once it is established that a change has a relation of dependence on its component cause, the existence of a material relation is established; so it is legitimate at that point to bring in the idea that a change's necessary relation of dependence for existence is identical with what the change itself is. So if a change has a necessary relation of dependence on some cause, the change is totally dependent on causes for existence; It cannot be dependent in some respects and not in others, or dependent to one degree but not to another degree.

A change is a relation of dependence, of need, and what the component cause is

does not satisfy that relation. But what the efficient cause is and what the component cause is together satisfy the demands of that relation. For what the efficient cause is requires that the component cause cease to be what it is. By requiring that the component cause cease to be what it is, what the efficient cause is requires that the component cause undergo the change and become, strictly speaking, that which the change depends on, become that which terminates the change's relation of dependence. As a result, the change can continue to exist in the component cause without the efficient cause, because the state of change is now one of the things that the component cause is, one of the answers to the question "What is X?", namely, "X is something undergoing a change." A change is not something external to the subject of change, as if a change were something with which the subject were accidentally juxtaposed. A change exists as a feature of the subject. That is why a change needs a cause and why what the subject is without the change is not sufficient to satisfy the relation of dependence that is what the change is.

Also, the fact that the subject can undergo the change makes that which the subject is without the change a material relation of ability to undergo the change. But what the subject is without the change is not sufficient to fulfill that relation of ability to undergo the change, not sufficient to actualize the subject's relation of potency for undergoing the change. So that relation needs something other than what the subject is to fulfill it. Can the change itself be all that the subject needs for its relation of ability to undergo the change to be fulfilled? The subject needs something to require it to cease to be what it is in that respect and become something other than what it is. Is the change the only thing that requires the subject to cease to be what it is? If so the change either has nothing for its cause or is cause of itself. If so, the subject either has nothing that fulfills its relation of ability to undergo the change or that

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which is not sufficient to fulfill that relation (namely, what the subject is) is sufficient to fulfill that relation.

The above can be applied to immanent action. A subject capable of an immanent action is not performing it, does not have characteristic G, the immanent action. So the subject must undergo change caused by an external efficient cause, a change that puts the subject in the state necessary for the subject to produce the immanent action. So an external efficient cause gives the subject Characteristic F, the characteristic necessary for action G to emanate from the subject.

Simultaneous with the coming into existence of F, then, G comes into existence in the subject. Is the coming into existence of G a further change, a distinct change from the coming into existence of F? The coming into existence of G is not identical with the coming into existence of F. But the subject's acquisition of G is not a further passive reception from an external agent, not the fulfillment of a potency on the part of the subject to cease to be what it is (to change) because something other than itself, the efficient cause, is what it is. It is the fulfillment of a potency of the subject to acquire a new characteristic because of what it is. What the subject is is not a relation to G such that the subject is not sufficient for the existence of G; that kind of insufficiency only applies when the subject is what it is and the change bringing G into existence does not occur. Only then is the relation of the subject to G such that what something other than the subject is must require the subject to change in order that G may come into existence. When what the subject is is sufficient for G, G exists simultaneously with the subject's being sufficient for G. So there is no contradiction to the principle of efficient causality, which only applies when what the subject is is not sufficient for the existence of X so that, if X is a relation of dependence, X needs more than the subject. In the case of immanent action, what

the subject is is not an ability to become something it now is not; what the subject is is not a relation of ability to acquire something, since the subject does not exist with such an unfulfilled ability, and cannot exist without it as long as the subject is F. The reason is that the subject's relation to G is a relation of G's emergence from the subject, of what the subject is in other respects making it impossible for the subject not also to have G, where G is something in need of a cause (the last clause qualifying the previous clause that could be read to make G the cause of the subject).

Logic, Nov. 20, 1992

In calculational logic, a "proof" is a string of marks such that each subsequent line . . . . Carnap seems to have wanted a definition like that for logical truth, i.e., a string of marks satisfying a definition that refers solely to properties of the marks as marks. So you can use the failure of Carnap's definition of logical truth against the orthographic concept of proof (and vice versa) and hence against the concept of "logic" that depends on this concept of proof. We know logical truths are true the same way we know proofs are valid proofs, by awareness of logical relations to terms other than these relations.

Thomism, 10-22-92

Maritain is unquestionably the best modern interpreter of Aquinas. Are his interpretations historically perfect? Not at all. But! (1) They are more correct than any other modern interpreter and, more importantly, (2) the kind of historical mistakes Maritain made do not affect the overall philosophical value of his Maritain's views, nor do they affect in the most important ways the consis-

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cy of his philosophical views with those of Aquinas.

9-21-92

Life and Abortion

Ethics, 10-12-92

You cannot reply to Hume's dictum that reason cannot dictate to passion in the abstract, nor do you need to. That is, you need to show specific knowledge that reason possesses and that unethical decisions conflict with. But once you have done that, you have done all you need to do. In other words, you show a decision to be immoral by showing that something reason knows to be true about values is not true. But having shown that, you have shown the decision to be defective as a human decision.

Likewise, you cannot reply to the positivist's attack on metaphysics by talking about self-evidently necessary principles in the abstract. You need to show how some the denial of some metaphysical conclusion would lead to the denial of something whose opposite was self-evidently necessary. But once you have done that, you have done all you need to reply to the positivist.

10-7-92

UPS

For the ordination speech: It is not the liturgy that gets in the way of pastoral

reform; it is our pastoral leader's belief that reform will come through the use of their powers. Rather than misuse sacramental powers, I have seen priests and lay people with healing gifts or musical ability overemphasize their powers to the detriment of pastoral reform. Still, the liturgy is particularly tempting.

10-6-92

#### Ethics and Abortion

Utilitarianism relies on at least one other principle, which, by hypothesis, is nonutilitarian. In fact, the reason why we think that the utilitarian principle obligates is that, when we know what the greater good for all consists in, if we choose a lesser good for the sake of satisfying our desires, we are putting our interests ahead of the interests of other human beings. So we think that a decision based on rational knowledge should value the interests of other human beings equally to our own, and the interests of multiple human beings more than our own. This principle of equal or greater interest is more fundamental than seek the greatest good of the greatest number. We think there is something wrong for a decision based on rational knowledge to put our interests ahead of those of another even if there is an equal amount of good involved, i.e., even if the total amount of good will be the same whether I get the advantage or whether she gets the advantage.

Contrary to Hume, rational knowledge can obligate us, because reason knows truths about values, desires, interests, ends, etc.

On the utilitarian principle, my value is the relation of my being to the good of the species, just as the value of a bee is its relation to the good of the hive. If the other principle utilitarianism needs is nonutilitarian, then the

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value of an individual is not utilitarian and not, therefore, just the relation of the individual to the good of the whole.

10-6-92

SSR

Why are these facts not better known through the media? Through a variety of historical accidents, those who oppose this point of view have managed to usurp the name "liberal" (meaning concerned with justice rather than order and viewing the state's role as the achievement of the common good, rather than merely the protection of individual wealth), they have managed to claim the name "liberal" for themselves, as if traditional liberals (whether economic or social), the admirers of men like Adlai Stevenson, Hubert Humphrey, and Walter Reuther, should not be concerned about our responsibilities to those least able to protect their own rights, our young -- as if their opponents were not concerned about justice for our young, and the state's responsibility to ensure that justice.

Unfortunately, my point of view is often associated, in the public mind, with those who appear to be against government, or to be more concerned that government ensure order than justice, or to value individual aggrandizement more than the common good. . . those who confuse a proactive government with socialism, who are more concerned with their freedom to pursue wealth than with freedom of thought and expression,

10-6-92



## Science

In quantum theory, according to Putnam, if you have a definite amount of energy, you don't have a definite number of particles, and vice versa. But zero is a definite number. So if you have zero particles, you have some energy, and vice versa. Maritain would say that anomalies like this are the inevitable result of the mixed character of mathematical physics. Mathematical abstraction differs from physical abstraction. When we apply the results of mathematical abstraction to the results of physical abstraction, there is not going to be a perfect fit. The theory we construct with the use of mathematics will have features it owes to the tool we use, mathematics, not to physical reality. The preceding statement does not use "tool" to refer to the whole theory; Maritain's view is not ordinary instrumentalism. But whether or not the theory is a tool, we use a tool, mathematics, to construct it. Just as a painting owes some of its properties, e.g., shapes and colors, to the subject being depicted and the artist's view of the subject, so it owes some of its properties, e.g., the graininess of the brush strokes, to the kind of tool the artist used, so physical theory owes some of its properties to the nature of mathematics, not to the nature of the reality being understood. Among the properties it owes to mathematics is zero being considered a definite number. Zero is not a number, a quantity; it is the absence of quantity. To represent zero as a number on a footing, as far as representation is concerned, with other numbers is to use a being of reason, which is perfectly valid in mathematics. The fact that it is not really a number like another numbers is shown by the necessity for a rule against multiplying by zero, while there is no rule against adding or subtracting by zero.

