

XxxDecember 7, 2011

"Per se valuable" is not to be confused with "bonum honestum". The latter is a good for persons; it has its goodness as part of the fulfillment of persons, as one kind of part of the fulfillment of persons; it has its goodness as one of the ends of a persons nature.

xxx3-5-01

The list of my articles that would not appear in "a reintroduction to philosophy" includes: Maritain's philosophy of nature, abortion, metaphysics and immateriality, on the training of Thomists.

xxxLanguage of thought, Haldane, formal signs, Poincaré and Wittgenstein, 3-5-01

the quo is not a language. What is specific to language is that we must be aware of the signs to be made aware of the signified. The opposite is true of thought. We become aware of the quo by positing an explanatory factor to account for our awareness of the object. So the explanatory factor we posit does not itself function as an object when it makes us aware of the signified. And the question of the relation of the object we are aware of to what things are is a different question: it is the question whether our awareness of those objects can lead us to true judgments about what things are. So Haldane is wrong to look for a solution to the problem of realism in the idea that we acquire the "forms" of what things are.

Likewise this identity theory of truth is very different from Frege's identity theory of truth.

Skepticism presupposes a standard of truth drawn from experience. If not, it would not have anything to be skeptical about. To be skeptical about whether something is true, I must have some understanding of what truth is. And since truth is a goal, my understanding of truth involves understanding of some sort of standard. Maritain goes beyond this argument and deeper. He starts epistemology with the question what is this truth, this standard, that a skeptic takes for granted.

xxxInclusive language in the pope's documents, 3 -- 5 -- 0 1

See the Gospel of Life number 8 7, quoting John 2: 1 4 -- 1 7.

xxxIncarnation, Inc, HU, Hypostatic Union, Properties, subsistence, April 25, 2000

The following remarks concern material in two sets of files, the files entitled "Inc" and those entitled "Properties". These deal with the topics of the incarnation and hypostatic union, on one hand, and the question of how a substance causes its properties, on the other hand. The idea is that the concept of exercising existence as opposed to receiving existence can help us solve both problems. A substance's causing of its properties is virtual efficient causality. But wherever there is something that is only virtual, there must be something corresponding that exists in a formal sense. My argument is that the best way to understand virtual efficient causality is to identify it with the exercise of existence, the exercise of existence is what virtual efficient causality is formally.

But there are two questions. In the case of the incarnation, I propose the hypothesis that any created substance needs a distinct factor called the exercise of existence in order to be an efficient cause. The problem is why aren't existence and essence together enough for a created substance to be a cause. The first part of the answer is that in order to be an efficient cause the substance must first cause its own necessary accidents, its properties. But this leads to the second problem.

Why cannot the formal factor that we identified with the virtual efficient causality be the existence itself of the substance.? We can say first that in the case of formal efficient causality the existence of the cause is not considered to be the cause. But the thing that exists is considered to be the cause, and should be considered to be the cause. So in looking for virtual efficient causality, we are looking for something that is analogous to things rather than the existence of things. (Note that here the word analogous is taken in

the ordinary sense rather than in the paragenic sense.) We might even say that we are looking for something analogous to a substance's properties, rather than its existence. For it is through its properties that a substance exercises formal efficient causality.

I call the exercise of existence "subsistence". Perhaps we should say that subsistence is a property or a modification of the existence rather than of the essence. That would ensure that subsistence is on the side of substance rather than on the side of accidents. It would also give a little bit more specificity to calling subsistence a mode. Introducing the word mode can appear to be an ad hoc device that does not really fit into the list of realities and possible principles of realities that is justified by other legitimate metaphysical considerations. And in a sense it is such a device. But by calling it a modification of existence we are at least giving it a new place on our list, rather than putting it in a place that already seems to be filled up.

But existence is not potential in respect to anything. So subsistence is not a mode of existence in this sense of something that resides in existence by fulfilling a potency of existence. Or maybe we can just say that subsistence is a relation of the substance to its existence, or I should say is analogous to a relation of the substance to its existence. This would also put subsistence solidly on the side of substance rather than accident. Again, the word analogous is used in the non-technical sense rather than in the sense of paragenic. Making subsistence analogous to a relation would also tie the doctrine of subsistence in creatures to the doctrine of the Trinity.

Or it might even be possible to say that there are two kinds of created existence, two kinds of created acts of existence. One kind includes the exercise of existence by its identity with itself, not by any addition. The other kind does not include the exercise of existence. So what we are suggesting, hypothesizing, is that it is possible for God to give a created essence an existence which is not identical with the exercise of existence. Is that possible? Why not? The hypothesis simply means that God himself has to supply the needed subsistence by directly causing the accidents of the substance, that is, the properties, the necessary accidents of the substance. Since subsistence would still precede the existence of accidents, it would still be on the side of substance rather than of accidents. And this solution would leave Jesus's

human nature completely intact, completely untouched.

So maybe the problem with the incarnation is not that we lack a logically possible theological explanation, but rather that we have several logically possible explanations but we do not know which one to choose.

Big:

An accident's transcendental relation of dependence is the same regardless of what the term of the relation is. But the term must at least be something subsistent. It is not enough for the term to be a mere existent. Being an existent makes the substance eligible to be a material cause of something. But to be the efficient cause of something requires more than what is required to be a material cause. To be an efficient cause as opposed to a material cause, the form or act to be communicated must belong to the efficient cause in some way, must be in the efficient cause in some way. And since existence makes it to be a material cause, existence must belong to it, be in it, in some way other than merely the way that makes it a material cause.

And the efficient cause as such is a correlative of the material cause. It needs a material cause in order to be an efficient cause. That is, it needs a material cause somehow distinct from itself in order to be an efficient cause. So existence must belong to the efficient cause but in some correlative opposite way to the way it belongs to the material cause in order for the material cause to be a material cause.

Also, since action is on the level of accidents, and is an existence on the level of accidents, there must be a potency for action on the level of accidents, a potency fulfilled by existence such that the existence is not the same existence that actuates the substance.

June 26,2001

Subsistence: what is potential in some way or ways is identical with what is an actuality in other ways. If entity 1 is potentially red or green, indifferently red or green, something outside of entity 1 must cause it to

be either red or green. The outside cause must have the energy required to change it from one color to another, or from no color to being colored, and also have a nature that explains why the color is this color, say red, not another color.

We are explaining how an essence acquires necessary accidents. Here the potential subject is potential only for this accident, not that. So the essence's nature accounts for the nature of the accident caused, so we only have to account for the energy that allows the essence to be the cause of its necessary accidents. That is, we have to explain the energy of the virtual efficient cause, or in other words, the virtual energy of the efficient cause, not the distinct nature of the cause. But that energy must be somehow distinct from the nature. That is where subsistence comes in. Nature is not contradictorily the cause of its accidents in the order of specification (think about the specification of conscious acts, like the specification of the act of sight), because it is not the cause in the order of exercise.

December 20th, 2002

Exercised existence: The union of an accident with a substance, for example, a ball's being in motion, *is* identical with the existence of the accident. But the ball's being in motion includes the existence of the substance. So the substance contributes to the existence of a complex, which existence is the existence of the accident, in a way that (the existence of) the accident does not. What the existence of the motion is is not exercised by the motion, but by the ball. The existence of the motion "belongs to" the motion in only a secondary way. It really belongs to the ball, since the accident is a feature of the ball.

The existence of Christ's human nature, which receives existence, does not belong to a human supposit. A human supposit (definition) is that to which received existence belongs, as the existence of an accident belongs to its substance, not to the accident.

New topic:

Something distinct from essence must be the source of the causing of accidents; otherwise, the essence would be because of an effect and the receiver of an effect in the same way at the same time. A thing can be a cause of its own actualization only to the extent that an act that is caused efficiently by one part of the same is received in another part of the thing. The question is can the essence's existence be that factor distinct from the essence itself that allows the efficient cause of the accidents to be somehow really distinct from the material cause?

The answer is no for the following reason. Existence is a necessary condition for the essence to produce its accidents, certainly. But existence is just as much a necessary condition for the essence to receive the accidents that it produces. So existence cannot be that which distinguishes the essence as efficient cause from the essence as material cause.

February 25 , 2004,

Essence must not only specify existence and receive existence and limit existence, it must exercise existence.

In the Father-Son relation, an essence utters itself to itself. An essence exercises existence. The divine essence exercises its existence. There is no "real" distinction in God between existing and exercising existence, because his existence is not a received existence. But the "real" distinction in the Trinity corresponds to the distinction between exercising and having existence in us. So in us is that distinction a participation in what the Trinity is, as perfections belonging to essence are participations in what God is?

An operative power is an act relative to substance and potency relative to its own operation. So there is room for two different applications of the statement "act and potency are in the same order," that is, there is a coordination between them, they are coordinated and correlative. Substance and power are potency and act in the order of what a thing is. Power and operation are a further potency-act couple in a more restrictive order of what a thing is (analogical set). (See Simon on the definitions of action.)

To be received by is not to the exercise by. "By" refers to a different kind of causality in each case. Existence is exercised by essence. Essence is the acting subject (analogical). Essence is the acting subject of accidents rather than being the acting subject of existence. In other words, in exercising existence, essence is an efficient cause; in receiving existence, it is a material cause. So "by" expresses different causal relations (think Trinity).

Existence actualizes the potency of essence in one way; accidents actualize the potency of essence in another way. Existence actualizes essence in one direction. Accidents actualize essence in another direction. Of course, I am talking about substantial essence. It is by receiving existence that essence is actualized in one way; by receiving existence, a potency of essence is actualized in one way. By exercising existence, a potency of essence is actualized in another way, by the production of the essence's accidents. The exercise of existence is not itself an accident, but actualizes accidents.

We are here are talking about to different relations (think Trinity). Actualizing accidents corresponds to God's uttering his nature to himself. He does not actualize the nature, as accidents do, but he utters it to himself, utters it so perfectly that he can love himself as if in another, as if loving another, where "as if" does not mean that the Trinity is not real, it means the opposite.

So perfectly that he can contemplate himself in another; another what? Another exerciser of existence, another who corresponds to the accident-producing exercise of existence in the creature, which does not occur in God.

God utters what he is to himself. A created a nature exercises its existence by producing accidents.

In ordinary created causality, God causes an effect through the causality of a creature that is a cause because the creature is exercising its own created existence when the causality takes place. In Christ, God wills that there is no created cause of the accidents of Christ, because there is no created cause

exercising its own existence and therefore becoming a cause of the accidents.

At the end of the day, we still want to know what subsistence is in creatures if it is not the same as the existence of creatures. We still want to know what the exercise of existence is in creatures if it is really distinct from the existence of creatures. Call it a "mode" just for the sake of having a name; calling at that does not add any intelligibility.

But perhaps for theological purposes all we need to say about subsistence, the exercise of existence, is this. It is directly analogous not to any of the divine perfection's, as opposed to the divine relations. Rather it is directly analogous to the divine relations. Think of Maritain's super analogy of faith. Or perhaps we can say that the distinction between existence and the exercise of existence in creatures is not analogous to the way God's other perfection's become distinct in creatures so much as it is analogous to the way God's relations are distinct from each other in God.

This might mean, for instance, that subsistence is a metarelation attaching to the act of existence without actualizing potency of the act of existence. Rather, it actualizes a pre-accidental potency of the essence. Or maybe we can say that subsistence is a metarelation attaching to the essence pre-accidentally by actualizing a potency of the essence. Metarelation means that it is not in the category of relation, nor is it what is ordinarily understood as a transcendental relation, but is a third analogate distinguished from either of the previous two.

Again, the question is whether this is all we need to say for theological purposes. And one of the theological purposes served by making subsistence and its distinction from essence or existence analogous to distinctions of relations from one another in God would be that it could explain how only one person of the Trinity became man. He became man by substituting for what would ordinarily be created subsistence. And since created subsistence is analogous to the divine relations, only one of the divine relations would become man at one time, according to which one God chose.

The relation of receiving existence on the part of essence would be somehow really distinct from the relation of exercising existence on the part of essence. That which receives existence and that which exercises existence would be the same in subject, just as the road to and from Rome is the same in subject. But the modalities of receiving existence and exercising existence on the part of that subject would be really distinct as one metarelation is distinct from its contrary opposite metarelation.

The potency to exercise existence would then have to be really distinct from the potency to receive existence; for one of the potencies can be fulfilled without the other's being fulfilled. Or may be just receiving existence leaves a reservoir a potency unfulfilled in the essence. As a matter of fact, receiving existence does leave a reservoir of potency unfulfilled in the essence. For it leaves the essence's potency for accidents, necessary accidents, unfulfilled. The exercise of substantial existence precedes the existence of a necessary accidents as the existence of the cause precedes the existence of the effect.

So the fulfillment of that reservoir of potency, that is, the existence of necessary accidents, requires the prior existence of the relation of exercising substantial existence on the part of essence. Is there, as a result, another reserve of potency in the essence prior to its potency for accidents?

Don't forget. The potency for exercising existence is analogous to an active potency, while the potency for receiving existence is a passive potency. Still, an active potency that is not always producing an effect must undergo a passive perfection before its effects emerge.

But since the distinction between the essence and its exercise of existence is analogous to the distinction between relations in the Trinity, the distinction between essence as receiving existence and essence as in potency to exercised existence would have to also be a metapotency. Maybe we can say that it is a potency that is not even there until essence receives existence. Prior to essence's receiving existence, the essence is what it is in the mind of God. And it is complete as being what it is in the mind of God. There is no potency in it other than the potency for necessary accidents.

But it is also a potency for receiving existence. And as a potency for receiving existence it is a potency for becoming something that is potentially exercising existence. It is only a potency to be something exercising existence in relation to its reception of existence, not in relation to its completeness as an essence defining what something is. And maybe that is what the phrase metapotency would mean in terms of its cash value.

Wait; I've been forgetting what I said the other day about the two types of passive potency in essence. When essence receives existence, its passive potency for existence is fulfilled, but its passive potency for accidents is not yet fulfilled. It also has an active potency for causing the existence of its accidents, for causing the fulfillment of its passive potency. So receiving existence does leave a reservoir of potency to be fulfilled, a reservoir of passive potency.

We can resolve the apparent contradiction between essence's being both an active and passive potency in the same respect by comparing essence to an active potency whose act is an immanent action. The actuation of a potency for immanent action resides in the potency. But it is not a passive actuation of the potency. Or rather it is not formally a passive actuation of the potency. It is virtually a passive activation of the potency. The way the immanent action perfects the power includes an actuation that is virtually the actuation of a passive potency. That is, it includes all there is of perfection in what happens when a passive potency is actuated, but it is formally more than the actuation of a passive potency.

Likewise, essence's actuation of its accidents is not formally the actuation of a passive potency. But it does everything that the actuation of a passive potency would do. So the actuation of what I just called the essence's passive potency for accidents is formally an active actuation, but it accomplishes everything that a passive actuation would. In other words, the accidents reside in the essence analogously to the way that the immanent action resides in the power from which it emerges.

But here is where subsistence comes in too. An operative potency that is not always producing an immanent action must itself be moved from potency to act in a passive manner in order for it to be in

sufficient act for the immanent action to emerge from. For if it was already in a sufficient state of act for the immanent action to emerge, an action would always be emerging. Likewise, for the essence to function as an active potency for its accidents, it has to be actuated by subsistence. Because a mere reception of existence puts in existence of the virtual passive potency for the accidents but does not actuate the active potency for the accidents.

As the divine relations are relations generated by God's knowledge and love of himself, an essence's causing of its power's, for example, the powers of knowledge and love, is a metarelation of the essence to its existence, the metarelation of exercising the existence not just receiving it.

xxxEthics, NO AA, April 20, 2000

The following are some proof texts from the general discussion of ethics in the summa, proof texts that I can use if called on to do so. These are all from the prima secundae. In question 20 article three Aquinas states that "the morality of the outward deed is subordinate to that of the inward act of the will." In question 18 article six he says that "our outward acts possess no moral significance save in so far as they are voluntary." Question 19 article one, reply to the third objection: "the will's object is a good thing as presented by the mind, and it is as fitting in with an intelligent rule of conduct that it belongs to a moral category and causes moral good in the will's acts." Question 19 article one: "the source of the good or evil all human acts is from the act of the will." Question 20 article one: "if considered as part of the effective performance of the deed, then it, the goodness of an outward deed, is posterior to the goodness of a willing which is its source." I also made a note to refer to question 18 article two, and question 19 article three, reply one.

April 25, 2000

Our decisions relate us to things as if they were this or that. By a decision we are related to things as if

they were this or that. In deciding we relate ourselves to things as if they were this or that. Once we recognize that this admittedly vague description is a true description, there will only be one possibility for explaining the nature of this relation. There must be a relation of strict identity between the way we decide and the way things are. The explanation by way of identity is inevitable here just as it is in the case of knowledge. When we say knowledge relates us to things as if they were this or that, we are on a virtuous slippery slope that leads us to the identity theory of truth. Wittgenstein recognize this, although he did not consider the slope virtuous. But Wittgenstein is the only philosopher since Aristotle to come up with that concept without getting it from Aristotle. The fact that Wittgenstein unlike Aristotle did not like the concept should not take away from Wittgenstein's originality in arriving at that concept on his own.

May 1, 1999

This is another argument in defense of the idea that we must evaluate a zygote as a person, that is that we must evaluate human organisms that cannot yet make free choices, or who can no longer make free choices, as ends-in-themselves. This argument is more direct and more appropriate than the second argument in my natural obligation article. This argument is also developed somewhere in my earlier ethics notes, to be found in the fire safe boxes in my office.

In making a decision about the future of such an organism, we are comparatively evaluating the organism and ourselves as agents oriented to ends. If we put any interest we choose above the interests of that organism, we are giving ourselves as pursuers of ends a higher place in our evaluations than that organism has in our valuations. So we are giving each a place in our system of values, and we are giving each a place in our system of values precisely as agents oriented to achieving ends.

In making such a decision we must at least implicitly select an end from the point of view of which we will make the decision, and implicitly at least select a standard from the point of view of which we make a comparative evaluation of ourselves as agents oriented to ends. That standard must consist of some feature or set of features that is part of what we are. Because we are evaluating what we are. What we

are is the object of the evaluation. I.e., the object of the evaluation is what we are. And these features must be the features, or must be features, by means of which we are agents oriented to ends.

But we can be oriented to ends at many different levels and in many different ways. When I am fully awake I am oriented to ends in one way. When I am asleep I am oriented toward achieving future ends in a less direct way. When I am drunk I am oriented to future ends in an even less direct way. When I am in a coma I am oriented to future ends in still a further less direct way. In comparatively evaluating myself to another human organism as an agent oriented toward ends, ends that will give value to my decision, I must select some level at which I am oriented to ends or some way in which I am oriented to ends as the point of view from which to make the comparative evaluation. For example, if I choose the state of being fully awake as the feature from the point of view of which I should comparatively evaluate other organisms, then all people who are now asleep are less than ends-in-themselves in way that I am an end in myself.

How do we decide which standard to use? That is, by what standard do we decide which standard to use? In my abortion article I answer this question from the point of view of the temporal stages of development that the organism goes through. That answer contains an implicit answer to the current question, which does not concern temporal stages but concerns features that we and the other organisms possess now or do not possess now. Just as we must evaluate from the point of view of the most fundamental stage at which we are oriented toward human ends temporally, we must evaluate from the most fundamental characteristic by which we are now oriented toward human ends. How do we decide what that characteristic is?

First, the reason why we must evaluate from the point of view of the most fundamental characteristic that orients us toward ends is that any other selection is arbitrary and so contrary to the goal of the rational appetite. By the way, in the natural obligation article I tried to use the word ends only for achievements we are oriented to by choice and the word goal for achievements we are oriented to by the rational appetite before making a choice. I did that just in the hope of introducing a little bit of clarity. I suppose it would have helped to tell the reader what I was trying to do. But if we do not make the comparative evaluation

from the most fundamental level, our choice will achieve an end which is no higher than ends to which the organism is also oriented. But we will be preventing that organism from achieving any of those ends. If we do not choose from the point of view of the most fundamental level, we are making a choice that gets its value for us from a prior orientation to ends and which would have no value for us were it not for a prior orientation to ends, which orientation we share with the other organism.

I will not developed this argument further now, under the assumption that the arguments in the abortion article are clear enough that they can be adapted to this other purpose the way they now stand.

Second, what is that most fundamental level? Since the zygotes are equal to us as agents oriented to ends, the level must be some characteristic or set of characteristics that we share with the zygotes. So the level must be the level of our genetic orientation toward the achievement of human ends.

5-23-00

The value of a person for us should be identical with what a person is. The value of God for us should be identical with what God is.

To cause a good to exist, to cause some good effect, by choosing to perform an intrinsically evil act is to cause a good to exist by producing an evil that is incomparably more evil than the good that is achieved is good. Moral evil is incomparably the worst kind of evil. So no good produced by a moral evil can justify doing an intrinsically evil act.

The alternative to saying that moral evil is the highest kind of evil, is incomparably the highest kind of evil, is to define evil in terms of an accumulation of consequences. But such a definition can't work. The reason is that such a definition will always presuppose some other kind of evil, that is, presuppose another kind of evil by reference to which the evil of consequences is measured. For we can only measure the accumulated evil of the consequences after we decide whether the interests of all parties are to be treated equally. And if they are to be treated equally, that is if the interests of the parties are to be treated equally,

we still have to establish a hierarchy between the different kinds of interests that each of the parties has.

So the primary evil will always be, not the evil calculated in the consequences, but the evil of not treating each person's interests equally to those of another person's. The primary evil will concern the status that persons have in our values.

New topic. To comparatively evaluate us as agents oriented to ends, the evaluation must go to the most fundamental level. Why? To stop anywhere else is a choice. The choice seeks an end. To deprive another agent of an end by choosing less than the most fundamental level is arbitrary and hence contrary to the goal of the rational appetite. More fundamentally, it is to treat the other agent as if she were not oriented to ends of equal value to the ends we achieve by our choice of a level above which we have chosen not to treat her as oriented to ends of equal value. What is the most fundamental level? Since we start as zygotes, it must be a level we share with zygotes.

New topic. My article on natural obligation left out the following point. Is something evil because of how it affects us or how it affects the other person? The answer is yes. Is something evil because it deprives the other person of a good or deprives us of a due good? Again, the answer is yes. Is moral evil defined by the absence of a good that is due us or by depriving the other person of a good? My theory makes that a totally false dichotomy. My theory makes the answer to be that it deprives us of a good because it deprives the other a good. And it deprives the other of a due good because that good is something due the other from us.

New topic. My article on natural obligation left out the following thought, which is expressed someplace in outtakes three. What exists for us with an intentional existence as an object of desire, that is, a value, must be identical with what exists or will exist for itself with an entitative existence as a thing, just as what exists for us with an intentional existence as an object of knowledge must be identical with what exists for itself with an entitative existents as a thing.

New topic. My article on natural obligation did not include the following thought. For Aquinas, what more could be needed to show that murder was wrong then showing that murder treats things as if they are not what they are, specifically, showing that murder treats ends-in-themselves as if they were not ends-in-themselves, treats ends-in-themselves as if they were a means to our ends. That is, mere means to our ends.

New topic. The rational appetite's inclination to accord with reason is not an arbitrary desire or a desire we need not necessarily have. For example, it is not a desire that evolution gave us by accident. Nor is it a desire that sometime in the past served an evolutionary function but now no longer serves any particular function. It is not a contingent event that we have such a desire, or an unnatural event. It is the converse of all of this that is true. It would be unnatural if we did not have such an inclination. It would be arbitrary if we had the faculty of reason but did not have the inclination to act in accord with what we know by reason. The latter situation would not only be unnatural, it would require us to act in irrational ways. Or it would at least require that our acting in ways that accord with reason would be a pure happenstance, a pure contingent or random event. Therefore the rest of the time we would necessarily be acting we would be acting irrationally, that is, we would be acting irrationally and doing so of necessity. It would be arbitrary for nature to give us reason and not give us the goal of acting in conformity to reason. It would be unnatural if we had reason but did not have that goal.

In other words, there is absolutely nothing unnatural about our having moral obligation. About our being subject to moral obligation. There is nothing unnatural about the fact that depriving another person of her due deprives us of something that is due. There is nothing unnatural about the fact that depriving another person of her due is defective from our point of view as well as hers.

11-24-00

"Other than" is not the same as "contrary to" or "contradictory to" or "relative opposite to." Can x be other in our values than it is in reality without being contradictory to what it is in reality?

Is an act evil because, for example, doing it fails to achieve the goal of contemplation? If so, is the act intrinsically evil? Maybe "intrinsically evil" means "must cause us to fail of the goal of contemplation". But why does it do that unless it is evil in the sense that we fail of contemplation because of the act, because the act is evil? If so, contemplation is not the standard by which it is evil. If it is evil because it makes us miss contemplation, it is not intrinsically evil and we must ask why it makes us miss contemplation.

I first learned these principles reading Aquinas and his disciples. Aquinas tied moral value to.... His disciples interpret this as the inclination to act in accord with reason's value judgments made by the standard of some goal other than that inclination itself, the goal of happiness or intellectual contemplation. If so, his ethics are inconsistent from the very start. For him the will's primary love is love of friendship of persons for their own sake, and love all of other things, other goods, for the sake of persons is secondary love. And the Commandments to love God and neighbor are both self-evident and primary precepts of natural law. But then the obligation to these loves of friendship cannot be derived from the obligation to love goods of concupiscence, like happiness and contemplation, which he correctly considers to be objects of love of concupiscence. If so, (1) the precepts would not be self-evident, (2) love of friendship would not be the basic love, and (3) it would be difficult to see how acts contrary to love of friendship could be intrinsically evil. Rather, they cause moral evil because choosing them causes something evil of concupiscence.

The value of God in our evaluations of things must be what God is. Same with man. But man is a featherless biped. So what man is in our evaluations must be what he is with respect to his relation to freely chosen ends and means, with respect to human ends to be sought by free choice.

Simon in footnote: a full text of which is not included in the English translation.

12-26-00

The obligation to love is not based on love of concupiscence, because love of concupiscence is only secundum quid love. See "on the divine names," chapter 4, lecture nine, No. 405. And see Summa

theologiae, first of the second part, question 26, article four.

Love of friendship is not the same as friendship. And friendship requires reciprocal and mutually recognized loves on the part of the friends.

The transcendental true requires identity with being, identity of object with being, such that where that identity is absent, there is falsity. The transcendental good requires identity between what a thing is and what is a value for us such that where that identity is absent, goodness is lacking.

Good and evil are formally distinct by the accord or discord of the will with reason. See first part of the second, question 18, article 5; question 72, article two. What is it that reason materially judges? The good of persons; the proper order of person. Then the proper order of other goods. "Proper" by what standard? Second part of the second, question 26; in III sentences, this dictation 29. "On charity" question one, article nine.

BIG

On Justice and things exterior to persons: see second of the second, question 180, question 2, reply 2. Question 58, articles 2, 18, 9, and 10, especially 10. Question 31, article 1; 43, introduction. An act of justice toward another need not be intrinsically an act of friendship. When I pay my cook, I do justice to him. But the act of paying him is not intrinsically an act of love of friendship. I could, for instance, pay him only as a means for getting some good for myself; still, I would not be doing him an injustice properly speaking. It is the opposite if I use someone else's person making ability solely for my own benefit and not as an act of friendship.

The intentional existence of the lover in love: see first part of the second, question 28, article 2.

For me to know what is good (by love of concupiscence) for another, she must be ordered to that good prior to my seeking that good.

12-29-00 BIG

There does not just happen to be an appetite with the goal of valuing things to be what they are. If there is such a thing as rational knowledge of what things are, there cannot not be an appetite with that goal, that is, our choices based on rational knowledge cannot not be the act of an appetite with that goal. There may just happen to be rational knowledge of what things are. But if there is such knowledge, the appetite by which we make choices based on that knowledge necessarily has that goal.

there is another implicit answer in Aquinas to that objection. There is an implicit answer that we can get out of what he says, and one that is consistent with everything else he says, but an answer he does not explicitly make. And that answer does work.

3-5-01

On so-called "animal rights." Is our disgust at this treatment of animals ethical or aesthetic? Well, is it or is it not based on the same disposition, the same inclination, that is exercised in our love for our pets and other animals? Of course it is. Our disgust at this treatment of human beings is based on our love for them, and so our disgust at this treatment of animals is based on whatever causes us to love them. But what is it that causes us to love animals?

Is it not our ability to imagine how they feel? We can project ourselves into them. We can sympathize with them because we think we can understand their feelings, their reactions, their consciousness. We project our feelings into them, and we receive their feelings into ourselves by imagining that they have feelings like our own. And no doubt we are correct. They do have feelings.

But all of this so far strictly aesthetic. We like or dislike aesthetically the feelings that we attribute to them,

just as we like or dislike them when we experience them. But all of this is aesthetic.

This ability to empathize with feelings similar to our own when we observe them is a very important feature of our makeup. Evolution no doubt gave it to us for a very good reason. And when it comes to ethical behavior, it often has a very important role to play. Because usually the feelings we are sympathizing with are feelings of other persons to whom we not only have aesthetic relations but also ethical relation, that is, ethical obligations.

But love of friendship for persons is the form of the other virtues. It is what makes the content provided by the other virtues morally obligated. Our aesthetic reactions to the mistreatment of other conscious organisms, human and animal, supplies important content for ethical behavior. But what makes that content moral, what gives it a specifically moral character, is its relation to our obligation to love of friendship for other persons.

But the fact that evolution gave us at this ability that does not distinguish between persons and animals makes it easy to confuse our disgust at animal abuse with moral disgust. Again, it is very very helpful, and it is the most natural thing in the world, to have that ability. That helpfulness and that naturalness increases the confusion with ethical disgust.

And the fact that that natural and helpful ability does not distinguish between our aesthetic reactions to human and animal pain means that if we accustom ourselves to be complacent about animal pain we are the same time accustoming are ourselves to be complacency about the same kind of pain when we experience it in humans. The complacency in question is only aesthetic. But it can have significant ethical consequences since the natural tendency in question is meant to be helpful to our fulfilling our ethical obligations.

If there were no ends-in-themselves, all values would be relative to subjective desires. But if there are ends-in-themselves, there is an objective value for other values to be relative to. But why does the

existence of ends-in-themselves create an objective value rather than just another, though different, subjective value? That is, a value that comes into existence as such because of its relation to that subjective disposition we call the will? Because to treat an end-in-itself in as an end-in-itself is to treat her as if she is what she is known objectively to be. So treating her does fulfill a "subjective" desire, but the nature of that desire is to conform to objective knowledge of what she is by evaluating her to be what she objectively it is. On the other hand, to treat an object of animal desire as if it were an end-in-itself would be to treat it as if it is not what it objectively is.

And given the rational knowledge of what she is, it is necessary that there be an appetite oriented to value her to be what she is. That is, it is necessary that moral good and evil exists; it is necessary that to be an appetite governed by specifically moral standards, that is, an appetite whose act is successful or defective by the standards we happen to call "moral."

And even if there is such a thing as the rational appetite conforming to prior value judgments apparently made by some other standard, where would that other standard come from? Nowhere else than reason's knowledge of what things are (for there is nothing else for metaphysics to talk about; there is nothing else for reason to know than what things are; and there is nothing else for appetites to value than what things are). So ultimately a violation of such a value judgment would be evil because it treats things as if they are not what they are; a violation would treat things as if they are not as they are known to be. And because of that the violation would be defective for a rational being.

The goal of the rational appetite must be what something in its. And what that something is must be the rational appetite's good because of reason's knowledge of what that something is. For that is the way all appetites based on consciousness must work; they respond to what a known object is. So if the will's response is defective, the will's act must be a failure to achieve the state that what its good is is what the pertinent thing is. (See my correspondence with father Dewan and my e-mail to Curtis Hancock, Ray Dennehy, and Dan.)

The disorder in the intrinsically evil object is a disorder that will cause moral disorder in the act that

chooses it.

Vicious circle: allegedly reason makes a value judgment by some goal other than the will's own goal. But for the will's act to be required to aim at that goal, the goal must be a goal for the will's act.

The goal of the rational appetite is to be dictated to by reason, to let reason dictate to it; that is what the rational appetite is for, to allow our action to be guided by that great gift, reason. To allow our action to be directed by our relationship to what things are. To allow our knowledge of what things are to direct our action. To allow our action not to be blind, not to be undertaken blindly. Nature did not give us reason so that we would act as if we did not know what things are. Nature gave us reason so that our action would be directed by knowledge of what things are. Otherwise our action would be blind. We would have knowledge of what things are, but that knowledge would be irrelevant to the actions we take relative to what things are.

How does reason direct our action? Not by the will's conforming to reason's moral knowledge; that would be circular.

xxxEthics, NO, AA after revised Thomist copy sent, June 4, 2001

Why our evaluations cannot be just indifferent to the other person's achievement of her legitimate ends. In setting our own ends, there are only two possibilities. We are able to give another person status, in our values, of being someone whose fulfillment of her own ends is one of our ends, or of being a means to the fulfillment of our own ends. There is no other possibility. If we do not make her pursuit of ends one of our ends, we must make her a means to our pursuit of ends. For that is all that the rational appetite's evaluations do, give things the status of being ends or means to ends in our evaluations. That is, the status of being our ends or means to our ends. So the only possibilities are that her ends are our ends or that she is a means to our ends.

People are not indifferent to their own pursuit of ends from their own point of view, or from the point of view of their own ends. So if we are indifferent to that, or of their status in our evaluations is indifferent, it must be from our point of view, from the point of view of our ends, to the exclusion of being from the point of view of their ends, or from our point of view to the exclusion of theirs.

There is such a thing as an entity being or not being something in my values. Being what? Being an end or means.

If I do not will his good the way I will my own good, he is not an end-in-itself in my values, because I will my good as that for the sake of which other things exist. I will my good as the good of an end-in-itself. He is an end-in-itself as I am. The same way I am. I will my good. If I do not also will he is good, then...

I must will that she exists for the sake of her own ends.

Now a comment on a different problem:

If I really choose 1, I will do what I sincerely think gets 1. But why must I morally choose 1; what makes a choice defective if I do not? Only the fact that 1 is a goal of my faculty of choice itself. This is why if 1 is a technical goal, I will make use of my knowledge, if I am sane, but if 1 is the goal of the rational appetite, I can fail to make use of my knowledge. That is, if we are talking about technical knowledge of how to achieve an end, we are talking about knowledge I will use if I choose that end, but if we are talking about the goal the rational appetite has prior to choice, we are talking about moral knowledge, practical knowledge of the moral kind, that I can fail to use.

Animal rights and the brain damaged

The reason such juxtapositions are not accidental in living things is that

our DNA constitutes a design calling for a certain kind of development. That design constitutes a standard for judging development. It is not a misfortune if a chimp does not develop enough intelligence to multiply and divide; it is a misfortune if a human child does not so develop. In each case there is an objective standard for saying what is a misfortune and what is not.

When we judge brain damage, of any kind, to be a misfortune, by what standard do we judge it to be a misfortune? By the standard of whatever goal the damaged part of the brain could formerly achieve that it can no longer achieve. By implication, then, we are saying that, other things being equal, we should value what that part of the brain is in terms of what it formerly could contribute. Other things might not always be equal; something that is a disadvantage from one point of view might turn out to be an advantage from another point of view. But if the value in question is an absolute value, or a necessary condition for an absolute value, other things can never be equal.

Why does Singer say we should not value human baby as much as we value a mature horse? Because of achievements that we find in the horse that are supposedly higher than the achievements a human baby has yet made. But that all depends on your point of view doesn't it? Can we not find achievements in the human child that are not found in a horse and that we can find reason for valuing more highly than what we find in a horse?

For example, a human baby has already developed specifically human parts of the brain that we cannot find in a horse's brain. Why should we not value those specifically human accomplishments, achievements, more highly than we value a horse's achievements? And what criteria should we use in determining which is higher?

Singer probably thinks he has an answer to these questions. He might say something like, well, the reason we value the specifically human parts of the brain is not for their own sake but for the sake of achievements they can lead to in the future. But the now existing horse already has achievements which are the reason why we value his brain would human brain. So we should value the achievements up a horse more highly than the achievements of the baby because the achievements of the horse are in some sense terminal. They are in some sense of fulfillment of the finality which is only potential when the brain exists but they do not, and which is the reason why we value the brain.

But one thing singer is missing is this. We do not just have to decide whether the horse is more accomplished than the baby. Nor do we just have to decide what criteria we should use in making that judgment, for example, the kind of criteria attributed to singer in the previous paragraph. We have to decide how we decide. We have to decide how to we choose between criteria. We have to decide what criteria we use the decide between criteria.

We get all way back to that. And why should we not get all away back to back? We are human beings contemplating killing another member of the human species, contemplating not just doing something to another member of the human species but eliminating that member from existence altogether. Shouldn't elimination of its existence require us to examine what goes into our value judgments all way to the most fundamental level we can find?

And at that level we find that the basis of value judgments is not achievements but the orientation to future achievements.

Consequentialism and Aquinas on the object determining morality, June 4, 2001

We cannot use our person-making power outside of a context in which we leave the use of that power open to making persons. Nature may close the context so that persons cannot be made, but we cannot. This illustrates the sense in which we are responsible for our actions, not for their results. Or better, the sense in which ethics governs good or evil actions, regardless of results. The action in question is the act of the will (against consequentialism). Just as it is against the goal of the rational appetite to evaluate ourselves to be agents oriented to our own destruction, and to the cessation of our orientation to ends, it is against the nature of the rational appetite to evaluate ourselves to be agents oriented to the preventing THE USE OF our person-making power from making persons. (we can prevent our pma from making persons, but cannot use our pma and prevent it from making persons.)

We are responsible for our actions, i.e., acts of the will. Even if the will's relation to external consequences caused a defect in the will's act, still the evil would consist of a privation of an internal goal of the will. This is further proof of my interpretation of what Aquinas means by the object's determining the morality of the act. Sometimes it is not the object; it is the circumstances, i.e., the consequences in these circumstances. So sometimes those circumstances can cause evil in the act of the will. And so what the object does in other cases is cause evil in the act of the will, where "cause" must have a parallel meaning in both cases. Aquinas's analysis requires this parallel between circumstances, which are not moral per se, and objects. The way objects cause evil in every act that chooses them is the same way that circumstances cause evil in some of the acts that choose them. So morality is primarily in the choice, not in the chosen object.

Even when we are infertile, temporarily or permanently, to conform to what reason knows about human sexuality, a rational appetite must value everything else associated with sex as existing for the sake of making persons. Our cognitive faculties are what they are primarily for the sake of giving us knowledge of truth even when we are unconscious and so cannot

exercise the ability to know truth. Our cognitive faculties do not entirely cease being what they are when we are unconscious, and the primary reason why they are what they are at that time is knowledge of truth. The existence of the first rational beings may have been an accidental product of blind forces of nature, but even if reason was selected for reproduction because, at some time in our evolution, it contributed something other than knowledge of truth to our survival, reason itself is not blind. And by reason itself we can recognize that it is rational knowledge of truth that makes us ends-in-themselves and that, therefore, what reason is deserves to be valued, even when it is not functional, primarily for being that which makes persons absolute values. (So a brain damaged person is still an AV.)

Mill, nothing is wrong unless it hurts someone else, June 26, 2001

If I have the right to treat myself like an animal, there is no basis, no reason, for not treating another person like an animal.

His existence and behavior is for the sake, first, of giving himself ends and, second, of evaluating everything else by reference to those ends.

We cannot avoid evaluating things as ends or as means to our ends. So if other person's ends are not our ends, if we do not choose the end of making their ends our ends, we are necessarily evaluating them as means. We are able to so choose our ends that his ends are among our ends, that we will his ends as our ends, if not, we so choose our ends that his existence and behavior is a means to our ends.

The only thing choices can do is to evaluate things as our ends or as means to our ends. So if other person's ends are not our ends, that is, if in our

evaluations their existence and behavior is not for the sake of their own ends, in our evaluations they exist for our ends to the exclusion of existing for their own ends.

The fact that length is a relative value does not mean that we can have a just reason for intending to shorten life. Length is a relative value for both animals and persons. But persons are that for the sake of which everything else exists. The fact that persons are absolute values does not mean that we cannot allow the nonexistence of a person for another purpose, e.g., giving a pain medicine with the side effect of shortening life. Since we are not choosing to cause a person's nonexistence, the morality is not determined by the absolute value of person who will die. But can death benefit an absolute value? Yes, because length of life is in itself only a means to other goods.

Allowing shortening does not evaluate freedom from pain as being a means to his ceasing to exist, a means to putting an absolute value out of existence.

(And human suffering)

Animal suffering, which includes human physical suffering,

Physical suffering, which includes both human and animal suffering,

If I have the right to treat myself like an animal, there is no reason, no basis, for not treating other persons like animals. This is a remark against John Stuart Mill's idea that we can do anything to ourselves as long as it does not hurt another person.

If nonpersons do not exist for the sake of persons in our system of values,

in our system of values other persons cannot measure the value of nonpersons by their own ends. The value of nonpersons in our system of values is not measured by the ends of other persons in addition to being measured by our ends.

Value things to be what they are can sound as "abstract and impersonal as "choose so that you can will the rule conduct as a universal law." But the former means to make things ends and means in accord with reason's knowledge that something is or is not an end-in-itself.

The rational is not just a plus relative to the reason that we evolved the way that we did. It is not like the ability to use written language which is not one of things selected by evolution for its own sake; the ability to use written language is just a plus relative to the reason that the dispositions that enable us to use written language were selected in the first place.

Paragraph

The rational appetite was selected for the purpose of letting us use reason to guide us in the pursuit of other purposes, other ends, and so the rational pursuit of other ends always has the additional end (goal) of conforming to rational knowledge of what things are.

All beings act out of an orientation toward producing certain effects. As satisfying the prior orientation, those effects are called the "good" of those beings. To say that free beings pursue ends of their own choosing is to say that they pursue their own good by means of choosing their own ends (is to say that we pursue our good by means of choices of our own ends). To this definition of "good" we should add something to the effect that effects are called good for the being that produces them when the effects are somehow

interior to the being that produces them, as they are in the case of plants and animals.

No appetite chooses (aims at) its own satisfaction. It chooses (aims at) that which will, as a matter of fact, cause its satisfaction, cause its satisfaction because it is that to which the appetite is oriented. Any appetite chooses that to which it is oriented and which will therefore cause its satisfaction because that is the kind of thing to which it is oriented.

Statements in the preceding paragraph always seemed strange to me because it seemed to me that in choosing, for example, some food for the sake of the taste I was choosing for pleasure that results from the satisfaction of that orientation. What I fail to see was that there are two appetites involved here. The choice of pleasure is not an act of the appetite that will produce the pleasure. The choice of pleasure is an act of the will; the will chooses to pleasure that results from the satisfaction of another appetite. But the other appetite does not have its own satisfaction as that to which it aims. If it did have its own satisfaction has that which aims, it would never achieve its satisfaction. For the satisfaction comes from the appetite's achieving something other than the satisfaction. If the appetite never achieved that other thing, the appetite would never produce a state of satisfaction.

We are oriented to pursue, achieve, our good by freely choosing ends to which we are necessarily oriented prior to making choices, ends to which our nature orients us prior to making choices of our own ends. A child that reaches the age of reason is aware of pursuing her good by choosing her own ends, by pursuing ends that she freely sets for herself, that she sets them for herself for the sake of achieving her good.

The desire for that which brings happiness, for the fulfillment of the unfulfilled, is always the efficient cause of seeking ends; the value is determined by the formal causality of the end. So "that for the sake of which" has two senses. We can say that everything is for the sake of happiness. But in the pursuit of happiness we do not identify the good we are seeking with "our happiness."

We identify the good for the sake of which all other goods exists as a goal and as the formal fulfillment of persons as such, that is, with the state that fulfills the orientations of persons as such. We identify our good with being moral. That brings happiness because we do it for its sake, not for the sake of happiness. It brings happiness because it fulfills the rational appetite's goal. And that goal is not "to fulfill its own goal"; its goal, the goal whose fulfillment brings happiness, is that of acting in accord with reason.

"And so the place they have in our values is not really that of things oriented to the achievement of their own freely chosen ends."

We pursue our good by freely selecting the ends at which we aim. By freely selecting the ends to which we direct our actions. Free beings, I should say persons, have freedom of choice over the ends to which they direct her action.

Awareness of speculative truths, for example, the truth that such as such and action will cause my death, makes the desires that cause ultimate practical judgments right or wrong. Knowledge of how that awareness of speculative truths makes desires right or wrong must be knowledge of how an action relates to the rational appetite's goal of conforming to speculative knowledge of what

things are. It must be knowledge of whether or not a choice would treat things as if they are what they are as known by speculative knowledge.

Practical knowledge of the moral, not the artistic, kind must be awareness of the way right desire depends on the rational appetite's relation to speculatively known truths.

It is the entity that is an end-in-itself. For an entity to be an end-in-itself in my values, to exist for the sake of its free choice of ends, is to exist for the sake of free choices of his true good. It is to exist for the sake of pursuing her true good by for all the free choice. If not, I am not willing his happiness. I am willing that a cause himself on happiness.

To be an end-in-itself in my values is to be oriented to your true good, which happens to consist of certain kinds of free choices. To be an end-in-itself in my values you must exist for the sake of your own ends, that is, for the sake of pursuing good ends by your own free choice. You exist for the sake of your own fulfillment. Why? One reason: that is what you are; someone who exists for the sake of achieving his own fulfillment by his own free choices, for the sake of making his fulfillment his own by freely choosing it.

But human "that for the sake of which everything else exists" need to achieve the other things that exists for their sake. To achieve those other things that exist for their sake. Human nature gives us needs that must be fulfilled to achieve other things that are "for our sake." And human nature makes some things more necessary than others to achieve the things that exist for our sake.

For our sake means for our good. It means for the sake of benefiting us.

xxxEthics, NO, AA, after final changes sent to Thomist, 2-5-02

What about concept of the common good? Since Aquinas bases, or at least uses, his theory of natural law on the concept of the common good, I need to show how my presentation of Aquinas relate to that concept.

Consider in the first place the precept of loving God above all things. Love of friendship for God is love of friendship for the common good of the universe. Love of something means willing the good for that thing. But in the case of loving God, love does not mean willing that he get any additional good. He already has all good in himself. In the case of loving God, willing the good means assenting to the good that he is, willfully respecting the good that he is, willfully consenting to the fact that God is God.

In the case of love for created persons there are two kinds of love to be distinguished. There is love of friendship and love of concupiscence. Regarding the second kind of love the concept of common good does not create any difficulty. Love of concupiscence wills goods other than the person for the sake of persons. The goods that it is obligated to will for persons include common goods as the principal part. The common good is higher than the individual good. That means that among the things that are good for persons the common good is higher than the individual good. Therefore in willing goods for persons we must primarily will the common good. And precepts of natural law which concern what goods love of friendship requires us to will for persons are precepts primarily telling us to will common goods for persons.

But does the precept obligate us to have love of friendship for persons concern the common good? If not, it would seem that there is a precept of natural law that is not based on the common good. Is the obligation to have love of friendship for persons an obligation to love of any good or goods that is a common good?

Since persons are that for the sake of which everything else exists, created persons in their own way are a common good of the universe. Even if there was only one created person, that person would be a common good for everything else in the universe, a good that is common relative to everything else in the universe. And a loving that person with love of friendship amounts to loving her as that for the sake of which everything else exists, precisely as that for the sake of which everything else exists or could possibly exist. So love of friendship for that one person would amount to her loving herself as a common good of all possible other things.

Likewise, when one created person loves another created person with love of friendship, they are loving the other person as a common good of every other creature that could possibly exist.

Created persons are secondary analogates of the concept of the common good of the universe, just as they are secondary analogates of the concepts of person, good, etc.

On the other hand, if you do not like analyzing a single person in the universe in terms of a common good, then we can interpret Aquinas's reference to the common good in the definition of law in another way. We can say that law is a rational ordinance for the common good wherever there is such a thing as a common good. For wherever there is such a thing as a common good,

it takes precedence over anything that relates to it as a corresponding individual good. So the law stated in terms of the common good will automatically tell us whatever obligations we have relative to any corresponding individual good. So it is not the case that there would be no such thing as obligation if there were no such thing as commonness in the domain of the good. In other words, it is not commonness that makes willing the good obligatory.

What obligates is not the commonness of the good but the fact that there are natural ordinations to ends such that failure to achieve the end is a privation of something that is due because it is a goal relative to a prior orientation. If there were case where there was not a common good, we would still need rational ordinances for the good. But Aquinas does not mention this case because in fact there is such a thing as the common good. So he does not have to discuss the other case which is entirely hypothetical and contrary to fact.

2 approaches to morality:

When all the frills are stripped away, when we get down to basics, there are really only two approaches to morality. One way is to judge right and wrong on the basis of subjective feelings, emotions. We feel bad about the old persons suffering, so we want to help him commit suicide. We feel bad about the pregnant teenager, and we don't feel bad about the zygote, so we abort the zygote.

Of course, feelings are notoriously fickle. They are conditioned by sometimes capricious social changes. We used to be horrified by abortion; now we feel it is the kind thing to do.

But what alternative is there to basing our moral judgments on our feelings about things? In the last analysis, there is only one possible alternative. The only other possibility is that there is some reality, something that is what it is independently of our subjective feelings about, that is such that if we do not treat it in certain ways, we are treating it as if it is not what we know it to be by reason. There must be some reality such that when we know what it is, we cannot treat it in certain ways without being dishonest with ourselves, because we know we are treating it as if it were not what we know it to be. We know that the status it has in our system of values contradicts what it is in reality independently of our values.

How could there be such a reality? A philosopher named Kant said that persons are ends-in-themselves. He had reasons for saying this that are different from the idea that we know what things are in reality, but we might ask what genuine reasons there might be for considering persons ends-in-themselves. Because that is what they are in reality, there is an objective basis for treating them as ends-in-themselves rather than as mere means to our ends.

One traditional basis for saying that persons are ends-in-themselves is the belief that persons have free choice over the ends to which their existence and behavior is directed. If that is true of what persons are in reality, and if the way we at treat them as if they were directed to our freely chosen ends as opposed to their own, then we are treating them as if they are not what they are and what we know them to be. But to so act that we are treating them as beings directed to ends of their own free choosing is to treat them as ends-in-themselves. It is to so choose our values that the status they have in our values is things whose ends we will as we will our own.

Now the belief that we have freedom of choice over the ends to which our action is directed is controversial. We do not intend to enter that controversy. But we want to look at the implications for morality of not believing that we have this kind of freedom. For we are merely trying to contrast two approaches to morality that are at bottom the only two choices. By contrasting them we mean we are looking at the conflicting implications for our lives that these two approaches have.

If persons do not have free control over their ends, then the basis of their action must ultimately be their subjective inclinations, and subjective inclinations can be the only basis for morality. For example, when we say that we should not treat persons as mere objects, mere things, which is another way of saying that we should treat them as ends-in-themselves as opposed to treating them as mere means to our ends, we may be thinking that the characteristic in reality that makes persons deserve a certain kind of treatment from us is the fact that persons, unlike mere things, have feelings.

When we mistreat persons, we mistreat things with feelings, things that are conscious of pain and hurt. When we mistreat mere things, however, we are mistreating things that cannot experience pain, that do not have feelings, etc. and it may be that what differentiates persons from things is not that persons have freedom of choice but only that they have feelings.

If feelings are the only thing that differentiates persons from things, then persons are not ends-in-themselves in the sense that the existence of a person is the existence of that for the sake of which all other values exist; or in other words, in the sense that the existence of a person is the existence of an absolute value to which all relative values must be relative.

If feelings are what makes persons persons, when we say that we should not

treat persons as objects, we really are not contrasting objects to absolute values. Persons are just a higher kind of object, but not an absolutely different kind of object. For example, if the existence of persons is the existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists, there can be no justification in killing a person simply because they lack some other good such as freedom from pain. Freedom from pain cannot be put on the same scale as removing a person from existence.

As a result, when feelings change, our ideas about if it is okay to kill and whom it is so not okay to kill change also. For example, many years ago those in the pro-life movement were warning that abortion puts us on a slippery slope toward killing children. When they said that many people scoffed. Now however, articles about killing children appear in places of honor on the op-ed pages of the New York Times.

What has changed? Only our feelings, our perceptions. Someday our feelings may tell us that we should kill anyone over the age of 70, because we perceive the world to be overpopulated. It is this kind of implication that both those who base morality on the absolute value of person and those who base morality on the fact that persons have feelings must confront in their own ways.

Someone who adopts feelings morality today may not like the idea that in the future she could be one of the people kill when our feelings about killing change. But she has to be ready to except that implication of that kind of morality. Today she has to except implication that maybe we should be able to kill children.

But people who believe that persons are absolute values have to confront the same implication. They have to confront the fact that it is perfectly

consistent for someone with the opposite approach to morality to accept abortion or any other kind of killing whatsoever, depending on the fickle feelings of culture. They have to accept the fact that someone who does not agree that persons are ends-in-themselves because of what they are independently of our feelings are perfectly consistent in not agreeing with them.

The conclusion is that most of the arguments by which people on both sides of the life issue try to convince the others are beside the point. Most of the arguments do not get back to the very basis of morality itself. Nor do they get back to the very nature of the value of the person. But unless they do get back there, the opponents are talking past each other; they are ships passing in the night.

