

Thing/object, formal and material objects, 3-17-95

How get to formal and material objects from the strict definition of "object":

The mind has objects. Idealism is not skepticism; so the object is a potential thing, a potential real existent. But a thing, even a potential thing, is never objectified by the whole of itself, and so it is objectified by means of features which constitute formal objects through which a material object is made known.

Math, Science and Rity, 3-17-95

In many contexts and for many valid purposes, it is proper to define zero as a number. But if zero is a number absolutely speaking, what would the absence of number be?

SB, First Chapter, 3-17-95

Start the chapter with a demonstration that a change is caused. Then, talk about "known by the meanings the terms," empiricism, rationalism, and Kantianism, relative to that demonstration.

We will proceed from here to analyze the causing of change further. Focusing on change in this way is in one sense a return to the Greek starting point of philosophy. Modern philosophy has not emphasized change. But this will not be retrogression. We can know recapitulate the effort of the Greeks in the light of what has gone on since. And so we can reconstruct philosophy from the same starting point, but do so in a way that avoids the pitfalls that have occurred in the actual course of philosophical history. In particular, we can reconstruct that history in the light of the linguistic turn, or in the light of the disputes of 20th-century philosophy, with its effort to bring the clarity of formal methods to philosophy.

Logic, PNC, Formal Systems, 3-17-95

The PNC looks like just another logical truth to the propositional calculus. But that just *demonstrates* one of the limitations of formal methods, as