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## Truth and Reference

Jan. 21, 95

(Reference: what logical property must predicates have in order for us to know, before we can judge the truth or falsity of a proposition, that the proposition asserts something of an actual or possible extra-cogntional existent, rather than of a fictional or other cognition-dependent object? (What logical property must we be able to recognize predicates as having?) Once we name that property the only other one of any interest is the truth or falsity of the proposition. So what is left for "reference"? And maybe the property in question is not "logical," at least not in any narrow sense of that term, but semantical. That is, it is the meaning of the proposition that counts, ie., our knowledge of what the proposition is saying, is talking about.)

10-5-92

Putnam, in class, says that reference is more important than sense. The reason seemed to have been that between two theories, the same term will have different senses. But to judge truth, or judge between conflicting truth claims, you need to be able to pick out something that both claims are about. If the senses of terms differ, they don't allow you to pick out the thing you need to pick out. So you need to know reference more than sense.

I say: to judge any truth, a thing must be objectified in more than one way. So to judge between conflicting claims, something must be once objectified the same way in the two claims and once objectified positively in one claim and negatively, in the other claim, but positively and negatively relative to the same sense and, as a result of the same sense, positively and negatively relative to the same reference. If meaning changes so that we cannot objectify any reality the same way in the two theories, the theories cannot be in conflict.

How someone else is using a word, and hence what he is referring to by it, is an empirical matter. We may not have a "direct" way of expressing what he means in our language, but to the extent that we can construct a locution that expresses what he means in our language, there is a locution that means the same thing in two languages, and it is possible to judge whether the statement is true. And if it is not possible to judge whether it is true, the statement does not conflict with anything else we can express in our language.

Does someone believe that Tully is the murderer, if he does not know that Cicero is Tully? The only interesting way of putting this is: does she know that the sentence "Tully is the murderer" is true? Knowing the truth of that sentence requires knowing how "Tully" is used. But she can lack knowledge of how "Tully" is used, and as long as we know how it is used, we can say "She knows that Tully is the murderer," as long as "knowing that Tully is the murderer" is not used equivalently to "knowing the truth of the sentence 'Tully is the murderer.'" For we can use "She knows that Tully is the murderer" equivalently to "She knows the truth of the sentence 'The person sitting over there (or the person in the green shirt, or the person named 'Cicero,' etc.) is the murderer.'" But more, when we say "She knows that the person sitting over there is the murderer," we do not imply that she knows he is sitting over there. So we are not necessarily saying, "She knows the truth of the sentence, '...'" We are saying she knows a state of affairs objectified by that sentence; a dog can even know such a state of affairs ("Fido knows Tully is sad").

When we use sentences, we are objectifying states of affairs. The only time when quantifying in is even an issue is when the state of affairs we are objectifying is a person's knowledge of the truth of a particular sentence. (Again, this analysis shows that the assertive-redundancy theory of truth is incorrect.)

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9-10-92

## Life and Abortion

While a metaphysical analysis of the continuity of the human agent's existence is not necessary for recognizing that the infant has rights if the adult does, that analysis reinforces the rights of the infant. First, I will explain the sense in which the same agent continues to exist from the zygote stage to the adult; then, I will explain why we must affirm that continuity.

The zygote's causality initiates a series of changes. In any change there is something that remains the same, something that is the same because it was entity A before the change and is entity A after the change. That is what distinguishes change from creation ex nihilo. What is it that remains throughout the changes initiated by zygote? An agent oriented to the future production of human ends, whatever they maybe. The zygote and the adult are oriented to those ends by different sets of causal dispositions. But the nature of the acts by which human ends are achieved requires that they, and the proximate dispositions for them, result from a series of self-transformations caused by the agent oriented to them, beginning at the zygote stage. The zygote is disposed to cause changes resulting in mitosis; the adult is disposed to cause changes resulting in sensing, understanding, willing, etc. But the dispositions by which the agent at the zygote stage is oriented to the eventual causing of human achievements are dispositions to act on itself and modify itself. That is, a change undergone by one part of the causal system, for example, the motion of an organelle, causes a change in another part of the causal system, the dividing of a DNA molecule. By such acts, the agent both causes its own continued existence causes itself to have new

dispositions for future acts. By those future acts, the agent will continue a series of self-modifications through which it gives itself new dispositions for self-modifications until it causes itself to have the dispositions for those self-modifications by which human ends are achieved. In other words, the agent that existed at the time of the zygote makes itself into an adult.

Of course, the agent's actions, from the zygote stage on, depend on the cooperation of other causes, but that is true of any agent. Of a toddler, for example, it may be true to say that this child is capable of creating greater music than Bach. For it may be that what she now is makes her capable of developing the mature ability to produce great music. If so, the existence of that music will be an effect of what she now is, since the existence of her later abilities will be an effect of the abilities she now has. Like any agents, including adults, toddlers depend on external conditions and materials in order to act: atmospheric pressure, temperature, oxygen, food, and so on. But such external factors are conditions, not for the toddler's passive acquisition of mature abilities, but for her active development of them. We might also say, "Someday, she will have the capacity to produce greater music than Bach." But that would be true only if the abilities the child now has enable her to produce her later abilities to produce great music. And everything just said about the relation between the toddler and the mature musician is true of the relation between the zygote, the toddler, and the mature musician. Great musicians exist only because what exists at the zygote stage is an agent whose abilities enable it to produce the later ability to create great music by first producing the toddler's ability to learn music.

But why is it the same instance of an agent that becomes an adult after being a zygote, rather than there being a series of distinct agents? Notice first that to be any physical agent is to have a continuous, temporally extended, existence.

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Any causal orientation toward future acts, even acts in the "immediate" future, is an orientation whose existence is temporally extended (even a mature human orientation like the orientation toward making choices is an orientation toward future choices).<sup>1</sup> And agents typically act by themselves undergoing changes that have a temporally extended existence. The cause of your car's wheels turning is the drive shaft's turning. The cause of the drive shaft's turning is the motion of the pistons. The cause of a piston's motion is a change undergone by the fuel. Etc., etc. If causes acted instantaneously, there would be no time; there is time because the causes of change are other temporally extended changes. But whatever is true of other agents, the reason we can call a zygote an agent is that going on within the zygote are multiple temporally extended changes by which parts of the zygote cause changes in other parts. It is the existence of such temporally extended changes that make the zygote dispose the zygote to cause certain proximate effects and so orient the zygote to other eventual effects. Such changes are going on continuously and overlap one another. When one ends, another is still going on; while the latter is still going on, another begins. Therefore, there is no one moment at which the preceding temporally extended agent ends and the succeeding temporally extended agent begins. Even in one continuous change, we cannot select a point that is not preceded by some other point. So for every proximate effect by which we try to differentiate a subsequent agent from its predecessor, we can find an even earlier proximate effect that previously would have been considered part of predecessor.

At the end of the first mitosis, when two fully formed cells exist, does a different agent exist? We might describe that mitosis as the unitary cell that constitutes the zygote reproducing "itself" or reproducing its kind. But that cell does not reproduce itself or its kind in the same sense that an amoeba does.

In both cases, the result of the change is the existence of two cells that resemble a previously existing single cell and resemble it precisely in respect to the causal orientation to divide and produce other cells in the same way that the first did. The result of the change is also a continuation of what existed before in the sense that parts of each of the resulting cells previously were parts of the single cell. The single cell can, therefore, be said to be continuing itself, where "itself" is defined as a causal system existing within a membrane. For the mitosis is caused by parts of the single cell, the original causal system, acting on other parts.

But the result of an amoeba's reproduction is the existence of two distinct causal systems oriented to a distinct set of effects. In the zygote's mitosis, only parts of the original causal system are reproduced. The membrane that surrounds the initial cell (the initial causal system) does not divide; the result of the reproduction exists within the original cell's membrane. The DNA and other parts of the initial cell are reproduced, and in the process the original DNA molecules cease to exist. But the original agent does not cease to exist. Since the result of the change is two cells existing within the membrane that was previously the membrane of one cell, rather than saying the initial cell reproduced itself, it is more exact to say that that which was once one cell in one membrane became a thing with two cells in that membrane. That is, the same thing that was once a one-celled causal system in that membrane is now a two-celled causal system in that membrane; or the same causal system that was once a one-celled entity in one membrane is now a two-celled entity in that membrane. We cannot say there are distinct causal systems, as we must in the case of the amoeba. Instead of reproducing itself, the causal system that existed at the time of the zygote so acted as to cause itself to become, so acted as to make itself into, a causal system with two cells.

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The existence of the zygote's single cell has certainly ceased by the time its two succeeding cells exist. But since the existence of a physical agent is the temporally extended existence of a changing complex of parts so organized that their causal dispositions orient them, as a unit, toward certain future effects, the temporal extension of the agent that existed in the zygote has not ceased when the single cell no longer exists. And, of course, the same analysis applies to the agent existing as the result of all succeeding mitoses.