Notice that on the free will basis of morality, a person is someone who was oriented to future free choices. She is someone who was oriented to choices by her underlying nature, not by whether she is fully awake now, sleeping, drunk, drugged or comatose. People in each of those states are in fact oriented toward free choices even though in different ways. For example, we now know that comatose people can wake up after years.

So when we say that the orientation to free choices makes a person an end-in-itself, an absolute value, we can mean just this or that way of being oriented to free choices. Because if we did, the only basis for our choice of this or that way would be our feelings about it or about them. That is why the prolife sees human life starting at the zygote. Before the sperm and ovum unite, there does not exist an agent oriented to the future production of its own free choices. After conception, there does exist an agent whose causal dispositions orient it to be the producer of future free choices.

So if we select any time after conception as the way of being oriented to free choice that we freely choose to be the beginning of moral value, our choice can only be based on feelings about that way of being oriented to free choice as opposed to the zygote's way. But on the other hand, if persons are not absolute values, there is no other way to make such a choice except on the basis of feelings.

And notice that for most of the history of the human race, following feelings was a relatively good guide to judging morality and a significant aid to doing the moral thing. It is perfectly understandable that evolution would select emotions that are beneficial to the individual and the common good.

But evolution does not do anything perfectly. For most of human history, feelings may have corresponded with morality, say, 95% of the time or more. But for most of human history, we did not face issues like abortion, euthanasia or assisted suicide.

That last thing a society wants to do is to tell its doctors that they can kill people when they think it is appropriate to do so. That should be self-evident. The response will be that they will only kill people who choose to be killed. But historical facts show otherwise and there is good reason for those facts.

Choice as such imposes no moral obligations on me; what imposes obligation is the value, the moral standing, of the entity that makes the choice. When my cat makes a choice, it imposes no obligations on me, because cats do not have sufficient moral standing for that. When a person makes a choice, it can impose a moral obligation because of the moral standing of the entity making the choice.

But if assisted suicide or euthanasia is a moral choice, the existence of a person is not the existence of the absolute good. If the existence of a person is not the existence of the absolute good, the value of persons is on a relative scale with that of cats. So there logically can be circumstances where a doctor could decide that killing someone is appropriate even if it is against that person's choice.

"Per se valuable" is not to be confused with "bonum honestum". The latter is a good for persons; it has its goodness as part of the fulfillment of persons, as one kind of part of the fulfillment of persons; it has its goodness as one of the ends of a persons nature.

August 3rd, 2002

The existence of an objective not arbitrary ethics requires that there be a value that can't be balanced against other values, a value that other values cannot be balanced against.

We need a value that is the fulcrum. If not, then either there is no fulcrum, or we have a moving fulcrum.

August 8, 2003

In choosing my ends, I am always seeking my own good (cause in the order of exercise). So I can make you a means to my ends or make you someone whose behavior is also (directed to your ends and so) for your own good. I can make you someone whose behavior is for your own good by making you someone directed

to your own (pre-volitional) ends. When you are directed to your own ends, you are directed to your own pre-volitional ends more basically than to your chosen ends.

When I am directed to my own chosen ends, I am directed more basically to my own pre-volitional ends. Why otherwise do we make choices; why otherwise do we have to make choices? Because we are oriented to conflicting ends prior to the choice.

What he is in our system of goods (of ends and means) is someone oriented to a good that is his own, just as we are oriented to good that is our own. And the good of our own that we are oriented to can include the good of treating him as oriented to his own good.

New topic:

The will must value things to be what they are from what point of view? Or from what point of view is it that the will must value things to be what they are? From the point of view of the end of a faculty that seeks the good of the entity, seeks the good of the entity by making free choices of ends. What is the other person from the point of view of an entity that seeks its good by freely choosing rationally known ends?

The nature of what exists can impose obligation it can only if it is related to some end of ours. (And if the nature of what exists does not impose obligation, our ends make morality arbitrary, that is, a rowdy becomes relative to our ends.) The nature of what exists must be related to our orientation to some future end. If our evaluations can cause us to decide that an existent oriented to ends of the same value is not our moral equal,

morality is arbitrary, not imposed by what exists. So allowing us to decide that a fetus is not equal to us in value is to make morality arbitrary.

Notice that a fetus certainly is not equal to us in functional value. But if we measure a fetus by functional value only, we have already excluded the fetus from being a person. That is, from being something intrinsically valuable, something that exists for the sake of its own ends. But if its ends are the equal of our ends, either it is also something that exists for its own sake, or neither of us are things that exist for their own sake. And if neither of us are things that exist for their own sake, is entirely arbitrary whether or not it is good or evil to kill either of us.

February 17, 2004,

To evaluate the other as a means to our chosen end is to evaluate her as a means to our own good. To evaluate her as oriented to her own chosen ends is to evaluate her as oriented to her own good. Our obligation is not to will that she achieve ends but that she achieve her good, because we know that our own act of choosing ends are themselves means, only means, to our good.

March 6, 2004 big

Another quotation from Aquinas on the fact that persons determine their own ends freely:

ST, I 18, 3.

May 29, 2004

Choices place values on things in ways that either do or do not conform to what things are. Our choices in fact put values on things in ways that conform

to what things are or do not conform to what things are.

xxxArtificial Contraception, birth control, AA 9-15-01

Important. Bring in the common good stuff from immediately above in the ethics section.

Footnote "natural obligation" on intrinsically evil cause effect connections. Put the footnote in the final section where I discuss further conditions for the morality, the moral good and evil, of choices. In the same final section, when I discuss the good of persons as persons, refer to Aquinas, the first question in the first part of the second part of the summa, on moral acts being the acts of humans as humans, and vice versa.

In sex, we value our partner because of her person making ability, but we are still valuing her. So if we devalue her person making ability we are to that extent devaluating her. We could also devalue, for example, her music making ability. For example, we might not be music fans, and might prefer her to please us by using her food making ability rather than her music making ability. But in devaluing her music making ability in this way, we are not devaluating her in a way that relates to the value of persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists. But when we devalue her person making ability, we are devaluating her in a way that relates to the value persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists. Specifically, we are devaluating her by giving persons the status of not being that for the sake of which everything else exists.

His existence and behavior is for the sake, first, of giving himself ends and, second, of evaluating everything else by reference to those ends.

A good can be relative and still be necessary for the continued existence of something for the sake of which everything else exists.

Thwarting the nutritive function is not interfering with his continued existence. So it does not require evaluating the nutritive function as if it did not exist for the sake of ends-in-themselves.

Sex is a means to that without which persons can acquire no other value. If sex does not exist for that purpose, persons are not that for the sake of which everything else exists.

Length is a relative value. Still, shortening is equivalent to killing an absolute value. But because length is itself a relative value, we can do something that has the effect of shortening life, as long as the intention of the choice is not shortening life.

If we evaluate something else as more important than existence, we are evaluating the existence of persons as if persons are not that for the sake of which everything else exists. And to frustrate procreation for the sake of some other goal, to evaluate sex as not for the sake of existence in order to use sex for some other goal, is evaluating existence as if it were not that without which absolute values could achieve no ends whatsoever.

We practice birth control precisely because one sex act can cause life. We frustrate the nutritive function because no one act or even multiple acts need shorten life.

If I refuse to value sex as a means to end 1 for the sake of achieving end 2,

1 is not in my values the existence of that the sake of which everything else exists. But if I refrain from pursuing 2 precisely so that in my values persons can have the status of that for the sake of which everything else exists, then...

Sex is a means to an absolute value. If in our evaluations sex is not a means to an absolute value, but we interfere with its being a means to an absolute value for the sake of achieving a relative value, in our evaluations being a means to an absolute value is on a par with being a means to a relative value; for we can sacrifice being a means to an absolute value for the sake of being a means to a relative value, which makes the relative value at least as important in our values as an absolute value. It makes an absolute value have the status in our values equal to a relative value, and vice versa.

If the value of the child does not consist in, come from, depend on, whether or not we want the child, the value of using our sexuality for the sake of procreation cannot consist of, be determined by, etc., where there we want to use it for procreation. But since sex is not an end-in-itself in its own right, the value of using it at all can be determined by whether we want to use it.

If the value of the means that gave 1 existence is solely 2, the value of 1 is solely 2.

If using sex has the value of 1 is solely because I want it to have that value...

If I can decide that sex will not have the value of 1 without devaluing 1,

then I have value solely in relation to my desires.

If I can morally decide that the value of using sex will not be I, ...

Without which there could be no other values for that for the sake of which all other values exist.

Whenever we make a choice we are seeking something as yet nonexistent. So morality is determined by how we seek nonexistent values, where how we seek means how the way we seek them requires us to evaluate existing persons. How it requires us to judge the value of being a person, to place value on being person, to give being person a place, a status, in our system of values.

I value means for the sake of ends. What place a person has in my value is shown by how I value sex as a means to ends. (Sex: that is, you insofar as you are a sexual being.) If I value persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists, I must value you insofar as you are a sexual being as being for the sake of giving existence to persons, not just pleasure or companionship to a person.

If I value you as a means of giving a person pleasure as opposed to...

If I refuse to value you insofar as you are sexual as being a means to give existence to a person in order to value you as a means to some other end, the end of existence for persons is not the existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists.

So if I sacrifice existence for a person for the sake of pleasure for a person, the existence of a person is not, cannot be, the existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists. Better: if I value sex as achieving

pleasure for person in a way that requires me to refuse to value it as providing existence for person, I am not valuing the existence of persons as the existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists.

We must always use sex as if it is always what it is for the sake of what it can do at times of fertility.

It is wrong to separate the meaning of our procreative ability from procreating persons. To separate the value of our person making ability from making persons.

A person that would be entirely a product of a machine would be the product of something whose value, unlike the value of a person, was not unique and irreplaceable.

August 5th, 2002

Using sex and refraining from procreating is to devalue the person because, when sex is used, it's value is the same as the end. When sex is use, it's value is the same as the end; so using sex yet and deliberately subordinating using sex for end x 2 using yet for end y subordinates x 2 y. But refraining from using sex at all does not subordinate x to anything, because sex has the same value as the end only insofar as it is used for an end.

We know that choosing to use sex while preventing conception evaluates persons as not being ends-in-themselves. And we want to avoid choices that value persons as not being ends-in-themselves. So we have the *end* avoiding that kind

of choice. So one kind of choice that we avoid for the sake of that end is artificial contraception. So we will refrain from seeking other ends associated with sex and practicing contraception at the same time. But we can also avoid other ends by simply refraining from sex altogether. The two cases differ in that in the second I avoid the kind of choice I want to avoid by *sacrificing* other goals associated with sex.

If I am going to use sex, I will use it so that I do not prevent it from participating in the value of the person. It does not participate in the value of persons if I seek some other value while contravening procreation or subordinating procreation to some other goal. But it only participates in the value of an end insofar as I choose it as a means to ends. If I do not choose it as a means to ends, to the extent that I do not choose to use it as a means to ends, the issue of sharing the value of persons need not come up.

In our values the value of the means equivalent to the value of the end only insofar as we choose to use the means for some end. Only then should the status of the means in our values be equivalent to the value of an end. (Come to think of it it would be wrong if a mere means and the value of an end in our evaluations at any time other than we use it as a means for that end. So it would be wrong to give sex same value as a person in any other case.) Only when we value sex as not being a means to absolute values or as being means to absolute values does what in reality is a means to absolute values correctly have or incorrectly fail to have a status in our evaluations of dealing equivalent to absolute value. And so, when we are considering how to use sex for an end, we are considering whether to correctly make it equivalent to the value of the person or incorrectly to private of that value. When we are considering whether to use sex as a means or to use refraining from sex as a means, we can see that refraining to use sex as a means can value persons as

ends-in-themselves. For automotive for not choosing to use sex as a means would be not wanting to use sex in a way that would incorrectly get the status in our values of not being a means to absolute value. That is, we can refrain from sex precisely because persons are ends-in-themselves in our system of values but would not be ends-in-themselves in our system of values if we used sex in a certain way.

I can give persons the proper status in my values both when I am not choosing to use my person making ability and when I choose not to use my person making ability, but not when I choose to use my person making ability and also to prevent the existence of persons. One reason is that I have no obligation to the child that would be produced if I chose to use sexuality; so I have no obligation to bring that child into existence. To be obligated to use my person making ability would amount to being obligated to bring another person into existence.

December 20th, 2002, other sexuality issues:

Human existence results from the activity of a causal organism. That causal organism consists of the union of men and women in intercourse. The meaning of that union between man and woman in intercourse is capable of being the fact that the man and woman have made a permanent commitment of love to one another. Committed love is love of the other person as irreplaceable in his or her value.

If that is the meaning of the existence of the organism that produces a human

child, the meaning of the human child's existence is the fact that persons are worthy of permanent, committed love as irreplaceable values.

But what if the meaning of the existence of the organism that produces a human child is less than that of a union between a man and a woman resulting from a permanent commitment of love to one another? Can the meaning of the existence of the product of that organism be that such a product is worthy of permanent, committed love?

Also, in the context of a properly functioning family, the child learns that the meaning of its life is that persons are worthy of committed, permanent, unconditional love. The child learns that the meaning of its existence is the fact that persons such as it are worthy of love as irreplaceable values. For the child learns that he or she exists because of that kind of love between persons. He or she exists because persons deserve that kind of love from one another.

August 8, 2003

The nature of what exists can impose obligation it can only if it is related to some end of ours. (And if the nature of what exists does not impose obligation, our ends make morality arbitrary, that is, a rowdy becomes relative to our ends.) The nature of what exists must be related to our orientation to some future end. If our evaluations can cause us to decide that and exists can oriented to ends of the same value is not our moral equal, morality is arbitrary, not imposed by what exists. So allowing us to decide that a fetus is not equal to us in value is to make morality arbitrary.

Notice that a fetus certainly is not equal to us in functional value. But if

we measure a fetus by functional value only, we have already secluded the fetus from being a person. That is, from being something intrinsically valuable, something that exists for the sake of its own ends. But if its ends are the equal of our ends, either it is also something that exists for its own sake, or neither of us are things that exist for their own sake. And if neither of us are things that exist for their own sake, is entirely arbitrary whether or not it is good or evil to kill either of us.

New topic:

Can there be a reason not to have as many children as humanly possible? Assume that there can be such a reason. That reason must be based on the fact that persons are absolute values. So that reason leaves persons absolute values in our evaluations. So long as sex remains for the sake of absolute values in our evaluations, that is, as long as our decisions respecting sex leave persons as absolute values in our evaluations, we can abstain. For in choosing to abstain, I do not exclude sexuality from existing for the sake of being a person making ability. Its place in my evaluations is still that of being a person making ability.

xxxAdd to Wittgenstein and Maritain on Intentional Existence, Apr 10, 00

In this section where I try to show that Maritain's theory of intentional existence is correct, as opposed to Wittgenstein's, I say that the example that I analyze is an example where we are aware of an actual

entitative existent. The example is of a sense perception. An opponent might say that sense perception is not a good example because sense perception alone does not tell us that we are not hallucinating. Rather, we have to use inductive reasoning to conclude that we are not hallucinating and therefore that we are not sensing a nonexistents, or we are not aware of a nonexistents (i.e., the opponent who says intentional existence is basically for reference to the nonexistent).

The reply is that the epistemological question of how I know I am not hallucinating is a different question from the one I am answering when I say that sense perception makes us aware of an actual entitative existent. For what the inductive reasoning tells us is that this sense experience is an experience of a real existent. So when I say that sense perception bears on a real existent, I am assuming, as I have a right to assume, that the epistemological question has already been answered. For the answer to that question does not refute, but reinforces, the fact that this experience is an experience of a real existent, and so that the purpose of intentional existence is not to explain how we can consciously relate to the nonexistents.

But it remains the case that Wittgenstein is the only philosopher since Aristotle to independently come up with the concept of the object of awareness existing with in the conscious being, ourselves.

August 9th, 2003

Simon calls intentional existence and " objective union". Why is it a "union"? For one thing, it is a connection. To have something as an object is to be connected to that object somehow. In particular, it is to be connected to it as something that specifies what the state of consciousness is and what we are and so far as we have that particular state of consciousness. It is to be connected to it as something that determines what we are; determines the content of what we are in some way. It is to be connected to its as something that forms what we are in some way. In some way that makes us what we are. We are connected to this rather than that, to what this is rather than to what that it is.

March 3, 2004, big our phone of

In "an introduction to ontology of knowledge," page 66, Simon says that "in the case of cognition, all that matters is to exist as qualified by the object." When I know an object, I am qualified by what that object is. What that object is is in some way part of what I am. Because what I am would be different if the object I am knowing were different from what it is. At one time, what I am is someone who sees a circular red space on someone else's arm; at another time what I am is someone who sees a blue red space on someone else's arm. So what I am differs according to what the object I am aware of is. My history would be different, if the object were different.

So assume I am looking at a circular area covered by red on someone else's arm. That circular area qualifies what the other person is. It is a quality of his being. He exists as qualified by a red patch. I exist as qualified by having that red patch as an object. Those are two different ways of existing as qualified by that object. What they are both real, as opposed to imaginary, and as opposed to ingenuine, ways of existing as qualified by a red patch. So there are two different modes of real, genuine existence in which what I am, what I exist as, can include a red patch.

When I see a red patch, it is accidental both to my act of vision, which belongs to me, and to the red patch whether or not the red patch belongs to me as a quality. The act of seeing a red patch on somebody else's arm is the same as the act of seeing a red patch that happens to be on my arm.

Is not accidental to being aware of the existence of pain that the pain alongs to me. That the pain is a quality of my being is not accidental to the act by which I am conscious of the pain; and it is not accidental to the existence of the pain as a quality of my being that I am conscious of it by means of that act. (It is not accidental to act of seeing red that the act belongs to me.)

How does anesthesia affect this analysis?

xxxFrom the Turing Machine to an Averoes Machine, consciousness, Apr 10, 00

A better test of the difference between a computer intelligence and human, a better test than Turing's test, would be a test in which the computer has to tell the truth. That is, a test in which the computer has to give correct answers, rather than try to fool us with answers programmed to imitate human answers. In particular, we want truthful answers to the question whether the computer is conscious. The problem is how do you ask such questions. In fact there are several problems under that heading. One problem is how do you ask such a question in a way that doesn't lead the computer to the answer you want or the answer you don't want. But a more basic problem, one presupposed by the previous problem, is just how you ask the computer whether it is conscious in a way that allows the computer to give a truthful answer. Well, how do you ask human beings whether they are conscious? One way is to describe consciousness in terms of bipolarity. That is, following Fred Crossen, to use Husserl's description of consciousness as opposed to Descartes's. Descartes had the two acts theory of self consciousness: the act by which we are aware of ourselves as knowers of objects is distinct from the act by which we are aware of the object. Husserl, on the other hand, saw that any act of consciousness was bipolar including awareness both of an object and of ourselves precisely as being aware of the object.

But there is another way to describe consciousness that many philosophers are not aware of. Averroes used Aristotelian concepts to describe conscious states in a way that distinguished them from non conscious states. It would be very interesting to use Averroes's description in two tests. The first test would use Averroes's concepts to see whether we could get a human being to give truthful answers to the question whether you are conscious. If the first test succeeds, then we can use the same test on a computer. How would we construct such a test? (Is the value at address xxx or in register 12 nonzero?)

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you ask the computer whether it is conscious in a way of the asking that allows the computer to give a truthful answer.

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First, you would teach students to use the Aristotelian matter and form a vocabulary. But you would do this in as simplified a way as possible. You would not get into the distinction between prime matter and substantial form. You could get into the distinction between substance and accident in order to explain the matter/form relation between them. Perhaps you could prepare the students by giving them some good reading on these concepts. Perhaps the section on matter and form from Gilson's *Being and Reality*. Or you might use Mortimer Adler or John wild. Then you ask them whether, for example, the square of light on the retina was a matter form relationship. Then whether all our consciousness of the square has a form/matter relationship with what we are without that consciousness. Hopefully we could get them to give an affirmative answer to both questions without needing to ask leading questions.

Then we would ask them about the perceived square, the square that is the object of consciousness. Is

that square a feature of us? Is it a characteristic of what we are? But perhaps it would be better to start someplace else. In fact, it would definitely be better. We should start by asking them questions like would you be completely the same person if you are now seeing a circle rather than a square? Is it different for a person to be seeing someone being mutilated as opposed to seeing a beautiful portrait.? Yes it is different. Is the history of the person who sees someone being mutilated different from the history of a person who sees a beautiful portrait instead? Or, is the history of someone who saw Pearl Harbor taking place different from the history of someone who instead saw a New York Yankee ballgame taking place at the same time?

The answer to these questions is, of course, yes. And the hope would be that after asking this kind of question, it would be easier to get them to say yes the object that we see it is a feature, a characteristic, of what we are. From there we would try to get them to say that that it is not a feature in the same way that the Square on our retina is or our consciousness of the Square is. And we would try to get them to say that the difference is that unlike the latter features, the object is not related to us by a form/matter relationship. Why? Because the object is present precisely as a characteristic of something other than ourselves or simply as itself other than ourselves. If it had a form/matter relationship to us, it would not be related to us as something other than us.

In trying to lead the student up to these answers we might be able to use multiple-choice tests, assuming again that the answers are so written as not to allow the student to give the right answer just because he thinks that it is the answer that we want.

But the tests I have just described might not be the tests we want to give the computer. If a computer is not conscious, we do not want to ask it a question that requires it to have a relationship to, say, a square that can be described as not a matter form relationship. We can't start by asking it whether it has a relationship to an object that we can later ask whether it is a matter form relationship. Somehow, we want to ask the computer whether it has a relationship to say, a square, of a kind that cannot be described as a matter form relationship because the object is present precisely as having a matter form relationship to

something other than the computer.

Again however, we might be able to use multiple-choice questions. Which of the following is a kind of relationship that you, the computer, does not have to the square?

It is important that we do not have to agree with Averroes to find this kind of question interesting and worthwhile. Averroes's theory is an example, a model, of a kind of theory that we can use to describe the difference between conscious states and non conscious states. Having seen this example, maybe we can find others. (How teach a computer metaphysical vocabulary?)

April 20, 2000, AI, Adler-U, Jun 17, 1998

How to ask a machine: Are you conscious? Don't ask it if it is self-conscious. Ask about the contents of self-consciousness, that is, the prior consciousness of the other that self-consciousness is consciousness of.

Are you related to, do you have a relation to ... To the word Atriangle@? Yes. To that for which the word Atriangle@ is used? Here one answer might be AYes, I have a relation to that triangle, and that triangle, and that triangle, ad infinitum@ (Wittgenstein on the series). Since it can't be related to an actual infinity of triangles, can we replace the reference to the members of the set by a reference to a formula the covers each member, the formula for a triangle? Yes, but then we have to ask the same questions about each sign in the formula.

Can I ask it ABut do you have the kind of relation to that for which Atriangle@ is used that my Poincaré article shows to be a necessary cause of the behavior of using Atriangle@ meaningfully?@ AYes, I am related to that, that, that, etc. and each of them instantiates that for which Atriangle@ is used.@ But do

you have a relation to it such that what individuates that, and that, and that is not included? Well, I've got a relation to a math formula that applies to all triangles. But do you have a relation to each term in the formula such that you are related to that for which the term is used without including what differentiates this and that?

Once we have explained consciousness in terms of matter and form, or better in terms of the contrast with a matter and form analysis, we should be able to extend the explanation to self consciousness. Awareness of self is a feature residing in a subject. So awareness of self is a form/matter relationship. But consciousness of self also differs from all other kinds of features residing in a subject. In consciousness we have a relation to ourselves that is other than a matter form relationship, just as our relationship to an external object of consciousness is other than a matter form relationship. In other words, the conscious knower exists in two ways. He exists as a subject with a feature. And she exists with another kind of existence at the same time. She has what she is existing in her as object, that is, what she is exists with an existence over and above that of a subject. The Square visual object exists within us but exists within us in away other than that of the form received by a matter. It does not exist within us as a feature received in a matter, even though it is a genuine feature of ourselves. Likewise, consciousness exists within us but not as a feature received in matter, when we are talking about self consciousness. Consciousness has an existence like the existence of the Square visual object.

11-24-00

After explaining how sensory consciousness comes into existence: so is sensory consciousness an unobservable process running alongside of all of the physical processes that we are able to observe? No, it is a process unobservable by exterior observation running alongside all of the processes that are observable by exterior observation. But sensory consciousness is not unobservable absolutely. It is observable by interior experience. And that interior experience is the experience of a physical being, a being that does not possess some factor like a sole that would be capable of existing apart from matter.

Nor are any of the processes that we are talking about capable of existing apart from matter.

Perhaps the tenacity of the modern mind/body problem can be explained almost entirely by the epistemological fallacy of completely eschewing interior experience in favor of exterior experience. Perhaps I should call this a U-turn rather than an epistemological fallacy. The opponent is aware of how notoriously unreliable descriptions, assertions, based on interior experience are. But if my analysis of sensory consciousness is correct, interior experience should be the only way to observe sensory consciousness.

The zone of the objects of sensory consciousness, the domain of the objects of sensory consciousness, is the domain of matter/form unions. Sensory consciousness is not a matter/form union. So sensory consciousness cannot be the object of external experience. But awareness of the existence of external experience is what we mean by internal experience.

So sensory consciousness is a physical process that is observable in precisely the way that it should be observable. It is observable in the only way that it can be observable. And this way of being observable does not make sensory consciousness an occult process, except for those who define everything not observable by external experience as something occult. But that way of defining is what creates the whole problem.

June 26, 2001

A computer does mechanical process, i.e., a math proof, (1) by means of another mechanical, algorithmic process (2), but has no understanding of the validity of the process. I perform mechanical process (1) by means of a different algorithmic process (3), but in addition I am aware of the rules of validity at the same time. Is it possible to explain that simultaneous awareness of validity by means of a further algorithmic, or any algorithm, without an infinite regress?

March 5, 2004 big

Let's say we design a computer that can "see" that there is a red patch on my arm and produce the true sentence "there is a red patch on your arm." When I say "see," I mean something like this. Light bounces off the arm toward the computer and is somehow registered in the computer in away analogous to the way light is registered by our power of vision.

We turn on the computer and the light. Then we ask the computer "is there a red patch on the arm?" or "what color is the patch on the arm?" Or something like that. Then the computer produces the correct answer. The question is whether there is a process of consciousness going on in computer as when we perform the same kind of behavior that the computer just performed.

To answer the questions we ask it, the computer checks certain data points in memory. One data point will tell it what color it has registered. The way the data point tells it is by containing certain settings of the memory units. A setting of a memory unit is a matter form relationship. A potency has either been actualized or not actualized. Such an actualization is a matter form relationship.

I now ask the computer whether it has any relation to the patch, the color, the arm, or any combination of the use, that goes beyond being a matter form relationship. The reason I ask the question this way is that my consciousness of the red patch on the arm begins where a merely matter form relationship ends. The fact that I possess that consciousness is a matter form relationship. But what I am then possessing is not a matter form relationship. What I am then possessing, the state of consciousness of the object, the relation to the object, is not a matter form relation. Because it is a relation to another. If I had a matter form relationship to it, I would be qualified by the red patch the same way that I am qualified by the existence of the consciousness of the red patch.

The consciousness of the red patch is a quality of my being the same way that the red patch is. That is, the consciousness of the red patch is a property I possess. But the nature of that property namely the

nature of the relation to the red patch, is not the relation of possessing the red patch the way I possess it when there is a red patch on my arm. So I am asking the computer whether the red patch on my arm is a quality of the computer in any other way than away matter form qualities are qualities of the computer. (Is it part of my true description in any other way. Is what Mr. Smith is part of my true description. Are there true sentences about what I am that require what Mr. Smith is to be part of my true description?)

Now how do I explain to the computer what a matter form relationship is? And how do I explain the criteria for being a matter form relationship to the computer in such away that, in theory, the computer should be able to judge that its consciousness, if it has such, goes beyond being a matter form relationship? Maybe I can't explain that to computer. But if not, that proves the point that computer processes are not like human thought. Human thought can and must grasp metaphysical concepts. For human beings to be rational animals is for them to be metaphysical animals.

xxxThomism, Metaphysics. Existence and Essence, Substance, Matter and Form, Apr 4, 00

Unless we can prove that there is more than 1 substance in the universe, Thomists have a problem. The big bang theory creates the possibility that the universe is one substance. If you ask how all the innumerable parts of the universe can be one substance, I will reply in the same way that the body with all its innumerable parts can be one substance. But there is this important difference. We explain the unity of the body by saying that the substantial form is present in every part. That is, that the whole of the substantial form is present in every part. I don't believe that what I'm going to saying next has been said before, but it is worth saying. To get an idea of how the whole of the substantial form can exist in every part, compare the form's causality to God's causality of the universe. We say that God is present everywhere by his causality. In other words, anywhere, that is any specific place we could point to, exists only because God is there making it exists. Likewise with the body. The only reason all or extended body exists, on the matter form theory, is that the substantial form causes an extended body to exist. Here the causality is formal not efficient, as it is in the case of God. But other than that the analogy

is pretty good. Any spot on our body, on our extended body, exists as such, that is, exists as part of an extended continuum, only because the substantial form causes that spot to exist as part of a continuum by causing the continuum to exist. The substantial form can only do this by existing in each part. If it did not exist in each part, only part of the substantial form would exist in each part. Then the substantial form would itself be an extended continuum, and we would have to explain how that continuum comes to exist as a unified continuum. The only way the substantial form can be an explanation of the existence of a unified continuum is by the whole substantial form's presence at every point in the continuum. And that simply means that the form is present by its causality, because that is what the form is, a cause. So where a part of the continuum exists, the cause of the continuum must exist, and so the substantial form must exist.

To get back to comparing the universe as one substance to the body as one substance: the problem with using the matter form theory as the basis of the comparison is that the truth of the matter form theory presupposes the existence of more than one substance. It either presupposes the existence of a multitude of substances existing at the same time, or a succession of substances resulting from a succession of substantial changes. If neither of those conditions is the case, what is the basis for the matter form theory? And if the universe is one substance, neither of those conditions is the case.

Actually, there is one other way, at least, to get to the matter form theory. That way it is by explaining the relationship between universal concepts and they are individual instances. I will come back to this way later. (Also by quantitative division of the continuum?)

There is another problem for Thomists, if the universe is one substance. How do we argue for the real distinction between existence and essence? (Is the reason we, not angels, need judgments to know the truth just that our objects are not the whole thing? If angels know the whole individual, do they know its existence? If not, maybe we can argue for the essence/existence distinction this way.) A common way of arguing for it is From the multiplicity of substances. Multiplicity requires a limitation. Limitation requires the reception all the act by a potency really distinct from the act; hence the real distinction between the act of existence and essence.

Another way of arguing for about real distinction occurs after we have proven the existence of God and established that he is pure act. But can we use the standard arguments for the existence of God if the universe is one substance? How do we know, for instance, that the existence of this substance is contingent? In fact, how do we know that this substance's existence is distinct from its essence?

I am not saying that these questions cannot be answered. But I am saying that there is work to be done, philosophical work to be done, that cannot be done simply by commenting on the texts of Aquinas. In other words, to answer this question, or these questions, Thomists will have to do something they are unfamiliar with: work of a philosophical kind.

For instance, I can't think of one possible way to argue for a multiplicity of substances that is very round about. If we can prove that intellectual activity requires a substantial form that is subsistent, we can argue that the existence of human beings constitutes the existence of a multiplicity of substances, and of substances that come into existence through substantial change. But how do we established that intellectual activity requires a subsistent substantial form if we do not have the matter form theory as a given to argue from? Perhaps there is a way. We might be able to argue that what things are, that is, what individuals are, could not be truthfully expressed by universal concepts unless individuals were composed of substantial form and prime matter. Or even if there's only one individual other than human beings, namely, the universe, for us to be able to truthfully describe that substance by means of universal concepts might imply that this one substance was composed of matter and form.

I will not try to develop that argument any further here. But I would like to add one point about proofs of the immateriality of the soul in general. We have to establish the existence of universal concepts in human beings in a way in which they do not exist in animals. One possibility that has not been explored, as far as I know, is that though animals appear to be able to use universal concepts, they give no evidence of being aware of universality as such. That is, we not only use universal concepts but we are aware of the fact that they are universal. We can reflect on that fact. That might be one way of

distinguishing animal intelligence from human intelligence.

Also, I will add an answer to an objection against the suggested way of proving of the existence of a multiplicity of substances. What if an opponent were to say that the multiplicity of human consciousnesses no more proves the existence of many substances than the fact that we are conscious through many parts of our body proves that we are more than one substance. In other words, why can't the existence of many human consciousnesses be ways that the one substance is conscious, just as our sight, our touch, our hearing, our imagination, etc. are different ways in which we are conscious?

Without answering this argument completely, I want to point out that it is obviously based on a false analogy. We are able to ask about the unity of all of the different ways in which we are conscious because as a matter-of-fact our consciousness is unified. That is, we are aware that it is the same being who sees, who hears, who imagines, etc. the universe, on the other hand, gives no evidence of such a unified consciousness. That is there is no evidence that Joe's consciousness and my consciousness are unified in a higher consciousness that is aware of both Joe's consciousness and my consciousness. So the alleged analogy is pure speculation.

Also, we might be able to argue that the existence of the one substance is contingent, or that its existence is distinct from its essence, from the fact that it undergoes accidental change. That fact proves that this substance is not pure act. If its existence were identical with its essence, that is, if its essence were an act of existing, could it be in potency to anything? If not, then it could not undergo accidental change.

August 9, 2003, big

Where there is potency in a being there is intrinsic multiplicity, because pure potency cannot exist as such. Since substance is in potency to accidents, the substance itself is not pure act or pure potency and must be a mixture. So existence is distinct from essence in it, since existence is act relative to whatever else there is in it.

Can we analyze existence itself into a compound of act and potency? If so, is not the act part of that composite the real existence? Can it be replied that fact any potency is identical with something that is a state of actuality in the different respect? So the existence would be identical with something that is in act of a certain respect in the same time potential in other respects. In other words, it really wouldn't be a composite in the sense of having distinct parts, but only in the sense that the same thing is in act in a certain respect at the same time in potency another respects.

In other words, is it possible that every form of act can be identical with a form of potency? Can every form of act also be a formal potency by its identity with itself? If not, then the act part of the "existence" must be the real existence. And every time something is in act in a certain respect and in potency another respect there is in that thing a distinction of two parts, by one of which parts it is in act and by the other of which parts it is in potency. It is the unified thing that is that one and the same time in act in certain respects and in potency in other respects; but that one unified saying is in act by reason of one element of its makeup and in potency by reason of another. It is not the element that is in act or in potency; it is the thing composed of the elements that is that the same time in act and in potency in different respects. Otherwise, it would not be true that every potency is identical with something that is a form of actuality in another respect.

So if there is an existence that is in act in some respect and in potency another respects, that existence itself must be composed of elements. And the element by reason of which the existence is in act is the real existence. So in the last analysis, existence cannot be in potency in any respect, and anything that is in potency in any respect, for example, a changeable thing, cannot be identical with its existence. Since it is not identical with its existence, there is a potency act relation between it and its existence, and its existence is therefore necessarily a caused existence, caused by an existence that is not itself the existence of an essence other than itself.

xxxC and D, predicament, Jan. 24, 2000

For the introduction to a re-introduction to philosophy, or for epilogue: at this point in history of philosophy every word has been used in so many different senses, and these senses are related in so many subtle and complex ways, that it takes almost a superhuman effort of concentration not to fall into error when trying to do philosophy. (As time goes on, it gets more difficult, not less, to know philosophical truth, i.e., to learn philosophical truth [educability; teachability].)

The Fregean might respond that it is precisely this problem that motivates him to look to Fregean methods for a way out. Of course, the history of using Fregean methods has not only failed to provide a way out but it just added to the number and complexity of the meanings. But also the kind of concentration and awareness I am talking about is different from the kind necessary to do logistic correctly. In fact that very word "different" in the last sentence illustrates precisely the kind of difficulty that incredibly multiple meanings now create for doing philosophy. (So logistic adds more different meanings or sets of meanings.)

When you say one thing is different from another, the reader who has been conditioned by Quine is liable to incorrectly think that you are invoking some sort of untenable dualism between these two things. He will want to say, with Quine, everything is together on the same continuum. But by using the word "different" I was not implying that things were not on the same continuum; points on the continuum are different from another aren't they? In saying that one thing is different from another, all I am saying is that I am able to point to characteristics assertible of one of them that are not assertible of the other and that the [placenta and] of those characteristics have consequences that are true of one and not true of the other and that these characteristics are important from a point of view which happens to be the point of view from which I am speaking at the moment, not the only possible point of view.

Certainly there are points of view from which philosophical language can be viewed as on a continuum with formal languages. Perhaps there are no points of view from which they cannot be seen as on a

continuum. Still, more than a century of philosophy has proven that skill in using formal languages does not diminish the number, the subtlety, the complexity, and sometimes the profundity, of the multiple meanings words can have in philosophy nor does it increase our ability to escape the kind of paradox and disagreement those multiple meanings have always produced and produce geometrically more frequently as time goes on.

New topic:

Answering of philosophical questions requires sorting out many strands and putting them in the right place. But we start with a very tangled web. And every step is perilous; every step is one where you can go off the deep end. To sort it all out you have to concentrate.

No matter how rigorous we consider ourselves to be, the fact is that in philosophy we don't push back far enough against our own assumptions. Maritain says that critical idealists are not critical enough, and that is their problem. Logical positivists were praised for being so rigorous, even against their own assumptions. The exact opposite is the case of logical positivists. The fact that they could not see this at the same time that they and their admirers were patting themselves on the fact for being so rigorous is proof enough of what I'm trying to show. It could be no better illustration of it.

Very often the following kind of situation occurs in philosophy. We have our attention fixed on an object that is only deceptively relevant, and actually not relevant, to the philosophical problem. For example, we contemplate a tri-valued logical system as an object. We think that in doing so we are helping to solve problems about quantum mechanics. We neglect that we still have to use, bivalent logic to do logic. Focusing on certain properties of the object, we are blissfully unaware of properties, the central properties, without which there would be no focusing on the object, and even no object, that is, without which the object could not be constructed.

Contemporary culture has demonstrated that value commitments can blind even educated people to

scientific truth. For example, consider feminism, global warming, homosexuality, overpopulation, environmental issues, etc. If value commitments can do this relative to scientific truth, they can do it much more so in the area of the paragenetic and of the problems caused by thing/object identity.

The meaning of Kant much is clearer than it was before. He was taking a good idea to an illogical extreme. What he should have said is that we are much, much less prone to error in using causal necessary true is as regulative principles for empirical knowledge than we are when using them philosophically, that is, when studying causal necessity ontologically. In other words, we are much much more prone to error when doing philosophy. We should all recognize that our being much more prone to error in philosophy is a very well established empirical fact. But error in philosophy, for example, the generation of contradictions, are not necessary, as Kant thought they were.

If post-Fregean philosophy has no successes as measured by solving pre-Fregean questions (as opposed to solutions to post-Fregean questions like agreeing that quantification has only one meaning), then pre-Fregean philosophy must be a really strange bird. Exactly. That is the only reasonable conclusion to come to. But that reasonable conclusion is not the same as the unreasonable conclusion that would make pre-Fregean philosophy invalid and/or unnecessary. Nothing could be more necessary. Perhaps we could defying philosophy as that which contains the answers to all those puzzles we cannot seem to answer. If so, the reason we have not answered them is that philosophy so defined is very, very difficult.

New topic:

In philosophy we are always replying to objections, to real or imaginary opponents. In mathematics and logic we rarely do. That is the condition of philosophy; the state of philosophy.

Abstraction in Math and metaphysics, logic, calculational method, Frege, C and D, phil method, Big 09-16-01

I did not make any progress on this until the Lord showed me how to analyze concrete examples showing

the difference between mathematical abstraction and philosophical abstraction. This is not induction from concrete examples. Induction would imply that I already know the right way to express the difference. If I don't know that yet, multiplying lying examples will not help per se.

Compare "snow is white" and "existence is the act of all acts." The second is abstract relative to the first. But " $\text{Ex} (\text{Fx} \rightarrow \text{Gx})$ " is abstract relative to both in a different way. There are 2 parts to the difference: a symbolic use of signs and the calculational use of signs.

I can remember how all the words are used in a long, complex philosophical sentence. I cannot remember whether it was "Fxy" or "Fyx", etc. this problem relates to be symbolic use of signs, not directly to the calculational use of signs.

Now consider a long series of additions: $247 + 143 + 9562 +$, etc. first, I cannot remember the whole string, and so I don't remember the whole thought. In contrast, I can remember a whole complicated philosophical series of thoughts. Second, I don't know what the result of the addition is until I perform the operations that are what the + signs stand for. The second problem relates to the calculational use of signs.

August 9th, 2003

The U-turner says this: if we think of it this way (for example, disquotation), we don't have any problem. Yes, but is that the only legitimate way to think about it? Or does the "way of thinking about it" succeed only by being selective about how it wants to look at a question? If we assume that there is no more to the question can this, we get the conclusion we want. But the fact that looking at it this way avoids the problem is not itself evidence that there really isn't any problem. Think of the problem of universals, substance, causality, disquotation, foundations of math, what are numbers, etc..

We "can think about" Zeno's arrow "as an infinite addition problem." But can we think about the problem of

universals as a quantification over predicates problem? We "can" but does it do us any good? And in fact, though we can think of the arrow as an infinite addition problem and solve that problem, does doing so solve the philosophical problem?

xxxMemory, Jan. 24, 2000

In the memory, we are aware of an object as something that did dominate over us, did thrust itself upon us, that was thrust upon us. So in memory, we have an awareness of ourselves as having been dominated over in this way, as having had this object thrust upon us, etc. but in imagination, we have an awareness of an object, like a red or a musical note, as potentially thrusting itself upon an as something that can potentially thrust of itself upon us, or be thrust upon us.

xxxLogic, Pena, Vagueness, Sorites, Jan. 24, 2000

Whoever is rich has enough money to achieve these practical results. Whoever has X amount is rich. Does it follow that whoever has one less than X is still rich? That depends on what you mean by the practical results. If you have an exact quantity in mind, it may not be true that one less than X makes you rich. If you don't have an exact quantity in mind, "rich" does not objectify individual quantities quantitatively. So we mix types of concepts when we try to reason from whoever has X is rich to whoever has one less than X is rich, where X and rich may be nonquantitative objectifications while "1" is quantitative.

Rich is a subjective description. It assumes that the hearer and I share a common goal. It describes quantity by saying of it that the quantity is significant from the point of view of that goal or that the quantity is subjectively impressive in a positive sense from the point of view of that goal. The reason that we replace a subjective description with quantitative is precisely that subjective descriptions can vary with the eye of the beholder. So the fallacy of going from rich to plus one is like that of going from ought to is. Rich is like ought to, and plus one is like is.

The bottom line is that just because it is fallacious to mix these kinds of concept in a argument does not mean that each statement taken singly cannot be true.

We are invalidly combining two kinds of measurement, like forgetting to convert from metric to British, but here conversion is invalid. + 1 indicates one kind of measurement. "Big", "rich" etc. indicates another. That latter is basically subjective. I have such and such a reaction to his size, based on my goals and experience; and in using "big" I am assuming that you have goals and experience similar enough to mine that you will have a similar reaction. "Big" says "You would have the kind of reaction I had, and for the same reason. But I am not assuming how far our similarity in reaction would go, as the absolute size differed, anymore than I am assuming how far my similarity in reaction would go; for I do not know, nor do I need to know, how far my similarity in reaction would go. The reason I do not need this is that unclear cases cannot disprove the existence of clear cases.

The fact that our two reactions may only be similar, or that two reactions of mine may only be similar, in a certain respect is no problem. Even in the case of strictly univocal and universal terms, the individuals to which they apply are only similar outside the mind. The question is whether they are sufficiently similar that the same abstracted concept can be identical with each. But sometimes the abstracted concept does not apply clearly to all cases; sometimes it does; sometimes it only applies clearly to some cases.

The last two paragraphs apply to +1 kind of vagueness, i.e., vagueness where the opposite kind of measurement is objective and quantitative. What about "chair", "car", etc., including "vague" itself? These cause no problem unless they function in the same kind of sorites as +1 type vague terms. If they do function in such sorites, another way out must apply to them.

And why not just come out and say that I will use "big", "rich," etc. in a way that makes it logically invalid to combine them in argument with +1?

Perhaps there is a similarity here to reasoning with analogical concepts. Two things make it possible to do this. First, the analogical term is used in the same way each time it appears in the argument. That is, no statement in the argument uses the analogical term in such a way that the use is proper only to one analogate and not the others. In vagueness, you do not combine vague predications with +1 predications. Each general term has to be vague in the same way.

Second, the possibility of analogical reasoning may also rely on the fact that the two analogical terms vary in the same way, e.g., whatever exists is good such that variations in ways of existing have corresponding variations in ways of having goodness or being good.

April 20, 2000

The title of the article might be "in defense of a fallacy: vagueness reconsidered." Or perhaps vagueness appreciated, or perhaps vagueness defended.

If the premise is "if the thing is big, then the thing minus one is big," there is a fallacy of equivocation. The word big is used in different senses in the antecedent and the consequent. In the antecedent big has a practical rather than a speculative meaning. It means something like significant for the purposes at hand. It is significant from the point of view of some assumed goal that is taken for granted in the conversation, taken for granted in the background of the conversation. I have remarks to this effect somewhere in another Notes file. Or it means that the thing has a size that would impress you, the listener, or impresses me, the speaker, given certain goals or standards we are assumed to have.

In the antecedent it must mean something different. Why? Because the consequent use is a speculatively defined quantity, plus one, or minus one. For the consequent to have truth value, then, or for the consequent to be true, the other term of the plus or minus relation should also be a speculatively defined quantity.

Not all vagueness is of the quantitative variety. For example, chair is a vague predicate. But could chair be used in the sorites? Perhaps not, but as far as the sorites goes, to combine a word like one or two to a word like big or small is to combine two different kinds of measuring, two different ways of measuring. Likewise, reasoning with analogical terms is valid only because in sentences like "whatever exists is good" the subject in the predicate are measured in the same way and so vary what each other in the same way. That is, as one thing differs from another with reference to existence, it will also differ from another with reference to goodness. So the syllogism using that premise doesn't take existence or goodness in the specific way in which applies only to the minor term. The syllogism uses each of these terms in the same way in the each premise and in the conclusion.

If we were to define a term like "big" one time as a quantity falling within such and such a specifically measured range and in other time as a quantity that would be impressive from the point of view of a person who has a goal x as the standard which determines whether she is impressed or not, we would be using that term in two different senses; we would be using that term using that term equivocally.

If I tell gold digger that blind date I am fixing her up with is "rich," what I mean is that the money he has is of a sufficient amount to "impress" her. In other words, "rich" is "defined" by a subjective reaction on her part. The fact that it will or will not impress her is not very precise, and the fact that she herself would hesitate over many cases, are both truths. And so they offer no evidence whatsoever against the existence of bivalent truth or our ability to know it.

Of course, if we had complete scientific knowledge, we could predict and state exactly what her reactions would be, clearly impressed, clearly unimpressed, or various states in between. Each of the states is what it is and is not what it is not. So each state is monovalent. But we can objectify these states in different ways and for different purposes. When we objectify such a state by the word-function of "rich", the truth value of the statement does not make the statement suitable for all purposes. In particular, it is not suitable for appearing in argument in which we draw a conclusion about what happens when we add an arithmetically objectified quantity to it.

xxxontological analysis big, January 12, 2000

Being is logically included in all word-functions, but it is not logically included in a way that distinguishes one word function from another. To be alluded to in a word function, that is, explicitly alluded to, is not the same as being logically included. And in ontological concepts being is explicitly alluded to in a way that distinguishes one kind of being from another.

We cannot use being and other ontological concepts to express, to objectify, how red and green differ. Ontological concepts can only express what red and green have in common. They can only express the similarity between red and green. Ontological concepts can only express what red and green have in common and what the differences between red and green have in common, and what the difference of red from green has a common with red, and what the difference of green from red as a common with green.

We cannot objectify what makes red differ from green by means of diverse ontological concepts, in terms of diverse ontological concepts. We can objectify what makes substance differ from accidents, causes from effects, actuality from potentiality, necessity from contingency, truth from falsity, etc. by means of diverse ontological concepts; we must objectify these things by means of diverse ontological concepts. It is a question of how we use being and other ontological concepts in objectifying diversities between things, between realities and aspects of reality.

Page

xxxLimitation of act by potency, 01-11-00

God overflows all bounds. About everything else we can only say that it is no longer bounded with respect to this kind of bound or that kind of bound. If something is no longer bounded by this or that kind of bound, it is unlimited in that respect, unlimited with respect to that kind of limitation. But it's still may be bounded in other respects, with respect to other kinds of bounds. A. subsistent whiteness would be on bounded with respect to that kind of bound that comes from a potency to receive whiteness. In other words, the potency for receiving whiteness is potentially infinite, and no amount of that potency can ever exhaust the possibility for whiteness. The whiteness itself can never be limited to a particular amount of whiteness, where amount refers to all the whiteness that can be received by potency for whiteness. But whiteness is still something limited in other respects; for whiteness itself is a way of receiving existence. It is a potency for exists. And so it is a limiting factor with respect to existence.

The following thought, pertinent to the limitation of act by potency, comes from thinking about the nature of absolute values in ethics. An absolute value differs from a value that is merely higher relative to others in the following way. Let say we have 10 things and we assign them relative values starting from 1 to 10, with 10 being the highest. Now if value 10 is not an absolute value, not the kind of value from which all other values derive and which itself does not derive from other values, then it would be legitimate to sacrifice value 10 for some combination of other values, as long as the total of the other values was greater than 10. There would be no value that was sacrosanct. Some combination of lesser values could always trump the value that was the highest value.

The connection with the limitation of act by potency is this. For those 10 items to be on the same scale such that number 10 is just a higher degree of whatever numbers one through nine have that gives them value, each member of the set must be an individual who is possession of whatever it is that gives each of them the value that is limited by being received by a potency. They are all on the same scale because some one value is multiplied by being received in a potential subject that limits the amount of the value that a potential subject has.

Start with the assumption that we have 10 individuals whose multiplicity is the result of their potencies. It

follows that their kind of comparative value, that is, the fact that they are on a scale where some combination of lower values can be higher than the value of the highest individual, depends on the fact that each is a subject whose potency has received a certain degree of the value.

Now make a different assumption: that we have a multiplicity of entities one of which so possesses the value in question that no possible combination of entities possessing that value in a lesser way could amount to more of the value than that possessed by that one entity. It would follow that the relationship between that one entity and the others is not that the one entity receives the value in question into a potency of the same kind as a potency that limits the other members of the multiplicity and puts them on a scale such that some combination of the lesser could always possess a greater value than the higher.

The genus is taken from the matter, from potency. That is, the kind is taken from the matter, the potency. The reason that no individual can be both red and green at the same time, odd or even at the same time, two, three, or four at the same time, is that potency of one kind can only be actualized in one way at the same time. Because that's what we mean by a potency of the same kind, by a potency for act that is the same kind: what we mean is that red and green are actualizations of the same potency, and as a result nothing can be red and green at the same time.

Going back to the previous two paragraphs. In one case we have the following "if, then," relation: if the multiplication results from potency, some combination of the lower can be greater than the higher. But do we have a "only if" relation: only if the multiplication results from potency can some combination of the lower be greater than the higher?

In the other case we have the following "if, then" relation: if no amount of the lower could be greater than the higher, then the higher is not just a potential subject that receives more of the same value. But do we have and "only if" relation: only if the higher is not just a potential subject receiving the value can some combination of the lower fail to be greater than the higher?

Or, in the first case, do we have the "only if" relation: only if some combination of the lower can be greater than the higher, can the higher be just another potential subject?

Or, in the second case, do we have the "only if" relation: only if no combination of the lower can be greater than the higher is the higher not just another potential subject?

xxxMiracles, 12-22-99

Essays in Thomism, edited by Robert E. Brennan

From an abundant spring: the Walter Farrell Thomist, P. J. Kennedy, New York

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xxxLife, substantial change, 12-22-99

Any causal system (CS) imposes its own form on something external to itself. In life the result of imposing the form is not a numerically distinct form or a numerically distinct CS with a similar form. The result is the continued existence of a CS oriented to use of the new material to act on itself, to so act on itself that one part of itself acts on another with the result of the continued existence of a CS oriented to achieve goals X, Y, Z. by parts of itself acting on parts of itself. The properties of the two (new?) become instrumental causes, causes used by the principal cause, the plant. Only in procreation does a CS pass its form to a numerically distinct individual. So do inanimate causes, but the form imposed is the form of a CS oriented to maintain its own existence by . . .

August 8, 2003, big

If an agent has all it takes to act and a prior change in the subject makes the subject properly disposed the agent's effect will then occur. Or if an agent is put in act, the agent's effect will then occur. The question is what makes the agent and the subject part of the same causal system?

What if two such sets of agents and subjects are not just part of two similar causal systems but are effects of similar causal systems? Or one such system is the cause and the second is its effect. The first agent and subject system produces a second agent and subject system that is similar.

