xxx3-5-01

The list of my articles that would not appear in "a reintroduction to philosophy" includes: Maritain's philosophy of nature, abortion, metaphysics and immateriality, on the training of Thomists.

xxxLanguage of thought, Haldane, formal signs, Poinsot and Wittgenstein, 3-5-01

the quo is not a language. What is specific to language is that we must be aware of the signings to be made aware of the signified. The opposite is true of thought. We become aware of the quo by positing an explanatory factor to account for our awareness of the object. So the explanatory factor we posit does not itself function as an object when it makes also aware of the signified. And the question of the relation of the object we are aware of to what things are is a different question: it is the question whether our awareness of those objects can lead us to true judgments about what things are. So Haldane is wrong to look for a solution to the problem of realism in the idea that we acquire the forms of what things are.

Likewise this identity theory of truth is very different from Frege's identity theory of truth.

Skepticism presupposes a standard of truth drawn from experience. If not, it would not have anything to be skeptical about. To be skeptical about whether something is true, I must have some understanding of what truth is. And since truth is a goal, by understanding of truth involves understanding of some sort of standard. Maritain goes beyond this argument and deeper. He starts epistemology with the question what is this truth, this standard, that a skeptic presupposes.

xxxInclusive language in the pope's documents, 3 -- 5 -- 0 1

See the Gospel of Life number 8 7, quoting John 2: 1 4 -- 1 7.

xxxIncarnation, Inc, HU, Hypostatic Union, Properties, April 25, 2000

The following remarks concern material in two sets of files, the files entitled Inc and those entitled H Properties. These deal with the topics of the incarnation and hypostatic union, on one hand, and the question of how a substance causes its properties, on the other hand. The idea is that the concept of exercising existence as opposed to receiving existence can help us solve both problems. A substance's causing all of its properties is virtual efficient causality. But wherever there is something that is only virtual, there must be something corresponding that exists in a formal sense. My argument is that the best way to understand virtual efficient causality is to identify it with the exercise of existence, the exercise of existence is what virtual efficient causality is formally.

But there are two questions. In the case of the incarnation, I propose the hypothesis that

any created substance needs a distinct factor called the exercise of existence in order to be a cause. The problem is why aren't existence and essence together enough for a created substance to be a cause. The first part of the answer is that in order to be an efficient cause the substance must first cause its own necessary accidents, its properties. But this leads to the second problem.

Why cannot be formal factor that we identified with the virtual efficient causality be the existence itself of the substance.? We can say first fact in the case of formal efficient causality be existence of the cause is not considered to be the cause. But the thing that exists is considered to be the cause, and should be considered to be the cause. So in looking for virtual efficient causality, we are looking for something that is analogous to things rather than the existence of things. (Note that here the word analogous is taken in the ordinary sense rather than in the parageneric sense.) we might even say that we are looking for something analogous to a substance's properties, rather than its existence. For it is through its properties that a substance exercises formal efficient causality.
I call the exercise of existence "subsistence". Perhaps we should say that subsistence is a property or a modification of the existence rather than of the essence. That would ensure that subsistence is on the side of substance rather than on the side of accidents. It would also give a little bit more specificity to calling subsistence a mode. Introducing the word mode can appear to be an ad hoc device that does not really fit in two the list of realities and possible principles of realities that is justified by other legitimate metaphysical considerations. And in a sense it is such a device. But by calling it a modification of existence we are at least giving it a new place on our list, rather than putting it in a place that already seems to be filled up.

But existence is not potential in respect to anything. So subsistence is not a mode of existence in this sense of something that resides in existence by fulfilling a potency of existence. Or maybe we can just say that subsistence is a relation of the substance to its existence, or I should say is analogous to a relation of the substance to its existence. This would also put subsistence solidly on the side of substance rather than accident. Again, the word analogous is used in the non-technical sense rather than in the sense of parageneric. Making subsistence analogous to a relation would also tie the doctrine of subsistence in creatures to the doctrine of the Trinity.

Or it might even be possible to say that there are two kinds of created existence, to a kind of created acts of existence. One kind includes the exercise of existence by its identity with itself, not by any addition. The other kind does not include the exercise of existence. So what we are suggesting, hypothesizing, is that it is possible for God to give a created essence an existence which is not identical with the exercise of existence. Is that possible? Why not? The hypothesis simply means that God himself has to supply the needed subsistence by directly causing the accidents of the substance, that is, the properties, the necessary accidents of the substance. Since subsistence would still precede the existence of accidents, it would still be on the side of substance rather than of accidents. And this solution would leave Jesus's human nature completely intact, completely untouched.

So may be the problem with the incarnation is not that we lack a logically possible theological explanation, but rather that we have several logically possible explanations but we do not know which one to choose.

Big:

An accident's transcendental relation of dependence is the same regardless of what the term of the relation is. But the term must at least be something subsistent. It is not enough for the term to be a mere existent. Being an existent makes the substance eligible to be a material cause of something. But to be the efficient cause of something requires more than what is required to be a material cause. To be an efficient cause as opposed to a material cause, the form or act to be communicated must belong to the efficient cause in some way, must be in the efficient cause in some way. And since existence makes it to be a material cause, existence must belong to it, be in it, in some way other than merely the way that makes it a material cause.

And the efficient cause as such is a correlative of the material cause. It needs a material cause in order to be an efficient cause. That is it needs a material cause somehow distinct from itself in order to be an efficient cause. So existence must belong to the efficient cause but in some correlative opposite way to the way it belongs to the material cause in order for the material cause to be a material cause.

Also, since action is on the level of accidents, and is an existence on the level of accidents, there must be a potency for action on the level of accidents, a potency for filled by existence such that the existence is not the same existence that actuates the substance.

June 26,2001

Subsistence: what is potential in some way or ways is identical with what is an actuality in other ways. If entity 1 is potentially red or green, in differently red or green, something outside of entity 1 must cause it to be either red or green. The outside cause must have the energy required to change it from one color to another, or from no color to being colored, and also have a nature that explains why the color is this color, say red, not another color.

We are explaining how and essence acquires necessary accidents. Here the potential subject is potential only for this accident, not that. So the essence's nature accounts for the nature of the accident caused, so we only have to account for the energy that allows the essence to be the cause of its necessary accidents. That is, we have to explain the energy of the virtual efficient cause, or in other words, the virtual energy of the efficient cause, not the distinct <u>nature</u> of the cause. But that energy must be somehow distinct from the nature. That is where subsistence comes in. Nature is not contradictorily the cause of its accidents in the order of specification (thing about the specification of conscious acts, like the specification of the act of sight), because it is not the causing the order of exercise.

xxxEthics, NO AA, April 20, 2000

The following are some proof texts from the discussion the general discussion of ethics in the summa, proof texts that I can use if called on to do so. These are all from the prima secundae. In question 20 article three Aquinas states that "the morality of the outward deed is subordinate to that of the InWord act of the will." In question 18 article six he says that "our outward acts possess no moral significance save in so far as they are voluntary." Question 19 article one, reply to the third objection: "the will's object is a good thing as presented by the mind, and it is as fitting in with an intelligent rule of conduct that belongs to a moral category and causes moral good in the will's acts.' Question 19 article to: "the source of the good or evil all human ask is from the act of the will." Question 20 article one: "if considered as part of the effective performance of the deed, then it, the goodness of an outward deed, is posterior to the goodness of a willing which is its source." I also made a note to refer to question 18 article to, and question 19 article three, reply one.

April 25, 2000

Our decisions relate us to things as if they were this or that. By a decision we are related to things as if they were this or that. In deciding we relate ourselves to things as if they were this or that. Once we recognize that this admittedly vague description is a true description, there will only be one possibility for explaining the nature of this relation. There must be a relation of strict identity between the way we the side and the way things are. The explanation by way of identity is inevitable here just as it is in the case of knowledge. When we say knowledge relates us to things as if they were this or that, we are on a virtuous slippery slope that leads us to the identity theory of truth. Wittgenstein recognize this, although he did not consider the slope virtuous. But Wittgenstein is the only philosopher since Aristotle to come up with that concept without getting it from Aristotle. The fact that Wittgenstein unlike Aristotle did not like the concept should not take away from Wittgenstein's originality in arriving at that concept on his own.

May 1, 1999

This is another argument in defense of the idea that we must evaluate a zygote as a person, that is that we must evaluate human organisms that cannot yet make free choices, or who can no longer make free choices, as ends in themselves. This argument is more direct and more appropriate than the second argument in my natural obligation article. This argument is also developed somewhere in my earlier ethics notes, to be found in the fire safe boxes in my office.

In making a decision about the future of such an organism, we are comparatively evaluating the organism and ourselves as agents oriented to ends. If we put any interest we choose above the interests of that organism, we are giving ourselves as pursuers of ends a higher place in our evaluations than that organism has in our valuations. So we

are giving each of us a place in our system of values, and we are giving each of us a place in our system of values precisely as agents oriented to achieving ends.

In making such a decision we must at least implicitly select an end from the point of view of which we will make the decision, and implicitly at least select a standard from the point of view of which we make A comparative valuation of ourselves as agents oriented to ends. That standard must consist of some feature or set of features that is part of what we are. Because we are evaluating what we are. What we are is the object of the evaluation. And these features must be the features, or must be features, by means of which we are agents oriented to ends.

But we can be oriented to ends at many different levels and in many different ways. When I am fully awake item oriented to ends in one way. When I am asleep item oriented toward achieving future ends in a less direct way. When I am drunk I am oriented to future ends in an even less direct way. When I am in a coma I am oriented to future ends in still a further less direct way. In comparatively evaluating myself to another human organism as an agent oriented toward ends, ends that will give value to my decision, I must clacked some level at which I am oriented to ends or some way in which I am oriented to ends as the point of view from which to make the comparative of valuation. For example, if I choose the state of being fully awake as the feature from the point of view of which I should comparatively evaluate other organisms, then all people who are now asleep our less than ends in themselves in way that I am an end in myself.

How do we decide which standard to use? That is, by what standard do we decide which standard to use? In my abortion article I answer this question from the point of view of the temporal stages of development that the organism goes through. That answer contains an implicit answer to the current question, which does not concern temporal stages but concerns features that we and the other organisms possess now or do not possess now. Just as we must evaluate from the point of view of the most fundamental stage at which we are oriented toward human ends temporally, we must evaluate from the most fundamental characteristic by which we are now oriented toward human ends. How do we decide what that characteristic is?

First, the reason why we must evaluate from the point of view of the most fundamental characteristic that orients us toward ends is that any other selection is arbitrary and so contrary to the goal of the rational appetite. By the way in the natural obligation article I tried to use the word ends only for achievements we are oriented to by choice and the word goal for achievements we are oriented to by the rational appetite before making a choice. I did that just in the hope of introducing a little bit of clarity. I suppose it would have helped to tell the reader what I was trying to do. But if we do not make the comparative evaluation from the most fundamental level, our choice will achieve an end which is no higher than ends to which the organism is also oriented. But we will be preventing that organism from achieving any of those ends. If we do not choose from the point of view of the most fundamental level, we are making a choice that gets its value for us from a prior orientation to ends and which would have no value for us were it not for a prior orientation to ends, which orientation we share with the other organism.

I will not developed this argument further now, under the assumption that the arguments in the abortion article are clear enough that they can be adapted to this other purpose the way they now stand.

Second, what is that most fundamental level? Since the zygotes are equal to us as agents oriented to ends, the level must be some characteristic or set of characteristics that we share with the zygotes. So the level must be the level of our genetic orientation toward the achievement of human ends.

5-23-00

The value of a person for us should be identical with what a person is. The value of God for us should be identical with what God is.

To cause a good to exist, to cause some good effect, by choosing to perform an intrinsically evil act is to cause a good to exist by producing and evil that is incomparably more evil then the good that is achieved is good. Moral evil is incomparably the worst kind of evil. So no good produced by a moral evil can justify doing an intrinsically evil act.

The alternative to saying that moral evil is the highest kind of evil, is incomparably the highest kind of evil, is to define evil in terms of an accumulation of consequences. But such a definition can't work. The reason is that such a definition will always presuppose some other kind of evil, that is, presuppose another kind of evil by reference to which the evil of consequences is measured. For we can only measure the accumulated evil of the consequences after we decided whether the interests of all parties are to be treated equally. And if they are to be treated equally, that is if the interests of the parties are to be treated equally, we still have to establish a hierarchy between the different kinds of interests that each of the parties has.

So the primary evil will always be, not the evil calculated in the consequences, but the evil of not treating each person's interests equally to those of another person's. The primary evil will concern the status that persons have in our values.

New topic. To comparatively evaluate us as agents oriented to an, the evaluation must do to the most fundamental level. Why? To stop anywhere else is a choice. The choice seeks an end. To deprive another agent of an end by choosing less than the most fundamental level is arbitrary and hence contrary to the goal of the rational appetite. More fundamentally, it is to treat the other agent as if she were not oriented to ends of equal value to the ends we achieved by our choice at a level above which we have chosen not to treat her as oriented to ends of equal value. What is the most fundamental level? Since we start has the zygotes, it must be a level we share with zygotes.

New topic. My article on natural obligation left out the following point. Is something evil because of how it affects us or how it affects the other person? The answer is yes. Is something evil because it deprives the other person of a good or deprives on us of a due

good? Again, the answer is yes. Is moral evil defined by the absence of a good that is due us or by depriving the other person of a good? My theory makes that a totally false dichotomy. My theory makes the answer to be that it deprives us of a good because it deprives the other a good. And it deprives the other of a due good because that good is something due the other from us.

New topic. My article on natural obligation left out the following thought, which is expressed someplace in outtakes three. What exists for us with an intentional existence as an object of desire, that is, a value, must be identical with what exists or will exist for itself with an entitative existence as a thing, just as what exists for us with an intentional existence as an object of knowledge must be identical with what exists for itself with an entitative existents as a thing.

New topic. My article on natural obligation did not include the following thought. For Aquinas, what more could be needed to show that murder was wrong then showing that murder treats things as if they are not what they are, specifically, showing that murder treats ends in themselves as if they were not ends in themselves, treats ends in themselves as if they were a means to our ends. That is, mere means to our ends.

New topic. The rational appetite's inclination to accord with reason is not an arbitrary desire or a desire do we need not necessarily have. For example, it is not a desire that evolution gave us by accident. Nor is it a desire that sometime in the past served an evolutionary function but now no longer serves any particular function. It is not a contingent event that we have such a desire, or an unnatural event. It is the converse of all of this that is true. It would be unnatural if we did not have such an inclination. It would be arbitrary if we had the faculty of reason but did not have the inclination to act in accord with what we know by reason. The latter situation would not only be unnatural, it would require us to act in irrational ways. Or it would at least require that our acting in ways that accord with reason would be a pure happenstance, a pure contingent or random event. Therefore the rest of the time we would necessarily be acting we would be acting irrationally, that is, we would be acting irrationally and doing so of necessity. It would be arbitrary for nature to give us reason and not give us the goal of acting in conformity to reason. It would be unnatural if we had reason but did not have that goal.

In other words, there is absolutely nothing unnatural about our having moral obligation. About our being subject to moral obligation. There is nothing unnatural about the fact that depriving another person of her due deprives us of something that is due. There is nothing unnatural about the fact that depriving another person of her due is defective from our point of view as well as hers.

11-24-00

Other than" is not the same as "contrary to" or "contradictory to" or "relative opposite to." Can x be other in our values of and it is in reality without being contradictory to what it is in reality?

Is an act evil because, for example, doing it fails to achieve the goal of contemplation? If so, is the act intrinsically evil? Maybe "intrinsically evil" means "must cause us to fail of the goal of contemplation". But why does it do that unless it is evil in the sense that we fail of contemplation because the act? If so, contemplation is not the standard by which it is evil. If it is evil because of makes us miss contemplation, it is not intrinsically evil and we must ask why it makes us this contemplation.

II first learned these principles reading Aquinas and his disciples. Aquinas tied moral value to.... His disciples interpret this as the inclination to act in accord with reason's value judgments made by the standard of some goal other than that inclination itself, the goal of happiness or intellectual contemplation. If so, his ethics are inconsistent from the very start. For him the will's primary love is love of friendship of persons for their own sake, and love all of other thing, other goods, for the sake of persons is secondary love. And the Commandmentsto love God and neighbor is both self-evident and primary precept of natural law. But then the obligation to these loves of friendship cannot be deriving from the obligation to love goods of concupiscence, like happiness and contemplation, which he correctly considers to be objects of love of concupiscence. If so, (1) the precepts would not be self-evident,) 2) love of friendship would not be the basic loves, and (3) it would be difficult to see how acts contrary to love of friendship could be intrinsically evil. Rather, they cause moral evil because choosing them cause is something evil of concupiscence.

The value of five in our evaluations of things must be what God is. Same with man. But man is a featherless biped. So what man is in our evaluations must be what he is with respect to his relation to freely chosen ends and means, with respect to human ends to be sought by free choice.

Simon in footnote: a full text of which is not included in the English translation.

12-26-00

The obligation to love is not based on love of concupiscence, because love of concupiscence is only secundum quid love. See "on the divine names," chapter 4, lecturer nine, No. 405. And see Summa theologiae, first of the second part, question 26, article for.

Love of friendship is not the same as friendship. And friendship requires reciprocal and mutually recognized love is on the part of the friends.

The transcendentals true require identity with being, identity of object with being, such that where that identity is absent, there is falsity. The transcendental good requires that identity between what a thing he is and what is a value for us such that where that identity is absent, goodness is lacking.

Good and evil are _formally_ distinct by the accord or discord of the will with reason. See first part of the second, question 18, article 5; question 72, article to. What is it that

reason <u>materially</u> judges? The good of persons; the proper order of person. Then the proper order of other goods. "Proper" by what standard? Second part of the second, question 26; in III sentences, this dictation 29. "On charity" question one, article nine.

On Justice and things exterior to persons: see second of the second, question 1 80, question 2, reply 2. Question 58, articles 2, 1 8, 9, and 1 0, especially 1 0. Questions 31, article 1; 4 3, introduction. An act of Justice toward another need not be intrinsically an act of friendship. When I pay my cook, I do justice to him. But the act of paying him is not intrinsically an act of love of friendship. I could, for instance, taking only as a means for getting some good for myself; still, I would not be doing him an injustice properly speaking. It is the opposite if I use someone else's person making ability solely for my own benefit and not as an act of friendship.

The intentional existence of the lover in love: see first part of the second, question 28, article 2.

For me To know what is good (by love of concupiscence) for another, she must be ordered to that good prior to my seeking that good.

12-29-00 BIG

There does not just happen to be an appetite with the goal of valuing things to be what they are. If there is such a saying as rational knowledge of what things are, there cannot not be an appetite with that goal, that is, our choices based on rational knowledge cannot not be the act of an appetite with that goal. There may just happen to be rational knowledge of what things are. But if there is such knowledge, the appetite by which we make choices based on that knowledge necessarily has that goal.

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there is another implicit answer in Aquinas to that
objection.  There is an implicit answer that we can get out
of what he says, and one that is consistent with everything
else he says, but an answer he does not explicitly make.
And that answer does work.
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3-5-01

On so-called "animal rights." Is our discussed at this treatment of animals ethical or aesthetic? Well, is it or is it not based on the same disposition, the same inclination, that is exercised in our love for our pets and other animals? Of course it is. Our discussed at this treatment of human beings is based on our love for them, and so our discussed at this treatment of animals is based on whatever causes us to love them. But what is it that causes us to love animals?

Is it not our ability to imagine how they feel? We can project ourselves into them. We can sympathize with them because we think we can understand their feelings, their reactions, there consciousness. We project our feelings into them, and we receive their feelings into ourselves by imagining that they have feelings

like our own. And no doubt we are correct. They do have feelings.

But all of this so far strictly aesthetic. We like or dislike the feelings that we attribute to them aesthetically, just as we like or dislike them when we experience them. But all of this is aesthetic.

This ability to empathize with feelings similar to our own when we observe them is a very important feature of our makeup. Evolution no doubt gave it to us for a very good reason. And when it comes to ethical behavior, it often has a very important role to play. Because usually the feelings we are sympathizing with our feelings of other persons to whom we not only have aesthetic relations but also ethical relation, that is, ethical obligations.

But love of friendship for persons is the _form_ of the other virtues. It is what makes the content provided by the other virtues morally obligated. Our aesthetic reactions to the Miss treatment of other conscious organisms, human and animal, supplies important _content_ for ethical behavior. But what makes that content moral, what gives it a specifically moral character, is its relation to our obligation to love of friendship for other persons.

But the fact that evolution gave us at this ability that does not distinguish between persons and animals makes it easy to confuse our disgust at animal abuse with moral disgust. Again, it is very very helpful, and it is the most natural thing in the world, to have that ability. That helpfulness and that naturalness increases the confusion with ethical disgust.

And the fact that that natural and helpful ability does not distinguish between our aesthetic reactions to human and animal pain means that if we accustom ourselves to be complacent about animal pain we are the same time accustoming are ourselves to be complacency about the same kind of pain when we experience it in humans. The complacency in question is only aesthetic. But it can have significant ethical consequences since the natural tendency in question is meant to be helpful to our for filling our ethical obligations.

If there were no ends in themselves, all values would be relative to subjective desires. But if there are ends in themselves, there is an objective value for other values to be relative to. But why does the existence of ends in themselves create an objective value rather than just another, though different, so objective value? That is, a value that comes into existence as such because of its relation to that subjective disposition we call the will? Because the trade an end in itself in as an end in itself is to treat her as if she is what she is known objectively to be. So treating her does fulfill a "subjective" desire, but the nature of that desire is to conform to objective knowledge of what she is by evaluating her to be what she objectively it is. On the other hand, to treat an object of animal desire as if it were an end in itself would be to treat it as if it is not what it objectively is.

And given the rational knowledge of what she is, it is necessary that there be an appetite oriented to value her to be what she is. That is, but it is necessary that moral good and evil exists; it is necessary that to be an appetite governed by specifically moral standards, that is, an appetite is an act of successful or defective by the standards we happen to call "moral."

And even if there is such a thing as the rational appetite conforming to prior value judgments apparently made by some other standard, where would that other standard come from? Nowhere else then reasons knowledge of what things are (for there is nothing else for metaphysics to talk about; there is nothing else for reason to know that what things are; and there is nothing else for appetites to value than what things are). So ultimately a violation of such a value judgment would be evil because it treats things as if they are not what they are; a violation would treat things as if they are not as they are known to be. And because of that the violation would be defective for a rational being.

To the goal of the rational appetite must be what something in its. And what that something is must be the rational appetite's good because of reason's knowledge of what that something is. And for that is the way all appetites based on consciousness must work; they respond to what a known object is its. So if the will's response is defective, the will's act must be a failure to achieve the state that what its good is is what the pertinent thing is. (See my correspondence with father Dewan and my e-mail to Curtis, Ray, and Dan.)

The disorder in the intrinsically evil object is a disorder that will cause moral disorder in the act that chooses it.

Vicious circle: allegedly reason makes a value judgment by some goal other than the will's own goal. But for the will's act to be required to aim at that goal, the goal must be a goal for the will's act.

The goal of the rational appetite is to be dictated to by reason, to let reason dictate to it; that is what the rational appetites for, to allow our action to be guided by that great gift, reason. To allow our action to be directed by our relationship to what things are. To allow our knowledge of what things are to direct our action. To allow our action not to be blind, not to be undertaken blindly. Nature did not give us reason so that we would act as if we did not know what things are. Nature gave us reason so that our action would be directed by knowledge of what things are. Otherwise our action would be blind. We would have knowledge of what things are, but that knowledge would be irrelevant to the actions we take relative to what things are.

How does reason direct our action? Not by the will's conforming to reason's <u>moral</u> knowledge; that would be circular.

xxxEthics, NO, AA after revised Thomist copy sent, June 4, 2001

Why our evaluations cannot be just in different to the other person's achievement of her legitimate ends. In setting our own ends, there are only two possibilities. We are able to give another person status, in our values, of being someone whose fulfillment of her own ends is one of our ends, or of being a means to the fulfillment of our own ends. There is no other possibility. If we do not make her pursuit of ends one of our ends, we must make her a means to our pursuit of ends. For that is all that the rational appetite's evaluations do, give things the status of being ends or means to ends in our evaluations. That is, the status of being our ends or means to our ends. So the only possibilities are that her ends are our ends or that she is a means to our ends.

People are not in different to their own pursuit of ends from their own point of view, or from the point of view of their own ends. So if we are in different to that, or of their status in our evaluations is in different, it must be from our point of view, from the point of view of our ends, to the exclusion of being from the point of view of their ends, or from our point of view to the exclusion of theirs.

There is such a thing as an entity being or not being something in my values. Being what? Being an end or means.

If I do not will is good the way I will my own good, he is not an end in itself in my values, because I will my good as that for the sake of which other things exist. I will my good as the good of an end in itself. He is an end in itself as I am. The same way I am. I will my good. If I do not also will he is good, then...

I must will that she exists for the sake of her own ends.

Now a comment on a different problem:

If I really choose 1, I will do what I sincerely think gets 1. But why must I choose 1; what makes a choice defective if I do not? Only the fact that 1 is a goal of my faculty of choice itself. This is why if 1 is a technical goal, I will make use of my knowledge, if I am sane, but if 1 is the goal of the rational appetite, I can fail to make use of my knowledge. That is, if we are talking about technical knowledge of how to achieve an end, we are talking about knowledge I will use if I choose that end, but if we are talking about the goal the rational appetite has prior to choice, we are talking about moral knowledge, practical knowledge of the moral kind, that I can fail to use.

Animal rights and the brain damaged

    The reason such juxtapositions are not accidental in living things is that our DNA constitutes a design calling for a certain kind of development. That design constitutes a standard for judging development. It is not a misfortune

if a chimp does not develop enough intelligence to multiply and divide; it is a misfortune if a human child does not so develop. In each case there is an objective standard for saying what is a misfortune and what is not.

When we judge brain damage, of any kind, to be a misfortune, by what standard to we judge it to be a misfortune? By the standard of whatever goal the damaged part of the brain could formerly achieve that it can no longer achieve. By implication, then, we are saying that, other things being equal, we should value what that part of the brain is in terms of what it formerly could contribute. Other things might not always be equal; something that is a disadvantage from one point of view might turn out to be an advantage from another point of view. But if the value in question is an absolute value, or a necessary condition for an absolute value, other things can never be equal.

Why does singer say we should not value human baby as much as we value a mature horse? Because of achievements that we find in the horse that are supposedly higher than the achievements a human baby has yet made. But that all depends on your point of view doesn't it? Can we not find achievements in the human child that are not found in a horse and that we can find reason for valuing more highly then what we find in a horse?

For example, a human baby has already develop specifically human parts of the brain that we cannot find in a horse's brain. Why should we not value those specifically human accomplishments, achievements, more highly then we value a horse's achievements? And what criteria should we use in determining which is higher?

Singer probably thinks he has an answer to these questions. He might say something like, well, the reason we value the specifically human parts of the brain is not for their own sake but for the sake of achievements they can lead to in the future. But the now existing forest already has achievements which are the reason why we value his brain would human brain. So we should value the achievements up a force more highly then the achievements of the baby because the achievements of the horse are in some sense terminal. They are in some sense of fulfillment of the finality which is only potential when the brain exists but they do not, and which is the reason why we value the brain.

Bought one thing singer is missing is this. We do not just have to decide whether the horse is more accomplished then the baby. Nor do we just have to decide what criteria we should use in making that judgment, for example, the kind of criteria attributed to singer in the previous paragraph. We have to decide how we decide. We have to decide how to we choose between criteria. We have to decide what criteria we use the decide between criteria.

We get all way back to that. And why should we not get all away back to back? We are human beings contemplating killing another member of the human species, contemplating not just doing something tour another member of the human species but a laminating that member from existence altogether. Shouldn't elimination of its existence require us to examine what goes into our value judgments all way to the most fundamental level we can find?

And at that level we find that the basis of value judgments is not achievements with the orientation to future achievements.