Each of the stages succeeding the zygote is causally oriented to the production of the same eventual achievements as the zygote. The two-celled causal system is, like the zygote, just a stage in an agent's development. And each subsequent stage in the process is a case of an existing agent so modifying itself that the same agent that once existed without the modification now exists with the modification. At the zygote stage, that agent does not possess the proximate disposition to cause mature human acts, but the zygote's proximate causal dispositions make it the first stage in the existence of a particular instance of human agency, which instance of human agency will, in the normal course of events, cause itself to acquire the proximate dispositions to mature human acts and, as a result, cause itself to perform those acts.

And there is more. It may seem pleonastic to describe a causal sequence by saying that every stage is oriented to the same eventual effect, since the causal relation of the parts of a series to an effect is what makes the series a causal sequence. But contrast the way in which the zygote and all the subsequent stages of development are related to the achievement of human ends to the way the loss of a nail is related to the loss of a kingdom in "For want of a nail . . . the kingdom was lost." The loss of a nail is the beginning of a sequence of steps leading to a particular end. But the connection between the nail and the end



result is accidental to the nail. Nothing in a nail's molecular structure, for example, relates it to the loss of a kingdom, as opposed to any other effect. The molecular structure of a zygote, on the contrary, specifically relates it to its ultimate effects, as well as to the intermediary stages. And the nature of what exists at each intermediary stage specifically relates it to its ultimate effects and the succeeding stages -- as well as to the preceding stages, since it is an effect of the preceding stages.

In the zygote, there is a causal system essentially, not accidentally, oriented to acts leading to the eventual production certain ultimate effects, effects such as acts of sensing, remembering, thinking, and deciding. The acts by which the zygote initiates the process leading to those effects include acts of some parts of the zygote on other parts. The proximate result of such acts is a modification of some of the matter that made up the zygote; that is, the stage immediately succeeding the zygote is a modification of something that was part of what existed at the earlier stage. And the proximate result to which the zygote's causal dispositions are oriented is the existence of a causal system to which the description just given equally applies. The agent is no longer a 1-celled entity. But it is something non-accidentally oriented to the eventual production of the same ultimate activities by acting on parts of itself to produce an proximate result that is a modification of some of that matter that made it up. Finally, the latter result is the existence of a causal system to which the descriptions just given equally apply, that is, an agent non-accidentally oriented to producing the ultimate effects by so acting on itself that the result is an agent of the same kind.

Consequently, there continues to exist at each stage a causal system essentially oriented to the future production of certain activities by so acting on parts of itself that those parts continue to be parts of a causal system essen-

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tially oriented to those ultimate activities. In other words, there is always a causal system essentially oriented to the eventual production of certain activities by so acting on parts of itself that the modification of its parts continue the existence of a causal system essentially oriented to those eventual activities. That description is true of the zygote and the adult. The act by which the zygote continues the existence of that causal orientation is mitosis. The acts by which an adult continues the existence of that causal orientation include breathing, digesting, and circulating blood, as well as sensing, reasoning, deciding, and so on. The adult has proximate dispositions for production of those modifications of its parts that constitute the acts through which human ends, whatever they maybe, are ultimately achieved, acts of sensing, understanding, etc. Through those proximate dispositions, the adult is, like the zygote and every other earlier stage, essentially oriented to the future production of those acts, even though, in the adult, the future may be the immediate future.

Making the description of what remains in existence general enough to cover such diverse causal configurations as the zygote and the adult does not make the unity between the zygote and the adult merely logical. The described unity is causal, not logical, and essential, not accidental. When the described sequence of changes occurs, there can be no reason to deny that it is the same agent that exists at each stage of the process. By being oriented to cause the continued existence of a particular causal orientation by modifying itself, that is, by acting on parts now making it up, the agent is oriented to cause the continued existence of "itself," where "itself" is defined, here, by the temporally extended existence of causal orientation of the kind described. Just as it is the same water that undergoes the change from liquid to solid state when it freezes, it is the same human agent that undergoes the changes from being 1-celled to 2-celled to

n-celled. It is the same instance of human agency that exists at each stage, since any instance of human agency is the existence of something temporally extended.<sup>2</sup>

The same proximate dispositions to activity do not remain in existence. But the adult's proximate dispositions for human acts are not only the effects of a past orientation to the production of those causal dispositions, an orientation that no longer exists. The continued existence of those proximate dispositions is the effect of a causal orientation that exists in the zygote and at every subsequent stage, the orientation to the eventual production of those ultimate acts by causing the continued the existence an agent oriented to the eventual production of those ultimate acts. Underlying, causally, the orientation to future acts that comes from the proximate dispositions for those acts is the orientation to cause the continued existence of an agent oriented to those future acts. The latter orientation, the orientation to cause the continued existence of the agent oriented to those future effects, does not require the existence of the proximate dispositions for those effects, since it exists from the zygote stage on. The proximate dispositions for the activities that keep the latter orientation in existence differ at each stage, but each of those stages is an effect of the same agent's causing itself to develop so that it can continue to be an agent oriented to causing, not only certain ultimate acts, but its own continued existence as an agent oriented to those ultimate acts.<sup>3 4 5</sup>

The alternative to admitting that it is the same agent that develops itself through this process would be to deny the existence of any agent that develops itself; for if there is any process that deserves to be described an agent's developing itself, the process initiated by the zygote is surely one. And if there can be no agent that develops itself, no agent has more than an instantaneous existence. Therefore, if the human adult is an agent that remains existence

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through time (even when it lacks the proximate dispositions for psychological acts, as in a coma), the human zygote is the same agent that will exist when the human adult exists.

Finally, if the above arguments were not sufficient to establish the perseverance of the same human agent, I could point to the implications of the fact that the process initiated by the zygote results in the continuous copying of the zygote's DNA code. Although, the proximate dispositions to activity differ at each stage, those proximate dispositions are steps in the working out of the same plan hard-coded by nature into each stage, a plan that exists first in the zygote. Notice, first, that the terms "code" and "instructions," in reference to DNA are anthropomorphic circumlocutions for the causal dispositions of a DNA molecule.

But what exists at stage is what it is because it is a step in the working out of a plan that, unlike the relation of the nail to the loss of the kingdom, is hard-coded by nature into each stage. What exists at each stage is describable as an agent with that essential causal orientation only because it is a modification of an agent describable as an agent with that same orientation. What exists at each stage is an agent containing a hard-coded plan that orients the agent to the eventual achievement of certain acts by so acting on itself that the result is an agent that has the same orientation because it contains the same hard-coded plan. By hypothesis, then, each stage fits into the plan differently; otherwise, they would not be distinct steps in the plan. The presence of the DNA code in the zygote and in the cells of the adult makes each of them a causal system essentially oriented to produce the same eventual activities by, among other things, acting on itself to produce to future existence an agent with the same essential causal orientation.

At the zygote stage and other earlier stages, the proximate dispositions for the adult's activities do not yet exist. But those dispositions are steps in the working out of the same plan for human achievements, a plan that exists first in the zygote.

The characteristic making that which remains throughout the process initiated by zygote the same thing is, at least, the characteristic of being an agent of the kind just described.

It is always a causal system essentially oriented to the production of certain ultimate activities, it is always a causal system essentially oriented to that production by so acting on parts of itself that the immediate result is a modification of its parts that continues existence of a causal system essentially oriented to those ultimate activities by acts that modify its parts.

It is always a causal system essentially oriented to the production of certain ultimate activities, it is always a causal system essentially oriented to that production by so acting on parts of itself that those parts continue to be parts to a causal system essentially oriented to those ultimate activities by acts that modify its parts.

It is always a causal system essentially oriented to the production of certain ultimate activities by so acting on parts of itself that the immediate result is a modification of its parts that continues the existence of a causal system essentially oriented to those ultimate activities by acts that modify its parts. In other words, it is always a causal system essentially oriented to the production of certain ultimate activities by so acting on parts of itself that the modifica-

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tion of its parts that is a causal system of the same kind.

Here:

it is always a causal system essentially oriented to the production of certain ultimate activities by so acting on parts of itself that those parts continue to be parts of a causal system essentially oriented to those ultimate activities by acts that modify its parts. In other words, it is always a causal system essentially oriented to the production of certain ultimate activities by so acting on parts of itself that the modification of its parts that is a causal system of the same kind. That description is true of the zygote and the adult. The act by which the zygote continues the existence of that causal orientation is mitosis. The acts by which an adult continues the existence of that causal orientation include breathing, digesting, circulating blood, and so on. In addition, the adult has proximate dispositions for production of those modifications of its parts that constitute the acts through which human ends, whatever they maybe, are ultimately achieved, acts of sensing, understanding, etc. Through those proximate dispositions, the adult is, like the zygote and every other earlier stage, essentially oriented to the future production of those acts, even though, in the adult, the future may be the immediate future.