We would then consider them unit causal systems on inductive grounds. But they would not be like two similar machine's that were not causally related to each other. Induction would tell us that the first machine and the second machine would operate similarly, but not that the first and second were related as cause and effect. Induction tells us that the original agent and subject combinations are systems (mereological sums) that not only operate similarly but that are also causally related such that the action of some parts of the first on the other parts of the first produce a system with parts that act on one another in the same way that the similar parts of the first acted on one another.

Induction then says that the two mereological sums are each a kind of causal unit each of whose parts are necessary effects of another causal unit of the same kind so the two are not just unified logically but are unified causally in a back word and forward direction. The being together of their parts is a necessary effect not just of causally unrelated mereological sums, but of the same kind of togetherness of the same kind of causes, where "kind" is defined both backwardly and forwardly.

In contrast atoms making a molecule of water is a more than logical sum. The atoms in the molecule just happen to be together. The only thing that is not just a happening is the production of a certain kind of effect, water, from a happening of this kind. (The opposite of a causal sum is a chance sum; a merely mereological sum is a chance sum.)

Likewise, the molecules of an amoeba just happen to be together (as far as we know before induction tells us otherwise), but they have a necessary connection with a certain kind of effect and with a certain kind of cause. Given certain atoms prior to the existence of water, water does not just happen. And the product of the amoeba does not just happen. Both water and amoebas are systems of certain kinds with certain kinds of effects but whose unity does not just happen relative to another kind of unity that might just happen.

So we do not consider the sets of atoms existing before the molecule water as a unified causal agent, that is, as having an existence other than that of a chance union. But we do consider the first amoeba as a system whose effect is a system of the same kind. So it is not just the second amoeba that we consider a unified system, as in the case of the molecule water, but the first amoeba also. And by induction we therefore consider anything of a kind of similar to those amoebas as unified causal systems also.

Life, March 2, 2004

Thoughts while rereading "an introduction to metaphysics of knowledge" on life. On page 75, he uses the phrase " changes completed within the subject from which they are understood to proceed." I make the marginal comments: to use this concept first identify something as the cause of a change ("from which it proceeds"), then if the change affects the very efficient cause from which it proceeds, it is life.

But all efficient causes differ from the material cause. So what does it mean to say that the change affects the cause from which it proceeds? It means that the nature of the immediate efficient cause is such that it, the efficient cause, depends on its connection with the material cause to be what it is, to be that which is able to produce this change in the material cause. The material cause part of the whole has a causal (known by induction) connection to what the

efficient cause part is. Machine parts do not; they are accidentally connected.

((Comments added in parentheses in this section of these notes come after reading the entry on Aristotle in the Internet encyclopedia of philosophy by Joe Sachs. A comment on the clause "the efficient cause depends on its connection with the material cause to be what it is": a living thing is a source of activities that keep in the existence the living thing, that keep in itself in existence. What do we mean by "itself"? What is the causal unit established by induction?)

The activity of a machine can be said to keep the machine in existence, or keep "itself" in existence, if we identify the machine precisely as an entity performing this kind of activity. That is, the machine's activity keeps itself in existence precisely insofar as what "itself" is is something performing this activity.

The activities of a living thing do something more. They keep the living thing in existence, not just as something performing these activities, but as something capable of performing these activities, something capable of continuing to perform these activities. The activities of the machine do not account for the fact that what the machine is as a whole is something capable of continuing these activities.

Both the machine and the living thing are sources of activities that are understood by induction to perfect a thing from which the activities proceed. That is, induction establishes that a machine is a unit causal system relative to the production of its activities and a living thing is a unit causal system relative to the production of its activities. Induction tells us that each complex system defined by certain characteristics causes certain typical activities, defined by certain characteristics.

Likewise, the activities that induction associates with these different agents definable by sets of characteristics other than the activities themselves are activities that perfect the agents of these activities. But only in the case of life does induction tell us that these activities perfect their agent precisely by making their agent a cause capable of continuing activities of that kind. So only living things' activities have the result of keeping the living thing in existence precisely as the kind of unity that induction established to begin with.

Maybe this connection between a living thing's activities and its own continued existence precisely as capable of those activities is an example of what Simon means by the not fortuitous connection between agent and patient. That is, the reason that the agent of these activities and the patient of these activities are not accidentally connected is that the agent must be the patient precisely in order to be the agent, precisely in order to exist and continue to exist in this way. In the case of a machine the agent and patient are connected but not connected in such a way that the agent must be the patient in order to exist as this kind of agent or to continue to exist as this kind of agent. (Here "kind of agent" could be defined by the characteristics the agent possesses prior to the activity or by the activity. Which one is used to define the agent could make the difference.)

But is not a rock, or almost any other material "thing," a causal system that holds itself together by interior activities? Yes, the atoms in a rock are held together by the forces, electromagnetic forces, that the atoms exert on each other. In order to distinguish life, we have to point to another instance of the not fortuitous or not accidental that holds in this case. It is accidental to each atom that it is exerting influence on the particular atom next to it. It is not accidental to the atom that it exerts this kind of influence on its environment. But it is accidental that the environment happens to contain the particular other atom that is being influenced. And so it is accidental to each atom that it forms a unit causal system by influencing each other.

The influence of atom number one on atom number two does not keep atom number one in existence as an entity capable of exercising this kind of influence on its environment. It keeps it in existence as an entity capable of exercising this activity on atom number two, and therefore keeps it in existence as a member of his causal system, but the fact that it is exercising that influence on atom number two and the fact that it is part of this causal system is accidental to the fact that it is capable of exercising his kind of activity on its environment. It is not accidental to a heart that it exercises and influence on a causal system that also includes a liver. If a heart's influence did not affect the liver, a heart could not stay in existence as a heart, that is as having this kind of influence on anything its environment.

The same would be true of the liver relative to the heart. The same would not be true of a finger relative to the heart. It is accidental to the kind of influence the heart exerts that it affects a finger and that therefore a causal system containing both the heart and the finger are kept in existence. It is not accidental to the finger, however that it is part of a causal system that has a heart. The finger could not stay in existence as a unit having certain causal capabilities if it were not part of system that included the causal capabilities of the heart.

But in using these animal examples to explain what is meant by "not fortuitous" and "not accidental" in the connection between agent and patient, we seem to be far ahead of what our intuitive understanding of a flower as a living thing contains.))

Quoting Aristotle in footnote 39: "we think of plants also as living, for they are observed to possess in themselves an originative power through which they increase or decrease in all spatial directions." and on page 76, he refers to the "coincidence of the efficient and of the material or receptive causality in the same individual subject."

In the margin, I make this comment on the phrase "same individual subject." "That is, a subject that induction establishes as an individual causal entity, establishes as a kind of thing whose parts are so causally linked to a third thing, the whole, that they belong to a type of inductive causal unity. The nature of that from which the change proceeds is causally linked to the nature of that in which the change resides such that their coexistence is an inductive fact.

Day after day, we see the same plant growing. We establish that it is the same plant inductively. We would be multiplying causes far beyond necessity if we posited the existence of different plants every time we checked to see if the size of the plant in this particular place had changed. So induction establishes a single material cause for a series of changes in size. Now the question is what is or what are the efficient cause of that series?

Induction does not reveal any causes exterior to the plant other than the causes that are exterior to other plants which grow in different ways, in different shapes, in different sizes. Likewise, induction gives us reason to believe that the plant we saw yesterday is the source of what we see today. We see the plant unfolding as it grows. So as it unfolds, we see one day the feature of the plant that has developed the next day. This is inductive evidence that the newly acquired feature comes from the plant itself as from its efficient cause. What the plant is today came from what the plant was yesterday.

For example, we see roots sprouting. We see different kinds of roots sprouting from different kinds of seeds. We see seeds with similar characteristics always sprouting roots with similar characteristics. We see seeds with the similar characteristics are sprouting roots with the similar characteristics. But the ground, the air, the water, etc. around these different kinds of seeds are all the same. So induction gives us evidence that it is the seed, and the growing plant itself, from which the differences between these different kinds of growth come.

So we establish first of all a single subject as the material cause; then we establish the same subject as the efficient cause. And we establish that even before the efficient cause acts, whatever the nature of the efficient cause is, that nature is linked to the nature of the material cause that will receive the subsequent action. For the nature of the series of changes that we began with is such that, whatever that nature is, it emerges from an efficient cause that is part of the same whole to which the material cause belongs. And the material cause of the changes that we begin with is of such a nature that it is part the same whole that the efficient cause belongs to.

Is this coincidence of the material cause and the efficient cause in the same whole causal system merely accidental? Induction tells us that the efficient cause of the growth is itself affected by the growth. The efficient cause that is causing growth today is the same thing that was a smaller efficient cause yesterday. And that growth of the efficient cause itself is essential to the nature of the kind of change whose observation we began with. For we began with a unified material cause that undergoes the change. We end with a unified efficient cause resulting from the process of change. And that ending is essentially connected to the beginning.

Here "essentially connected" means causally connected in such a way that the material cause to which the change occurs is by its identity with itself the same as the efficient cause from which the change comes. For the change is by its identity with itself a growth of that which is the efficient cause of the change.

In order to explain this, and keep efficient and material causality separate, we will have to find in different parts in this causal whole. But in order to explain the essential connection just described, whatever parts we come up with will have to be essentially connected causally. In

order for the efficient cause to exist, in order for it to be what it is, it will have to be connected to something else which is the material cause. And in order for the material cause to be what it is, it will have to be connected to something else which is the efficient cause. So these must be essentially connected within a whole that is inductively established as an individual of an essentially connected causal type.

We could come up with other explanations for the plant's growth, but they would violate inductive simplicity. For example, we could think that the ground has some sort of magnetic force that pulls the roots out of the seed. But that would not explain why different seeds sprout different kinds of roots. Likewise, when the plant is growing aboveground rather than underground, we would have to posit some sort of magnetic force in the air that pulls the plant up and also pulls it out as the plant grows. So we would be positing an invisible cause when a visible cause would do. And we would be positing a second magnetic force.

Or when the plant grows aboveground we might think that some cause from the ground is pushing its way into the stalk and pushing its way to the edges of the plant's growth. But that would just be a kind of internal cause to explain why this causal unit, the plant, is causing his own growth. It would just be a bad internal explanation that needs to be replaced by a good internal explanation. For what ever the causes that come from the ground are, they act as causes by being inside the stalk.

Take another example, a dog. Induction establishes that a dog with a head of a certain shape is causally connected to a dog with a tail of a certain shape. The fact that the head is what it is is causally connected to the fact that the tail is what it is. If the head was not what it is, the tail would not be what it is. If the tail was not what it is, that head would not be what it is.

This does not mean the head causes the tail or that the tail causes the head to be what it is. It means that whatever the causes are of the head's being what it is are also the causes of the tail's being what it is. Therefore when causes of that kind exist, effects of both of those kinds will follow necessarily.

The same argument would apply to the body, the legs, the paws, etc.. So induction establishes that the dog is at least that much of a causal unit. The dog is a unit of a causal type to at least that extent, namely, the extent of these causal relations just enumerated.

That causal unit is the material cause of changes in the positions of the legs, which changes result in changes in the positions of the body that head the tail etc.. In other words, the dog is the material cause of change of the dog's walking across the room. What is the efficient cause?

The movements of the legs are the efficient cause of the movement of the head, the body, the tail. That is, the movements of the legs are the efficient cause of the change in place of the head, the body, and the tail. What is the efficient cause of the movements of the legs?

Observation reveals no other cause in existence than the dog itself. All the other possible causes are there whether or not the dog is there. Only when the dog is there do we get such motions. Of course, the last sentence could refer to material causality alone. But between the times when the dog is not moving and when it is moving all the other causes are there, the ground, the air, and so on.

Furthermore, induction shows us that the dog's legs' motions follow events like sounds, or certain sights, we know from our own experience what sounds and sights are. Simplicity requires us to posit such powers in animals. That is the dog can see and hear also. Knowing that the dog can see and the dog can hear, we recognize that certain motions follow after the

dog hears certain things and sees certain things. But we know that something like a sound is not itself the efficient cause of the motions of the legs. So simplicity requires us to posit the cause of the motions of the dog's legs in the dog itself.

So the dog's motion is a change completed within the subject from which it is understood to proceed. So the change affects the very efficient cause from which it proceeds. Is the connection between the efficient cause and material cause accidental? We already know that there is a causal connection between the head and the tail such that given what ever their causes are, the tail will be what it is when the head is what it is and vice versa. So likewise given what ever the causes of the dog are, whatever the faculty by which it causes its own motion is, given that the causes of the dog are what they are, that faculty must be what it is. And if it must be what it is, it must be connected to the material cause such that the result of the material cause's being affected is that the efficient cause itself is affected.

Likewise, the dog is the material subject of growth. And the same analysis that applies to the plant will show that the dog is the efficient cause of the growth. And that analysis will show that the results of the change caused by the efficient cause is the growth of the efficient cause itself. Growth of the plant or of the dog is by its identity with itself growth of the efficient cause of the growth. This is not an accidental connection therefore. It is an essential connection.

When a balloon, a rubber balloon, is blown up. The space that the rubber occupies expands. (I am talking about the rubber itself not space occupied by the air with in the balloon.) The effect of this causal process is the growth of the balloon in the sense of the growth of the area that the rubber covers. But this process does not affect the efficient cause of the process. The balloon is not the efficient cause of its own growth. So here, we do not have a case in which the source of the change is itself perfected by the change. This is not life.

It is accidental to a piston's being what it is in other respects that it is also connected to a causal system with wheels. The piston's being what it is in other respects and its being connected to a causal system with wheels are not necessary effects of some third cause. They are contingent effects of a third cause, the carmaker.

On the other hand, that the heart is what it is and that blood is what it is are necessary effects of the same third cause or causes. It is possible, however, that the human genome is what it is, and so necessarily combines parts of the human being the way it does, as an historical accident. Still, it cannot be an accident relative to what the heart is that blood is what it is. The heart would not be what it is if blood were not what it is. Is the reverse true? Could blood be what it is if the heart were not what it is? Perhaps. But blood certainly could not remain what it is if it were not united with something functionally, that is, causally, equivalent to a heart to keep the blood moving. If the blood stopped moving, the causal system as a whole would cease living, and the blood would deteriorate and cease being what it is.

But perhaps for life all we need is the fact that the efficient cause, here the heart, of the blood's motion would not be what it is if the blood, the material cause, were not what it is. And the heart would not be what it is if its action on the blood did not perfect the heart itself, because of the heart's relation to the blood. So in the case of the relation of the heart to the blood, there appears to be a nonaccidental, a necessary, causal connection between what the efficient cause is and the fact that the effect is a perfection of the efficient cause itself. So this would be life in the sense of the not fortuitous co-existence of the efficient and material cause in the same individual subject.

((Quoting Saks, " an animal is either full of circulation and respiration or it is rotting." In other words, the activities that are caused by the animal as an efficient cause have the effect of

keeping that animal in existence as that kind of efficient cause, as the kind of thing that is capable of causing that kind of activity.

"Everything in the world is busy just continuing to be itself." " the thinghood of living things consists in organized unity, maintained through effort."

In a living thing, it is not accidental to the existence of part number one that it has this connection to part number two.

" An animal. . . is continually making itself, by snatching suitable material from its environment and discarding unsuitable material. Add some sufficiently unsuitable material, like arsenic, and the sum of parts remains, but the animal ceases to be." The sum of parts remains, but a causal system capable of certain kinds of activities no longer remains. The sum of parts is no longer a causal system capable of certain kinds of activities.

A living thing continually makes itself.

"The animal or plant . . . is perpetually being made and remade after the form of its species, yet there is no craftsman to work on. It is a composite of material and form, yet it is the material in it that is constantly being used up and replaced, while form remains intact." Of course, this refers to secondary matter not prime matter. So it is not only the form that remains the same but the union of prime matter and substantial form that remains the same.

xxxFrom the Turing Test to an Averroes Test, August 9, 1999

(The machine's ability to fool us might only show our ability to be fooled.)

What we really want is a test in which the machines must tell the truth instead of trying to fool us. We want a truthful answer to the question are you conscious, or do you have consciousness? By consciousness I do not mean a second act of awareness that has a first distinct act of awareness as its object. By consciousness I mean an awareness of my own existence that accompanies my awareness of any other object. Or, an awareness of my existence as that which is aware of X whenever awareness of any X exists. This is what Fred Crosson called Husserl's concept of consciousness. To find Crosson's reference to that concept, check any of his books or anthologies on artificial intelligence. He may not refer to Husserl by name but he will certainly have a description of that concept of consciousness in contrast to others.

How can we describe consciousness so that we can program a machine to truthfully answer whether it is conscious or not? Averroes has a description that will distinguish consciousness from any other state, from any non-conscious state. The description uses Aristotle's metaphysics. So the question becomes whether we can teach the machines Aristotle's metaphysics. To use Averroes' description, you do not have to believe Aristotle's metaphysics. We do not have to say that change must be looked at in terms of matter and form; we only have to say that it can be looked at in these terms.

But this raises some other questions, and that is the point of going into this discussion of Averroes. One question is whether the only way to describe consciousness is metaphysical. And if so, can we teach a machine to do metaphysics. The by teaching a machine to do metaphysics, I'd not mean programming at to give the correct answers in a Turing test. That is the whole point of wanting a machine that gives truthful answers. But then how can we be sure that the machine understands metaphysics? One way is a by requiring it to be able to figure out whether or not it is conscious, given Averroes analysis.

Another question arises if we cannot teach a machine to do metaphysics in this way. As Gilson said, man is a metaphysical animal. If a machine the cannot do metaphysics, there is something crucial to what we can do, and to what makes us what we are, that machines cannot do.

Also note the following in connection with Aristotle analysis of change, which Averroes relies on. We might think that the reduction of all change to locomotion might eliminate the relevance of a matter form analysis of change. But a mere change of place still requires that something new will exist as the result of the change; that is, requires some new reality to be present. If the only thing new is a spatial relationship between two bodies, then you have to admit the reality of relations. And Aristotle considers relations accidental forms. One way out of this in some cases is that from new spatial relationships other properties not reducible to a mere change of position sometimes emerge. Since these properties are other than spatial relations, and Aristotelian form would be needed to account for them; or at least, the change can be looked at in terms of Aristotelian forms, even if mere locomotion cannot.

page

xxxYes and NO. putsverd, AA, August 2, 1999

The question is not whether it might be possible to have a criterion but what purpose the criterion would serve in a particular case, especially the case of the argument I am now making.

Don't forget to have a reference at the end about Tarski. Also church and touring machines.

Awareness that an inference is a valid requires implicit awareness of the validity of an inference principle. It is impossible that the implicit awareness of the validity of the inference principle take place by means of a criterion for recognition. Use of a criterion would require an implicit inference just as the use of rules A and B do. So awareness of the validity of the implicit inference would requires another use of a criterion, which would require another implicit inference, which would require another use of a criterion, etc.

9-21-99

In the web of belief, there are places where the use of criteria is more appropriate than in other places. And there are some places where it would not be useful. And there are some places where it could not be useful. The use of criteria are not even possible in the case of the self-evident necessity of the validity of an inference. It would generate an infinite regress of inferences, since the awareness of the self-evident necessity of the validity must be implicit in awareness of the premises.

So the move away from axiomatic method does not eliminate the need for self-evident necessity.

If a sentence is true by the meanings of its terms, we must be able to know that it is true by knowing the meaning of its terms alone.

12-22-99

We don't grasp that Red is a color by first identifying an LCO that distinguishes color from red.

This counterfactual argument does not require that there be languages that express the same thing we do or that we could know that they do, if in fact they exist.

5-11-00

Important. In this section where I started talking about Quine, I make the statement that a particular truth

that I call attention to is "true by virtue of meaning". That needs to be clarified later. The fact is that it is true by virtue of the fact that the meanings differ only by LCO's. So the nonlinguistic objects that are meant cannot be different in their prelinguistic state. If they were different, that would contradict the hypothesis that the meanings differ only by LCO's.

5-23-00

In the last section where I talk about self-evidence about arranging strings of marks being less abstract and foundational I could say less abstract and epistemologically foundational or metaphysically foundational.

It happens that if we use language in certain ways, we cannot avoid being aware of certain LCO. And it happens to be the case that if we are acquainted with certain LCO's, we cannot avoid being able to see the necessity of certain truths. If LCO's become objects of awareness in any other way, they would not be LCO's.

When we are acquainted with such relations, we are acquainted with relations that make certain sentences necessarily true. And acquaintance with these relations is sufficient for knowing that the meanings, that for which we use, certain words do not differ except on the side of those relations, except by such relations. If we are acquainted with some meanings, we cannot fail to be acquainted with relations between them that render some sentences necessarily true. But acquaintance is one thing, ability to explain their difference from others, or to express criteria for identifying them, is another.

In the last paragraph, should I express myself in terms of what formal clarity and rigor presuppose, or in terms of what awareness of formal clarity and rigor presupposes?

Point out that just as mathematics is entirely valid subject on its own, and not just an aid to science, so the formal methods used by logic or the study of those that is entirely valid subject on its own. But viewed as a means to awareness of inferential validity, formal methods are a tool. That is, viewed as an epistemologically useful means, an epistemologically successful means, to the awareness of inferential

validity.

Explain that by the "terms" of relations, I mean the "relata" of relations.

The technical success of nonstandard logic cannot and does not do away with the role of the principles of standard logic in our grasp of the technical success of nonstandard logic. That is all I am saying. My point should be considered a very minor one for those whose chief interest is logic itself; for there just is no other way to get any place than by the use of formal methods. but it is more than of minor point for those who want to draw philosophical conclusions from what logic can achieve. Just as Putnam has shown that Tarski's great technical achievement tells philosophers nothing about truth in natural languages, so I am only saying that the success of nonstandard logic tells philosophers nothing about the epistemological status of consistency, bivalence, or necessary truth.

What red is and what color is are prelinguistic values. Now what color is is vague in relation to what red is. So of a prelinguistic value, for example, what red is, we can predicate a linguistically constituted value, for example, being more precise than. That is, linguistically constituted values can be features that accrue to prelinguistic values. If so, they are features belonging to prelinguistic values as a result of being expressed in language. The combination of these 2 kinds of features makes all the difference when we talk about logic and logical necessity.

This shows that logic is not about laws of thought. It is about properties belonging to what red is and what color is. Nor is logic about "abstract objects", for example structures, models, sets, or set-theoretically defined relations.

Do not say that necessary truth is defined as a "function of" what make sentences true, but that they are defined by "reference to" what make sentences true. That is, what makes multiply predicative sentences true. They are defined by a condition for the truth of multiply predicate of sentences.

Maybe drop the stuff about epistemology using psychological concepts. Just point out that LCOs are not

psychological relations.

12-26-00, BIG

Here is an idea I can use if I separate the section on disproving that everything follows from contradiction into its own article. At the end of that article I can make the distinction between logic and logistic. Then I can ask why it's worth pointing out. When the early critics of modern logic pointed it out, it might not have been worth noting. But for want of making that distinction, certain claims are made for the later results of modern logic, certain epistemological claims, that would have been better served to acknowledge this distinction first. Putnam's critique of the disquotational theory of truth is a good example of this. Other examples are the claims that are made about consistency, necessary truth, and bivalence.

The technical success of nonstandard logic cannot and does not do away with the role of the principles of standard logic in our grasp of the technical success of nonstandard logic. That is all I am saying. My point should be considered a very minor one for those whose chief interest is logic itself; for their just is no other way to get any place than by the use of formal methods. but it is more than of minor point for those who want to draw philosophical conclusions from what logic can achieve. Just as Putnam has shown that Tarski's great technical achievement tells philosophers nothing about truth in natural languages, so I am only saying that the success of nonstandard logic tells philosophers nothing about the epistemological status of consistency, bivalence, more necessary truth.

Instead of saying "p" also is 1, say "p" also has the value T, or the value 1.

Principles of noncontradiction express the function of "negation," which is to prevent the (use of) contradictories from both achieving some presumed goal.

In any argument a sign that indicates that a premise is contradictory (a negation sign) must have the same use in each of the inference principles that allow us conclude to "q". Otherwise, the contradictory premise and the principles are irrelevant to each other. The sign indicates the assignment or lack of assignment of some target value (1, T, etc.) to a formula. So we have simultaneous assignment and lack of assignment

of a binary value to an expression (assignment or association with; value or state). It is the fact that the premise is the simultaneous presence and absence of a value that prevents any principle employing a sign indicating contradiction in a premise from being a truth functionally valid principle (or true on every model, or true under every possible assignment of 1, 0, etc.) (. . . that employs a sign indicating contradiction in a premise that prevents any principle It is the fact that the premise is the simultaneous presence and absence of a value [of the same value?] the prevents any principle that employs a sign indicating contradiction in a premise from being a principle true on all possible 1/0 assignments.)

For if a principle using a sign indicating absence of a value is now valid, that is, true under all interpretations, it need not be true under all interpretations. Under contradiction, a principle whose validity turns on the absence of the value will not be truth functionally valid. Likewise a principle whose validity results from the presence of that value will not be truth functionally valid, if the simultaneous absence and presence of that value is allowed.

Rutz's point is within logic itself; in addition to that, there is the following epistemological point.

He said, "this sentence is", and what he said is true. Also try using italics. Or how about "this string of shapes is true" or "the space occupied by this string of shapes is true"? Or "the first so many digits in this string of letters between quotation marks is true"? In each of the latter cases, the subject is something that is neither true nor false; because whatever causal conditions are necessary for a string of marks to achieve the status of being true or false, and I do not need to know all of what those conditions are, they certainly are not achieved in those strings. And if they are not achieved in the latter cases, there is no reason to think they are achieved in the first case, the "sentence is" case.

start section 3: we can choose, stipulate, etc. definitions, rules, etc. but awareness of rule keeping is not awareness of logical necessity. Still, awareness of rule keeping presupposes awareness of the validity of principles of inference. That consciousness depends on awareness of how words are used; so it depends

on consciousness of the contradictoriness of the opposite. And incommensurability does not affect contradictoriness. Putnam shows that there cannot be a computational proof of what I want to say (Godel same).

Put LCO's and self-evidence as close to the end as possible, that is, to explain "what has gone before," where the latter includes as much as possible. When you get to LCOs, start by saying that they will not be a novelty; they have roots in medieval logicians (or medieval philosophies of logic, i.e., second intentions). The medievals did not give formal arguments or analyses of them. But what I am adding to the medievals is not formalism, it is a genetic causal argument of how logical LCOs come into cognition. That, not formalism, is what we need philosophically.

Start: prior to Frege we could have said... Here bring in the nontechnical way of saying it. But Frege does not help this argument, or any argument to show that everything follows from contradiction.

Later, include Ashworth in the text; explain virtual, absolute, formally valid.

Once LCOs are in existence, they are properties of whatever predicates like "red" and "colored" apply to. But there need not be separate words for that. What about when there are separate words, like "if," "not," etc.? When such LCOs make us aware of the logical necessity of inferential principles, there is an only implicit awareness of the principles. For the explicit awareness concerns the premises of the inference, not the inference principle. One of the consequence of this is that these inference principles are not rules for the arrangement of marks. In order for rules for the arrangement of marks to function in our awareness of the correctness of a step in a computational process, the awareness of the rule has to be explicit, not implicit. That's what such a rule is all about. That is, an explicit instruction for how to arrange marks. So the role of inference principles in awareness of logical validity, the epistemological role, is completely different from the role of formal rules and awareness of formal correctness. (Logical principles have implications for the arrangement of marks, as Sommers shows. Specifically, they imply that we should substitute marks in certain ways and have certain explicit rules about arranging marks, for our formal

system to be useful as a tool of logic.

Mention what Putnam said in conversation about criteria in science. Then point out that still criteria must serve some end. And they do not serve any similar end in this case. And what end would they serve? Also, the whole issue with Quine is whether in addition to the so-called "empirical" (read: "scientific") there is also something called "the analytic." The logical positivists had said that in addition to the empirical, there is another zone called the "analytical." So contrary to Putnam, Quine was not arguing against the logical positivists that there could be no such analytical zone on the grounds that criteria are useful in the other zone, the empirical zone. Putnam says that I am unfair to Quine precisely because criteria are useful in the empirical zone. But the logical positivists never denied that.

In the short article, say that since you are talking about logic you will not be talking about philosophical arguments concerning consistency and bivalence.

Analytic truths are supposed to be "linguistic" in some more or less clear way in which empirical truths are not "linguistic." Perhaps there is/are some useful senses in which analytic truths are "linguistic" in ways in which other truths are not. But I wish to point out that there is at least one important sense of "linguistic" in which truths whose necessity derives from linguistically constituted objects are not linguistic in a way in which empirical truths fail to be linguistic. I'm not saying this is the only sense of that word that is useful. But there is another very important sense which has been neglected and which needs to be pointed out. It is that sense that I will use here.

So-called analytic truths are not true by virtue of meaning. Nor are they linguistic as being true by virtue of meaning. Meanings are not something necessarily linguistic. The word "sentence" has a meaning that is linguistic. The word "neutron" has a meaning that is not something linguistic. Analytic truths are true by virtue of the fact that the meanings are distinguished only by linguistically constituted objects (a causal analysis, not of our cognition of their truth, but of their truth. But this analysis of their truth still is not a criterion for recognition and still implies that the recognition of truth is not caused by a criterion). But to say

that is not the same as to say that the meanings themselves are linguistically constituted objects. It is only to say that those meanings have acquired linguistically constituted features by becoming that for which certain words are used. Those meanings were around before any words were around (before becoming "meanings").

If we want, can say that thousands were killed by the meaning of the noise "atomic bomb," or by the meaning of the noise "cancer." The statements are perfectly true. They do not make the cause of millions of deaths linguistic.

In denying that analytic truths are linguistic in some way peculiar to themselves, I am not denying that they are in some way linguistic. What I'm trying to point out is that all truths are linguistic by their nature. So I am not denying the importance of language for all truths. Rather, in asking how analytic truths are linguistic in ways that other truths are not, I am trying to assert the importance of language for all truths.

Perhaps add to the short article: the refutation of the everything-follows argument opens up several kinds of questions. One kind concerns the use of the concept of something implying that everything is true within a formal system. For example, within a system of intuitionistic logic. Nothing in my refutation implies that the use of such a concept could not have some interesting purpose, some valuable purpose, for some system of formal methodology (as opposed to "formal system").

Another kind of question concerns the invoking of the concept of everything following as a justification for structuring a formal system or formal methods certain way. Here the examples I'm thinking of are relevance logics or paraconsistent logics. They sometimes claim to justify themselves by the need to avoid that consequence. If that were their only justification, they needn't have bothered. But it does not follow that they should not have bothered. For there may be other justifications. Nor does it follow that a logician cannot achieve interesting and important results by constructing such a system, even if he had no other justification for doing so.

But there is one other kind of question that needs to be raised. It is important to know first that this other kind may be of no direct interest to the logician whatsoever. She needn't not be concerned about it at all. Because it is a question outside of logic itself. It is the question of the epistemology of logic, specifically, the epistemology of formal methods. By that I mean, the question of how we are aware that a step in a formal process is justified by the rules of the process. That step is related to my refutation of the everything follows argument in the following way.

We can be aware that the everything follows conclusion follows from ordinary truth functionally valid rules of inference and at the same time aware that these rules are no longer truth functionally valid, when we permit contradiction. This shows that we can be aware that a step in a formal process satisfies the formal rules and yet be aware that neither the rules nor the result of following them has any logical value or force of its own. But independently of whether or not the rule or result reflects something that is logically valid, in being aware that a step satisfies a rule, we have to follow a rule of inference that we are implicitly aware of in being aware of the rule and the fact that using the rule here yields a certain result.

To show this, bring in or at least mention Lewis Carroll's Achilles-tortoise paradox here. This raises a number of questions that are epistemological in nature and not directly logical in nature. Our awareness, our implicit awareness of an inferential rule and of the value of the rule. Is it awareness of a necessary truth? If so, is it justified awareness of a necessary truth? If so, what is that justification and how are we aware of it? And if it is not awareness of a necessary truth, or awareness of the justification of a necessary truth, what is it awareness of? These questions, or rather such questions, cannot be answered in ignorance of the contributions of formal methods to questions about necessity and about knowledge, but neither can the contributions of formal methods completely answer these questions. But neither can the contributions of formal methods provide final answers to these questions in the last analysis.

The reason is that these questions concern our awareness of the epistemological value of formal methods themselves. Or rather these questions concern how we are aware of the epistemological value of formal methods and their results. For example, if our implicit awareness of the value of modus ponens while we

are using modus ponens to draw conclusions is an awareness of something with only provisional value, something whose value really depends upon the fact that so far we have commonly used it, then our awareness of the value of a step, a step in a formal process, is an awareness of something with only provisional value.

It would be a mistake to think that formal methods themselves answer such questions. This would be a forest-for-trees fallacy. For example, someone like Wittgenstein might think that the analysis of logical validity in terms of truth functional tautologies can explain logical necessity. But to recognize a well formed formula as a truth functional tautology we have to be able to recognize that a particular set of distributions of truth values to its atomic formulas exhausts the possibilities of distributing truth values to the atomic formulas. In other words, we have to recognize the necessary truth that all the possibilities are covered. That there are no other possibilities.

I gave you half a truth table, for instance, and said "here, this defines an operator," you would know that the operator had been inadequately defined from the point of view of being a function of the truth values of its component wffs. The same requirement that we recognize that all the possibilities have been covered applies to rigorous definitions of formal proofs and to rigorous specifications of formal languages.

What about consistency proofs? Don't they at least get us a step closer to the question of necessity? But even in this case, awareness that steps in the proof satisfy rules is not awareness that the rules have a certain value and so not awareness that the results have any certain value. First, application of the rules requires the use of modus ponens. If modus ponens is only provisional, then the value of the transition from the rule to the result is only provisional. If the result is meant to show that a system containing a string corresponding to, or representing modus ponens, belongs to a system that is consistent or complete or both, we must have some awareness that whatever other rules we are using to get that result have some connection with an interesting definition of such a result, that is "consistency" or "completeness" defined interestingly, and how do we know that connection, and whether that connection is true, and whether that connection is necessarily true or provisional, and so on and so on and so on?

Routley has shown formally how, even in a formal context, we can apply W. E. Johnson's terminology (without all its baggage) to express the relation of normal negation to other negations, without loss of formal rigor.

Graeme Forbes in his article "logic, philosophy of" in the Routledge encyclopedia philosophy gives the following great example:

"a distinction between propositions (or statements, or sentential contexts) which are de dicto and propositions (and so on) which are de re originates in medieval philosophy. But only contemporary modal logic affords the tools for a precise characterization of this distinction, although it must be granted that the distinction remains a puzzle in epistemic contexts. (His emphasis)

01-10-01

Maybe it would be helpful to think in terms of a letter addressed to a philosophizing logician, not a snide letter but a letter asking sincere questions that are backed up by actual examples. The immediately preceding quotation from "logic, philosophy of" provides a good example.

The letter might begin by quoting Aristotle on the difference between dialectic and metaphysics, the difference being that you cannot build a metaphysics out of logic. Then you might ask whether a modern logician thinks that modern logic has changed the situation. And state that you know some reasons why someone might think that modern logic does not change that situation, and that you'd like to present those reasons in order to get his response.

The first reason is that mathematical logic is even further removed from what Aristotle had in mind by metaphysics, and what most traditional philosophers had in mind by philosophy, that is the logic Aristotle

had in mind. Relative to the traditional role of logic, mathematical logic is a tool that is not identical with the subject it serves, just as mathematics is an indispensable tool for physics. In physics you cannot at all get along without mathematics, but knowledge of physical truths is a different kind (of fame) from knowledge of mathematical truths. So if metaphysics cannot be built on logic, much less can be built on a tool of logic.

To describe mathematical logic as a tool to serve something other than itself is not to imply that mathematical logic is not intrinsically valuable. Mathematical logic is entirely worth studying for its own sake, just as mathematics is worth studying for its own sake. And just as mathematics could not be a tool for physics were mathematics not a valid subject on its own right, so mathematical logic would not be for logic were mathematical logic not a valid study on its own right.

So my questions should not be taken to apply in a disrespect for the achievements, the very great achievements, of modern logic. But I must confess to being suspicious, not of modern logic, but of certain modern logicians, suspicious that they are not satisfied with the great achievements that logic can boast of for its own sake but will only be satisfied if their method monopolizes the ways of dealing with the questions that philosophy has always asked.

A good example of this was Michael Martin's talk at the society of Christian philosophers at Merrimack college. His thesis was that it was incoherent to say that God had "knowledge." To establish this, he gave three definitions of knowledge couched in post Fregean terminology. Of course, none of these definitions corresponded to what any earlier philosopher would have meant by predicating knowledge of God. When this objection was raised, his reply was basically that none of the earlier attempts to predicate knowledge of God were worth considering because they were not as clear as his definitions for knowledge. They were not as clear because they were not using post Fregean techniques.

So unless you're using post Fregean techniques, according to someone like him, is not even worth discussing with you he has to say. But is it worth discussing what he has to say, if it really doesn't have

anything to do with what anybody has meant when they predicated knowledge of God? Isn't this intellectual imperialism, or dictatorship, or tyranny. Isn't he saying "I won't play with you unless you play my game?" And there are no doubt standards by which one can justly say that his methods are more clear than those of traditional theists. But if his methods cannot formulate positions of traditional theists, why is that not a limitation on his methods, rather than on the value of traditional methods. And no matter what standard judges his methods as clearer, what if his kind of clarity just isn't relevant to the topic under discussion? Finally, as I will discuss below, what evidence is there that his kind of clarity has been helpful in solving any philosophical problems.

Another example pertinent to the question whether there is a limitation in a formal method that cannot express certain theories about God, or whether or there is a shortcoming in the theory: somewhere in one of Pena's articles, he criticizes certain kinds of talk about God that use reduplicative predications, that is, "as" phrases. The reason for his criticism, or one reason for his criticism, is that no one has worked out a successful formal method using such phrases. But we did not have to wait for formal methods to know that syllogisms were valid inferences, that modus ponens was a valid form of inference, etc. so why should we not say that the fact that formal methods cannot capture the logic of such statements is merely an innocent limitation to formal methods? Likewise, for the Trinity. A criticism of the Trinity based on formal methods could not be relevant unless that formal method was capable of formulating traditional assertions about the Trinity.

In suggesting that their method is not the only one worthy of pursuing, I am sure that they will have a corresponding suspicion of me. They will think that I am suggesting that we go back to the kind of obfuscation that afflicted philosophy or 2500 years before Frege. At this point, however, another questions concerning the role of modern logic in doing philosophy arises.

Yes, philosophy has been afflicted with disagreement and paradox throughout its history. But 100 years after Frege, is there any less disagreement and paradox in philosophy? The answer must be no. Then

what has mathematical logic contributed, not to logic where mathematical logic has proven to be the indispensable tool, but to philosophy? One reply might be that the old kinds of disagreement and Paradox were bad kinds, but the kinds of paradox in disagreement that have arisen since Frege are good kinds. But why? Because the current obfuscation in philosophy is based on the most clear and precise formal methods? But if those methods cannot produce clarity and precision in philosophy, why is the current obfuscation any better than the old?

No, earlier methods did not succeed at all in eliminating disagreement and Paradox from philosophy. But I do not believe that at least one earlier method is able to provide an explanation for the constancy of disagreement and paradox in philosophy that the approach to philosophy via mathematical logic is completely incapable of providing. For that explanation predicts the occurrence of obfuscation in philosophy without self referentially claiming that philosophy is in any way invalid. In other words, I am not offering an explanation that would produce more clarity and less paradox than would the methods of mathematical logic in philosophy. But why should that burden be on me?

But rather than bore you with my account of that explanation, I would like to have you answer one more question which is relevant to this whole issue of whether I am suggesting that we go back to a kind of obfuscation that your methods have put behind us for ever. Could you mention any successes that your method has had over the last 100 years? I don't mean successes within logic itself. No one can fault, for example, the contributions of a Tarski, a Kripke, a Craig, etc. to logic itself. But where have these contributions gotten us any closer to answering any philosophical questions?

By philosophical questions, I mean the kind of questions philosophers have always asked about, for instance, truth, necessity and possibility, the relation of theories to experience, etc. you might reply that the whole point of your method is to redefine those questions. No doubt about it. But we have already raised the issue of what successes your method has given, in contrast to previous methods. And if the current reply is the one you would like to make, there is always the issue of whether by the time you are through redefining a question it is really the same question. And if it is not the same question, what reason have you given for believing that the old question is invalid other than your act of faith in your method, in

spite of the fact that your method hasn't produced any better results than the old methods.

For example, the way the problem of universals is currently expressed that problem is not the problem that traditionally vexed philosophy. And not only does the modern approach not suppress that previous question but the very conditions that give rise to the modern question presuppose the conditions to which the previous question is addressed. That is, the answer to the modern question presupposes that the earlier question can be answered.

And when I ask about your successes, another important thing has to be kept in mind. I'm not talking about your successes in criticizing your own predecessors. Granted, philosophers of modern logic have been successful in moving beyond, or I should say, in negatively criticizing, for example the approach of the Tractatus and of the logical positivists, or that of ordinary language philosophers or that of the disquotationalists. Those successes, or that type of success, does not necessarily constitute a success relative to answering the questions philosophers have always asked. Much less does it constitute success in answering those questions as replaced by other questions using post Fregean vocabulary.

What about the rest of us who never had the kind of hangups exemplified by the Tractatus or the logical positivists or ordinary language philosophy?

Another question about formal methods and their use in philosophy would be whether they produce paradoxes of their own, paradoxes that are artifacts of formal systems and formal methods. I think of the paradox on p. 184 of the 4th edition of Quine's "methods of logic." He calls it a truth of logic; why should we not call it simply an artifact of one otherwise great of logic? After all, mathematics produces paradoxes as its artifacts, without diminishing the validity of mathematical method or the importance of it. So the occurrence of paradoxes in this study of formal systems would not diminish the importance or value of that study anymore than paradoxes do in mathematics.

Another reply would be that some and perhaps many analytic philosophers recognize the problem of doing

metaphysics based on logic, and so they escape the criticisms I have made so far. But this raises the question of what constitutes a successful attempt to escape from basing metaphysics on logic. And that question brings up some of the same issues I have already mentioned.

For example, in his book on noncontradiction and excluded middle, Nicholas Rescher bends over backwards to say that he is doing ontology and not doing logic. But an examination of what he actually does, an examination for my point of view, shows that he is still just doing metaphysics by extending logic. For he gets himself into trouble precisely because he neglects the fact that the truth of propositions is an effect of what exists in a particular world (an effect of which what exists in a particular world is the cause). As a result, he winds up with so-called "worlds" in which sentences are true even though the required causes of their truth are absent from the world.

The root of this problem is the attempt to define a "world" in an ontological sense in terms of the truth of propositions. Where the reality is that the truth of propositions is a byproduct of what is the case in a world. In other words, truth must be defined in terms of existence rather than existence being defined in terms of truth. And it leads to some specific things that can be said about what the proper way of doing metaphysics, as opposed to improperly basing it on logic, is.

Whatever else must be true of the correct method and metaphysics, that method must define other values in terms of the extra logical value we call "existence." Not the other way around. From the primacy of extra logical existence, however, it does not follow that existential quantifiers must have more than one meaning. The opposite follows. Precisely because existence is not a logical value, the logical role of quantifiers can be the same at every level.

Even if there were no arguments in favor of the fact that existence is an extra logical value, you want to maintain that we are incorrect in holding that position, you should at least recognize this as a fundamental point of departure for two radically different philosophical paths. Just as I am trying to understand, and hope I do understand, why someone would think that metaphysics should be based on logic, I ask you to

understand why someone would think that whatever else it is, existence cannot be merely a logical value.

But in fact there are arguments for my position. They are of 2 kinds. The first are arguments to show that to be is not to be known. The second kind are arguments to show that in the structure of what exists there is a distinct factor that should be described as act with respect to everything else being described as potency of one kind were another. And the factor whose cognition--independent presence these arguments establish is at least one of, and actually more than that, the meanings of our ordinary word "existence."

3-5-01

Are we not able to articulate a data of experience to whatever level of precision or vagueness our language allows us to? Can we look at something and say "something," "a body," "a plant," "a flower," "a tool of," etc.? So why he would we need distinct, really distinct, properties corresponding to each of these words? And if there were distinct properties, there would have to be real connections, real links, and so real relations between them. That would be another level of complexity.

Delete the last paragraph. Delete the Quine paragraph. Delete the paragraph on the reality of properties and on Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. Remove the paragraph on a Putnam's defense of criteria. Move bivalence to the end. By dropping references to principles of noncontradiction (especially in the plural), I can delete the stuff about negation altogether. Then drop the reference to causal realism in the indeterminacy of translation footnote. Drop the stuff about no arguments working in (?). And if I drop the Tractatus paragraph, I can move the statement about the irrelevance of the ontology of properties below, and add it to the heuristic sentence. If I drop the Quine and Kripke paragraph, perhaps I can drop the stuff about the necessary not being the same as the linguistic.

Either remove the paragraphs about other operations not being able to be defined, or recast the discussion strictly in terms of classical logic and the dependence of classical operators on the exclusion of contradiction.

The usual reply to Carol's paradox is that rules are not premises but there is more to it. And we must grasp the truth of the rules by knowing the words of the premises; otherwise he cannot be aware of the validity of the argument. Therefore we must now investigate self-evidence (or "the analytic"). Doing so will illuminate the relevant issues such as synonymy and Quine's critique of the analytic. (If they are known just by knowing meanings, we know them by [knowing them amounts to] knowing that if they are not true, some meaning would both be what it is and not what it is [meaning in the objective sense would not be what it is, in contrast to meaning in the sense of a relation between a word and that for which the word is used would not be what it is].)

Principles of noncontradiction just express certain, or a certain, use of "negation" signs. And a particular formal system may not need those uses, or that use, but if it does not include that use, it cannot contradict principles of noncontradiction that do use signs in that way.

And sentence and predicate negation signs determine the truth conditions of sentences and so the truth values of sentences. So predicate negation signs result in the truth values of sentences. And they cause the truth of one of their sentences.

Give an example of an inference implied in checking validity by means of truth tables. And for example, when 1 or 0 is assigned to a component sentence one place, it must be assigned to the sentence wherever the sentence occurs. So you cannot even use truth tables if you allow contradiction.

Consider the truth table for one formula expressing the decision procedure method of showing that everything follows from contradiction, the formula using material implication. At this point, which truth table rules to use seems to become arbitrary. So the very method itself of using formal methods becomes the issue. So I will henceforth use nontechnical terms as well as technical. And the later medievals appear to have done the same using vocabulary, which from our point of view, was technical but not rigorous by our standards.

So what should we do? We should say that nothing follows from contradiction.

It is perfectly fine to create all of the alternative logics that you like. We do not have to change classical logic to avoid the conclusion. The questions raised are at the level of the epistemology of logic, of the evaluation of what goes on in classical logic. You do not even have to deny that classical logic is composed of necessary truths.

Obviously, for classical logic to allow the truth of contradictions will be ad hoc. I want to say "must" be ad hoc. But the very reason why I want to say must is the reason why I cannot, namely, there's no more necessity. Because there is no more necessity, there is only the ad hoc. (But really there can only be the ad hoc. And that shows that you can't really get rid of necessity; he still have to use it. If all necessity were gone, per impossible, then we would have to describe the consequences, or have to be able to describe the consequences, using phrases like "then there can only be," "then there must only be," etc.) but we would need some rules, and therefore ad hoc rules, precisely because without new rules, nothing follows from contradiction. (Use ECQ ex contradictione quodlibet.)

In paraconsistent logic, does saying that there are true contradictions amount to saying that both parts of the contradictions are true, or that the compound sentence composed of the contradictories is both true and false.

Logic in my sense of the word in no way replaces modern logic and its contribution.

All this may seem obvious. What, however, if awareness of the validity of the steps requires awareness of necessary truth? I will argue that that it does.

Watch for the use of words like implies, consequence, as opposed to words like (the due us?), derive, and yield. The former are semantic, and the latter are the syntactical.

The kind of arguments that might be brought against my claims are not, for example, that we can use this

or that formal device method to construct a different kind of formal method, language, or system. Such arguments would not be relevant to my argument. What could be relevant to my argument, if their premises were true, would be, for example, claims about the fact that words can change meaning, incommensurability.

In order to avoid the consequence that everything follows from contradiction, or in order to avoid the validity of arguments to that effect, we do not need a non classical logic, for example, a paraconsistent or relevance logic. Without resort to any modern methods, some traditional logicians rejected ECQ. So modern methods are not needed, for example, those of Pena. When you accept contradiction, you have already rejected disjunctive syllogism. This fact is important in its own right.

To avoid ECQ, you don't have to go outside of classical logic. You have to go outside of classical logic to get ECQ.

One motivation for paraconsistent logic is that inconsistent theories can be nontrivial. But I eliminate that motivation.

Emphasize that a causal analysis of how we are aware of the validity of deduction is not the same thing as a deductive defense of the validity of deduction. See Susan Haack, p. 198. Rather my causal analysis shows why we do not need a deductive defense of the validity of deduction. For it shows that if certain conditions hold, we cannot not be aware of that validity. And it shows that if we are aware of how to use certain words, those conditions cannot not hold. Also, these are not causal explanations I'll on Dummett's "explanatory" arguments (haack, p. 181). Also, this is not a "justification" of deduction (p. 200).

what has the LCO analysis of "red is a color" got to do with modern logic? Each entry in the truth table is a set of 1 0 assignments to component statements: for example, "p" assigned 1, and "q" assigned 2. So just as red is a case of color, Green is a case of color, etc. because of the necessary identity and, so "p & q" being assigned 1 is a case of "p -> q" being assigned 1, because assigning 1 to the first is distinct only

by the linguistic construct from assigning it to the second. And so on.

In even if Quine did not intend to deny that there are self-evident truths, only deny that such truths can be classified as "true by meaning," "true by convention," etc., that's fine with me.

Perhaps instead of truth tables say matrix.

What do I mean by "a feature"? I mean what it is to be something red, something colored, etc. because that, namely, what it is to be something red, is really distinct from what it is to be something oblong. Notice however, that in the phrase "what it is to be something red" and other such phrases the linguistic analyst would put red in quotation marks.

Formal language method vs. natural language method: in the latter symbols appear not just as objects of manipulation, that is, not so that their correct or incorrect use is determined by rules for concatenating and detaching, which is to say that natural language is not a calculational language. But that raises the question of why numbers can be the "object" of a merely calculational language.

Possible worlds are only relevant to philosophy to the extent that possible" means "could be the case that" where that means "the following state of affairs could exist," and so could be the cause of the truth of a statement. Possible worlds are relevant only to the extent that they are possible existents and therefore possible causes of truth.

How about this as a translation of "supposition": place holding.

Maritain could have said "there is such a thing as recognition of logical necessity, and that is something different from awareness of satisfying movements." But that distinction would not have mattered much before the development of nonstandard logics, since logics are clearly a more powerful method for studying those very necessary truths that Maritain would have been referring to. (Still any method has limitations from some point of view, because any tool has limitations from some point of view. For example, the success of this tool mislead people, for example, Russell, about the centrality, the

epistemological centrality, of the principle of noncontradiction. But that is a different question. Epistemological centrality is not the issue here.)

But now that we have nonstandard logics, the impression can be that they eliminate the epistemological need for necessary truth is, that is, for consistency and bivalence. So now the distinction implied by Maritain is crucial.

Without any further understanding of "truth" or truth conditions," we can see that the question of necessary truth is the question of why, if "F" can be truthfully predicated of some x, then "G" can also be truthfully predicated of that x; in other words, the question is why must those predicates be truthfully predicable of the same x. And we can answer that for multiply predicative truths, that is, for truths such that the question is whether if one predicate is true, the other must also be true, without any further consideration of truth conditions other than the truth conditions, individually, for "F" on the one hand and "G" on the other.

Concerning nonstandard logics, the issue is not whether they work, but so what if they do. That is, the extra-logical question of what difference they make. Or better: concerning nonstandard logics, there are issues concerning what difference they make. (In other words, don't say that these are the only issues, just that here are some legitimate questions nonstandard logics raise.)

To avoid paradoxes such as the liar, we don't need to know why a string of symbols lacks truth value, only that it does lack truth value. Such paradoxes are often by themselves proof that a particular string of symbols lacks truth value, for example, the string "this sentence is", or the string "this theorem is" as in "this theorem is not provable." Nor does this reply mean that truth and falsity are always contraries rather than contradictories. The preceding statement can be true of strings of symbols without prejudice to the question whether there are such things as propositions which must be either true or false and cannot fail to be one or the other.

All I really want to say is that nonstandard logic is no reason to give up necessary truth, and that there are

good reasons for keeping it.

Traditional logicians also would have said that inference principles are necessary truths and self-evident truths.

Precisely because the methods of modern logic open up infinite possibilities for semantics and syntax, modern logic cannot provide answers for philosophical questions. Those questions call for definite answers, not infinite possibilities. They call for specific answers.

We have to be aware that our definition of a proof can cover all the possible cases and that the rules of the language can cover all possible cases.