Consequentialism and Aquinas on the object determining morality, June 4, 2001

We cannot use our person-making power outside of a context in which we leave the use of that power open to making persons. Nature may close the context so that persons cannot be made, but we cannot. This illustrates the sense in which we are responsible for our actions, not for their results. Or better, the sense in which ethics governs good or evil actions, regardless of results. The action in question is the act of the will (against consequentialism). Just as it is against the goal of the rational appetite to evaluate ourselves to be agents oriented to our own destruction, and to the cessation of our orientation to ends, it is against the nature of the rational appetite to evaluate ourselves to be agents oriented to the preventing THE USE OF our person-making power from making persons. (we can prevent our pma from making persons, but cannot use our pma and prevent it from making persons.)

We are responsible for our actions, i.e., acts of the will. Even if the will's relation to external consequences caused a defect in the will's act, still the evil would consist of a privation of an internal goal of the will. This is further proof of my interpretation of what Aquinas means by the object's determining the morality of the act. Sometimes it is not the object; it is the circumstances, i.e., the

consequences in these circumstances. So sometimes those circumstances can cause evil in the act of the will. And so what the object does in other cases is cause evil in the act of the will, where "cause" must have a parallel meaning in both cases. Aquinas's analysis requires this parallel between circumstances, which are not moral per se, and objects. The way objects cause evil in every act that chooses them is the same way that circumstances cause evil in some of the acts that choose them. So morality is primarily in the choice, not in the chosen object.

Even when we are infertile, temporarily or permanently, to conform to what reason knows about human sexuality, a rational appetite must value everything else associated with sex as existing for the sake of making persons. Our cognitive faculties are what they are primarily for the sake of giving us knowledge of truth even when we are unconscious and so cannot exercise the ability to know truth. Our cognitive faculties do not entirely cease being what they are when we are unconscious, and the primary reason why they are what they are at that time is knowledge of truth. The existence of the first rational beings may have been an accidental product of blind forces of nature, but even if reason was selected for reproduction because, at some time in our evolution, it contributed something other than knowledge of truth to our survival, reason itself is not blind. And by reason itself we can recognize that it is rational knowledge of truth that makes us ends-in-themselves and that, therefore, what reason is deserves to be valued, even when it is not functional, primarily for being that which makes persons absolute values. (So a brain damaged person is still an AV.)

Mill, nothing is wrong unless it hurts someone else, June 26, 2001

If I have the right to treat myself like an animal, there is no basis, no reason, for not treating another person like an animal.

His existence and behavior is for the sake, first, of giving himself ends and, second, of evaluating everything else by reference to those ends.

We cannot avoid evaluating things as ends or as means to our ends. So if other person's ends are not our ends, if we do not choose the end of making their ends our ends, we are necessarily evaluating them as means. We are able to so choose our ends that his ends are among our ends, that we

will his ends as our ends, if not, we so choose our ends that his existence and behavior is a means to our ends.

The only thing choices can do is to evaluate things as our ends or as means to our ends. So if other person's ends are not our ends, that is, if in our evaluations their existence and behavior is not for the sake of their own ends, in our evaluations they exist for our ends to the exclusion of existing for their own ends.

The fact that length is a relative value does not need that we can have a just reason for intending to shorten life. Length is a relative value for both animals and persons. But persons are that for the sake of which everything else exists. The fact that persons are absolute values does not mean that we cannot allow the nonexistence of a person for another purpose. Since we are not choosing to cause a person's nonexistence, the morality is not determined by the absolute value of person who will die. But can death benefit an absolute value? Yes, because length of life is is in itself only a means to other goods.

Allowing shorten the does not evaluate freedom from pain as being a means to his ceasing to exist, a means to putting an absolute value out of existence.

(And human suffering)

Animal suffering, which includes human physical suffering,

Physical suffering, which includes both human an animal suffering,

If I have the right to treat myself like an animal, there is no reason, no basis, for not treating other persons like animals. This is a remark against John Stuart mill's idea that we can do anything to ourselves as long as it does not hurt another person.

If not persons do not exist for the sake of persons in our system of values, other persons cannot measure the value of nonpersons by their ends own in our system of values. The value of nonpersons is not also measured by the ends of other persons in our system of values.

Value things to be what they are can sound as "abstract and impersonal as "choose so that you can will the rule conduct as a universal law." But the former means to make things ends and means in accord with reason's knowledge that something is or is not an end in itself.

The rational is not just a plus relative to the reason that we've all the way that we did. It is not like the ability to use written language which is not one of things selected by evolution for its own sake; the ability to use written language is just a plus relative to the reason that the dispositions that enable us to use written language or selected in the first place. Paragraph

The rational appetite was selected for the purpose of letting us use reason to guide us in the pursuit of other purposes, other ends, and so the rational pursuit of other ends always has the additional end (goal) of conforming to rational knowledge of what things are.

All beings act out of of an orientation toward producing certain effects. As satisfying the prior orientation, those effects are called the "good" of those beings. To say that free beings pursue ends of their own choosing is to say that they pursue their good by means of choosing their own ends. To this definition of "good" we should add something to the effect that effects are called good for the being that produces them when the effects are somehow interior to the being that produces them, as they are in the case of plants and animals.

No appetite chooses its own satisfaction. It chooses that which will, as a matter of fact, cause its satisfaction, cause its satisfaction because it is that to which the appetite is oriented. Any appetite chooses that to which it is oriented and which will therefore cause its satisfaction because that is the kind of thing to which it is oriented.

Statements in the preceding paragraph always seemed strange to me because it seemed to me that in choosing, for example, some food for the sake of the case I was choosing for pleasure that results from the satisfaction of that orientation. What I fail to see was that there are to appetites involved here. The choice of pleasure is not an act of the appetite that will produce the pleasure. The choice of pleasure is an act of the will; the will chooses to pleasure that results from the satisfaction of another

appetite.   But the other appetite does not have its own satisfaction as that to which it aims.   If it did have its own satisfaction has that which aims, it would never achieve its satisfaction.   For the satisfaction comes from the appetite's achieving something other than the satisfaction. If the appetite never achieved that other thing, the appetite would never produce a state of satisfaction.

We are oriented to pursue, achieved, our good by freely choosing ends to which we are necessarily oriented prior to making choices, ends to which our nature orients us prior to making choices all our own ends.   A child that reaches the age of reason is aware of pursuing good by choosing her own ends, by pursuing ends that she freely sets for herself, but she sets them for herself for the sake of achieving her good.

The desire for that which brings happiness happiness, for the fulfillment of the unfulfilled, is always the efficient cause of seeking ends; the value is determined by the formal causality of the end.   So "that for the sake of which" has two senses.   We can say that everything it is for the sake of happiness.   But in the pursuit of happiness we do not identify the good we are seeking with "our happiness."

We identify the good for the sake of which all other goods exists as a God and as the <u>formal </u>fulfillment of persons as such,   that   is,   which   the   state   that   fulfills   the orientations of persons as such.   We identify our good with being moral.   That brings happiness because we do it for its sake, not for the sake of happiness.   It brings happiness because it fulfills the rational appetite's goal.   And that goal is not "to fulfill its own goal"; its goal, the goal whose fulfillment brings happiness, is that of acting in accord with reason.

"And so the place they have in our values is not really that of things oriented to the achievement of their own freely chosen ends."

We pursue our good by freely selecting the ends at which we aim.   By freely selecting the ends to which we direct our actions.   Free beings, I should say, persons have freedom of choice over the ends to which they direct her action.

Awareness of speculative truths, for example, the truth that

such as such an action will cause my death, makes the desires that cause ultimate practical judgments right or wrong. Knowledge of how that awareness of speculative truths makes desires right or wrong must be knowledge of how an action relates to the rational appetite's goal of conforming to speculative knowledge of what things are. It must be knowledge of whether or not a choice would treat things as if they are what they are as known by speculative knowledge.

Practical knowledge of the moral kind must be awareness of the way right desire depends on the rational appetite's relation to speculatively known truths.

It is the entity that is an end in itself. For an entity to be an end in itself in my values, to exist for the sake of free choice of ends, is to exist for the sake of free choices of his <u>true </u>good. It is to exist for the sake of pursuing her true good by for all the free choice. If not, I am not willing is happiness. I am willing that a cause himself on happiness.

To be an end in itself in my values is to be oriented to your true good, which happens to consist of certain kinds of free choices. To be an end in itself in my values you must exist for the sake of your own ends, that is, for the sake of pursuing good ends by your own free choice. You exist for the sake of your own fulfillment. Why? One reason: that is what you are; someone who exists for the sake of achieving his own fulfillment by his own free choices, for the sake of making is fulfillment is own by freely choosing it.

What human "bad for the sake of which everything else exists" need to achieve the other things that exists for their sake. To achieve those other things that exist for their sake. Human nature gives us it needs that must be fulfill to achieve other things that are "for our sake." And human nature makes some things more necessary than others to achieve the things that exist for our sake.

For our sake means for our good. It means for the sake of benefiting us.

xxxEthics, NO, AA, after final changes sent to Thomist, 2-5-

What about concept of the common good? Since Aquinas bases, or at least uses, his theory of natural law on the concept of the common good, I need to show how my presentation of Aquinas relate to that concept.

Consider in the first place the precept of loving God above all things. Love of friendship for God is lovable friendship for the common good of the universe. Love of something means willing the good for that thing. But in the case of loving God, love does not mean willing that he get any additional good. He already has all good and himself. In the case of loving God, willing to the good means assenting to the good that he is, willfully respecting the good that he it is, willfully consenting to the fact that God is God.

In the case of love for created persons there are two kinds of love to be distinguished. There is love of friendship and love of concupiscence. Regarding the second kind of love the concept of common good is not create any difficulty. Love of concupiscence wills goods other than the person for persons. The goods that it is obligated to will for persons include common goods as the principle part. The common good is higher than the individual good. That means that among the things that are good for persons the common good is higher than the individual good. Therefore in willing goods for persons we must primarily will the common good. And precepts of natural law which concern what goods love of friendship requires us to will for persons are precepts primarily telling us to will common goods for persons.

But does the precept obligate us to have love of friendship for persons concern the common good? If not, it would seem that there is a precept of natural law that is not based on the common good. Is the obligation to have love of friendship for persons an obligation to love of any good or goods that is a common good?

Since persons are that for the sake of which everything else exists, created persons in their own way are a common good of the universe. Even if there was only one created person, that person would be a common good for everything else in the universe, a good that is common relative to everything else in the universe. And a loving that person with love of

friendship amounts to loving her as that for the sake of which everything else exists, precisely as that for the sake of which everything else exists or could possibly exists. So love of friendship for that one person would amount to her loving herself as a common good of all possible other things.

Likewise, when one created person loves another created person with love of friendship, they are loving the other person as a common good of every other creature that could possibly exist.

Goods, created persons are secondary analogates of the concept of the common good of the universe, just as they are secondary analogates of the concepts of person, good, etc.

On the other hand, if you do not like analyzing a single person the universe in terms of a common good, then we can interpret Aquinas is reference to the common good in the definition of law in another way. We can say that law is a rational ordinance for the common good where ever there is such a thing as a common good. For where ever there is such a thing as a common good, it takes precedence over anything that relates to it as a corresponding individual good. So the law stated in terms of the common good will automatically tell us what ever obligations we have relative to any corresponding individual good. So it is not the case that there would be no such thing as obligation if there were no such thing as commonness in the domain of the good. In other words, it is not commonness that makes willing the good obligatory.

What obligates is not the commonness of the good but the fact that there are natural ordinations to ends such that failure to achieve the end is a privation of something that is due because it is a goal relative to a prior orientation. If there were case where there was not a common good, we would still need rational ordinances for the good. But Aquinas does not mention this case because in fact there is such a thing has the common good. So the does not have to discuss the other case which is entirely hypothetical and contrary to fact.

2 approaches to morality:

What Al the frills are stripped a way, when we get down to basics, there are really only to approaches to morality.

One way is to judge right and wrong on the basis of subjective feelings, emotions. We feel bad about the old persons suffering, so we want to help him commit suicide. We feel bad about the pregnant teenager, and we don't feel bad about the zygote, so we abort the zygote.

Of course, feelings are notoriously fickle. They are conditioned by sometimes capricious social changes. We use to be horrified by abortion; now we <u>feel</u> it is the kind thing to do.

But what alternative is there to basing our moral judgments on our feelings about things? In the last analysis, there is only one possible alternative. The only other possibility is that there is some reality, something that is what it is independently of our subjective feelings about, that is such that if we do not treat it in certain ways, we are treating it as if it is not what we know what to be by reason. There must be some reality such that when we know what it is, we cannot treat it in certain ways without being dishonest with our self, because we know we are treating it as if it were not what we know it to be. We know that the status it has in our system of values contradicts what it is in reality independently of our values.

How could there be such a reality? A philosopher named Kant said that persons are ends in themselves. He had reasons for saying this that are different from the idea that we know what things are in reality, but we might ask what genuine reasons there might be for considering persons ends in themselves. Because of that is what they are in reality, there is an object of basis for treating them as ends in themselves rather than as mere means to our ends.

One traditional basis for saying that persons are ends in themselves is the belief that persons have free choice over the ends to which there behavior and existence is directed. If that is true of what persons are in reality, and if the way we at treat them as if they were directed to our freely chosen ends as opposed to their own, then we are treating them as if they are not what they are and what we know them to be. But to so and that we are treating them as beings directed to ends of their own free choosing is to treat them as ends in themselves. It is to so choose our values that the status they have in our values is things whose ends we will as we will our own.

Now the belief that we have freedom of choice over the ends to which our action is directed is controversial. We do not intend to enter that controversy. But we want to look at the implications for morality of not believing that we have this kind of freedom. for we are merely trying to contrast to approaches to morality that are at bottom the only to choices. By contrasting them we mean we are looking at the conflicting implications for our lives that taste to approaches have.

If persons do not have free control over their ends, then the basis of their action must ultimately be their subjective inclinations, and subjective inclinations can be the only basis for morality. For example, when we say that we should not treat persons as mere objects, mere things, which is another way of saying that we should treat them as ends in themselves as opposed to treating them as mere means to our ends, we may be thinking that the characteristic in reality that makes persons deserve a certain kind of treatment from us is the fact that persons, unlike mere things, have feelings.

When we mistreat persons, we mistreat things with feelings, things that are conscious of pain and hurt. When we miss treat mere things, however, we are is treating things that cannot experience pain, that do not have feelings, etc. and it may be that what differentiates persons from things is not that persons have freedom of choice but only that they have feelings.

If feelings is the only thing that differentiates persons from things, then persons are not ends in themselves in the sense that the existence of a person is the existence of that for the sake of which all other values exist; or another words, in the sense that the existence of a person is the existence of an absolute value to which all relative values must be relative.

If feelings are what makes persons persons, when we say that we should not treat persons as objects, we really are not contrasting objects to absolute values. Persons are just a higher kind of object, but not an absolutely different kind of object. For example, if the existence of persons exist the existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists, there can be no justification in killing a person simply because they lack some other good such as freedom from pain. Freedom from pain cannot be put on the same

scale as removing a person from existence.

As a result, when feelings change, our ideas about it is
okay to kill and whom it is so not okay to kill change also.
For example, many years ago those in the pro-life movement
were warning that abortion puts us on a slippery slope
toward killing children. When they said that many people
scoffed. Now however, articles about killing children
appear in places of honor on the op-ad pages of the New York
Times.

What has changed? Only our feelings, our perceptions.
Someday our feelings may tell us that we should kill anyone
over the age of 70, because we perceive the world to be
overpopulated. It is this kind of implication that both
those who based morality on the absolute value of person and
those who based morality on the fact that persons have
feelings must confront in their own ways.

Someone who adopts feelings morality today may not like the
idea that in the future she could be one of the people kill
when our feelings about killing change. But she has to be
ready to except that implication of that kind of morality.
Today she has to except implication that maybe we should be
able to kill children.

But he told who believe that persons are absolute values
have to confront the same implication. They have to
confront the fact that it is perfectly consistent for
someone with the opposite approach to morality to except
abortion in any other kind of killing whatsoever, depending
on the fickle feelings of culture. They have to except the
fact that someone who does not agree that persons are ends
in themselves because of what they are independently of our
feelings are perfectly consistent in not agreeing with them.

The conclusion is that most of the arguments by which people
on both sides of the life issue tried to convince the others
are beside the point. Most of the arguments do not get back
to the very basis of morality itself. Nor do they get back
to the very nature of the value of the person. But unless
they do get back there, the opponents are talking passed
each other; they are ships passing in the night.

Notice that on the free will basis of morality, a person is
someone who was oriented to future free choices. She is
someone who was oriented to choices by her underlying

nature, not by whether she is fully awake now, sleeping, drunk, drugged or comatose. People in each of those states are in fact oriented toward free choices even though in different ways. For example, we now know that comatose people can wake up after years.

So when we say that the orientation to free choices makes a person an end in itself, an absolute value, we can mean just this or that way of being oriented to free choices. Because if we did, the only basis for our choice of this or that way would be our feelings about it or about them. That is why the prolifer sees human life starting at the zygote. Before the sperm and ovum unite, there does not exist an agent oriented to the future production of its own free choices. After conception, there does exists an agent whose causal dispositions orient it to be the producer of future free choices.

So if we select any time after conception as the way of being oriented to free choice that we freely choose to be the beginning of moral value, our choice and only be based on feelings about that way of being oriented to free choice as opposed to the zygote's way. But on the other hand, if persons are not absolute values, there is no other way to make such a choice except on the basis of feelings.

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xxxArtificial Contraception, birth control, AA 9-15-01

Important. Bring in a common good stuff from immediately above in the ethics section.

Footnote "natural obligation" on intrinsically evil cause effect connections. But the footnote in the final section where I discuss further conditions for the morality, the moral good and evil, of choices. In the same final section, when I discuss the good of persons as persons, refer to to Aquinas, the first question in the first part of the second part of the summa, on the moral acts being the acts of humans as humans, and vice versa.

In sex, we value our partner because of her person making ability, what we are still valuing her. So if we are devalue her person making ability we are to that extent

devaluating her. We could also devalue, for example, her
music making ability. For example, we might not be music
fans, and might prefer her to please us by using her food
making ability rather than her music making ability. But in
devaluing her music making ability in this way, we are not
devaluing her in a way that relates to the value of persons
as that for the sake of which everything else exists. But
when we devalue her person making ability, we are devaluing
her in the way that relates to the value persons as that for
the sake of which everything else exists. Specifically, we
are devaluing her by giving persons the status of not being
that for the sake of which everything else exists.

His existence and behavior is for the sake, first, of giving
himself ends and, second, of evaluating everything else by
reference to those ends.

A good can be relative and still be <u>necessary </u>for the
continued existence of something for the sake of which
everything else exists.

thwarting the nutritive function is not interfering with his
continued existence. So it does not require evaluating the
nutritive function as if it did not exist for the sake of
ends in themselves.

Sex is a means to that without which persons can acquire no
other value. If sex is not exist for that purpose, persons
are not that for the sake of which everything else exists.

Length is a relative value. Still, shortening is equivalent
to killing an absolute value. But because length is itself
a relative value, we can do something that has the fact of
shortening life, as long as the intention of the choice is
not shortening life.

If we evaluate something else as more important than
existence, we are evaluating the existence of persons as if
persons are not that for the sake of which everything else
exists. And to frustrate procreation for the sake of some
other goal, to evaluate sex as not for the sake of existence
in order to use sex for some other goal, we are evaluating
existence as if it were not that without which absolute
values could achieve no ends whatsoever.

We practice birth control precisely because one sex act can
cause life. We frustrate the nutritive function because no

one act or even multiple acts need shorten life.

If I refused to value sex as a means to end in 1 for the sake of achieving end 2, 1 is not in my values the existence of that the sake of which everything else exists. But if I refrain from pursuing 2 precisely so that in my values persons can have the status of that for the sake of which everything else exists, then...

Sex is a means to an absolute value. If in our evaluations sex is not a means to an absolute value, but we interfere with its being a means to an absolute value for the sake of achieving a relative value, in our evaluations being a means to an absolute value is on a par with being a means to a relative value; for we can sacrifice being a means to an absolute value for the sake of being a means to a relative value, which makes the relative value at least as important in our values as an absolute value. It makes an absolute value that the status in our values equal to a relative value, and vice versa.

If the value of the child does not consist in, come from, depend on, whether or not we want the child, the value of using our sexuality for the sake of procreation cannot consist of, be determined by, etc., where there we want to use it for procreation. But since sex is not an end in itself in its own right, the value of using it at all can be determined by whether we want to use it.

If the value of the means that gave 1 existence is solely 2, the value of 1 is solely 2.

If using sex as the value of 1 is solely because I want it to have that value...

If I can decide that sex will not have the value of 1 without devaluing 1, then 1 has value solely in relation to my desires.

If I can morally decide that the value of using sex will not be 1, ...

Without which there could be no other values for that for the sake of which all other values exist.
Whenever we make a choice we are seeking something as yet nonexistent. So morality is determined by how we seek

nonexistent values, where how we seek means how the way we seek them require us to evaluate existing persons. How it requires us to judge the value of being a person, to place value on being person, to give being person a place, a status, in our system of values.

I value means for the sake of ends. What place a person has in my value is is shown by how I value sex as a means to ends. (Sex: that is, you and so far as you are a sexual being.) If I value persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists, I must value you insofar as you are a sexual being as being for the sake of giving existence to persons, not just pleasure or companionship to a person.

If I value you as a means of giving a person pleasure as opposed to...

If I refused to value you insofar as you are sexual as being a means to give existence to a person in order to value you as a means to some other end, the end of existence for person is not the existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists.

So if I sacrifice existence for person for the sake of pleasure for a person, the existence of a person is not be the existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists. Better: if I value sex as achieving pleasure for person in a way that requires me to refuse to value it as providing existence for person, I am not valuing the existence of persons as the existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists.

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xxxAdd to Wittgenstein and Maritain on Intentional Existence, Apr 10, 00

To in this section where I try to show that Maritain's theory of intentional existence is core racked, as opposed to Wittgenstein's, I say that the example that I analyze is an example where we are aware of an actual entitative existent. The example of is a sense perception. An opponent might say that sense perception is not a good example because sense perception alone does not tell us that we are not hallucinating. Rather, we have to use inductive reasoning to conclude that we are not hallucinating and therefore that we are not sensing a nonexistents, or we are not aware of a nonexistents.

The reply is that the epistemological question of how I know I am not

hallucinating is a different question from the one I am answering when I say that sense perception makes us aware of an actual entitative existent. For what the inductive reasoning tells us is that this sense experience is an experience of a real existent. So when I say that sense perception bears on a real existent, I am assuming, as I have a right to assume, that the epistemological question has already been answered. For the answer to that question does not refute, bought reinforces, the fact that this experience is an experience of a real existent, and so that the purpose of intentional existence is not to explain how we can consciously relate to the nonexistents.

Bought it remains the case that Wittgenstein is the only philosopher since Aristotle to independently come up with the concept of the object of awareness existing with in the conscious being, ourselves.

xxxFrom the Turing Machine to an Averoes Machine, consciousness, Apr 10, 00

A better test of the difference between a computer intelligence and human, a better test than Turings test, would be a test in which the computer has to tell the truth. That is, but test in which the computer has to give correct answers, rather than try to fool us with answers programmed to imitate human answers. In particular, we want truthful answers to the question whether the computer is conscious. The problem is how do you ask such questions. In fact there are several problems under that heading. One problem is how do you ask such a question in a way that doesn't lead the computer to the answer you want or the answer you don't want. But a more basic problem, one presupposed by the previous problem, is just how you ask the computer whether it is conscious in a way that allows the computer to give a truthful answer.

Well, how do you ask human beings whether they are conscious? One way is to describe consciousness in terms of bipolarity. That is, following Fred Crossen, to use Husserl's description of consciousness as opposed to Descartes's. Descartes had the two acts theory of self consciousness: the act by which we areaware of ourselves as knowers of objects is distinct from the act by which we are aware of the object. Husserl, on the other hand, saw that any act of consciousness was bipolar including awareness both of an object and of ourselves precisely as being aware of the object.

But there is another way to describe consciousness that many philosophers are not aware of. Averoes used Aristotelian concepts
to describe conscious states in a way that distinguished them from non conscious states. It would be very interesting to use Averoes's description in two tests. The first test would use Averoes's concepts to see whether we could get a human being to give truthful answers to the question whether you are conscious. If the first test succeeds, then we can use the same test on a computer. How would we construct such a test?

A better test of the difference between computer intelligence and human, a better test than Turing's test, would be a test in which the computer has to tell the truth. That is, but test in which the computer has to give, rather than try to fool us with answers programmed to imitate human answers. In particular, we want truthful answers to the question whether the computer is conscious. The problem is how do you ask such a question in way that doesn't lead the computer to the answer you want or the answer you don't want. Bought a more basic problem, one presupposed by the previous problem, is just how you ask the computer whether it is conscious in a way of the asking that allows the computer to give a truthful answer.

Well, how do you ask human beings whether they are conscious? One way is to describe consciousness in terms of bipolarity. That is, following Fred Crossen, to use Husserl's description of consciousness as opposed to Descartes' ask. Descartes had the two acts theory of consciousness: the act by which we are aware of ourselves as knowers of objects is distinct from the act by which we are aware of the object. Husserl, on the other hand, saw that any act of consciousness was bipolar, including awareness both of an object and of ourselves precisely as being aware of that object.

But there is another way to describe consciousness that many philosophers are not aware of. Averoes used Aristotelian concepts to describe conscious states in a way that distinguished them from non conscious states. It would be very interestingto use Averoes's description in two tests. The first test would use Averoes's concepts whether we could get a human being to give truthful answers to the question whether you are conscious. If the first test succeeds, then we can use the same test on a computer. How would you construct such a test?

First, you would teach students to use the Aristotelian matter and form a vocabulary. But you would do this end has simplified away as possible. You would not get into the distinction between prime matter and substantial form. You could get into the distinction between substance and accident in order to explain the matter form relation between them. Perhaps you could prepare the students by giving them some good reading on these concepts. Perhaps the section on matter and form from Gilson's painting and reality. Or you might use Mortimer Adler or John wild.
Then you ask them whether, for example, the square of light on the retina was a matter form relationship. Then whether all or consciousness of the square has to a form matter relationship with what we are without that consciousness. Hopefully we could get them to give it an affirmative answer to both questions without needing to ask leading questions.

Then we would ask them about the perceived square, the square that is the object of consciousness. Is that square a feature of us? Is it a characteristic of what we are? But perhaps it would be better to start someplace else. In fact, it would definitely be better. We should start by asking them questions like would

you be completely the same person if you are now seeing a circle rather than a square? Is it different for a person to be seeing someone being mutilated as opposed to seeing a beautiful portrait.? Yes it is different. It is the history of the person who sees someone being mutilated different from the history of a person who sees a beautiful portrait instead? Or, is the history of someone who saw Pearl Harbor taking place different from the history of someone who instead saw a New York Yankee ballgame taking place at the same time?

The answer to these questions is, of course, yes. And the hope would be that after asking this kind of question, it would be easier to get them to say yes the object that we see it is a feature, a characteristic, of what we are. From there we would try to get them to say that that it is not a feature in the same way that the Square on our retina is or our consciousness of the Square is. And we would try to get them to say that the difference is that unlike the latter features, the objects is not related to us by a form matter relationship. Why? Because the object is present precisely as a characteristic of something other than ourselves or simply as itself other than ourselves. If it had a form matter relationship to us, it would not be related to us as something other than us.

In trying to lead the student up to these answers we might be able to use multiple-choice tests, assuming again that the answers are so written as not to allow the student to give the right answer just because he thinks that it is the answer that we want.

But the tests I have just described might not be the tests we want to give the computer. If a computer is not conscious, we do not want to ask it a question that requires it to have a relationship to, say, a square that can be described as not a matter form relationship. We can't start by asking it whether it has a relationship to an object that we can later ask whether it is a matter form relationship. Somehow, we want to ask the computer whether it has a relationship to say, a square, of a kind that cannot be described as a matter form relationship because the object is present precisely as having a matter form relationship to something other than the computer.

Again however, we might be able to use multiple-choice questions. Which of the following is a kind of relationship that you, the computer, does not have to the square?