Making the description is general enough to cover such diverse activities as those of the zygote and the adult does not debase the description, because the connection between the zygote's and all subsequent causal dispositions and the adult's causal dispositions is essential, not accidental. At the zygote stage and other earlier stages, the proximate dispositions for the adult's activities do not yet exist. But the adult's proximate dispositions for human acts are not only the

effects of a past orientation to the production of those causal dispositions, an orientation that no longer exists. The continued existence of those proximate dispositions is the effect of a present causal orientation that existed in the zygote and at every subsequent stage, the orientation to the eventual causing of those ultimate acts by causing the continued the existence an agent oriented to the eventual causing of those ultimate acts. The proximate dispositions to activity by which each stage continues the orientation so described differ at each stage. But what exists at stage is what it is because it is a step in the working out of a plan that, unlike the relation of the nail to the loss of the kingdom, is hard-coded by nature into each stage. What exists at each stage is describable as an agent with that essential causal orientation only because it is a modification of an agent describable as an agent with that same orientation. What exists at each stage is an agent containing a hard-coded plan that orients the agent to the eventual achievement of certain acts by so acting on itself that the result is an agent that has the same orientation because it contains the same hard-coded plan. By hypothesis, then, each stage fits into the plan differently; otherwise, they would not be distinct steps in the plan. The presence of the DNA code in the zygote and in the cells of the adult makes each of them a causal system essentially oriented to produce the same eventual activities by, among other things, acting on itself to produce to future existence an agent with the same essential causal orientation.

Stop

A zygote is an agent essentially, not accidentally, oriented to the eventual production certain ultimate activities. The acts by which the zygote initiates

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the process leading to those effects include acts of some parts of the zygote on other parts. The immediate result of such acts is a modification of some of the matter that made up the zygote. That is, the stage immediately succeeding the zygote is a modification of something that was part of what existed at the earlier stage; the immediate result belongs to something that existed as part of the earlier stage. Furthermore, the part that received the modification is not just something passive. It possesses properties before, during, and after the change that give it an active relation to the process leading to the ultimate effects. That is, their presence before, during, and after the change is part of the hard-coded plan that relates the zygote stage and each subsequent stage to the ultimate effects.

And the immediate result to which the zygote's causal dispositions are oriented is the existence of an agent to which the description just given equally applies. The agent is no longer a 1-celled entity. But it is something non-accidentally oriented to the eventual production of the same ultimate activities by acting on parts of itself to produce an immediate result belonging to something that was part of what made it up. The modified parts are not just passively related to the ultimate effects.

Finally, the immediate result, of which those parts are members, is the existence of an agent to which the descriptions just given equally applies, that is, an agent non-accidentally oriented to producing the ultimate effects by so acting on itself that the result is an agent of the same kind. At each stage there is an orientation to so modify the then existing agent that the agent is essentially oriented to the eventual production of certain ultimate activities that will be modifications of the then existing agent. Or, at each stage there is an orientation to so modify the then existing agent that the agent is essentially



oriented to causing the continued existence of such an orientation. Although these statements have a recursive structure, that is not meant to imply that they are definitions of anything. They are descriptions of a state of affairs that happens to occur when zygotes exist.

When this state of affairs holds, there can be no reason to deny that it is the same agent that exists at each stage of the process. The agent is oriented to causing the continued existence of such an orientation in itself, that is, in matter that now makes it up. In other words, the agent is oriented to cause the continued existence of "itself," where "itself" is defined by the temporally extended existence of causal orientation of the kind just described. The description is deliberately general enough to cover a zygote's causing DNA to divide and an adult's causing its muscles to contract. What prevents that degree of generality from slipping into the vacuous is the essential connection between the structure of the zygote and the coming into existence of muscles.

If there is any doubt that we should count the agent to be the same at each stage, the following consideration should remove it. Although the above descriptions are true of the process initiated by the zygote, they can be misleading in one respect. They can unintentionally give the impression that there are fixed points in the process where we can say "Here the point at which this change occurs; here is the point at which the immediate result of this change exists." In fact, there are multiple changes, caused by one part of the causal system in another part, continuously going on at all times. Even in one continuous change, we cannot select a point that is not preceded by some other point. So for every "immediate result" by which we try to draw a distinction between agents, since the first agent has changed, we can find an even earlier "immediate result," which previously would have been considered part of the first agent. At that rate, the zygote is never itself, after the first moment of its existence, since there are

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always changes going on within it. And if we can't solve the problems associated with the concept of "first moment of existence," the zygote is never itself.

In any change there is something that remains the same, something that is the same because it was an F before the change and is an F after the change. What characteristic makes that which remains throughout the change initiated by zygote the same thing? At least the characteristic of being an agent of the kind just described. Just as it is the same water that undergoes the change from liquid to solid state when it freezes, it is the same human agent that undergoes the changes from being 1-celled to 2-celled to n-celled. It is the same instance of human agency that exists at each stage, because to be an agent of that kind is to possess an orientation toward a temporally extended process. Even our mature orientation to making choices is an orientation toward future choices, no matter whether that future includes the "immediate" future.

Notice that in the first mitosis, the existing unitary cell does not really reproduce itself, because it includes a membrane that is not reproduced. Rather, that which, a thing which, is now one cell in one membrane becomes a thing with two cells in one membrane. The whole agent that existed at the time of the zygote does not reproduce itself.

What also saves the above from being vacuous, is that the effects to which the agent is essentially oriented is the continued existence of an effect of the same kind.

Nature is a set of causal dispositions, orientations, existing in a complex whole. A nature is a union of parts, a system of parts so united that, a union of parts whose structure gives the union a causal orientation or set of causal orientations to certain ultimate achievements to be reached by certain means, by actions of certain kinds. A nature is an organization of parts oriented to

certain ends.

9-25-92

## Science and Rity

The scientific realist believes we get closer and closer to the truth about what exists. Does Maritain permit this? Or is he saying we get closer and closer to achieving the epistemological type of the mixed, mathematical-physical science? Maybe both; within the framework of that epistemological type, we get closer and closer to reality.

Russell (according to Putnam) says the reason molecules are "fictions" is that when we analyse the hidden logical form of statements about molecules, the quantifiers will only range over immediately observable entities. That is not what Maritain means by the use of beings of reason in science. Maritain means we "quantify" over beings of reason. Yet, Maritain wants to say such statements are still "true." Notice that Gamow's imaginary number example shows that beings of reason can aid us to know reality. Why should this be? Because we are intellects in matter. Angels do not need to employ beings of reason to know reality better. At an even more fundamental level, we use concepts constructed with the use of the relation of negation to understand reality, but negation is a being of reason.

There are many degrees and manners of knowing "what things are." Some of those manners of knowing what things are use beings of reason, because human knowers need to use beings of reason to know what things are.

9-25-92

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Humanistic method

Possible title: Is Phenomenology the Only Alternative to Linguistic Analysis

De facto, the answer is yes, because Realists (Thomists) have failed to live up to their responsibility. That responsibility is to make the treasures of the Realist tradition accessible to our contemporaries, to so present those treasures that our contemporaries can appreciate their worth. To do that, we must present those treasures philosophically, not textually or historically. The reason we have not done that is that we have not trained our grad students to do that. We have not trained our grad students to do that, because we have trained them to do what we were trained to do.

First, why do we want an alternative to linguistic analysis? Because of certain values to which we are committed and which we do not feel are served by linguistic analysis.

9-17-92

Logic

Example of a logical truth: whatever is said of all is said of one; whatever is true of all is true of one.

Sure, the relations exemplified by the formulas of a formal system are not specifically cognitional, but they are applicable to cognitional relations, just as mathematical relations are applicable to physical quantities.

But how far and under what conditions and with what restrictions are they applicable?

The formulas of formal systems are designed to represent certain logical relations, to model certain logical relations, to signify certain logical relations or logical structures, i.e., sets of logical relations. But notice that my critique of the demonstration that anything follows from contradiction does not say that one could not have a formal system that had the law of disjunctive syllogism but did not have the law of contradiction. It would be interesting, even important, if a system that denied contradiction could not have disjunctive syllogism. But my criticism is different. Without knowing in advance what is or is not true of formal systems, I know that if contradictions are permitted, disjunctive syllogism cannot do the logical work it is supposed to do; I know that disjunctive syllogism presupposes noncontradiction in the sense that, if contradictions can be true, the law of disjunctive syllogism is not true.

Also, how did that system of strict implication that Prior refers to keep disjunctive syllogism out? By fiat? Or by deduction, e.g., from the denial of the law of noncontradiction?

Not laws of thought, laws of objects of thought. But the objects are physical realities. Yes, but laws pertaining to them in their role of being objects, laws of them in their value as being objects. Laws of relations pertaining to them in their role of being objects.

My explanation of logical relations, my description of logical relations, is meant to show why some truths are necessary and why we cannot not know some logical relations when we know truths about things, including showing that we do not and cannot need criteria for identifying singular instances of these relations to know logical truths.