In the definition of logical properties as properties belonging to objects as objects, we can include the fact that "as" refers to a causal relation, namely, the fact that logical properties are the result of our making things objects, because logical properties are ways of being objects. A logical property like vagueness or precision is a way in which we make things objects, where "a way of making" does not refer to a psychological act but to the result of whatever psychological act makes (in psychological way X) a thing an object (in logical way Y).

Quantification, June 26, 2001

Why call existence of form of quantification? Because quantification is saying "all of them" or "some of them". But this presupposes existence. What about them? In other words, quantification presupposes that a universe of discourse is posited. But the object in that universe of discourse need not be existents in the ontological sense.

Tarski, truth, self reference, metalanguage, June 26, 2001

In "snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. The words "true" and the words in "snow is white" must belong to the same language. But a language that can talk about snow can only have a word for

truth if it can also talk about language about snow. A language that does not at least have the potential for talking about itself is an incomplete language and an epistemologically unuseful language. (re-read Putnam's argument against disquotatation.)

Polyadic predicates. 09-16-01

Polyadic predicates are not the reason logic is a serious subject. Logic always has been a serious subject, and monadic symbolic logic has never pretended to absorb all questions from traditional serious logic. Polyadic predicates are the reason why the use of Fregean methods are a serious undertaking.

In terms of the goal, the teleonomic cause, of knowing the truth of " $Fxz \rightarrow Fzy$," the objectification of x and y must be subordinate to the objectification of z , as means of objectifying z . For the identity required for the recognition of truth is formally the identity between z and z . Using x and y to objectify z will require other at least implicit identity relations, but those other identities are used as a means to grasp the identity of z with z . If not, we could never grasp the identity of something with something.

Self evidence, 09-16-01

Means of diverse objectification can be so related logically, can be so logically related, that the objectified cannot be distinct other than logically. Here "logically" means related with reference to properties of the modes of objectification as such and only to the modes of objectification as such.

Logical relations, 09-16-01

Logical relations and logical properties are objects of awareness with which other objects of awareness become associated as a result of being objects of awareness. "Associated" might be better than "accrued to," etc.

Material implication, 09-16-01

The material conditional is really an enthymeme. As such, the question is not whether it is true or false; the question is whether the reasoning of which it is an abbreviation is a sound, where "sound" means both true and valid.

You cannot combine Frege and Hume. My logic article shows that the concept of self evidence explains and is more compatible with the success of post Fregean methods more than are Humean and Kantian skepticism. The reason post-Fregean methods haven't worked in philosophy is bad philosophical assumptions. Good philosophical assumptions explain the success of post Fregean methods. They do this by showing that philosophy is something other than an application of logic. The same process of explaining the success of post Fregean methods shows that philosophy is something other than an application of logic, and so simultaneously shows why post-Fregean methods are not successful in philosophy.

On p. 177 of "methods of logic" there appears to be a good example of the fact that substitution uses inference by way of modus ponens.

Do I have to get into the issue of quantification over properties?

Not all languages with color words need to have a separate word for color. Nor do we need to have many color words to abstract a concept of color.

Linguistically constituted objects that make sentences necessarily true sometimes occur. And it happens that we cannot be aware of how some words are used without being aware of such linguistically constituted objects.

Necessity and self evidence do not concern relations of ideas, relations of concepts, etc. the relation is between what it is to be color and what it is to be red; and what is to be color or red is not something linguistic or conceptual.

My position is not fallibilism.

First I establish that inference principles are necessary. Then I establish that they are self-evident by the tortoise Achilles argument.

To recognize logistic correctness, (1) I need to know necessary logical truths, but (2) logistic knowledge in itself does not give me that recognition.

New topic:

Do I really need the ontological metaphysical discussion of properties? Isn't the issue really epistemological. I am making the assumption that, epistemologically, whatever "color" communicates is also communicated by "red". That assumption is true of non-philosophers innocent of any problems about the ontology of "properties." For the man on the street, whatever is communicated by "color" is communicated by "red" but "red" communicates more than does "color."

Maybe a metaphysics of distinctions between properties will later be... called for. But if so that later theory must not be inconsistent with the epistemological fact that the speakers of English understand "color" when they hear "red." And I am not making a factual claim. I am just assuming that "red" logically includes "color," but that epistemological assumption happens to be true. So I do not even need to establish its truth, but it is important to note that the assumption that I am choosing at the beginning of this dialectical argument happens to be a true assumption.

After talking to Chuck Kelly, Mar. 2nd, 2002

Those words on p., between the previous. And the following. Are not a sentence just by being what they physically are. Physically they are not words just scratches. Those scratches become a sentence by

being associated with things other than themselves. But the things other than themselves with which they become associated fall into two classes.

First, there are objects of reference, of naming, of description, etc. that are pre-linguistic and pre-logical. That is simply to say that language does not start by talking about language. In order to have a language to talk about, we have first to talk about things that fall into our apprehension before language exists. After language exists, we can talk about objects of naming, describing, referring, etc. that are linguistic in nature.

But extra linguistic objects are not the only objects with which those scratches become associated in order to become words and sentences. They also become associated with objects we later describe as being a subject, being a predicate, being a cupula, being singular or plural, being past or present tense, masculine, feminine or neuter, etc. such objects come into existence and come into apprehension when language exists for the initial purpose of talking about prelinguistic objects. But the way language happens to work is that in order to communicate about those initial prelinguistic objects, the scratches become associated both with prelinguistic objects and linguistic objects.

in other words, the scratches have to be associated with prelinguistic objects in certain forms of association, in certain ways, ways that are necessary for language to do its job of communicating about prelinguistic objects.

Once language is in existence, we can name, describe, refer to, etc. objects of kinds other than our initial prelinguistic objects. We can use language for any kind of objects that comes into apprehension, including objects that are specifically linguistic. In other words, we can talk about names, predicates, descriptions, etc. but it is important to note that even when we are talking about specifically linguistic objects, a distinction must still be made between the objects that the scratches name, describe, refer to, etc. and objects that the scratches become associated with for the sake of naming, describing, etc. the former objects.

In other words, when I am talking, for instance, about what it is for a group of scratches to function as a subject, the word "subject" must have two kinds of association's. It must have that kind of association with subjects that is the kind we call being the meaning of the word "subject." But assume that the scratches "subject" used with that meaning also happen to be a subject of a sentence in which they are so used. Those scratches then have two kinds of association with what it is to be subject. In order to function linguistically those scratches have the association with what is to be a subject that we call the meaning of those scratches. But those scratches also have the kind of association with what it is to be a subject that we call actually being a subject.

One way to distinguish these different kinds of association is to note that when the scratches "subject" are used as a subject they share the characteristic of being a subject with any other group of scratches that can be so used. But when the scratches "subject" have the meaning of what is to be a subject, they have a characteristic they do not share with other groups of scratches except for those groups of scratches whose meaning is synonymous with the meaning of "subject."

Talking about the relations between these two different kinds of association can be tricky, obviously. But I want to say some things that hopefully will avoid any unnecessary trickiness. I want to talk about a certain aspect of the relation between those two kinds of association that concerns our belief in the truths of sentences in which scratches have both kinds of association. For the sake of avoiding unnecessary complications, I assume that the objects with which the scratches have the first kind of association are the kind of prelinguistic objects that we must be communicating about in order for language to come into existence in the first place: trees, rocks, motion, color, shape, multiplicity, warmth, speed, granularity, windchill, etc..

When we believe that a group of scratches has the characteristic of truth, we are not believing in any sort of correspondence between the linguistic or logical characteristics with which any or all of those scratches are associated, on the one hand, and prelinguistic reality on the other. We are not believing that any of the linguistic or logical characteristics with which those scratches are associated reflect prelinguistic

reality. We are not attributing any of the linguistic or logical characteristics with which those scratches are associated to prelinguistic reality.

That is precisely what we do not and cannot be doing. Whatever the relation between those scratches and reality is that makes that group of scratches true, whether it is correspondence or coherence or something else, it cannot be a relation between the logical or linguistic characteristics those scratches are associated with and reality.

The reason is that logical or linguistic characteristics are just means, tools, for understanding, in the mode appropriate for human reasoning faculties, the relation between the prelinguistic and prelogical objects with which those scratches are associated and reality, what ever that relation may be. But in knowing the truths about prelinguistic reality in the mode that is appropriate for our reasoning faculties, we do not attribute that mode of knowing to the reality that we know. If we did, the sentences in which we made attribution would be false; for the mode of understanding has a relation to reality only to the extent that the prelogical and prelinguistic objects with which scratches are associated have a relation to reality. (Geach's quote from Aquinas ST I, 13 ?? ad ?) (Does having a relation to reality make them distinct from reality? No, but to know reality as such is to know the relation of one object to another object as thing.)

The goal, the purpose, of linguistic and logical characteristics of groups of scratches is for us to know the relation between prelinguistic and prelogical objects and reality. Whatever the way that linguistic and logical characteristics serve that function, it cannot be by our attributing such characteristics to prelogical reality. Doing so would entirely defeat the purpose of those characteristics. Their purpose is to enable us to know and communicate about something entirely distinct from and prior to them.

The reason why we need to use logical and linguistic relations, characteristics, and objects to communicate about prelinguistic reality, is not that those relations, characteristics and objects correspond to, reflect, or are true of prelinguistic reality. The reason is the partial and fragmentary nature of human intelligence. We can only understand things by breaking the job of understanding in parts. In the process of breaking the job of understanding and parts, before we complete the job understanding by seeing the

unity of those parts by means of the truth of proposition, those prelinguistic parts become related in ways they are not related outside of being objects of human modes of knowing.

They become related as, for example, the meaning of the scratches that function as a subject or predicate in a sentence. Or for example, they become related as the meaning of this name or the referent of this name. Those relations simply do not apply to them in their prelinguistic reality. So such relations cannot be what we know about prelinguistic reality when we know the truth about prelinguistic reality.

But when we are aware of truth, we are aware of both kinds of objects. Because we are not just aware of reality but the relation between reality and a sentence, where "sentence" does not refer to scratches in their physical existence. "Sentence" can only refer to scratches with both kinds of characteristics. So knowing truth we have to know both kinds of characteristics. And that is one place where the confusion can come from, from the fact that both kinds of characteristics have to be in our consciousness when we know the relation between one kind of characteristic in prelinguistic reality. It is not just a fact or an accident that both kinds of characteristics have to be in our consciousness. As long as we can only know reality in partial and fragmentary manners, the characteristics that define our tools and means of knowing prelinguistic reality have to be part of that which we know. For you can only know the truth about reality by uniting things that have previously been broken up by a process in which they have necessarily acquired logical and linguistic characteristics as well as being associated with prelinguistic characteristics.

In other words what we have to know is precisely the prelinguistic unity of objects that have become logically and linguistically diverse. And we have to be aware of them in their logically distinct states in order to go through the process of recognizing their unity in their prelogical state. Because we can only recognize the truth about that prelogical unity by comparing prelogical realities that we have made logically diverse by our mode of knowing.

It is important to notice that when I talk about our mode of knowing being partial and fragmentary, I am not talking about the fact that in order to know reality we must know a multiplicity of distinct truths, where each

truth only expresses part of what is true in reality as a whole. Rather, the partial and fragmentary mode of knowing manifests itself in the formation of concepts prior to the formation of propositions. The reason that we need multiple propositions is that our concepts are fragmentary. So even though any one truth can be described as partial with respect to the total set of truths, any one truth is in itself an overcoming of the partial and fragmentary character of knowing from which logical relations take their origin.

New topic

Maybe start this way, or may be introduce ECQ do this way: quote Maritain and on logic vs. logistic. Or at least bring up the issue of two epistemological types as a theme of the essay. Then say that I will use ECQ to illustrate the distinction between these two types.

Arguments that everything follows from contradiction work if and only if other premises, for example, disjunctive syllogism, are true. Are they true? They are not necessarily true if the principle of noncontradiction is not true. So maybe they are just true by stipulation. But can that be all there is to logical knowledge: from the stipulations, this follows. After all, we have to use modus ponens or modus tollens. But are not these just further stipulations?

No, because it is just another stipulation, you get the Achilles tortoise paradox. Quine shows that stipulation gets that. Modus ponens has to be used but can't be a stipulation, short of an infinite regress. It has to be implicitly known as valid. How? Again, Quine can help, that is, his critique of the analytic can help us see how.

The reason that stipulation gets an infinite regress is that stipulation makes something an explicit premise. And get from explicit premises to an explicit conclusion you need to use the rule of modus ponens on those premises, even though one of those premises is modus ponens itself. Because of modus ponens is just stipulation, it can't get you to this conclusion rather than that conclusion necessarily. It can't get you to any conclusion. We have to apply a rule to the premises to get to a conclusion. If our knowledge of the truth of the rule, or of the applicability of the rule is the same kind as our knowledge that we have made a

stipulation, we are in an infinite regress.

Against two-place predicates: given the relation expressed by aRb , it is not the case that relation R , or it need not be the case, that relation R is just as much a property of a as it is of b . For example, Tom knows Dick, Tom kicks Dick,, Tom laughs at Dick.

August 16, 2002

Questions such as self evidence, analyticity, necessary truth, etc. do not arise from ordinary language as opposed to formal language. They arise from an investigation of the epistemological conditions necessary for doing things like using formal languages and recognizing that a step in a formal process is valid according to the rules.

Logic, Metaphysics, logical relations, features, properties, 5-23-00

Compare "Tom knows dick" to "Dick is known by Tom." From a metaphysical point of view, the first relation is a real relation, a real existent, while the second relation is a logical relation only, a nonreal existent. But from the point of view of the way they are represented logically, the way they are objectified, they are equally relations. For both we use a "tom related to Dick" "Dick related to Tom" logical structure to objectify them. This should clearly show that metaphysics cannot be based on logic. Also, it should clearly show that for every predicate with a distinct meaning there is not a really existing feature distinct from another really existing feature.

xxxSommers, 02-11-02

The following notes are taken from comments written in the margins of "the logic of natural language."

p. vii. "Articles could not do justice to the neoclassical alternatives that I was advocating."

p. viii. "Modern logic uses the forms, 'Px' and '-Px', to represent predicates thereby inflating to oppositions of contrariety and contradiction so fundamental to the classical term-theoretical standpoint." Point out that I am not entering into this problem; I am just assuming the classical modern position for the sake of my argument.

On p.xi he seems to say that the basic logical particles consist of more than signs for negative quality. But doesn't he say at the end of chapter 9 that signs of opposition are the basic logical signs? Also on this page he points out that the scholastics with the first to construe "Socrates it is..." As "every Socrates is...".

P. 1. "For logical purposes, be parsed"; "logical syntax of natural language"; "logical syntax of a sentence"; "logical subject"; "logical predicates". His use of these phrases to start off paragraph seems to imply that there are such things. But later in the paragraph he says "such regimentation put sentences into logically useful patterns." That's more like it. It's not that these things actually exists but a question of useful ladies of translating sentences for logical purposes. And what he means by logical purposes, and what he should mean by logical purposes, is made clearer by the later phrases "logical reckoning call for more then this sort of belief that t of the to book, calculation mechanically.

For on the next page he says "logical syntax is the syntax of an artificial language constructed for the purpose of a formalizing deductive reasoning." He is quoting somebody else, but later on certainly agrees. But the very next sentence seems to imply that there are such things as logical syntax and logical form.

"According to the construction us these are needed to make perspicuous the logical form and to facilitate logical reasoning." "Logical form," no. "Facilitate logical reasoning," means mechanical calculation.

Page 4. Uses the word "logistic." "The logistic advantage enjoyed by Fregean systems of logic." Later on this page there is a good sentence affirming is apparent belief in the existence of logical form.

Remember the difference in usage between "referring" and "denoting." See p. 6.

P. 10. "In the traditional syntax for logic all predicates, including those whose terms are relational, are 'monadic'. But maybe they are neither monadic or polyadic. May be these are and valid categories. Compare "the color red is neither odd nor even."

P. 14. "Frege himself did not think of his logical language as contributing to empirical linguistics; it seems at times that he had to great contempt for natural languages to credit them with a logical syntax." If so, he was right. They have no "logical syntax" because they are not calculation machines, and that's all there is to logical syntax.

P. 15. Note the reliance on the term "syntactical" on this and the following pages.

P. 16. Maybe there can be quantity without expressions like "some" or "all," Just as every sentence is modally characterized whether it's mode is made explicit or not.

P. 18. Russell quote: "... Did so for technical reasons." That is, for purposes of facilitating computation.

P. 19. This has implications for Rescher. The truth conditions for "all 1 is 2" is the truth of "this 1 is 2," and "that 1 is 2." But note the parent redundancy in the last statement. But truth condition for... Is the truth of... If statements like that are taken as definitions, they are circular. And he might take it as a definition at the bottom of this page.

P. 21. "The question of the existence of certain syntactical forms is something that we are learning to view in a scientific light. For we have, if only in principle, certain criteria for judging the adequacy of linguistic

theories when they postulate the existence of some class of syntactical objects."

P. 23. This does not prove that quantity is while, but does prove that the whole issue is irrelevant. That is, we can construct a calculus the translating natural language either way, that is, either Frege's or Leibniz's. Therefore neither way expresses an essential "logical" property of natural language or of anything else. Recall the essay "what numbers must not be". The argumentation is the same. Precisely because all of these conflicting theories do equally well at handling numbers, no one of these theories can express the essence of numbers.

P. 27. Simon explains propositions with no reference to logical subject or logical form. If there is a "logical structure," it is only in need for dual objectification, at least dual objectification.

P. 28. Is this a good example for thing-object analysis?

P. 29. "The reason we do not bother specify the quantity of "Socrates is wise" is precisely because either one will do."

P. 33. Aristotle on substance not having a contrary. See also p. 30 and p. 42.

P. 34. A good example of the fact that logical relations can have visible syntactical and semantic analogs.

P. 34, at the triangle. Doesn't this example rely too much on contingent features of grammar? Couldn't way construct a grammar that did what he says shouldn't be done? OK, he seems to say so that the bottom of p. 43 in the top p. 44.

P. 35. Here "form" just seems to mean "is equivalent to."

P. 37. Quotes Dummett as saying that ontology does depend on the philosophy of language. Further in the quotes Dummett says Frege's symbolic language is logically perspicuous. Really, its computationally

perspicuous.

P. 37. At the triangle. A clear example that a "logical subject" is nothing more than a form of expression that is a grammatical or syntactical form.

P. 38. "The recognition of their validity is taken as a fact "that may be left at the intuitive level"." This seems to be an admission that, and the context he and Frege are talking about, they are abstracting from an analysis of how we grasp that step in an inference is valid. In other words, they are leaving room for precisely what I am trying to do.

At the circle. An example of a very common reasoning structure. But causally can distinguish. That is, the truth of "something" is an effect.

P. 39, at the Cross. Here "logical subject" seems equivalent to "syntactical form."

At the circle. "Existential generalization is for the Fregean a primitive rule of inference whose validity is left to the intuitive level." Goes on to say the opposite for Leibniz who can show that 1 follows a syllogistically from the other. But my point is how do we intuitively that a syllogism is valid?

P. 39. The uses "thing" as a predicate for the first time.

P. 40. "For Frege the application of the ontological category term "object" is dependent upon the linguistic category term "proper name" and not conversely." See above remark from p. 37.

P. 41, At "big". "Traditional formal logic which does not discriminate subject from predicate on semantic grounds." That is, it discriminates them only on syntactical grounds, while and Frege they necessarily have different semantics.

P. 42, at the triangle. "In modern predicate logic, negation is always sentential and scope and predicate

light "is unwise" is not an expression on its own right." Do I need to be cautious about this when I caught about negation at the beginning of my argument in use both forms of the principle of noncontradiction? Maybe I need a footnote.

P. 44. "But one must agree with some bad and ontologically independent grounding of the subject-predicate distinction is untenable." So must derive ontology from logic rather than vice versa.

P. 46. "Father of" and "between" are not terms. They are relational expressions that enter into terms. Here are terms are understood in the traditional sense of either subject or predicate, indifferently.

P. 47. Note that the thing-object analysis can accommodate both the modern and the traditional. See the Italy article.

"In modern predicate logic, be a symmetry between individual symbols and predicate letters is written into the formation rules and any evidence of a symmetry that assumes the canonical status of the forms of modern predicate logic must be dismissed as planted evidence."

P. 48. U-turn: "the fact that philosophers of caliber of Strawson Dummett are enmeshed in the same question-begging procedure is proof, it anywhere needed, of the whole of the doctrine of atomicity on contemporary logical theory... the Tractatus of Wittgenstein is only one example of play major philosopher in the fall of its dogmatic embrace."

At "no." "The features of atomicity is subject to confirmation or disconfirmation in a developed linguistic science." From empirical point of view, perhaps. But not from the ontological point of view illustrated by Simon.

P. 50. Note that in all that's, individuality seems logically (that is, intellectually) prior to universality. And that is contrary to fact. Summer seems to provide a defense of the thesis that a universal is what the

intellect first grasps. That may be one of the implications of his theory that the pronoun refers back to something described by predicate.

At the crosses. Here "reference" definitely means that a referred to thing exists. But logical truth is a goal extraneous to a sentence itself. The logical properties of a word or sentence are what we put into the word or sentence. We do not put truth into a sentence; reality does. Likewise, we cannot put reference in the sense of real existence into our use of a word. We can put a claim of existence into our use of a word; but only reality can give that for which we use a word real existence.

If a sentence is contingent, as existence statements must be, I can know the sentence's logical properties without knowing that the sentence is true. That is what makes the sentence contingent.

P. 51. "And perhaps it may be acknowledged that only those who think of reference in a tendentiously Fregean way will find anything really odd about this." Yes, yes, yes.

At the second "good." He notes that Russell's idea of reference was broader than that of the contemporary Fregean that he criticizes.

At "?". Both "some 1 is 2" and "all 1's are 2's" are about all the 1's.

P. 52. At "OK." "This takes seriously the idea that only in the context of the whole proposition may we speak of the reference of its subject."

P. 53. "And to most contemporary philosophers of failure to refer is tantamount to a truth-value gap." So for them truth depends on reference, not the other way around. So for Strawson, truth depends on reference not the other way around.

P. 54. "It is then also natural to hold that a condition for a proposition having a truth value is that it's logical

subject refers to an object. We may call that's the referring condition for having a truth value: unless its object word actually refers to objects be atomic sentence cannot be used to make a statement and one who understood sentence is said not to have asserted a proposition."

P. 55. "Cause, purporting to refer and being about are not tied to truth conditions in the way that referring is."

P. 57. He seems to say that for Geach definite descriptions refer as do proper names.

P. 59, at the Cross. "Definite reference to individual begins with and is semantically dependent on an indefinite epistemic reference to that individual." So universal is what is first in the intellect. For you cannot make definite references unless you have first made an indefinite reference.

P. 60, at the Cross. "To be allowed to speak of the existence of the thing in a non-actual domain is one thing. To say that in "a ghost is in the attic" a ghost refers "intensionally" to a ghost is another." This seems to confirm what I say about intentional existence not being the same as cognition-dependent existence.

At "big". "Some 1 is No. 2." "1" denotes to every 1, but "some 1" refers only to some 1.

At the triangle. What can different "logical forms" mean but that 1 and 2 have some different features of a logical nature. A very harmless claim. For as the paragraph goes on to say "for purely logical concerns" we could avoid the distinction. That is, the different features do not have the cash value they are thought to have for some assumed logical goal.

At "yes." A terrific quotation from Searle to support my view that reference is of no "logical" interest whatsoever.

P. 61, at the Cross. A big, big statement to the effect that all of these different forms of syntax have the same truth conditions. Again, a confirmation of my use of "what numbers must not be" to argue against

their being such a thing as logical forms or logical subject's. Once we "get beyond the circumstances under which the proposition is taken as true" all these theories are merely different logical tools, grammar its constructed for some purpose, in particular the purpose of calculation. To try to absolutize any of them is to try to have a tool with no limitations. Only God's knowledge as no limitations, and therefore he does not need any tools. If we need tools, is because we are limited, and so our tools must be limited also.

P. 66. Unlike in "what numbers must not be," the theories summers is comparing may not be completely equivalent. Each will have some advantages that the others do not. So none of them is the "essence" of logical form, because, unlike the case of numbers where there is such a thing as numbers, there is no such thing as logical form and logical subjects.

P. 138. "There are a number of reasons for the failure of traditional formal logic to develop an adequate logic of relations, none of them do to any intrinsic advantage of a logical syntax of modern predicate logic over traditional formal logic. One of the main reasons was its failure to achieve a formal notation for representing categorical propositions -- relational and non-relational alike -- that was felicitous for a logical calculus."

Note that Maritain and offered a theory of truth, years after he wrote "formal logic," that would be independent of the subject-predicate for name-predicate syntactical forms.

At the circle. He goes on to say that traditional logicians were unable to read universal categorical propositions as equivalent to hypothetical propositions. No, they always recognized that universals concerned possible being, but correctly they did not identify that fact with logical form. See Maritain and on supposition.

P. 140. "This advantage of modern logic over traditional logic could only be a practical one and not a theoretical one." From what he goes on to say, "theoretical" seems to refer to questions like whether you really have to have the Fregean understanding of atomic propositions. But theoretical vs. practical could

also refer to something else. Formal systems always have one perceived advantage, the practicality of calculation. But that does not give them the kind of theoretical advantage that would make them the basis for a metaphysics. That is just another U-turn.

P. 141. "Usefulness for logical reckoning" of "a formal notation." See the top of p. 144.

P. 142. Big quote: "the only serious problem facing traditional formal logic is that of logical reckoning."

P. 143. He gives an example of an inference using an apparently redundant pleonastic, trivially true, truism. "Every 1 is 1." Some people may find this counterintuitive or the very least awkward. But modern logic does exactly the same kind of thing what it recognizes inferences like "if p, then p." As valid inference is on a par with other inferences. From a "formal" point of view (mechanical) you really can distinguish cases like this, either the modern cases of redundancy or the use of the truism for a traditional premise. And that is good for developing formal systems.

At the Cross. "This substitution principle is the rule corresponding to dictum de omni: what is true of every 1 is true of (what is) an(or any) 1." Great quotation for showing that substitution does indeed involve inference. Note the difference between the substitution rule and the logical truth it "corresponds" to.

Would summer's syllogistic defense of substitution, or syllogistic presentation of substitution, solve my problem about instantiation? I am thinking of some thing like the reasoning: whatever performs acts of a particular type has the ability to perform acts of that particular type. Men perform acts of the rational type. Men have the ability to perform acts of the rational type.

P. 144. Emphasize that the most powerful aspects of Frege's methods were not the details of his own particular formal system but the use of a computational method, something other formal systems could also employ. But logical recognition is not the same as recognition of computational success, the

correct application of computational rules. If summer's system that come before Frege's, it would have been thought to be the right one for exactly the same reasons that Frege's was considered to be the only right one.

P. 145. Perhaps criticize Maritain and and, for example, Geach and Strawson and Dummett for thinking that the problem between modern and traditional logic was at the level of logic proper rather than at the level of the epistemology of logic. Or at least criticize Maritain and for making it looked as if, or for not making an explicit, clear, that...

P. 146. At the crosses. Again a good example that the real issue between traditional formal logic and modern predicate logic is solely one of good or bad, powerful or not powerful, "techniques."

P. 147. "Methods of proof". He is talking about methods of computation and calculation. There follows a great quote to show how philosophers are guilty of the U-turn where mathematicians are not.

Further down. "I shall show how to give it a subject-predicate (non-phrase/verb-phrase) analysis of vernacular sentences that corresponds exactly to the structure, and modern predicate logic, of a sentences that translate them." But then may be the issue about true logical subjects and logical forms is an even up the level of syntactical differences. Ask Chuck what the cash value of this statement is. "We shall see that quantificational translations of relational sentences have a definite, albeit covert, subject-predicate structure." He's referring to translations into modern predicate logic.

P. 148. Identity or lack of identity between what is objectified as "a tail of some horse" and as "a tail of some reptile."

P. 149. Where summers shows Frege's "Fx" is equivalent to a subject-predicate structure, I show that Maritain's identity theory of truth, originally stated in subject-predicate form, can be stated in "Fx" and "Rxy" terms.

P. 150. Awareness that an argument is valid by the rules of a computational method (1) presupposes awareness of logically necessary truths used as inference principles, implicitly used as inference principles, and (2) is not identical with the implicit awareness of logically necessary truth. That is, awareness of educational validity is not the same thing as awareness of necessary truth but presupposes it.

P. 151. Several times he seems to assume that there is such a thing as an underlying logical structure for sentences.

P. 153. He has been discussing questions of priority of one view of sentences, or a sentence structure, over another, priority of one kind of subject over another kind of subject, one kind of sentence over another, one kind of predicate over another, etc. But there is another kind of priority that philosophers can diffuse with all the above. The question is whether term logic has logical priority, priority in developing a logic, but whether it has epistemological priority. The epistemological priority of term logic is not that "all propositions say something about something." The epistemological priority is that to show why, or how, we know that an antecedent implies its consequent, we must ultimately use syllogism's linking the terms of the antecedent and the consequent. If we can't link their terms, our knowledge of the truth of a hypothetical does not have epistemic necessity.

P. 155. He says he wants "a theory in which neither type of proposition is viewed as analytically prior to the other but both are viewed as structurally isomorphic. A theory in which terms of propositions are the elements of abstract structures governed by laws that can be interpreted to hold indifferently for categorical propositions or for compound propositions."

If his method of doing traditional formal logic had been discovered before Frege's new way of doing logic, the details of a 20th-century philosophy would have been radically different. But the same basic mistake would be present that has always been present since Plato.

P. 156. Quine's ontological relativity shows the irrelevance of logic to metaphysics. For ontological relativity would be (of certainly) true if a logical and the empirical were the only two points of view. Only on that hypothesis would ontological relativity be even relevant to metaphysics.

At the circle. On his account these should be equivalent, but obviously they are not so material implication is irrelevant to existential truths, that is, existential identities between things and objects. And see the top of p. 157.

P. 157. Why not the first also?

P. 159. "The carrying out of the program commits us to an ecology of states of affairs and, more particularly, to a Wittgensteinian world.... Only the latter idea allows us to carry on with the program of giving compound propositions to categorical form while allowing for a diversity of states, cases or facts."

At the cross. "Our own standpoint is that... Share a common structure which makes one or the other style of analysis possible but that neither analysis is necessary or even desirable." He is talking about the strategy of analyzing hypothetical propositions as categorical subject-predicate propositions.

At the top. "Structure"? Causal structure? teleonomic cause?

P. 160, at the crosses. Here the defends, or thinks the defends, his idea of a common structure. But the fact that a common method is possible does not show an underlying logical form. It only shows that an even more comprehensive grammar is possible. But the limits of this grammar as a clue to anything else are shown by the use of the "if the elements are... Then... It is..." Statements.

At the circle. "The parity and mutual independence of term and propositional logic implies that syncategormata which seem respectively specific to terms and to propositions must have important formal affinities." Of course, this too shows my point that the affinities are syntactical, and so the differences are also syntactical.

P. 161 , at the top. "We have no need of negative and compound state of affairs in accounting for the truth of negations and compound sentences.

At "Rescher." "The semantic thesis appropriate to a neoclassical logic of terms of propositions plus limits the correspondence of true sentences to state of affairs noted by elementary affirmative sentences." That's is my criticism of Rescher. "Negations and compound sentences are themselves non-denotative but are interpreted as affirming or denying the existence of the states denoted by their elementary component sentences.

P. 162, at the crosses. Am I am "object" person as opposed to a "state of affairs person"? No, that is a false dichotomy. The fundamental state of affairs is the existence of what he calls "objects." And he has a good example in what follows to show the false dichotomy.

At the circle. Does this apply to the grue paradox?

At the triangle. Again, material implication is irrelevant to the identity of objects in existence.

At the blue circle. Metaphysical conclusions from logical premises?

P. 163. He explains why the logic of propositions and truth functions came to have primacy over the logic of terms. He goes out to say that he is affording either kind of reduction. But adds that the conduct of expressions joining terms and sentences have important affinities. So we trying to cover itself by saying, one hand he is going to do something that might look like reduction, but on the other hand he is not really doing reduction.

Not on p.: instead of trying to the right conclusions from Sommers work, philosophers are liable to do the opposite. Their liable to say that Sommers just adds to the tools we have to try to use logic to solve the philosophical problems. Just as Milton Fisk said that he could you so and so's modal logic to develop a philosophy of necessity in history, others will say that Sommers work gives them options for solving philosophical problems that they did not have before.

Of course, some philosophers will want to reply to taking away logic as the basis for solving philosophical problems "what do we do now? We thought we had a way to deal with these questions. You have taken that way from us; so we're left with nothing." Obviously this is not a satisfactory state to leave them in.

P. 165. Characterizing "the distinction between logical and extra-logical expressions." You can't distinguish the expressions other than by distinguishing that which they express. And you can't do that by "criteria" for identifying individual's. Causal analysis shows that there does occur cognition-dependent objects that are logical. But the philosophical use of that concept is not to identify individuals. It is to do further causal analyses.

P. 166. "The class of atomic sentences cannot itself be fixed independently of the class of categoremata." We don't have to know how to "effects" the categoremata, only have to know, causally, that language for public objects, existents, precedes and produces language for cognition-dependent objects.

P. 167. He says that in natural language each elementary sentence has to terms. No, each elementary truth is known by recognizing the identity of at least two "terms," not terms of language but terms of the

thing-object relation, two relata.

At the top: concerning Deely. How can cognition-dependent objects be primitive unless there exists a cognition of something, x , on the basis of which other objects of cognition dependent? Does not want so say that beings of reason are formed on the basis of, on the model of, real being? Doesn't that undercut Deely's interpretation of Poincaré?

P. 170. We can consider negations times to have a sense that does not depend on laws; laws depend on it. Or vice versa. Either way contradiction is not imply everything. For if negation is defined by laws, we can use disjunctive syllogism to get "q". Or we can get "q" from disjunctive syllogism, but we know that disjunctive syllogism is not a necessary truth or that it does not define the same meaning for negation signs, sense of another law and the set of laws defining negation signs is broken. So if we break the other law, we get "q" because negation does not mean what it meant before; and disjunctive syllogism does not mean what it meant.

The opponent will say that that is his point. Without the principle of noncontradiction, other laws will get to anything. But they only get to anything if they still work as before. And they don't work as before if the meaning of negations signs. has changed.

P. 173. At the Cross. Good example that the rules he needs for his model of thought always make such models imperfect. If I can prove that universally, can show that thought is not a calculation process. Maybe the implicit awareness of self evident inference principles in the awareness of the premises proves this.

P. 175 , at top. "If... Are terms or relations". Notice the shift of "categories," "domains," or "universes" from terms, which are means of objectification, to relations, which are the objectified.

Further down: "exploiting the similarities of logic to of arithmetic...".

P. 176. "A notation that makes it possible to do logic in an arithmetical way."

P. 177, at the Cross. Material implication: the logical has not only suppressed the ontological, it has suppressed the epistemological. It is because "1 implies 2" that "not both 1 and not 2" is true. Entailment is epistemological. Likewise, it is because of the truth of statements using terms as traditional logic does, that the connection between the antecedent and consequent of the hypothetical is true.

P. 183. Two kinds of rules: rules of transformation and rules of derivation. On the next p. he adds laws of derivation.

P. 195. The focus on studying the various advantages and disadvantages of the various models of inference can distract us from looking at what goes on in inference epistemologically. Sure, psychology is perilous, but logical modeling does not replace it. If a philosophy of logic is the philosophy of studying various models of thought, it is not the epistemology of logic, which still needs to be done.

P. 197. Great quotation: "the Fregean may object that "something exists" cannot even be expressed in the standard language of modern predicate logic. But this only means that the formation rules of modern predicate logic are, and that respect, deficient."

At the "?" "Support Quine's view that the correct interpretation of quantifier is objectual and not substitutional."

P. 201. "Whenever... Has a truth value, then... And Or... are true." He seems to be saying something similar to what I say about the law of excluded middle. I say it applies to anything that has a truth value. But his way of claiming that a sentence does not have truth value is very different from mine. I must make sure they are not confused. Mine is a causal analysis saying that whatever they may be, causes necessary for a sentence to have truth value are not present.

P. 202. "The idea that relational expressions like "loves" are to place predicates has no place in classical linguistics or classical logic."

P. 204. "According to that rule, inference with two or more premises proceeds in algebraic fashion by cancellation of middle elements."

P. 205. "The logical vocabulary of basic logic consists of signs of opposition. And it suggests that inference proceeds by cancellation and substitution according to the dictum that traditional logicians have always considered to be fundamental and at the basis of deductive reasoning."

We start with an extra-logical value. To negate it, to get the opposite, we don't need any additional extra-logical value; just need a cognition-dependent object. So he implies that negation is the basic cognition-dependent object. Aquinas does the same thing. To find Aquinas's quotation to that effect look in Regis's "epistemology."

"There is also the psychological question of how we reason..."

P. 206. "... The question is legitimate and alternative logistical systems with different logical syntax is will one day receive confirmation or disconfirmation as models for the deductive process actually taking place as we move from premises to conclusions." Perhaps, but they are only models, and no model is perfect. And if logic enters the empirical questions about how we reason, it does not answer the ontological questions about how we reason.

"It is far more likely that the actual procedures we use in getting from the premises to the conclusion are closer to the model of cancellation than to the model of instantiation and generalization familiar to the practitioner of modern predicate logic."

P. 208. "Traditional formal logic has no apparatus for regimenting sentences in a manner that makes truth conditions perspicuous. This may be thought of as a disadvantage; nevertheless, for that very reason, traditional formal logic does not find itself forcing standardized truth conditions on sentences of the same logical form."

P. 210. "Our account of... Does not construe its logical form existentially." Again, there is no such thing as logical form, only what is causally required epistemologically to grasp truth, as shown by Simon.

P. 212. At the Cross. An example of possible existence.

P. 213. "The amplitude of a term in a statement is determined by my knowledge of the meaning of that statement..." This is what I want to say about the reference of a term.

P. 216. Great quotation: "It is in any case to be avoided by a theory of logical signs that is based on some idea of what logical signs have in common. When expressions as different as "or" and "there exists" are both included in the list of the formative elements all logical language, the philosopher has actually given up trying for unified understanding of the logical formatives."

P. 224, at the top. Good example showing that substitution is in inference or at least requires an inference.

At the bottom. This is goes on why "the planets are nine" does not imply that "the number of planets is the square of 3" is not a necessary truth.

P. 284. Perhaps this example shows that is more likely that Aristotle's doctrine of "primary" subjects is based on his doctrine of substance than vice versa.

P. 286. "The algebraic representation could be usefully exploited in exhibiting such common features as commutivity."

P. 291. Again, like Aquinas, negation is primitive and prior to other logical notions.

P. 292. Perhaps he us. In logic "exists" as unrestricted amplitude precisely because real existence is not logical; so existence for realities as the same logical properties as existence for other "objects." He does not to give a good way of handling "every tiger exists" in terms of an amplitude that is not restricted to the domain of realities. As a result the sentence is not redundant.

P. 306. "The consequences -- for metaphysics, for logic, for the philosophy of language -- of a decision on the question whether the categoremata are charged or uncharged, are widely ramify in virtually uninvestigated. But the decision cannot be made in isolation; it depends on which organon of logic we choose to accept."

P. 312. "Decidability is, of course, a characteristic of statements that accrues to them in virtue of the abilities of those who make the statements."

P. 313. "Dummett defined realism as the "belief that for any statement there must be something in virtue of which it or its negation is true"."

P. 314. "It is one thing to say that the law does not apply in a given case or over given domain giving reasons to withhold truth values from the sentences that appear to violate the law." (I would say that I do not have to give reasons to withhold the truth values. Whatever the "reasons", that is, the causes why a sentence fails to have truth value may be, I do not have to know what they are. If a sentence violates the principle of excluded middle, there is a failure of truth value someplace.) "it is quite another thing to assert conjunction of negations that Dummett cannot but see as an overt violation of the classical sentential law of excluded middle. It is therefore it never really possible for Dummett to say that Jones was neither brave nor not brave: the must instead argue for a truth value gap, never a like matter since nothing less than a theory of meaning is required for the judgment that a prima facie meaningful statement is neither true nor false." (Again, I do not want to have to provide a theory of meaning or anything else. I know that it excluded middle is violated, some cause necessary for a sentence to have truth value, whatever that cause may be and I do not need to know, is missing.)

P. 316. He is not really saying what I am saying. He is saying that both sentences can have the truth value of being false. I am saying that truth value was never achieved.

P. 319 "the curious doctrine that the absence of 1's is reason enough to except "every 1 is 2" leads to curious theses in the theory of meaning." Then on p. 321 he says "it is not just harmless paradox to say that the absence of 1's is reason for the truth of "every 1 is...". In the footnote he then draws a parallel with material implication. In material implication the absence of truth in the antecedent makes the whole thing true. In the universal categorical the absence of existence for the subject allegedly makes the whole thing true."

P. 323. "So we have both the rejection of the logical law of excluded middle and the semantic law of bivalence."

P. 326. "We need to be able to distinguish between denying of Socrates that he is wise and denying that Socrates is wise. If the first is reduced to the second, then we have no way of saying anything negative about Socrates. For the second is not about Socrates that all but about the proposition that Socrates is wise. Of that proposition, it says that it is not the case.

P. 334. "Terms like "existent" and "occurrent" differ from terms like "striped" and "dangerous" and not really characterizing their subjects." Yes, there is a big difference between "exists" and other grammatical predicates. But saying that there is a big difference is one thing, articulating the difference and its consequences is another. improper articulation deprives us of understanding human knowledge, because it deprives us of metaphysics.

P. 335. His critique of on to on exists being predicate is reminiscent of Maritain and Cajetan. But are "domains" the best way to talk about possible and actual existence? There is no need to be absolute by saying that it is the "best" or "the only" way. Domains are a concept of a very, very powerful tool. But all

tools are limited. Again, is "is exists a predicate" a question?

P. 336. "It is, to repeat, essential to the point of view that I am advocating to say that "there are tigers" is construed as a sentence of the subject-predicate form. It is not essential to my point of view to insist on any thesis involving possible world semantics or metaphysics." Again, is "is exists a predicate" a question?

P. 338. "A theory of reference appropriate to the logical syntax of traditional formal logic is an attractive alternative to the contemporary theory."

P. 339. "The syntax of the sentence like "Socrates is why use" does not differ in the central respects from that of a sentence like "a man is why use" or "every man is why use" so far as the form of the subject is concerned."

P. 340. "We have lately discuss some of the implications for logic and for metaphysics of the contemporary treatment of negation as a sentential operator or "connective."

"Restriction of the vocabulary for expressing logical form to the logical particles" a quotation from Katz.

P. 341. Good on the distinction between translating (modern logic) and transcribing (traditional logic) sentences of natural language. And the footnotes good on the syntactical character of quantification.

P. 342. "Transcribes the vernacular for logical reckoning"

P. 43. Good argument that Frege's "terms" are not really terms.

xxxCarol's Paradox, Adler-U, universal concepts, difference of man, BIG, 5-11-00

My original purpose for going into Lewis Carroll's Achilles/tortoise paradox was not to do the philosophy of logic what to do the philosophy of mind. Specifically, I was looking for a new argument to establish the difference of humanbeings from machines on the one hand and animals on the other. I was hoping to show that awareness of the correctness of than algorithmic process was not itself the result of an algorithmic process.

Concerning the difference of man, the following argument, which is far as I know has not been used, should be used. In the article on contradiction I show that awareness of how to apply a rule requires a minimal deductive inference. The kind of inference I describe their is probably one that animals could accomplish in certain cases. They could not accomplish an inference that required recognizing that a particular well formed formula was a well formed formula. But they could certainly accomplished inferences that require them only to recognize something visually. For example, the rule might be if you see yellow, screen. Applying that rule requires an inference, a deductive inference.

But I want to say that animals cannot be aware that a deductive inference is correct. That is a cannot be aware of that particular logical relationship. Because awareness of the correctness of the algorithmic process requires awareness of the necessary truth of logical principles used by the process, modus ponens in particular. And animals cannot recognize such necessary truths, especially not such self-evidently necessary truths. They can be aware that something went wrong. For instance, if they are following the rule they haven't thought and they do not get the result they expect, they will be frustrated. Being frustrated is not the same as recognizing that of the conclusion of the inference follows necessarily from a self-evidently true logical principle. We on the other hand can recognize that logical necessity.

Likewise, animals appear to be able to use universal concepts in some sense. Distinguishing their universal concepts from ours may or may not be an easy process. But what distinguishes human beings is that we can't recognize the relationship of universality. That is, we can recognize that a particular object

of concept is indeed a universal, does indeed bear the relation of your personality to correlatives which bear the relation of individuality.

12-27-00

To be aware of the validity of an argument, we must be aware, cognizant, not just of the rule but up the truth of the rule. And cognizant of it in a manner that does not require arriving at its truth by deduction from other rules. Or from other premises, whether the other premises are rules or not. But a machine have that kind of awareness?

If we can add the definition of life using the concept of the "not fortuitous" to Averoes's analysis of consciousness we might be able to show that consciousness requires "life" in a way that machines are not yet capable of. Or maybe better, in sensation requires a substance, consciousness requires a substance, not an accident like a machine.

Is logical knowledge knowledge of the correctness of the steps in a proof as opposed to knowledge of the necessary truth of inference principles? Perhaps we want to say this. But if so there is another question. In addition to knowledge of the correctness of steps in a proof, in algorithm, is there such a thing as knowledge of necessary truths that are or that correspond to logical inference principles? I am arguing not only that there is such a thing but if there were not such a thing, we could not have knowledge of the correctness of the steps in a proof.

Another good example of how knowledge of the correctness of an all the algorithmic step presupposes knowledge of the necessary truth of modus ponens is the use of substitution by way of universal or existential specification or generalization.

xxxEthics, cruelty to animals, , overflow, aesthetics, July 27, 1999

On page 404 of Putil, Philip D. Vine offers what he calls an overflow principal that makes cruelty to animals unethical. He is wrong, but there could be an esthetic overflow principal that explains why cruelty to animals appears to be intrinsically leave all the way cruelty to human beings is, although cruelty to animals cannot have the same moral significance as cruelty to human beings.

On page wk five of the New York Times for July 20 fifth 1999, talking about an Atlantic monthly article, Nicolas Wade says "seeing a highly intelligent animal life a dolphin or a chimpanzees, people cannot resist computing to what what ever they would feel in the same context. This is probably part of our genetic programming. The whole art of living in social groups is to figure out other members intentions and act accordingly. We do this instinctively, and almost any fellow mammal will trip the reflex."

He is para-raising the interest John S. Kennedy, quoted on page 45 of the Atlantic monthly for July 1999 via Stephen Budiansky in the article "the truth about dogs". Can be says that "we are compulsive anthropomorphizers, always on the lookout for behaviors that mimic human social phenomena such as loyalty, be traileed, reciprocity. These are useful things to lookout for when one is a group dwelling animal whose survival is threatened less by wild beasts than by back stabbing fellow the group dwellers. All work cognitive ability to ascribe motives to others is a large part of the makes us human. But it is truly compulsive. Human beings do it so instinctively that they are for ever ascribe being malignant or bending the motives even to in animate forces such as the weather volcanoes, and internal combustion engines."

To use D. Vine's word, there is an overflow from our ability to ascribe motives and other healing to human beings to the ability to drive them to animals. But this is an esthetic overflow, not a moral one. Even with our the overflow principal, we naturally have a negative esthetic reactions to pain in animals because we know what pain is in ourselves and we negatively we act, in an esthetic sense, to it. So we don't like to see pain in animals same reason that we don't like to be it in other human being, namely, we don't like pain where ever we see it because we don't like it in ourselves. We have a negative reaction to thinking

about pain whatever the context of the pain we are thinking about. Because that is what pain is in our perception, something we think negatively of.

There is nothing moral about this at all. Everything that the last paragraph talks about is esthetic. But our negative esthetic reaction to pain is strong enough for us to confuse it with a moral reaction. But if there is a moral dimension to causing pain in animals, that moral dimension cannot come just from an esthetic reaction. No matter how strong and the emotional reaction may be, and emotional reactions do not constitute a moral judgment. I think to think of animals sufferings, because I think to think of sufferings. But hating the idea of animals sufferings does not tell me whether it is morally right or wrong, or if it is morally right or wrong, to cause animal sufferings.

The animal rights movement draws most of its strength from this confusion.

March 1st, 2002

Singer says that a grown horse is more rational than a human baby. Let's compare other species. Compare a grown rat that has learned to maneuver a maze to a baby chimpanzee. The baby chimpanzee will someday be able to use language and even add, subtract, multiply and divide. Let us assume that an adult rat will never be able to do these things. Singer says that we should value the grown horse more than we do the baby human. Why? Presumably because what exists when a grown horse exists is a higher achievement, a higher accomplishment. Why? Because the ability to obey commands, which the horse has achieved, has not been achieved by the baby. So we find a higher achievement in the horse and in the baby.

Well, do we find a higher achievement in the rat than in the baby chimpanzee? The existence of the baby chimpanzee is an achievement of some kind. Why should we consider the rat's ability to maneuver a maze a higher achievement than what exists when a baby chimpanzee exists? Likewise, what exists when a human baby exists is an achievement that in some respects surpasses the achievement that

exists when a horse is able to obey commands. For example, the baby human being as a much more developed brain. Is it in accomplishment of nature to produce something with a human brain? Why isn't that a higher accomplishment than a horse that can obey orders?

Singer my reply that the reason we seem to value the achievement that exists when a human baby exists more than the achievement that exists when an adult horse exists is that the baby clean up are human brain gives that baby potential for further achievements. Yes what is potential in one respect is always something actual and other respect; potency is always just the other side of a coin from a state of actuality. But the reason we value the state of actuality is precisely the other side of the coin. The reason we value state of actuality, singer might say, is that it gives us a potency for certain future accomplishments, accomplishments of the kind that the horse is already achieved.

But the horse and the rat have only achieved some of the kinds of accomplishments that the baby human beings nature and the baby chimpanzees nature gives them the potency to achieve. Why should we value the accomplishment of only certain things to which the actuality already accomplished in the babies is a potency higher than we value the actuality which constitutes that potency for much higher achievements than the horse will never achieve? Or the rat.

But achievements have value only in relation to the ends of some agent. When a dog that is now a puppy acquires enough hair, because of that achievement that dog may now be useful for achieving the end of someone who needs a hairy object to wipe up tar. But having the ability to wipe up tar is hardly of benefit to the dog. That achievement does not serve any of the dog's ends.

So one question we have to answer whatever we are asking how to evaluate things on the basis of their accomplishments rather than of their potencies is whose ends will provide the point of view from which we make the evaluation. When we value the horse more than that the human baby, we are certainly not adopting the point of view of the ends of the human baby as our standard of evaluation. Whose standard are what standard are we using?

Notice that one thing is necessarily true of any answer we give to whether we should value 1 above 2,

whatever it 1 and 2 may be. Any answer will depend on our choosing some standard for evaluating, of evaluation. Any answer we give will result from some end we are trying to achieve, some achievement we are reaching for that has value for us precisely because we have chosen that achievement is our end, our goal for making this evaluation. How else can we decide whether to evaluate the baby chimpanzee higher or lower than we evaluate the adult rat?

So when we value the horse more than we value the human baby, we are valuing the human baby from the point of view of our ends, our chosen ends, to the exclusion of its chosen ends. It might seem that what I'd just said in the last paragraph makes this inevitable. We can only make evaluations from the point of view of our ends. Yes, but we can and do choose the end of giving other people's pursuit of ends a status equal to our pursuit of ends in our evaluations. We give their pursuit of ends the status of being just as important as our pursuit of ends in our system of values.

We can do that and we generally do that for human adults. But if we prefer to horse of the child, we are specifically refusing to do that for the child. Why? On what grounds? On what basis? On what justification?

Again, achievements have value only in relation to the ends of some agent. The ends for which an agent is directed are determined by its potentialities, and by its actualities only to the extent that they are one side of a coin whose other side is potentiality. A child's actualities, the achievements that its intrinsic nature constitutes, given potentiality of achieving the same kind of ends that we can achieve by deciding to kill a baby. The child is an agent oriented to achieve the same kind of ends as is the agent that kills the baby. What gives the agent that kills the baby the justification for doing so?

The argument that I can justly prefer the rat to the chimpanzee because I consider the achieved ability to negotiate a maze to have more value than the achieved ability that constitutes a potency for the future abilities to use language and arithmetic would hardly be an argument that is impressive to the chimpanzee. The reason would be that the chimpanzee would judge the argument from the point of view

of its ends rather than my ends. So what we really have to decide is how we value the orientation to ends. We really have to decide whether we value the child's orientation to ends more than the horse's orientation to ends.

In other words, what we really have to decide is how we value an agent precisely under the aspect of being agent oriented to future ends. As an agent oriented to future ends should we value the child more highly than the horse? From this point of view, we have to measure value in terms of the accomplishment that the child already consists of precisely adds an orientation toward future ends of certain kinds. That is what makes the child of certain kind of agent. And it is kinds of agent that we are evaluating.