It it is important that we do not have to agree with Averroes to find this kind of question interesting and worthwhile. Averroes's theory is an example, a model, of a kind of theory that we can use to describe the difference between conscious states and non conscious states. Having seen this example, maybe we can find others.

April 20, 2000, `AI, Adler-U, Jun 17, 1998`

How to ask a machine: Are you conscious? Don=t ask it if it is self-conscious.   Ask about the contents of self-consciousness, that is, the prior consciousness of the other that self-consciousness is consciousness of.

Are you related to, do you have a relation to ... To the word Atriangle@? Yes. To that for which the word Atriangle@ is used? Here one answer might be AYes, I have a relation to that triangle, and that triangle, and that triangle, ad infinitum@ (Wittgenstein on the series). Since it can=t be related to an actual infinity of triangles, can we replace the reference to the members of the set by a reference to a formula the covers each member, the formula for a triangle? Yes, but then we have to ask the same questions about each sign in the formula.

Can I ask it ABut do you have the kind of relation to that for which Atriangle@ is used that my Poinsot article shows to be a necessary cause of the behavior of using Atriangle@ meaningfully?@ AYes, I am related to that, that, that, etc. and each of them instantiates that for which Atriangle@ is used.@ But do you have a relation to it such that what individuates that, and that, and that is not included? AWell, I=ve got a relation to a math formula that applies to all triangles.@ But do you have a relation to each term in the formula such that you are related to that for which the term is used without including what differentiates this and that?

Once we have explained consciousness in terms of a matter and form, or better in terms of the contrast with matter and form analysis, we should be able to extend the explanation to self consciousness. Awareness of self is a feature residing in a subject. So awareness of self is a form matter relationship. But consciousness of self also differs from all other kinds of features residing in a subject. In consciousness we have a relation to ourselves that is other than a matter form relationship, just as our relationship to an external object of consciousness is other than a matter form relationship. In other words, the conscious knower exists in two ways. He exists as a subject with a feature. And she exists with another kind of existence at the same time. She has what she is existing in her as object, that is, what she is exists with an existence over and above that of a subject. The Square visual object exists within us bought exists within us in away other than that of the form received by a matter. It does not exist within us as a feature received in a matter, even though it is a genuine feature of ourselves. Likewise, consciousness exists within us but not as a feature received in matter, when we are talking about self consciousness. Consciousness has an existence like the existence of the Square visual object.

11-24-00

After explaining how sensory consciousness comes into existence: so is sensory consciousness and the unobservable process running alongside of all of the physical processes that we are able to observe? No, it is a process unobservable by the exterior observation running alongside all of the processes that are observable by exterior observation. But sensory consciousness is not unobservable absolutely. It is observable by interior experience. And that interior experience is the experience of a physical being, a being that is not possess some factor like a sole that would be capable of existing apart from matter. Nor are any of the processes that we are talking about capable of existing apart from matter.

Perhaps the tenacity of the modern mind/body problem can be explained almost entirely by the epistemological fallacy of completely eschewing interior experience in favor of exterior experience. Perhaps I should call this a U-turn rather than an epistemological fallacy. The opponent is aware of a notoriously unreliable descriptions assertions based on interior experience are. But if my analysis of sensory consciousness is correct, interior experience should be the only way to observe sensory consciousness.

The zone of the objects of sensory consciousness, the domain of the objects of sensory consciousness, is the domain of matter/form unions. Sensory consciousness is not a matter/form union. So sensory consciousness cannot be the object of external experience. But awareness of the existence of external experience is what we mean by internal experience.

So sensory consciousness is a physical process that is observable in precisely the way that it should be observable. It is observable in the only way that it can be observable. And this way of being observable does not make sensory consciousness an occult process, except for those who define everything not observable by external experience as something occult. But that way of defining is what creates the whole problem.

June 26, 2001

A computer does mechanical process (1) by means of another mechanical, algorithmic process (2), but has no understanding of the validity of the process. I perform mechanical process (1) by means of a different algorithmic process (3), but in addition I am aware of the rules of validity at the same time. Is it possible to explain that simultaneous awareness of validity by means of a further algorithmic, or any algorithm, without an infinite regress?

xxxThomism, Metaphysics. Existence and Essence, Substance, Matter and Form, Apr 4, 00

Unless we can prove that there is more than 1 substance in the universe, Thomists have a problem. The big bang theory creates the possibility that the universe is one substance. If you ask how all the innumerable parts of the universe can be one substance, I will reply in the same way that the body with all its innumerable parts can be one substance. But there is this important difference. We explain the unity of the body by saying that the substantial form is present in every part. That is, that the whole of the substantial form is present in every part. I don't believe that what I'm going to saying next has been said before, but it is worth saying. To get an idea of how all the whole of the substantial form can exist in every part, compare the form's causality to God's causality of the universe. We say that God is present everywhere by his causality. In other words, anywhere, that is any specific place we could point to, exists only because God is there making it exists. Likewise with the body. The only reason all or extended body exists, on the matter form theory, is that the substantial form causes an extended body to exist. Here are the causality is a formal not efficient, as it is in the case of God. But other than that the analogy is pretty good. Any spot on our body, on our extended body, exists as such, that is, exists as part of an extended continuum, only because the substantial form causes of that spot to exist as part of a continuum by causing the continuum to exist. The substantial form can only do this by existing in each part. If it did not exist in each part, only part of the substantial form would exist in each part. Then the substantial form would itself be an extended continuum, and we would haveto explain how that continuum comes to exist as a unified continuum. The only way the substantial form can be an explanation of the existence of a unified continuum is by the whole substantial form's presence at every point in the continuum. And that simply means that the form is present by its causality, because that is what the form is, a cause. So where a part of the continuum exists, the cause of the continuum must exist, and so the substantial form must exist.

To get back to comparing the universe as one substance to the body as one substance: the problem with using the matter form theory as the basisof the comparison is that the truth of the matter form theory presupposes the existence of more than one substance. It either presupposes the existence of a multitude of substances existing at the same time, or a succession of substances resulting from a succession of substantial changes. If neither of those conditions is the case, what is the basis for the matter form theory? And if the universe is one substance, neither of those conditions is the case.

Actually, there is one other way, at least, to get to the matter form theory. That way it is by explaining the relationship between universal concepts and they are individual instances. I will come back to this way later.

There is another problem for Thomists, if the universe is one substance. How do we argue for the real distinction between existence and essence? A common

way of arguing for it is From the multiplicity of substances. Multiplicity requires a limitation. Limitation requires the reception all the act by a potency really distinct from the act; hence the real distinction between the act of existence and essence.

Another way of arguing for about real distinction occurs after we have proven the existence of God and established that he is your act. But can we use the standard arguments for the existence of God if the universe is one substance? How do we know, for instance, that the existence of this substance is contingent? In fact, how do we know that this substance's existence is distinct from its essence?

I am not saying that these questions cannot be answered. But I am saying that there is work to be done, philosophical work to be done, that cannot be done simply by commenting on the texts of Aquinas. In other words, to answer this question, or these questions, Thomists will have to do something they are unfamiliar with: work of a philosophical kind.

For instance, I can't think of one possible way to argue for a multiplicity of substances that is very round about. If we can prove that intellectual activity requires a substantial form that is subsistent, we can argue that the existence of human beings constitutes the existence of a multiplicity of substances, and of substances that come into existence through substantial change. But how do we established that intellectual activity requires a subsistent substantial form if we do not have the matter form theory as a given to argue from? Perhaps there is a way. We might be able to argue that what things are, that is, what individuals are, could not be truthfully expressed by universal concepts unless individuals were composed of substantial form and prime matter. Or even if there's only one individual other than human beings, namely, the universe, for us to be able to truthfully describe that substance by means of universal concepts might imply that this one substance was composed of matter and form.

I will not try to develop that argument any further here. But I would like to add one point about proofs of the immateriality of the soul in general. We have to establish the existence of universal concepts in human beings in no way in which they do not exist in animals. One possibility that has not been explored, as far as I know, is that though animals appear to be able to use universal concepts, they give no evidence of being aware of universality as such. That is, we not only use universal concepts but we are aware of the fact that they are universal. We can reflect on that fact. That might be one way of distinguishing animal intelligence from human intelligence.

Also, I will add an answer to an objection against the suggested way of proving of the existence of a multiplicity of substances. What if an opponent were to say that the multiplicity of human consciousnesses no more proofs of the existence of many substances than the fact that we are conscious through many parts of our

body proves that we are more than one substance. In other words, why can't the existence of many human consciousnesses be ways that the one substance is conscious, just as our sight, our touch, our hearing, our imagination, etc. are different ways in which we are conscious?

Without answering this argument completely, I want to point out that it is obviously based on a false analogy. We are able to ask about the unity of all of the different ways in which we are conscious because as a matter-of-fact our consciousness is unified. That is, we are aware that it isthe same being who sees, who hears, who imagines, etc. the universe, on the other hand, gives no evidence of such a unified consciousness. That is there is no evidence that Joe's consciousness and my consciousness are unified in a higher consciousness that is aware of both Joe's consciousness and my consciousness. So the alleged analogy is pure speculation.

Also, we might be able to argue that the existence of the one substance is contingent, or that its existence is distinct from its essence, from the fact that it undergoes accidental change. That fact proves that this substance is not pure act. If its existence were identical with its essence, that is, if its essence were an act of existing, could it be in potency to anything? If not, then it could not undergo accidental change.

 xxxC and D, Jan. 24, 2000

Answering of philosophical questions requires sorting out many strands and putting them in the right place. But we start with a very tangled web. And every step is perilous; every step is one where you can go off the deep end. To sort it all out you have to concentrate.

No matter how rigorous we consider ourselves to be, the fact is that in philosophy we don't push back far enough against our own assumptions. Maritain says that critical idealists are not critical enough, and that is their problem. Logical positivists were praised for being so rigorous, even against their own assumptions. The exact opposite is the case of logical positivists. The fact that they could not see this at the same time that they and their admirers were patting themselves on the fact for being so rigorous is proof enough of what I'm trying to show. It could be no better illustration of it.

Very often the following kind of situation occurs in philosophy. We have our attention fixed on an object that is only deceptively relevant, and actually not relevant, to the philosophical problem. For example, we contemplate atri-valued logical system as an object. We think that in doing so we are helping to solve problems about quantum mechanics. We neglect that we still have to use, bivalent logic to do logic. Focusing on certain properties of the object, we are blissfully unaware of properties, the central properties, without which there would be no focusing on the object, and even no object, that is, without which the object

could not be constructed.

Contemporary culture has demonstrated that value commitments can't lying even educated people to scientific truth. For example, consider feminism, global warming, homosexuality, overpopulation, environmental issues, etc. if value commitments can't do this relative to scientific truth, they can do it much more so in the area of the parageneric and of the problems caused by thing/object identity.

The meaning of Kant much clearer than it was before. He was taking a good idea to no logical extreme. But he should have said is that we are much, much less prone to error in using causal necessary true is as regulative principles for empirical knowledge then we are when using them philosophically, that is, when studying causal necessity ontologically. In other words, we are much much more prone to error when doing philosophy. We should all recognize that our being much more prone to error in philosophy is a very well established <u>empirical</u> fact. But error in philosophy, for example, the generation of contradictions, are <u>not</u> necessary, as Kant thought they were.

If post -- Fregean philosophy has no successes as measured by solving pre-Fregean questions (as opposed to solutions to post-Fregean questions like agreeing that quantification as only one meaning), then free-Fregean philosophy must be are really strange bird. Exactly. That is the only reasonable conclusion to come to. But that reasonable conclusion is not the same as the on reasonable conclusion that would make free-Fregean philosophy invalid and/or unnecessary. Nothing could be more necessary. Perhaps we could defying philosophy as that which contains the answers to all those puzzles we cannot seem to answer. If so, the reason we have not answer them is that philosophy so defined is very, very difficult.

Abstraction in Math and metaphysics, logic, calculational method, Frege, C and D, phil method, Big 09-16-01

I did not make any progress on this until the Lord show me how to analyze concrete examples showing the difference between mathematical abstraction and philosophical abstraction. This is not induction from concrete examples. Induction would apply that I already know the right way to express the difference. If I don't know that yet, multiplying lying examples will not help per se.

Compare "snow is white and "existence is the act of all acts." The second is abstract relative to the first. But "Ex (Fx -> Gx)" is abstract relative to both in a different way. There are 2 parts to the difference: a symbolic use of signs and the calculational use of signs.

I can remember how all the words are you in a long, complex philosophical sentence. I can remember whether it was "Fxy" or "Fyx", etc. this problem relates to be symbolic use of signs, not directly to the calculational use of signs.

Now consider a long series of additions: 247 + 143 + 9562 +, etc. first, I can remember the whole strain, and so I don't remember the whole thought. In contrast, I can remember a whole complicated philosophical series of thoughts. Second, I don't know what the result of the addition is until I perform the operations that are what the + signs stand for. The second problem relates to the calculational use of signs.

xxxMemory, Jan. 24, 2000

In the memory, we are aware of an object as something that did dominate over us, did thrust itself upon us, that was thrust upon us. So in memory, we have an awareness of ourselves as having been dominated over in this way, as having had this object thrust upon us, etc. bought in imagination, we have an awareness of an object, like a red or a musical note, as potentially thrusting itself upon an as something that can potentially thrust of itself upon us, or be thrust upon us.

xxxLogic, Pena, Vagueness, Sorites, Jan. 24, 2000

Who ever is rich pass enough money to achieve these practical results. Whoever has X amount is rich. Does it follow that whoever has one less than X is still rich? That dependence on what you mean by the practical results. If you have an exact quantity in mind, it may not be true that one less than X makes you rich. If you don't plan an exact quantity in mind, "rich" does not objectify individual quantities quantitatively. So we mix types of concepts when we try to reason from whoever has X is rich to whoever has one less than X is rich, where X and rich may be nonquantitative objectifications while "1" is quantitative.

Rich is a subjective description. It assumes that the hearer and I share a common goal. It describes quantity by saying of it that the quantity is significant from the point of view of that goal or that the quantity is subjectively impressive in a positive sense from the point of view of that goal. The reason that we replace a subjective description with quantitative is precisely that subjective descriptions can very what the eye of the beholder. So the fallacy of going from rich to plus one is like that of going from ought to is. Rich is like ought to, and plus one is like is.

The bottom line is that just because it is fallacious to mix these kinds of concept in a argument does not mean that each statement taking singly cannot be true.

We are invalidly combining two kinds of measurement, like forgetting to convert from metric to British, but here conversion is invalid. + 1 indicates one kind of measurement. "Big", "rich" etc. indicates another. That latter is basically subjective. I have such and such a reaction to his size, based on my goals and

experience; and in using "big" I am assuming that you have goals and experience similar enough to mine that you will have a similar reaction. "Big" says "You would have the kind of reaction I had, and for the same reason. But I am not assuming how far our similarity in reaction would go, as the absolute size differed, anymore than I am assuming how far my similarity in reaction would go; for I do not know, nor do I need to know, how far my similarity in reaction would go. The reason I do not need this is that unclear cases cannot disprove the existence of clear cases.

The fact that our two reactions may only be similar, or that two reactions of mine may only be similar, in a certainr respect is no problem. Even in the case of strictly univocal and universal terms, the individuals to which they apply are only similar outside the mind. The question is whether they are sufficiently similar that the same abstracted concept can be identical with each. But sometimes the abstracted concept does not apply clearly to all cases; sometimes it does; sometimes it only applies clearly to some cases.

The last two paragraphs apply to +1 kind of vagueness, i.e., vagueness where the opposite kind of measurement is objective and quantitative. What about "chair", "car", etc., including "vague" itself? These cause no problem unless the they function in the same kind of sorites as +1 type vague terms. If they do function in such sorites, another way out must apply to them.

And why not just come out and say that I will use "big", "rich," etc. in a way that makes it logically invalid to combine them in argument with +1?

Perhaps there is a similarity here to reasoning with analogical concepts. Two things make it possible to do this. First, the analogical term is used in the same way each time it appears in the argument. That is, no statement in the argument uses the analogical term in such a way that the use is proper only to one analogate and not the others. In vagueness, you do not combine vague predications with +1 predications. Each general term has to be vague in the same way.

Second, the possibility of analogical reasoning may also rely on the fact that tthe two analogical terms vary in the same way, e.g., whatever exists is good such that variations in ways of existing have corresponding variations in ways of having goodness or being good.

April 20, 2000

The title of the article might be "in defense of a fallacy: vagueness reconsidered." Or perhaps vagueness appreciated, or perhaps vagueness defended.

If the premise is "if the thing is big, then the thing minus one is big," there is a fallacy of equivocation. The word big is used in different senses in the

antecedent and the consequent. In the antecedent big has a practical rather than a speculative meaning. It means something like significant for the purposes at hand. It is significant from the point of view of some assumed goal that is taken for granted in the conversation, taken for granted in the background of the conversation. I have remarks to this effect somewhere in another Notes file. Or it means that the thing has his size that would impress you, the listener, or impresses me, the speaker, given certain goals or standards we are assumed to have.

In the antecedent it must means something different. Why? Because the consequent use is a speculatively defined quantity, plus one, or minus one. For the consequent to have truth value, then, or for the consequent to be true, the other term of the plus or minus relation should also be a speculatively defined quantity.

Not all vagueness is of the quantitative variety. For example, chair is a vague predicate. But could chair the use in the be used in the sorites? Perhaps not, but as far as the sorites goes, to combine a word like one or two to a word like big or small is to combine two different kinds of measuring, two different ways of measuring. Likewise, reasoning with analogical terms is valid only because in sentences like "whatever exists is good" the subject in the predicate are measured in the same way and so vary what each other in the same way. That is, as one thing differs from another with reference to existents, it will also differ from another with reference to goodness. So the syllogism using that premise doesn't take existence or goodness in the specific way in which applies only to the minor term. The syllogism uses each of these terms in the same way in the each premise and in the conclusion.

If we were to define a term like "big" one time as a quantity falling within such and such a specifically measured range and in other time as a quantity that would be impressive from the point of view of a person who has a goal x has the standard which determines whether she is impressed or not, we will would be using that term in two different senses; we would be using that term using that term equivocally.

If I tell of gold -- digger that blind date I am fixing her up with is "rich," what I need is that the money he has is of a sufficient amount to "impress" her. In other words, "rich" is "defined" by a subjective reaction on her part. The fact that what we'll or will not impressed or is not very precise, and the fact that she herself would hesitate over many cases, are both truths. And so they offer no evidence whatsoever against the existence of bivalent truth or our ability to know it.

Of course, if we had complete scientific knowledge, we could predict in-state exactly what her reactions would be, clearly impressed, clearly unimpressed, or various states in between. Each of the states is what it is and is not what it is not. So each stage is monovalent. But we can objectify these states in different

ways and for different purposes. When we objectify such a state by the word-function of "rich", the truth value of the statement is not make the statement suitable for all purposes. In particular, is not suitable for appearing in argument in which we draw a conclusion about what happens when we add an arithmetically objectified quantity to it.

11-24-00 truth, speculative and practical knowledge, vagueness, Pena, sorites BIG

The ancient Egyptians would have said things like "that property line is to close to the tree", "that border is further away and it was last year." They were using what Maritain calls practical vocabulary. Because of the vagueness of this vocabulary, they invented geometry. Then they could say things like "that property line should be free seat further from the tree," "that border is five yards further away that it was last year." This is what Mary can calls speculative vocabulary.

It is interesting that mathematics is the purest example of a speculative knowledge as opposed to practical knowledge. Yet, there is nothing more practical from the point of view of human ends than possessing that speculative knowledge we call mathematics. So right away we have an important example, or an example showing the importance of, the question of whether a type of knowledge is practical knowledge as opposed to the question of whether a person has a practical purpose in pursuing a particular branch of knowledge.

A distinction between speculative and practical knowledge, as opposed to the question of what person's purpose is in pursuing a kind of knowledge, is much more difficult to make than ordinarily admit, or people are ordinarily conscious of. Just take a look at those sections on speculative and practical knowledge and vocabulary in the second part of the degrees of knowledge, or the first chapter I believe of the book by Finnis's that which published by Georgetown University press. I will attempt to have an out a more rigorous distinction than is usually offered. Doing this is important not only in itself but also for the sake of being able to apply the speculative/practical vocabulary distinction to the problem of the sorites and vagueness.

Practical knowledge has to do human ends in the means to achieve them. But in order to make the speculative knowledge/practical knowledge distinction we have to recognize that in addition to practical knowledge about things that are human ends there is also speculative knowledge about such things. Knowledge itself is a human end, but all sorts of knowledge about knowledge are speculative knowledge about knowledge. God is a human end, intellectual contemplation is a human end, love is a human end, and so on. If there is such a thing as practical knowledge to be distinguished from speculative knowledge, we have to be able

to distinguish practical knowledge about things like God, contemplation, love, knowledge, and speculative knowledge about these things.

Practical knowledge deals with human ends considered as such, that is, which truths in which human ends are objectified as human ends. Thus, in my ethics article, when I say that the failure to love God above all things is a failure to value him to be what he is, I am talking about a human end, namely, the end of valuing guide to be what he is, but I do not identify it as a human end. Knowledge of the truths under consideration, namely the truth that failure to love God above all things is a failure to value him to be what he is, does not inform us that any of the things mentioned in that truth are human ends.

On the other hand, the truth that failing to love God above all thing is a failure to achieve the end of the rational appetite, or that failing to value God to be what he is is a failure to achieve the end of the rational appetite, is a truth about human ends considered as such, about human ends objectified as human ends, about human ends identified it as being human ends.

In the case of artistic knowledge, knowledge about how to make houses, cars, paintings, and so on, we are dealing with things that are nothing but human ends or means to human ends. And so knowledge about them is always practical knowledge, even if the truths we know about them don't seem to identify them in relation to human ends. For merely an always knowing them to be what they are is to know them as human ends.

Speculative knowledge is knowledge of truths about disinterested matters, indifferent objects. What are disinterested and in different objects? Hopefully, that is what the preceding paragraphs make clear; that is certainly what they try to make clear.

try this formula: the truths known by speculative knowledge are true of things because the things are objects of human interest and only because the things are objects of human interest. Or perhaps: a truth of practical knowledge is a statement true of something because the thing is an object of human interest.

And what has this to do with the problems of the vagueness and bivalence relative to truth? When we say that quote "that is big," "a heap", "a lot," "chubby," "rich," etc., what we mean is " that is in a range, or part of a continuum, which, given your interests or purposes, you would call "big," "a heap," etc. But if you add or subtract anything from a value you have objectified in any of the preceding ways, it does not follow that the result of adding or subtract the can likewise be objectified in any of these ways. (Also, cloud, share chair share, person.)

All that the opponent can show is that the way the values are objectified by

predicates like the above is such that it is not suitable to use operations like adding and of subtracting with them. Just because certain kinds of <u>reasoning</u> cannot use certain predicates, it does not follow that sentences using that predicates are not <u>true</u>. So the argument based on the so right cease is off the point. That argument that most shows that certain kinds of reasoning with certain kinds of sentences does not work.

  the anti-bivalence person is trying to show something different: that such vagueness prevents a sentence from being true.

If we mix predicates like "plus 1" and "big", we commit a fallacy of equivocation by mixing terms having practical meanings with terms having speculative meanings.

The way quantity is objectified by "rich," big," etc. is such that it is not suitable as operations like adding and subtracting with it. So these terms provided no argument against bivalence.

clarity. Is a concept unclear, or is our perception of individuals not clear enough to apply it and, or both? A person with 28 -- 20 vision would have difficulty applying some concepts. The question is whether a concept is clear enough for the purpose for which we are using it. Often, indeed almost always, in philosophy the purpose for a concept, for the use of a concept, is not to identify an individual.

If the purpose at hand makes a concept to be the kind of concept that it is appropriate to add 1, then the meaning of the concept is that of a quantitative and range, and the premise that the result of adding 1 is in the same range need not be true.

Even if a concept is made, there can be clear cases that are not disprove by the existence of unclear cases; anymore than the existence of "the great unwashed" this proves the existence of them will but great washed." Here, a " clear" case of concept F means that case that it is <u>unreasonable</u> to consider a non-F. What is reasonable is to be determined inductively. But here, induction applies not only to the individual we are describing by a concept but also to the individual who is using a concept. It is unreasonable to believe that this individual is not an instance all what a particular person means by a concept both because of what induction tells us about the individual being described and about the purposes of the individual doing the describing.

The example of the practical meaning of "long" is a perfect perfectly valid example for the Egyptian case. But a clearer example might be something like this. "The margin of error you left yourself for that boundary is too large." "The margin of error is too small."

A great and small town rich and poor. These concepts locate their reference and

different places on the same continuum, without objectifying what those places exactly are. They objectified those places only as "significant from the point of view of some practical, ethical, aesthetic, political, religious, goal, in fact, and a goal other then the goal of finding speculative truth."

And that significance cannot be defined by actually dividing the new. Such concepts locate things on a continuous scale. a scale potentially divided into discrete sections but not actually so divided, as far as the meanings of these terms certain. These concepts referr to the relative positions of things on a scale that must, for the sake of these concepts, that is, by the nature that these objective concepts happens at hand, be potentially, not actually, discreetly divided.

So the significance of these concepts cannot be defined by saying up to this point "poor ", this point and beyond rich."

Also, great and small, rich and poor, are relative concepts. They locate their reference and different places on the same continuum, without objectifying what those places exactly are. Because we're talking about continuous rather than discrete quantity, and a point on the scale will always be greater than some, thing and smaller than others, no matter how close to either end we take point. For the nature of these concepts is such that any quantity is both great and small from different points of view. If we add or subtract something from a quantity, result is still both great and small from different points of view, though not exactly all of the same points of view.

So concepts like greater and smaller do not work in such away that for any discrete quantity added or subtracted, we can saying that the results is significant from the point of view, or for the point of view, that defines great and small. For there will always be quantities between that which that which is now small and that which is now big such that it is undefined whether these in between quantities are themselves big or small in this sense.

"Small" objectifies a quantity in a relation true all the other quantities in one part of a potentially divided continuum; "big" objectifies the same quantity in relation to all the other quantities in the potentially divided continuum. And each of these concepts objectifies quantitative in relation true some practical value from the point of view of which each of these parts of the continuum are either better or worse as means to that end.

So it is not just vagueness that is the cause. It is a mixture off vagueness and precision, in the same respect, that is one of the causes. All judgments mix different objectification is, but here are the objectification is our such that they are meanings and so differ that we can mix them in certain ways but not in other ways. In particular, we cannot mix them in the reasonings requiring addition and

subtraction.

A use larger than B, B Is Smaller Than A. If I Adding a Penny to the Second Quantity, is it still smaller? Not necessarily. So the small is to be smaller Then a Quantity and to Be Smaller Than It by a Continuous Range of Potential Quantities which range is important relative to some practical standard, some standard other than speculative truth.

Of course, both speculative knowledge and practical knowledge are knowledge of speculative truths. So we can ask what I the difference between speculative and practical knowledge should make such a big difference to speculative and practical vocabularies. Why, for instance, should to the difference between them be so great fact, as Maritain shows, they can appear to contradict each other?

Both concern the conformity between what exists or can exist outside the mind and what exists in the mind, or what exists in the mind and what exists or can exist in reality. But the speculative and the practical ways of relating to the existence to which the each conform are essentially different. Conformity to what exists or can exist outside the mind the essence of knowledge. But speculative and practical knowledge have contrary, not contradictory, ways of relating to what can exist outside the mind.

In one case, the goal is purely to make the way things now exists or now can exist outside the mind exist inside the mind. In the other case, we also know speculative truth about how things can exist outside of the mind. But those truths specifically concern how to put something that now exists only in the human mind into existence outside the human mind. So we have what appears to be an analogical set. In both cases, we have speculative truth, which is conformity of the mind to an object which is entirely plausible in relation to the knowledge, and in no way an effect of the knowledge. But in the second case we have an additional relation in which the object is also an effect of the knowledge.