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein asks a question about there being a 27-termed

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relation. Why would anyone, like Poinset, think relations can only be two termed? What unexpressed assumptions are behind these conflicting approaches to relations? Poinset would not countenance a 27-termed relation because the being of a relation is causally subordinate to the being of a thing in which it resides and which the relation, because the relation resides in it, links to some other thing. (But wouldn't Poinset say there could be one similarity relation to multiple things?) When we say "aRbcd," however, the relation, designated by R, has a different status in our objectifications (not necessarily in our affirmations about reality). In our objectifications, it is not causally subordinate to a, b, c, or d. It, the relation, is instead our theme; it is formal; it is specifying of our cognitional act. Logically, i.e., in our objectifications, what ontologically are not relations are objectified relationally. Values that do not have the ontological status of relations inhering in subjects in reality, are objectified by linking things, like a, b, c, and d, relationally. But in doing so, we do not objectify it as if it were causally subordinate to the subject in which it exists. That subordination is signified by explicit affirmations about the ontological status of relations; it is not signified by the logical way in which relations are objectified or in which nonrelations are objectified relationally. Rather than logically signifying them as subordinate, we make that which we objectify relationally a something to be discussed and analyzed in its own right; we make it the "subject"; we do not make it subordinate to some other subject.

Maybe some of the problems we consider problems "in" logic are really problems created by the limitation of a method used in doing logic, a problem with a tool, not with subject matter to which we apply a tool. For example, Russell's problems with sets may be of this kind.

9-17-92

Math

Yes a number is a property of a set, and a set is a cognition-constituted object. It is perfectly Thomistic to say that a number is a property of a set. The difference between the transcendental one and the one that is the principle of number is that the latter one is one of some kind of thing, one apple or one orange. That means that a number, for Aquinas, is a number of a kind of thing, two apples or two oranges. Whatever reality a number may have, to objectify number, we have to predicate a universal concept of things in its extension. So we objectify number as a property of the extension of a universal concept. And that extension is a set formed by viewing cognition-independent realities from the perspective of a universal concept.

But it does not and cannot follow that a number is a set of sets. Just look at the first set. What makes all these individuals members of that set? Not the fact that we use the same word for them. The question is, why are they members of the set for which we use the same word? Either because of causal relations between them or because of a perceived similarity between them (or both). A number is a respect in which different sets are similar, that is, a number is a characteristic possessed by more than one set. As such a number is a characteristic of a cognition-constituted relation, the relation of being in the extension of a universal concept, but a characteristic of that relation qua terminating in that which is not cognition-constituted.

9-12-99

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UPS

We have to have the correct pastoral vision, and we have to be practical about how that vision will be fulfilled. We have to know how to bring that vision about, givent the circumstances we have to deal with. For example, we have to know how much time we have to work with and how much time outside of sacramental celebration is necessary to bring it about.

9-11-92

Poinsot - AA

The Mary Baker Eddy Memorial Hospital - for Hypochondriacs

9-9-92

Ethics

Responsibilities to animals. In an important sense, reason knows that psychological states of animals exist "for the sake of" the animals. For these states exist as effects of the animal's causal dispositions, the animal's orientations to ends. The animals themselves produce these states as a result of their, the animal's orientations to achieve ends, so these states exist for the sake of the animal's achievement of its ends.

9-7-92



## Ethics

Keeping a promise has a certain value and can have greater or lesser importance depending on the value of the content of the promise. That is, it is good to keep a promise, all other things being equal. We do not have to justify keeping a promise, unless some other situation arises where there is a greater value. But the values are there to be compared; they are not just in the eye of the beholder. That is, what things are gives a rational appetite the end of keeping promises. But what things are can impose higher ends, ends where there is more at stake by the standard of what the natures of things orient them to and what is necessary to achieve that which the ends of things orient them to. For example, if keeping a promise to Joe will result in Joe's death, it is better not to keep the promise, because the ends Joe is oriented to cannot be achieved, if he is dead.

9-7-92

## Freedom

We do not have the kind of awareness of our true last end, God, that we have of a joke we are laughing at or a sex object that stimulates us. That is, we do not have the kind of awareness that necessitates a response of adherence on the part of the will the way we cannot not avoid enjoying the joke or being stimulated by the sex object. Therefore awareness that X is a necessary condition for achieving our last end does not necessitate the choice of X.

Aug. 21, 95

There is freedom only if (necessary condition) the will has an infinite object.  
Is there freedom if (sufficient condition) the will has an infinite object? Yes,

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if from having an infinite object, the power of non-acting necessarily follows.

And that is precisely what does follow from the infinite gap between our necessary infinite object and the finite objects we encounter. That is, what follows is the ability to nihilate, to non-act, toward any finite object. But does the ability to act, to not non-act, toward any finite object follow? Yes, because of the goodness in the object.

9-7-92

Poinsot - AA

Perhaps start section 3, the section after the criticism of "whatever is in the mind would just be another sign," this way: It is not enough to say that what is before the mind is not a sign but that for which a sign is used. That can be true, but we still have the issues of awareness of the connection between a sign and that for which the sign is used. Merely having what it is to be a cat before our mind does not associate this object with the word "cat." This is where "seeing-as," i.e., seeing signs as signs, comes in (and if that is not in section 3, these remarks apply to whatever section "seeing-as" is discussed in). And we don't have to answer all questions about seeing-as. All we have to do is see that Wittgenstein admits, at least implicitly, that in seeing a sign as a sign, you see the sign as related to its use in the same act, and, therefore, see the use in the same act, as that for which the sign is used. So he admit that you are aware of that for which a sign is used, which is Poinsot's point.

But maybe this issue is already discussed at the end of the seeing-as section.

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9-3-92

## Entailment and Logic

Title: An Empirical Discovery Concerning Entailment. I have discovered a case in which the truth of a premise or premises renders the truth of a conclusion necessary because of a relation or connection between the premises and the conclusion. It is no objection that I have not provided a criterion by which I can unfailingly determine whether this situation holds when confronted with other cases. The discovery of a case in which there is an exponent for which the pythagorean relation holds in this case, e.g,  $2^2 + 3^2 = 5^2$ , does not require me to know whether it ever holds for any other squares, much less for any other exponents.

Using rules of substitution may justify substituting  $p$  and  $\neg p$ , but doing so violates rules of "logic." I can eliminate the word "Logic" and other apparently implied knowledge claims (for example, the apparent claim that I have a definition of "logic"). Substituting  $p$  and  $\neg p$  violates a law of truth. It renders the substitution untrue, but it does more than that. It takes away my reason for believing the truth of the rules of inference I would need to draw other conclusions. The reason I believe I can use those rules of inference is that I believe the assertion that such and such a rule yields a valid conclusion is necessarily true, that is, I believe its opposite would be contradictory. And contradictions cannot be true.

As illustrated by what happens when I follow an apparently innocent rule of substitution here, formal methods are only a method for doing logic. They are the most powerful, useful, and extensible method yet found, but they are only a method. The reason they are a useful method is that we can perceive some sort of "connection," "correlation," "link," "similarity," "translation," etc. between the rules and premises of formal systems and the "laws of logic," whatever that might mean. I do not need to know what that means; nor do I need to be able to make more specific what "correlation," etc. mean here. For all I need to know is that some sort of link between the rules and something else (which I happen to call "laws of logic") is broken when I substitute contradiction. When I do that, something that was there all along is no longer there. I do not have to know completely what that something, a relation to X, is. Rather, I now have sufficient knowledge to motivate me to wonder further what that something is. But I am not guaranteed, nor need I be, of any success in finding out further what X and this relation to it are.

We must not confuse method with content, the content we are interested in when it comes to questions of truth and valid inference.

9-1-92

Life

Can we define what constitutes principal and instrumental causality in life? Yes. For example, certain effects in the development of living things are traceable to the causality of genes. The production of eyes is not accidental relative to what certain genes are as the loss of a kingdom is accidental to what a nail is in "For

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want of a nail . . . the kingdom was lost." To produce those effects, the zygote needs the cooperation of the environment, as all causes do, but the contributions of the environment are instrumental relative to the causality of the zygote, because you cannot trace the zygote-specific effects to the environment. What the zygote's causality contributes is precisely what it is about the effect that makes it specific to the zygote. Therefore that which those effects owe to the environment are instrumental relative to what it is about those effects that makes them specific to the zygote.

9-1-92

Causality - AA

The Tractatus says facts are not connected with one another. Hume says the same thing. But this is at most the lack of an epistemological connection, and tells us nothing whatsoever about what is true of facts as things. Need we believe that events are not causally connected? At most, the empiricist could argue that it is not reasonable, due to simplicity, to posit causal connections. But we posit that things have certain natures. Science posits that things have certain natures, as a result of which they obey universal laws. We do not just posit universal laws, but things of such a nature that they obey those laws.