In the value of the infant and the horse, we are basically comparing the value of free agents as agents: the infant, the horse, and ourselves. The reason why we are comparing agents is that on the basis of ends we are seeking by our actions we are putting out of existence an entity with its own ends to be achieved by its own actions, the infant, and doing so on the basis of comparing the value of the infant and the horse. So we are comparing the value of entities that achieve ends by acting precisely as entities that achieve ends by acting.

From the point of view of what ends and whose ends do we decide how to come terribly value these agents? We may have ends that mak an equine agent that can obey commands more valuable to us, from the point of view of those ends, then what any infant is as an agent right now. But the infant is also an agent oriented to ends. To the goals that make a horse more valuable to us right now make a horse more valuable from the point of view of the infant's ends? No. The point of view of the infant's ends, the horse is at most a means. From the point of view of the infant's ends, the infant herself is not just a means, her well being is rather her ultimate subjective end. (Note that securing the ends of human beings who cannot secure them themselves is the moral responsibility of human beings who can secure them. So instead of it being moral to kill the infant, it is our moral responsibility to help the infant achieve its ends.)

How can our achieving ends deprive another human agent of the ability to achieve any ends? They have different ways of being oriented to ends than we do, but by what ends and whose ends should we evaluate those differences? One way answer that question is to compare the value of what we would accomplish by killing her to the value that would be accomplished if she achieved her own ends. The ends we achieve by killing her can be no greater than the kind of ends that she is oriented to achieving. But if the ends to which we are oriented at no greater value than the ends to which he is oriented, how can our comparative evaluation of agents make our value as agents greater than hers?

Granted, our longer development as given us more means for achieving our ends and she now possesses. In that relative sense, our value as agents is greater, since given the same kind of ends, what we are now is something better equipped to achieve them. But the question is does that equipment justify our killing agents or less well-equipped to achieve them. Presumably it would be an injustice if we deprive someone who is now equally equipped to achieve them of the ability to achieve them or some of them.

Having means to achieve an end is a value to them only because they are oriented to the end. By the standard of its orientation to ends deprive being an entity of an existing feature does it no more harm, and so is no more and of an injustice, and preventing it from acquiring the feature in the first place, which is what we would do if we kill the agent before acquired that feature. So is just as wrong to prevent an agent from acquiring a means to its ends that it does not now possess as it is to deprive the agent of that means would already possesses it.

So is just as wrong to decide that the agent that is now in infant not acquire the means to achieve its ends as it is to decide an adult no longer have those means. The fact that adults already possess a means to achieve an end is not what makes it wrong to deprive them of that end. What makes it wrong is the fact that they need that means to achieve an end to which they are oriented. Having a means does not make one thing's achievement of an end of greater value than another thing's achievement of the same kind of an; for the value of a means only comes from the orientation to ends. And the infant's causal dispositions orient and to ends of the same kind as an adult's.

Singer to do is reply may be that I am only shown that it is wrong to kill human infants that are sufficiently

normal that we can expect them to develop the abilities to achieve the ends that give value to our actions. So we are comparing agents oriented to ends that either will or will not ever be able to achieve. How we make this comparison? From the point of view of what ends or whose ends? We are in effect comparing the potentiality for achieving certain kinds of ends to the complete absence of the potentiality for achieving those ends. Do those ends themselves provides sufficient criteria for making evaluation, not when we are comparing two agents oriented to the same kind of ends.

What ends, then, will provide such criteria? Any ends we choose will be chosen by us as intermediate ends subordinate to the kind of ultimate ends that both agents possess. Therefore the basis for choosing those ends cannot provide a justification for valuing the agents unequally.

Here singer may respond by stating that in terms of those same ultimate ends we know that can achieve no good, for the infant, to keep the infant in existence. The words they can ask what good it does for the infant to keep the infant in existence. In "natural obligation" I respond to this argument on the basis that an infant possessing orientations to free choices is an end-in-itself. In order to reply to singer at this point do I have to go into the concept that a free being is that for the sake of which everything else exists, the good for the sake of which all lesser goods exist? Perhaps. But if I do, then short of going through the whole argument of "natural obligation," I would have to end the argument here by explaining the two approaches morality.

If I do use the two approaches to morality strategy here, I would conclude that if infants are not ends-in-themselves and our only standard for making decisions are feelings, say here is quite correct that we can kill infant's if we prefer horses to them. But he must face the conclusion that we can kill any human being for any reason that our feelings, including our socially conditioned feelings, would incline us to kill.

For Thomist, add an abstract that shows the connection to Thomism. Point out that one kind of nature has been left out almost completely from discussions of natural law and other "naturalistic" approaches to ethics, the nature of one faculty: the will, the rational appetite.

xxxWhat are numbers? May 1, 2000

In discussing Aquinas's a theory of numbers Thomists have a shockingly avoided what are known as transcendental numbers, for example, the number of persons in the Trinity. It is these numbers, rather than the numbers that result from the division of all continuum, that are what modern mathematics is talking about.

But in what follows I am going to have to use the word transcendental in two different senses. When speaking of transcendental numbers, we mean numbers that transcend the sphere of the material, numbers that can be shared by material beings and immaterial beings, just as other transcendental properties can be. But the analysis that follows also depends on comparing the concept of number to what are known in tradition as the transcendentals. With that warning, I hope I can make things clear for the reader.

Consider the Trinity. Is the quantity 3 and accident of the Trinity, an accidental feature inhering in the Trinity? If not, is number merely a being of reason, a logical construct of some sort.? No, the number of persons in the Trinity is a reality; that is, the fact that there are three persons in the Trinity rather than two or four it is a reality. Likewise, if God had created only three creatures, say three angels, the fact that there were three creatures rather than two or four would be a reality. Yet, the No. 3 would not be an accident of any of the 3 Angels. So what kind of concept is number?

We know that number is associated with the extension of a universal concept. In order for there to be three, there must be three of something: three oranges, three apples, three persons, or what ever. That is

why the concept of number can appear to be a being of reason. For universality and extension are logical relations and therefore beings of reason. But the fact that a concept includes a being of reason does not imply that the objective concept as a whole is the objective concept of a being of reason. In fact, it means the opposite. The whole point of the doctrine of the transcendentals, that is, of the concepts convertible with being, the one the good the true etc., is that the addition of a being of reason to the concept of being leaves the result identical with the reality objectified by means of the first concept, the concept of being. The whole point of the doctrine of the transcendentals is that the true is not a being of reason but is convertible with, that is, identical with, being. Not identical as an objective concept, but identical as to the reality objectified by each of these objective concepts.

The reason for this identity is precisely that the concept of the true adds only a being of reason to the concept of being and therefore does not add any reality to the concept of being. Something similar must be true of the concept of number.

To the reality all of the persons in the Trinity the No. 3 adds the concept of falling under the extension of the concept of person. It objectifies the realities that fall under the extension of that concept precisely as falling under the extension of a concept. But what falls under the extension of a concept is not a being of reason, or need not be, it can be a reality and in the first instances must be a reality. To the reality that exists when the Trinity exists, or the reality that exists when only three creatures have been created, the No. 3 adds the being of reason of a falling under the extension of the concept of person or the concept of creature, respectively, that is, of being a term of the relation of universality that characterizes the objective concept of person or creature. But it adds more. It adds the concept of falling under the extension of a universal concept together with the other things that fall under the extension. Or, in common with the other things that are terms of the relation of universality.

To the reality that exists when the Trinity exists or three creatures exist, the concept of number adds the being of reason of so many falling under the extension of a concept together, the concept of so many falling under a universal concept in common. So the existence of three or the existence of 4 is not a being of reason it is identical with the existence of the realities being objectified. But it objectifies those realities

in a certain way, just as the concept of true objectifies being in one way in the concept of good objectifies being in another way. Note that I have not spoken about a set of realities. The concept of set comes later and the concept of set it is the concept of a being of reason. The No. 3 objectifies the persons that exists in the Trinity and the creatures that exist, if only three creatures have been created, by a specific way of falling under the extension of a concept together. Here specific refers to a species as opposed to an individual, on the one hand, or a genus, on the other. The persons of the Trinity fall under the concept of person, fall under the concept of person together or in common, in the same way, or in anyway that is the same as a way that the 3 creatures fall under the concept of creature together.

But note also that number can apply to beings of reason as well as to real beings. For beings of reason can also fall under universal concepts; rather, they do also fall under universal concepts. And the mathematician looks at numbers in abstraction from whether the No. 3 is identical with a kind of reality that exists when for example the Trinity exists or a triangle exists. And so for the purposes of the mathematician, she can construct beings of reason and consider them numbers on a par with the whole numbers, even though a being of reason like zero, negative numbers, the square root of negative one, etc. are not and cannot be ways in which realities fall under the extension of concepts in common with other realities or together with other realities.

The following may be a little repetitious. Assume that only these realities exists, Tom, Dick and Harry. We want to say that when these realities exists, multiplicity exists. And we also want to say that when these realities exists, multiplicity is not something that exists over and above what exists when Tom Dick and Harry exist. So multiplicity is a reality, but it is not a reality distinct from what exists when Tom, Dick and Harry exist. We can also say that when Tom, Dick and Harry exist, threeness exists.

Threeness is a species of multiplicity. Whenever multiplicity exists, some species of multiplicity must exist.

Along the same lines, but from a different point of view, another thing we want to say is that the above definition of number does not imply that multiplicity comes into existence only when universal concepts

with extension come into existence. To say that when Tom Dick and Harry exist, threeness also exists is not to say that there also must exist a human knower with the universal concept, say, of person. When Tom, Dick and Harry exist, the reality that exists, the extramental reality that exists, is such that it is capable of truthfully being objectified by the No. 3, because, the concept of person includes Tom, Dick and Harry, and only Tom, Dick and Harry, in its extension. But that which is capable of being so objectified truthfully exists prior to any such objectification. What exists prior to the objectification are potential terms of the concept of person's extension, where the potentiality does not refer to what exists prior to the objectification, but to the potentiality of the objectification, the potentiality of the objectification's occurring.

In other words, what exists prior to the objectification is multiplicity, in particular, threeness. The multiplicity consists of entities capable of becoming objects of the concept person. We can say that the No. 3 exists prior to the concept of person in the sense of numbered number, that is, of what is counted by the word three, the word three being numbering number. So to say that multiplicity exists is to say that reality is such that it is capable of being truthfully objectified by numbering number, where numbering number means that reality plus the relation of reason of there being terms of the extension of a concept together.

When entities, Tom, Dick, and Harry exist, threeness exists. When entities Tom, Dick, Harry and Sam exist, fourness exists. When God creates T, D and H, he creates multiplicity (quantity) at the same time, and multiplicity is not a reality that exists or is created over and above what exists and is created when T, D and H are created. Multiplicity is the undefined genus of the definition of numbers; number is a species of that genus, specific numbers, 3 for example, are species of numerical quantity, and T, D and H are an individual instance of 3, of the species of number, the species of multiplicity, 3. T, D and H are a 3. They are a multiplicity of 3, a group of three, a numbered number of 3. Is "group" a being of reason. Yes. If so, a "multiplicity" is a being of reason. Yes, but it is a BOR used to objectify a reality, the reality that more than one instance in the extension of "creature" or "being" exists. "Being known" is a BOR; being part of a group is a BOR. But being part of a group objectifies a reality, just as being known objectifies a reality. That which "something in the extension of 'being'" objectifies is not a BOR any more than "something known" is

a BOR. Being "one of more than one in the extension of 'being'" objectifies Tom, and it objectifies Dick, and it objectifies Harry. Likewise, "something falling under the extension of 'creature' with Dick and Harry" is a BOR that objectifies Tom, objectifies a real being, Tom, objectifies what Tom is by means of a BOR.

Sets are beings of reason. They belong to the third order of abstraction, because that is where number, even in the classical sense, belongs. We, including Simon, have ignored completely Aquinas's treatment of "transcendental" number in the treatise on the Trinity. Surely the quantity of persons in the Trinity is as real as any other quantity. Division of a material continuum may be necessary to supply us with the examples from which our psychological process of learning about numbers must begin. But the truth of arithmetical sentences does not require "common intelligible matter."

Then what is number? Assume God created only Larry, Moe and Curly. Did He also create threeness? If so what is it? An accident? If so, an accident of whom? A substance? If so, that would be Pythagoreanism with a vengeance. In fact, there is another way out within Thomism, though not one ever applied to this problem before, to my limited historical knowledge.

Numbers are in important respects like the True, the Good, the Beautiful, etc. (Call them here the "convertibles." Though I am comparing "transcendental" numbers to them, I am not comparing them with respect to the meaning of the word "transcendental"; in fact, the meanings are different in each case. Three is not convertible with being, but it is "transcendental" in the sense of being truthfully asserted of immaterial being.) The true, the good, etc. are 100-percent realities; that's why they are convertible with being. The fact that to objectify being in these ways we must make use of relation of reason does not mean that what is so objectified is in anyway not real. It means the opposite. Because the only difference between the true and what exists is a relation of reason added to what exists, there is by hypothesis no real difference between them; what is objectified by "true" is by hypothesis identical with the reality objectified by "being."

Likewise, threeness, or the number three, adds to the reality of Larry, Moe and Curly only the relation of

reason of being the extension of such objective concepts as "created beings," "finite beings," "caused beings," "human," "animal," "rational," "actors," etc. So when God created L, M and C, He did indeed create threeness, but He did not create any reality in addition to L, M and C. Threeness is a reality (or a characteristic of reality, and for there to be three beings, not two or four, is something real) but is neither a substance nor an accident. It is what exists objectified by means of a certain kind of being of reason. Likewise, when God created L, He created something true, good etc. But he did not created them as realities in addition to L. (Pace Benacerraf, I'd like to see this argued in an article entitled "What Numbers MUST Be.")

The philosopher can recognize this as the psychological source of the concept of set, which of course goes far beyond the kind of set that is its psychological source.

From: John C. Cahalan (Jack) <jcahalan@world.std.com>

To: buckley@jcvaxa.jcu.edu <buckley@jcvaxa.jcu.edu>

Subject: Simon on Math and Logic

Date: Tuesday, October 24, 2000 2:16 PM

Dear Joe,

In case you don't remember, I was Joe Evan's undergrad assistant at the Maritain Center during your last years at ND.

I just read your fine article in the '95 ACPQ.

I argue on pp. 461 (at "A final point")-462 of Causal Realism (if John Carroll's library does not have this, shame on the philosophy dept.) that Simon does NOT show that mathematical concepts are analogical

sets in HIS sense, since mathematics does not use that "yes-yes"/"yes-no" (or "yes-but") mode of predication. Philosophers may need to use that kind of predicate when we talk about math (are the Three Stooges a set in the same sense as the Three Little Pigs? Yes and no.) But mathematicians do not.

This is important to me because in that chapter I use Simon to answer a crucial question concerning philosophy's ability to know truths. In the final analysis, philosophers must verify by *reductio ad absurdum*, that is, to propositions whose opposites are self-evidently contradictory. But that is the way math and logic verify: so why can't philosophy produce consensus in the ways that they do, i.e., by defining and deducing? I argue that the "yes-no" character of philosophical (i.e., ontological) concepts explains why consensus cannot occur in philosophy as it does in math and logic. If analogical sets are not peculiar to ontological concepts, philosophers have no credible way of claiming to be able to verify even though our arguments do not produce consensus with the regularity that other investigations into necessary truths do.

Also, I am currently circulating an article, coming to you by surface mail, in which I argue as follows: Assume that there is such a thing as awareness of the validity of inferences. If so, that knowledge is at least part of what I mean by the noise "logic." Awareness of the validity of inferences requires implicit awareness of the necessary truth of some inference principle; so logic in this sense is or includes knowledge of such necessary truths. The relation between logic in this sense and formal methods is this: Formal methods are to logic as mathematics is to physics, an indispensable tool not identical with the kind of knowledge of which it is a tool.

Knowledge of physical truths is not knowledge of mathematical truths. Knowledge that a formula is arrived at by steps satisfying the rules of a system is not knowledge that the rules or any formula arrived at by their means is necessarily true. So awareness of formal correctness is not the kind of awareness that I (and everyone else in fact, but that is irrelevant) am calling logical knowledge. But formal methods are just as indispensable to logic and mathematics is to physics; you just can't get very far otherwise.

On the other hand, I argue that awareness of formal correctness presupposes awareness of inferential

validity, i.e., presupposes knowledge that is "logical" in this sense. So there is such a thing as a distinct kind of knowledge that happens to provoke the noise "logic." Of course, one is free to use that noise in any other sense, including for knowledge by formal methods as opposed to knowledge of the necessary truth of inference principles strictly speaking. But then we would have the problem of distinguishing logic in that sense from mathematics. If you restrict "logic" to awareness of the necessary truth of inferences principles, you might still have the problem of distinguishing different kinds of formal systems, those that are mathematical and those we might not want to call mathematical. But that problem is only complicated, and made much more serious, if we think that it is the problem of distinguishing logic from math.

Also, I in effect argue, on pp. 313-319 of the Wittgenstein/Poinsot article I am sending (with a typo corrected), that what Quine calls the problem of universals is Not at all the traditional problem. Rather, his position satisfies the traditional definitions of nominalism or conceptualism, not of any kind of realism in the traditional sense. The modern approach suppresses rather than replaces the traditional problem, which still must be addressed, as I use Wittgenstein to argue.

Sets are beings of reason. They belong to the third order of abstraction, because that is where number, even in the classical sense, belongs. We, including Simon, have ignored completely Aquinas's treatment of "transcendental" number in the treatise on the Trinity. Surely the quantity of persons in the Trinity is as real as any other quantity. Division of a material continuum may be necessary to supply us with the examples from which our psychological process of learning about numbers must begin. But the truth of arithmetical sentences does not require "common intelligible matter."

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Finally, notice that logical relations like identity, abstraction (perfect/"yes-yes" and imperfect/"yes-but") are analogical. But I would argue that the "yes-but" member of such sets occurs in logic only because one kind of pre-logical knowledge is ontological in Simon and Maritain's sense, i.e., resolvable to the supreme object of imperfect abstraction: that which exists. (If you have heroic patience, you might want to read Causal Realism, pp. 427-434, 438-453, 462-467. For "word-function" and "meaning(t)" just read "objective

concept.")

Sorry for going on so long. But since you are working on some Simon texts in these areas, I thought you might be interested.

12-15-00 BIG

From our understanding of the word-functions of arithmetic, we know in advance of knowing the correct answer that the answer to questions like the following will either be necessarily true or necessarily false: "is 157 a prime number?" And we know this without a formal, that is, calculational, proof. But if we can know this about any number, and know the answers to other arithmetical questions about any number are either necessarily true false, we can know that arithmetic is consistent. For we know that there is the true answer and a false answer to any well formed question. And we know that the true answer is necessarily true, and the false answer is necessarily false.

Godel has shown that knowledge of this kind cannot result from calculational proofs. This is another baking example of the difference between awareness of mechanical correctness in a series of steps leading to result and awareness of necessary truth. That was the point of my article on logic and the principle of noncontradiction. I can add here that the knowledge illustrated in this example is knowledge about computational knowledge. It is knowledge of the fact that if we form of certain kind of operation, namely, and arithmetic operations, we will necessarily get a certain kind of result. It is knowledge not that a certain step in a process conforms to a certain rule, but that if a step in a process conforms to the rules, the result will have a certain character. In other words, it is a kind of knowledge about what the rules are, what the operations governed by these rules are, and what the results of these operations are. And the answer to the question how we acquire the latter kind of knowledge is related to what is nonidentical with the question of how we acquire knowledge that a step in a process conforms to the rules.

From our understanding of the word-functions of arithmetic, we know in advance of knowing the correct

answer that the answer to questions like the following will either be necessarily true or necessarily false: "is 157 a prime number?" How much arithmetic do we need to know in order to know that the answer to any such question is either necessarily true or necessarily false? Not very much at all. Assume that we are teaching a child how to use numbers by counting her fingers. The child is not learning about 2, say, as a characteristic of her fingers as fingers. Then what she learning about 2? She is learning about 2, not in relation to fingers as such, but in relation to 1, as a logical or causal relation to 1. And she learns about all numbers by the way they are related to 1, that is, how they are related to 1 "item," "object," etc., in other words, how they are related to the "unit." At the same time she learns what a unit is, that is, by the relation of the word function of "the unit" to the word-functions of "2" and any other number.

What kind of relation? Relations that make certain truths necessarily true. The child is objectifying quantities, is learning to objectify quantities, as terms of certain kinds of relations. And it's so happens that whenever a "multitude" exists, the multitude is necessarily made up of items that can be objectified as units relative to other "units" within the at least cognition-dependent unity that is the multitude, because that is the word-function that "multitude" happens to have, namely, an at least cognition dependent collection of parts. And since any multitude must be objectifiable in this way, it must be objectifiable by word-functions so defined by relation to be word-function of "one", or "one of..." that sentences using certain of those word-functions must always be necessarily true or necessarily false. Otherwise, one or more of those word-functions would both be and not be what they are.

Why must any multitude be objectifiable by numbers understood arithmetically? Because that's what we happen to be by the word "multitude" and the word "number."

The number of my living parents happens to be 2. The result of adding 1 to 1 happens to be two. Given what the word-function of "number of my living parents" happens to be, that number will of not always be 2. Given what the word-function of "result of adding 1 to 1" happens to be, that number must always be 2. Both of these phrases happen to objectify the quantity 2. But the word-function of "2" does not objectify that quantity in a way that has necessary relations with what the word-function of "number of my living parents" objectifies, with what that word-function is. The word-function of "2" does objectify that quantity in

a way that has necessary relations with what 1 is, what 3 is, what 4 is, etc.

The latter word-functions objectify their quods as terms of logical or causal relations that ground necessity, because that is what numbers and numbered quantities as such are, that is, terms of certain kinds of logical and causal relations, which kinds just happen to make other quantities objectified by the same means have necessary relations of identity and not-identity with one another.

We may never have used were even heard of the number 157 before. But unless someone is trying to trick us when they use the noise "157", we know that the rules of the Arabic number system will give us that word-function. Those word-functions and their association with various noises are governed by rules. Given that those rules happen to be what they are, they generate necessary truths. Not all rules need generate necessary truths. We might have rules that tell us, for instance, that in generating a series of quantities, we start by flipping a coin. If heads, we generate a series by adding three times and then flipping a coin again. If heads again, we multiply 20 times and then a coin again. And we might say that on cloudy days we name each successive quantity by the series of words starting at the top of a randomly selected page in the dictionary.

It just so happens that when the word function of "multitude" exists, then it just so happens that we can objectify what that multitude it is by word functions and sentences of arithmetic. Why? Because it just so happens that the word functions we call those of arithmetic are ways of objectifying multitude, or of objectifying what we call a "multitude". Causal and logical relations hold between the word function of "multitude" and those of arithmetic. Specifically, the word-functions about numbers are quantities of objectified by logical and causal relations to other instances of what we call "quantities". In teaching and numbers to a child, we need not teach her how to use words like "multitude", but we are in fact familiarizing her with the kind of reality that she will later make the word-function of "multitude."

We just happen to be acquainted with word-functions, namely, numbers and arithmetic operations on numbers, that happen to be so related by logical and causal relations that sentences composed of certain terms about numbers will always be necessarily true. And it just happens that, given what those word functions are, there is a certain kind of state of affairs to which, given that these states of affairs are what

they are, these word-functions will always be applicable to them, these were functions will always objectify those states of affairs. The states of affairs I am referring to our those which are the were functions of "quantity," "multitude," "multiplicity," in other words, quantitative states of affairs.

For it just so happens that given what the word function of "quantity" and the others just mentioned are and given what the word functions of arithmetic are, quantities will always be objectifiable arithmetically. And so it just so happens that multitude and multitudes will be objectifiable by means of necessary arithmetic truths. Why? Because of relations between what the word-functions of "quantity", "multitude," etc. happen to be and what the word-functions of arithmetic are, relations that make it necessarily the case that when quantities happen to exist, arithmetical truths apply. What kind of relations between the word-functions of "quantity" and those of "arithmetic"? The logical and causal relations that define the word-functions of arithmetic, the logical and causal relations that constitute the word-functions of arithmetic.

The word-functions of arithmetic objectify their quods as units, either units consisting of 1 and only one individual or units resulting from grouping one individual with another, with another, with another, etc. the grouping may consist of a cognition dependent causal relation or a cognition dependent logical relation. In either case the grouping would require some mental act or acts. We can use the word "grouping" to describe those acts. But that is not how the word "grouping" is used in the description of numbers that I just gave. A "grouping" in that sense is the object of a cognitive act, not itself a cognitive act. In other words, it is a mereological mereological some. It possibly is more than just a mereological sum, but it is at least that. This is not a psychologistic account of number.

God makes an angel; then he makes another angel. The result is 2 angel's. But arithmetic treats numbers in abstraction from whether a number of like 2 is a number of Angels, or fingers, or anything particular. From the point of view of arithmetic the causal operation producing a quantity of 2 is not making but adding. We start with one item and make another item. The result is two items. In making the "other item" we added to the first. But we could have started by making the other item. In that case, making it would not be equivalent to adding.

Adding means in operation result is a union of items of the same kind, for example, 1 and angel on a head

of pin. Now I put another angel there. They are united by the idea of "being on the head of this pin." So when we consider quantities just as such, not the number of Angels or fingers etc., we are considering quantities objectified, at least implicitly, as terms of cognition dependent relations. (adding is a cognition dependent relation of abstract "making.") For we are considering units, items, etc. are united by some idea where the "uniting" amounts to a cognition dependent causal relation of putting item X into a group with item Y, for example, grouping item X and Y as terms of some identity relation. and then adding W. to the group already formed by XY.

So diverse numbers, diverse quantities, are objectified as terms of cognition dependent relations . So we are considering numbers by relations such that if the result of some arithmetic operations were not identical with a particular number, the relations used to objectify would not be what they are. It just happens that reality as such that quantity objectified arithmetically is useful, that is, it just happens that reality is multiple, has multitudes, as parts outside of parts, etc. And therefore it is necessarily the case that we can objectify different quantities, and different species of quantity, in this way.

In the Trinity, the 3 persons are distinct (at least logically), so we get separate them, or treat them as if separated; that is, we can treat them as terms of cognition dependent relations being the result of cognition dependent relations of separating and uniting. Again, the cognition dependent relations of which different numbers of persons are the result are not psychological acts but but are themselves cognition dependent objects of which we are made aware by means of psychological acts.

August 9th, 2003

All sets have in common being logical constructs. But we start with sets of things that are not logical constructs. But once those first sets are in objective existence, why can we not have sets of elements that are themselves logical constructs, including sets of sets, sets that are members of themselves, etc.

A set of all sets that are not members of themselves implies a contradiction in the way he that a square Circle implies a contradiction. But other sets and mathematical entities are only contradictory if asserted to

have real existence.

xxxShort book, sb. Frege, analytic philosophy, May 1, 2000

The title is A **Re**-Introduction to Philosophy. The subtitle was going to be: the overlooked alternative to rationalism, empiricism, Kantianism, and their heirs. But I much preferred the following subtitle: why Post-Fregean methods have not reduced disagreement and Paradox in philosophy. Incidentally, notice that I put a hyphen between the word introduction and the prefix "Re". This is merely a device that will hopefully make the idea that this is not an introduction to philosophy stand out. For the same reason I have bolded and italicized the prefix.

Given that subtitle, one of the first things that must be said in the introduction is that there is nothing lacking in post-Fregean methods themselves. The problem is not the technical value of those methods; they are perfectly good, in fact excellent, in themselves. That is a given. The question is why they have not helped us reduce disagreement and Paradox in philosophy. By post-Fregean techniques I am thinking, for example, of Tarski's analysis of truth, Craig's a theorem, Kripke's semantic analysis of modal propositions, and even Russell's theory of descriptions. Russell's theory is perfectly successful as a technical logical device. The only issue is whether we can use it to answer the questions Russell thought we could answer with it, or any other philosophical questions. The same with our other examples.

Since these techniques are perfectly good in themselves, our failure to be able to reduce disagreement and Paradox by using them must come from other assumptions that we bring to the table either consciously or unconsciously. This book concerns some of those other assumptions. The bottom line is that we have been playing with a short deck. Even if our deck has the aces and all the face cards, and most of the No. cards, that is not enough in the particular game we are playing, the game of philosophy.

As Aristotle said, a small mistake in the beginning is a big one in the end.

This is not to assume that having a complete deck of assumptions will do for us what Fregean methods alone could not do. It might be that having the complete set of assumptions will reveal that we cannot achieve the kind of agreement and lack of Paradox that we find in other fields when we are doing philosophy. In other words we may have been operating under a false expectation.

In the subtitle and possibly in the introduction I do not refer to something else that Fregean methods have not help us reduce: obscurantism in philosophy. I may not bring that up until much later. The reason is that an open-minded analyst should be able to see that there is as much disagreement and Paradox in philosophy as there ever was. But one thing to their prejudices may not allow them to see is that there is as much obscurantism in philosophy. They operate under the a priori assumption that there are professional existence is justified by their success at bringing clarity into philosophy where clarity was lacking before.

Of course, that is not true. What it would not be good strategy to get them with that Paradox, it will be perceived by them as a Paradox, upfront. For examples of obscurantism think of David Lewis on possible worlds. And think of the lack of clarity in Quine's views once you get behind the surface clarity of his stylized prose.

xxxShort book, sb, causality, determinism and free will, BIG, 12-29-00

Causal determinism: what is determined? Not just that this kind of action will occur, but that this individual act occurs in this individual situation. So my presentation of causality does leave room for free will. Free will is possible if and only if some agent's causal determination is not specifies to this or that individual but is specified by universality in some way.

That a change would not exist without its subject is not just the trivial truth that the mereological sum the change in the subject would not exist without the subject. Rather, there is a relation of dependence of the

change on the subject; this relation is more than a logical relation or any kind of cognition-dependent relation. So there is more than a mereological sum here. And the change itself constitutes the fact that it has something fulfilling its need, its relationship of need.

The opponent wants to say that we should not call the change of causes when the effect in question is identical with the supposedly cause. But that is precisely my point. It is because the change cannot be a cause of itself that another cause is needed. For without the change, the change would not have the subject as its component cause.

Here is awarding that helped me start the final version (so far) of the argument for the principle of causality. The change is dependent as actually being caused, as having (needing) a component cause but not as united with its component cause.

Without an efficient cause, once the unchanging potential subject exists, no other cause would be necessary for an actually caused change to occur to the subject, and so the change would be because of itself.

By requiring the subject to change, the efficient cause requires the subject to be the term of . . . , to be that by which the change is caused, to terminate. . .

Descriptions by means of interior causes are not extrinsic denominations.

Assume that there is a reality, X., that requires conditions that are not now fulfilled. For the conditions to be fulfilled would be a change. Whatever else the change would be, it would be the coming into existence of the fulfillment of those conditions. Now assume that X. itself that change. X. is the coming into existence of the fulfillment of its own conditions. The opponent would have to reply that X has conditions, what they are now fulfilled, that is, its potential component cause already exists.

What the component cause is is insufficient precisely because it must cease being what it is in some respect in order to be the subject of the change. The change does not actually have a component cause

by the fact that the subject is what it is. The subject must precisely cease being what it is in some respect for the change to have the subject as its component causes the subject by being what give is does not give the change a component cause,. Does not allow does not fulfill the change's need for component cause the change to have a component cause. Perhaps this is a better reply to triviality objection.

To say that something depends on causes when does not have sufficient causes is to say that it gets sum of what it is from causes but does not get everything that it is from causes. It is dependent on causes but does not entirely derive from causes. Assume 2-part reality, 1/2, is dependent in all respects, but does not derive from causes in all respects. Then some respect of, in some respect, this reality does not come from the cause, although it needs the cause. So when 1/2 exists, all of what it is depends on causes to be what it is, but not all of what it is comes from its causes. Let 2 not come from the causes. So 2 is dependent in respect R1. Does 2 have sufficient causes in respect R1? If so, 2 must derive in respect R1. So there must be some other respect,R2, in which 2 depends but does not derive.

But does R 2 depend on R 1? If so, it must have sufficient causes in that respect. 2 either depends on 1, or is does not. If it does, 1 is a cause of 2, and there are sufficient causes for 1. It can 1 exist without 2? 1 depends on causes and derives from causes, causes produce it. 2 depends on causes, but does not derive from causes.

Assume something does not derive from causes. Why must it depend on causes? Some of what it is must derive from causes for it to be true that it depends on causes.

2 is the existence of more than that for which, whatever it is, 1 2 depends on causes. So 2 must not depend on causes.

If an effect does not derive from its causes but only presupposes them, the effect must be somehow independent all its causes, if the causes are not sufficient for it. Its causes cannot account for all of what it is. All of what it is does not come from its causes. The causes do not produce all of what it is. Another

good way to say it is that the causes do not require the existence of all of what the effect is. All the causes can exist without all of what the effect is existing so when all of the effect exists, not all of what it is is such that the causes would not exist without it. 2 of what it is made depend on 1, but the causes do not produce 2, do not require 2.

Can an effect not derive anything from its causes, just presuppose them? If it only presupposes them, it still must be somehow independent of its causes, if its causes are not sufficient for it. And if they are sufficient for it, it is not independent of them. The causes cannot account for all of what it is; all of what it is does not come from its causes. The causes do not produce all of what it is. The causes do not require the existence of all of what it is. So the causes can exist without all of what it is existing. So when it all exists, not all of it is such that the causes would not exist without it. Feature 1 of what it is made depend on feature 2, but the causes do not produce feature 1, do not require the existence of feature 1. (For example, a motion's rate of acceleration depends on the existence of the motion, likewise the length of time of the state of motion, likewise the direction of the motion. Also, whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver; so could there be some aspect of the result that does not derive from either of the causes? No, it's simply derives from both.)

A change has a relation of dependence on a component cause. What the subject is does not fulfill requirement of that relation. And without the change, the subject cannot fulfill requirement of that relation, namely, to be something that changes.

The subject is something by which the change is caused.

There must be another causal function without which that which undergoes change would not be something undergoing the change; there must be whatever is requires for the component cause to actually undergo the change.

The component cause cannot be the sole thing on which the change depends; otherwise the change is responsible for its having subject as its cause.

Why can't we explain the change by a constant? The result of the change is 1. And "explanation" of 1 must link 1 to something specific to 1, something that is not linked in the same way to what is not to 1. If 2 is constant through the change from non 1 to 1, 2 is no more linked to 1 than it is to non 1. So 2 does not explain 1. (This would be a good exercise for graduate students: articulate why we can't explain the change by constant. The preceding articulation is good for some purposes. For other purposes, a different though not contradictory explanation might be needed. But the different articulation might appear contradictory.

First, knowledge is causal in general. But second, causal knowledge is incomplete and in perfect because of the distinction between the ontological and the empirical.

The better distinction is not between the logical and the empirical, which is the only distinction the analysts use. It is between the causal (whether ontological or empirical) and the logical.

Items for the bibliography: Ray Dennehy, "the ontological basis of certitude," the Thomist, volume 50, No. 1, Jan., 1986, pp. 120-150. "Unreal realism," volume 55, No. 4, 1991, pp. 631-655.

xxxSex, Pew, SSR, sexual ethics, 5-23-00

In marriage, Our sexual partner must be as close to us, as closely united to us, as our own sexuality is. Why? Because what is the alternative? The alternative would be an arrangement, a contract, with a built-in distance between us, a built-in limit on how far we give ourselves to each other and how far we united to each other.

We cannot be responsible for making the use of our person making ability into the kind of use in which it cannot be a person making ability. We cannot be responsible for making the way we use our person making ability be a way in which it cannot be a person making ability. This is what the homosexual does. Or this is what homosexual acts do. To choose a homosexual act is to choose to use our person making ability in a way that it could not be a person making ability.

The way we use our person making ability must be the same way that can produce offspring, by which we produce offspring, when and if we are fertile. For the use of our person making ability must always be such that any other goal we are seeking is subordinate to the goal of making persons.

If human beings were created to live forever, and if we all had person making ability, but if that ability was intended to produce only one new person, and if that was going to take 100 million years, our person making ability would still be the ability to make that for the sake of which everything else exists, and our person making ability would be that before for it was anything else. In other words, even under those assumptions, it would be immoral to use our person making ability as if it did not exist for the sake of producing that for the sake of which everything else exists. If we don't see that, we don't see the awesomeness of what it is to be a person.

When we see heterosexuals acting romantically toward each other, we know we're watching nature's design for making persons at work. We know this whether or not we know that the members of the couple are now fertile. Because we know what the primary and essential purpose for our sexuality is, and not only is it essential it is absolute.

When we see heterosexuals acting romantically toward each other, we are watching nature's design for making person at work. We are watching nature's person making apparatus at work. We are watching nature's person making function at work. The way it works is for one person with a partial person making ability to be attracted to another person for the sake of the other person's partial person making ability. One person desires another person because of the other person's partial person making ability. One partial person making ability desires union with another person because of the other person's partial person making ability.

This is it.

The result, that is, the desired union, is the existence of a complete person making agency, a complete

person making causal system. To say that my sexuality exists for the sake of the existence of persons is to say that, first of all, my sexuality exists for the sake of the existence of a complete person making causal system. So the fact that persons are that for the sake of which everything else exists means that my sexuality, as far as my values are concerned, must exist for the sake of the existence of a complete person making causal system. In my values, my sexuality must exist for that sake if persons are to have the status in my values all being that for the sake of which everything else exists.

3-5-01

In prostitution, visual pornography, etc., we let others enjoyed our body for and like the drug) at the expense of our personhood, something we have no right to sell. For we are selling our person making ability not, for example, our food making ability.

1: Sex is fun, just fun, not to be evaluated more seriously than that. So don't get excited if, for example, the President fools around. 2: that kind of fun, that is, getting it whenever I can and as much as I can is my highest priority, is what I think about modus, etc.. So it's OK if, for example, a President subordinate perjury as long as the perjury is just about that trivial matter, sexual fun. (Or 2: it is so much fun in fact that. . . ; it is so much pleasure, in fact, that . . .).

Sexual freedom requires that a be morally justifiable to kill the product of conception.

In 1970 or so, we began killing fetuses, and the prophecy was made that infanticide and euthanasia were not far behind. In 2000, we are permitting voluntary euthanasia and our justifying infanticide. In 2030, we will be committing in voluntary euthanasia and infanticide. In 2060? But remember, this is proof that we can have morality without religion. All we have to do is redefine morality.

There are true and only two relations where we are fully committed to another person precisely as something for the sake of which everything else exists, that is, as something deserving committed love for

their own sake: the spousal relation and the parental relation.

I am a sexual being, I have sexuality, for the sake of being a person maker.

Justice, Aristotle, McInerney: the nature of the person as an end-in-itself settles what is due all persons in all circumstances. Justice settles what is due to different persons in different circumstances. Love of friendship for persons as ends-in-themselves is the form of the other virtues, including the virtue of justice. The other virtues provide the content for love of friendship. Given that I am obligated to will the good for myself and other persons, what is the content of that good? The content is the content of the other virtues. And some acts are intrinsically evil precisely because they cannot be matter for that form. That is, given what those acts are, it is impossible for love of friendship to place its form on them; it is impossible for them for that form, to bear that form, to receive that form.

Big:

Although my cook is always due committed love, that is is always worthy of committed love, that need not enter my relation to her as a cook; it is not essential to that relation. But if I use her person making ability, the value of a person as worthy of committed love is essential to that relation, is the value of a person is essential to that relation. I cannot usurp person making ability without placing a value on what person is, and so I cannot use her person making ability without either evaluating what person is to be that for the sake of which everything else exists or not to be that for the sake of which everything else exists.

And I use it Salamon's ability to perform a function, no permanent commitment is called for because functions can be replaced, that is, the value of the ability to perform the function is only a value that can be replaced by another value. So we can dismiss a cook with no offense against the personhood of the cook, that is, no offense against the cook's dignity as a person.

01-05-00, BIG

I see an elderly, infertile couple kissing romantically. I am watching nature's plan for making people in action. The couple are not doing anything that would make their sexuality not be a person making ability. They are not doing anything that would cause their sexuality not to be a person making ability. They are not doing anything that causes it not to be a person making ability. Gays do.

A desire for sex is nature's plan for making people. But notice that nature planned it this way independently of infertility. That is, this essential part of nature's plan for making people, this desire that exists for the sake of making people, exists whether or not other parts of the person making ability are functioning.

Sex is what it is, as all the features it has, at times of infertility for the sake of what it is at times of fertility. In the same way, the brain is what it is at times of sleep for the sake of being a thinking instrument, an instrument for thinking. The brain always is what it is for the sake of being an instrument for thinking. Likewise, our sexuality at all times is what it is for the sake of being a person making ability. If it were not, then persons would not be that for the sake of which everything else exists. The times of infertility, even after menopause, are for the sake of our being person makers, and so for the sake of the existence of persons, because human person making does not stop at conception, it goes on until the offspring has reached psychological maturity in adulthood. So the parents need sexuality as a unifying factor to remain together while they are raising the child, even if one or the other of the parents has become permanently infertile.

So if a couple uses their sexuality non-vaginally, in their valuation the act by which they give each other pleasure is not an act that exists in the sake of making, is not what it is the sake of making persons. And so it is not what it is for the sake of making that for the sake of which everything else exists. And if not, they cannot be consistently evaluating each other as beings for the sake of which everything else exists.

Since our sexuality is always what it is for the sake of being a person making ability, that is, for the sake of bringing into existence that for the sake of which everything else exists, any use of our sexuality must use

it as if, it must be treated as if, must value it to be a person making ability. For it is what it is for the sake of being a person making ability. It is what it is even at times of infertility for the purpose of being a person making ability.

Why can I not use my sexuality anyway I want when I am infertile? Because in doing so, I would be doing what animals do and achieving the kinds of goods animals, that is, beings that are not ends-in-themselves, achieve. The nature of the person, the value of the person, is not involved in any of the goods of those kinds. So I need not be truly valuing myself and my partner as ends-in-themselves while pursuing those kinds of goods. In other words, when using my sexuality non-vaginally, I am evaluating my sexuality as if it were like my food making ability. That is I am evaluating my sexuality as if it were oriented toward goods that are not in themselves ends-in-themselves.

I just use the phrase "need not." But to say that I need not do something does not amount to saying that I am contradicting the doing of that something. Yes, but in using my food making ability, I need not, but in using my person making ability in a certain way I must, be putting myself in opposition to the value of a person as that for the sake of which sexuality exists. My sexuality does not exist just for the sake of this person, namely, myself, as my food making ability does.

In order for a choice to evaluate a sex act to be a means of union between two ends-in-themselves, evaluate the act as a means that respects the partners as ends-in-themselves, the choice must evaluate the sex act as existing for the sake of making that for the sake of which everything else exists, everything else including the loving union of two ends-in-themselves.

In having a sex nonvaginally, the partners are doing it in a way which could not be a way that they become person makers. Each is relating to the other person in a way that could not be a way they unite to form a person maker. They are doing it in a way that could not be a way of subordinating sex to its person making ability. They are doing it in a way in which they could not be evaluating the other purposes of sex in subordination to its person making purpose. In having sex while they know they are infertile, they are not necessarily evaluating sex to be something other than a person making ability., that is, as existing for the

sake of something other than the existence of persons. In fact, they may be choosing vaginal sex precisely for the sake of avoiding a choice that would evaluate sex to exist for some other purpose.

In having sex nonvaginally, they are saying in effect "let's not use our person making ability in the way that would be necessary if we were to evaluate it, treat it, and evaluate ourselves as having it, is always being something that is what it is for the sake of the existence of absolute values."

How does the sex act express, signify, the status of the partners as worthy of committed love? By being the means by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence. (By being the means, in our evaluations, by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence.) But if we use sex nonvaginally, we are using it as if it were not the means by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence. So sex would not express the status of the partners as worthy of committed love.

(Because in our evaluations it is not a means to the existence of beings worthy of committed love, although that is what it is in fact that all times, that is, something that exists to be a means to the existence of absolute values .)

If we do anything that would cause a sex act not to be, in our evaluations, what it is for the sake of the existence of persons, we are causing the sex act not to be in our evaluations a natural sign expressing the status of our partner as a being worthy of committed love.

For me to succeed in treating persons as ends-in-themselves in situations where I hire a Foodmaker or a laundry doer, all I have to do is ensure that the person I hire is doing it in pursuit of her own freely chosen ends. For me to succeed in valuing persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists in situations where I use another end-in-itself's person making ability, it is not enough to ensure that the person whose ability I use is doing it in pursuit of her own freely chosen ends.

A chosen sex act, insofar as it is chosen as a means to an end, insofar as it is a term of an evaluation by our will, must be suited for procreation, must be an act existing for the sake of making persons. We cannot agree to reject the other person or ourselves as a person maker, to reject her fertility. We cannot agree to

hold back anything essential to using our person making ability as a person making ability. (An argument against artificial contraception.)

If nature prevents our sexuality from being able to produce persons at a particular time that is one thing. But if we do anything that would cause a sex act not to be in our evaluations a person making act, that is another thing.

Maybe sex just arose accidentally. But as used for rationally conscious chosen ends, it must exist for the sake of things that do not just happen to be that for the sake of which everything else exists, and it must exist for the sake of those things precisely as that for the sake of which everything else exists. So sex exists, not just for the sake of things that have been accidentally to be ends-in-themselves, but for the sake of those things precisely as that for the sake of which everything else exists.

If when infertile, I use my person making ability not vaginally, I evaluating it as a means to the kind of ends animals achieve, that is, goods of concupiscence. I have excluded the nature of persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists from the goods involved in my choice. So my person making ability is like my food making ability in my values. In using my food making ability as a food making ability, I am not so choosing that I am putting myself in opposition to the good of ends-in-themselves as such. In using my person making ability in the way I choose to use my food making ability, I am so choosing that I am putting myself in opposition to the value of persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists.

Conditions of in fertility are not subject to our choice. They are not under the control of choice. And so the appropriateness of a chosen act to realize organic complementarity depends, or the appropriateness of a chosen act to be a person making act or a means of union in our evaluations depends, on being the choice of a pattern of behavior which, and when conditions out of the control of this act of choice exist, could result in conception. ... as long as we do not choose to be causes of the prevention of those conditions; as long as we do not choose to prevent those conditions.

God wants the act that unites to people in committed love to be the same act that can create persons. That is, the same act by which they can create persons when conditions out of the control of the choice of this act would allow them to create persons.

I cannot avoid the issue of treating my cook as a person. But the reason I cannot avoid the issue is not her food making ability. I could replace that by a machine. I also cannot avoid the issue of treating persons as persons when I use her person making ability. But the reason is not only that she is a person. The reason is also that I am placing a value on her as a person making, as having a person making ability. So mutual consent is not enough for me to use her person making ability. There are restraints on the ways I can use her person making abilities, restraints on the conditions under which I can use her person making ability, even voluntarily.

Conditions of in fertility are not part that human sex act. That is, they are not part of the sex act as chosen, since they are not in the control of human choice. So the appropriateness of the human sex act to realize organic complementarity (Grisez) does not depend on its being able to cause conception from a physical point of view, but on its being the kind of behavior, the pattern of behavior, and by which human beings can become causes of reproduction by means of their choice to use a sex act, by means of their choice to use their sexuality. It depends on human beings choosing to use their sexuality in the manner in which they could become reproducers, if other necessary conditions out of their control were present.

This is it:

A human sex act as such, that is, as an object of human choice and as directed by human choice, must be so directed that nothing in the way in which it is chosen, nothing in the manner in which we direct it to an end, would prevent it from being a reproductive act.

How does the sex act express, signify, the status of the partners as worthy of committed love? By being the means by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence. So if we choose to use our sexuality in a way in which it cannot be the means of procreation, we are choosing to use it in a way that it

cannot express the value of the partners as worthy of committed love. So our choice does not evaluate the person as something worthy of committed love for its own sake. The sex act expresses that value not only by being an act of desire for another person but by being an act of desire that can give existence to beings for the sake of which everything else exists. If we do anything that would cause a sex act not to be in our evaluations such an act we are not evaluating the person as the absolute value. And we are causing the sex act not to be a natural sign expressing the status of the partners as beings worthy of committed love.

An act of desire for another person for the sake of her ability to generate a being the sake of which everything else, including the desire, exists. This desire exists for the sake of the existence of things worthy of love for their own sake as, precisely as, being worthy of love for their own sake.

An animal's food making ability does not exist for the sake of ends-in-themselves as such. Compare an animal's food making ability and reproductive ability, and then compare the result of that comparison to the comparison between a human being's food making ability and person making ability.

Since persons are that for the sake of which everything else exists, I cannot love another person just as a means to creating persons. A process done for love for but that is not itself a process of love exists as a means to the end of already existing persons. That's what it would be in our evaluations; that's what we would evaluate it, the process, to be. And so the product of the process exists only because the product is wanted by me, that is, the process exists for the sake of creating a person only because the person is wanted by me. I want to have the child. I could use the process, perhaps, to achieve other goods.

Intercourse exists for the sake of making that for the sake of which everything else exists because evolution designed intercourse to produce that. Can I design another process for the sake of producing babies without reducing babies to being objects of love of concupiscence?

so choose that our evaluation of the chosen act, our way of evaluating the act, of making it a means to an end is, could not be causes of the act's being infertile, could not be a cause of the act's not been person making. So choose that the chosen means to an end is not prevented by the choice from being a means

of person making, from being the way the partners can make persons when other conditions out of the partner's control are present.

Big:

When we choose to use sex not vaginally, we are doing more than just recognizing the fact that we are otherwise infertile at that time. We are taking advantage of that in fertility in such a way that in our evaluations we are saying "I can use my sexuality as if it did not exist, as if it is not what it is, for the sake of the existence of the absolute value." And so we are saying that the absolute value is not the absolute value.

The act by which couples unite with each other should be the same act by which they can procreate. In other words, any use of our sexuality must be subordinate to its purpose of creating persons. That subordination does not mean that we should refrain from sex when infertile, but it does mean that even infertile sex must be subordinate in our evaluations to the absolute value for the sake of which sexuality exists. How do we subordinate infertile sex and the goals that it achieves to that other goal? One requirement is that we complete sex vaginally. If we choose not to complete sex vaginally, the status of our sexuality in our evaluations is not the status of existing for the sake of creating persons.

In other words, ends-in-themselves must always use sexuality as if it is the means, was the means, by which they came into existence. If we do not use it as if it is a means by which we came into existence, we are not evaluating our coming into existence as the coming into existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists. And so we are not evaluating ourselves as that for the sake of which everything else exists. And to use sex as if it is the means for the coming into existence of persons, we must choose to use sex in the manner in which our union with our partner, our common pleasure with our partner, can bring persons into existence. That is, we must complete sex vaginally.

Nature has designed times of infertility for the benefit and well-being of those sex has brought into existence, both parents and children. But if we are to value those that sex as but into existence as that for the sake of which everything else exists, we must value our sexuality as existing for the sake of bringing that for the sake of which everything else exists into existence.

So choose that our choice cannot be a cause of, cannot be a reason for, . . . the chosen act's not being a fertile act. So choose that the chosen manner of acting could not be a cause of . . ., that the chosen manner of acting is the same as the manner that can cause . . .

Big:

We cannot choose to use our person making ability as a means to an end in such a way that our choice causes it, and so we cause it, to be a kind of act that could not exist for the sake of producing that for the sake of which everything else exists. So choose to use our person making ability that, to the extent that the act is in the control of our choice, the act is the kind of act by which we can produce that for the sake of which everything else exists. So choose in such a way that it is not the causality of our choice that prevents the act from producing that for the sake of which everything else exists, and so causes us to evaluate ends-in-themselves as if they were not that for the sake of which everything else exists.

So choose that the act chosen does not cause our choice to evaluate persons as if they were not that for the sake of which everything else exists by causing us to evaluate our person making ability as if it did not exist for the sake of that for the sake of which everything else exists, as if it were not one of the "everything else" that exists for the sake of persons. As if that which gives existence to persons were not one of the "everything else" that exists for the sake of the persons that it gives existence to. So maybe the argument against not vaginal sex is just a mirror image of the argument in favor of using sex when we know we are in fertile.

If I use sex and not vaginally. when I know I am infertile, I am using it as if it were like a food making ability. The value of the person is not involved in the goods I pursue by using my food making ability.

Animals can pursue goods of the same kind, namely, goods of concupiscence. So in using sex and not vaginally, my person making ability is like a food making ability in my evaluations.

February 17, 2004

The meaning of marriage. We are sharing the faculty which brought us into existence. We are asking for the use of the faculty to which we owe our existence.

Persons are made by a relationship between two other people. That relationship can be temporary or permanent.

Sex should always be used the way it is used to make persons. It should always be performed the way it is performed to make persons. It should always be enjoyed the way it is enjoyed to make persons.

If I am the product of a machine, I am the product of something that can be morally evaluated to be a means to things that have only relative value. If I can be morally evaluated to be the product of a purely animal physical process, I am the product of something that can be morally evaluated as a means to relative values only. So it is not enough if the machine is freely used by persons, the means by which persons are made must itself be an act of love of a person as that for the sake of which everything else exists. The means by which persons are made must be something that cannot be evaluated morally (morally chosen as) a means to a relative value. If the means by which persons are made is not something that itself has the value of (is not something that is) an act of permanent love for another person "for the sake" of their person making ability.... If the person making ability is not a love making ability, a permanent love....