We might have speculative knowledge, for example, of how a supernova can come about. If a supernova occurs tomorrow, something that previously existed in the human mind and only now exists in reality. But we did not put it into reality; we did not knowingly cause the supernova. Practical knowledge, on the other hand, concerns precisely how to put what now exists only in the human mind into existence outside the mind. In other words, it concerns making reality conform with what is now inside our mind only. While speculative knowledge concerns making what exists in our mind conform to the way things now exist or can exist outside the mind.

Bringing a supernova into existence cannot be the end of an activity directed by human knowledge. We cannot have knowledge of a supernova that objectifies the supernova as an end to be achieved by activity directed by human knowledge. When a supernova comes into existence, the supernova is like an

end of human activity in this sense that its coming into existence is the coming into existence of something that existed previously only in the human mind. But it did not exist in the human mind as an end for human striving, as an end for human striving considered as such. In other words, we cannot have practical knowledge about a supernova. For we cannot have knowledge of how to make reality conform to the concept of a supernova that now exists in our mind.

Is it impossible for practical vocabulary to be precise? Perhaps yes perhaps no. Certainly when we "define" practical vocabulary by subjective responses, as we usually implicitly do in the case of terms like "rich," "huge," etc., etc., the vocabulary certainly be imprecise. But there are two points to be made here in favor of my case. First, beings age does not mean that sentences using them cannot be bivalent league true. It's simply means that they are vague truths. Second, even if they are precise, or even when they are precise, it does not follow that we can mix them with arithmetic terms in an argument without a fallacy of equivocation.

If practical vocabulary can be precise, it is to the extent and only to the extent that our conscious relations to human ends allows them to be precise. To did agree that the ends providing the meanings of the practical vocabulary are subjective, they cannot be precise in this sense that speculative vocabulary is precise. In other words, to the agree that our practical vocabulary is defined by subjective responses, our meanings cannot be precise.

12-12-00

The last few paragraphs are based on a file called "Logicpen" in folder "Doc" on my other computer. What follows here are some remarks referring to that file rather than quoting from it. In both practical knowledge and speculative knowledge about the possible, there is knowledge about how something that exists in the human mind can come to exist outside the human mind. For example, speculative knowledge can tell me how earthquakes come about. If an earthquake occurs tomorrow, the occurrence will verify that my knowledge about how earthquakes are possible is true. The earthquake occurs because a process that previously existed in the human mind only came to exist in reality also.

Practical knowledge, on the other hand, concern us the coming into existence outside of the human mind of what already exists in the human mind by human activity. It concerns how to bring into existence of previously conceived human end by a process of previously conceived human activity putting into existence previously conceived means to that end.

Under the heading "November 18 , 1998 big" their follows a page were so that could be added right after stuff above.

The following comments referred to page numbers that were accurate as of this date. If the page numbers have changed because of possible later edits too this file, the passages can still be found by their headers.

Under the heading "Pena, Aug. 3 1,9 4" I referred to in example to be used against the paraconsistent people. In "reason and morality," page. 197, Allen Gewirth uses the example of a dictator who uses contradiction for his own purposes. But this example does not support Pena's and others' justification for a paraconsistent logic, because they dictator would not knowingly countenance contradiction at the level of his own purposes.

Next in the logicpen file comes the header "truth -- Pena" 3 -- 2 7 -- 8 9" the two paragraphs there both continue and expand the arguments against Pena started above in this file, and argue against the idea that sentences cannot possess truth as units.

I am going to reproduce the next two paragraphs here, because they constitute one of my best statements of what logical relations are from the perspective of distinction between things as things and things as objects of knowledge. The header is "thing and object -- Pena -- paralogues, 3 -- 2 7 -- 8 9"

Pena objects to the use of terms like "as", "insofar as," and other reduplicative terms. What the analysis of parageneric abstraction in chapter 1 2 of "causal realism" shows that reduplicative expression are unavoidable in philosophy.

I use reduplication to describe logical relations in chapters 3 and 4. Logical relations pertain to objects as objects. What does "as" mean here? Causal relations. Logical relations are relations "resulting from" making things objects. They are also (2) relations pertaining to objects and (3) relations perceived to pertain to objects, that is, relations that exist in apprehension as themselves objects and exist in apprehension as modifying other objects. Further they modify other objects as a result of the other objects being objects. For they are perceived to be ways of being objects, one way of being an object as opposed to another way, or they are perceived to be ways of making things objects (for example, the identity relation). The idea that they are "ways of being objects" is the important new way of expressing it in this paragraph. "Ways of making things objects" is another new and good way of putting it.

The causal relations involved are both efficient (resulting from things being objects) and final (characterizing objects the sake of making them objects).

I look at a series of my signatures. Each is somewhat the same and someone different from the others. In other words, they are vaguely the same. They are the same in some vague way. If they are only vaguely the same, how do I know or how does anybody else know that they are intended to signify the same person? By causal reasoning about the intent of the signers. And all

interpretations causal reasoning. The interpretation of what the user is intended by "big," "rich," "chair," etc. is causal reasoning.

Consider: "if something is small, then continuously adding small amounts to be at results in something small." Not only is that false, it is contradictory. It contains the implicit contradiction that some quantity can be small washed but no quantity can be big, though big and small are comparative terms that require one another.

"At a little bit more red to the paint and the color will still be close enough to white for your purposes." That statement is <u>not</u> always true. So why should statements about adding 1 penny to a person's wealth still leading him rich or poor always be true?

When I use a term of practical vocabulary like "rich," "big," etc., I am in effect making a prediction about your subjective reaction to a certain quantity, say a quantity of money. When I say that somebody is rich, I am saying that he has an amount of money that is the kind that would provoke from you the subjective reaction you express by saying "he is rich." And that statement of mine can be false. There are specific mechanisms in your brain that deterministically would produce a reaction of calling something rich, calling it not rich, or hesitating about whether to call it rich. And on that basis it may well be false to say that if we had one penny to the amount in question would still have the same reaction. So the fact that vocabulary is practical rather than speculative can indeed make a difference to the issue of truth or falsity and of bivalence, a difference that undercuts the critics of bivalence. For it undercuts the use of this kind of example as an objection to bivalence.

My practical use of words like "big," "Rich," etc., says something like: given your interests, purposes, intentions, goals, emotional dispositions, mindset, etc., the thing or quantity I am describing will be at or above a point that will cause a particular kind of affective reaction in you. That is why my use is practical rather than speculative. But the vagueness comes from the fact that I do not know exactly where that pointed its. It comes from my ignorance of your mental conditioning. But my ignorance of your mental conditioning does not imply that there is no such conditioning. Likewise, my failure to describe the quantity, say, in precise mathematical terms does not mean that what I describing is not one specific quantity as opposed to all others.

But vagueness with this cause does imply that the premise of the sorites that status that a few subtracts so much from what is vague is still big is not true. Subtracting anything might move the thing beyond the point, whatever that pointed its, where you would have the kind of reaction I am predicting that you would have.

Vague terms like "big," "rich," "small," "poor," are not <u>useful</u> in the borderline cases. They are not <u>practical</u> when we are trying to point to the areas between

areas that are unambiguously big or small, rich or poor. But this is simply to say that that is not the kind of work that words like this do. As a result, we sometimes don't know whether to classify a quantity as big or small, rich or poor. But this does not violate the principle of excluded middle. There is such a saying as being in between, but the usefulness of that concept is not such that it is good and borderline cases between, say, big, neither big nor small, small; rich, neither rich nor poor. It does not follow that there are not plenty of cases where they are useful. It just means that not every premise of the sorites is true.
xxxontological analysis big, January 12, 2000

Being is logically included in all word-functions, bought it is not logically included in a way that distinguishes one word function from another. To be alluded to in a word function, that is, explicitly alluded to, is not the same as being logically included. And in ontological concepts being is explicitly alluded to in a way that distinguishes one kind of being from another.

We cannot use being and other ontological concepts to express, to objectify, how red and green differ. Ontological concepts can only express what red and green have in common. They can only express the similarity between red and green. Ontological concepts can only express what red and green have in common and what the differences between red and green have in common, and what the difference of red from green has a common with red, and what the difference of green from red as a common with green.

We cannot objectify what makes red differ from green by means of diverse ontological concepts, in terms of diverse ontological concepts. We can objectify what makes substance differ from accidents, causes from effects, actuality from potentiality, necessity from contingency, truth from falsity, etc. by means of diverse ontological concepts; we must objectify these things by means of diverse ontological concepts. It is a question of how we use being and other ontological concepts in objectifying diversities between things, between realities and aspects of reality.

Page

xxxLimitation of act by potency, 01-11-00

God overflows all bounds. About everything else we can only say that it is no longer bounded with respect to this kind of bounds or that kind of bound. If something is no longer bounded by this or that kind of bound, it is unlimited in that respect, unlimited with respect to that kind of limitation. But it's still may be bounded in other respects, with respect to other kinds of bounds. A. subsistents whiteness would be on bounded with respect to that kind of bound that comes from a potency to receive whiteness. In other words, the potency for receiving whiteness is potentially infinite, and no amount of that potency can ever exhaust the possibility for whiteness. The whiteness itself can never be limited to a

particular amount of whiteness, where amount refers to all the whiteness that can be received by potency for whiteness. Much whiteness is still something limited in other respects; for whiteness itself is a way of receiving existence. It is a potency for exists. And so it is a limiting factor with respect to existence.

Page

xxxMiracles, 12-22-99

Essays in Thomism, edited by Robert E. Brennan

From an abundant spring: the Walter Farrell Thomist, P. J. Kennedy, New York

Page

xxxLife, substantial change, 12-22-99

Any CS imposes its own form on something external to itself. In life the result of imposing the form is not a numerically distinct form or a numerically distinct CS with a similar form. The result is the continued existence of a CS oriented to use of a new material to act on itself, to so act on itself that one part of itself axon another with the result of the continued existence of a CS oriented to achieve goals X, Y, Z. by parts of itself acting on parts of itself. The properties of the two become instrumental causes pauses used by the principal cause, the plant. Only in procreation does a CS pass its form to a numerically distinct individual. So do inanimate causes, but the form imposed it is the form of a CS oriented to maintain its own existence by . . .
Page

xxxFrom the Turing Test to an Averroes Test, August 9. 1999

What we really want is a test in which the machines must tell the truth instead of trying to fuel us. We want a truth whole answer to the question are u conscious, or do you have consciousness? Vie consciousness I do not mean a second act of awareness that has a first distinct act of awareness as its object. By consciousness I mean and awareness of my own existence that a company is mind awareness of any other object. Or, and awareness of my existence as an us that which is aware of X whenever awareness of any X exists. This is want Fred Crosson called Husserl's concept of consciousness. To find Crosson's reference to that concept, check any of his books or anthology on artificial intelligence. He may not referred to the Husserl my name but he will certainly have a description of that concept of consciousness in contrast to others.

How can we describe consciousness so that we can program a machine to truth only answer whether it is conscious or not? Averroes has a description that will

distinguish consciousness from any other state, from any non-conscious state. The description and uses Aristotle's metaphysics. So the question be comes whether we can teach the machines Aristotle metaphysics. To use Averroes description, you do not have to believe Aristotle's metaphysics. We do not have to say that change must be looked at in terms of matter and form; we only have to say that it can be looked that in these terms.

But this raise is some other questions, and that is the point of going into this discussion of Averroes. One question is whether the only way to describe consciousness is metaphysical. And if sold, can we teach a machine to do metaphysics. The by teaching a machine to do metaphysics, I'd not mean programming at to give the correct answers in a Turing test. That is the whole point of wanting a machine that gives truthful answers. But then how can we be sure that the machine understands metaphysics? One way is a by requiring it to be able to figure out whether or not it is conscious, given Averroes analysis.

Another question arises if we cannot teach a machine to do metaphysics in this way. As Gilson said, man is a metaphysical animal. If a machine the cannot do metaphysics, there is something crucial to what we do, and to what makes us what we are, that machines cannot do.

Also note the following in connection with Aristotle analysis of change, which Averroes relies on. We might think that the reduction of all change to locomotion might eliminate the relevance of a matter form analysis of change. But a mere change of place still requires that something do with exist as the result of the change; that is, requires some new reality to be present. If the only thing new is a spatial relationship between two bodies, then you 1/2 to admit the reality of relations. And Aristotle consider is relations accidental forms. One way out of this in some cases is that from new spatial relationships other properties not reducible to a mere change of position sometimes emerge. Since these properties are other than spatial relations, and Aristotelian form would be needed to account for them; or at least, the change can be looked that in terms of Aristotelian forms, even if mere locomotion cannot.

page

xxxYes and NO. putsverd, AA, August 2, 1999

The question is not whether it might be possible to have a criterion but what purpose the criterion would serve in a particular case, especially the case of the argument I am now making.

Don't forget to have a reference at the end about Tarski. All so church and touring machines.

Awareness that an inference is a valid requires implicit awareness of the validity

of an inference principal. It is in possible that the implicit awareness of the validity of the inference principal take place body that views of a criterion For recognition. Use of A. criterion would require and implicit inference the just as the use of rules a and be do. So awareness of the validity of the implicit inference would requires another use of A. criterion, which would require another implicit inference, which would require another use of A. criterion, etc.

9-21-99

In the web of belief, there are places where the use of criteria is more appropriate than in other places. And there are some places where it would not be useful. And there are some places where it could not be useful. The use of criteria are not even possible in the case of the self-evident necessity of the validity of an inference. It would generate an infinite regress of inferences, since the awareness of the self-evident necessity of the validity must be implicit in awareness of the premises.

> So the move away from axiomatic method does not eliminate the need for self-evident necessity.

> If a sentence is <u>true </u>by the meanings of its terms, we must be <u>able </u>to know that it is true by knowing the meaning of its terms alone.

12-22-99

We don't grasp that Red is a color by first identifying and LCO that distinguishes color from red.

This counterfactual argument does not require that there be languages that express the same thing we do or that we could no then they do, if in fact they exist.

5-11-00

Important. In this section where I started talking about Quine, I make the statement that a particular truth that I call attention to it is "true by virtue of meaning". That needs to be clarified later. The fact is that is true by virtue of the fact that the meanings differ only by LCO's. So the nonlinguistic objects that are meant cannot be different in their prelinguistic state. If they were different, that would contradict the hypothesis that the meanings differ only by LCO's.

5-23-00

In the last section where I talk about self-evident about arranging strings of marks being less abstract and foundational I could say less abstract and epistemologically foundational or metaphysically foundational.

It happens that if we use language in certain ways, we cannot avoid being aware

of certain LCO. And it happens to be the case that if we are acquainted with certain LCO's, we cannot avoid being able to see the necessity of certain true is. If LCO's become objects of awareness in any other way, they would not be LCO's.

When we are acquainted with such relations, we are acquainted with relations that make certain sentences necessarily true. And acquaintance with these relations is sufficient for knowing that the meanings, that for which we use, certain words do not differ except on the side of those relations, except by such relations. If we are acquainted with some meanings, we cannot fail to be acquainted with relations between them that render some sentences necessarily true. But acquaintance is one thing, ability to explain their difference from others, or to express criteria for identifying them, is another.

In the last paragraph, should I express myself in terms of wanting formal clarity and rigor suppose, or in terms of what awareness of formal clarity and rigor presupposes?

Point out that just as mathematics is entirely valid subject on its own, and not just in a to science, so the formal methods used by logic or the study of those that is entirely valid subject on its own. But view it as a means to awareness of inferential validity, formal methods are a tool. That is, view it as an epistemologically useful means, and epistemologically successful means, to the awareness of inferential validity.

Explain that by the "terms" of relations, I mean the "relata" of relations.

The technical success of nonstandard logic cannot and does not do away with the role of the principles of standard logic in our grasp of the technical success of nonstandard logic. That is all I am saying. My point should be considered a very minor one for those whose chief interest is logic itself; for their just as no other way to get any place than by the use of formal methods. but it is more than of minor point for those who want to draw philosophical conclusions from what logic can achieve. Just as Putnam has shown that Tarski's great technical achievement tells philosophers nothing about truth in natural languages, so I am only saying that the success of nonstandard logic tells philosophers nothing about the epistemological status of consistency, bivalence, more necessary truth.

What red is and what color is are prelinguistic values. Now what color is vague relation to what red is. So of a prelinguistic value, for example, what red is, we can predicate a linguistically constituted value, for example, being more precise than. That is, linguistically constituted values can be features that accrue to prelinguistic values. If so, they are features a longing to prelinguistic values as a result of being expressed in language. The combination of these 2 kinds of features makes all the difference when we talk about logic and logical necessity.

This shows that logic is not about laws of thought. It is about properties belonging to what red is and what color is. Nor is logic about "abstract objects", for example structures, models, sets, or set-theoretically defined relations.

Do not say that necessary truth is defined as a "function of" and what make sentences true, but that they are defined by "reference to" what make sentences true. That is, what makes multiply predicate of sentences true. They are defined by a condition for the truth of multiply predicate of sentences.

May be dropped to stop about epistemology using psychological concepts. Just point out that LCOs are not psychological relations.

12-26-00, BIG

Here is an idea I can use if I separate the section on disapproving that everything follows from contradiction into its own article. At the end of that article I can make the distinction between logic and logistic. Then I can ask why it's worth pointing out. When the early critics of modern logic pointed out, it might not have been worth noting. But for want of making that distinction, certain claims are made for the later results of modern logic, certain epistemological claims, that would have been better served to acknowledge this distinction first. Putnam's critique of the disquotational theory of truth is a good example of this. Other examples are the claims that are made about consistency, necessary truth, and bivalence.

The technical success of nonstandard logic cannot and does not do away with the role of the principles of standard logic in our grasp of the technical success of nonstandard logic. That is all I am saying. My point should be considered a very minor one for those whose chief interest is logic itself; for their just as no other way to get any place than by the use of formal methods. but it is more than of minor point for those who want to draw philosophical conclusions from what logic can achieve. Just as Putnam has shown that Tarski's great technical achievement tells philosophers nothing about truth in natural languages, so I am only saying that the success of nonstandard logic tells philosophers nothing about the epistemological status of consistency, bivalence, more necessary truth. Instead of saying "p" also is one, say "p" also has the value T, or the value 1.

Principles of noncontradiction express the function of "negation," which is to prevent the contradictories from both achieving some presumed goal.

In any argument assigning that indicates that a premise is contradictory (a negation sign) must have the same use in each of the inference principles that allow us conclude to "q". Otherwise, the contradictory premise and to be principles are irrelevant to each other. The sign indicates the assignment or lack of assignment of some target value (1, T, etc.) to a formula. So we have simultaneous assignment and lack of assignment of Albany value to an

expression (assignment or association with; value or state). It is the fact that the premises the simultaneous presence or absence of the value that prevents any principal employing assigning indicating contradiction into premise from being a truth functionally valid principal (or true on every model, or true under every possible assignment of 1, 0, etc.)

For if a principle using a sign indicating absence of a value is now valid, that is, true under all interpretations, it need not be true under all interpretations. Under contradiction, a principle was validity turns on the absence of the value will not be truth functionally valid. Likewise a principle was validity results from the presence of that value will not be truth functionally valid, if the simultaneous absence in presence of that value is allowed.

Rutz's point is within logic itself; in addition to that, there is the following epistemological point.

He said, "this sentence is", and what he said is true. Also try using italics. Or how about "this string of shapes is true" or "the space occupied by this string of shapes is true"? Or "the first so many digits in this string of letters between quotation marks is true"? In each of the latter cases, the subject is something that is neither true nor false; because what ever causal conditions are necessary for a string of marks to achieve the status of being true or false, and I do not need to know all of what those conditions are, they certainly are not achieved in those strings. And if they are not achieved in the latter cases, there is no reason to think they are achieved in the first case, the "sentence is" case.

start section 3: we can choose, stipulate, etc. definitions, rules, etc. but awareness of rule keeping is not awareness of logical necessity. Still, awareness of rule keeping presupposes awareness of the validity of principles of inference. That consciousness depends on awareness of how words are used; so it depends on consciousness of the contradictoriness of the opposite. And incommensurability does not affect contradictoriness. Putnam shows that there cannot be a computational proof of what I want to say (Godel same).

Put LCO's and self-evidence as close to the end as possible, that is, to explain "what has gone before," where the latter includes as much as possible. When you get to LCO is, start by saying that they will not be a novelty; they have roots in medieval logicians.

Start: prior to Frege we could have said... Here bring in the nontechnical way of saying it. But Frege does not help this argument, or any argument to show that everything follows from contradiction.

Later, include Ashworth in the text; explain virtual, absolute, formally valid.

Once LCOs are in existence, they are properties of whatever predicates like "red"

and "colored" apply to. But there need not be separate words for that. What about when there are separate words, like" if," "not," etc.? When such LCOs make us aware of the logical necessity of inferential principles, there is an implicit awareness of the principles only. For the explicit awareness concerns the premises of the inference, not the inference principle. One day consequence of this is that these inference principles are not rules for the arrangement of marks. In order for rules for the arrangement of marks to function in our awareness of the correctness of a step in a computational process, the awareness of the rule has to be explicit, not implicit. That's what such a rule is all about. That is, an explicit instruction for how to arrange marks. So the role of inference principles in awareness of logical validity, the epistemological role, is completely different from the role of formal rules and awareness of formal correctness.

Mention what Putnam said in conversation about criteria in science. Then point out that still criteria must serve some end. And they do not serve any similar end in this case. And what and what they serve? Also, the whole issue with Quine is whether in addition to the so-called "empirical" (read: "scientific") there is also something called "the analytic." The logical positivists had said that in addition to be empirical, there is another zone called the "analytical." So contrary to Putnam, Quine was not arguing against the logical positivists that there could be no such analytical zone on the grounds that criteria are useful in the other zone, the empirical zone. Putnam says that I am unfair to Quine precisely because criteria are useful in the empirical zone. But the logical positivists never denied that.

In the short article, say that since you are talking about logic you will not be talking about philosophical arguments concerning consistency and bivalence.

Analytic truths are supposed to be "linguistic" in some more or less clear Way in which empirical truths are not" linguistic." Perhaps there is/are some useful senses in which analytic truths are "linguistic" in ways in which other truths are not. But I wish to point out that there is at least one important sense of "linguistic" in which truths whose necessity derives from linguistically constituted objects are not linguistic in a way in which empirical truths fail to be linguistic. I'm not saying this is the only sense of that word that is useful. But there is another very important sense which has been neglected and which needs to be pointed out. Is that sense that I will is here.

So-called analytic truths are not true by virtue of meaning. Nor are they linguistic as being true by virtue of meaning. Meanings are not something necessarily linguistic. The word "sentence" as a meaning that is linguistic. The word "neutron" has a meaning that is not something linguistic. Analytic true is our true by virtue of the fact that the meanings are distinguished only by linguistically constituted objects. But to say that is not the same as to say that the meanings themselves are linguistically constituted objects. It is only to say that those means have acquired linguistically constituted features by becoming that for

which certain words are you just. Those meanings were around for any words were around.

If we want, can say that thousands were killed by the meaning of the noise "atomic bomb," or by the meaning of the noise "cancer." The statements are perfectly true. They do not make the cause of millions of deaths linguistic.

In denying that analytic truths are linguistic in some way peculiar to themselves, I am not denying that they are in some way linguistic. What I'm trying to point out is that all truths are linguistic by their nature. So I am not denying the importance of language for all truths. Rather, in asking how analytic truths are linguistic in ways that other truths are not, I am trying to assert the importance of language for all truths.

Perhaps add to the short article: the refutation of the everything-follows argument opens up several kinds of questions. One kind concerns the use of the concept of something implying that everything is true within a formal system. For example, within a system of intuitionistic logic. Nothing in my reputation implies that the use of such a concept could not have some interesting purpose, some valuable purpose, for some system of formal methodology (as opposed to "formal system").

Another kind of question concerns the invoking of the concept of everything following as a justification for structuring a formal system or formal method is certain way. Here the examples I'm thinking of our relevance logics for paraconsistent logics. They sometimes claimed to justify themselves by the need to avoid that consequence. If that were there only justification, they needn't have bothered. But it does not follow that they should not have bothered. For there may be other justifications. Nor does it follow that a logician cannot achieve interesting and important results by constructing such a system, even if he had no other justification for doing so.

But there is one another kind of question that needs to be raised. It is important to know first that is other kind may be of no direct interest to the logician whatsoever. She needn't not be concerned about it at all. Because it is a question outside of logic itself. It is the question of the epistemology of logic, specifically, the epistemology of formal methods. By that I mean, the question of how we are aware that a step in a formal process is justified by the rules of the process. That step is related to my reputation of the everything follows argument in the following way.

We can be aware that the everything follows conclusion follows from ordinarily truth functionally valid rules of inference and at the same time aware that these rules are no longer functionally valid, when we permit contradiction. The shows that awareness that a step in a formal process satisfies the formal rules and yet be aware that neither the rules nor the result of following them has any logical

value or force of its own. But independently for whether or not the rule or results reflects something that is logically valid, in being aware that a step satisfies a rule, we have to follow rule of inference that we are implicitly aware of in being aware of the rule and the fact that using the rule here yields a certain result.

To show this, bring in or at least mention Lewis Carroll's Achilles-tortoise paradox here. This raises the number of questions that are epistemological in nature and not directly logical in nature. Our awareness, our implicit awareness of an inferential rule and of the value of the rule. Is it awareness of a necessary truth? If so, is it justified awareness of a necessary truth? If so, what is that justification and how are we aware of it? And if it is not awareness of a necessary truth, or awareness of the justification of a necessary truth, what is it awareness of? These questions, or rather such questions, cannot be answered in ignorance of the contributions of formal methods to questions about necessity and about knowledge, but neither can the contributions of formal methods completely answer these questions. But neither can the contributions of formal methods provide final answers to these questions in the last analysis.

The reason is that these questions concern our awareness of the epistemological value of formal methods themselves. Or rather these questions concern how we are aware of the epistemological value of formal methods and their results. For example, if our implicit awareness of the value of modus ponens while we are using modus ponens to draw conclusion is an awareness of something with only provisional value, something whose value really depends upon the fact that so far we have commonly used it, then our awareness of the value of a step a step in a formal process is an awareness of something with only provisional value.

It would be a mistake to think that formal methods themselves answer such questions. This would be a forest-for-trees fallacy. For example, someone like Wittgenstein might think that the analysis of logical validity in terms of truth functional tautologies can explain logical necessity. But to recognize a well formed formula as a truth functional tautology we have to be able to recognize that a particular set of distributions of truth values to its atomic formulas exhausts the possibilities of distributing truth values to the atomic formulas. In other words, we have to recognize the necessary truth that all the possibilities are covered.

I gave you have a truth table, for instance, and said "here, this defines an operator," you would know that the operator had been inadequately defined from the point of view of being a function of the truth values of its component wffs. The same requirement that we recognize that all the possibilities have been covered applies to rigorous definitions of formal proofs and to rigorous specifications of formal languages.

What about consistency proofs? Don't they at least get us a step closer to the question of necessity ? But even in this case, awareness that steps in the proof

satisfy rules is not awareness that the rules have a certain value and so not awareness that the results have any certain value. First, application of the rules requires the use of modus ponens. It modus ponens is only provisional, than the value of the transition from the rule to the result is only provisional. If the result is meant to show that a system containing a string corresponding to, or representing modus ponens, belongs to a system that is consistent or complete or both, we must have some awareness that whatever other rules we are using to get that result have some connection with interesting and definition of such a result, that is "consistency" or "completeness" defined" interestingly," and how do we know that connection, and whether that connection is true, and whether that connection is necessarily true or provisional, and so on and so on and so on?

Routley has shown formally how, even in a formal context, we can apply W.. E. Johnson's terminology (without all its baggage) to express the relation of normal negation to other negations, without loss of formal rigor.

Graeme Forbes in his article "logic, philosophy of" in the Routledge encyclopedia philosophy gives the following great example:

"a distinction between propositions (or statements, or sentential contexts) which are de dicto and propositions (and so on) which are de re originates in medieval philosophy. But only contemporary modal logic affords the tools for a precise characterization of this distinction, although it must be granted that the distinction remains a puzzle in epistemic contexts. (His emphasis)

01-10-01

Maybe it would be helpful to think in terms of a letter addressed to a philosophizing logician, not a snide letter but a letter asking sincere questions that are backed up by actual examples. He immediately preceding quotation from "logic, philosophy of" provides a good example.