And the example does not have to assume that no two bodies can be in the same place. It just has to assume that the bodies coming into contact have surfaces with certain physical properties, for example, a kind of strength in contrast to tensile strength.

Causal connections do not violate simplicity, because they add nothing to what the connected things are. They just express the fact that given what B is and A is, B cannot remain what it is.

Scientific and other empirical beliefs concern things as things, not as objects. Likewise, causal beliefs are beliefs about things as things, or at least they need not be beliefs of another kind than beliefs about things as things. Not only that but causal beliefs about things as things, when we have causal beliefs of that kind, need not violate simplicity by postulating additional entities that have no epistemological ground. For beliefs about causal connections are not beliefs about entities in addition to what things are.

4-17-88

Short Book

In bibliography: Gurvitch's article "On the Conceptual Consciousness"; the chapter on abstraction from Goldstein's Psychopathology and Human Nature; that woman's New Scholasticism article on universals in Aquinas.

4-17-88

Thomism and Short Book

The Scandal of Thomism. This could be the theme of an appendix in the short book.

M. E., at the 1988 ACPA, says the problems in ethics I am addressing are "not real problems". Perhaps they are not. But if not and if we know it, it is our moral

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obligation to try to explain to all those colleagues who think they are real precisely why they are not real. M. E.'s kind of thinking is why Thomism is in such bad shape.

4-17-88

Sexuality

"Social Relationships and Social Cognition in Nonhuman Primates", Science, Dec. 12, 1986, pp. 1361-66, by Dorothy Cheney et al.. They examine "the reproductive benefits of long-term social bonds," whether and how long-term social bonds contribute to reproductive success of the actor or its close relatives.

In man, the connection between the long-term bond between husband and wife and their offspring's chance of reproduction should be obvious. Human children are helpless at birth and unable to take proper care of themselves for years. They need the help of adults who are committed to them. In other words, human sexuality contributes to our reproductive success by supporting a long-term relationship between the parents. It supports this relationship in different though related ways. It provides an ongoing source of immediate reward for the sacrifices one makes in marriage. And it gets the marriage started by fostering an emotional relationship which will not last as long as the marriage but which is extremely helpful for the beginning to be the beginning a relation that will outlast the emotion. Also, it provides memories to help sustain the relation.

Human sexuality was selected because it performed these functions. For otherwise,



it would not have fostered the reproductive success of the members of the species.

042488

Short Book

A way of expressing thing-object identity: Identity between what has been objectified as existing in certain ways and what exists.

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042488

PCG and Sex

We are taught not to expect any more of ourselves than to be controlled by our sexual desires, to have them be the organizing factor in our lives, to have them be in charge of our lives; not to expect any more of ourselves than to submit our lives to the service of our sexual desires.

That is the kind of self-image we have developed -- and that shows what an effect on our lives our self-image has.

042488

UPS

We have the power to free homosexuals and others from their bondage; if we are not succeeding in doing this, it is because we do not have enough faith.

042488

Sex, Society, and Rights

The PAQ criticism. State early: The literature, the discussion, of free expression has not adequately considered society's need for the family to function well nor the effect of pornography on the family.

State early: Democracy must recognize the parents' right to bring up their children. Therefore, a democracy has no choice but to try to make the family work. Because a society must also fulfill its obligation to provide children with loving environments.

The real issue is how much love we think our children deserve, how much risk we have the right to take that many children will not get that love. Do they only deserve the kind of love we can offer by setting up a cabinet office of children's affairs?

042688

#### Ethics Epilogue

Which is the solution to is-ought, that ethics is practical or that the will is a rational appetite? What a dilemma for the Thomist, both doctrines are Thomistic doctrines, but Aquinas never linked either doctrine to the is-ought problem. So Thomists are forced to do something unnatural, think for themselves.

Contrary to Grisez and Finnis, it is the nature of the will as a rational appetite that both responds to the is-ought problem and shows that speculative knowledge has ethical implications even though ethics is practical knowledge.

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042688

Speculative-practical

No matter how subtle the distinction between these two kinds of knowledge and how difficult it is to accurately articulate their difference, there must be a distinction to be drawn. Mathematics is a perfect example of knowledge speculative in type. Therefore the distinction is clear in some cases even if obscure in others.

042788

Short Book

Title of Epilogue: Profundity and Precision or Profundity and Rigor, as opposed to the title of the Preface: Profundity and Clarity. Sadly rigor and precision in philosophy do not coincide with clarity, due to the paragenetic nature of philosophical concepts. (not typed on date of entry).

11-20-90

Article on Simon's discussion of truth in Metaphysics of Knowledge.

Simon's discussion of truth in Metaphysics of Knowledge is untypical of him. It does not have the clarity we expect from him, and it proceeds from a lofty metaphysical perspective instead of directly from experience. Still, this is the

only discussion of the thing object problem outside of Maritain (and Ivo Thomas) so I intend to explain what Simon is doing there.

He begins by explaining logical truth by means of ontological truth. But the notion of ontological truth itself derives from logical truth, so this method of proceeding is not helpful from a pedagogical standpoint. We can express the important conclusions he comes to without relying on this roundabout procedure. First, he wants to show that the synthesis, the composition and division, involved in the judgment of truth is not just a synthesis of ideas, it is a composition or division of thought with reality. A proposition is not just a matter of compounding ideas. Adding the concept "rational" to "animal" we get the more complex concept "rational animal" not the proposition "Some animal is rational." A proposition is a synthesis of ideas that enables us to compose or divide between thought (the proposition) and reality by judging the truth or falsity of the proposition (enunciation, in Simon's terms). An enunciation does not just compose and divide ideas; it composes and divides relative to things, i.e., thing S is thing P, or S is P in reality. You judge the conformity between thought and reality by judging that a thing is such and such, i.e., by assenting to a proposition that expresses that a thing is such and such. So paradoxically, just by knowing the S is P, you know that the thought that S is P conforms to reality.

"S is P" does not affirm a relation of thought to reality; it affirms a relation of S to P. But in assenting to the relation between S and P affirmed by "S is P", we are assenting to "S is P". And in assenting to "S is P", we are knowing the conformity of thought to reality.

Second, he wants to conclude that knowledge of the truth of an enunciation, and therefore, of the "conformity" (what are his terms for this?) of thought and reality, requires reflection of the knower on himself.

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11-20-90

Maybe an article entitled "How to Reconstruct Thomism." The article would be principally on the distinction between thing and object. Maybe this would get more attention than just an article on Maritain, which could be ignored by all the Torontonians and others. The article would immediately explain why Thomism should henceforth be called Realism; the fact that this might include more than Aquinas is beside the point, given all the conflicting interpretations of Aquinas. The article would end by saying that no more articles of this type should be written. It could even admit that the reason for writing it this way was just to get attention. Also, it would include that point that the question of whether the starting point is or is not subjective is tangential to solving the problems. The first problem is what is truth. That turns out to be the very problem vexing others today. Maritain takes it for granted that we know the possible methods of verification open to us, experience, reduction to the self-evident, or some combination of them. Why does he not go further into them that he did, say, in Reflexions? Because, for example, to go further into why the principle of causality is reducible to the self-evident is to discuss things as things, change and its conditions, not things as objects; it is to do ontology not epistemology.

## Intellect versus sense

4-19-91

What does having a concept of a rose add to sensory awareness of a rose? Universality, yes, so that reasoning about a rose is possible. But also the object of concept is objectified as what some possible being is, as what it is for something to be a rose. Because a relation to possible existence is thus logically included in what we conceptually objectify, we can apply ontological causal truths to that object. So it is not just that the form of correct reasoning is potentially satisfied by this concept, since it is universal, but the conditions for reasoning on the part of the matter are satisfied, i.e., that object can be a topic for causal reasoning.

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Thing object (Maritain)

4-19-91

When I learn truths about a thing, for example, that it exists, that it is red, etc., new things become true of it, statements are now true of it that were not true before. For example, the statement "The thing is known by me" is now true. Before it was just true that it exists; now it is also true that it is known. The first is a truth about it as a thing; the second is a truth about it as an object of knowledge. And other statements become true of it as an object of knowledge because we first know truths about it as a thing. These other truths are different from the truths known about it as a thing, and they often predicate of the known thing properties attributable to it as a result of its being known that differ from the properties it is known to possess as a thing. But they can't alter that which is known about it as a thing. The contrary characteristics cannot enter into that which is known about it as a thing.

The above is a way to introduce the thing/object distinction. I could have started from another point. To distinguish the sciences, we cannot refer solely to what is true of things as things. There would be infinite sciences. In addition to what is, by the hypothesis that we possess scientific knowledge, known about things as things, there must be truths about things as objects of knowledge not entirely identical with what is true about them as things.