1-12-00

The following comments are for the most part but not exclusively directed toward artificial conception.

In artificial conception, we make our sexuality into a machine for making products. But our person making ability is not a machine for making persons. Our person making ability makes persons by acts of love. They are byproducts of acts of love for another person. The fact that they are byproducts of an act of committed love for another person allows us to be able to make persons and at the same time allow persons to be valued is that for the sake of which everything else exists.

In other words, we do not value our sex partner for her ability to make persons. If we value her for her ability to make persons, we would not evaluate her as an end-in-itself. If we fail to value her as an end-in-itself, we cannot value our sexuality as existing for the sake of ends-in-themselves. So we must produce persons as a direct result of valuing our sex partner as an end-in-itself.

"All children should be wanted" now has come to mean that in order to be acceptable children should satisfy their parent's desires for the child's identity. We have stopped saying yes to whatever the child turns out to be. This is the reduction of a person to being an extension of another person's will. Instead, we should be in awe at every human life.

Persons should be made by an act of love for an already existing person, and not just any act of love but act of love for her as having a person making ability. This rules out artificial conception.

If there were an "art" of making persons, that art would not be adequate to the "good of the work to be produced" if it only guaranteed that the results would be a well functioning person, but did not guarantee that the means of causing the existence of the person was, unlike rape, adultery, fornication, worthy of the dignity of that which is caused. Or if we only think about the artistic aspect (that is, all is well the ends well), we are you morally neglecting the good of the result as a person who has a right to be brought into

existence in a manner worthy of her.

Sexual love is person making love. As person making love, it must be a love that honors, values, persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists; otherwise it is unworthy of being person making love.

Artificial insemination is person making but is not an act of love that is person making. The person making an act should be a full communion of persons, that is, not just a sexual act but a marital sexual act. (The person making act should be a bodily act of love, since that is the kind of person being made and since that is the way we make a person namely by making a bodily entity.) And the person making act should not be just a marital act, but a sexual marital act.

If marriage is to be an intrinsic good (Grisez), that is, not just a means to some other good, artificial conception must be evil. If artificial conception is not evil, marriage must not be an intrinsic good.

Intercourse is a good given to another for her own sake, an intrinsic good given to another for her own sake. Removing a gamete is not an intrinsic good but an instrumental good.

Morally, exclusive coitus is the only sort of act that married couples can do and not married couples cannot do. this is the only act that is exclusive of persons committed to each other as that for the sake of which everything else exists. So conception by exclusive coitus is the only way of conceding that he is specifically marital. Only coitus transmits life in a marital way.

In artificial conception, we separate the person making function, the generative function, from the unitive function.

Big:

The use of our person making ability requires exclusivity. Unlike the use of our food making ability, the choice to use our person making ability involves the value we place on the person essentially. The value of the person is that of someone worthy of love for their own sake, not for the sake of their function. And

so involves the value of the person as irreplaceable and unique. For insects that I am relating to a person making being as an object of love precisely for her person making ability.

biologically most animals are complete individuals with respect to most functions. In what the complete organism capable of reproducing sexually is the united pair. The may take care is the organic unit that produces the offspring. So the meaning of the offspring, its value, is that of an effect of this organic unit.

In this organic unit is not brought into existence by valuing the person as that for the sake of which everything else exists, by valuing persons as worthy of committed love for their own sake, what is the value of the offspring?

Persons are now made by an act of an organism, a person making organism constituted by an act of love of one person maker for another because he or she has a person making ability.

See page 6 0 on qualities (page of what: Grisez? Simon?)

sex is a means of producing that for the sake of which everything else exists. But not only is this higher than others, but the requirements of this act set and shape the requirements for those we choose to use sex (Grisez). So the unity of sex partners should never merely being physical only, temporary, etc.. Sex must be used in a way appropriate to the spiritual begetting (upbringing) of children.

Big:

So the partners must not just will to cooperate fairly with each other and Karen food making ability) but must have committed love for each other. That is, they must have love for each other not just for the sake of making a product, even though the product will be something for the sake of which everything else exists. Precisely because persons are that for the sake of which everything else exists a love from which persons come cannot be love just for the sake of making a product. When we cooperate for the sake of making food, in our actions are compatible with our love in each other just for the sake of making a product. The nature of the act of making food is not such that the act requires to be an act in support of

committed love for the other. Likewise, the nature of the act of artificially conceiving is compatible with loving each other just for the sake of making a product. The nature of the act is not such that the act requires to be an act in support of committed love for the other person for her own sake.

In making any other product, we can will to cooperate fairly, without committed love, because the value of the person as such is not involved in the product of the cooperative act, but only in the two agents of the cooperative act. So as long as the agents make the product willingly the value of the person is respected.

Compare artificial insemination to an artificial food making ability.

When I choose to eat for pleasure, the value of the person as that for the sake of which everything else exists does not come into play beyond the fact that, in fact, it is a person choosing to achieve that chosen end. When I hire a cook, the value of the person comes into play, but only to the extent that the other person is also seeking a chosen end. But instead of hiring a cook, I could have a robot do it when I choose to use my person making ability, for example, by calculating his firm for artificial insemination, the value of person enters the nature of the end of the act chosen as means to an end.

In

By nature's design, the existence of a person, that is, the existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists, is the result of a union of one person's partial person making ability with another person's. So the existence of a person is the result of the desire of one person to unite with another person because of the other person's person making ability. The existence of a person is the result of the desire of one person for another person because of the other person's person making ability. So the existence of a person is not just the result of my use of my partial person making ability and my partner's use of her partial person making ability. It is the result of my partial person making ability causing a desire on my part to unite with another person because of her partial person making ability. It is the result of a desire for

another person because of her person making ability. It is the result of a love for another person because of her person making ability.

A perhaps interesting way to approach the question of artificial conception would be to assume that from the beginning our means of person making was a mechanical one. That is, that we had been given some sort of mechanical methods, say, of extracting the sperm from the male and the egg from the female so that we could unite them in a test tube. How, then, would the morality of the act of making a person differ from what it is now? One thing to notice is that while the child to be conceived might be an object of desire, the partner in the process of person making would not be an object of desire in the sense in which she is now.

We would desire the contribution of the partner, perhaps, solely for her contribution to the product to be made. We could desire the contribution of the partner solely for her contribution to the product to be made. In sexual reproduction we cannot do that. In sexual reproduction we must desire, that is, we must have a desire, for our partner for the sake of some of her own attributes other than just her contribution to the new person to be made. Those attributes do in fact constitute her partial person making ability. But to make a person we have to have a desire for what those attributes themselves are, and a desire for her because of what those attributes are. In other words, in sexual reproduction the partner cannot be desired just as a means to the end of bringing another person into existence.

Desiring her just as a means to the end of producing a new person may seem to be better than just desiring her as a means to the existence of our own sexual pleasure. But that is not the moral alternative that we face here. Since we're talking about her person making ability, to value that ability for some other end than the creation of a person to the exclusion of the end of creating a person would be to value the person as if the person were not that for the sake of which everything else exists. So the issue is not whether we can morally compare desiring her as a means to sexual pleasure as opposed to desiring her as a means to producing a new human being. The question is only the question of the morality of desiring her solely as a means to the existence of a new person.

But from a psychological point of view that is what we cannot do now. To get a new person, we have to have a desire for her because of what she is. So in sexual reproduction, on the one hand, we cannot desire her solely for her contribution to the existence of a new person, but we can immorally desire her solely for the sexual pleasure she can give us. So the situation we are in, or were in, prior to artificial conception is that in order to produce a child we must have a love for our partner which does not reduce the partner to being a means to our sexual pleasure or a means to the existence of a new person. In other words, to produce another person, we must have love for our partner that is consistent with valuing our partner's status as an end-in-itself. To do that while valuing her for her person making ability, we cannot value the person making ability simply as a means to our sexual pleasure. If we are valuing her person making ability as a means to our sexual pleasure, we are not valuing the person as that for the sake of which everything else exists. But neither can we succeed in making a person if we value her person making ability merely as a means to making a person. We must value her person making ability as something that makes her an object of love.

Let us return to the case where our person making ability was originally mechanical. It is possible to use our person making ability without any other object of desire than the existence of another person. That is, our desire for our partner would be strictly limited to being a means to the existence of another person. Or at least our desire for our partner could be so strictly limited.

We can desire to relate to another person strictly for the sake of her food making ability, in the same sense. This is not incompatible with giving her the status in our values as that for the sake of which everything else exists, as long as we relate to her for the sake of her food making ability in a way that makes her use of that ability voluntary, that is, freely chosen for the sake of her own ends. But the question is whether we can relate to her for the sake of her person making ability and do so in a way that gives her the status in our values of an end-in-itself just by ensuring that her use of her person making ability is voluntary?

We can do so only if the way we desire the existence of the new person is consistent with valuing the new person to be an end-in-itself and not just a means to our own ends. Not just a means to our own personal

fulfillment. In effect, we are saying that our use of her person making ability does not require us to value her in anyway other than we value her when we use her food making ability. She does not have to be an object of desire or love for any other reason than her contribution to that object of desire or love which is the new person. That is, she does not have to be an object of desire or love in anyway other than in the general sense in which we must ensure that any other persons contributions to our ends are voluntary on the other persons part.

That is, the ability that serves our ends is, like her food making ability, not so related to that for the sake of which everything else exists that in order to give that for the sake of which everything else exists its proper place in our values we have to love her her in a specific, unique, Sense. We do not have to relate to her person making ability, or to her because of her person making ability, in a way that involves a love for her, or a desire for her, which is both beyond the love that any dealing with another person morally requires and beyond a desire for her just for the sake of sexual pleasure. If we don't have that kind of love for her when we use her for the sake of creating a new person, are we really able to value the new person as a person deserves to be value, as opposed to merely valuing her as something that will fulfill our ends. That is the question.

Does it help to put it this way? As it is now, at least prior to artificial conception, producing another person required a desire not just for the new person but a desire that relates us to the partner in person making. But that desire relating us to the partner in person making has two interesting characteristics. One is that it is a desire for her for the sake of attributes which as a matter of fact constitute her person making ability. But the other is that this desire for her because of those person making attributes cannot be a desire, morally, that values her person making ability just for the sake of making a new person. As things are now, it has to be a desire for those attributes because of what they are and what they make her not just as a means to the existence of another person, but what they make her with respect to being a person love for her own sake. Or they make her a person worthy of love for features she possesses independently of whether those features are means to any other end than making her an object of our desire or love.

And it is that lasts characteristic that is the key to morality, sexual morality. Is it also the key to the immorality of artificial conception? That is the question.

Is it morally correct for me to so evaluate the use of my sexuality that it does not exist, sexuality or the use, for the sake of a union of love between ends-in-themselves? Is it morally correct to evaluate my sexuality as if it does not exist for the sake of uniting me in love with another absolute value, another being for the sake of which everything else exists? In other words, is it moral for me to separate the use of my sexuality from all the psychological and intimately interpersonal aspects of my sexuality that go into the use of my sexuality in normal sex? For those aspects of my sexuality exist precisely for the sake of sex acts being love acts between two beings worthy of committed love for their own sake.

An act of using someone's food making ability or laundry doing ability does not exist for the sake of a union of committed love with another and in itself. It does not exist for the sake of giving myself to another and in itself for her own sake. All I have to do to ensure that I am treating her as Foodmaker or the laundry due her as an end-in-itself is to make sure that she is acting voluntarily and being treated fairly, that is, equally. But to respect the status of our person making ability as existing for the sake of making ends-in-themselves, the chosen use of someone's person making ability, unlike the use of their food making nor laundry doing ability, must be an act of love for her sake as an end-in-itself, an end-in-itself having ability to making ends-in-themselves. Because to truly evaluate the product of that ability as something for the sake of which everything else exists, I must evaluate someone who has that ability as worthy of love, of committed love for her own sake.

So it is a 2 way Street: a choice to use my person making ability must be a choice evaluating the product of that ability as that for the sake of which everything else exists, including the ability; and a choice to use my person making ability must be the choice that evaluates that ability as existing for the sake of an act of love for the other person maker as something for the sake of which everything else exists. Otherwise, we are not consistently evaluating ends-in-themselves as ends-in-themselves. (It must be a choice evaluating the product as an end-in-itself, and a choice evaluating the object of the desire that produces the child as an end-in-itself.)

Let's say that out of love for my wife, I want to give her baby and choose artificial conception to do so.

The process I choose I choose Out of love, but the process itself is not a process of love. And a process that is not itself a process of love exists as a means to the end of already existing persons. So in choosing an act that is not a process of love we are evaluating the product of the act as existing for the sake of already existing persons. Why? Because a process that is not itself a process of love can only be chosen by evaluating it as an act that exists as a means to the end of already existing persons, by evaluating it as a means that exist for the sake of the end of already existing persons. And so we must consistently evaluate the product of the act that way.

The process is chosen and exists only because its product is wanted by me, that is, the process exists for the sake of producing a baby only because the baby is wanted by me. That same process could be used for other scientific goals.

In the case of morally done sex, however, we evaluate the act both as existing for the sake of producing an end-in-itself and as an act of love that respects an existing end-in-itself as an end-in-itself, an act of love for an existing end-in-itself. Evolution designed intercourse for the sake of producing a being that is in fact something for the sake of which everything else exists.

A sex act should not only be an act of desire (love of concupiscence) for another person, but can only respect that person as an end-in-itself by being (chosen as, evaluated as) an act of desire that gives existence to beings that are that for the sake of which everything else exists. Conversely, a sex act should not only be an act resulting from the desire for another person (the child) but an act evaluated as an act of love of friendship for an existing person maker, an act treating an existing person maker as an end-in-itself.

An act of using another person's person making ability cannot be just a matter of fairness, the way it using her food making ability or her laundry doing ability can be. But artificial conception uses another person's person making ability in the same way that I use her food making or laundry doing ability, that is, using those abilities does not require an act of love of friendship, an act of committed love for the other as an

end in herself. So using her person making ability must require that kind of commitment.

The act by which I create a thing for the sake of which everything else exists, the act which I choose to be act creating a thing for the sake of which everything else exists, must be a chosen act that is itself an act of love for my partner person maker. Why? Because the existence of the organic unit that makes persons is an act of love in which persons are united, or by which persons are united. To choose to become a person maker without choosing an act of loving union with another thing for the sake of which everything else exists is to evaluate my person making ability to be other than what it is: a way of creating things for the sake of which everything else exists by a loving union between things for the sake of which everything else exists, by a unity between ends-in-themselves that is a loving relation of friendship, not just cooperating in a task.

The value of the product depends on the value of a producer. To choose to replace creating ends-in-themselves by a loving union between ends-in-themselves is to evaluate the creation as the product of something less than a loving union between ends-in-themselves and so as less than something itself worthy of love as an end-in-itself.

In sexual person making, what makes the 2 partners into one person making organism is an act of love between them. So what makes the person is an act of love of persons for persons. What makes the two partners into a person making organism is an act of love for another end-in-itself precisely as being an end-in-itself with an end-in-itself making ability. That end-in-itself making ability is an ability to love another end-in-itself for the sake of that ability.

I am a product of masturbation. I am a product of using the person making ability as an object of utility, like a food making ability or a laundry doing ability. I am a product of using a person making ability as if it could be replaced by a machine, as if it were an ability that could be replaced (as opposed to the irreplaceable value of the product) by a machine.

When I use her laundry doing ability, my relation to her as an end-in-itself only requires for voluntary

participation. That is, it does not require to be used in a way that (does not require an act that) should be exclusive, committed, irreplaceable, etc., does not require my relating to a person making being as an object of love for an end-in-itself, what is not require committed love for an ended itself precisely because the ability I am using exist for the sake of beings that our ends-in-themselves, an ability whose proper evaluation requires me to love her in a way worthy of an end-in-itself, not just to be fair to her.

In intercourse, the partners must not just will to be fair to one another about sharing goods of concupiscence, as they can when they share their food making ability. They must not just evaluate their mutual use of there person making ability as just sharing a good of concupiscence with one another fairly. They must evaluate the use of their person making ability, their mutual use of their mutual person making ability, as as requiring to be part of an act of love for, an act of committed love for, another end-in-itself making end-in-itself. It must be love for another end-in-itself making end-in-itself for her own sake, not just for the sake of making a product. This is the only way to avoid treating the results as a good of concupiscence.

In artificial conception, I agree to share a good of concupiscence, and I agree explicitly not to share an act of love of friendship. I explicitly agree to exclude an act of love of friendship.

We are not obligated to intend to procreate. But if that is our intention, the good of the offspring must be primary in our intention. For example, before conception it would be immoral for me to alter my jeans so that the offspring will have cystic fibrosis for the sake of an experiment. You might reply that a nonexistent person has no rights. That is correct. But whatever we think of "rights talk" once we intend to create a person, it is immoral for us to do anything prior to that person's existence that does not take the benefit of that person into account. So there are ways of bringing human offspring into existence that are immoral even if the immoral acts occur prior to the existence of the new person.

Consider this. Human persons are the products of acts that are mere plaything's. If so, what is the value of a person? If a person is the product of an activity that is essentially trivial, were essentially for the sake

of pleasure, is that product really something we can describe as that for the sake of which everything else exists? Or if a person is an accidental product of a romp of physical passion, is the existence of that product the existence of the absolute value to which every other value is relative? If the greater cannot come from the lesser, the answer to these questions must be no. Then why should we not give the same answer to the question whether the product of a mechanical means of person making is absolute value?

If we intend to create a person, we must simultaneously intend to serve the interests of that person as a being for the sake of which everything else exists. If when we intend to create a person we do not simultaneously intend to do whatever is necessary to serve the interest of that person as an end-in-itself, we are not valuing persons as ends-in-themselves. The person we intend to create is not an end-in-itself in our values.

But is the good of that person served if we separate the generative function of our person making ability from its unitive function? Does it serve her good to be the product of a mechanical act? Does it serve her good if we use our person making ability outside of an act of love and for the other already existing person who is our partner in the act? Outside of an act of love for our partner precisely as having a person making ability, an act in which the existence of one person making organism is constituted by the love of the two already existing persons for each other as having person making abilities.

In artificial conception, the product does not come from the existence of a unified person making organism, an organism the meaning of whose existence is love of one person for another person. Is the existence of such a product the existence of an end-in-itself worthy of love as being something for the sake of which everything else exists?

In artificial conception, I "use" or person making ability, but not as an object of love, not as a feature because of which I love her. I use it as a pure means to something other than itself or than her. I separate her person making ability from its role of being an object of a love act, or from its role of making her the object of a love act. I am making her person making ability a mere tool.

Sexual love is not just a person making act. It is an act of love that is person making, an act that loves the whole person of the partner because of the partner's person making ability. In artificial conception, the

person making ability of the other is a mere tool. So the existence of the product of the person making ability is the existence of something that comes from the use of a mere tool, rather than from an act of love that at the same time constitutes an act of the person making ability, the ability to make that product.

Artificial conception is person making but is not a person making act of love. It uses another person's person making ability, but does not treat her person making ability as a feature because of which she is loved, because of which she is an object of love an object of love for her own sake, not just for the sake of making something else. Or, it does not treat her person making ability as itself an object of love, but as a mere tool not loved for its own sake. And if the product of our person making ability is the product of a mere tool not loved for its own sake, can the value of that product be that of something for the sake of which everything else exists?

But if we are valuing her because of her person making ability, we can be at the same time valuing her for her own sake only if we are valuing her person making ability as existing for the sake of the existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists.

In artificial conception, I separate person making from an act of love for another absolute value. I separate my use of my person making ability from an act of, an act expressing, committed love for another end-in-itself. I can morally use a food making or laundry doing robot and so separate my use of a food making ability or laundry doing ability from an act of justice for another end-in-itself. So my use of another entity's food making ability or laundry doing ability does not require a relation to another end-in-itself considered as such. Can I morally separate my use of my person making ability from a desire for another already existing person because of her person making ability? In that case, the offspring is not the results of a desire for another already existing person because because of the features that maker of person maker; nor is the offspring the result of a desire to give my person making ability to another already existing person because of her person making ability.

Maybe approach it this way: start with an animal that has both in offspring making ability and, for example, a nest making ability. Let's assume that in this species both abilities require the cooperation of the male

and female. Now elevate that animal to the status of a person, that is, the status of something for the sake of which everything else exists. The moral value of the nest making ability in itself has not changed. Now that ability serves the interests of an end-in-itself, but the ability itself does not produce an end-in-itself. The status of the offspring producing ability, however, that is, the moral value of that ability, as changed.

The use of another being's person making ability requires an evaluation of an already existing person by its very nature. The use of a food making ability or a laundry doing ability need not. The latter abilities could belong to robot's. Does artificial contraception require that our use of our person making ability relates us to another person as an object of evaluation? Now it does, but not necessarily in the future. For example, ova might be made in artificial ways rather than taking from a woman's womb.

In artificial conception, the cause of another end-in-itself's existence is an object of mere love of utility. For it is a mechanical process. If the cause of entity 1's existence is an object of mere love of utility, is a mere tool, a mere mechanical process, can entity 1 be an end-in-itself, an absolute value, something for the sake of which everything else exists? How can it be if the greater cannot come from the lesser? Compare to: we are product of a mere desire for pleasure.

In artificial conception, our act of choice is a choice for the greater to come from the lesser. But to so evaluate the greater that in our evaluations it comes from the lesser, is to evaluate the greater as if it were not the greater and the lesser as if it were not the lesser. In other words, and so choosing, we are evaluating a child to be something that has the kind of value that a machine is able to produce. It has the kind of value that does not require an act of love of one absolute value for another absolute value, an act of love one for the other precisely under the aspect of their being absolute values.

When I masturbate or remove an egg from the uterus, there is no essential teleological connection between such an act and creating a person. Sperm and eggs could be used for other scientific purposes. In fact, without deliberate human intervention, the occurrence of conception would be entirely accidental to these acts. In normal sex, on the other hand, if conception is going to happen, it's going to happen, unless deliberate human intervention prevents it. The occurrence of conception, when it takes place, is a natural outcome of the act; it is an outcome naturally connected to the act. Human intervention would be

necessary to prevent conception.

In normal sex, the act is naturally and necessarily procreative; so is naturally in conformity to the transcendence of the person making ability's goal of making persons over all other goals. In artificial conception, the acts performed are extrinsic to the person making ability's goal of making persons. So in choosing artificial conception, I am not evaluating an act of my person making ability to be what it is, that is, one with a natural relation to making persons.

Evolution gave the person making ability the goal of acts that are person making whether I want them to make persons or not, whether I want them to be person making acts or not. In other words are evolution designed my person making ability for acts that make things for the sake of which everything else exists, whether I want them to make things for the sake of which everything else exists or not. In artificial conception, on the other hand, an act is person making only because I choose it to be person making. The process exists for the sake of making a baby only because a baby is wanted by me, not because the nature of the act is ordered to something that has value whether or not I want it. So the baby would be a product of an act, not that produces something of intrinsic value no matter what other people want, but an act that produces something that has whatever value it has only because another person wants that.

An act that makes a baby should be an act that by its nature, by what it is, is an act of love of friendship for another person, not just the love of concupiscence for a baby, for pleasure, etc.

The value we place on sexuality will determine the value we place on human life. So if we make sexuality into a machine for making persons, rather than an act of love that makes persons, then...

As of now, life comes from an act of love. And the meaning, the value, of human life is that of committed love one person for another, the committed love from which life comes. So what is the meaning of human life if it comes from a mechanical process, rather than from an act of love? The giving of existence is not an act of love in which two people give each other their life-sharing power. The process of creating human life is not identical with an act of love between two people.

It is an injustice to the child unless the cause of its existence is committed love for persons as such, and so unless the cause is an act of committed love for persons as such. It is an injustice to the child if her existence is not the result of an act that is an act of love between two persons.

To make artificial conception the moral equivalent of natural is to evaluate conception by an act of committed love of two persons for each other because of their sexuality to be morally equivalent to making persons by a machine.

From the point of view of the injustice done to the child, being a test tube baby is much like being a child of rape or a child born illegitimately. Because a person is worthy of committed love for her own sake, because it is the meaning of her existence to be something worthy of committed love, she should come into existence in a way consistent with that meaning. Bringing a child into existence the way mere things come into exist, mechanically, is an injustice to the child the way bringing a child into existence the way mere animals come into exist, as a result of blind passion, is an injustice to the child. The child's existence should be the result of an act of placing of value on another person, and because of the other person's feature of being someone with a person-making ability, as being worthy of committed love.

Artificial contraception and artificial conception both treat sexual beings as if sexuality were merely a way of performing tasks and so treat sexual beings as such as if they were makers of mere things. Only an act of committed love for another person as a sexual being can treat a sexual being as if the value of sexuality is not that of tasks were making thing is. Morally, if a human person may come from a mere capacity for making things, the person is not an end-in-itself.

When a child results from an act of marital love, she results from the fact that, beyond wanting the child in wanting each other, the parents value persons as worthy of committed love for their own sake. When human life comes from an act expressing committed love for each other as sexual beings, the meaning, the value, of the result of sexuality is that of committed love of one sexual being for another from which the new person comes. So the meaning of the coming into existence of the child is not just that she was

wanted by someone else but beyond that she is something worthy of committed love just for being what she is, a person.

To say that the value of the child depends on whether the child comes from an act expressing committed love amounts to saying that the act is understood as an actualization of their committed love, a manifestation of their committed love, an exercise of their committed love. So when human life comes from an act that is understood as an exercise committed love, understood as an actualization of committed love, and that is performed because it is so understood, then the value of the child is that of an end-in-itself. For the source of the child's existence is the very fact that the parents value persons as worthy of committed love for their own sake.

Children deserve to know that the meaning of their existence as persons is love between persons, the self-giving of one person to another. So they deserve to know that their existence, is, not from a machine, but from acts in which persons value each other, as beings with person-making ability, to be worthy of committed love.

01-21-00

The following comments are based on comments in the file Notes2. They concern a variety of different topics under the heading of sexual morality.

We value things for what they can bring into existence. But something we value for what it can bring into existence is not an absolute value, since its value is subordinate to and measured by that which it can bring into existence. Persons must not be valued for what they can bring into existence. The existence of a person is the value that measures all other values, that all other values to be consistent with.

Committed love implements the value of the person.

There are 2 good paragraphs dated Jan. 24, 95.

If society has the duty and the interests of protecting and preserving human rights, not all religions are equal from the point of view of society. Not all religions are of equal value from the point of view of society. Since there are no rights without God, secular humanism is not of equal value to theism.

Because of sexuality is our person making ability, the way in which we use it, and the context in which we use it, can either affirm the ethically absolute value of the person as such or deny it. We do not have the right to tell someone else "I consensually give you permission to use my person making ability in a way that prevents the absolute value of the person from being affirmed.

Why is extramarital sex "dirty" or degrading? What does it degrade? Degrades the value of human life. If human life is the product of an act of animal passion, what then is the value of human life? On the other hand, if human life the product of committed love between persons, what is the value of human life?

There is a good paragraphs on euthanasia agent may 3 0, 9 5.

On illegitimacy: if we separate our life-giving faculty from committed love, we are separating the life we give, human life, from being deserving of committed love.

It is important to focus not only on the fact that the goal of sex is an absolute value but also the fact that what sex gives human beings is the most fundamental thing of all, existence. It is because sex gives us existence that the parent responsible for giving the child committed love. Under normal circumstances, I am not responsible for giving committed love to the child of the parents across the street. But they are responsible. Why? Because they are responsible for the very existence of this being that is something for the sake of which everything else exists.

So in seeking freedom from the connection between sex and committed love for the sake of pleasure, we are devaluing our own existence we are choosing to live like animals (who cannot choose it; they have to live that way). That is why extramarital sex is "dirty," because of what it does to the value of human life. This is truly "sexual alienation," that is, alienation from our meaning as persons.

We must always use acts as if it is always what it is for the sake of what it can do at times of fertility.

I value means for the sake of ends. What place a person has in my value is shown by how I value sex as a means to ends. (Sex: that is, you and so far as you are a sexual being.) If I value persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists, I must value you insofar as you are a sexual being as being for the sake of giving existence to persons, not just pleasure or companionship to a person.

Yyyyy

xxxLogic, Metaphysics, logical relations, features, properties, 5-23-00

Compare "Tom knows Dick" to "Dick is known by Tom." From a metaphysical point of view, the first relation is a real relation, a real existent, while the second relation is a logical relation only, a nonreal existent. But from the point of view of the way they are represented logically, the way they are objectified, they are equally relations. For both we use a "Tom related to Dick" "Dick related to Tom" logical structure to objectify them. This should clearly show that metaphysics cannot be based on logic. Also, it should clearly show that for every predicate with a distinct meaning there is not a really existing feature distinct from another really existing feature.

xxxWittgenstein and Poincaré, formal signs, Haldane, language of thought, BIG 12-27-00

Revise the article on Wittgenstein and Poincaré to emphasize that formal signs are not "the language of thought;" they are the opposite of that. In the traditional medieval categories, or scholastic categories, the language of thought would be conceptualism, not realism of in a variety and especially not of the diacritical variety. Think of Ockham's natural signs, as described by Greg Reichberg. And they are not formal signs. They function as signs by first being objects of awareness, objects that naturally represent things other

than themselves. And formal signs do not function as signs in the way that language does. They function as signs in a way opposite to the way language does, contrary to that way. If formal signs were objects of awareness, we would need an infinite regress of psychological entities by means of which we were aware of formal signs in order to be aware of the first formal sign.

xxxProblem of reference, Putnam, Kripke, BIG 12-27-00

This is what the problem he is. If the meaning of a name is not a description, how can a name succeed in

referring and less than name to saying actually exists? In other words, how is the name succeed in communicating; how does it succeed in objectifying. If its meaning would that of a description, as the meanings of predicates are, it could get its meaning from other words. Where does it get its meaning if there are no other words to get its meaning?

Well, where do our primary predicates get their meaning? An alcoholic in dts sees a pink elephant. He points and says, "that is coming at me," or "I fear that." The name "that" refers to an individual in his perceptual field. Is this a private language? No, because language must already exists in order for him to do this. He is just extending the use a language that came into existence for the sake of communicating about really existing public objects. Once public language exists, we can use it for imaginary objects.

Should we had: we can souse language as long as we are using it for an object of awareness that is capable of description, where "capable" does not refer to the actual resources of any language or of any user of language. It refers to the fact that the object has, for example, perceivable features.

xxxBeing is not a genus, analogy, paralogues, parageneric abstraction, Simon, 12-27-00

Here is an attempt to state why the usual presentations of the reason that being is not a genus are insufficient. The reason is not that whatever features other than being itself are predicated to distinguish some kind of being from another are features of which being is affirmatively predicable. The words the reason is not that differences like material, rational, finite, living, etc., features that distinguish one kind of being from another, are all features of which being is affirmatively predicable (living is a mode of being, materiality is a mode of being, etc.).

Paralogues: an abatement that does not have the effect of denying the common ground, but that, unlike a specific difference, establishes an order of priority and posteriority with respect to do the common ground. Specific differences do not establish an order of priority and posteriority respecting the common ground.

And that simply means that a paralogue, unlike a genus, is such and orderable common ground. But the

priority and posteriority is not in the ontological order of causality, or the psychological order of the first paralogate known to us relative to the second, but the logical order existing out of affirmation and negation. (affirmation and negation with respect, not to the truth of the predication of the common ground, but to the truth of in order in the truth of predicating the common ground, and order based on ontological and psychological order but not identical with them. It is an order in the strength of the predication of the (so) orderable common ground, a common ground that is orderable with respect to diminuendo and crescendo).

In other words, the paragraph preceding the last simply means that there are intelligible values, objective concepts, intelligible features of reality that unlike genera are orderable with respect to strength of predication by means out of affirmation and negation, unlike specific differences. Such intelligible values happen to occur; that is simply a brute fact we have to take account of.

But to say that it is simply a group fact that we need to take account of does not mean that we cannot explain why there are such intelligible features in terms of the need of our intellects to abstract from prime matter and therefore deal with univocal concepts. As a result, intelligible values that are not diversified by the pure potentiality of prime matter cannot be objectified by means of univocal concepts. So they must be objectified in the way paralogues are objectified. These are objects intelligible in themselves but are not the proper objects of our mode of intelligence, not the proper objects of reason.

But at the same time they are the basis of the intelligibility of the objects that are the proper objects of reason. And that is why philosophy has so much difficulty explaining knowledge of our proper objects, because knowledge of our proper objects has to be explained in terms of knowledge of objects that are not our proper objects.

Belay philosophers must use language, the nature of the way they use language, requires them to produce apparent contradictions. That is the nature of the beast and the reason philosophy is full of *apparently* unsolved problems. When a philosopher writes a solution to a problem, it usually happens that

the proposed solution generates as many, or as significant, paradoxes as the problem she is trying to solve.

November 17, 2003

The difference between paragenic and paragenic abstraction is this: generic abstraction is abstraction that makes its inferiors equal with respect to that which is abstracted, that is, the common ground. Paragenic abstraction does not make its inferiors equal, does not objectified them equally with respect to the common ground.

"Equality" here is not refer to whether something is more or less in eight quantitative sense, but whether something satisfies a predicate more or less well.

xxxTime, order of past and present, 12-27-00

Event B. is causally related to event A such that B. and A cannot coexist. Since they cannot coexist, there must be in order between them. They are in order to set. One must be first in existence; the other second in existence. Are these ordinal numbers, "first" and "second," sufficient to define the temporal sequence of before (the past) and after (the future)? Or does the use of these ordinal's presuppose a standard (and a standard other than causal, since not all temporal sequences are causal) for before and after such that we mean that A is first "in time" and B. second "in time." Yes.

So how do we define before and after? Are they pure primitives in the definition of time? No, Aristotle's brilliant stroke: define before and after from the relation of spatial point C to point D. period. As spatially immobile, either of these two points can be used as the start of the lying segment, but not of the motion from C to D. so we can use the cognition-independent order of motion to define the order of time.

Time is a quantity of motion according to the order of before and after given by the motion from C to D. the quantity is a different kind of quantity from the spatial length, of which either of the two points could be the

beginning, indifferently, and the time is the same quantity to the whole spatial universe.

xxxSpatial relations, BIG 12-26-00

The concept of time includes a being of reason. Likewise, the concepts of the true and the good include beings of reason. Can this approach be extended the problem of place, or the problem of spatial relations? Again, threeness is a reality, but is not a reality over and above the reality of, say, Larry, Moe, and curly. We objectify the reality of threeness by taking a common characteristic, that of being is due to, and seeing that characteristic and Larry, Moe, and curly, in relation to each other.

Likewise, we get "to the left of" or "to the right out of" by taking something, for example, Moe, to use as a point of view, and hence a source for a relation of reason, and viewing Larry and curly in relation to him.

(But don't I presuppose "spatial" relations here?)

There is a new existence, a new state of affairs. But I objectify that new existence using a relation of reason. What is the new state of affairs? For example, Moe has ceased being in a state of motion at a certain rate in a certain direction for a certain time. But what was the old state of affairs? For instance, Moe was at rest in a certain place, and then move in a certain direction.

BIG, this looks like it. A continuum, and extended reality, exists. It has real parts outside of real parts. We can designate (being of reason?) Really distinct parts by "A," "B." the parts so designated are at a certain distance from one another. That is, the part of a continuum between A and B. has a certain length. That length is a reality, because it is a real part of the continuum, and a continuum is a reality. And at the size of that length is a reality even if we use beings of reason to objectify that size. At AA is also at certain distances from other points, C, D., D. etc..

Now the same occupying that part of the continuum we call A begins to move in the direction of B. then the thing stops. What is new? It was in motion in a certain direction, covering a certain length in a certain time. Now it is at rest at a different distance from B., C, D. etc., then it was before. So there is a new state of affairs, but no really existing relations, or no no really existing relations. The distance from the thing that

was in A to cap B is shorter than that was. That is a reality, a fact. But that distance already existed. What is new is the presence of the thing formerly at A in a part of the continuum that previously existed where "at" is an objectified relation of reason, a relation of reason used to objectify a reality.

New topic: when the forces on anybody are in equilibrium, the body does not change place. Given that the body is what it is and that it exists in a certain configuration with other things that are what they are, it is not the case that the body must change in place; instead, it is the case the body cannot change in place. If it did change in place, then either it, some other thing in the configuration, or the configuration would not be what it is. So if a previous locomotion results in the forces on the body being in equilibrium, we may have no reason to say that the previous change results in any further change to that body.

What it does not follow that the only change resulting from the locomotion is change in spatial relations. We have to consider the results of locomotion relative to the entire universe. Even if the state of the universe were exactly the same at the beginning of a locomotion and the end (think of circular motion, for instance) but causal history of the universe would be different, other things being equal, since force fields in universe would be changing throughout the motion.

The phrase "in the area" may appear to reintroduce spatial relations at a level prior to the change caused as a result of something's being in the area. But the reality of places in the sense of specific areas is not in doubt; nor is the reality of something's being act or in an area, as long as its being act or in an area does not require a distinct entity describable as a spatial relation. Since the reality of extension is not in doubt, we can use place phrases like "in the area" with phrases like "when the spatial location of something relative to the rest of the universe is the same as a location of this area relative to the rest of the universe" or "when the spatial temporal distance of something from some point of reference is this place in this field of force."

xxxMaterial logic, BIG 12-26-00

Properties of objects as objects, that is, logical properties, are ways of being objects of knowledge. That is, they are ways of being that which fulfills our goal, achieves our goal, when our goal is knowledge. Material logic studies properties of objects as objects that are defined by (caused by) properties of objects as things. A certain property of things as things is relevant to its status as an object, to its second existence as an object. In other words, a certain property of things as things is relevant to the thing's way of being that which fulfills the goal of having knowledge.

more specifically, it is relevant by the standard of the goal of knowledge of truth. (Relevance must always be measured by some goal.) That is, knowledge of the identity of object and thing. So logical properties are features of our ways of knowing truth and the identity of object and thing; or features of the process of achieving the goal of objectifying things and knowing that what some object is is also what things are.

Whether A is an effect of B., or vice versa, is relevant to the status of A and as an object to be understood. It is relevant to A's way of being an object of knowledge to A's way of being that which fulfills our goal of having knowledge. It is relevant to A vis-a-vis our goal of understanding A, of knowing truths about A by means of truths about B and vice versa.

Whether what A is requires prime matter is relevant to be intelligibility of A, since prime matter is unintelligible through itself.

Whether what accidents are in themselves makes them understandable only in relation to substance is relevant to the goal of understanding accidents. So ANALOGY does belong to material logic!

Another example would be necessary and contingent truth.

xxxThing/object identity as source of error, Gilson, 12-2 29-00

We begin the epistemology by asking epistemological questions. The appropriate way to ask epistemological questions is to use object descriptions. So we think in terms of object descriptions, and it is perfectly natural to do so. So Gilson is incorrect if he implies that if we start with thought, we begin as "idealists."

But what we are seeking to know about is our ability to know the truth of sentences using thing descriptions. And so we are seeking to know whether what is objectified by a thing description is what is also objectified by another thing description. That is why we need not "begin as idealists."

At the end of my article on thing an object in Maritain, I say that the problem is that the identity of the thing an object must coexist with their diversity, and vice versa. It's deeper than that. The factor of identity does not just exist with the factors of diversity. The difficulty is that it is the factors of diversity themselves that enable the identity; the identity between thing an object occurs by means of factors of diversity, factors like abstraction, universality, possibility.

Another point. In causal realism I say that cognition dependent existence is not intentional existence what is a substitute for real existence, a cognition dependent substitute for real existence. I could've also said that it is a cognition dependent replica of real existence, or an imitation of real existence.

xxxGod's knowledge of time, BIG, 12-29-00

Mozart has a famous statement about how he composed symphonies. He says that he saw the whole symphonies from beginning to end at one time. He did not see a step by step; he saw in all and once. Now imagine Mozart conducting a symphony. Simultaneously with the downbeat, he goes into a reverie in which he relives the initial experience in which he saw the symphony all and once. And assume that he

stays in that reverie throughout the whole performance of the symphony. From the viewpoint of the players, the symphony proceeds step by step, each note ceasing to exist as the succeeding note comes into existence. But from the point of view of the conductor's consciousness all the notes are there, including their relations of preceding and succeeding, at once. Both the players and conductor experience the whole symphony. Like the players, the conductor experience is the whole thing. But he does so in one unchanging moment that endures throughout the succeeding moments of the player's consciousness.

An even better metaphor like the following. When we look at any picture, the grasp at one time a whole composed of distinct parts. If we were not grasping a Gestalt, wherein multiple parts are grasp at the same time, the only alternative would be that we were grasping and infinitesimally small point. So let us imagine that we are viewing one picture, let's say a picture of someone in action of some kind. If we can grasp one collection distinct parts at one time, what is there to prevent us from grasping a somewhat larger collection by adding another picture to the first grasping the two at the same time? In fact, we do the equivalent of this all the time.

So now let us add a third picture and lying each of them up one beside the other, the words, three in a row. If the fact that each of these pictures taken individually is a complex of distinct parts is not prevent us from grasping that picture for what it is, what is there to prevent us from grasping all three simultaneously? In fact not only does the fact that which are individually is a complex of distinct parts not prevent us from grasping it, we have just seen that that's the only way we can grasp anything. That's what grasping anything amounts to. So what is only a small step from their grasp being the three distinct parts together simultaneously.

Now let us label these pictures "past," present," "future." It shows that there is no contradiction in God's seeing the whole of time simultaneously. Of course, no metaphor is perfect and someone might object that each of these pictures is static, whereas time flowing. So this metaphor does not represent God's grasp of the flow of time, since you cannot break that flow of into an actually distinct parts as these pictures are.

But if this objection as opposed to create a problem we can just combining the three picture metaphor with the Mozart metaphor. Because in the Mozart metaphor, it's a whole flow of time that is grasped at once. Or we can even stay within the metaphor of the pictures. We assumed that they were pictures of action. Even though each picture is a still, we rarely see a picture of action, even a cartoon, and think of the action portrayed as frozen in time. At any one time, we perceive the portrayed action as extending through time. In other words, each of us can do a little bit of what Mozart to do a lot of. And if Mozart could do it, can't God?

xxxHypostatic union, subsistence, BIG 12-29-00

In every being except God, action is distinct both from the essence of the agent and from the act of existing of the agent. So the virtual action by which an existing substance produces its necessary accidents should not be formally identical with either the essence or the existence of the substance. It should be distinct from the essence of the substance somewhat as ordinary action distinct from the active potency.

Any effect has a transcendental relation to a cause. But where more than one cause can produce that kind of effect, the nature of the fact does not reveal the nature of the cause. But there is one thing we know about every effect, or about the necessary cause of every effect. We know that it is a supposit, a subsistent, something with subsistence. In the case of necessary accidents, that which has the subsistence could be the individual substance or God.

Begin: My theory captures only a portion of the traditional theory of subsistence. (For example, on some serious, subsistence distinguishes Socrates from Socrates's individual human nature.) My theory is intended to capture no more than that. But that is all I need.

xxxLiberal Conservative, 3-7-01

Non fundamentalist liberals, realist liberals rather than moderate liberals, have always: an anti-Communist and antisocialist. Then nonideological wind of the ideal is not possible; they bend when the neo conservatives won't. Have always opposed to capital punishment, even before it was fashionable to do so. Been willing to admit that conservatives are sometimes right. Our willing to cooperate with those that fundamentalist liberals consider "enemies," for example, Pat Robertson. Think we should learn from past failings, such as our naivete regarding Soviet espionage; we do not avoid discussing those failings of the grounds that "it might give help to the conservatives." Do not consider conservatives and these as if this were some sort of game or war, even though that is what conservatives think of us. Believed that that moral obligation binds us objectively and meta culturally; we hold our positions because we believe we are objectively obligated to do so; without objective obligation, there would be no reason to do so. Believed that the basis of a political position must be moral obligation that binds objectively, binds because it is based on our ability to know objective truth. Believed that we should judge, evaluate sexual behavior not just for what it can contribute to our individual pleasure, but to our long-term personal happiness and that of others, especially of children that have been and will be produced. Do not view abortion as . . . Believed in government intervention in the economy because of the necessity of private property and free markets and hence of the necessity to redress their failures.

xxxBooks on historical Jesus, 3-7-01

Josh McDowell, "new evidence that demands a verdict". Lee Strobel, "the case for Christ." (This as a star after it) Dr. Gary Habermas, "the historical Jesus's."

xxx medical ethics, 4-1 1- 01

Reed Grisez and Boyle on letting die. Maybe that is the issue. Why letting die, for example, removing food and water, does or does not make need a cause of death. For example, a disease puts him in a coma, so it causes him not to be able to feed himself. What is my responsibility? If I letting die, do I cause is death; do I intend his death as a means to an end?

xxx freedom, Nihilation, 4-11-01

Another phrase from commonsense that expresses what Maritain means by nonconsideration of the rule: mind your manners; keep in mind.

To cease considering something is to cease taking it into consideration at the practical, concrete, existential level.

xxx Faith and reason, 4-17-01

Before heading faith, I can wonder whether God has revealed anything to man. And I can search for reasons to think that in a particular religion God has indeed reveal things to man. I might not know what kind of reasons those might be or even what kind of reasons they could be, but I can assumed that it is possible for God to do this and that God knows best what kinds of reasons he has to use to let me know that he is revealing something.

But according to rationalists, we shouldn't even get that far. To them, it is a violation of reason to believe that God has revealed anything. So there is something wrong if we even bother looking. In other words, they claim to know that God is unable to give us sufficient reasons for thinking that he is revealing something. They claim to know that such reasons cannot exist. They know that not even God could find such reasons, because they would be contradictory to the nature of "reason" in the sense of intelligence. Therefore, rather than wondering whether God has provided evidence such that since that evidence exists, we have a moral obligation to believe that someone says is from God, rationalists know that it would you wrong to think that evidence giving us a moral obligation to believe could ever exist.

Put this way, it is their view that is immediately seen to be irrational. How could they possibly know that it is beyond the mind of God to design evidence such that its existence would be sufficient for us to know that if we do not believe something is God's revelation, we are being morally wrong? How do they know,

in other words, that God cannot give us the inestimable gift of knowing things we are incapable of knowing by natural reason?

They might try to reply that kind of evidence I'm talking about is contradictory, and therefore not even God to create such evidence much less design it. They would say it is contradictory because it is asking reason to deny itself. Is not faith something that is beyond reason? Or is not faith in something that is beyond reason? And if reason could justify faith, why would it be faith?

To answer this, we simply has to locate precisely the dividing line between reason and faith. First, Jesus provides sufficient evidence for believing that he says, or will say, is God's revelation. Up until now reason alone is operating. We have not gone beyond reason. Now Jesus's tells us something that reason would be incapable of knowing. We are beyond reason now, but we are justified in doing so because within reason itself we saw sufficient evidence for believing that what ever Jesus's might say next is true, whether or not what he says next is something that falls within reason or outside of reason.

The importance of the above argument is that we do not even have to give an analysis of how evidence can show us that it is obligatory to believe, in order to reply to the rationalists. And once the folly of that rationalists's reasoning is seen, the obligation of asking ourselves whether God has ever revealed anything is clear.

When we start down that path, the first thing we can do is eliminate those religions and those persons who do not claim to be revealing anything from God. Perhaps the next thing we can do is eliminate those religions and those persons who do not claim to have an answer to the problem of evil. Another thing we can look for his consistency of certain kinds. For instance, one kind of consistency that we should look for what that most people do not is the following. If the leaders of the Christian Church had been free of all sins in their decision-making, we would know that Christianity could not be reveal truth, because the history of the Christian Church would be inconsistent with Christian teaching that leaders of the Church will indeed be guilty of sin.

And when we start down has all looking for whether or not God has revealed anything, we know in advance that what we are looking for is whether some human being can speak for God. In other words, does the Koran and speak for God? Does Moses speak for God? Etc. and when we put the question that way, the next question is whether some human being claims to speak for God has credentials that would amount to the kind of evidence we are looking for. If God is going to speak to us, he will either speak to me directly, in which case I am the human being that is the vehicle of his revelation, or evil speak to someone else. Either way he has to give the person he is seeking to sufficient evidence for that person to know that he should believe what is coming next. And so if I should believe what another human being claims to be revelation from God, I need evidence about that human being, sufficient evidence of that human being. And so that human being must have credentials.

But knowing that the human being must have credentials narrows the field considerably. Where are the Muslim miracles, the Buddhists miracles, the Hindu miracles, etc.? Where are the Jewish miracles after Jesus's? Very quickly the field will narrow down to Jesus's, at least to the important extent that the know we have to take a serious look at the credentials Jesus offers. Our question becomes same question that the Jews that had for Jesus's, "are you are the one who was to come, or shall we wait for another?"

In McInerney's detective example, what I am deciding on the basis of inductive reasoning, that is, on the basis of whether or not it is reasonable to believe the opposite, is whether I should enter into with this person the kind of relationship that would make it totally inappropriate, totally contrary to the nature of the relationship, to hire a detective to investigate further whether the person deserves that kind of relationship.

Similarly, when I decide that the opposite of putting my faith in Christ is unreasonable, I am entering into a personal relationship which would be broken by certain kinds of doubt.

Also, the kind of certitude given by knowledge that it is unreasonable to believe the opposite of a proposition is not the kind of certitude that constitutes faith. The latter kind of certitude is given as a get to after acting on the basis of the first kind of certitude. And when that second kind is given as a gift, or after it is given as a gift, it then becomes a personal relationship of the kind that would be broken by the

detective type of investigation. So maybe I could read "the grammar of assent" and add the necessary enhancements to it.

"Religious assent": religion is a species of justice. So the issue is that something is due God in this situation. What is due God? The recognition that divinely revealed truth is involved.

If my conscience disagrees with the ordinary magisterium, I must follow my conscience. If an expert disagrees, she is obligated to explain why to other experts, for the sake of enlightening them. But the case of keeping such disagreements the secret from non' experts is gone forever. So the magisterium must have occur each to say publicly that someone whose conscience disagrees is obligated to follow their conscience.

I am obligated to believe that Dr. if I have a family to support, etc.. So prior obligations determine the obligation to believe the doctor's statement that this is the only way to save a life.

December 21st, 2002

Unlike the Greek intellectual, of modern intellectual refuses God's offer of the gift of enlightenment above reason. Is a gift of superior enlightenment. Buying reason we can no that it is unreasonable not to believe what Jesus says. (Unreasonable: the goal of reason is to assent to what exists and only what exists; and there are only two kinds of evidence for that. The goal of reason is to assent to what exists on the basis of evidence for what exists.) Reason can no that it is unreasonable to believe the opposite of "I should believe what Jesus says."

Since I know that my reason, I have the obligation to except Jesus's gift of enlightenment superior to reason. But I may also know that by accepting faith I would be accepting certitude, justified certitude, I do

not want to believe (for example, that God can give me enlightenment superior to reason, which is what the intellectual does not want to believe). I know that God can give me certitude that I will know comes from his indwelling in me not from me.

In the Greek intellectual, the absence of faith was a mere negation, not a privation. So the modern intellectual operates with wounded reason, not just incomplete reason. In fact, the modern intellectual has the audacity to claim to know that God is so weak that he cannot figure out a way to communicate to us things that could not be known just by reason alone.

To say that reason is able to know the truth of "I should believe what Jesus says," is not to say that this often occurs without the help of grace. 2 different questions are involved here. What is the nature of such a belief? The answer that question is that it is a natural, rational belief. And what is the cause of such a belief? Grace may well be the cause. Likewise, it is correct to say that reason is capable of knowing the existence of God, in other words, that the existence of God is by nature an element of rational knowledge. But that does not tell me anything about how belief in the existence of God usually comes about. Another example: there are truths about ethics that belong by nature to reason but are also included in what is revealed by faith.

xxxSuicide, April 24, 2001

Morality governs behavior toward persons. But the source of the behavior is also a person, and so the source of the behavior must respect her own

personhood. I cannot acknowledge the value in another's personhood without implicitly acknowledging the value in my personhood, a value that binds me as much as the other person's value binds me. For if I do not respect that value in myself, I implicitly disrespect it in the other. If I do not respect the value of personhood in myself, I imply that personhood anywhere does not have a value that I am defective if I do not recognize.

In the phrase "another person," as used in the claim that morality concerns behavior toward another person, it is the word "person" not "another" that has the moral significance.

xxxMedical Ethics, April 24, 2001

I cannot choose refraining from preserving life, e.g., from saving a drowning man, as a means to death, e.g., to inherit as a result of death. Can I choose to refrain from preserving life as a means to ending undue suffering? What if saving the life would inflict undue suffering on me? If that would be a legit reason for me to refrain from saving the life, why wouldn't saving the other person from undue suffering be a legit reason to refrain from saving her life?

xxxIntellectual fads, June 26, 2001

Values clarification, deconstruction, new math, progressive education, not directive counseling.