The letter might begin by quoting Aristotle on the difference between dialectic and metaphysics, that difference being that you cannot build a metaphysics out of logic. Then you might ask whether a modern logician thinks that modern logic has changed the situation. And states that you know some reasons why someone might think that modern logic does not change that situation, and that you'd like to present those reasons in order to get his response.

First reason is that mathematical logic is even further removed from what Aristotle had in mind by metaphysics, and what most traditional philosophers had in mind by philosophy, that is the logic Aristotle had in mind. Relative to the traditional role of logic, mathematical logic is a tool that is not identical with the subject its serves, just as mathematics is and indispensable tool for physics. In

physics cannot at all get along without mathematics, but knowledge of physical truths is a different kind of famed from knowledge of mathematical truths. So if metaphysics cannot be built on logic, much less can be built on a tool of logic.

To describe mathematical logic as a tool to service of something other than itself is not to imply that mathematical logic is not intrinsically valuable. Mathematical logic is entirely worth studying for its own sake, just as mathematics is worth studying for its own sake. And just as mathematics could not be a tool for physics were mathematics not a valid subject on its own right, so mathematical logic would not be for logic were mathematical logic not a valid study on its own right.

So my questions should not be taken to apply in a disrespect for the achievements, the very great achievements, a modern logic. But I must confess to being suspicious, not a modern logic, but a certain modern logicians, suspicious that they are not satisfied with the great achievements that logic can boast of for its own sake but will only be satisfied if their method monopolizes the ways of dealing with questions that philosophy has always asked.

A good example of this was Michael Martin's talk at the society of Christian philosophers at Merrimack college. His thesis was that was incoherent to say that God had "knowledge." To establish this, he gave three definitions of knowledge couched in post Fregean terminology. Of course, none of these definitions corresponded to what any earlier philosopher would have meant by predicating knowledge of God. When this objection was raised, his reply was basically that none of the earlier attempts to predicate knowledge of God were worth considering because they were not as clear as he is definitions for knowledge. They were not as clear because they were not using post Fregean techniques.

So unless you're using post Fregean techniques, according to someone like him, is not even worth discussing with you have to say. But is it worth discussing what he has to say, if it really doesn't have anything to do with what anybody has meant when they predicating knowledge of God? Isn't this intellectual imperialism, or dictatorship, or tyranny. Isn't he saying "I won't play with you unless you play my game?" And there is no doubt, or there are no doubt, standards by which one can justly say that he is methods are more clear than those of traditional theists. But if his methods cannot formulate positions of traditional theists, why is that not a limitation on his methods, rather than on the value of traditional methods. And no matter what standard judges his methods as clearer, what if his kind of clarity just isn't relevant to the topic under discussion? Finally, as I will discuss below, what evidence is there that his kind of clarity has been helpful in solving any philosophical problems.

Another example pertinent to the question whether there is a limitation in a formal method that cannot express certain theories about God, or whether or there is a

shortcoming in the theory: somewhere in one of Pena's articles, he criticizes certain kinds of talk about God that use reduplicative predications, that is, "as" phrases. The reason for his criticism, or one reason for his criticism, is that no one has worked out a successful formal method using such phrases. But we did not have to wait for formal methods to know that syllogisms were valid inferences, that modus ponens was a valid form of inference, etc. so why should we not say that the fact that formal methods cannot capture the logic of such statements is merely an innocent limitation to formal methods? Likewise, for the Trinity. A criticism of the Trinity based on formal methods could not be relevant unless that formal method was capable of formulating traditional assertions about the Trinity.

In suggesting that their method is not the only one worthy of pursuing, I am sure that they will have a corresponding suspicion of me. They will think that I am suggesting that we go back to the kind of obfuscation that afflicted philosophy or 2500 years before Frege. At this point, however, another questions concerning the role of modern logic in doing philosophy arises.

Yes, philosophy has been afflicted with disagreement and paradox throughout its history. But 100 years after Frege, is there any less disagreement and paradox in philosophy? The answer must be no. Then what has mathematical logic contributed, not to logic where mathematical logic has proven to be the indispensable tool, but to philosophy? One reply might be that the old kinds of disagreement and Paradox were bad kinds, but the kinds of paradox in disagreement that have arisen since Frege are good kinds. But why? Because the current obfuscation in philosophy is based on the most clear and precise formal methods? But if those methods cannot produce clarity and precision in philosophy, why is the current obfuscation any better than the old?

No, earlier methods did not succeed at all in eliminating disagreement and Paradox from philosophy. But I for one believe that at least one earlier method is able to provide an explanation for the constancy of disagreement and paradox in philosophy that the approach to philosophy via mathematical logic is completely incapable of providing. For that explanation predicts the occurrence of obfuscation in philosophy without self referentially claiming that philosophy is in anyway in valid. In other words, I am not offering an explanation that would produce more clarity and less paradox then would the methods of mathematical logic in philosophy. But why should that burden be on me?

But rather than bore you with my account of that explanation, I would like to have you answer one more question which is relevant to this whole issue of whether I am suggesting that we go back to a kind of obfuscation that your methods have put behind us for ever. Could you mean any successes that your method has happened over the last 100 years? I don't mean successes within logic itself. No one can fault, for example, the contributions of a Tarski, a Kripke, a Craig, etc. to

logic itself. But where have these contributions gotten us any closer to answering any philosophical questions?

By philosophical questions, I mean the kind of questions philosophers have always asked about, for instance, truth, necessity and possibility, the relation of theories to experience, etc. you might reply that the whole point of your method is to redefine those questions. No doubt about it. But we are already raised the issue of what successes your method has given, in contrast to previous methods. And if the current reply is the one you would like to make, there is always the issue of whether by the time you are true redefining a question is really the same question. And if it is not the same question, what reason had you'd given for believing that the old question is invalid other than your act of faith in your method, in spite of the fact that your method hasn't produced any better results than the old methods.

For example, the way the problem of universals is currently expressed that problem is not the problem that traditionally vexed philosophy. And not only does the modern approach not suppress that previous question but the very conditions that give rise to the modern question presuppose the conditions to which the previous question is addressed. That is, the answer to the modern question presupposes that the earlier question can be answered.

And when I ask about your successes, another important thing has to be kept in mind. I'm not talking about your successes in criticizing your own predecessors. Granted, philosophers of modern logic have been successful in moving beyond, or I should say, in negatively criticizing, for example the approach of the Tractatus and of the logical positivists, or that of ordinary language philosophers or that of the disquotationalists. Those successes, or that type of success, does not necessarily constitute a success relative to answering the questions philosophers have always asked. Much less does a constitute success in answering those questions as replaced by other questions using post Fregean vocabulary.

What about the rest of us who never had the kind of hangups exemplified by the Tractatus or the logical positivists or ordinary language philosophy?

Another questions about formal methods and their use in philosophy would be whether they produce paradoxes of their own, paradoxes that are artifacts of formal systems and formal methods. I think of the paradox on p. 184 of the 4th edition of Quine's "methods of logic." He calls it a truth of logic; why should we not call it simply an artifact of one otherwise great of logic? After all, mathematics produces paradoxes as its artifacts, without diminishing the validity of mathematical method or the importance of it. So the occurrence of paradoxes in this study of formal systems would not diminish the importance or value of that study anymore than paradoxes do in mathematics.

Another reply would be that some and perhaps many analytic philosophers recognize the problem of doing metaphysics based on logic, and so they escape the criticisms I have made so far. But this raises the question of what constitutes a successful attempts to escape from the same metaphysics on logic. And that question brings up some of the same issues I have already mentioned.

For example, in his book on noncontradiction and excluded middle, Nicholas Rescher bends over backwards to say that he is doing ontology and not doing logic. But an examination of what he actually does, an examination for my point of view, shows that he is still just doing metaphysics by extending logic. For he gets himself into trouble precisely because he neglects the fact that the truth of propositions is an effect of what exists in a particular world. As a result, he winds up with so-called "worlds" in which sentences are true even though the necessary causes of their truth are absent from the world.

The root of this problem is the attempt to define a "world" in an ontological sense in terms of the truth of propositions. Where the reality is that the truth of propositions is a byproduct of what is the case in a world. In other words, truth must be defined in terms of existence rather than existence being defined in terms of truth. And is leads to some specific things that can be said about what the proper way of doing metaphysics, as opposed to improperly basing it on logic, is.

Whatever else must be true of the correct method and metaphysics, that method must define other values in terms of the extra logical value we call "existence." Not the other way around. From the primacy of extra logical existence, however, it does not follow that existential quantifiers must have more than one meaning. The opposite follows. Precisely because existence is not a logical value, the logical role of quantifiers can be the same at every level.

Even if there were no arguments in favor of the fact that existence is an extra logical value, you want to maintain that we are incorrect in holding that position, you should at least recognize this as a fundamental point of departure for to radically different philosophical paths. Just as I am trying to understand, and hope I do understand, why someone would think that metaphysics should be based on logic, I ask you to understand why someone would think that whatever else is existence cannot be merely a logical value.

But in fact there are arguments for my position. They are of 2 many kinds. The first are arguments to show that to be is not to be known. The second kind are arguments to show that in the structure of what exists there is a distinct factor that should be described as act with respect to everything else being described as potency of one kind were another. And the factor whose mind -- independent presence these arguments establish is at least one of, and actually more than that, the meanings of our ordinary word "existence."

3-5-01

Are we not able to articulate a data of experience to whatever level of precision or vagueness our language allows us to? Can we look at something and say "something," "a body," "a plant," "a flower," "a tool of," etc.? So why he would we need distinct, really distinct, properties corresponding to me to these words? And if there were distinct properties, there would have to be real connections, real links, and so real relations between them. That would be another level of complexity.

Delete the last paragraph. Delete the Quine paragraph. Delete the paragraph on the reality of properties and on Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. Remove the paragraph on a Putnam's defense of criteria. Move bivalence to the end. By dropping references to principles of noncontradiction (especially in the plural), I can delete the stuff about negation altogether. The drop the reference to causal realism in the indeterminacy of translation footnote. Drop the stuff about no arguments working in. And if I drop the Tractatus paragraph, I can move the statement about the irrelevance of the ontology of properties below, and add it to the heuristic sentence. If I drop the Quine and Kripke paragraph, perhaps I can drop the stuff about the necessary not being the same as the linguistic.

Either remove the paragraphs about other operations not being able to be defined, or recast the discussion strictly in terms of classical logic and the dependence of classical operators on the exclusion of contradiction.

The usual reply to Carol's paradox is that rules are not premises but there is more to it. And we must grasp the truth of the rules by knowing the words of the premises; otherwise he cannot be aware of the validity of the argument. Therefore we must now investigate self-evidence (or "the analytic") and. Doing so will illuminate the relevant issues such as synonymy and Quine's critique of the analytic.

Principles of noncontradiction just express certain, or a certain, use of "negation" signs. And a particular formal system may not need those uses, or that used, but if it does not include that use, it cannot contradict principles of noncontradiction that to use signs in that way.

And" sentence and predicate negation signs determine the truth conditions of sentences and so the truth values of sentences. So predicate negation signs result into the truth values of sentences. And they cause the truth is one of their sentences.

Give an example of an inference implied in checking validity by means of truth tables. And for example, when 1410 is assigned to a component sentence one place, it must be assigned to the sentence wherever the sentence occurs. So you cannot even use truth tables if you allow contradiction.

Consider the truth table for one formula expressing the decision procedure method it of showing that everything follows from contradiction, the formula using material implication. At this point, which truth table rules to use seems to become arbitrary. So the very method itself of using formal methods becomes the issue. So I will henceforth use nontechnical terms as well as technical. And the later in the evils appear to have done the same using vocabulary, which from our point of view, was technical but not rigorous by our standards.

So what should we do? We should say that nothing follows from contradiction.

It is perfectly fine to create all of the alternative logics that should like. Do not have the change classical logic to avoid the conclusion. The questions raised are the level of the epistemology of logic, of the evaluation of what goes on the classical logic. You do not even have to denying that classical logic use composed of necessary truths.

Obviously, for classical logic to allow the truth of contradictories will be ad hoc. I want to say "must" be ad hoc. But the very reason why I want to say must is the reason why I cannot, namely, there's no more necessity. Because there is no more necessity, there is only the ad hoc. (But really there can only be the ad hoc. And that shows that you can't really get rid of necessity; he still have to use it. If all necessity were gone, per impossible, then we would have to describe the consequences, or have to be able to describe the consequences, using phrases like "then there can only be," "then there must only be," etc.) but we would need some rules, and therefore ad hoc rules, precisely because without new rules, nothing follows from contradiction. (Use ECQ ex contradictione quodlibet.)
In paraconsistent logic, does saying that there are true contradictions amount to saying that both parts of the contradictions are true, or that the compound sentence composed of the contradictories is both to a false.

Logic in my sense of the word in no way replaces modern logic and its contribution.

All this may seem obvious. What, however, if awareness of the validity of the step is a requires awareness of necessary truth? I will argue that that it does.

Watch for the use of words like implies, consequence, as opposed to words like the due us, derive, and yield. The former are semantic, and the latter are the syntactical.

The kind of arguments that might be brought against my claims are not, for example, that we can use this or that formal device method to construct a different kind of formal method, language, or system. Such arguments would not be relevant to my argument. What could be relevant to my argument, if their premises were true, would be, for example, claims about the fact that words can change meaning, incommensurability.

In order to avoid the consequence that everything follows from contradiction, or in order to avoid the validity of arguments to that effect, we do not need a non classical logic, for example, a paraconsistent or relevance logic. Without resort to any modern methods, some traditional logicians rejected ECQ. So modern methods are not needed, for example, those of Pena. When you accept contradiction, you have already rejected disjunctive syllogism. This fact is important in its own right.

To avoid ECQ, you don't have to go outside of classical logic. You have to go outside of classical logic to <u>get</u> ECQ.

One motivation for paraconsistent logic is that inconsistent theories can be nontrivial. But I eliminate that motivation.

Emphasize that a causal analysis of how we are aware of the validity of deduction is not the same thing as a deductive defense of the validity of deduction. See Susan Haack, p. 198. Rather might causal analysis shows why we do not need a deductive defense of the validity of deduction. For it shows that if certain conditions hold, we cannot not be aware of that validity. And it shows that if we are aware of how to use certain words, those conditions cannot not hold. Also, these are not causal explanations I'll on Dummett's "explanatory" and arguments (haack, p. 181). Also, this is not a "justification" of deduction (p. 200).

what has the LCO analysis of "red is a color" got to do with modern logic? Each entry in the truth table is a set of 1 0 assignments to component statements: for example, "p" assigned 1, and "q" assigned 2. So just as red is a case of color, Green is a case of color, etc. because of the necessary identity and, so "p & q" being assigned 1 is a case of "p -> q" being assigned 1, because assigning 1 to the first is distinct only by the linguistic construct from assigning it to the second. And so on.

In even if Quine did not intend to do not that there are self-evident truths, only deny that such truths can be classified as "true by meaning," "true by convention," etc., that's fine with me.

Perhaps instead of truth tables say matrix.

What do I mean by "a feature"? I mean what it is to be something red, something colored, etc. because that, namely, what it is to be something red, is really distinct from what it is to be something oblong. Notice however, that in the phrase "what it is to be something red" and other such phrases the linguistic analyst would put red in quotation marks.

Formal language method vs. natural language method: in the latter symbols appear not just as objects of manipulation, that is, not so that they are correct or

incorrect use is determined by rules for concatenating and detaching, which is to say that natural language is not a calculational language. But that raises the question of lying numbers can be the "object" of a merely calculational language.

Possible worlds are only relevant to philosophy to the extent that possible" means "could be the case that" where that means "the following state of affairs would exist," and so could be the cause of the truth of a statement. Possible worlds are relevant only to the extent that they are possible existents and therefore possible causes of truth.

How about this as a translation of "supposition": place holding.

Maritain could have said "there is such a thing as recognition of logical necessity, and that is something different from awareness of satisfying movements." But that distinction would not have mattered much before the development of nonstandard logics, since logistics are clearly a more powerful method for studying those very necessary truths that Maritain would have been referring to. (Still any method has limitations from some point of view, because any tool has limitations from some point of view. For example, the success of this tool mislead people, for example, Russell, about the centrality, the epistemological centrality, of the principle of noncontradiction. But that is a different question. Epistemological centrality is not the issue here.)

But now that we have nonstandard logics, the impression can be that they eliminate the epistemological need for necessary truth is, that is, for consistency and bivalence. So now the distinction implied by Maritain is crucial.

Without any further understanding of "truth" or truth conditions," and we can see that the question of necessary truth is the question of why, if "F" can be truthfully predicated of some x, then "G" can also be truthfully predicated of that x; in other words, the question is why must those predicates be truthfully predicable of the same x. And and we can answer that for multiply predicative truths, that is, for truths such that the question is whether if one predicate is true, the other must also be true, without any further consideration of truth conditions other than the truth conditions, individually, for "F" on the one hand and "G" on the other.

Concerning nonstandard logics, the issue is not whether they work, but so what if they do. That is, the extra-in logical question of what difference they make. Or better: concerning nonstandard logics, there are issues concerning what difference they make. (In other words, don't say that these are the only issues, just that here are some legitimate questions nonstandard logics raise.)

To avoid paradoxes such as the liar, we don't need to know why a string of symbols lacks truth value, only that it does lacks truth value. Such paradoxes are often by themselves truth that a particular string of symbols lacks truth value, for example, the string "this sentence is", or the string "this theorem is" as in "this

theorem is not provable." Nor does this reply mean that truth and falsity are always contraries rather than contradictories. The preceding statement can be true of strings of symbols without prejudice to the question whether there are such things as propositions which must be either true or false and cannot fail to be one or the other.

All I really want to say is that nonstandard logic is no reason to give up necessary truth, and that there are good reasons for keeping it.

Traditional logicians also would have said that inference principles are necessary truths and self-evident truths.

Precisely because the methods of modern logic open up infinite possibilities for semantics and syntax, modern logic cannot provide answers for philosophical questions. Those questions call for definite answers, not infinite possibilities. They call for specific answers.
We have to be aware that our definition of a proof can cover all the possible cases and that the rules of the language can cover all possible cases.

In the definition of logical properties as properties belonging to objects as objects, we can include the fact that "as" refers to a causal relation, namely, the fact that logical properties of the result of our making things objects, because logical properties are ways of being objects. A logical property like vagueness or precision is a way in which we make things objects, where "a way of making" does not refer to a psychological act but to the result of whatever psychological act makes (in psychological way X) a thing an object (in logical way Y).

Quantification, June 26, 2001

Why call existence of form of quantification? Because quantification is saying "all of them" or "some of them". But this presupposes existence. What are about them? In other words, quantification presupposes that a universe of discourse is posited. But the object in that universe of discourse need not be existents in the ontological sense.

Tarski, truth, self reference, metalanguage, June 26, 2001

In "snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. The words "true" and the words in "snow is white" must belong to the same language. But a language that can talk about snow can only have a word for truth if it can also talk about language about snow. A language that does not at least have the potential for talking about itself is an incomplete language and an epistemologically unuseful language. (re-read Putnam's argument against disquotation.)

Polyadic predicates. 09-16-01

Polyadic predicates are not the reason logic is a serious subject. Logic always has been a serious subject, and monadic symbolic logic has never pretended to a sore all questions from traditional serious logic. Polyadic predicates are the reason why the use of Fregean methods are a serious undertaking.

In terms of the goal, the teleonomic cause, of knowing the truth of "Fxz -> Fzy," the objectification of x and y must be subordinate to the objectification of z, as means of objectifying z. For the high density required for the recognition of truth is formally the identity between z and z. Using x and y to objectify z will require other at least implicitly identity relations, but those other identities are used as a means to grasp the identity of z with z. If not, we could never grasping the identity of something with something.

Self evidence, 09-16-01

A means of diverse object dictation can be so related logical, can be so logically related, that the objectify cannot be distinct other than logically. Here "logically" means related with reference to properties all of the modes of objectification as such and only to the modes of objectification as such.

Logical relations, 09-16-01

Logical relations and logical properties are objects of awareness with which other objects of awareness become associated as a result of being objects of awareness. "Associated" might be better than "accrued to," etc.

Material implication, 09-16-01

The material conditional is really an enthymeme. As such, the question is not whether it is true or false; the question is whether the reasoning of which it is an abbreviation is a sound, where "sound" means both true and valid.

You cannot combine Frege and Hume. My logic article shows that the concept of self evidence explains and is compatible with the success of post Fregean methods that are Humean and Kantian skepticism. The reason post Fregean methods haven't work in philosophy is bad philosophical assumptions. Good philosophical assumptions explain the success of post Fregean methods. They do this by showing that philosophy is something other than an application of logic. The same process of explaining the success of post Fregean methods shows that philosophy is something other than an application of logic, and so simultaneously shows why post Fregean methods are not successful in philosophy.

On p. 177 of "methods of logic" there appears to be a good example of the fact that substitution uses inference by way of modus ponens.

Do I have to get into the issue of quantification over properties?
Not all languages with color words need to have a separate word for color. Nor do we need to have many color words to abstract a concept of color.

Linguistically constituted objects that make sentences necessarily true sometimes occur. And it happens that we cannot be aware of how some words are used without being aware of such linguistically constituted objects.

Necessity and self evidence do not concern relations of ideas, relations of concepts, etc. the relation is between what it is to be color and what it is to be red; and what is to be color or read is not something linguistic or conceptual.

My position is not fallibilism.

First I establish that inference principles are necessary. Then I establish that they are self-evident by the tortoise Achilles argument.

To recognize logistic\s correctness, (1) I need to know necessary logical truths, but (2) logistic knowledge in itself does not give me that recognition.

New topic:

Do I really need they ontology metaphysical discussion of properties? Isn't the issue really epistemological. I am making the assumption that, epistemologically, whatever "color" communicates is also communicated by "red". That assumption is true of non-philosophers innocent of any problems about the ontology of "properties." For the man on the street, whatever is communicated by "color" is communicated by "red" but "red" communicates more than does "color."

Maybe of metaphysics of distinctions between properties will later be... call for. But if so that later theory must not be inconsistent with the epistemological fact that the speakers of English understand "color" when they hear "red." And I am not making a factual claim. I am just assuming that "red" logically includes "color," but that epistemological assumption happens to be true. So I do not even need to establish its truth, but it is important to note that the assumption that I am choosing at the beginning of this dialectical argument happens to be a true assumption.

xxxSommers, 02-11-02

The following notes are taken from comments written in the margins of "the logic of natural language."

p. vii. "Articles could not do justice to the neoclassical alternatives that I was

advocating."

p. viii. "Modern logic uses the forms, 'Px' and '-Px', to represent predicates thereby inflating to oppositions of contrariety and contradiction so fundamental to the classical term-theoretical standpoint." Point out that I am not entering into this problem; I am just assuming the classical modern position for the sake of my argument.

On p.xi he seems to say that the basic logical particles consist of more than signs for negative quality. But doesn't he say at the end of chapter 9 that signs of opposition are the basic logical signs? Also on this page he points out that the scholastics with the first to construe "Socrates it is..." As "every Socrates is...".

P. 1. "For logical purposes, be parsed"; "logical syntax of natural language"; "logical syntax of a sentence"; "logical subject"; "logical predicates". His use of these phrases to start off paragraph seems to imply that there are such things. But later in the paragraph he says "such regimentation put sentences into logically useful patterns." That's more like it. It's not that these things actually exists but a question of useful ladies of translating sentences for logical purposes. And what he means by logical purposes, and what he should mean by logical purposes, is made clearer by the later phrases "logical reckoning call for more then this sort of paraphrasing." By "logical reckoning" he means, as is clear from the rest of the book, calculation mechanically.

For on the next page he says "logical syntax is the syntax of an artificial language constructed for the purpose of a formalizing deductive reasoning." He is quoting somebody else, but later on certainly agrees. But the very next sentence seems to imply that there are such things as logical syntax and logical form.

"According to the construction us these are needed to make perspicuous the logical form and to facilitate logical reasoning." "Logical form," no. "Facilitate logical reasoning," means mechanical calculation.

Page 4. Uses the word "logistic." "The logistic advantage enjoyed by Fregean systems of logic." Later on this page there is a good sentence affirming is apparent belief in the existence of logical form.

Remember the difference in usage between "referring" and "denoting." See p. 6.

P. 10. "In the traditional syntax for logic all predicates, including those whose terms are relational, are 'monadic'. But maybe they are neither monadic or polyadic. May be these are and valid categories. Compare "the color red is neither odd nor even."

P. 14. "Frege himself did not think of his logical language as contributing to empirical linguistics; it seems at times that he had to great contempt for natural

languages to credit them with a logical syntax." If so, he was right. They have no "logical syntax" because they are not calculation machines, and that's all there is to logical syntax.

P. 15. Note the reliance on the term "syntactical" on this and the following pages.

P. 16. Maybe there can be quantity without expressions like "some" or "all," Just as every sentence is modally characterized whether it's mode is made explicit or not.

P. 1 8. Russell quote: "... Did so for technical reasons." That is, for purposes of facilitating computation.

P. 19. This has implications for Rescher. The truth conditions for "all 1 is 2" is the truth of "this 1 is 2," and "that 1 is 2." But note the parent redundancy in the last statement. But truth condition for... Is the truth of... If statements like that are taken as definitions, they are circular. And he might take it is a definition at the bottom of this page.

P. 21. "The question of the existence of certain syntactical forms is something that we are learning to view in a scientific light. For we have, if only in principle, certain criteria for judging the adequacy of linguistic theories when they postulate the existence of some class of syntactical objects."

P. 23. This does not prove that quantitie is while, but does prove that the whole issue is irrelevant. That is, we can construct a calculus the translating natural language either way, that is, either Frege's or Leibniz's. Therefore neither way expresses an essential "logical" property of natural language or of anything else. Recall the essay "what numbers must not be". The argumentation is the same. Precisely because all of these conflicting theories do equally well at handling numbers, no one of these theories can express the essence of numbers.

P. 27. Simon explains propositions with no reference to logical subject or logical form. If there is a "logical structure," it is only in need for dual objectification, at least dual objectification.

P. 28. Is this a good example for thing-object analysis?

P. 29. "The reason we do not bother specify the quantity of "Socrates is wise" is precisely because either one will do."

P. 33. Aristotle on substance not having a contrary. See also p. 30 and p. 42.

P. 34. A good example of the fact that logical relations can have <u>visible</u> syntactical and semantic analogs.

P. 34, at the triangle. Doesn't this example rely too much on contingent features of grammar? Couldn't way construct a grammar that did what he says shouldn't be done? OK, he seems to say so that the bottom of p. 43 in the top p. 44.

P. 35. Here "form" just seems to mean "is equivalent to."
P. 37. Quotes Dummett as saying that ontology does depend on the philosophy of language. Further in the quotes Dummett says Frege's symbolic language is logically perspicuous. Really, its calculationally perspicuous.

P. 37. At the triangle. A clear example that a "logical subject" is nothing more then a form of expression that is a grammatical or syntactical form.

P. 38. "The recognition of their validity is taken as a fact "that may be left at the intuitive level"." This seems to be an admission that, and the context he and Frege are talking about, they are abstracting from an analysis of how we grasp that step in an inference is valid. In other words, they are leaving room for precisely what I am trying to do.

At the circle. And example of a very common reasoning structure. But causally can distinguish. That is, the truth of "something" is and effect.

P. 39, at the Cross. Here "logical subject" seems equivalent to "syntactical form."

At the circle. "Existential generalization is for the Fregean a primitive rule of inference whose validity is left to the intuitive level." Goes on to say the opposite for Leibniz who can show that 1 follows a syllogistically from the other. But my point is how do we intuitive that a syllogism is valid?

P. 39. The uses "thing" as a predicate for the first time.

P. 40. "For Frege the application of the ontological category term "object" is dependent upon the linguistic category term "proper name" and not conversely." See above remark from p. 37.

P. 41, At "big". "Traditional formal logic which does not discriminate subject from predicate on semantic grounds." That is, it discriminate them only on syntactical grounds, while and Frege they necessarily have different semantics.