T/O and Self-evidence

4-19-91

In a handwritten note, I give some apparently self-evident denials based on thing/object identity, e.g., that universal concepts can't inform us of individual realities, that abstract concepts can't inform us of concrete realities. There are also apparently self-evident affirmations corresponding to these, e.g., that whatever informs us of reality must be individual, since realities are individual. Also, statements informing us about sensible reality must be contingent since the existence of sensible things is contingent.

And the idealist's formula, to be is to be known, can be traced to thing/object identity as well as to paragenetic abstraction (as I do in Causal Realism).

The only question left is what genuinely self-evident, or at least necessary, truths might be denied because of thing/object identity.

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Simon on Analogy

4-19-91

Simon gives us a radically different interpretation of what it means that being is not a genus.

Simon puts the focus on the meaning of imperfect abstraction, on what it means for a concept to be imperfectly abstracted.

Also, he may be the first to point out that metaphor is not an independent kind of logical unity of meaning.

Card of the Card-Carrying Intellectuals of the World

4-19-91

First page:

Card-Carrying Intellectuals of the World

Legal name, nom d'plume, IQ, percentile, # of lines in my Who's Who entry, dissertation director, latest accomplishment, # of times mentioned in the New York Review of Books, Amount contributed to PBS, # of NEH grants, Fulbright year, Next sabbatical, # of years since attending church, synagogue, or mosque,

Second page

This card is proof of the bearer's unawareness that intellectuals have chronically:

- o Attacked unfashionable forms of religious bigotry while promoting others.
- o Been tossed to and fro by every wind of doctrine (Marxism, Freudianism, social Darwinism, Malthusianism, trial marriages. I.e., that outside of the hard sciences where disputes can be settled by intersubjectively available data, we have promoted appealing intellectual fads as if they were undeniably true.
- o Defended the rights of intellectuals and artists under dictatorships while ignoring the daily abuse of the rights of the vast majority.

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- o Conformed to the latest intellectually popular theory while criticizing others for mindless conformity.
  
- o Taught both that there are no objective values and that their values are superior to those of other eras, groups, and cultures.

CCIW's Mottos:

Oops!

Well, back to the old drawing board.

Although a theory is held by most intellectuals at a given time, it still might be true.

SSR - AA

6-14-91

Penelope Leach in the Boston Globe, 6-5-91, p.72: "Babies need a one-on-one relationship and unconditional love, which is the root base of their self-esteem." Note that the love they need is unconditional, babies can't do anything to earn it. Babies are supposed to learn that persons deserve love just because they are persons. "Employers . . . have an obligation to help rear the next generation." In fact, we all have that obligation, and it obliges us to more than financial support (which she was talking about in the context of employers).

Leach's books: Your Baby & Child: From Birth to Age Five, Your Growing Child: From Babyhood through Adolescence, The First Six Months: Getting together with Your Baby. Now writing What about the Children?, a big book about children and society.

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Women's Lib

6-14-91

Penelope Leach in the Boston Globe, 6-5-91, p.72: "Women are expected to do everything. They are expected to have careers and a satisfying family life, too. After giving birth to a child, they are told to get right back out there and get on with their careers, bring home the money. This suggests to them that it's not important for them to stay at home with the infant." Globe reporter: "Leach thinks a shift in attitude will come when industry and government give fundamental rights to babies, not parents. Babies are a minority and should have their needs met." Almost. Families, not just parents and children, have rights. The reason is that our obligation to civil law derives from the fact that civil law serves a common good, and a common good takes moral precedence over any corresponding individual goods. But the family has a common good of its own, and so civil law must respect the family as the locus of its own moral precedence over corresponding individual goods.

HU, immanent action, causality, substance causing accidents, Feb. 4, 95

A substance's causing of its necessary accidents can be compared to immanent action emerging from a faculty. But a faculty that was not always causing an immanent action needs to receive an actuation from an external agent in order to go from potentially causing the immanent action to actually causing it. Likewise, a substance may require a further actuation to enable it to cause its necessary accidents. By removing that actuation and causing those necessary accidents directly, God subsumes the substance as His own nature, the nature through which He acts personally.

Not also that all physical causality requires an actuation over and above physical agents being what they are. It also requires physical agents to be in motion. When moving ball A hits stationary ball B, ball B acts on ball A. But ball B is able to act on ball A only because ball A is in motion.

In order to be an agent, a substance must first produce its own properties. For it to produce its own properties, there must be a solution to the dilemma that it would be the agent and patient in the same respect at the same time. The solution must be that, just as it causes an effect through a faculty, it causes the faculty through something non-identical with itself or with the faculty. That is what I call subsistence. If there still seems to be a paradox with respect to the whole substance being the material cause of the production the substance performs through its subsistence, we can solve the problem by comparing the production of the faculty to an immanent action. In an immanent action, the effect resides within the faculty. The effect is an act, not relative to a passive potency but to an active potency. The effect completes and actuates the potency as a result of the potency itself producing that effect. We can say that the relation between potency and act here is virtually that of a passive potency to its act. For the relation does all that the actuation of a passive potency does, it has all that the actuation of a passive potency has, but it has more than that. Likewise, with the production of necessary accidents.

Trinity and HU - AA

6-14-91

We can share in the Trinity! Subsistence is a participation in the Trinity's property of being diffusive of itself. I.e., "The good is diffusive of itself" is not a property of all being, or at least not self-evidently so, or it is a property of all being only because of a value distinct from essence and existence. All beings must have this element, but one being, Jesus, has it because He shares God's subsistence. To share His subsistence = to share, to participate in, to have, a relation to a term, a specific relation to a specific term, the Father. That relation, identical with the divine essence, is true of Jesus, is shared, possessed, exercised by, Jesus. Jesus's humanity has the same relation to the Father that the Son has. The other divine relations are not true of Jesus. What terminates the relations of emanation from the agent Jesus is the same thing that terminates the Father's relation of generating the Son.

The good is diffusive of itself because of a property distinct from essence or existence in us (not so distinct in God). Reason reveals that there are two elements distinct in us, essence and existence, that are not distinct in God. Revelation reveals that there is a third element distinct in us, subsistence, which corresponds to something also in God and not distinct from His essence, the

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divine relations.

By depriving Jesus of that property and causing his necessary accidents directly, God has to associate Jesus with one of the distinct subsistences in Him, because it is necessary that Jesus, as for any being, be associated with some subsistence. As a result, Jesus relates to the Father exactly as the second person does, where "exactly" does not refer to specific or generic identity, but Jesus's relation to the Father is the Son's relation to the Father. Jesus's created existence and essence do not relate to the Father as the Son does. But this PERSON, this source of activity, this originator of diffusion of being, has the same relation to the Father as the Son, i.e., as that diffuser of being that is the Son. The relation of this diffuser of being to the Father is the relation that constitutes the Son, that is the Son.

Feb. 14, 95

It is false that the Father and Son are not the same, if "the same" means the same entity or individual nature. It is true that they are not the same, if "the same" means the same way that individual nature relates to Itself. It can relate to Itself, by a formal relation, if and only if it also relates to Itself by the opposite formal relation; otherwise there would be nothing to terminate the first formal relation and, by terminating it, make it a genuine formal relation as opposed to a material relation.

How can they be the same, if they are different? The essence of God is identical with a relatedness (F) to different relatedness (S), which other relatedness is also identical with the essence of God. These relatedness are nothing more than ways one and the same essence faces itself, relates to Itself. They are only ways for one and the same essence to face Itself, to stand face-to-face with Itself. They are only faces the essence shows to Itself. Because by F relating to S, F is relating to Itself, since S is identical with the same essence that F is identical with. The only thing that differentiates F and S is that which is necessary for F and S to provide the essence with a way of relating, not to something distinct from itself, but to itself. And that (whatever it is that is necessary for the essence to relate to itself, can only be a mode or relatedness, a mode of terminating opposition. To be a mode of terminating opposition is to be merely a term of a relation of opposition, but to be such a term is to be a relation, since Poincaré shows that to be a term is to be relative.

All that is possible, because relations do not require subjects to be genuine forms of relatedness, hence an all-perfect being can be identical with a relation. And because, if there is a being that is identical with a mode or relatedness, that being can only be an infinitely perfect being.



Logic - BIG

6-14-91

Knowing the laws of logic does not consist of knowing that a step in a formal system satisfies the rules or is valid in the system any more than knowing the laws of logic consists of knowing the laws of math or sciences, or that a particular individual satisfies those laws. In math, science, as well as formal systems, we USE logic to make valid derivations. That does not make knowledge of math or science or formal systems knowledge of logic. Machines can make substitutions in formal systems, but that is not the same as AWARENESS that the substitution is an instance of the rule covering substitutions. That awareness is grasping an individual as an instance of a universal. Can that grasp be explained extensionally. The extensionalist starts with a predicate, a mark, and a number of individuals. He says that the meaning of the predicate consists of its extensional mapping to all of the individuals. Now we move back from the domain of the individuals to the domain of the predicates, i.e., language. At that level we say that understanding the logical relations embedded in language consists of recognizing individual cases as satisfying rules. But is the meaning of the rules the extensional mapping of the rules to the individual cases? Then we are explaining the meaning of the rules by the individual instances and our awareness of the meaning of the rules by our awareness of the individual instances, rather than explaining our understanding of the instance by the fact that we grasp it as an instance of a rule.