There is another list like this in one of my other notes files.

xxxWittgenstein and Maritain, Varghese, Possenti, logic, formal systems, logical knowledge, 09-16-01

Another necessary truth, a self-evidently necessary truth, known by the science of logic is "extension and intention vary in inverse proportion to one another.

xxxTake a Message to Michael, 09-22-01

I start off by saying that ethical values concerned the interior act of choice. In doing so, am I making huge and unjustified psychological assumptions about occult mental acts. Not all. Referring to the interior act of choice as the seat of moral value is just a summary way speaking about the fact that moral value concerns the way he rationally conscious beings cause their exterior behavior. One mountain ranger performs the same exterior acts as the other. But one does it thinking that those acts to save lives; the other does it thinking that those acts will take lives.

De jure, I should not have to explain all that. De facto, many people will think I am making invalid assumptions. That is because most contemporary philosophers asked uninformed questions based on false assumptions. But should I not address those philosophers and help them see? Sure. But if I address those who falsely asked the question I just mentioned, what about those who falsely asked other questions about whatever my next point will be?

You have to make choices about whom you will address. But what about all of those for contemporary philosophers or so screwed up? Well, I've written a 500 page book to address their problems. So you can't blame me for not trying. Certainly, I may not have succeeded. But no one would be more delighted then I if someone did the job better than I did. But what would it take to do the job better? 1000 page book ? 1000 page book that no one will read?

My solution is really very very simple. The last analysis only two pieces all speculative knowledge are at stake: that God is the infinitely perfect source of all being; and that persons

have freedom of choice. Our conscious appetitive do to the rest. To explain how and why they do the rest takes more speculative knowledge. But that is a different matter.

So the speculative knowledge that are choices are either in conformity to or not a conformity to its not "scientific" knowledge. But neither is its knowledge about "values." Values don't enter the picture until the appetitive faculties respond or fail to respond. And the last sentence is a piece of object of knowledge, or should say speculative knowledge, about what things are that is not "scientific" knowledge; nor is it a statement of some sort of normative fact, whether an intuitional normative fact or whatever.

Those last issues are all false issues and ill formed questions. They arise because philosophers don't get back to what is most basic and what is most fundamental, namely, the nature of ethical values. Ethical good and evil have to apply to what I above called the interior act of choice, and they have to be measured by some sort of goal, some sort of end we think we "should" applied to those choices, where "should" does not have a moral meaning yet but means the end to which we are holding choices is a naturally necessary end for the faculty of making choices.

The ideas of the last paragraph are basic and fundamental, and unless we ask them first, there is no possible way we can understand ethics, where understanding ethics is a form of speculative knowledge. In particular, if we asked the kind of questions that contemporary philosophers ask first, questions that that don't get back to the most basic issues, there is no way we can understand ethics.

It is absolutely fundamental that we talk about goals and ends when we talk about making moral

judgments. We have to be asking whether some end is achieved or is not achieved. If we don't understand that we don't understand the question we're asking. And if we don't understand that we are asking that about the interior act of choice we don't understand what question we are asking.

Perhaps the objection to referring to the interior act of choice is like Michael's objection to speaking of awareness rather than recognition. He didn't like awareness because it sounded too psychological. Then what is recognition? What is recognition is not something psychological? He probably meant something like "recognitions is a state I can verify empirically." Fine. I can accept that. But so is awareness of state I can verify. Interior act of choice might sound too psychological, that is, the adjective "interior" might sound too psychological, but I needed something to distinguish between the seat of moral value and the exterior acts performed.

Likewise that persons have freedom of choice is a speculative truth what a nonscientific speculative truth. It is a metaphysical, ontological, or philosophical speculative truth. So the apparent dichotomy between scientific facts and values is a false dichotomy but not all for the reasons that ordinarily are given. Because the reasons ordinarily given by themselves based on false dichotomies based on false premises. Again, where you start to cut through all of that? The false problems of modern philosophy are all layered on other false problems of modern philosophy that are layered on other false problems of modern philosophy.

You have to start somewhere. I've tried to ways. I've written a 500 page book theoretically addressed to people do not share my assumptions, more victimized by all those false questions,

and I've written a paper on ethics address to people who share certain specific assumptions that I share.

Is there another way do it? Recall that both Hume and Kant had to write short books to get anyone to listen to what they said in their long books. So yes, I will try to write a short book that accomplishes what the short books of Hume and Kant accomplished. In yet, unlike in my first book, I will cut to the chase and establish that every event must have a cause. Then I will show that that truth is the basis of empirical knowledge. That will show that our questions about scientific knowledge as opposed to other kinds of knowledge start off with false assumptions about what scientific knowledge is. But not just false assumptions about science not being objective. That itself is a false dichotomy. Science is objective. But neither is it false because there is another kind of fact called moral facts, whether intuitive or not. Again these are all false questions.

xxxThe short book, a reintroduction to philosophy, 10-01-01

The introduction to the short book will talk about the question of Post Fregean lack of success in reducing paradox in disagreement in philosophy. The question is how far I should show my hand in the introduction. How far should I go in describing just how bad the situation is?

Should I, for example, give my examples about the differences between metaphysical abstraction and mathematical abstraction, that is, computational abstraction. I could give an example of metaphysical abstraction and clearly label it as something from old-fashioned philosophy. Then

I could show the difference between the kind of abstraction that held in old-fashioned philosophy and the kind of abstraction that people today say is an indication of the ability to do philosophy.

xxxAbortion, 02-06-02

The zygote is in control of its development despite the help it needs from its environment. It is in control of the things that make the development human development. Its action directs its transformation from a zygote into an adult human being. It is in control of its development insofar as that development as features that are specifically human.

May 29, 2004

When you choose to kill a fetus, you are an entity oriented to achieving some end by means of choice. The choice will put out of existence an entity oriented to achieving ends of the same value that you will achieve by means of the choice.

We value entities as higher and lower according as we value the effects they can produce, the ends they can achieve, as higher and lower. We value entities as higher or lower according as we value the accomplishments they can produce, the accomplishments they can have, as higher or lower. Plants as opposed to minerals are capable of accomplishments like maintaining the themselves in existence by their own activities, increasing their own size by their own activities, reproducing entities of their own kind by their own activities.

So when we put out of existence an entity oriented to accomplishments of the same value as we are achieving by means of the choice to put that entity out of existence, we are putting out of existence an entity of the same value as ourselves. What about the fact that I might be able to achieve higher accomplishments in the arts or science than the entity that I am killing? The relevant kind of accomplishment is the ability to make choices based on rational knowledge. That is the only relevant kind of accomplishment is that is what I'm doing when I make a choice of considering which kind of accomplishment will measure our value.

Crucial to this way of evaluating plants as higher than minerals is the identification of a plant as "itself". In other words, to evaluate the accomplishments of one the kind of agent as higher or lower than those of another kind of agent, we have to identify a unit agent.

For example, we say that plants reproduce entities of their own kind. But we mean is that a plant is an agent with certain capabilities and that among those capabilities is the power to produce another agent with the same kind of capabilities. In contrast consider fire. We consider fire a mineral activity not a plant activity. Yet fire in a real sense reproduces itself. But we do not think that fire reproduces "itself" in the sense of producing an agent of the same kind as the agent that caused the reproduction. Why not?

Fire does cause an agent of the same kind in the sense that one thing on fire, one thing with the property of fire, can produce the property fire in an already existing thing. We do not think that fire reproduces a new agent. We think that the agents of fire, the now come busting agent and the agent to be put on fire in the future, already exists. When something catches fire, there is an

already existing agent with the capacity for a new property, the property of being on fire. When that already existing agent acquires that new property, it can then cause other already existing agent's with the capacity for that property to acquire that property.

This view of fire results from inductive reasoning. We do not find some one, single kind of agent acquiring fire and starting fire in other things. All sorts of different kinds of things catch fire, and all sorts of different kinds of things on fire cause new fires in all sorts of other kinds of things. The only thing that these are succeeding agents that catch fire from one another have in common is the fire self. Or should say is fire itself.

In life on the other hand, one kind of agent with a set of properties other than the property of being able to produce the same kind of agent and other than the property of having been produced by the same kind of agent reproduces an agent with a set of properties of the same time, where the set includes both the property's other than reproduction and the ability to reproduce. So now, induction can associate reproduction with a set of properties other than reproduction itself to make an inductive connection between that set and reproduction. Therefore, induction can identify an agent by a set of properties other than reproduction and conclude that unit agent's of such a set of properties can reproduce.

Here is an example of A. "machine" that can duplicate at least one living function, the function of keeping itself going in the sense of keeping its own activity going. I have an internal combustion engine. The combustion will begin when I mix two chemicals in a tank that is part of this causal system. Likewise life begins when two different things combined, a sperm and an egg, a seed and a fertilizer. The engine is so designed that once the combustion is producing

energy, an arm on the engine will reach to another tank not yet attached to the engine and attached a tube from that tank to the engine. Then the arm will turn a valve on that other tank. Then one of the two chemicals will flow from that tank into the engine's tank, thereby feeding the engine so that its energy is maintained. And perhaps the engine is designed to do that to do different tanks so that it feeds itself on both chemicals.

This engine does not cause itself to grow. This engine does not reproduce another like itself. And in one sense it does not keep itself in existence. But it does keep itself in existence in the sense of keeping in existence its activity. So it keeps itself in existence in so far as it is not just this kind of engine but is an engine actually operating. And to make this more obvious perhaps we can have the engine keep repeating the action of attaching the tube and turning the valve to acquire a certain amount of new food so that it does not happen just once.

Could we designed a machine that was complicated enough to produce a machine like itself. There are two cases to consider the case of sexual reproduction and the case of reproduction without sex. In the latter, could we produce a machine like an amoeba. Wouldn't machine number one that was capable of producing machine number two have to be more complicated then machine number two? Probably. But one way to get a form of reproduction would be to designed a machine number one that produced, not an adult machine number two, but a small machine number two that would cause itself to grow into the size of machine number one.

In the case of sexual reproduction, on the other hand, it is never the case that there is only one machine producing one machine. There are two machine's producing one machine.

xxxRelativism, tolerance, truth, knowledge of truths, 0 2-07-02

Replace relativistic tolerance with the recognition of the great difficulty of finding philosophical true and so with humility toward ourselves and tolerance toward others.

Relativism gives an exhilarating sense of freedom. The freedom is freedom from finding truths. This implies that relativistic tolerance is arrogant as compared to humility before the truth. (Rorty's quote from Chesterton.) Pure rejection of true, as opposed to humility about it, is arrogance: "I have nothing to be humble about, since there is no such thing as truth.

February 17, 2004

Aquinas on abortion: see an article by John Noonan perhaps in a book edited by Noonan, or a book by Noonan. It contains a reference to the summa, 2-2, question 64, article eight, objection two. And it may contain references to other places in Aquinas.

xxxWhat every undergraduate should learn from a philosophy course, 02-07-02

Any undergraduate should know about relativism, science is them, skepticism, and what is at stake in morals if the person is not an absolute value and all values are relative, etc.

Every undergraduate should know the difference between the solutions to the problem of evil that are implying by the beliefs in an infinite God, and a finite God. She should know the implications of those different beliefs for the problem of free will and the problem of damnation. She should know the two approaches to ethics that I outlined someplace in these notes, I believe. In any case, the two approaches assume, on the one hand, the existence of something that is an end-in-itself or, on the other hand, assumes that there is no such thing as an end-in-itself. The implications of the second view I that all ethical positions are are true.

Every undergraduate should know that if there is no God, there are no objective rights; and there is no way to defend the value of an individual human person against the greatest go to the greatest number.

Every undergraduate should know the weakness of citing contemporary experts infields like philosophy, ethics, theology.

xxxEvery event must have a cause, causal necessity, causality, Hume, 2-12-02.

If something is an effect of an efficient cause, that thing is a material relation of dependence on the efficient cause. It is identical with a transcendental relation of dependence; what it is it is a transcendental relation of dependence. Therefore if at one time it has an efficient cause, it must have an efficient cause whenever it occurs. For whenever it occurs assumes that we are talking about the exact same thing occurring. If it is the exact same thing and at one time it is identical with a transcendental relation of dependence on an efficient cause, if what it is is the same thing as a transcendental relation of dependence, it must always be a transcendental relation of dependence. For if it were not such a relation, it would not truly be identical with something else which is such a relation. It cannot really be the same thing, or the same kind of thing.

Maybe a way to make the argument would be something of the form: since change is dependent on a cause, on a material cause, if it did not also have an efficient cause, then something or other that cannot be a being of reason would be a being of reason. Or something that can only be a being of reason would be a real being.

In causal realism I argued that if there were no efficient cause, then the change would be the cause of itself. Why? Because it needs an actual cause and it, the change, is what makes the actual cause the actual cause. An opponent might say that describing that which undergoes a change as a cause of the change is an extrinsic denomination for that which undergoes the change, and since it is an extrinsic denomination, it puts nothing real in that which undergoes the change.

(So making something an actual material cause, or making it truthfully describable as a material

cause of something other than itself no more changes the thing intrinsically than making something desired by something other than itself change is the thing intrinsically or making something known by something other than itself change is the thing intrinsically. But here precisely it is a change in what the thing is that makes it truthfully describable as the term of the change's relation of dependence on something other than itself. What is known about a thing is what it is prior to being known; what is good about a thing is what it is prior to being desired. That by which a thing is a cause of the change is not just what it is prior to undergoing the change.)

But the same thing is true of "good" as said of that which is desired, of "the true" as said of that which is known. These predicates add nothing real to their subjects. But precisely because they add nothing real to their subjects they are identical with their subjects. They are identical with that which their subjects are. They are identical with whatever it is its their subjects are. So the fact that they add an extrinsic denomination, a being of reason, to their subjects does not mean that they do not characterize what their subjects are intrinsically. Just as what is desired about something is intrinsic to it, what makes a thing a cause is intrinsic to it. What makes that which undergoes a change a cause of the change is intrinsic to that which undergoes the change.

In order for what it is to go from not being truthfully described as an actual cause of the change to being truthfully described as an actual cause of the change, the subject of the change must change. Unless the subject changes, the change itself does not have anything that actually causes it; it only has something that potentially causes it. In other words the change is only potentially caused. It only potentially has a cause. It only potentially has that which causes it. It only

potentially has something as that which causes it.

(The opponent will say that as soon as the potential subject of the change exists, there exists all there is to that without which the change would not exist. But the change only has a term of its relation of dependence when the change exists. And having a term of its relation of dependence is not an extrinsic denomination for the change, since the relation of dependence on a term is intrinsic to what the change is; the change is an intrinsic relation of dependence on its term. That is true of the change at the time that the change exists.)

Only by undergoing the change, does the subject of the change become truthfully describable by the extrinsic denomination "cause of the change." That extrinsic denomination applies to what the subject is together with the change; it does not apply to the subject without the change. Just as what is desired about a thing is intrinsic to it. What makes a thing a cause of the change, a material cause of the change, is interior to it. But the interior features making it a material cause of the change include the change. (The interior features described by "cause of the change" include the change. For if you do not include the change in what "cause of the change" describes, what the subject is is not the cause of the change, since what the subject is is something only potentially undergoing the change.)

When we say that a change needs a cause, of what ever kind, we are saying that when the change exists there must be something describable by the extrinsic denomination "cause of the change" and so describable because of what it is intrinsically. But it is the change that brings it about that what the subject is intrinsically describable as "cause of the change."

When we say that a change needs a cause, any kind of cause, we are saying the change would not exist without the existence of something nonidentical with itself in whole or in part. The subject undergoing the change is in part identical with the change.

Without the change, the subject's reality would not be sufficient to describe the subject as that which the change has for its cause; the subject's reality would not be sufficient to be that which the change has for its cause. The change can have something for its cause only if the change has drawn its subject from potency to act so that where what the subject is was at one time only in potency with respect to the change, what the subject is no longer includes a potency with respect to the change. What-The-subject-is's not being potency with respect to the change, or the change's now being part of the subject, part of what the subject is, is what constitutes the state of affairs of the change's actually having something for its cause.

"Actually having something for its cause" is in extrinsic denomination of the change. But the extrinsic denomination describes that which the change is intrinsically, since the change's relation of dependence on an actual cause is identical with what the change is. The change has a relation of dependence on what the subject is intrinsically, what the subject intrinsically is. Describing what the subject intrinsically is by a relation of reason to the change. Or rather, we are not describing what the subject intrinsically is by a relation to the change that is only a relation of reason to the change. We are describing what the subject intrinsically is by something that intrinsically belongs to it, the change.

If you want to say that what make the subject a cause of the change is what it is prior to the

change, or is what it would be the change had not occurred to it, you have to face the fact that what the subject was prior is it's the change is something that is only potentially undergoing the change. And what is only potentially undergoing the change is not that which satisfies the change's relation of dependence, the relation that is not just an extrinsic denomination for the change but is identical with what the change is.

New Start:

Maybe a way to make the argument would be something of the form: since change is dependent on a cause, on a material cause, if it did not also have an efficient cause, then something or other that cannot be a being of reason would be a being of reason. Or something that can only be a being of reason would be a real being. Or if the material cause were its only cause, ... a being of reason ...

In causal realism I argued that if there were no efficient cause, than the change would be the cause of itself. Why? Because it needs an actual cause and it, the change, is what constitutes the actual cause the actual cause; undergoing the change itself is what it is for the actual cause to be an actual cause.. An opponent might say that describing that which undergoes a change as a cause of the change is an extrinsic denomination for that which undergoes the change, and since it is an extrinsic denomination, it puts nothing real in that which undergoes the change. So becoming an "actual cause" is a being of reason expressing the simple fact that the change exists. (The opponent will say that making something an actual material cause, or making it truthfully describable as a material cause of something other than itself, no more changes the thing

intrinsically then making a thing desired by something other than itself changes the thing intrinsically or making something known by something other than itself changes the thing intrinsically. But here precisely it is a change in what the thing is that makes it truthfully describable as the term of the change's relation of dependence on something other than itself.

What is known about a thing is what it is prior to being known; what is good about a thing is what it is prior to being desired. That by which a thing is a cause of the change is not just what it is prior to undergoing the change. Or just: to be a cause of a change cannot be just being that which it was prior to the change.

The opponent will say that the necessity of any cause is based on the real distinction between cause and effect. Here, the change is really distinct from that which undergoes it. So the change plus the subject is not the cause of the change, since it includes the change. But a whole including a part is really distinct from the part. The change still needs a cause distinct from itself, and if the subject is the only cause, the cause is the subject undergoing the change; so the change is cause of itself.)

But the same thing is true of "good" as said of that which is desired, of "the true" as said of that which is known. These predicates adds nothing real to their subjects. But precisely because they add nothing real to their subjects they are identical with their subjects. They are identical with that which their subjects are. They are identical with whatever it is its their subjects are. So the fact that they add an extrinsic denomination, a being of reason, to their subjects does not mean that they do not characterize what their subjects are intrinsically. Just as what is desired about something is intrinsic to it, what makes a thing a cause is intrinsic to it. What makes that which

undergoes a change a cause of the change is intrinsic to that which undergoes the change. (Perhaps this is what must be firmly established first: like the good and the true, what makes a thing a cause is something intrinsic to it, but not what is intrinsic to it prior to the change. The reality on which the BORs the good and the true are based is some reality outside of that which is desired or known. The reality on which the BOR "actual cause" is based is not something really distinct from the subject, namely, the change, because it is the subject including the change, with the change.)

In order for what it is to go from not being truthfully described as an actual cause of the change to being truthfully described as an actual cause of the change, the subject of the change must change. Unless the subject changes, the change itself does not have anything that actually causes it; it only has something that potentially causes it. In other words the change is only potentially caused. It only potentially has a cause. It only potentially has that which causes it. It only potentially has something as that which causes it.

(The opponent will say that as soon as the potential subject of the change exists, there exists all there is to that without which the change would not exist. But the change only has a term of its relation of dependence when the change exists. And having a term of its relation of dependence is not an extrinsic denomination for the change, since the relation of dependence on a term is intrinsic to what the change is; the change is an intrinsic relation of dependence on its term. That is true of the change at the time that the change exists.

But I am not saying that the change "causes" its subject to be the change's cause, only that the

change is included in its own cause. If the change is a cause of its subject's being a material cause, the change does it by being a formal cause. But would it be good to call an accidental form a "cause" here? Maybe Maritain's analysis of the accidental "essence" in Intro to Phil as that "by which . . ." could be helpful here.)

Only by undergoing the change, does the subject of the change become truthfully describable by the extrinsic denomination "cause of the change." That extrinsic denomination applies to what the subject is together with the change; it does not apply to the subject without the change. Just as what is desired about a thing is intrinsic to it. What makes a thing a cause of the change, a material cause of the change, is interior to it. But the interior features making it a material cause of the change include the change. (The interior features described by "cause of the change" include the change. For if you do not include the change in what "cause of the change" describes, what the subject is is not the cause of the change, since what the subject is is something only potentially undergoing the change.)

When we say that a change needs a cause, of what ever kind, we are saying that when the change exists there must be something describable by the extrinsic denomination "cause of the change" and so describable because of what it is intrinsically. But it is the change that brings it about that what the subject is intrinsically describable as "cause of the change."

When we say that a change needs a cause, any kind of cause, we are saying the change would not exist without the existence of something nonidentical with itself in whole or in part. The

subject undergoing the change is in part identical with the change.

Without the change, the subject's reality would not be sufficient to describe the subject as that which the change has for its cause; the subject's reality would not be sufficient to be that which the change has for its cause, would not be sufficient for the change to actually have something other than itself as its cause. The change can have something for its cause only if the change has drawn its subject from potency to act so that where what the subject is was at one time only in potency with respect to the change, what the subject is no longer includes a potency with respect to the change. What-The-subject-is's not being potency with respect to the change, or the change's now being part of the subject, part of what the subject is, is what constitutes the state of affairs of the change's actually having something for its cause.

"Actually having something for its cause" is in extrinsic denomination of the change. But the extrinsic denomination describes that which the change is intrinsically, since the change's relation of dependence on an actual cause is identical with what the change is. The change has a relation of dependence on what the subject is intrinsically, what the subject intrinsically is. Describing what the subject intrinsically is by a relation of reason to the change. Or rather, we are not describing what the subject intrinsically is by a relation to the change that is only a relation of reason to the change. We are describing what the subject intrinsically is by something that intrinsically belongs to it, the change.

If you want to say that what make the subject a cause of the change is what it is prior to the change, or is what it would be the change had not occurred to it, you have to face the fact that

what the subject was prior to the change is something that is only potentially undergoing the change. And what is only potentially undergoing the change is not that which satisfies the change's relation of dependence, the relation that is not just an extrinsic denomination for the change but is identical with what the change is.

"Actually having something as its cause" does not describe what the change is by adding to what the change is a BOR based on what is extrinsic to the change, adding a concept that is a BOR because it is based on a relation that is extrinsic to what the change is. The change's relation of dependence on what the subject is such that without the subject the change would not exist that relation is not extrinsic to what the change is. Something that actually has something other than itself as a term of the change's relation of dependence is what the change is. Something that actually has the subject of the change as term of a relation such that without the subject that something would not exist, or not be what it is, is what the change is.

But "without the subject" in that statement means "without that which is the subject being the subject," "without that which is the subject actually undergoing the change, actually changing it what it is, actually changing from what it is being only potentially what undergoes the change.

To be a cause adds nothing real to the thing that becomes a cause. To be a material cause does add something real to the thing that becomes a cause; it adds something that makes the subject a cause, not by its being extrinsic to the cause but by its being intrinsic to what the cause now is. It adds something that makes the change now actually have the subject as term of the change's relation of dependence on something other than itself.

Maybe do it this way: Make the false assumption that the change's relation of dependence on something other than itself were also something nonidentical with the change. What follows from that? Then contrast to the case where the relation of dependence is identical with what the change is. What follows if the subject is term of a relation that is extrinsic to what the change is?

New Start:

The good is a BOR but it describes what is intrinsic to the good. "Cause" is a BOR but it describes what is intrinsic to the cause, what the cause is intrinsically.

In the case of the good and the true, the reality on which the BOR is based is external to the thing described. In the case of "cause" is the reality on which the BOR is based external to the thing described? In the case of the true and the good, no change takes place in what the thing is intrinsically when it becomes truthfully describable as good or true. In the case of "cause," however, the opposite is the case. (So is "cause" really a BOR or only apparently a BOR? "Really a BOR" depends on the subject's distinction from the effect, the change; "apparently a BOR" depends on including the change with the subject. Maybe what I want to show is that by claiming that the subject is the only cause of the change, you have it both ways, that is, the change is part of itself and so not really distinct from the cause in the way that it must be distinct from the cause. In other words, "cause" is a BOR as said of the efficient cause, but if there is no efficient cause, "cause" would invalidly cease being a BOR.)

Another argument:

The whole (substance plus accident) is an effect of its parts. But this time want of parts is an effect of the other. So does that make the whole the cause of itself? The whole, the subject plus the change, is an effect of its parts. There would be no subject changing without the subject and its change. But there would also be no change without the subject; so a whole is cause of itself. For the subject can be what it is without the whole existing. If the change were not caused, the whole would not exist; so either the whole has no cause or is cause of itself.

And notice that it is not just the subject that has a causal relation to the change. There is another causal relation here. The change has a causal relation to the whole. The whole is not just a mereological sum, a conceptual unity. The unity consists of the fact that the change is an actualization of the subject. The change, like any form, actualizes its subject. So the whole exists because of the causality of the change relative to the subject, causality that "produces" the whole. But the causality that produces the whole exists because of a causality of the subject relative to the change. So the whole does not exist merely by the causality of the subject relative to the change; it also exists by the causality of the change relative to the subject.

The change benefits from, experiences, receives the causality of the subject only insofar as the subject is part of the whole and so only insofar as the subject is a cause of the whole.

The best of the above revised and put in order (but see below for even better)

In causal realism I argued that if there were no efficient cause, than the change would be the cause of itself. Why? Because it needs an actual cause and it, the change, is

what constitutes the actual cause the actual cause; undergoing the change itself is what it is for the actual cause to be an actual cause. An opponent might say that describing that which undergoes a change as a cause of the change is an extrinsic denomination for that which undergoes the change, and since it is an extrinsic denomination, it puts nothing real in that which undergoes the change. So becoming an "actual cause" is a being of reason expressing the simple fact that the change exists.

The opponent wants to say that just as being a good is not a feature of, a part of, what a good thing is, being a cause is not a feature of what a cause is.

But that is not really the issue. The question isn't whether to be a cause of A is anything intrinsic to the cause. The question is whether A happens to be intrinsic to that which A has for a cause, that on which A depends. If so, A is cause of itself.

But the same thing is true of "good" as said of that which is desired, of "the true" as said of that which is known. These predicates add nothing real to their subjects. But precisely because they add nothing real to their subjects they are identical with their subjects. They are identical with that which their subjects are. They are identical with whatever it is its their subjects are. So the fact that they add an extrinsic denomination, a being of reason, to their subjects does not mean that they do not characterize what their subjects are intrinsically. Just as what is desired about something is intrinsic to it, what makes a thing a cause is intrinsic to it. What makes that which undergoes a change a cause of the change is intrinsic to that which undergoes the change.

The good is a BOR but it describes what is intrinsic to the good. "Cause" is a BOR but it describes what is intrinsic to the cause, what the cause is intrinsically. Just as "desired by A" describes what is intrinsic to B, not what is extrinsic to it, "cause of A" describes what is intrinsic to B. Change has a relation of dependence on what the subject is intrinsically.

"Desired by A" and "cause of A" both describe something, B, by a relation possessed

by something that is non-identical with the thing described. It would seem, therefore, that to say that when A "causes something to be A's cause" it is not really doing anything to the cause. That phrase says nothing more than that A is caused by B, where the only genuine as opposed to linguistically apparent causality goes on in A, so that A is not cause of itself in any real sense.

But the difference between "desired by A" and "cause of A" is that the truth condition of the first does not consist of a change in what B is intrinsically, while the truth condition of the second does consist of a change in what B is intrinsically. The cause of A is not B as not undergoing the change but is precisely B as undergoing the change. So the change is part of what its cause is; so the change is cause of itself, since it belongs to its cause precisely insofar as it has a cause. The change has something on which it depends only to the extent that it is part of that on which it depends.

"Being a cause of A" need not express anything in addition to what B is when B is not the cause of A. So being a cause of A does not produce a contradiction unless A is part of its "cause," for then A is included in, is part of, that which is allegedly extrinsic to it.

In general, "being a cause of A" does not express anything in addition to what B is when it is not a cause of A; the only thing in addition to what B is when it is not cause of A is something entirely nonidentical with B, A. That is true of being a cause in general, but precisely the opposite is true of being that kind of cause we are calling a component cause or material cause. Being a material cause adds something to what B is, something that constitutes what it is for B to be a material cause; and what is added constitutes the truth condition of B's being a cause not by being extrinsic to what B now is but by being intrinsic to what B now is. It adds something to B that constitutes what it is for A to have that on which A depends, that which A's relation of dependence has for a term, that constitutes what it is for A to be caused, where to be caused is not extrinsic to what A is.

like the good and the true, what makes a thing a cause is something intrinsic to it, but not what is intrinsic to it prior to the change. The reality on which the BORs the good and the true

are based is some reality outside of that which is desired or known. The reality on which the BOR "material cause" is based is not something really distinct from the subject, namely, the change, because it is the subject including the change, with the change.

In the case of the good and the true, the reality on which the BOR is based is external to the thing described. In the case of "cause" is the reality on which the BOR is based external to the thing described? In the case of the true and the good, no change takes place in what the thing is intrinsically when it becomes truthfully describable as good or true. In the case of "cause," however, the opposite is the case.

To be a material cause does add something real to the thing that becomes a cause; it adds something that makes the subject a cause, not by its being extrinsic to the cause but by its being intrinsic to what the cause now is. we are not describing what the subject intrinsically is by a relation to the change that is only a relation of reason to the change. We are describing what the subject intrinsically is by something that intrinsically belongs to it, the change.

The "union" of the subject and the change is not just a mereological sum, a logical entity. It is a union consisting of causal relations, constituted by causal relations, a union of causal relations that "produce" a new reality, a changing subject, that is different from the reality that existed before. What the change is is nothing other than something belonging to, characterizing, its subject, a feature of its subject. That is the nature of the relation we happen to be calling "dependence on a material cause."

The fact that B needs something intrinsic to itself for A to be caused means that A needs for B to have that intrinsic thing for A's relation of dependence, which is identical to what A is, to have a term. But that thing intrinsic to B is A itself; so A is cause of itself.

Something that has something other than itself as term of a relation of dependence is what a change is, what A is. (term of a relation such that without that thing other than itself

a change would not be what it is) But a change's not existing without its subject means "without that which is the subject actually changing in what it is, without what-it-is ceasing to be only potentially that which undergoes the change, only in potency to undergoing the change."

(Feature F, e.g., a spherical shape, is identical with a potency to roll. When the ball is rolling, feature F is no longer identical with a potency to roll, but feature F is still identical to feature F. That is the nature of the low, weak mode of being we call "potency." As it is low on the scale of being, it is low on the scale of preserving identity, which is a property of being. That paradox is what Greek philosophy was all about. It is solved by the fact that feature F is an intrinsically imperfect mode of being that can never, for example, exist in an infinite state.)

If you want to say that what makes the subject a cause of the change is what it is prior to the change, or is what it would be the change had not occurred to it, you have to face the fact that what the subject was prior to the change is something that is only potentially undergoing the change. And what is only potentially undergoing the change is not that which satisfies the change's relation of dependence, the relation that is not just an extrinsic relation to the change but is identical with what the change is.

If the subject is only potentially undergoing the change, the subject is only potentially what it needs to be for the change to have something whose causality the change enjoys (whose intrinsic reality the change enjoys, benefits from, experiences as the term of the change's relation of dependence). The subject only potentially has what it needs to have for the change to have something on which it depends.

What makes something a potential subject of a change is identical with an actual feature or set of features the subject already has. What makes the ball a potential subject of the kind of change we call rolling is that the ball is actually a solid actually with a spherical shape. Being A potency for a certain kind of change is identical with actually being a solid of a certain shape. But being identical with a potency for that change is no longer what being a

solid of a certain shape is, when the solid is actually rolling. So at one time the same set of features are identical with, another time not identical with, a potency for a certain change.

That is just a fact about the kinds of realities being a solid and being spherical are, intrinsically imperfect realities that are at different times the same as themselves while being identical with opposite potencies: the potency to change, the potency to be at rest. It is precisely this "weird" nature of potency that makes change require a sufficiently actual efficient cause. It is precisely this low, weak mode of being that constitutes potency (and for which I called it "weird") that makes potency require an efficient cause in order to be actualized. The material cause alone won't do precisely because it IS the potency.

Without the change, the subject's reality would not be sufficient for the change to have something for its cause, for the subject to be that which the change has for its cause; the subject's reality would not be sufficient to be that which the change has for its cause, would not be sufficient for the change to actually have something other than itself as its cause, to actually have the subject as its cause. The change can have something for its cause only if subject's potency has been actualized, put into act, is actualized, so that where what the subject is was at one time only in potency with respect to the change, what the subject is no longer includes a potency with respect to the change. What-The-subject-is's not being potency with respect to the change, or the change's now being part of the subject, part of what the subject is, is what constitutes the state of affairs of the change's actually having something for its cause.

When we say that a change needs a cause, of what ever kind, we are saying that when the change exists there must be something describable by the extrinsic denomination "cause of the change" and so describable because of what it is intrinsically. But it is the change that brings it about that what the subject is (the change that constitutes what it is about the subject that makes the subject) intrinsically describable as "cause of the change." "Cause of the change" applies to, is true of, what the subject is with the change, not what the subject is without the change.

Just as what is desired about a thing is intrinsic to it. What makes a thing a cause of the change, a material cause of the change, that which undergoes the change, is interior to it. But the interior features making it a material cause of the change include the change. (The interior features described by "cause of the change" include the change. For if you do not include the change in what "cause of the change" describes, what the subject is is not the cause of the change, since what the subject is is something only potentially undergoing the change.)

The opponent will say that as soon as the potential subject of the change exists, there exists all there is to that without which the change would not exist. But the change only has a term of its relation of dependence when the change exists. And having a term of its relation of dependence is not an extrinsic denomination for the change, since the relation of dependence on a term is intrinsic to what the change is; the change is an intrinsic relation of dependence on its term. That is true of the change at the time that the change exists.

But I am not saying that the change "causes" its subject to be the change's cause (for the change is what it is for the subject to be that without which ...), only that the change is included in its own cause. If the change is a cause of its subject's being a material cause, the change does it by being a formal cause. But would it be good to call an accidental form a "cause" here?

Without the change, the subject is only potentially that which the change experiences as its cause, only potentially that which the change benefits from. Unless the subject changes, the change itself does not have anything that actually causes it; it only has something that potentially causes it.

The opponent will say that making something an actual material cause, or making it truthfully describable as a material cause of something other than itself, no more changes the thing intrinsically than making a thing desired by something other than itself changes the thing

intrinsically or making something known by something other than itself changes the thing intrinsically. But here precisely it is a change in what the thing is that makes it truthfully describable as the term of the change's relation of dependence on something other than itself. What is known about a thing is what it is prior to being known; what is good about a thing is what it is prior to being desired. That by which a thing is a cause of the change is not just what it is prior to undergoing the change. Or just: to be a cause of a change cannot be just being that which it was prior to the change.

The opponent will say that the necessity of any cause is based on the real distinction between cause and effect. Here, the change is really distinct from that which undergoes it. So the change plus the subject is not the cause of the change, since it includes the change. But a mereological whole including a part is really distinct from the part. The change still needs a cause distinct from itself, and if the subject is the only cause, the cause is the subject undergoing the change; so the change is cause of itself.

Other possible arguments:

Maybe a way to make the argument would be something of the form: since change is dependent on a cause, on a material cause, if it did not also have an efficient cause, then something or other that cannot be a being of reason would be a being of reason. (If the change is not included in its own cause, in what the subject now is, the subject's changing is just a mereological sum, a logical entity; so all the entities we know are just logical entities of ultimate "particles.") Or something that can only be a being of reason would be a real being. Or if the material cause were its only cause, ... a being of reason ...

(So is "cause" really a BOR or only apparently a BOR? "Really a BOR" depends on the

subject's distinction from the effect, the change; "apparently a BOR" depends on including the change with the subject. Maybe what I want to show is that by claiming that the subject is the only cause of the change, you have it both ways, that is, the change is part of itself and so not really distinct from the cause in the way that it must be distinct from the cause. In other words, "cause" is a BOR as said of the efficient cause, but if there is no efficient cause, "cause" would invalidly cease being a BOR.)

We know that some things, for example, laughter, have efficient causes. What has an efficient cause is a material relation of dependence on the efficient cause. So if the same thing were to occur without an efficient cause, it could not really be the same thing, since the thing in question, by its identity with itself, is a relation of dependence on an efficient cause. (If it cannot remain what it is when something else is what it is, its not remaining what it is is a material relation of dependence on an efficient cause. The dependence is not a relation in the cause; so it must be a relation belonging to the effect. And if it is not a material relation in the effect, there will be an infinite series of effects, since every effect will require such a formal relation, and every formal relation will be an effect requiring such a formal relation.)

If it were not just change that needs an efficient cause but a special kind of change, it would not just be the insufficiency of the component cause to be the term of the change's relation of dependence that the calls for an efficient cause to make up for the insufficiency. The efficient cause would make up for the insufficiency of a certain kind of component cause but not for other kinds; other kinds would be component causes even though they are not sufficient to be component causes.

In the "special" case, what a change is would be a relation of dependence on something, the efficient cause, sufficient to make the component cause a component cause. In the special case, the change would need something to make the component cause the component cause. And it would need something sufficient not just because component causes are, as such, insufficient, but only because special cases of subjects of change becoming component causes require a sufficient efficient cause, not component cause as such. (Not just because component causes are insufficient, but because what some particular subjects are is insufficient.)

But the component cause as such is insufficient. So there are two types of insufficient component cause, A and B. Both types A and B are insufficient, but only type A's insufficiency requires the addition of something sufficient.

But where would the change's additional relation of dependency come from? There would be an additional relation of dependency because now there would be two kinds of change. Every change would still be a relation of dependence on an insufficient component cause. But some cases of having necessary conditions would require sufficient conditions and some would not. Those that would "require" sufficient conditions would do so because their relation of dependency on sufficient conditions would be identical with what they are. But all changes are identical with a relation of dependency on an insufficient component cause; so the relation of dependency on a sufficient efficient cause would be an additional relation. But there cannot be a real multiplicity of distinct relations if they are all identical with the same thing.

If something is an effect of an efficient cause, that thing is a material relation of dependence on the efficient cause. It is identical with a transcendental relation of dependence; what it is it is a transcendental relation of dependence. Therefore it at one time it has an efficient cause, it must have an efficient cause whenever it occurs. For whenever it occurs assumes that we are talking about the exact same thing occurring. If it is the exact same thing and at one time

it is identical with a transcendental relation of dependence on an efficient cause, if what it is is the same thing as a transcendental relation of dependence, it must always be a transcendental relation of dependence. For if it were not such a relation, it would not truly be identical with something else which is such a relation. It cannot really be the same thing, or the same kind of thing.

With the efficient cause, the change does have something on which it depends that does not include the change itself. Given that the efficient cause is what it is, the component cause cannot remain what it is. If the component cause did not remain what it is without an efficient cause, the component cause's not remaining what it is, the change, would be part of its own cause (be its only cause). With the efficient cause, the cause of the subject's not remaining what it is, the change, does not include the new state the subject is in, does not include what the subject now newly is; the cause of the subject's not remaining what it is is what the efficient cause, something distinct from the subject is. (With the efficient cause, the subject's not remaining what it is, the change, is not part of its own cause. The change does have something on which it depends, something as the term of its relation of dependence, but the change alone does not constitute what it is for that which the change has a term of its relation of dependence to be the term of its relation of dependence. The (existence of the) change alone does not constitute what it is for the change's relation of dependence to have a term; does not constitute what it is ...)

Remove the efficient cause and the only cause of the subject's not remaining what it is, the change, is what the subject is, not what anything other than the subject is. But it is not what the subject is prior to not remaining what it is. The only cause is what the subject is when it does not remain what it previously was. The only cause is the subject precisely as not remaining what it is. The only cause is the subject as not remaining in the condition, in the state, that does not include the change itself as part of what it is. The change itself is

included in that which the change has as term of its relation of dependence.

The subject could have remained what it previously was for an indefinite length of time. During none of that time would the change have a term of that relation of dependence that is identical with what the change is (the change would not be in a relation, have a relation, be related, to a term other than itself without which the change cannot exist; the change would be related to a term other than itself without which it could not exist). If at any point during that time the change actually had a term of its relation of dependence, was in a relation to such a term, was related to such a term, had a relation to such a term, the change would have existed at that time. Since the change did not exist at that time, the change did not have that on which it actually depends at that time.

So without the efficient cause, the only cause would be the subject precisely in the state of being what it now is as opposed to being what it previously was. With the efficient cause that which the change has as term of its relation of dependence (that which the change is related to as . . . , that which the change is in a relation to such that . . .) does not include what the change is in any inconsistent way; since what the efficient cause is is other than what the changing subject is.

Mustn't the changing subject also be in a relation with the change that is real? Does the change's relation to the subject not touch the subject at all, not affect the subject at all, not relate the subject to the change (so that, or as if, to say "the subject is related to the change" does not describe the subject intrinsically - as it could have described the subject before the change). On the contrary, that is precisely what the change's relation to the subject, which is identical with what the change is, does. To say that the subject is related to the change does not add a third thing called "the subject's relation to the change," over and above the union of subject and change. If it did, there would be an infinite series of them.

But the subject's potency for the change is now a material relation of being

something that changes, of having the change as part of what it is. What the subject is is now identical with the relation of having a state of change; is identical with that which is a relation of having a state of change. A relation of being fulfilled by a state of change, actualized by it, realized by it.

It is that real relation to the change that the subject is that constitutes the subject's being the component cause of the change, that constitutes the change's having a term, that constitutes the subject's being the term of the change's relation of dependence. So the subject's being the component cause of the change depends on the change's real relation to the subject which makes the subject really related to the change. The subject's being that real relation to the change depends on something other than the subject's actualized potency, the feature that at one time was a potency for the change but no longer is a potency for the change; it depends on the change. But then that on which the subject's being that real relation depends, the change, is caused by the subject. So . . . the change's dependence on the subject is caused by the subject's dependence on the change.

The very, very best of the above revised and shortened:

In causal realism I argued that if there were no efficient cause, than the change would be the cause of itself. Why? Because it needs an actual cause and it, the change, is what constitutes the actual cause the actual cause; undergoing the change itself is what it is for the actual cause to be an actual cause.. An opponent might say that describing that which undergoes a change as a cause of the change is an extrinsic denomination for that which undergoes the change, and since it is an extrinsic denomination, it puts nothing real in that which undergoes the change. So becoming an "actual cause" is a being of reason expressing the simple fact that the change exists.

The opponent wants to say that just as being a good is not a feature of, a part of,

what a good thing is, being a cause is not a feature of what a cause is.

But that is not really the issue. The question isn't whether to be a cause of A is anything intrinsic to the cause. The question is whether A happens to be intrinsic to that which A has for a cause, that on which A depends. If so, A is cause of itself.

But the same thing is true of "good" as said of that which is desired, of "the true" as said of that which is known. These predicates adds nothing real to their subjects. But precisely because they add nothing real to their subjects they are identical with their subjects. They are identical with that which their subjects are. They are identical with whatever it is its their subjects are. So the fact that they add an extrinsic denomination, a being of reason, to their subjects does not mean that they do not characterize what their subjects are intrinsically. Just as what is desired about something is intrinsic to it, what makes a thing a cause is intrinsic to it. What makes that which undergoes a change a cause of the change is intrinsic to that which undergoes the change. Just as "desired by A" describes what is intrinsic to B, not what is extrinsic to it, "cause of A" describes what is intrinsic to B.

The difference between "desired by A" and "cause of A" is that the truth condition of the first does not consist of a change in what B is intrinsically, while the truth condition of the second does consist of a change in what B is intrinsically. The cause of A is not B as not undergoing the change but is precisely B as undergoing the change. So the change is part of what its cause is; so the change is cause of itself, since it belongs to its cause precisely insofar as it has a cause. The change has something on which it depends only to the extent that it is part of that on which it depends; the change has something on which it depends only by being part of that on which it depends. Not an "accidental" but a part essential to the subject's being that on which A depends, essential to A's having the subject as that on which A depends.

"Being a cause of A" need not express anything in addition to what B is when B is not the cause of A. So being a cause of A does not produce a contradiction unless A is part of its

"cause," for then A is included in, is part of, that which is allegedly extrinsic to it.

In general, "being a cause of A" does not express anything in addition to what B is when it is not a cause of A; the only thing in addition to what B is when it is not cause of A is something entirely nonidentical with B, A. That is true of being a cause in general, but precisely the opposite is true of being that kind of cause we are calling a component cause or material cause. Being a material cause adds something to what B is, something that constitutes what it is for B to be a material cause; and what is added constitutes the truth condition of B's being a cause not by being extrinsic to what B now is but by being intrinsic to what B now is. It adds something to B that constitutes what it is for A to have that on which A depends, that which A's relation of dependence has for a term, that constitutes what it is for A to be caused, where to be caused is not extrinsic to what A is. (with the efficient cause, the change still constitutes what it is for C to have S as term of its relation of dependence. But if there is no efficient cause, the change then becomes part of its only cause and so is cause of itself.)

like the good and the true, what makes a thing a cause is something intrinsic to it, but not what is intrinsic to it prior to the change. The reality on which the BORs the good and the true are based is some reality outside of that which is desired or known. The reality on which the BOR "material cause" is based is not something really distinct from the subject, namely, the change, because it is the subject including the change, with the change.

To be a material cause does add something real to the thing that becomes a cause; it adds something that makes the subject a cause, not by its being extrinsic to the cause but by its being intrinsic to what the cause now is. we are not describing what the subject intrinsically is by a relation to the change that is only a relation of reason to the change. We are describing what the subject intrinsically is by something that intrinsically belongs to it, the change.

The "union" of the subject and the change is not just a mereological sum, a logical entity. It is a union consisting of causal relations, constituted by causal relations, a union of

causal relations, a matter of causal relations between nonidentical things, that "produce" a new reality, a changing subject, that is different from the reality that existed before. What the change is is nothing other than something belonging to, characterizing, its subject, a feature of its subject. That is the nature of the relation we happen to be calling "dependence on a material cause."

Being that which undergoes the change is not an extrinsic denomination for the subject; if it was an extrinsic denomination for the subject, the changing subject would be a mereological sum only. The change is something OF the subject; that's all the change is. And undergoing the change is what the subject is in part (where "in part" has only a logical sense); the subject is something that undergoes the change.

The fact that B needs something intrinsic to itself for A to be caused means that A needs for B to have that intrinsic thing for A's relation of dependence, which is identical to what A is, to have a term. But that thing intrinsic to B is A itself; so A is cause of itself.

A change's not existing without its subject means "without that which is the subject actually changing in what it is, without what-it-is ceasing to be only potentially that which undergoes the change, only in potency to undergoing the change."

If you want to say that what makes the subject a cause of the change is what it is prior to the change, or is what it would be the change had not occurred to it, you have to face the fact that what the subject was prior to the change is something that is only potentially undergoing the change. And what is only potentially undergoing the change is not that which satisfies the change's relation of dependence, the relation that is not just an extrinsic relation to the change but is identical with what the change is.

If the subject is only potentially undergoing the change, what the subject is intrinsically is only potentially what the change needs it to be for it to have something whose causality the change enjoys (whose being the change has for its cause, whose being the change enjoys as its cause, whose intrinsic reality the change enjoys, benefits from, experiences as the term of the change's relation of dependence). The subject only

potentially has what it needs to have for the change to have something on which it depends.

The subject is only potentially what it needs to be for the change to have something whose being satisfies the change's relation of dependence; what the subject is is only potentially sufficient to be that whose being the change's relation of dependence terminates in.

(Feature F, e.g., a spherical shape, is identical with a potency to roll. When the ball is rolling, feature F is no longer identical with a potency to roll, but feature F is still identical to feature F. That is the nature of the low, weak mode of being we call "potency." As it is low on the scale of being, it is low on the scale of preserving identity, which is a property of being. That paradox is what Greek philosophy was all about. It is solved by the fact that feature F is an intrinsically imperfect mode of being that can never, for example, exist in an infinite state.)

It is precisely this "weird" nature of potency that makes change require a sufficiently actual efficient cause. It is precisely this low, weak mode of being that constitutes potency (and for which I called it "weird") that makes potency require an efficient cause in order to be actualized. The material cause alone won't do precisely because it IS the potency.

Without the change, the subject's reality would not be sufficient for the change to have something for its cause, for the subject to be that which the change has for its cause; the subject's reality would not be sufficient to be that which the change has for its cause, would not be sufficient for the change to actually have something other than itself as its cause, to actually have the subject as its cause. The change can have something for its cause only if subject's potency has been actualized, put into act, is actualized, so that where what the subject is was at one time only in potency with respect to the change, what the subject is no longer includes a potency with respect to the change. What-The-subject-is's not being potency with respect to the change, or the change's now being part of the subject, part of what the subject is, is what constitutes the state of affairs of the change's actually having something for its cause.

When we say that a change needs a cause, of what ever kind, we are saying that

when the change exists there must be something describable by the extrinsic denomination "cause of the change" and so describable because of what it is intrinsically. But it is the change that brings it about that what the subject is (the change that constitutes what it is about the subject that makes the subject) is intrinsically describable as "cause of the change"; the change's relation of dependence does not terminate in the subject. "Cause of the change" applies to, is true of, what the subject is with the change, not what the subject is without the change.

Just as what is desired about a thing is intrinsic to it. What makes a thing a cause of the change, a material cause of the change, that which undergoes the change, is interior to it. But the interior features making it a material cause of the change include the change. (The interior features described by "cause of the change" include the change. For if you do not include the change in what "cause of the change" describes, what the subject is is not the cause of the change, since what the subject is is something only potentially undergoing the change.)

The opponent will say that as soon as the potential subject of the change exists, there exists all there is to that without which the change would not exist. But the change only has a term of its relation of dependence when the change exists. And having a term of its relation of dependence is not an extrinsic denomination for the change, since the relation of dependence on a term is intrinsic to what the change is; the change is an intrinsic relation of dependence on its term. That is true of the change at the time that the change exists.

But I am not saying that the change "causes" its subject to be the change's cause (for the change is what it is for the subject to be that without which ...), only that the change is included in its own cause.

Without the change, the subject is only potentially that which the change experiences as its cause, only potentially that which the change benefits from. Without the change itself being part of what the change has for a cause, the change has no cause. So either it has no cause or is cause of itself.

The opponent will say that making something an actual material cause, or making it truthfully describable as a material cause of something other than itself, no more changes the thing intrinsically than making a thing desired by something other than itself changes the thing intrinsically or making something known by something other than itself changes the thing intrinsically. But here precisely it is a change in what the thing is that makes it truthfully describable as the term of the change's relation of dependence on something other than itself. What is known about a thing is what it is prior to being known; what is good about a thing is what it is prior to being desired. That by which a thing is a cause of the change is not just what it is prior to undergoing the change. Or just: to be a cause of a change cannot be just being that which it was prior to the change.

If the subject is the only cause, the cause is the subject undergoing the change; so the change is cause of itself.

With the efficient cause, the change does have something on which it depends that does not include the change itself. Given that the efficient cause is what it is, the component cause cannot remain what it is. If the component cause did not remain what it is without an efficient cause, the component cause's not remaining what it is, the change, would be part of its own cause (be its only cause). With the efficient cause, the cause of the subject's not remaining what it is, that is, the cause of the change, does not include the new state the subject is in, does not include what the subject now newly is; the cause of the subject's not remaining what it is is what the efficient cause, something distinct from the subject is. (With the efficient cause, the subject's not remaining what it is, the change, is not part of its own cause. The change does have something on which it depends, something as the term of its relation of dependence, but the change alone does not constitute what it is for that which

the change has a term of its relation of dependence to be the term of its relation of dependence. The (existence of the) change alone does not constitute what it is for the change's relation of dependence to have a term; does not constitute what it is ...)

Remove the efficient cause and the only cause of the subject's not remaining what it is, the change, is what the subject is, not what anything other than the subject is. But it is not what the subject is prior to not remaining what it is. The only cause is what the subject is when it does not remain what it previously was. The only cause is the subject precisely as not remaining what it is. The only cause is the subject as not remaining in the condition, in the state, that does not include the change itself as part of what it is. The change itself is included in that which the change has as term of its relation of dependence.

The subject could have remained what it previously was for an indefinite length of time. During none of that time would the change have a term of that relation of dependence that is identical with what the change is (the change would not be in a relation, have a relation, be related, to a term other than itself without which the change cannot exist; the change would not be related to a term other than itself without which it could not exist). If at any point during that time the change actually had a term of its relation of dependence, was in a relation to such a term, was related to such a term, had a relation to such a term, the change would have existed at that time. Since the change did not exist at that time, the change did not have that on which it actually depends at that time.

So without the efficient cause, the only cause would be the subject precisely in the state of being what it now is as opposed to being what it previously was. With the efficient cause that which the change has as term of its relation of dependence (that which the change is related to as . . . , that which the change is in a relation to such that . . .) does not include what the change is in any inconsistent way; since what the efficient cause is is other than what the changing subject is.