P. 42, at the triangle. "In modern predicate logic, negation is always sentential and scope and predicate light "is unwise" is not an expression on its own right." Do I need to be cautious about this when I caught about negation at the beginning of my argument in use both forms of the principle of noncontradiction? Maybe I need a footnote.

P. 44. "But one must agree with some bad and ontologically independent grounding of the subject-predicate distinction is untenable." So must derive

ontology from logic rather than vice versa.

P. 46. "Father of" and "between" are not terms. They are relational expressions that enter into terms. Here are terms are understood in the traditional sense of either subject or predicate, indifferently.

P. 47. Note that the thing-object analysis can accommodate both the modern and the traditional. See the Italy article.

"In modern predicate logic, be a symmetry between individual symbols and predicate letters is written into the formation rules and any evidence of a symmetry that assumes the canonical status of the forms of modern predicate logic must be dismissed as planted evidence."

P. 48. U-turn: "the fact that philosophers of caliber of Strawson Dummett are enmeshed in the same question-begging procedure is proof, it anywhere needed, of the whole of the doctrine of atomicty on contemporary logical theory... the Tractatus of Wittgenstein is only one example of play major philosopher in the fall of its dogmatic embrace."

At "no." "The features of atomicity is subject to confirmation or disconfirmation in a developed linguistic science." From empirical point of view, perhaps. But not from the ontological point of view illustrated by Simon.

P. 50. Note that in all that's, individuality seems logically (that is, intellectually) prior to universality. And that is contrary to fact. Summer seems to provide a defense of the thesis that a universal is what the intellect first grasps. That may be one of the implications of his theory that the pronoun refers back to something described by predicate.

At the crosses. Here "reference" definitely means that a referred to thing exists. But logical truth is a goal extraneous to a sentence itself. The logical properties of a word or sentence are what we put into the word or sentence. We do not put truth into a sentence; reality does. Likewise, we cannot put reference in the sense of real existence into our use of a word. We can put a claim of existence into our use of a word; but only reality can give that for which we use a word real existence.

If a sentence is contingent, as existence statements must be, I can know the sentence's logical properties without knowing that the sentence is true. That is what makes the sentence contingent.

P. 51. "And perhaps it may be acknowledged that only those who think of reference in a tendentiously Fregean way will find anything really odd about this." Yes, yes, yes.

At the second "good." He notes that Russell's idea of reference was broader than that of the contemporary Fregean that he criticizes.

At "?". Both "some 1 is 2" and "all 1's are 2's" are <u>about</u> all the 1's.

P. 52. At "OK." "This takes seriously the idea that only in the context of the whole proposition may we speak of the reference of its subject."

P. 53. "And to most contemporary philosophers of failure to refer is tantamount to a truth-value gap." So for them truth depends on reference, not the other way around. So for Strawson, truth depends on reference not the other way around.

P. 54. "It is then also natural to hold that a condition for a proposition having a truth value is that it's logical subject refers to an object. We may call that's the referring condition for having a truth value: unless its object word actually refers to objects be atomic sentence cannot be used to make a statement and one who understood sentence is said not to have asserted a proposition."

P. 55. "Cause, purporting to refer and being about are not tied to truth conditions in the way that referring is."

P. 57. He seems to say that for Geach definite descriptions refer as do proper names.

P. 59, at the Cross. "Definite reference to individual begins with and is semantically dependent on an indefinite epistemic reference to that individual." So universal is what is first in the intellect. For you cannot make definite references unless you have first made an indefinite reference.

P. 60, at the Cross. "To be allowed to speak of the existence of the thing in a non-actual domain is one thing. To say that in "a ghost is in the attic" a ghost refers "intensionally" to a ghost is another." The seems to confirm what I say about intentional existence not being the same as cognition-dependent existence.

At "big". "Some 1 is No. 2." "1" denotes to every 1, but "some 1" refers only to some 1.

At the triangle. What can different "logical forms" mean but that 1 and 2 have some different features of a logical nature. A very harmless claim. For as the paragraph goes on to say "for purely logical concerns" we could avoid the distinction. That is, the different features do not have the cash value they are thought to have for some assumed logical goal.

At "yes." A terrific quotation from Searle to support my view that reference is of no "logical" interest whatsoever.

P. 61, at the Cross. A big, big statement to the effect that all of these different forms of syntax have the same truth conditions. Again, a confirmation of my use of "what numbers must not be" to argue against their being such a thing as logical forms or logical subject's. Once we "get beyond the circumstances under which the proposition is taken as true" all these theories are merely different logical tools, grammar its constructed for some purpose, in particular the purpose of calculation. To try to absolutize any of them is to try to have a tool with no limitations. Only God's knowledge as no limitations, and therefore he does not need any tools. If we need tools, is because we are limited, and so our tools must be limited also.

P. 66.   Unlike in "what numbers must not be," the theories summer is is comparing may not be completely equivalent. Each will have some advantages that the others do not.   So none of them is the "essence" of logical form, because, unlike the case of numbers where there is such a thing as numbers, there is no such thing as logical form and logical subjects.

P. 138. "There are a number of reasons for the failure of traditional formal logic to develop an adequate logic of relations, none of them do to any intrinsic advantage of a logical syntax of modern predicate logic over traditional formal logic. One of the main reasons was its failure to achieve a formal notation for representing categorical propositions -- relational and non-relational alike -- that was felicitous for a logical calculus."

Note that Maritain and offered a theory of truth, years after he wrote "formal logic," that would be independent of the subject-predicate for name-predicate syntactical forms.

At the circle. He goes on to say that traditional logicians were unable to read universal categorical propositions as equivalent to hypothetical propositions. No, they always recognized that universals concerned <u>possible</u> being, but correctly they did not identify that fact with logical form. See Maritain and on supposition.

P. 140. "This advantage of modern logic over traditional logic could only be a practical one and not a theoretical one."   From what he goes on to say, "theoretical" seems to refer to questions like whether you really have to have the Fregean understanding of atomic propositions. But theoretical vs. practical could also refer to something else.   Formal systems always have one perceived advantage, the practicality of calculation. But that does not give them the kind of theoretical advantage that would make them the basis for a metaphysics. That is just another U-turn.

P. 141. "Usefulness for logical reckoning" of "a formal notation." See the top of p. 144.

P. 142. Big quote: "the only serious problem facing traditional formal logic is that

of logical reckoning."

P. 143. He gives an example of an inference using an apparently redundant pleonastic, trivially true, truism. "Every 1 is 1." Some people may find this counterintuitive or the very least awkward. But modern logic does exactly the same kind of thing what it recognizes inferences like "if p, then p." As valid inference is on a par with other inferences. From a "formal" point of view (mechanical) you really can distinguish cases like this, either the modern cases of redundancy or the use of the truism for a traditional premise. And that is good for developing formal systems.

At the Cross. "This substitution principle is the rule corresponding to dictum de omni: what is true of every 1 is true of (what is) an(or any) 1." Great quotation for showing that substitution does indeed involve inference. Note the difference between the substitution rule and the logical truth it "corresponds" to.

Would summer's syllogistic defense of substitution, or syllogistic presentation of substitution, solve my problem about instantiation? I am thinking of some thing like the reasoning: whatever performs acts of a particular type has the ability to perform acts of that particular type. Men perform acts of the rational type. Men have the ability to perform acts of the rational type.

P. 144. Emphasize that the most powerful aspects of Frege's methods were not the details of his own particular formal system but the use of a computational method, something other formal systems could also employed. But logical recognition is not the same as recognition of computational success, the correct application of computational rules. If summer's system that come before Frege's, it would have been thought to be the right one for exactly the same reasons that Frege's was considered to be the only right one.

P. 145. Perhaps criticize Maritain and and, for example, Geach and Strawson and Dummett for thinking that the problem between modern and traditional logic was at the level of logic proper rather than at the level of the epistemology of logic. Or at least criticize Maritain and for making it looked as if, or for not making an explicit, clear, that...

P. 146. At the crosses. Again a good example that the real issue between traditional formal logic and modern predicate logic is solely one of good or bad, powerful or not powerful, "techniques."

P. 147. "Methods of proof". He is talking about methods of computation and calculation. There follows a great quote to show how philosophers are guilty of the U-turn where mathematicians are not.

Further down. "I shall show how to give it a subject-predicate (non-phrase/verb-phrase) analysis of vernacular sentences that corresponds exactly to the structure, and modern predicate logic, of a sentence is that translate them." But then may be the issue about true logical subjects and logical forms is an even up the level of syntactical differences. Ask Chuck what the cash value of this statement is. "We shall see that quantificational translations of relational sentences have a definite, albeit covert, subject-predicate structure." He's referring to translations into modern predicate logic.

P. 148. Identity or lack of identity between what is objectified as "a tail of some horse" and as "a tail of some reptile."

P. 149. Where summers shows Frege's "Fx" is equivalent to a subject-predicate structure, I show that Maritain's identity theory of truth, originally stated in subject-predicate form, can be stated in "Fx" and "Rxy" terms.

P. 150. Awareness that an argument is valid by the rules of a computational method (1) presupposes awareness of logically necessary truths used as inference principles, implicitly used as inference principles, and (2) is not identical with the implicit awareness of logically necessary truth. That is, awareness of educational validity is not the same thing as awareness of necessary truth but presupposes it.

P. 151. Several times he seems to assume that there is such a thing as an underlying logical structure for sentences.

P. 153. He has been discussing questions of priority of one view of sentences, or a sentence structure, over another, priority of one kind of subject over another kind of subject, one kind of sentence over another, one kind of predicate over another, etc. But there is another kind of priority that philosophers can diffuse with all the above. The question is whether term logic has logical priority, priority in developing a logic, but whether it has epistemological priority. The epistemological priority of term logic is not that "all propositions say something about something." The epistemological priority is that to show why, or how, we know that an antecedent implies its consequent, we must ultimately use

syllogism's linking the terms of the antecedent and the consequent. If we can't link their terms, our knowledge of the truth of a hypothetical does not have epistemic necessity.

P. 155. He says he wants "a theory in which neither type of proposition is viewed as analytically prior to the other but both are viewed as structurally isomorphic. A theory in which terms of propositions are the elements of abstract structures governed by laws that can be interpreted to hold indifferently for categorical propositions or for compound propositions."

If his method of doing traditional formal logic had been discovered before Frege's new way of doing logic, the <u>details</u> of a 20th-century philosophy would have been radically different. But the same basic mistake would be present that has always been present since Plato.

P. 156. Quine's ontological relativity shows the irrelevance of logic to metaphysics. For ontological relativity would be (of certainly) true if a logical and the empirical where the only two points of view. Only on that hypothesis would ontological relativity be even relevant to metaphysics.

At the circle. On his account these should be equivalent, but obviously they are not so material implication is irrelevant to existential truths, that is, existential identities between things and objects. And see the top of p. 157.

P. 157. Why not the first also?

P. 159. "The carrying out of the program commits us to and ecology us states of affairs and, more particularly, to a Wittgenstenilan world.... Only the latter idea allows us to carry on with the program of giving compound propositions to categorical form while allowing for a diversity of states, cases or facts."

At the cross. "Our own standpoint is that... Share a common structure which makes one or the other style of analysis possible but that neither analysis is necessary or even desirable." He is talking about the strategy of analyzing hypothetical propositions as categorical subject-predicate propositions.

At the top. "Structure"? Causal structure? teleonomic cause?

P. 160, at the crosses. Here the defends, or thinks the defends, his idea of a common structure. But the fact that a common method is possible does not show an underlying logical form. It only shows that an even <u>more comprehensive</u> grammar is possible. But the limits of this grammar as a clue to anything else are shown by the use of the "if the elements are... Then... It is..." Statements.

At the circle. "The parity and mutual independence of term and propositional

logic implies that syncategordmata which seem respectively specific to terms and to propositions must have important formal affinities." Of course, this too shows my point that the affinities are syntactical, and so the differences are also syntactical.

P. 161 , at the top. "We have no need of negative and compound state of affairs in accounting for the truth of negations and compound sentences.

At "Rescher." "The semantic thesis appropriate to a neoclassical logic of terms of propositions plus limits the correspondence of true sentences to state of affairs noted by elementary affirmative sentences." That's is my criticism of Rescher. "Negations and compound sentences are themselves non-denotative but are interpreted as affirming or denying the existence of the states denoted by their elementary component sentences.

P. 162, at the crosses. Am I am "object" person as opposed to a "state of affairs person"? No, that is a false dichotomy. The fundamental state of affairs is the existence of what he calls "objects." And he has a good example in what follows to show the false dichotomy.

At the circle. Does this apply to the grue paradox?

At the triangle. Again, material implication is irrelevant to the identity of objects in existence.

At the blue circle. Metaphysical conclusions from logical premises?

P. 163. He explains why the logic of propositions and truth functions came to have primacy over the logic of terms. He goes out to say that he is affording either kind of reduction. But adds that the conduct of expressions joining terms and sentences have important affinities. So we trying to cover itself by saying, one hand he is going to do something that might look like reduction, but on the other hand he is not really doing reduction.

Not on p.: instead of trying to the right conclusions from Sommers work, philosophers are liable to do the opposite. Their liable to say that Sommers just adds to the tools we have to try to use logic to solve the philosophical problems. Just as Milton Fisk said that he could you so and so's modal logic to develop a philosophy of necessity in history, others will say that Sommers work gives them options for solving philosophical problems that they did not have before.

Of course, some philosophers will want to reply to taking away logic as the basis for solving philosophical problems "what do we do now? We thought we had a way to deal with these questions. You have taken that way from us; so we're left with nothing." Obviously this is not a satisfactory state to leave them in.

P. 165.   Characterizing "the distinction between logical and extra-logical expressions." You can't distinguish the expressions other than by distinguishing that which they express. And you can't do that by "criteria" for identifying individual's. Causal analysis shows that there does occur cognition-dependent objects that are logical. But the philosophical use of that concept is not to identify individuals. It is to do further causal analyses.

P. 166. "The class of atomic sentences cannot itself be fixed independently of the class of categoremata." We don't have to know how to "effects" the categoremata, only have to know, causally, that language for public objects, existents, precedes and produces language for cognition-dependent objects.

P. 167.   He says that in natural language each elementary sentence has to terms. No, each elementary truth is known by recognizing the identity of at least two "terms," not terms of language but terms of the thing-object relation, two relata.

At the top: concerning Deely. How can cognition-dependent objects be primitive unless there exists a cognition of something,x, on the basis of which other objects of cognition dependent? Does not want so say that beings of reason are formed on the basis of, on the model of, real being? Doesn't that undercut Deely's interpretation of Poinsot?

P. 170. We can consider negations times to have a sense that does not depend on laws; laws depend on it. Or vice versa. Either way contradiction is not imply everything. For if negation is defined by laws, we can use disjunctive syllogism to get "q". Or we can get "q" from disjunctive syllogism, but we know that disjunctive syllogism is not a necessary truth or that it does not define the same meaning for negation signs, sense of another law and the set of laws defining negation signs is broken. So if we break the other law, we get "q" because negation does not mean what it meant before; and disjunctive syllogism does not mean what it meant.

The opponent will say that that is his point. Without the principle of noncontradiction, other laws will get to anything. But they only get to anything if they still work as before. And they don't work as before if the meaning of negations signs. has changed.

P. 173. At the Cross. Good example that the rules he needs for his <u>model</u> of thought always make such models imperfect. If I can prove that universally, can show that fought is not a calculation process. Maybe the implicit awareness of self evident inference principles in the awareness of the premises proves this.

P. 175 , at top. "If... Are terms or relations". Notice the shift of "categories," "domains," or "universes" from terms, which are means of objectification, to relations, which are the objectified.

Further down: "exploiting the similarities of logic to of arithmetic...".

P. 176. "A notation that makes it possible to do logic in an arithmetical way."

P. 177, at the Cross. Material implication: the logical has not only suppressed the ontological, it has suppressed the epistemological. It is because "1 implies 2" that "not both 1 and not 2" is true. Entailment is epistemological. Likewise, it is because of the truth of statements using terms as traditional logic does, that the connection between the antecedent and consequent of the hypothetical is true.

P. 183. Two kinds of rules: rules of transformation and rules of derivation. On the next p. he adds laws of derivation.

P. 195. The focus on studying the various advantages and disadvantages of the various models of inference can distract us from looking at what goes on in inference epistemologically. Sure, psychology is perilous, but logical modeling does not replace it. If a philosophy of logic is the philosophy of studying various models of thought, it is not the epistemology of logic, which still needs to be done.

P. 197. Great quotation: "the Fregean may objects that "something exists" cannot even be expressed in the standard language of modern predicate logic. But this only means that the formation rules of modern predicate logic are, and that respect, deficient."

At the "?" "Support Quine's view that the correct interpretation of quantifier is objectual and not substitutional."

P. 201. "Whenever... Has a truth value, then... And .... Or... are true." He seems to be saying something similar to what I say about the law of excluded middle. I say it applies to anything that has a truth value. But his way of claiming that a sentence is not have truth value is very different from mine. I must make sure they are not confused. Mine is a causal analysis saying that whatever they may be, causes necessary for a sentence to have truth value are not present.
P. 202. "The idea that relational expressions like "loves" are to place predicates has no place in classical linguistics or classical logic."

P. 204. "According to that rule, inference with two or more premises proceeds in algebraic fashion by cancellation of middle elements."

P. 205. "The logical vocabulary of basic logic consists of signs of opposition. And it suggests that inference proceeds by cancellation and substitution according to the dictum that traditional logicians have always considered to be fundamental and at the basis of deductive reasoning."

We start with an extra-logical value. To negate it, to get the opposite, we don't

need any additional extra-logical value; just need a cognition-dependent object. So he implies that negation is the basic cognition-dependent object. Aquinas does the same thing. To find Aquinas's quotation to that effect look in Regis's "epistemology."

"There is also the psychological question of how we reason..."

P. 206. "... The question is legitimate and alternative logistical systems with different logical syntax is will one day receive confirmation or disconfirmation as models for the deductive process actually taking place as we move from premises to conclusions." Perhaps, but they are only models, and no model is perfect. And if logic enters the empirical questions about how we reason, it does not answer the ontological questions about how we reason.

"It is far more likely that the actual procedures we use in getting from the premises to the conclusion are closer to the model of cancellation then to the model of instantiation and generalization familiar to the practitioner of modern predicate logic."

P. 208. "Traditional formal logic has no apparatus for regimenting sentences in a manner that makes truth conditions perspicuous. This may be thought of as a disadvantage; nevertheless, for that very reason, traditional formal logic does not find itself forcing standardized truth conditions on sentences of the same logical form."

P. 210. "Our account of... Does not construe its logical form existentially." Again, there is no such thing as logical form, only what is causally required epistemologically to grasp truth, as shown by Simon.

P. 212. At the Cross. An example of possible existence.

P. 213. "The amplitude of a term in a statement is determined by my knowledge of the meaning of that statement..." This is what I want to say about the reference of a term.

P. 216. Great quotation: "It is in any case to be avoided by a theory of logical signs that is based on some idea of what logical signs have in common. When expressions as different as "or" and "there exists" are both included in the list of the formative elements all logical language, the philosopher has actually given up trying for unified understanding of the logical formatives."

P. 224, at the top. Good example showing that substitution is in inference or at least requires an inference.

At the bottom. This is goes on why "the planets are nine" does not imply that "the number of planets is the square of 3" is not a necessary truth.

P. 284. Perhaps this example shows that is more likely that Aristotle's doctrine of "primary" subjects is based on his doctrine of substance than vice versa.

P. 286. "The algebraic representation could be usefully exploited in exhibiting such common features as commutivity."

P. 291. Again, like Aquinas, negation is primitive and prior to other logical notions.

P. 292. Perhaps he us. In logic "exists" as unrestricted amplitude precisely because real existence is not logical; so existence for realities as the same logical properties as existence for other "objects." He does not to give a good way of handling "every tiger exists" in terms of an amplitude that is not restricted to the domain of realities. As a result the sentence is not redundant.

P. 306. "The consequences -- for metaphysics, for logic, for the philosophy of language -- of a decision on the question whether the categoremata are charged or uncharged, are widely ramify in virtually uninvestigated. But the decision cannot be made in isolation; it depends on which organon of logic we choose to accept."

P. 312. "Decidability is, of course, a characteristic of statements that accrues to them in virtue of the abilities of those who make the statements."

P. 313. "Dummett defined realism as the "belief that for any statement there must be something in virtue of which it or its negation is true"."

P. 314. "It is one thing to say that the law does not apply in a given case or over given domain giving reasons to withhold truth values from the sentences that appear to violate the law." (I would say that I do not have to give reasons to withhold the truth values. Whatever the "reasons", that is, the causes why a sentence fails to have truth value may be, I do not have to know what they are. If a sentence violates the principle of excluded middle, there is a failure of truth value someplace.) "it is quite another thing to assert conjunction of negations that Dummett cannot but see as an overt violation of the classical sentential law of excluded middle. It is therefore it never really possible for Dummett to say that Jones was neither brave nor not brave: the must instead argue for a truth value gap, never a like matter since nothing less than a theory of meaning is required for the judgment that a prima facie meaningful statement is neither true nor false." (Again, I do not want to have to provide a theory of meaning or anything else. I know that it excluded middle is violated, some cause necessary for a sentence to have truth value, whatever that cause may be and I do not need to know, is missing.)

P. 316. He is not really saying what I am saying. He is saying that both sentences can have the truth value of being false. I am saying that truth value

was never achieved.

P. 319 "the curious doctrine that the absence of 1's is reason enough to except "every 1 is 2" leads to curious theses in the theory of meaning." Then on p. 321 he says "it is not just harmless paradox to say that the absence of 1's is reason for the truth of "every 1 is...". In the footnote the then draws a parallel with material implication. In material implication the absence of truth in the antecedent makes the whole thing true. In the universal categorical the absence of existence for the subject allegedly makes the whole thing true."

P. 323. "So we have both the rejection of the logical law of excluded middle and the semantic law of bivalence."

P. 326. "We need to be able to distinguish between denying <u>of Socrates</u> that he is wise and denying <u>that</u> Socrates is wise. If the first is reduced to the second, then we have no way of saying anything negative <u>about Socrates</u>. For the second is not about Socrates that all but about the proposition that Socrates is wise. Of that proposition, it says that it is not the case.

P. 334. "Terms like "existent" and "occurent" differ from terms like "striped" and "dangerous" and not really characterizing their subjects." Yes, there is a big difference between "exists" and other grammatical predicates. But saying that there is a big difference is one thing, articulating the difference and its consequences is another. improper articulation deprives us of understanding human knowledge, because it deprives us of metaphysics.

P. 335. His critique of on to on exists being predicate is reminiscent of Maritain and Cajetan. But are "domains" the best way to talk about possible and actual existence? There is no need to be absolute by saying that it is the "best" or "the only" way. Domains are a concept of a very, very powerful tool. But all tools are limited. Again, is "is exists a predicate" a question?

P. 336. "It is, to repeat, essential to the point of view that I am advocating to say that "there are tigers" is construe oval as a sentence of the subject-predicate form. It is not essential to my point of view to insist on any thesis involving possible world semantics or metaphysics." Again, is "is exists a predicate" a question?

P. 338. "A theory of reference appropriate to the logical syntax of traditional formal logic is an attractive alternative to the contemporary theory."

P. 339. "The syntax of the sentence like "Socrates is why use" does not differ in the central respects from that of a sentence like "a man is why use" or "every man is why use" so far as the form of the subject is concerned."

P. 340. "We have lately discuss some of the implications for logic and for metaphysics of the contemporary treatment of negation as a sentential operator or "connective."

"Restriction of the vocabulary for expressing logical form to the logical particles" a quotation from Katz.

P. 341. Good on the distinction between translating (modern logic) and transcribing (traditional logic) sentence is of natural language. And the footnotes good on the syntactical character of quantification.

P. 342. "Transcribes the vernacular for logical reckoning"

P. 43. Good argument that Frege's "terms" are not really terms.

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xxxCarol's Paradox, Adler-U, universal concepts, difference of man, BIG, 5-11-00

My original purpose for going into Lewis Carroll's Achilles/tortoise paradox was not to do the philosophy of logic what to do the philosophy of mind. Specifically, I was looking for a new argument to establish the difference of humanbeings from machines on the one hand and animals on the other. I was hoping to show that awareness of the correctness of than algorithmic process was not itself the result of an algorithmic process.

Concerning the difference of man, the following argument, which is far as I know has not been used, should be used. In the article on contradiction I show that awareness of how to apply a rule requires a minimal deductive inference. The kind of inference I describe their is probably one that animals could accomplish in certain cases. They could not accomplish an inference that required recognizing that a particular well formed formula was a well formed formula. But they could certainly accomplished inferences that require them only to recognize something visually. For example, the rule might be if you see yellow, screen. Applying that rule requires an inference, a deductive inference.

But I want to say that animals cannot be aware that a deductive inference is correct. That is a cannot be aware of that particular logical relationship. Because awareness of the correctness of the algorithmic process requires awareness of the necessary truth of logical principles used by the process, modus ponens in particular. And animals cannot recognize such necessary truths, especially not such self-evidently necessary truths. They can be aware

that something went wrong. For instance, if they are following the rule they haven't thought and they do not get the result they expect, they will be frustrated. Being frustrated is not the same as recognizing that of the conclusion of the inference follows necessarily from a self-evidently true logical principle. We on the other hand can recognize that logical necessity.

Likewise, animals appear to be able to use universal concepts in some sense. Distinguishing their universal concepts from ours may or may not be an easy process. But what distinguishes human beings is that we can't recognize the relationship of universality. That is, we can recognize that a particular object of concept is indeed a universal, does indeed bear the relation of your personality to correlatives which bear the relation of individuality.

12-27-00

To be aware of the validity of an argument, we must be aware, cognizant, not just of the rule but up the truth of the rule. And cognizant of it in a manner that does not require arriving at its truth by deduction from other rules. Or from other premises, whether the other premises are rules or not. But a machine have that kind of awareness?

If we can add the definition of life using the concept of the "not fortuitous" to Averoes's analysis of consciousness we might be able to show that consciousness requires "life" in a way that machines are not yet capable of. Or maybe better, in sensation requires a substance, consciousness requires a substance, not an accident like a machine.

Is logical knowledge knowledge of the correctness of the steps in a proof as opposed to knowledge of the necessary truth of inference principles? Perhaps we want to say this. But if so there is another question. In addition to knowledge of the correctness of steps in a proof, in algorithm, is there such a thing as knowledge of necessary truths that are or that correspond to logical inference principles? I am arguing not only that there is such a thing but if there were not such a thing, we could not have knowledge of the correctness of the steps in a proof.

Another good example of how knowledge of the correctness of an all the algorithmic step presupposes knowledge of the necessary truth of modus ponens is the use of substitution by way of universal or existential specification or generalization.

xxxEthics, cruelty to animals, , overflow, aesthetics, July 27, 1999

On page 404 of Purtil, Philip D. Vine offers what he calls an overflow principal that makes cruelty to animals unethical. He is wrong, but there could be an esthetic overflow principal that explains why cruelty to animals appears to be intrinsically leave all the way cruelty to human beings is, although cruelty to animals cannot have the same moral significance as cruelty to human beings.

On page wk five of the New York Times for July 20 fifth 1999, talking about an Atlantic monthly article, Nicolas Wade says "seeing a highly intelligent animal life a dolphin or a chimpanzees, people cannot resist computing to what what ever they would feel in the same context. This is probably part of our genetic programming. The whole art of living in social groups is to figure out other members intentions and act accordingly. We do this instinctively, and almost any fellow mammal will trip the reflex."

He is para-raising the interest John S. Kennedy, quoted on page 45 of the Atlantic monthly for July 1999 via Stephen Budiansky in the article "the truth about dogs". Can be says that "we are compulsive anthropomorphizers, always on the lookout for behaviors that mimic human social phenomena such as loyalty, be trailed, reciprocity. These are useful things to lookout for when one is a group dwelling animal whose survival is threatened less by wild beasts than by back stabbing fellow the group dwellers. All work cognitive ability to ascribe motives to others is a large part of the makes us human. But it is truly compulsive. Human beings do it so instinctively that they are for ever ascribe being malignant or bending the motives even to in animate forces such as the weather volcanoes, and internal combustion engines."