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Ethics - AA

6-14-91

The injustice in an act of the will can derive from an injustice in an exterior act. We can inadvertantly award someone else a musical prize that Horowitz, say, earned. An injustice has been done, though not a moral one. But a similar physical injustice could occur in awarding a prize to the wrong dog, let us say. The second injustice need not become moral when it is done consciously. But the injustice to Horowitz must become moral when done consciously. For in addition to his playing, which deserves a certain reward, there is the fact that the playing belongs to him and that he, unlike a dog, deserves a certain evaluation by the rational appetite if the rational appetite is to treat things according to what they are.

P&CG

6-14-91

Conservative and Liberal - both want freedom for the individual, not the person. And both are naive about evil, e.g., the unseen hand. And both want big government.

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Cause - AA

6-14-91

Don't have to assume "No two bodies can be in the same place at the same time" as a necessary truth. Only have to know that two bodies, A and B, are not now able to occupy the same place as a result of coming into contact at a certain speed.

Opponent: what good does this new concept of cause, new analysis of the concept of cause, do us, contra Hume, if we can't apply it to experience, which is really what Hume was saying, i.e., that the concept of cause does not come from experience. Answer: We can know that every event must have a cause.

Math

6-14-91

Is quantity an accident? When nature produces my right leg and my left leg, etc. does it also produce an additional reality called the "number" of my legs; does it also produce "twoness"?

Could it be that extension is not an accident but having "so much" extension is? No, having so much extension is accidental in the sense of contingent, but not in the sense of existing in another, if extension itself does not exist in another. For there is only a logical distinction between my having extension and my having so much extension. Granted, two-inchedness cannot exist in itself, is this extension or a measure of my extension, ie., of me? 2 inches cannot exist in itself, but 2 inches of something can.

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Sensation

6-14-91

We don't first ask "Is this a genuine sensation or not?"; we ask "Does X really exist or not?" "Is this object of awareness a real existent or not?" Later, we ask "Was I really seeing it or just imagining it?" I.e., was I performing the cognitive function that takes place through my eyes or not?" For we are later aware that the function performed by means of the eyes is also performed by means of the action of the environment on my eyes.

Or we ask "Does the object really exist?" and if the answer is no, then we conclude we were not really seeing it. At some point, we become aware that some faculties have objects that really exist. So we must start with awareness of the real existence of some objects and then become aware that the acts of knowing them, and the faculties of those acts, are acts and faculties bearing on real existence.

Contra Simon - BIG

Even the intentional action of the object on the sense would not be enough to make sensation intuitive. Even the intellect receives forms intentionally by the action of the agent intellect. But the forms received from the agent intellect do not objectify the agent of the form, but something else. The senses are intuitive because the form received objectifies the agent of the form. And that is because the form by which the senses know, the form they receive, is the action received from the object.

Brotherhood talk

6-15-91

We have to be very discerning about the decision to have optional liturgies. Because they have the strong tendency to become the focus, we should only have them when we are sure they will not interfere with our main pastoral objectives, which are not to get people to more liturgies, but to do what is necessary to improve the quality of our Sunday liturgies.

For example, if we had decided to have the liturgy on Monday, we would not have the problem of it interfering with building a Christian environment.

It's simple, the question we should all be asking is "What can we do outside the Sunday liturgy to make the Sunday liturgy effective, to allow it to bear fruit in our lives, to allow us to experience the effects it is intended to have." Once we have answered that question, our responsibility is to focus on that answer, what we are supposed to do outside the Sunday liturgy, and avoid anything that distracts us from focussing on that.

The liturgy is not the real problem. If we didn't have the liturgy, it would be something else. We add things to God's agenda; we listen to our spirit rather than to the Lord's. "Gee, wouldn't this be a beautiful thing to do? Wouldn't that be a wonderful thing to do?" And these "things" are good and beautiful. That's the problem. If they weren't good and beautiful, they couldn't tempt us to take the focus off God's plan. (Think of the ballet and the penitential service.) We don't focus just on doing God's will and letting Him be boss. We don't make that a priority sufficiently to prevent anything else from interfering with that priority no matter how good it may be in itself.

We have agendas concerning what problems need addressing first. For example, on all of our agendas is the problem of bringing liturgies to life. And we use the tools God provides to solve other problems to solve the problems we think need solving first.

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UPS Course

6-15-91

How get Christian environments? Bring individuals to an awareness of the indwelling of God within their souls. For our awareness of our personal union with God is the basis for our awareness of the union of the other person with God. And our awareness of the union of the other person with God is the basis for our love for them as Christian brothers and sisters, as fellow members of God's family.

So the middle term between the goal of Christian environments and the means of preaching the gospel is the need for Christian brotherhood to be based on personal awareness of God's dwelling in me.



## Sensation

6-27-91

Contrast imagining and sensing. When imagining, we are aware of being active in a way in which we are not aware of being active when sensing. What is that way of being active we are aware of in one case and not the other? Both are immanent acts, so it is unlikely that what we are aware of is a mode of immanence. This is confirmed by the fact that what we are made aware of by reflection is immanent activity, awareness. So our reflective awareness of imagining and sensing has in common that it is awareness of immanent activity. What is left is transitive activity. So what is transitive about imagining? The production of the image, the specifier, the means of cognition. So in sensing, we are not aware of producing the specifier. We are aware of receiving the specifier passively. In imagining, we are aware of making the object present to consciousness, because we are aware of producing or actualizing the specifier by which the object is made present to consciousness.

Another causal term describing the difference between sensing and imagining: sensations are said to be "stronger" than acts of imagination.

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#### Humanistic Method

5-5-92

Why do humanistic philosophers not gain more converts from the empiricists? Because they do not have intersubjective means of verifying their assertions and settling their disputes, because they lack a method that the empiricists find convincing, that meets the empiricist's standards for epistemological rigor.

To meet those standards, one must justify humanistic conclusions by a nonhumanistic method. But humanists balk at this. Why?

For a very ancient reason, the same reason that makes nominalism so popular. The conditions that attach to the values humanists cherish in themselves, conditions which are in fact among those values, are contrary to the conditions that must attach to those values in order for them to be the objects of the kind of knowledge that can verify assertions about them rigorously. For example, humanists cherish the concreteness of human existence as opposed to the abstraction of conceptual analysis. But to make assertions about the concreteness of human existence, humanists must use abstract concepts such as concreteness and existence.

6-18-92

Intellectuals:

Intellectuals live in dream worlds of their own creation. The rest of us live in dream worlds of their creation. And intellectuals worship and rely on God's of their own making (in their own image?), just as ancient idol makers did.

The intellectual's pledge: I admit that my basic assumptions are religious.

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6-18-92

Infanticide/Ethics/SSR

Can we turn the passing on of human life into a technology, i.e., a process of making as opposed to doing (art versus prudence). Can you turn creating human life into a process of manipulating things?

1. Notice that in the first mitosis, the existing unitary cell does not really reproduce itself, because it includes a membrane that is not reproduced. Rather, that which, a thing which, is now one cell in one membrane becomes a thing with two cells in one membrane. The whole agent that existed at the time of the zygote does not reproduce itself.

2. Notice that in the first mitosis, the existing unitary cell does not really reproduce itself, because it includes a membrane that is not reproduced. Rather, that which, a thing which, is now one cell in one membrane becomes a thing with two cells in one membrane. The whole agent that existed at the time of the zygote does not reproduce itself.

3. Individual ultimate ends. Reproduction of another member of the species causes the existence, in some of the matter that belonged to the agent, of an orientation to specifically similar ultimate effects, but not the same individual effects, e.g., eyes and blue eyes but not the same blue eyes that exist in the parent.

4. As I noted above, one point at which we might be tempted to say that an individually distinct human agent has replaced the original agent is that point at which there is no matter remaining from the original agent, in adults, approximately every seven years. But the consider points A and B, eight years apart in the life of an adult. The agent existing immediately after B is made of some of the same matter that existed immediately before B, and each of these agents is oriented to producing future decisions based on rational knowledge, as well to causing the future existence of whatever features give the adult the ability to produce decisions. But the same description applies to any point selected between A and B. The agent existing immediately before any such point shares these characteristics with the agent existing immediately after it. Therefore, if transitivity of identity applies to the agent existing before and after B, the fact that, by the time of B, all of A's matter has been replaced cannot imply that transitivity of identity does not apply to the agent existing at A and at B. If the same individual agent exists before and after B, it exists at A and B. And a fortiori, if a total replacement of matter does not imply an individually distinct agent, lesser changes cannot imply it.

5. And if we can't solve the problems associated with the concept of "first moment of existence," the zygote is never itself.