Added after final review of the "very, very best of the above":

Instead of speaking of the subject's owing its being "that which C has for its cause" to C, or C's constituting the subject "a cause of C," make C the subject of the predicate, that which undergoes C. Say "C has a term of its relation of dependence by the fact that C is a feature of S, by the fact that C is a feature constituting S that which is that on which C depends; or, C's being a feature of S constitutes C's having S as that on which C depends." C's being a feature of S constitute the state of affairs of C's having a term of its relation of dependence, having that on which it depends.

C is what differentiates the state of affairs when C does not have that on which it depends from the state of affairs of C's having S as that on which it depends.

C's being a feature of S is the same as C's having S a term of its relation of dependence on a component cause. So C's having S as that on which C depends is an EFFECT of the efficient cause, A. Without A, the total term of C's relation of dependence includes C, because C's not having S as a cause unless S undergoes C means C constitutes the fact that C's total cause is C's cause.

With A, S's undergoing C is what constitutes C's having S as a cause, but not as its total cause. C is in no way a part of one of C's causes, A, is in no way a part of one of the things that C has as term of its relation of dependence.

The efficient cause is something other than C to which S owes the fact that it is undergoing C. When A and S exist, C has sufficient causes of which C is a necessary effect, but C is not part of them. What A now is and what S now is without C constitute sufficient causes of C; are the causes (not just the constituents) of S's being the component cause of C. C is still the constituent, but now C is caused to be the constituent by A.

We can say that the existence of C constitutes what it is for A not just to be A but also to be a cause of C. The existence of C constitutes what it is for C to have A as a term of C's relation of dependence. But C does not constitute what it is for C to have A as a term of its relation of dependence by being a feature of A, a part of A, a part of what A needs to be A in order for C to have A as a term of its relation of dependence, in order for C to have a relation of dependence on A.

Without A, C would not exist without C's existing in S. But here "would not exist without . . ." refers to C's existing in S as a necessary effect of sufficient cause(s) other than C, where what S is before C is sufficient to undergo C if and only if what something like A is requires S to cease being what it is before undergoing C.

C's relation of dependence terminates in S if and only if S acquires a new characteristic, C, which characteristic IS a relation of dependence on an efficient cause (S's potency is also a relation of dependence on A). Not just C but also C's having S as that on which C depends is an EFFECT of the efficient cause. So C is not cause of itself.

C is a relation of dependence on an efficient cause. So when S acquires C, it is acquiring something that is a relation of dependence on an efficient cause. So S's acquiring C is an event that has a relation of dependence on an efficient cause. So S's being a cause of C is itself an EFFECT of the efficient cause.

C's being something that has a relation of dependence on S is itself an effect of A's and S's being what they are. So C is not cause of itself even if C constitutes S's being that which it has as a term of relation of dependence. So even if, as is contrary to fact, C "caused" S to be C's component cause, C would not be cause of itself. For C's causing S to be C's

component cause would be an effect of A, as in fact C's constituting S to be that on which C depends is an effect of A.

But if C only depended on S, C would be its own cause by being that about S that constitutes S the only thing C depends on. As long as C is not part of the only thing it depends on, but rather is caused to be a feature of S by something other than S or C, C is not "cause of itself," in any contradictory sense. C is caused to be the feature of S that constitutes S something on which C depends, that gives C S as something on which it, C, depends.

If C were not caused to be the feature of S that constitutes what it is for C to have S as something on which it depends, C would be cause of itself by the fact that it constitutes S the only thing C depends on, its only necessary cause. As long as C does not constitute S, not just C's cause, but C's only necessary cause, the only thing without which C would not exist, no problem.

The agent that causes C in S causes C to have S as term of its relation of dependence, and causes C to constitute what it is for C to have S as term of its relation of dependence; The agent that causes C causes C to constitute S C's component cause. The agent causes C to be part of its component cause and to be the feature of its component cause that makes S C's component cause.

When we discover the need for a component cause, we are discovering a cause whose causality is entirely subordinate to the efficient cause.

S's potency for C is a material relation to A. Is it a material relation of dependence on A? It is a material relation to something that is a material relation of dependence on A. It is a

material relation such that S would not be actualized without something other than itself, S; so it is a material relation that would not be actualized without an efficient cause. It is a material relation of not being something that C's without something other than itself, C. Without including something more than what it is when it is only potentially C'ing. It is a material relation such that its actualization depends on the efficient cause.

Without the change, what the subject is insufficient to be the cause of the change. With the change the subject is sufficient to be the only cause of the continuation of the state the change brings into existence. The existence of the change is simultaneous with the first instant of a new state in the subject; for the existence of the change is the same thing as the first instant of the existence of a new state in the subject.

On the assumption that the subject now has the new state, there is no reason the subject cannot remain in that state without the help of any cause, because the first instant of the existence of the new state constitutes the subject as something with that state.

But it is not just the new state that needs a cause, the subject's not remaining what it is needs a cause; the transition from what the subject previously was to what the subject now is needs the subject as component cause. And if the subject is the only cause of the transition, the transition is part of its own cause. But once the transition occurs, the subject is a sufficient cause of the continuation of the new state because it is the change in state that the subject is not sufficient for. So unless there is another change in state, there is no need for another cause.

But if the subject is a sufficient cause of the continuation of a state, it cannot at the same time be a sufficient cause for a change that is the noncontinuation of the state. (Maybe start with that: the subject is now unchanging and so is a sufficient cause of characteristics that

inhere in it. Then go on to talk about change needing a cause.) That noncontinuation depends on something other than itself, and if it depends on the subject alone it is part of its own cause. For it is one thing for the first instant of the new state to make the subject the cause of something that does not require a change, namely, the continuation of the new state. It is another thing for the first instant of the new state to constitute making the subject of a change that the subject is not sufficient for being just by being what it is without the OCCURRENCE of the first instant of the new state.

The change makes what the subject is a sufficient cause of the continuation of the new state. But if the change makes the subject a sufficient cause of the first instant of the replacing of an old state by the new. The change is what constitutes the subject that cause and so the first instant constitutes the subject what the first instant needs, a cause, and so the first instant is included in that thing other than itself without which the first instant would not OCCUR.

The subject is a sufficient cause of the continuation of its being F but not for its starting to be F after it was not F, a sufficient cause of the continuation of F but not of the occurrence of F.

So if there is no efficient cause, a change causes itself by making the subject a sufficient cause for the continuation of F. If there is no efficient cause, the occurrence of F makes the subject a sufficient cause of the continuation of F. So the occurrence of F is included in the cause of F. For a change to F is the same thing as being a change to being a cause of the continuation of F. So if the occurrence of F alone constitutes S a cause of the continuation of F, the occurrence of F is the cause of F's own continuation in existence.

By causing F in S, the efficient cause causes S to be a sufficient cause of the continuation of

F. To be the efficient cause of C is that same as being the efficient cause of S's being the cause of the continuation of F.

S is now a cause sufficient to sustain F in existence. But S must become so, must undergo a change to be so, a change to being F which is a change to being a sufficient cause to sustain the existence of F. S is now a cause sufficient to sustain F, but the truth condition of that was S's not remaining what it was before F, that is, the truth condition is a change from being non-F to F.

Paraphrases from Causal Realism:

"It is not the case that C is dependent with respect to having something that potentially undergoes it but not with respect to having something that actually undergoes it. The absence of causes sufficient for the existence of a term for C's relation of dependence on a component cause is the absence of causes necessary for C's relation of dependence to have a term, to be satisfied.

The fact that C is what differentiates S as sufficient for C to have a term of its relation of dependence from S as insufficient for C to have a term of its relation of dependence means that C constitutes S's being sufficient for C to have a term of its relation of dependence."

"C is what differentiates the situation in which C has a term of its relation of dependence from the situation in which there is only a potential term of C's relation of dependence. C is what differentiates the situation in which C has a component cause from the situation in which it does not. C is what differentiates the situation in which C has S as a component cause from the situation in which C does not have S as a component cause.

As capable of being what it is without undergoing C, what S is is not sufficient for C to have

a cause in that particular respect in which C is known to depend on a cause, namely, as having something that undergoes it."

Without C the characteristics constituting what S is make S only potentially that on which C depends.

"If C's happening to S is not an effect of some third entity which ipso facto is the cause of C's having S as its component cause, C causes itself, since the state of affairs of C's having S as a cause is constituted SOLELY by the fact that C in one of S's characteristics. It is C on its own that constitutes S's being C's cause."

Other possible arguments:

Maybe a way to make the argument would be something of the form: since change is dependent on a cause, on a material cause, if it did not also have an efficient cause, then something or other that cannot be a being of reason would be a being of reason. (If the change is not included in its own cause, in what the subject now is, the subject's changing is just a mereological sum, a logical entity; so all the entities we know are just logical entities of ultimate "particles.") Or something that can only be a being of reason would be a real being. Or if the material cause were its only cause, ... a being of reason ...

(In other words, "cause" is a BOR as said of the efficient cause, but if there is no efficient cause, "cause" would invalidly cease being a BOR. So is "cause" really a BOR or only apparently a BOR? "Really a BOR" depends on the subject's distinction from the effect, the change; "apparently a BOR" depends on including the change with the subject. Maybe what I want to show is that by claiming that the subject is the only cause of the change, you have it both ways, that is, the change is part of its cause and so not really distinct from the

cause in the way that it must be distinct from the cause.)

Instead of saying "the change is caused" because it depends on its subject, we would say the-subject's-undergoing-the-change is caused because it is a union of parts nonidentical with itself without which it would not exist. It is caused by the subject's and the change's being what they are. But neither the subject nor the change are sufficient for their union to be what it is; for the change depends on the subject (that is why the union is not just mereological) and what the subject is is not sufficient for the change to exist. Since the event is caused with respect to being a union of distinct part, and since whatever depends on causes in respect R must have sufficient causes in respect R, and since the change and the subject are not sufficient for their union in the event (unless the event, that is, their union which is what the event is) is cause of itself.

August 3rd, 2002,

Helen Keller was reasoning causally, but she had no previous experience of a connection between the events. So she could not have been reasoning from the similarity of past sequences of events. And now a

November 17, 2003

Here are some reasons for the fact that arguing that every change must have a cause requires such subtlety. One reason is ontological. Change has the least claim on being. It is strictly neither a substance nor an accident. For this reason, all of Greek philosophy had great difficulty dealing with. Today he we fail to focus on change because we start with the problem of knowledge of reality, not the problem of reality.

And this subtlety is only increased by the fact that, in the last analysis, it is only

instantaneous change that we are directly talking about. And in the case of instantaneous change we can overlook the fact change as needing cause in order to think only cause the first moment of the new existence which from then on does not need a cause.

Another reason is that the concept of cause appears to be a relation of reason like "being known." So the cause problem is bedeviled by some of the same fallacies that generate other endless philosophical disputes.

We are not willing to give up the existence of change or epistemological realism, even when we find ourselves incapable of defending them, for example, against Zeno. But we easily talk students out of causality.

New topic: one in the same feature is what makes a thing capable of being in motion or capable of being at rest. When it is at rest, it is potentially in motion, and vice versa. But we can also say that the same feature or features makes the universe, including subject S, two things intentionally have the feature of relative motion with respect to S. Or were relative at rest with respect to S.

May 29, 2004

Changes the component causes. This change, a change occurring to this saying at this time in this place, needs a component cause, but thing to which it occurs. Does the change also need a cause to be this change at this time in this place? The same component cause could have gone under a similar change yesterday but did not. Does the change need a cause to be this change that occurred today rather than yesterday?

Yes, because there is only a logical distinction between the change that occurs to this component cause and this change occurring at this time in this place. Because the distinction is only logical, changes need causes of why they occur at this time in this place. The component cause alone does not explain that.

This is what we grasp when we ask why the change occurred here and now. Why this change and not some other? We see that the explanation by means of the component cause leaves something to be explained that is as much in need of explanation as is the fact that in the change at all occurred. Any change at all occurring will require a component cause. But explanation by means of component cause leaves unexplained why it was not just any change at all but this particular change. And its being in this particular change is just as much in need of explanation as is the fact that is an example of the change in general.

But if it is true that there is only a logical distinction between being a change and being this change, and if it is true that component causality is real causality, why should not the recognition that a change requires a component cause be sufficient to cover what ever real causality explains why this change requires a cause? The answer must be that the foundation in reality for the logical distinction is such that it, the foundation, requires a multiplicity of causes for the change. Or the foundation in reality for the logical distinction is such that there is a multiplicity of causes. Is such that there must be a multiplicity of causes, not just the component cause.

And in fact the causality of the component cause together with the causality of the efficient cause are sufficient to explain the existence of this change, not that change. Because the causality of the agent results from a change that is prior in time to the change we are considering. The causality of the agent takes place at the end of a prior time, at the end of the time occupied by a change other than the one we are considering.

Also, there is a real sense in which the change's dependency, its need for explanation, is the same dependency on both the component cause and the efficient cause. That is, there is a sense in which the change's dependency on the component cause is only logically distinct from the change's dependence on the efficient cause. So corresponding to the merely logical distinction between a change and this change would be the merely logical distinction between the change's dependence on the component cause to be a change and its dependence on the efficient cause to be this change.

The logical distinction between the dependence on one cause and the dependence on the other cause, of course, very much has a foundation in reality, a foundation in the real distinction, required by that very dependence, between the component cause and the efficient cause.

To be this change is only logically distinct from being a change. But change needs a cause to be this change as much as to be a change. But the component cause does not explain why a change is this change at this time.

Another argument. In one case, the change is derived from an efficient cause. In another case, it is allegedly not derived. For example, we know by consciousness that laughter is caused by getting the joke. Can it be that a change is in one case derived and in another case not derived yet is the same as the first in all respects other than being derived?

If it is the same in all other respects, then being derived, when it is the case that it is derived, must be something external to it, like an Aristotelian accident, a formal as opposed to material relation. Is that possible?

If derivation is an extrinsic relation, the efficient cause causes two things, the change and its relation of derivation from the efficient cause. But if the relation of derivation itself derives, is the fact that it derives a relation external to it? If so there is an infinite regress. So why start the regress by saying that a change's relation of derivation is extrinsic to it? Therefore, if any change derives from an efficient cause, they all do.

The nature of explanation: to say that what the change is is explained by what the efficient cause is and what the component cause is is to say that when we know what the efficient cause is and what the component cause is we can see that some other being, the change, must be what it is, must come into existence. So explanation resolves into seeing what beings are. So explanation is a matter of things being what they are and our knowing that they are what they are.

So when we say that everything must have an explanation (a sufficient reason), we are saying one of two things. We are saying that what beings that number one and to our are such that, given that they are what they are, what being number three is must exist. In this case, being number three as an explanation in other beings.

Or we are saying that given that being number one is what it is, being number one must exist, being number one cannot not exist. In both types of explanation (sufficient reason), then, there is a relation expressed by "must." There is a relation of necessity between what something is and what something is, a relation of necessity between what exists and what exists. This relation of necessity is not just the relation of identity between what something is and what something is, certainly not in the first case and perhaps not in the second case. It is not just the logical relation of identity that is true of everything. What anything is is necessarily what anything is.

Any existent is necessarily an existent. In Socrates is sitting, he is necessarily sitting. (Can I use de re as opposed to de dicto necessity here? Only if it helps me get back to the necessary truth of the principle of efficient causality.)

May 29, 2004

"God exists." That is a necessary truth. Its necessity does not derive merely from the mode of objectification used in the two objectifications. Actually, it would probably better to use the formula "God is an existent." The necessity does not derive from the use of logical relations only, allusions to logical relations only or any the other ways in which necessity that characterize as logical is derived.

But is a causal necessity? What I want to say is that not only does what God is cause the truth of "God is an existent" but that what God is causes that statement to be necessarily true. What I want to say is that the necessity of that statement derives from what God is, which is something extra logical, not from anything logical in the sense of pertaining to the mode of objectification.

So in the case of "the tree is a tree," the necessity comes from the mode of objectification. In the case of "a tree exists", what is objectified, the reality that is objectified, the reality that is objectified does not cause the statement to be necessarily true; it only cause is the statement to be contingently true. In the case of "God is an existent" the reality objectified causes the statement to be necessarily true.

Perhaps we can call this privatively causal necessity in a nontrivial sense. For example, a logical fallacy in one sense is not logical, but in another sense it belongs to logic. It is not a mathematical fallacy, is not a grammatical fallacy, and so on. So even though it is not logical because it is privated of logic, still it is privatively logical. Another example would be a mathematical fallacy, as opposed to logical fallacy, the fallacy is mathematical, but not in the sense that it is good genuine mathematics. It is mathematical in the sense that the failing belongs to mathematics as opposed to one into, say, logic. It is a failing specifically relative to mathematics.

Likewise in God, a lack of distinction between essence and existence is a privation of a causal relation. the causal relation of which is a privation is a causal relation, or the causal relation, that accounts for the contingency of the existence of something that is distinct from its own existence. So a privation of that causal relation makes what God is something that causes the statement that God is an existent not just to be true but also to be necessarily true.

Have I said enough in the above, at least implicitly, to rule out the possibility (note the modality) of God, the being whose essence is its existence, just popping into existence? Have I ruled out the possibility that God did not exist forever, for example. He did not exist forever, but just popped into existence. I want to say that that possibility is ruled out by the nature of the reality in question because the nature of the reality in question causes the proposition that God is an existent to be necessarily, and therefore eternally, true.

May 29, 2004

Continuing the the above. Likewise, the fact that given that the efficient cause is what it is and the component cause is what it is, the change must be what it is, that necessary truth is caused by what those three things are. I want to say likewise the necessary truth of God exists is caused by what things are. So maybe there is a more generic case of not logical necessity where causal necessity as exemplified by "given that the efficient cause is what it is etc. then the change must be what it is," is a sub case of the broader case where what things are cause the necessary truth. In other words theret would be two ways in which what things are cause a necessary truth.

What things are would cause a necessary hypothetical truth in the case of caused entities and a necessary categorical truth in the case of God.

Would Aristotle say that what does not need a whole is the connection between two objects that are not only logically distinct, that is, only distinct in a way that derives from logical sources alone?

"God exists" is necessarily true but not by logical necessity. In using the word function of "exists" to objectify God we refer to something that can be distinct from God and from God's essence. Is this causal necessity? Causal necessity in the sense that in God there is an absence of the kind of causal distinction between essence and its existence that makes the existence of an essence a contingent property? This is privatively causal, not privatively in an ontological sense but in an epistemological sense.

xxx ordinary magisterium,, fallibility, religious assent, unacceptable risk, definitive teachings, March 13, 2002

The unacceptable risk argument against abortion might help us understand the obligation to assent to the fallible. Secularists like Nat Hentoff are against abortion because they realize that since they do not believe in God human life has to be their highest value. In other words they realize that there has to be some highest value; the alternative is chaos, moral chaos.

The response might be that the abortionist grants that human life is the highest value; he just thinks that human life begins at a different point. But the secularists proliferate could respond that if human life really is the only candidate for our highest value (and of course it is the only candidate if we do not admit God), then anything that potentially threatens human

life is an unacceptable moral risk. Whatever our highest value is, it must be something with respect to which even the risk of violating it is morally unacceptable. If just the risk of violating it is not morally unacceptable, it is not really our highest value. Because our decision to risk it must be based on some other value.

Now consider the person who is saying, consciously saying, I am going to obligate you to assent to this with mind and heart even though I know it could be wrong, even though I am conscious that it could be wrong and therefore that I might have to change from obligating you to assent to it someday. What could such a person be thinking? How could he do something as serious as obligating our assent in a way that binds our freedom if he is not absolutely sure that what he is obligating us to assent to is true?

Well isn't that person in a very similar situation to the prolifer who would be against abortion even if he could not prove that zygotes were persons. The prolifer would be imposing, consciously imposing, a great burden on women even without certitude that abortion would actually violate the highest value. The prolifer would be doing this because the alternative would be an unacceptable risk. Isn't the person who imposes an obligation to assent without absolute certitude on his part doing the same thing by implication?

By implication, isn't he saying that even though I do not have absolute certitude, anything less than obligating you to assent to this proposition would be an unacceptable risk. In other words, given the things that the authority figure does know for certain, which in this case would include both definitively taught doctrines and scientific or historical facts about the world, and given the current state of fallible knowledge concerning the issue under consideration, the authority figure judges that leading a certain proposition or disbelieving a certain proposition would be an unacceptable risk.

An unacceptable risk from what point of view? And even more important point of view than the highest secular value. The authority figure would be judging something to be an unacceptable risk from the point of view of divinely revealed truths concerning eternal salvation. Some truth or truths concerning eternal salvation, or some value or values revealed by those truths, would be what at risk in such a way that the risk would sufficiently outweigh any advantages that accepting the risk would have, given our current state of knowledge, that he, the authority figure, and we are obligated not to take that risk.

For example, the authority figure might judge it very unlikely, given our current state of knowledge, that a particular non definitively taught doctrine would turn out not to be true. And if the content of the doctrine made it sufficiently important relative to other truths or other values, the right thing to do might be to assent to the doctrine and to obligate others to assent to the doctrine.

This approach raises a number of questions and a number of problems, but not necessarily insurmountable problems. For example, every teaching of the ordinary magisterium would involve two distinct assertions. One would be the issue in question, for example, the morality of abortion or artificial contraception. The other would be the assertion about the risk in false in the first assertion. With respect to the first assertion, we know that religious assent does not mean believe that the assertion is true. Our obligation to assent does not go that far.

But what attitude are we obligated to have toward the assertion about the risk of the first assertion? Are we obligated to believe that the authority is correct in judging the first assertion to be an unacceptable risk? In other words, with the second assertion fall under the heading of definitive teaching of the ordinary magisterium? Even though the magisterium may change's attitude toward that risk, it may still be true that at the time that

was the correct judgments to make about the risk; and it may still be true that we are obligated to believe that at the time that was the correct judgments to make about the risk.

This is an interesting and tricky theological question. But the analysis presented here is on the right track, the practical consequences of this question are not as severe as its theological subtlety might make it appear. For we know now that if it would violate someone's conscience to assent to a not definitive teaching, a person can withhold his assent without violating its active faith in the Church as teaching with Christ's voice. When the Church speaks with Christ voice, it must be speaking infallibly, because Christ is infallible. That is what the doctrine of infallibility is all about. Therefore having conscience that disagrees with some non definitive teaching does not make someone a disloyal Catholic.

But the issue of whether we must agree with the second assertion, the assertion about the risk of the first assertion, only comes up for those who do more than disagree in conscience with the first assertion. One can disagree in conscience and decide to keep her disagreement relatively to herself. She can decide not to make her disagreement a public cause. And a reason for deciding not make a public cause can be either that she believes the Church cannot be wrong in making a judgment about current acceptable risks or that she believes the Church has the authority to bind her on the basis of its judgment about acceptable risk even though its judgment may be wrong.

In other words, she can judge that the Church has the authority, the Church is the one that has the authority, to make decisions about acceptable risks even if those decisions are fallible that both levels. For the issue of acceptable risk always involves the common good of the Church, for which the magisterium is responsible; and involving the common good of the Church means involving the eternal salvation of mankind. A mistake that could make what is a sin appear not to be a sin would have serious consequences for the Church's ability

to witness to the righteous life, and those consequences could last long after magisterium attempted to correct the problem.

So the only case in which the theological question concerning the status of the second kind of assertion would necessarily have practical consequences would be the case of someone whose conscience went beyond disagreeing with the assertion of the first time to the belief that she should make her disagreement public and publicly dispute with the magisterium. She would, of course, have to follow her conscience.

But even in this case, the theological aspects that is, the speculatively true aspects, of the problem could be more serious than the practical aspects make it appear. The person's conscience would not allow her to believe that assertions of the second time are part of the Church's exercise of Christ's teaching authority. If it were an exercise of that authority and she believed it was, her conscience would have to tell her that it was an unacceptable risk for her to go public with her disagreement.

But the problem concerning the second type of assertion may not concern Christ's in fallibility but the Church's authority to make decisions concerning the common good. Our dissenter might acknowledge that the Church doesn't have that fallible authority but disagree in conscience with the decision that fallible authority has made. If so, the problem is not one of assent to the ordinary magisterium but of the limits of conscientious disobedience to a legitimate authority, whether the disobedience concerns assent to teaching or some other kind of issue. So this case would not add any thing to the issue about to Church's teaching authority as opposed to its governing authority.

There are some analogies to this analysis of assent to the fallible and our obligation to assent to the fallible. Governments are making decisions binding us on the basis of fallible information, information they know is fallible, all the time. And they are doing it all the time

on the basis of the unacceptable risk of the opposite action or lack of action. Of course, where governmental authority is concerned, there is no question of assent of mind at heart to any of the propositions concerned. I might completely disagree with propositions on the basis of which the government made its decision, including propositions about the degree of risk involved and still assent to its right to bind me to obedience to that decision.

But in the case of dealing with a doctor of medicine, I may be obligated to assent to his judgment about risk even though we both know that judgment is fallible. She can tell me that doing something or not doing something would be an unacceptable risk even though we both know that tomorrow a medical journal might publish a new study showing that was not an unacceptable risk. Still on the basis of what we do today, his conscience would require him, correctly, to tell me what I should believe about the risk, and my conscience could tell me, correctly, that I ought to believe what he tells me about the risk.

Likewise, tomorrow a theological journal might publish an article demonstrating that a prior judgment about some unacceptable risk is incorrect, though it might have been correct given the state of knowledge at the time. The fact that such theological enlightenment could come into existence tomorrow does not mean that the Church should not make today decisions it does make concerning what it is or is not an unacceptable risk for Catholics to assent to.

So one way or another the issue is whether the Church has the right to make those judgments about what is or is not an unacceptable risk. By "one way or another" I'm referring to whether assertions of the second kind fall under the teaching or governing authority of the Church, and if under the teaching authority but they definitive or are they just as non definitive as assertions of the first kind. Either way we want to know why the Church would have that kind of authority.

The Church would be the seat of that authority in much the same way that a medical doctor is the seat of authority about medical risks. But doctor's authority about risks about the unknown is a result of his expertise about the known. Likewise, since the Church is the expert about what has been definitively taught in about values generated by what has been definitively taught, the Church is the expert about the acceptability of the risk of something that might potentially undermine a value concerning what has been revealed about eternal salvation.

Importantly, in saying that the Church is the expert I mean as opposed to the theologian. The theologian is not even guaranteed in fallibility it is understanding of the Church's definitive teachings, much more so then is he fallible about non definitive teachings. And much more so is he fallible about acceptable risks, since acceptable risks are judged from the perspective of definitive teachings about which he is not the final authority.

If I choose to oppose the Church's judgment about what is or is not an acceptable risk and therefore decide to go public with my dissent, I have to consider the risk involved in my doing that. For example, I might be mistaken about the values involved. I might be mistaken about what value the Church is trying to protect and what it is not trying to protect. For example, consider the current discipline about not allowing Protestants who believe in the real presence to receive. I may believe that ecumenicism is so important a value that I should ignore that discipline.

But if I do, I may be doing more to harm Christian unity then to advance it. For the real reason the Church does not allow Protestants to receive may not all be the Church's worry about the Eucharist's being abused. It may be the Church's worry about the ecumenical conflict writing from our different beliefs, not about the real presence, but about the need for

ordination. If we allowed them to receive, the Church could not reciprocate and allow Catholics to receive at Protestant churches that do not have valid orders. If the Church did reciprocate, Catholics would be giving scandal by clearly giving the impression that we considered their Eucharists to be the same as ours. This is the kind of risk to we have to be willing to accept if we challenged the Church's judgment, and its authority to make judgments, about acceptable risks.

But notice that in none of this by giving any concrete examples from the history of the Church of non definitive teachings that have changed. Only by analyzing concrete examples and these issues ever be understood. And what if there are no concrete examples? Then we can question whether this is any real issue at all. There might still be an issue, however, during a period of time in which the Church was uncertain about whether a doctor had been taught definitively. Even those who believe that the Church's position on birth control has been taught definitively might want to allow that at some time in the past there was reasonable doubt about whether it had been taught definitively.

And non existence of past examples would still out dissenter's today to refuse assent to things that had not been definitively taught until they are definitively taught or until the "traditional" teaching about the obligation to assent to non definitive teachings has itself been taught definitively. The reason that I have put traditional" is that this issue really didn't exists before Vatican 1's teaching about in fallibility. So the "traditional" teaching on this distinction can't go back more than 125 years or so.

This analysis explains why theologian's should not go beyond discussion the issue among themselves even though the Church is fallible in this matter. The Church is making the judgment that any stronger dissent than professional theological discussion would be contrary to the common good of the Church because it would be an unacceptable risk.

Some popular explainers of magisterium give the impression that they believe that there are no changeable or fallible teachings of the magisterium. For example, one speak so "solemn in fallible definitions" as if there were two kinds of in fallible doctrines, the solemn and the unsolemn. So Vatican 1's doctrine of in fallibility would not imply that there are fallible teachings. Vatican 1's definition would only mean that there are solemn in fallible doctrines in addition to in fallible doctrines that are not solemn. Another way I have seen this implied is by reference to definitions that are "in fallible in form," as if there were doctrines that are in fallible but not being in fallible form.

I do not intend to enter into a dispute about whether they are actually are any changeable, reformable, or fallible teachings of the magisterium. For the sake of argument, I will here assume that there are such. My purpose is to address those who believe that there are such and to demonstrate to them that we can be obligated to submit to those teachings even though they are fallible.

In meanings several sources, Vatican to on the Church, the catechism, the code of cannon law, I find a confusing variety of adjectives used to describe teachings that are not part of the extraordinary magisterium. There is the "ordinary" magisterium. The "universal" magisterium. Or perhaps it's the "ordinary and universal magisterium." The "authentic" magisterium. The "definitive" magisterium. To say the least, it is not always clear whether any of these are referring to the same thing or not.

"Ordinary" sometimes seems to refer to in fallible teachings about faith and morals to which the assent of faith is required. But some place in the catechism, its state that you ordinary magisterium requires "religious assent" as opposed to the assent of faith. See paragraph 892. But perhaps this paragraph is merely saying that there are two kinds of teachings of

the "ordinary" magisterium, definitive and non definitive. But there are other places where "ordinary" seems to refer only to in fallible teachings while "authentic" refers to both fallible and in fallible. But 892 seems the contrast the ordinary teaching, which it describes as fallible, to the extraordinary teaching described in 891, which it describes as in fallible.

892 gives a footnote to the Vatican Council's document on the Church when it, 892, uses the phrase "religious assent" as opposed to divine faith. But the paragraph and the council's document to which it refers, paragraph 25, seems to use "religious assent" in way that covers both definitive and non definitive teachings.

For example, it says "in matters of faith and morals, the bishops be in the name of Christ and the faithful are to accept their teaching and adhere to with the religious assent." But if they are speaking in the name of Christ, must they not be in fallible? But then goes on to say "this religious submission of mind it will must be shown in a "special way" to the authentic magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, even when he is not speaking ex cathedra, and to the description they give of religious submission seems to imply that they are talking about non in fallible teachings.

The document goes on to say that bishops are in fallible when "authentically teaching matters of faith and morals they are in agreement on one position as definitively to be held." In this sentence the adjectives "authentic" and "definitive "are associated. The next sentence, however, uses the adjective "universal" and associates it with "the submission of faith." Does that mean that the teachings referred to in the previous sentence cannot require the submission of faith?

The entirety of the following paragraph refers to in fallible teachings. It introduces the adjective "irreformable." It uses the adjectives "definitive" in connection with some of the

pope's teachings. And it uses of the phrase "assent of the Church" with reference to these in fallible teachings, whether of the pope or the bishops. It also uses the phrase "supreme magisterium" for both of these in fallible teachings to which "assent" is due.

In the catechism, paragraph 2034, the phrase "endowed with the authority of Christ" is associated with "the ordinary and universal magisterium of the pope and the bishops." (Emphasis in original.) but the next paragraph, 2035, introduces the concept of in fallibility as if and contradistinction to what was said in the preceding paragraph, and therefore as if in contradistinction to the ordinary magisterium.

Paragraph 891 associates the body of bishops with in fallibility went together with the pope they exercise the "supreme magisterium." The supreme magisterium is then associated with "the obedience of faith". The next paragraph, 892, specifically refers to teachings made "without arriving at it in fallible definition and without pronouncing into "definitive manner." And associates it with the "ordinary" magisterium to which no reference was made in the preceding paragraph that talked about the obedience of faith. Then it specifically says that "this ordinary teaching" requires religious assent which is specifically opposed to be "assent of faith," although it is an extension of it.

In paragraph 750 of the code of canon law, however, refers to teachings "proposed as divinely revealed" by the "ordinary and universal magisterium" as requiring belief "by defining and Catholic faith," where "faith" will be distinguished from "religious assent" in paragraph 752. In that paragraph, "religious assent" is associated with the "authentic magisterium," with no reference to ordinary or universal, and to teachings they do not intend to proclaim by "definitive" act.

There are other questions I am not addressing here. For example, I do not intend to give an

account of what "religious submission" as opposed to divine faith is. Likewise, I do not intend to explain how one is to tell whether the exercise of the magisterium is "authentic" in the non definitive sense. Nor how one is to tell when the intention is to speak "definitively."

On the practical level however, I wish to fallibly and non definitively state that the question has been settled definitively by Romans chapter 14.

Another reason not to go public about a theologian's disagreement in conscience is that, notoriously, there have been true positions backed by inadequate arguments.

Unacceptable risk is an entirely valid moral argument. Psychologically, it may seem second-best, but so are non-definitive teachings second-best, or at least the state that they are in his second best.

There are cases where we can no that the teaching as some connection with revealed truth even though the exact connection may not have been sufficiently articulated. Theologians have a responsibility of looking for that articulation.

Some factor is that affect the validity of unacceptable risk arguments: the importance of the value that is at risk. Here are it is the value that we can least afford to take any risk with. Another factor: the degree of risk.

One thing we should all be able to agree on before going any further. On the hypothesis that there are cases in which unacceptable risk arguments must be made, or better, unacceptable risk decisions must be made, we should all agree as to will must make those decisions, the hierarchy. So we should all agree that in the case where an unacceptable risk decision must be made, we know in advance that we will although religious obedience of intellect and will to whatever decision the hierarchy makes.

August 16, 2002

What follows are thoughts provoked by reading Francis Sullivan's "creative Fidelity". As a member of the body of Christ, I have a sacred and solemn right to know whether a doctrine has been taught definitively by the universal ordinary magisterium. The preceding sentence certainly follows from revelation very closely and may even be included in revelation, since part of revelation, an important part, is a Christian's knowledge of what the hierarchy is able to obligate him to.

Since Christian's habitat sacred right, the hierarchy has the solemn obligation to inform us what doctrines have been infallibly taught by the universal ordinary magisterium. So the question becomes how does the hierarchy communicated to me that a doctrine has been infallibly taught by the universal ordinary magisterium? Or, how to I tell that a doctrine has been so taught? The first conclusion is that way of doing so must exist or must be able to be brought into existence. The further conclusion that such as such is the way of doing so can be determined to be true on the basis of certain conditions.

For example, the method must be clear and indisputable to reasonable people. I submit that for all practical purposes there is only one method that will do: if the pope declares that something has been definitively taught by the universal ordinary magisterium, I must have the right to assume that his declaration is infallibly true. Even if there is no specific tradition on the truth of the preceding statement, that statement follows necessarily from other statements that are part of the tradition, as I said earlier.

The argument in favor of this position is simply that no other method will do. It is simply impractical to expect all the bishops in the world to get together whenever such a declaration is needed. It is also impractical to expect a dogma defined by the pope's own

authority every kind we need to know whether a doctrine is infallible. What can be done is for the pope poll all of the bishops electronically. Then he can announce to the church that all the bishops and they are in agreement. Since that is the only practical way to do it, it follows that it must be the way it should be done.

Another question to ask, as an argument in favor of this position, is what more what I need to know that a doctrine is infallible than to have the pope certify that all the bishops and he teach this doctrine definitively. In answer to that question some theologians might say that I can rely on their judgment that a doctrine of the ordinary magisterium has been taught infallibly. In reply that, I point out that we are now dealing with a very educated laity. They are so well educated, in fact, that they know they cannot rely solely on theologians for this judgment. They know that theologians have too often been heterodox for an intelligent layperson to trust them.

But to make this method of settling questions unequivocally clear we would need an ex cathedra statements to the effect that when the poll says that the bishops have been unanimous about a doctrine and that doctrine is infallibly taught.

Another question at least discussing is the issue raised by Grisez whether or once a doctrine has been taught universally and constantly it cannot later be changed because it has already been taught infallibly. Sullivan argues against this. He cites polygenesis as an example of a forbidden doctrine that is now allowed. But if disagreement among theologians over a doctrine that was formerly universally taught is sufficient to show that the doctrine is not definitive, then theologians would happen in their power to produce that a doctrine is not infallible just by creating controversy about it. In other words, there disagreement would be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

On the other hand, Sullivan can cite cases, as he does in the chapter on Vatican II, with something that was formerly universally taught is no longer taught.

August 9th, 2003, big

Sullivan is right. The submission that is required for non definitive teachings must not be assent in the sense of a yes or no judgment. It must be an attitude of submissiveness because it has degrees. Yes or no judgments do not have degrees. The reason we know that it has degrees is that the documents of the office of the doctrine of the faith says that various documents of the magisterium have varying degrees of authority. If the degree of a 40 varies, then the degree of submissiveness due to them must vary.

xxxThing-object, truth, Simon August 3, 2002 big

We cannot compare the known to the unknown. So how can we compare what is in the mind to what is outside the mind, since when what is outside the mind becomes known, it is in the mind?

xxxThe nature of humor, December 21st, 2002

Some years ago I told someone that humor is a species of the beautiful, that which being seen pleases. Since we know the genus, all that's left to do is to come up with the specific difference. That seems to be a daunting task. But it becomes less daunting when we realize that, since beauty is a transcendental, its definition must obey laws of paragenetic abstraction. Beauty is a paragenus. So the specific difference must be a reaffirmation and a

negating of the genus. So when we are given the genus, that is, the paragenus, we happen in an important sense, a crucial sense, already been given the specific difference.

The fact that the definition of humor will include a negation of the common ground that humor shares with other forms of beauty explains Aristotle's remark that humor is a species of the ugly.

In what follows, as I said here now, I do not intend to come up with a precise wording for what it is about beauty that is negating by humor. I think I am often going to use the word "incongruous" to express the negation that defines humor, as if the word "congruous" expressed the common ground that defines the beautiful. When I use words in this way, I will be speaking only in a very broad, not exact way.

In human beings, intelligence becomes found up with things that my nature are not under the rule of intelligence: emotions, sex, conventional expectations, social restraints, expected behavior, drunkenness (in humor it is drunkenness perceived in the *other* person, not in ourselves), stupidity, the occurrence of double meanings.

(Note also the difference between inductive certitude and mere habitual expectations. Induction gives us knowledge that it is unreasonable to believe the opposite of some connection. But justify certitude that it is unreasonable to believe the opposite of some connection is different from a mere sub rational expectation produced by habit. But such sub rational expectations can give the appearance of being rational, rational in the sense of being inductively justified expectations. When they did that appearance, they can be not only sub rational but apparently contrary to the rational, when the expectation is not fulfilled.)

Puns are a good example. Language is something that is under the control of intelligence the only reason that a noise has a particular meaning is that, we have deliberately given that meaning. But almost all the time it is not deliberate and therefore out of the control of reason, that the same noise or similar noises have these two unrelated meanings. From the point of view of reason, the fact that similar noises have unrelated meanings is an incongruity.

The fact that the double meaning is unplanned by intelligence is the central to its humor. But also essential to its humor is that the double meaning is not just something arational, in a negative to not primitive sense, but is irrational in the privative sense, since language as such is something that is under the control of reason. So in something that is under the control of reason we find something that is contrary to our expectations because it is not under the control of reason.

Something's merely being subrational is not enough for humor. The beauty that is perceived by humans is almost always perceived in something sensible and therefore subrational. Usually you we perceived beauty by finding something consonant with the rational in the subrational.

In humor is intellectual beauty found up with the perception of, and in the perception of, elements that are not only subrational but that at least have the appearance of being contrary to the rule of reason, to the control of reason, elements that are incongruous because contrary to the rule or conventional expectations of reason. (So an incongruity theory of humor adequately taken can explain the frustrated expectations theory of humor.)

This also enables an incongruity theory of humor to explain what is valid in the superiority theory of humor. In aspect of superiority is included in an adequately considered incongruity

theory. Humor is impossible unless intelligence is superior to physical reality, especially to the physical reality with which intelligence is bound up in human beings. Beauty is the congruence between the intellectual and the physical, humor is beauty from the incongruence between the intellectual and the physical.

Humor brings together things that are otherwise aesthetically incongruous in a way that is aesthetically congruous in other respects. What is aesthetically congruous in humor is the way in which the otherwise aesthetically incongruous elements are brought together in the context where they are still perceived as incongruous in other respects.

So there are two things to consider: first, how disparate are the things from the point of view of rational expectation? Second, ultimately they are brought together in the perception of unity caused by awareness of the context. How great the incongruity is and how tightly the humor ties the things together. How great the aesthetic incongruity is, and how tightly from the point of view of aesthetic perception the humor ties the things together.

(Can the idea of aesthetic congruency vs. aesthetic incongruity cover all the counter examples offered by the other theories, the superiority and relief theories? If they can offer examples where the incongruity is not aesthetic, then I cannot use the idea of aesthetic congruency and incongruity as the paradigmatic common ground.)

Concerning Aristotle's remark, assuming that the quotations of Aristotle are correct, endorsing the superiority theory of humor: did he say that in a discussion of, the in the theater, or was he only referring to comedy in the theater, where humor might plausibly be contrasted with tragedy in that in tragedy we identify with, rather than fields appear to be

unfortunate?)

(The superiority and relief counter examples are just one step further down the paragenetic tree. That is, the specific difference of a paragenus can itself be paragenetic in relation to its inferiors. So their counter examples may seem not to exemplify the incongruity that is the specific difference between humor and other kinds of beauty, but the reason for that appearance may be that this incongruity must be both affirmed and denied of the counter example in a paragenetic manner. In a words, the specific difference, incongruity, is itself a paragenus.)

(How does a joke connect the otherwise aesthetically on connected? For example, in Ed Sullivan imitations some awkward, ugly behavior becomes smoothly connected to Ed Sullivan, by a context that makes it clear similar to Sullivan's behavior or makes the similarity to Sullivan's behavior apparent.)

Humor is not just the incongruous but a type of beauty involving the incongruous. Aesthetically, the junction of the elements perceived to be incongruous would ordinarily be perceived to be an obstacle to beauty. In humor, the beauty consists precisely in making the incongruous appear to fact while still remains otherwise incongruous, the beauty consists in *how* the joke makes the incongruous the perceived as congruous in some respect while still being perceptually incongruous in some other respect. The beauty consists in *how* a joke makes the congruous of what is still the incongruous.

In general, beauty consists in how elements are brought together to be a unified whole, proportioned, and illuminating or aluminum. Humor consists in the incongruous, while perceived as such, being brought together to be unified, proportioned, and intelligible while still being perceived as counter intelligible in respects other than those respects that are the

ways in which they are brought together in this case. We laugh because of the fact that, or the way that, the otherwise incongruous is made congruous.

As Parageneric, the definition of humor must involve the paradoxical; that is the definition of humor must not just referred to the paradoxical but be paradoxical, include the paradoxical. The incongruence of humor is an otherwise privative irrationality, not just a non-irrationality, what a lack of rationality where it would otherwise be expected, for example, double meaning, expected by reason united to the physical. In other words, expected humanly. "Otherwise" means otherwise banned as presented in the joke where temporarily on the privative incongruity is made congruous. (So may be an adequately considered incongruity theory can accommodate Bergson's theory that humor is always directed at the human.)

Date "claritas" elements of beauty is an ontological splendor that is revealed to our mind. In the case of humor is the ontological splendor of *how* the incongruous is made congruous in the work.

In art and scholasticism, p. 29, Maritain says that there is beauty for Aquinas the moment the shining a beauty for on a suitably proportioned matter succeeds in pleasing the intellect. So humor would be a shining of a form on and unsuitably proportioned matter, or on an otherwise unsuitably proportioned matter. Could it also be the failure of expected shining of form on a suitably proportioned matter?

Other words for congruence in the sense of about congruence between the intellectual and the non-intellectual that is a characteristic of all humanly perceived beauty: consonance, this consonance; concord, discord; harmony; correspondence, etc.

Art and scholasticism page 33. "A fine arts thus stand out in the genus art as man stands out in the genus animal. And like a man himself they are like a horizon where matter in spirit meet." Likewise, humor is an horizon where matter in spirit, an horizon constituted by the meeting of matter in spirit.

"A fine arts are ordered to an object which transcends me and in which is a value in itself, and whose amplitude is limitless, for beauty, like being, is infinite." Likewise, in humor an object which transcends the human (the *rationaly* intellectual) is common in the sought rational.

But congruence that is essential to beauty and to the perception of beauty on the part of human beings is a congruence between the intellect and what it finds in a suitably proportioned matter. The intellect finds something intellectual in the sub intellectual. That is why the the kind of beauty we call the humerus is considered to be a sign of intelligence, that is, wit.

The creator of humor displays his intelligence by, on the one hand, recognizing the incongruity or apparent incongruity of the elements he is bringing together, and on the other hand, by the way his intellect structure is the joke so as to make the otherwise apparently contrary to rational congruence appear rationally congruence in this context.

xxxTrinity, Bible, first generation Christianity, February 11, 2004

What's did first generation Christians believe about the Trinity? We can find out by asking the question, as we read the early epistles, what is the author assuming that his audience already knows? In the first epistle to the Thessolonians, Paul says that we are children of God and that Jesus is the son of God. There must have been away that they would have

distinguished these two senses of being children of God, and Paul is assuming that the Thessolonians are aware of that way. And that way must have been more specific than a vague "Jesus is God's son in a special way."

Another principle we can now invoke, having established something about what the early Christians believed is that there must be some evidence, some vestige of, for that way of distinguishing Jesus from other children of God in the epistles, whether or not they are the earliest epistles. In the epistle to the the galatians, Paul says that we are adopted children of God. So Jesus must have been a child of God in a sense opposed to adoption. Jesus is a natural child of God. But what does this mean?

Using our concepts of person and nature, we can truthfully say that the first Christians believed that Jesus is one person in two natures. To say this does not imply that the first Christians possessed our concepts of person and nature, or even that they could have understood them. It only says that certain concepts that we possess can truthfully described concepts that they possessed. But what concepts that they possessed, or could have acquired with ease, express what they believe about Jesus's sonship?

In the first epistle to the Corinthians, we get some evidence. In chapter three, there is teaching about the spirit. That teaching appears to be something new to the Corinthians. At least, Paul gives the impression in the way he writes that he is giving information to the Corinthians that they may not have had before. On the other hand, that information presupposes that the Corinthians already believed certain things about the spirit.

In particular, that information would not have made any sense if the Corinthians did not already believe that the spirit was part of the life of God. "Part of the life of God" uses concepts that the Corinthians either could have had or could have acquired in away that was not anachronistic. "Part of the life of God" means that the spirit belongs to God not the way

creation belongs to him, as something exterior to him, but as something interior to him.

"Interior" could be further clarified, using concepts of which they were at least capable, as compared to the way God's power, knowledge, love, beauty, etc. belongs to him and as opposed to the way the things he is made belong to him. Our metaphysics would want to distinguish the way an attribute of God's nature, such as power, belongs to him from the way the divine persons belong to him. But without a lot of explanation, it would be in anachronistic to read that distinction into the phrase "interior part of God's life", or "part of God's interior life," at this point.

Likewise, "life" in our metaphysics can refer to an attribute of God's nature rather than an attribute of the divine persons. But it would be unnecessary and anachronistic to read that distinction into the phrase "part of God's interior life" in describing the early Christians' beliefs about Trinity. Believers know that the early Christians were experiencing the life of the Trinity. So they could have acquired and used the concept of God's interior life to express what they believe about Trinity.

Again, they must have believed that the spirit belongs to God's interior life. So why can we not say that they knew that the spirit belonged to God's interior life as something uncreated, unmade? We get that from the first epistle to the Corinthians. That same epistle describes Jesus as he threw whom we exist. And as we look for further vestiges of, evidence of, the earliest beliefs about the Trinity in perhaps later epistles, we again find beliefs that can be described by saying that Jesus is part of the interior life of God, Jesus belongs to the interior life of God, and he belongs to it not as something created but as something uncreated, unmade.

So it would be irrational to say that the earliest Christians could use such descriptions of the

spirit but not use such descriptions of Jesus gave them the spirit, and to earn to the spirit for them. The epistle to the Philippians uses the phrase "equal to God." Can we say that that phrase describes the earliest Christians belief about Jesus? Why not? Now that we know that Jesus is part of God's interior life, and uncreated part of God's interior life.

Jesus is God's perfect expression to himself of what he is. The spirit is the expression of the Father's and the son's mutual love, the their mutual expression of love. The spirit is the Father's and the son's sigh of mutual love. The spirit is the Father and the son's mutual sigh of love. The Father, the son and the spirit of their mutual love, and their mutual spirit of love, and their spirit of mutual love.

The Father is the originator, the son is the originated. The Father and son are the breathers, the spirit is their breath. They are the sighers. The spirit is their sigh.

xxxDave Carlin's book, February 17, 2004

Concerning his point, which I should check out again to make sure this is his point, that conservatives will probably win only to marginalize the church even further. It is correct that they will probably win. It is also correct that they will probably marginalize the church even further. But why they will they so marginalize it?

The conservatives will do that because while focusing on theological orthodoxy, they have failed to deal with the pastoral weakness of that segment of the church where Orthodox doctrine is still taught. That is, full Orthodox doctrine is still taught, as opposed to the generic Christianity described by Carlin. But conservatives have not noticed that if all we do it is get full doctrine taught the way it is what today, wherever it is actually taught, we expect the pastoral life of the church to be as ineffective as it is today were ever full doctrine

is taught.

Even though the book sticks to the historical and sociological level, every decision maker in the Church should read it. For it will prove that unless we make changes at some other level, namely the level of seminary pastoral preparation, the book's pessimistic conclusions will come true.

Concerning the chapter showing that we must identify secularism as the enemy. In that chapter, he is bending over backwards to make it so clear, so obvious, so simple that we need a defined enemy that even a bishop or even a cardinal could see the point. There, he is addressing the same problem I have run into how many times of the products of seminaries not being able to grasp new concepts and new categories. That is, he is addressing the problem of the products of seminaries interpreting every new idea in terms of the old categories they got from the seminary.

What we have to do is to so change the seminary that we get rid of the imperial priesthood. What changes are necessary to do that? The most important change is to give seminary ends a basic understanding of what Christianity really is. As I tried to demonstrate at this conference last year, the seminaries I'm not giving a basic understanding of what Christianity is. The proof of that are statements like "the Eucharist is the most important Catholic doctrine." Anyone who could say that were something like it does not know what Christianity is.

The priest has a particular way of being united with Christ's end of acting in the person of Christ. But the priest's way of being and doing these things does not compare in value and importance to the ordinary Christian's way of being united with Christ's and a being able to act in the person of Christ. There is literally no comparison. You cannot compare the finite to the infinite.

After Vatican II, the strategy in the seminary for dealing with the problem of the imperial priesthood was to emphasize that the priesthood is a service and the priest a servant of the people of God. But the seminary forgot to tell the priest's what in a something it was to be a member of the people of God. It forgot to tell the priest's how awesome were the people they were serving, how worthy of awe they were. The priest still learned to hold his way of being united with Christ in awe but not the ordinary Christian's way of being united with Christ in incomparably more awe.

As a result, priests often developed a compulsion to serve that unintentionally resulted in dominating rather than actually serving. Let me give an example, a small example, from the music ministry at our combination mass and prayer meeting. In their desire to serve, in their sincere desire to serve, they kept adding song after son to the mass and song after song to the prayer meeting until music was dominating the mass and prayer meeting. They had no intention to dominate. But there desire to serve was not tempered by any wisdom, not tempered by any overall point of view to provide a context for their desire to serve. Likewise, in the absence of a fundamental understanding of what Christianity is, priests had no overall context nor any wisdom that would temper there desire to serve, their understandable desire to serve.

Though priests had to serve because that was the meaning of their existence, that was what was fulfilling their purpose in existence. Or at least that's what they would have taken away, that's what they in fact did take away, from the seminary's emphasis on the fact that they were servants. Since the meaning of their life, the purpose of their existence, was to be servants, they had a compulsion to serve to the point of unintentionally dominating.

Nothing, for example, in that seminary training about service would have told them that the

Eucharist wasn't the most important doctrine of Christianity. Rather all that teaching about service, which was supposed to neutralize the imperial priesthood, only reinforced the idea that their service, especially the Eucharist, was the most important thing in Christianity. They came out of the seminary thinking that the life of the church revolved around their service, their sacramental service.

The seminary focused on what was distinctive to the priest's ministry, what was specific to it and not to Christianity in general. That focus unintentionally created the illusion that what was specific to the priest's ministry, what was distinctive of it, was the core of the life of the church.

May 29, 2004

Instead of using the phrase "generic Christianity," Dave should use the phrase "lowest common denominator Christianity."