To use D. Vine's word, there is an overflow from our ability to ascribe motives and other healing to human beings to the ability to drive them to animals. But this is an esthetic overflow, not a moral one. Even with our the overflow principal, we naturally have a negative esthetic reactions to pain in animals because we know what pain is in ourselves and we negatively we act, in an esthetic sense, to it. So we don't like to see pain in animals same reason that we don't like to be it in other human being, namely, we don't like pain where ever we see it because we don't like it in ourselves. We have a negative reaction to thinking about pain what ever the context of the pain we are thinking about. Because that is what pain is in our perception, something we think negatively of.

Their is nothing moral about this at all. Everything that the last paragraph talks about is esthetic. But our negative esthetic reaction to pain is a strong enough for us to confuse it with a moral reaction. But if there is a moral dimension to causing pain in animals, that moral dimension cannot come just from an esthetic reactions. No matter how strong and the emotional reaction may be, and emotional reactions does not constitutes a moral judgment. I think to think of animals sufferings, because I think to think of sufferings. But hating the idea of animals sufferings does not tell me win it is morally right or wrong, or if it is morally right or wrong, to cause animal sufferings.

The animal rights movement draws most of its strength from this confusion.

1-1-00

For Thomist, add an abstract that shows the connection to Thomism. Point out that one kind of nature has been left out almost completely from discussions of natural law and other "naturalistic" approaches to ethics, the nature of one faculty: the will, the rational appetite.

xxxWhat are numbers? May 1, 2000

In discussing Aquinas is a theory of numbers Thomists have a shockingly avoided what are known as transcendental numbers, for example, the number of persons in the Trinity. It is these numbers, rather than the numbers that result from the division of all continuum, that are what modern mathematics is talking about. I am grateful to dick from Merrimack for point this out to me.

But in what follows I am going to have to use the word transcendental in two different senses. When speaking of transcendental numbers, we mean numbers that transcend the sphere of the material, numbers that can be shared by material beings and immaterial beings, just as other transcendental properties can be. But the analysis that follows also depends on comparing the concept of number to what are known in tradition as the transcendentals. With that warning, I hope I can make things clear for the reader.

Consider the Trinity. It is the quantity 3 and accident although the Trinity, an accidental feature inhering in the Trinity? If not, is number merely a being of reason, a logical construct of some sort.? No, the number of persons in the Trinity is a reality; that is, the fact that there are three persons in the Trinity rather than to or for it is a reality. Likewise, if God had created only three creatures, state three angels, the fact that there were three creatures rather than true or for would be a reality. Yet, the No. 3 would not be an accident of any of the 3 Angels. So what kind of concept is number?

We know that number is associated with the extension of a universal concept. In order for there to be three, there must be three of something: three oranges, three apples, three persons, or what ever. That is why the concept of number can appear to be a being of reason. For universality and extension our logical relations and therefore beings of reason. But the fact that a concept includes a being of reason does not imply that the objective concept as a whole is an objective concept of a being of reason. In fact, it means the opposite. The whole point of the doctrine of the transcendentals, that is, of the concepts convertible with being, the one the good the true etc., is that the addition of a being of reason to the concept of being leaves the result I identical with the reality objectified by means of the first concept, the concept of being. The whole point of the doctrine

of the transcendentals is that the true is not a being of reason but is convertible with, that is, identical with, being. Not identical as an objective concept, but identical as to the reality objectified by each of the objective concepts.

The reason for this identity is precisely that the concept of the true adds only a being of reason to the concept of being and therefore does not add any reality to the concept of being. Something similar must be true of the concept of number.

To the reality all of the persons in the Trinity the No. 3 adds the concept of falling under the extension of the concept of person. It objectifies the realities that fall under the extension of that concept precisely adds falling under the extension of a concept. But what falls under the extension of a concept is not a being of reason, or need not be, it can be a reality and in the first instances must be a reality. To the reality that exists when the Trinity exists, or the reality that exists when only three creatures have been created, the No. 3 adds the being of reason of a falling under the extension of the concept of person or the concept of creature, respectively, that is, of being a term of the relation of universality that characterizes the objective concept of person or creature. But it adds more. It adds the concept of falling under the extension of a universal concept together with theother things that fall under the extension. Or, in common with the other things that our terms of the relation of universality.

To the reality that exists when the Trinity exists or three creatures exist, the concept of number adds the being of reason of so many falling under the extension of a concept together, the concept of so many falling under a universal concept in common. So the existence of three or the existence of 4 is not a being of reason it is identical with the existence of the realities being objectified. But it objectifies those realities in a certain way, just as the concept of true objectifies being in one way in the concept of good objectifies being in another way. Note that I have not spoken out a set of realities. The concept of set comes later and the concept of set it is the concept of a being of reason. The No. 3 objectifies the persons that exists in the Trinity and the creatures that exist, if only three creatures have been created, by a specific way of falling under the extension of a concept together. Here specific refers to a species as opposed to it an individual, on the one hand, or a genus, on the other. The persons of the Trinity fall under the concept of person, fall under the concept of person together or in common, in the same way, or in anyway that is the same as a way that creatures fall under the concept of creature together.

But note also that number can apply to beings of reason as well as to real beings. For beings of reason can also fall under universal concepts; rather, they do also fall under universal concepts. And the mathematician looks at numbers in abstraction from whether the No. 3 is identical with a kind of reality that exists when for example the Trinity exists or a triangle exists. And so for the purposes of the mathematician, she can construct beings of reason and consider them numbers on a par with the whole numbers, even though a being of reason like

zero, negative numbers, the square root of negative one, etc. are not and cannot be
ways in which realities fall under the extension of concepts in common with other realities or together with other realities.

The following may be a little repetitious. Assume that only these realities exists, Tom, Dick and Harry. We want to say that when these realities exists, multiplicity exists. And we also want to say that when these realities exists, multiplicity is not something that exists over and above what exists when Tom Dick and Harry exist. So multiplicity is a reality, but it is not a reality distinct from what exists when Tom, Dick and Harry exist. We can also say that when Tom, Dick and Harry exist, threeness exists.
Threeness is a species of multiplicity.   Whenever multiplicity exists, some species of multiplicity must exist.

Along the same lines, but from a different point of view, another thing we want to say is that the above definition of number does not imply that multiplicity comes into existence only when universal concepts with extension come into existence.
To say that when Tom Dick and Harry exist, threeness also exists is not to say that there also must exist a human knower with the universal concept, say, of person. When Tom, Dick and Harry exist, the reality that exists, the extramental reality that exists, is such that it is capable of truthfully being objectified by the No. 3, because, the concept of person includes Tom, Dick and Harry, and only Tom, Dick and Harry, in its extension. But that which is capable of being so objectified truthfully exists prior to any such objectification. What exists prior to the objectification are potential terms of the concept of person's extension, where the potentiality does not refer to what exists prior to the objectification, but to the potentiality of the objectification, the potentiality of the objectification's occurring.

In other words, what exists prior to the objectification is multiplicity, in particular, threeness. The multiplicity consists of entities capable of becoming objects of the concept person. We can say that the No. 3 exists prior to the concept of person in the sense of numbered number, that is, of what is counted by the word three, the word three being numbering number. So to say that multiplicity exists is to say that reality is such that it is capable of being truthfully objectified by numbering number, where numbering number means that reality plus the relation of reason of there being terms of the extension of a concept together.

When entities, Tom, Dick, and Harry exist, threeness exists. When entities Tom, Dick, Harry and Sam exist, fourness exists.

Dear Joe,

In case you don't remember, I was Joe Evan's undergrad assistant at the Maritain Center during your last years at ND.

I just read your fine article in the '95 ACPQ.

I argue on pp. 461 (at "A final point")-462 of Causal Realism (if John Carroll's library does not have this, shame on the philosophy dept.) that Simon does NOT show that mathematical concepts are analogical sets in HIS sense, since mathematics does not use that "yes-yes"/"yes-no" (or "yes-but") mode of predication. Philosophers may need to use that kind of predicate when we talk about math (are the Three Stooges a set in the same sense as the Three Little Pigs? Yes and no.) But mathematicians do not.

This is important to me because in that chapter I use Simon to answer a crucial question concerning philosophy's ability to know truths. In the final analysis, philosophers must verify by reductio ad absurdum, that is, to propositions whose opposites are self-evidently contradictory. But that is the way math and logic verify: so why can't philosophy produce consensus in the ways that they do, i.e., by defining and deducing? I argue that the "yes-no" character of philosophical (i.e., ontological) concepts explains why consensus cannot occur in philosophy as it does in math and logic. If analogical sets are not peculiar to ontological concepts, philosophers have no credible way of claiming to be able to verify even though our arguments do not produce consensus with the regularity that other investigations into necessary truths do.

Also, I am currently circulating an article, coming to you by surface mail, in which I argue as follows: Assume that there is such a thing as awareness of the validity of inferences. If so, that knowledge is at least part of what I mean by the noise "logic." Awareness of the validity of inferences requires implicit awareness of the necessary truth of some inference principle; so logic in this sense is or includes knowledge of such necessary truths. The relation between logic in this sense and formal methods is this: Formal methods are to logic as mathematics is to physics, an indispensable tool not identical with the kind of knowledge of which it is a tool.

Knowledge of physical truths is not knowledge of mathematical truths. Knowledge that a formula is arrived at by steps satisfying the rules of a system is not knowledge that the rules or any formula arrived at by their means is necessarily true. So awareness of formal correctness is not the kind of awareness that I (and everyone else in fact, but that is irrelevant) am calling logical knowledge. But formal methods are just as indispensable to logic and mathematics is to physics; you just can't get very far otherwise.

On the other hand, I argue that awareness of formal correctness presupposes awareness of inferential validity, i.e., presupposes knowledge that is "logical" in this sense. So there is such a thing as a distinct kind of knowledge that happens

to provoke the noise "logic." Of course, one is free to use that noise in any other sense, including for knowledge by formal methods as opposed to knowledge of the necessary truth of inference principles strictly speaking. But then we would have the problem of distinguishing logic in that sense from mathematics. If you restrict "logic" to awareness of the necessary truth of inferences principles, you might still have the problem of distinguishing different kinds of formal systems, those that are mathematical and those we might not want to call mathematical. But that problem is only complicated, and made much more serious, if we think that it is the problem of distinguishing logic from math.

Also, I in effect argue, on pp. 313-319 of the Wittgenstein/Poinsot article I am sending (with a typo corrected), that what Quine calls the problem of universals is Not at all the traditional problem. Rather, his position satisfies the traditional definitions of nominalism or conceptualism, not of any kind of realism in the traditional sense. The modern approach suppresses rather than replaces the traditional problem, which still must be addressed, as I use Wittgenstein to argue.

Sets are beings of reason. They belong to the third order of abstraction, because that is where number, even in the classical sense, belongs. We, including Simon, have ignored completely Aquinas's treatment of "transcendental" number in the treatise on the Trinity. Surely the quantity of persons in the Trinity is as real as any other quantity. Division of a material continuum may be necessary to supply us with the examples from which our psychological process of learning about numbers must begin. But the truth of arithmetical sentences does not require "common intelligible matter."

Then what is number? Assume God created only Larry, Moe and Curly. Did He also create threeness? If so what is it? An accident? If so, an accident of whom? A substance? If so, that would be Pythagoreanism with a vengeance. In fact, there is another way out within Thomism, though not one ever applied to this problem before, to my limited historical knowledge.

Numbers are in important respects like the True, the Good, the Beautiful, etc. (Call them here the "convertibles." Though I am comparing "transcendental" numbers to them, I am not comparing them with respect to the meaning of the word "transcendental"; in fact, the meanings are different in each case. Three is not convertible with being, but it is "transcendental" in the sense of being truthfully asserted of immaterial being.) The true, the good, etc. are 100-percent realities; that's why they are convertible with being. The fact that to objectify being in these ways we must make use of relation of reason does not mean that what is so objectified is in anyway not real. It means the opposite. Because the only difference between the true and what exists is a relation of reason added to what exists, there is by hypothesis no real difference between them; what is objectified by "true" is by hypothesis identical with the reality objectified by "being."

Likewise, threeness, or the number three, adds to the reality of Larry, Moe and Curly only the relation of reason of being the extension of such objective concepts as "created beings," "finite beings," "caused beings," "human," "animal," "rational," "actors," etc. So when God created L, M and C, He did indeed create threeness, but He did not create any reality in addition to L, M and C. Threeness is a reality (or a characteristic of reality, and for there to be three beings, not two or four, is something real) but is neither a substance nor an accident. It is what exists objectified by means of a certain kind of being of reason. Likewise, when God created L, He created something true, good etc. But he did not created them as realities in addition to L. (Pace Benacerraf, I'd like to see this argued in an article entitled "What Numbers MUST Be.")

The philosopher can recognize this as the psychological source of the concept of set, which of course goes far beyond the kind of set that is its psychological source.

Finally, notice that logical relations like identity, abstraction (perfect/"yes-yes" and imperfect/"yes-but") are analogical. But I would argue that the "yes-but" member of such sets occurs in logic only because one kind of pre-logical knowledge is ontological in Simon and Maritain's sense, i.e., resolvable to the supreme object of imperfect abstraction: that which exists. (If you have heroic patience, you might want to read Causal Realism, pp. 427-434, 438-453, 462-467. For "word-function" and "meaning(t)" just read "objective concept.")

Sorry for going on so long. But since you are working on some Simon texts in these areas, I thought you might be interested.

12-15-00 BIG

From our understanding of the word-functions of arithmetic, we know in advance of knowing the correct answer that the answer to questions like the following will either be necessarily true or necessarily false: "is 157 a prime number?" And we know this without a formal, that is, calculational, proof. But if we can know this about any number, and know the answers to other arithmetical questions about any number are either necessarily true false, we can know that arithmetic is consistent. For we know that there is the true answer and a false answer to any well formed question. And we know that the true answer is necessarily true, and the false answer is necessarily false.

Godel has shown that knowledge of this kind cannot result from calculational proofs. This is another baking example of the difference between awareness of mechanical correctness in a series of steps leading to result and awareness of necessary truth. That was the point of my article on logic and the principle of noncontradiction. I can add here that the knowledge illustrated in this example is knowledge about computational knowledge. It is knowledge of the fact that if we form of certain kind of operation, namely, and arithmetic operations, we will

necessarily get a certain kind of result. It is knowledge not that a certain step in a process conforms to a certain rule, but that if a step in a process conforms to the rules, the result will have a certain character. In other words, it is a kind of knowledge about what the rules are, what the operations governed by these rules are, and what the results of these operations are. And the answer to the question how we acquire the latter kind of knowledge is related to what is nonidentical with the question of how we acquire knowledge that a step in a process conforms to the rules.

From our understanding of the word-functions of arithmetic, we know in advance of knowing the correct answer that the answer to questions like the following will either be necessarily true or necessarily false: "is 157 a prime number?" How much arithmetic do we need to know in order to know that the answer too any such question is either necessarily true or necessarily false? Not very much at all. Assume that we are teaching a child how to use numbers by counting her fingers. The child is not learning about 2, say, as a characteristic of her fingers as fingers. Then what she learning about 2? She is learning about 2, not in relation to fingers as such, but in relation to 1, as a logical or causal relation to 1. And she learns about all numbers by the way they are related to 1, that is, how they are related to 1 "item," "object," etc., in other words, how they are related to the "unit." At the same time she learns what a unit is, that is, by the relation of the word function of "the unit" to the word-functions of "2" and any other number.

What kind of relation? Relations that make certain truths necessarily true. The child is objectifying quantities, is learning to objectify quantities, as terms of certain kinds of relations. And it's so happens that whenever a "multitude" exists, the multitude is necessarily made up of items that can be objectified as units relative to other "units" within the at least cognition-dependent unity that is the multitude, because that is the word-function that "multitude" happens to have, namely, an at least cognition dependent collection of parts. And since any multitude must be objectifiable in this way, it must be objectifiable by word-functions so defined by relation to be word-function of "one", or "one of..." that sentences using certain of those word-functions must always be necessarily true or necessarily false. Otherwise, one or more of those word-functions would both be and not be what they are.

Why must any multitude be objectifiable by numbers understood arithmetically? Because that's what we happen to be by the word "multitude" and the word "number."

The number of my living parents happens to be 2. The result of adding 1 to 1 happens to be two. Given what the word-function of "number of my living parents" happens to be, that number will of not always be 2. Given what the word-function of "result of adding 1 to 1" happens to be, that number must always be 2. Both of these phrases happen to objectify the quantity 2. But the word-function of "2" does not objectify that quantity in a way that has necessary

relations with what the word-function of "number of my living parents" objectifies, with what that word-function is. The word-function of "2" does objectify that quantity in a way that has necessary relations with what 1 is, what 3 is, what 4 is, etc.

The latter word-functions objectify their quods as terms of logical or causal relations that ground necessity, because that is what numbers and numbered quantities as such are, that is, terms of certain kinds of logical and causal relations, which kinds just happen to make other quantities objectified by the same means have necessary relations of identity and not-identity with one another.
We may never have used were even heard of the number 157 before. But unless someone is trying to trick us when they use the noise "157", we know that the rules of the Arabic number system will give us that word-function. Those word-functions and their association with various noises are governed by rules. Given that those rules happen to be what they are, they generate necessary truths. Not all rules need generate necessary truths. We might have rules that tell us, for instance, that in generating a series of quantities, we start by flipping a coin. If heads, we generate a series by adding three times and then flipping a coin again. If heads again, we multiply 20 times and then a coin again. And we might say that on cloudy days we name each successive quantity by the series of words starting at the top of a randomly selected page in the dictionary.

It just so happens that when the word function of "multitude" exists, then it just so happens that we can objectify what that multitude it is by word functions and sentences of arithmetic. Why? Because it just so happens that the word functions we call those of arithmetic are ways of objectifying multitude, or of objectifying what we call a "multitude". Causal and logical relations hold between the word function of "multitude" and those of arithmetic. Specifically, the word-functions about numbers are quantities of objectified by logical and causal relations to other instances of what we call "quantities". In teaching and numbers to a child, we need not teach her how to use words like "multitude", but we are in fact familiarizing her with the kind of reality that she will later make the word-function of "multitude."

We just happen to be acquainted with word-functions, namely, numbers and arithmetic operations on numbers, that happen to be so related by logical and causal relations that sentences composed of certain terms about numbers will always be necessarily true. And it just happens that, given what those word functions are, there is a certain kind of state of affairs to which, given that these states of affairs are what they are, these word-functions will always be applicable to them, these were functions will always objectify those states of affairs. The states of affairs I am referring to our those which are the were functions of "quantity," "multitude," "multiplicity," in other words, quantitative states of affairs.

For it just so happens that given what the word function of "quantity" and the

others just mentioned are and given what the word functions of arithmetic are, quantities will always be objectifiable arithmetically. And so it just so happens that multitude and multitudes will be objectifiable by means of necessary arithmetic truths. Why? Because of relations between what the word-functions of "quantity", "multitude," etc. happen to be and what the word-functions of arithmetic are, relations that make it necessarily the case that when quantities happen to exist, arithmetical truths apply. What kind of relations between the word-functions of "quantity" and those of "arithmetic"? The logical and causal relations that define the word-functions of arithmetic, the logical and causal relations that constitute the word-functions of arithmetic.

The word-functions of arithmetic objectify their quods as units, either units consisting of 1 and only one individual or units resulting from grouping one individual with another, with another, with another, etc. the grouping may consist of a cognition dependent causal relation or a cognition dependent logical relation. In either case the grouping would require some mental act or acts. We can use the word "grouping" to describe those acts. But that is not how the word "grouping" is used in the description of numbers that I just gave. A "grouping" in that sense is the object of a cognitive act, not itself a cognitive act. In other words, it is a mereological mereological some. It possibly is more than just a mereological sum, but it is at least that. This is not a psychologistic account of number.
God makes an angel; then he makes another angel. The result is 2 angel's. But arithmetic treats numbers in abstraction from whether a number of like 2 is a number of Angels, or fingers, or anything particular. From the point of view of arithmetic the causal operation producing a quantity of 2 is not making but adding. We start with one item and make another item. The result is two items. In making the "other item" we added to the first. But we could have started by making the other item. In that case, making it would not be equivalent to adding.

Adding means in operation result is a union of items of the same kind, for example, 1 and angel on a head of pin. Now I put another angel there. They are united by the idea of "being on the head of this pin." So when we consider quantities just as such, not the number of Angels or fingers etc., we are considering quantities objectified, at least implicitly, as terms of cognition dependent relations. (adding is a cognition dependent relation of abstract "making.") For we are considering units, items, etc. are united by some idea where the "uniting" amounts to a cognition dependent causal relation of putting item X into a group with item Y, for example, grouping item X and Y as terms of some identity relation. and then adding W. to the group already formed by XY.

So diverse numbers, diverse quantities, are objectified as terms of cognition dependent relation is. So we are considering numbers by relations such that if the result of some arithmetic operations were not identical with a particular number, the relations used to objectify would not be what they are. It just happens that reality as such that quantity objectified arithmetically is useful, that

is, it just happens that reality is multiple, has multitudes, as parts outside of parts, etc. And therefore it is necessarily the case that we can objectify different quantities, and different species of quantity, in this way.

In the Trinity, the 3 persons are distinct (at least logically), so we get separate them, or treat them as if separated; that is, we can treat them as terms of cognition dependent relations being the result of cognition dependent relations of separating and uniting. Again, the cognition dependent relations of which different numbers of persons are the result are not psychological acts but but are themselves cognition dependent objects of which we are made aware by means of psychological acts.

xxxShort book, sb. frege, analytic philosophy, May 1, 2000

The title is A **Re**-Introduction to Philosophy. The subtitle was going to be: the overlooked alternative to rationalism, empiricism, Kantianism, and their heirs. But I much preferred the following subtitle: why Post-Fregean methods have not reduced disagreement and Paradox in philosophy. Incidentally, notice that a put a hyphen between the word introduction and the prefix "Re". This is merely a device that will hopefully make the idea that this is not an introduction to philosophy standout. For the same reason I have bolded and italicized the prefix.

Given that subtitle, one of the first things that must be said in the introduction is that there is nothing lacking in post Fregean methods themselves. The problem is not the technical value of those methods; they are perfectly good, in fact excellent, in themselves. That is a given. The question is why they have not helped us reduced disagreement and Paradox in philosophy. By post Fregean techniques I am thinking, for example, of Tarski's analysis of truth, Craigs a theorem, Kripke's semantic analysis of modal propositions, and even Russell's theory of descriptions. Russell's theory is perfectly successful as a technical logical device. The only issue is whether we can use it to answer the questions Russell thought we could answer with it, or any other philosophical questions. The same with our other examples.

Since these techniques are perfectly good in themselves, our failure to be able to reduce disagreement and Paradox by using them must come from other assumptions that we bring to the table either consciously or unconsciously. This book concerns some of those other assumptions. The bottom line is that we have been playing with a short deck. Even if our deck has the aces and all the face cards, and most of the No. cards, that is not enough in the particular game we are playing, the game of philosophy. As Aristotle said, a small mistake in the beginning is a big one in the end.

This is not to assume that having a complete deck of assumptions will do for us

what Fregean methods alone could not do. It might be that having the complete set of assumptions will reveal that we cannot achieve the kind of agreement and lack of Paradox that we find in other fields when we are doing philosophy. In other words we may have been operating under a false expectation.

In the subtitle and possibly in the introduction I do not refer to something else that Fregean methods have not help us reduce: obscurantism in philosophy. I may not bring that up until much later. The reason is that an open-minded analyst should be able to see that there is as much disagreement and Paradox in philosophy as there ever was. But one thing to their prejudices may not allow them to see is that there is as much obscurantism in philosophy. They operate under the a priori assumption that there are professional existence is justified by their success at bringing clarity into philosophy where clarity was lacking before.

Of course, that is not true. What it would not be good strategy to get them with that Paradox, it will be perceived by them as a Paradox, upfront. For examples of obscurantism think of David Lewis on possible worlds. And think of the lack of clarity in Quine's views once you get behind the surface clarity of his stylized prose.

xxxShort book, sb, causality, determinism and free will, BIG, 12-29-00

Causal determinism: what is determined? Not just that this kind of action will occur, but that this individual act occurs in this individual situation. So my presentation of causality does leave room for free will. Free will is possible if and only if some agent's causal determination is not specifies to this or that individual but is specified by universality in some way.

That a change would not exist without its subject is not just the trivial truth that the mereological sum the change in the subject would not exist without the subject. Rather, there is a relation of dependence of the change on the subject; this relation is more than a logical relation or any kind of cognition-dependent relation. So there is more than a mereological sum here. And the change itself constitutes the fact that it has something fulfilling its <u>need</u>, its relationship of need.

The opponent wants to say that we should not call the change of causes when the effect in question is identical with the supposedly cause. But that is precisely my point. It is because the change cannot be a cause of itself that another cause is needed. For without the change, the change would not have the subject as its component cause.

Here is awarding that helped me start the final version (so far) of the argument for the principle of causality. The change is dependent as actually being caused, as having (needing) a component cause but not as united with its component cause.

Without an efficient cause, once the unchanging potential subject exists, no other cause would be necessary for an actually caused change to occur to the subject, and so the change would because of itself.

By requiring the subject to change, the efficient cause requires the subject to be the term of. . . , to be that by which the change is caused, to terminate. . .

Descriptions by means of interior causes are not extrinsic denominations.

Assume that there is a reality, X., that requires conditions that are not now fulfill. For the conditions to be fulfill would be a change. Whatever else the change would be, it would be the coming into existence of the fulfillment of those conditions. Now assume that X. itself that change. X. is the coming into existence of the fulfillment of its own conditions. The opponent would have to reply that X has conditions, what they are now fulfilled, that is, its potential component cause already exists.

What the component cause is is insufficient precisely because it must cease being what it is in some respect in order to be the subject of the change. The change does not actually have a component cause by the fact that the subject is what it is. The subject must precisely cease being what it is in some respect for the change to have the subject as its component causes the subject by being what give is does not give the change a component cause,. Does not allow does not fulfill the change's need for component cause the change to have a component cause. Perhaps this is a better reply to triviality objection.

To say that something depends on causes when does not have sufficient causes is to say that it gets sum of what it is from causes but does not get everything that it is from causes. It is dependent on causes but does not entirely derive from causes. Assume 2-part reality, 1/2, is dependent in all respects, but does not derive from causes in all respects. Then some respect of, in some respect, this reality does not come from the cause, although it needs the cause. So when 1/2 exists, all of what it is depends on causes to be what it is, but not all of what it is comes from its causes. Let 2 not come from the causes. So 2 is dependent in respect R1. Does 2 have sufficient causes in respect R1? If so, 2 must derive in respect R1. So there must be some other respect, R2, in which 2 depends but does not derive.

But does R 2 depend on R 1? If so, it must have sufficient causes in that respect. 2 either depends on 1, or is does not. If it does, 1 is a cause of 2, and there are sufficient causes for 1. It can 1 exist without 2? 1 depends on causes and derives from causes, causes produce it. 2 depends on causes, but does not derive from causes.

Assume something does not derive from causes. Why must it depend on causes? Some of what it is must derive from causes for it to be true that it

depends on causes.

2 is the existence of more than that for which, whatever it is, 1 2 depends on causes. So 2 must not depend on causes.

If an effect does not derive from its causes but only presupposes them, the effect must be somehow independent all its causes, if the causes are not sufficient for it. Its causes cannot account for all of what it is. All of what it is does not come from its causes. The causes do not produce all of what it is. Another good way to say it is that the causes do not require the existence of all of what the effect is. All the causes can exist without all of what the effect is existing so when all of the effect exists, not all of what it is is such that the causes would not exist without it. 2 of what it is made depend on 1, but the causes do not produce 2, do not require 2.

Can an effect not <u>derive</u> anything from its causes, just <u>presuppose</u> them? If it only presupposes them, it still must be somehow independent of its causes, if its causes are not sufficient for it. And if they are sufficient for it, it is not independent of them. The causes cannot account for all of what it is; all of what it is does not come from its causes. The causes do not produce all of what it is. The causes do not require the existence of all of what it is. So the causes can exist without all of what it is existing. So when it all exists, not all of it is such that the causes would not exist without it. Feature 1 of what it is made depend on feature 2, but the causes do not produce feature 1, do not require the existence of feature 1. (For example, a motion's rate of acceleration depends on the existence of the motion, likewise the length of time of the state of motion, likewise the direction of the motion. Also, whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver; so could there be some aspect of the result that does not derive from either of the causes? No, it's simply derives from both.)

A change has a relation of dependence on a component cause. What the subject is does not fulfill requirement of that relation. And without the change, the subject cannot fulfill requirement of that relation, namely, to be something that changes.

The subject is something by which the change is caused.

There must be another causal function without which that which undergoes change would not be something undergoing the change; there must be whatever is requires for the component cause to actually undergo the change.

The component cause cannot be the sole thing on which the change depends; otherwise the change is responsible for its having subject as its cause.

Why can't we explain the change by a constant? The result of the change is 1. And "explanation" of 1 must link 1 to something specific to 1, something that is

not linked in the same way to what is not to 1. If 2 is constant through the change from non 1 to 1, 2 is no more linked to 1 then it is to non 1. So 2 does not explain 1. (This would be a good exercise for graduate students: articulate why we can't explain the change by constant. The preceding articulation is good <u>for some purposes</u>. For other purposes, a different though not contradictory explanation might be needed. But the different articulation might appear contradictory.

First, knowledge is causal in general. But second, causal knowledge is incomplete and in perfect because of the distinction between the ontological and the empirical.

The better distinction is not between the logical and the empirical, which is the only distinction the analysts use. It is between the causal (whether ontological or empirical) and the logical.
Items for the bibliography: Ray Dennehy, "the ontological basis of certitude," the Thomist, volume 50, No. 1, Jan., 1986, pp. 120-150. "Unreal realism," volume 55, No. 4, 1991, pp. 631-655.

xxxSex, Pew, SSR, sexual ethics, 5-23-00

In marriage, Our sexual partner must be as close to us, as closely united to us, as our own sexuality is. Why? Because what is the alternative? The alternative would be an arrangement, a contract, with a built-in distance between us, a built-in limit on how far we give ourselves to each other and how far we united to each other.

We cannot be responsible for making the use of our person making ability into the kind of use in which it cannot be a person making ability. We cannot be responsible for making the way we use our person making ability be a way in which it cannot be a person making ability. This is what the homosexual doess. Or this is what homosexual acts do. To choose a homosexual act is to choose to use our person making ability in a way that it could not be a person making ability.

The way we use our person making ability must be the same way that can produce offspring, by which we produce offspring, when and if we are fertile. For the use of our person making ability must always be such that any other goal we are seeking is subordinate to the goal of making persons.

If human beings were created to live forever, and if we all had person making ability, but if that ability was intended to produce only one new person, and if that was going to take 100 million years, our person making ability would still be the ability to make that for the sake of which everything else exists, and our person making ability would be that before for it was anything else. In other words, even

under those assumptions, it would be immoral to use our person making ability as if it did not exist for the sake of producing that for the sake of which everything else exists. If we don't see that, we don't see the awesomeness of what it is to be a person.

When we see heterosexuals acting romantically toward each other, we know we're watching nature's design for making persons at work. We know this whether or not we know that the members of the couple are now fertile. Because we know what the primary an essential purpose for our sexuality is, and not only is it essential it is absolute.

When we see heterosexuals acting romantically toward each other, we are watching nature's design for making person at work. We are watching natures person making apparatus at work. We are watching natures person making function at work. The way it works is for one person with a partial person making ability to be attracted to another person for the sake of the other persons partial person making ability. One person desires another person because of the other persons partial person making ability. One partial person making ability desires union with another person because of the other persons partial person making ability.

This is it.

The result, that is, the desired union, is the existence of a complete person making agency, a complete person making causal system. To say that my sexuality exists for the sake of the existence of persons is to say that, first of all, my sexuality exists for the sake of the existence of a complete person making causal system. So the fact that persons are that for the sake of which everything else exists means that my sexuality, as far as my values are concerned, must exist for the sake of the existence of a complete person making causal system. In my values, my sexuality must exist for that sake if persons are to have the status in my values all being that for the sake of which everything else exists.

3-5-01

In prostitution, visual pornography, etc., we let others enjoyed our body for and like the drug) at the expense of our personhood, something we have no right to sell. For we are selling our person making ability not, for example, our food making ability.

1: Sex is fun, just fun, not to be evaluated more seriously than that. So don't get excited if, for example, the President fools around. 2: that kind of fun, that is, getting it whenever I can and as much as I can is my highest priority, is what I think about modus, etc.. So it's OK if, for example, a President subordinate perjury as long as the perjury is just about that trivial matter, sexual fun. (Or 2: it is so much fun in fact that. . . ; it is so much pleasure, in fact, that . . .).

Sexual freedom requires that a be morally justifiable to kill the product of conception.

In 1970 or so, we began killing fetuses, and the prophecy was made that infanticide and euthanasia were not far behind. In 2000, we are permitting voluntary euthanasia and our justifying infanticide. In 2030, we will be committing in voluntary euthanasia and infanticide. In 2060? But remember, this is proof that we can have morality without religion. All we have to do is redefine morality.

There are true and only two relations where we are fully committed to another person precisely as something for the sake of which everything else exists, that is, as something deserving committed love for their own sake: the spousal relation and the parental relation.

I am a sexual being, I have sexuality, for the sake of being a person maker.

Justice, Aristotle, McInerny: the nature of the person as an end in itself settles what is due all persons in all circumstances. Justice settles what is to different persons in different circumstances. Love of friendship for persons as ends in themselves is the form of the other virtues, including the virtue of justice. The other virtues provide the content for love of friendship. Given that I am obligated to will the good for myself and other persons, what is the content of that good? The content is the content of the other virtues. And some acts are intrinsically evil precisely because they cannot be matter for that form. That is, given what those acts are, it is impossible for love of friendship to place its form on them; it is impossible for them for that form, to bear that form, to receive that form.

Big:
Although my cook is always due committed love, that is is always worthy of committed love, that need not enter my relation to her as a cook; it is not essential to that relation. But if I use her person making ability, the value of a person as worthy of committed love is essential to that relation, is the value of a person is essential to that relation. I cannot usurp person making ability without placing a value on what person is, and so I cannot use her person making ability without either evaluating what person is to be that for the sake of which everything else exists or not to be that for the sake of which everything else exists.

01-05-00, BIG

I see an elderly, in fertile couple kissing romantically. I am watching nature's plan for making people in action. The couple are not doing anything that would make their sexuality not be a person making ability. They are not doing anything that would cause their sexuality not to be a person making ability. They are not doing anything that causes it not to be a person making ability. Gays do.

A desire for sex is nature's plan for making people. But notice that nature planned it this way independently of infertility. That is, this essential part of natures plan for making people, this desire that exists for the sake of making people, exists whether or not other parts of the person making ability are functioning.

Sex is what it is, as all the features it has, at times of infertility for the sake of what it is at times of fertility. In the same way, the brain is what it is at times of sleep for the sake of being a thinking instrument, an instrument for thinking. The brain always is what it is for the sake of being an instrument for thinking. Likewise, our sexuality at all times he is what it is for the sake of being a person making ability. If it were not, then persons would not be that for the sake of which everything else exists. The times of infertility, even after menopause, are for the sake of our being person makers, and so for the sake of the existence of persons, because human person making does not stop at conception, it goes on until the offspring has reached psychological maturity in adulthood. So the parents need sexuality as a unifying factor to remain together while they are raising the child, even if one or the other of the parents has become permanently infertile.

So if a couple uses their sexuality non-vaginally, in their valuation the act by which they give each other pleasure is not an act that exists in the sake of making, is not what it is the sake of making persons. And so it is not what it is for the sake of making that for the sake of which everything else exists. And if not, they cannot be consistently evaluating each other as beings for the sake of which everything else exists.

Since our sexuality is always what it is for the sake of being a person making ability, that is, for the sake of bringing into existence that for the sake of which everything else exists, any use of our sexuality must use it as if, it must treated as if, must value it to be a person making ability. For it is what it is for the sake of being a person making ability. It is what it is even at times of infertility for the purpose of being a person making ability.

Why can I not use my sexuality anyway I want when I am infertile? Because in doing so, I would be doing what animals do and achieving the kinds of goods animals, that is, beings that are not ends in themselves, achieve. The nature of the person, the value of the person, is not involved in any of the goods of those kinds. So I need not be truly valuing myself and my partner as ends in themselves while pursuing those kinds of goods. In other words, when using my sexuality non-vaginally, I am evaluating my sexuality as if it were like my food making ability. That is I am evaluating my sexuality as if it were oriented toward goods that are not in themselves ends in themselves.

I just use the phrase "need not." But to say that I need not do something does not amount to saying that I am contradicting the doing of that something. Yes,

but in using my food making ability, I need not, but in using my person making ability in a certain way I must, be putting myself in opposition to the value of a person as that for the sake of which sexuality exists. My sexuality does not exist just for the sake of this person, namely, myself, as my food making ability does.

In order for a choice to evaluate a sex act to be a means of union between two ends in themselves, evaluate the act as a means that respects the partners as ends in themselves, the choice must evaluate the sex act as existing for the sake of making that for the sake of which everything else exists, everything else including the loving union of two ends in themselves.

In having a sex nonvaginally, the partners are doing it in a way which could not be a way that they become person makers. Each is relating to the other person in a way that could not be a way they unite to form a person maker. They are doing it in a way that could not be a way of subordinating sex to its person making ability. They are doing it in a way in which they could not be evaluating the other purposes of sex in subordination to its person making purpose. In having sex while they know they are infertile, they are not necessarily evaluating sex to be something other than a person making ability., that is, as existing for the sake of something other than the existence of persons. In fact, they may be choosing vaginal sex precisely for the sake of avoiding a choice that would evaluate sex to exist for some other purpose.

In having sex nonvaginally, they are saying in effect "let's not use our person making ability in the way that would be necessary if we were to evaluate it, treat it, and evaluate ourselves as having it, is always being something that is what it is for the sake of the existence of absolute values."
How does the sex act express, signify, the status of the partners as worthy of committed love? By being the means by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence. (By being the means, in our evaluations, by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence.) But if we use sex nonvaginally, we are using it as if it were not the means by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence. So sex would not express the status of the partners as worthy of committed love.
(Because in our evaluations it is not a means to the existence of beings worthy of committed love, although that is what it is in fact that all times, that is, something that exists to be a means to the existence of absolute values .)

If we do anything that would cause a sex act not to be, in our evaluations, what it is for the sake of the existence of persons, we are causing the sex act not to be in our evaluations a natural sign expressing the status of our partner as a being worthy of committed love.

For me to succeed in treating persons as ends in themselves in situations where I hire a Foodmaker or a laundry doer, all I have to do is ensure that the person I hire is doing it in pursuit of her own freely chosen ends. For me to succeed in

valuing persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists in situations where I use another end in itself's person making ability, it is not enough to ensure that the person whose ability I use is doing it in pursuit of her own freely chosen ends.

A chosen sex act, insofar as it is chosen as a means to an end, insofar is is a term of an evaluation by our will, must be suited for procreation, must be an act existing for the sake of making persons. We cannot agree to reject the other person or ourselves as a person maker, to reject her fertility. We cannot agree to hold back anything essential to using our person making ability as a person making ability. (An argument against artificial contraception.)

If nature prevents our sexuality from being able to produce persons at a particular time that is one thing. But if we do anything that would cause a sex act not to be in our evaluations a person making act, that is another thing.

Maybe sex just arose accidentally. But as used for rationally conscious chosen ends, it must exist for the sake of things that do not just happen to be that for the sake of which everything else exists, and it must exist for the sake of those things precisely as that for the sake of which everything else exists. So sex exists, not just for the sake of things that have been accidentally to be ends in themselves, but for the sake of those things precisely as that for the sake of which everything else exists.

If when infertile, I use my person making ability not vaginally, I evaluating it as a means to the kind of ends animals achieve, that is, goods of concupiscence. I have excluded the nature of persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists from the goods involved in my choice. So my person making ability is like my food making ability in my values. In using my food making ability as a food making ability, I am not so choosing that I am putting myself in opposition to the good of ends in themselves as such. In using my person making ability in the way I choose to use my food making ability, I am so choosing that I am putting myself in opposition to the value of persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists.

Conditions of in fertility are not subject to our choice. They are not under the control of choice. And so the appropriateness of a chosen act to realize organic complementarity depends, or the appropriateness of a chosen act to be a person making act or a means of union in our evaluations depends, on being the choice of a pattern of behavior which, and when conditions out of the control of this act of choice exist, could result in conception.   ... as long as we do not choose to be causes of the prevention of those conditions; as long as we do not choose to prevent those conditions.

God wants the act that units to people in committed love to be the same act that can create persons. That is, the same act by which they can create persons

when conditions out of the control of the choice of this act would allow them to create persons.

I cannot avoid the issue of treating my cook as a person. But the reason I cannot avoid the issue is not her food making ability. I could replace that by a machine. I also cannot avoid the issue of treating persons as persons when I use her person making ability. But the reason is not only that she is a person. The reason is also that I am placing a value on her as a person making, as having a person making ability. So mutual consent is not enough for me to use her person making ability. There are restraints on the ways I can use her person making abilities, restraints on the conditions under which I can use her person making ability, even voluntarily.

Conditions of in fertility are not part that human sex act. That is, they are not part of the sex act as chosen, since they are not in the control of human choice. So the appropriateness of the human sex act to realize organic complementarity (Grisez) does not depend on its being able to cause conception from a physical point of view, but on its being the kind of behavior, the pattern of behavior, and by which human beings can become causes of reproduction by means of their choice to use a sex act, by means of their choice to use their sexuality. It depends on human beings choosing to use their sexuality in the manner in which they could become reproducers, if other necessary conditions out of their control were present.

This is it:

A human sex act as such, that is, as an object of human choice and as directed by human choice, must be so directed that nothing in the way in which it is chosen, nothing in the manner in which we direct it to an end, would prevent it from being a reproductive act.

How does the sex act express, signify, the status of the partners as worthy of committed love? By being the means by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence. So if we choose to use our sexuality in a way in which it cannot be the means of procreation, we are choosing to use it in a way that it cannot express the value of the partners as worthy of committed love. So our choice does not evaluate the person as something worthy of committed love for its own sake. The sex act expresses that value not only by being an act of desire for another person but by being an act of desire that can give existence to beings for the sake of which everything else exists. If we do anything that would cause a sex act not to be in our evaluations such an act we are not evaluating the person as the absolute value. And we are causing the sex act not to be a <u>natural</u> sign expressing the status of the partners as beings worthy of committed love.

An act of desire for another person for the sake of her ability to generate a being the sake of which everything else, including the desire, exists. This desire exists

for the sake of the existence of things worthy of love for their own sake as, precisely as, being worthy of love for their own sake.

An animal's food making ability does not exist for the sake of ends in themselves as such. Compare an animal's food making ability and reproductive ability, and then compare the result of that comparison to the comparison between a human being's food making ability and person making ability.

Since persons are that for the sake of which everything else exists, I cannot love another person just as a means to creating persons. A process done for love for but that is not itself a process of love exists as a means to the end of already existing persons. That's what it would be in our evaluations; that's what we would evaluate it, the process, to be. And so the product of the process exists only because the product is wanted by me, that is, the process exists for the sake of creating a person only because the person is wanted by me. I want to have the child. I could use the process, perhaps, to achieve other goods.

Intercourse exists for the sake of making that for the sake of which everything else exists because evolution designed intercourse to produce that. Can I design another process for the sake of producing babies without reducing babies to being objects of love of concupiscence?

so choose that our evaluation of the chosen act, our way of evaluating the act, of making it a means to an end is, could not be causes of the act's being infertile, could not be a cause of the act's not been person making. So choose that the chosen means to an end is not prevented by the choice from being a means of person making, from being the way the partners can make persons when other conditions out of the partner's control are present.

Big:

When we choose to use sex not vaginally, we are doing more than just recognizing the fact that we are otherwise infertile at that time. We are taking advantage of that in fertility in such a way that in our evaluations we are saying "I can use my sexuality as if it did not exist, as if it is not what it is, for the sake of the existence of the absolute value." And so we are saying that the absolute value is not the absolute value.

The act by which couples unite with each other should be the same act by which they can procreate. In other words, any use of our sexuality must be subordinate to its purpose of creating persons. That subordination does not mean that we should refrain from sex when infertile, but it does mean that even infertile sex must be subordinate in our evaluations to the absolute value for the sake of which sexuality exists. How do we subordinate infertile sex and the goals that it

achieves to that other goal? One requirement is that we complete sex vaginally. If we choose not to complete sex vaginally, the status of our sexuality in our evaluations is not the status of existing for the sake of creating persons.

In other words, ends in themselves must always use sexuality as if it is the means, was the means, by which they came into existence. If we do not use it as if it is a means by which we came into existence, we are not evaluating our coming into existence as the coming into existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists. And so we are not evaluating ourselves as that for the sake of which everything else exists. And to use sex as if it is the means for the coming into existence of persons, we must choose to use sex in the manner in which our union with our partner, our common pleasure with our partner, can bring persons into existence. That is, we must complete sex vaginally.

Nature has designed times of infertility for the benefit and well-being of those sex has brought into existence, both parents and children. But if we are to value those that sex as but into existence as that for the sake of which everything else exists, we must value our sexuality as existing for the sake of bringing that for the sake of which everything else exists into existence.

So choose that our choice cannot be a cause of, cannot be a reason for, . . . the chosen act's not being a fertile act. So choose that the chosen manner of acting could not be a cause of . . ., that the chosen manner of acting is the same as the manner that can cause . . .

Big:
 We cannot choose to use our person making ability as a means to an end in such a way that our choice causes it, and so we cause it, to be a kind of act that could not exist for the sake of producing that for the sake of which everything else exists. So choose to use our person making ability that, to the extent that the act is is in the control of our choice, the act is the kind of act by which we can produce that for the sake of which everything else exists. So choose in such a way that it is not the causality of our choice that prevents the act from producing that for the sake of which everything else exists, and so causes us to evaluate ends in themselves as if they were not that for the sake of which everything else exists.

So choose that the act chosen does not cause our choice to evaluate persons as if they were not that for the sake of which everything else exists by causing us to evaluate our person making ability as if it did not exist for the sake of that for the sake of which everything else exists, as if it were not one of the "everything else" that exists for the sake of persons. As if that which gives existence to persons were not one of the "everything else" that exists for the sake of the persons that it gives existence to. So maybe the argument against not vaginal sex is just a mirror image of the argument in favor of using sex when we know we are in fertile.

If I use sex and not vaginally. when I know I am infertile, I am using it as if it were like a food making ability. The value of the person is not involved in the goods I pursue by using my food making ability. Animals can pursue goods of the same kind, namely, goods of concupiscence. So in using sex and not vaginally, my person making ability is like a food making ability in my evaluations.

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1-12-00

The following comments are for the most part but not exclusively directed toward artificial conception.

In artificial conception, we make our sexuality into a machine for making products. But our person making ability is not a machine for making persons. Our person making ability makes persons by acts of love. They are byproducts of acts of love for another person. The fact that they are byproducts of an act of committed love for another person allows us to be able to make persons and at the same time allow persons to be valued is that for the sake of which everything else exists.
In other words, we do not value our sex partner for her ability to make persons. If we value her for her ability to make persons, we would not evaluate her as an end in itself. If we fail to value her as an end in itself, we cannot value our sexuality as existing for the sake of ends in themselves. So we must produce persons as a direct result of valuing our sex partner as an end in itself.

"All children should be wanted" now has come to mean that in order to be acceptable children should satisfy their parent's desires for the child's identity. We have stopped saying yes to whatever the child turns out to be. This is the reduction of a person to being an extension of another person's will. Instead, we should be in awe at every human life.

Persons should be made by an act of love for an already existing person, and not just any act of love but act of love for her as having a person making ability. This rules out artificial conception.

If there were and "art" of making persons, that art would not be adequate to the "good of the work to be produced" if it only guaranteed that the results would be a well functioning person, but did not guaranteed that the means of causing the existence of the person was, unlike rape, adultery, fornication, worthy of the dignity of that which is caused. Or if we only think about the artistic aspect (that

is, all is well the ends well), we are you morally neglecting the good of the result as a person who has a right to be brought into existence in a manner worthy of her.

Sexual love is person making love. As person making love, it must be a love that honors, values, persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists; otherwise it is unworthy of being person making love. Artificial insemination is person making but is not an act of love that is person making. The person making an act should be a full communion of persons, that is, not just a sexual act but a marital sexual act. (The person making act should be a bodily act of love, since that is the kind of person being made and since that is the way we make a person namely by making a bodily entity.) And the person making act should not be just a marital act, but a sexual marital act.

If marriage is to be an intrinsic good (Grisez), that is, not just a means to some other good, artificial conception must be evil. If artificial conception is not evil, marriage must not be an intrinsic good.

Intercourse is a good given to another for her own sake, an intrinsic good given to another for her own sake. Removing a gamete is not an intrinsic good but an instrumental good.

Morally, exclusive coitus is the only sort of act that married couples can do and not married couples cannot do. this is the only act that is exclusive of persons committed to each other as that for the sake of which everything else exists. So conception by exclusive coitus is the only way of conceding that he is specifically marital. Only coitus transmits life in a marital way.

In artificial conception, we separate the person making function, the generative function, from the unitive function.

Big:

The use of our person making ability requires exclusivity. Unlike the use of our food making ability, the choice to use our person making ability involves the value we place on the person essentially. The value of the person is that of someone worthy of love for their own sake, not for the sake of their function. And so involves the value of the person as irreplaceable and unique. For insects that I am relating to a person making being as an object of love precisely for her person making ability.

biologically most animals are complete individuals with respect to most functions. In what the complete organism capable of reproducing sexually is the united pair. The may take care is the organic unit that produces the offspring. So the meaning of the offspring, its value, is that of an effect of this organic unit. In this

organic unit is not brought into existence by valuing the person as that for the sake of which everything else exists, by valuing persons as worthy of committed love for their own sake, what is the value of the offspring?

Persons are now made by an act of an organism, a person making organism constituted by an act of love of one person maker for another because he or she has a person making ability.

See page 6 0 on qualities (page of what: Grisez? Simon?)

sex is a means of producing that for the sake of which everything else exists. But not only is this higher than others, but the requirements of this act set and shape the requirements for those we choose to use sex (Grisez). So the unity of sex partners should never merely being physical only, temporary, etc.. Sex must be used in a way appropriate to the spiritual begetting (upbringing) of children.

Big:

So the partners must not just will to cooperate fairly with each other and Karen food making ability) but must have committed love for each other. That is, they must have love for each other not just for the sake of making a product, even though the product will be something for the sake of which everything else exists. Precisely because persons are that for the sake of which everything else exists a love from which persons come cannot be love just for the sake of making a product. When we cooperate for the sake of making food, in our actions are compatible with our love in each other just for the sake of making a product. The nature of the act of making food is not such that the act requires to be an act in support of committed love for the other. Likewise, the nature of the act of artificially conceiving is compatible with loving each other just for the sake of making a product. The nature of the act is not such that the act requires to be an act in support of committed love for the other person for her own sake.

In in making any other product, we can will to cooperate fairly, without committed love, because the value of the person as such is not involved in the product of the cooperative act, but only in the two agents of the cooperative act. So as long as the agents make the product willingly the value of the person is respected.

Compare artificial insemination to an artificial food making ability.

When I choose to eat for pleasure, the value of the person as that for the sake of which everything else exists does not come into play beyond the fact that, in fact, it is a person choosing to achieve that chosen end. When I hire a cook, the value of the person comes into play, but only to the extent that the other person is also seeking a chosen end. But instead of hiring a cook, I could have a robot do it

when I choose to use my person making ability, for example, by calculating his firm for artificial insemination, the value of person enters the nature of the end end of the act chosen as means to an end.

In

By natures design, the existence of a person, that is, the existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists, is the result of a union of one persons partial person making ability with another person's. So the existence of a person is the result of the desire of one person to unite with another person because of the other persons person making ability. The existence of a person is the result of the desire of one person for another person because of the other persons person making ability. So the existence of a person is not just the result of my use of my partial person making ability and my partners use of her partial person making ability. It is the result of my partial person making ability causing a desire on my part to unite with another person because of her partial person making ability. It is the result of a desire for another person because of her person making ability. It is the result of a love for another person because of her person making ability.

A perhaps interesting way to approach the question of artificial conception would be to assume that from the beginning our means of person making was a mechanical one. That is, that we had been given some sort of mechanical methods, say, of extracting the sperm from the mail and the egg from the female so that we could unite them in a test tube. How, then, would the morality of the act of making a person differ from what it is now? One thing to notice is that while the child to be conceived might be an object of desire, the partner in the process of person making would not be an object of desire in the sense in which she is now.

We would desire the contribution of the partner, perhaps, solely fore her contribution to the product to be made. We could desire the contribution of the partner solely for her contribution to the product to be made. In sexual reproduction we cannot do that. In sexual reproduction we must desire, that is, we must have a desire, for our partner for the sake of some of her own attributes other than just her contribution to the new person to be made. Those attributes do in fact constitute her partial person making ability. But to make a person we have to have a desire for what those attributes themselves are, and a desire for her because of what those attributes are. In other words, in sexual reproduction the partner cannot be desired just as a means to the end of bringing another person into existence.

Desiring her just as a means to the end of producing a new person may seem to better than just desiring her as a means to the existence of our own sexual pleasure. But that is not the moral alternative that we face here. Since we're talking about her person making ability, to value that ability for some other end

than the creation of a person to the exclusion of the end of creating a person would be to value the person as if the person were not that for the sake of which everything else exists. So the issue is not whether we can morally compare desiring her as a means to sexual pleasure as opposed to desiring her as a means to producing a new human being. The question is only the question of the morality of desiring her solely as a means to the existence of a new person.

But from a psychological point of view that is what we cannot do now. To get a new person, we have to have a desire for her because of what she is. So in sexual reproduction, on the one hand, we cannot desire her solely fore her contribution to the existence of a new person, but we can immorally desire her solely for the sexual pleasure she can give us. so the situation we are in, or were in, prior to artificial conception is that in order to produce a child we must have a love for our partner which does not reduce the partner to being a means to our sexual pleasure or a means to the existence of a new person. In other words, to produce another person, we must have love for our partner that is consistent with valuing our partner's status as an end in itself. To do that while valuing her her fore her person making ability, we cannot value the person making ability simply as a means to our sexual pleasure. If we are valuing her person making ability as a means to our sexual pleasure, we are not valuing the person as that for the sake of which everything else exists. But neither can we succeed in making a person if we value her person making ability merely as a means to making a person. We must value her person making ability as something that makes her an object of love.

Let us to return to the case where our person making ability was originally mechanical. It is possible to use our person making ability without any other object of desire than the existence of another person. That is, our desire for our partner would be strictly limited to being a means to the existence of another person. Or at least our desire for our partner could be so strictly limited.

We can desire to relate to another person strictly for the sake of for food making ability, in the same sense. This is not incompatible with giving her the status in our values as that for the sake of which everything else exists, as long as we relate to her for the sake of her food making ability in a way that makes her use of that ability voluntary, that is, freely chosen for the sake of her own ends. But the question is whether we can relate to her for the sake of her person making ability and do so in a way that gives her the status in our values of an end in itself just by ensuring that her use of her person making ability is voluntary?

We can do so only if the way we desire the existence of the new person is consistent with valuing the new person to be an end in itself and not just a means to our own ends. Not just a means to our own personal fulfillment. In effect, we are saying that our use of her person making ability does not require us to value her in anyway other than we value her when we use her food making ability. She does not have to be an object of desire or love for any other reason than her

contribution to that object of desire or love which is the new person. That is, she does not have to be an object of desire or love in anyway other than in the general sense in which we must ensure that any other persons contributions to our ends are voluntary on the other persons part.

That is, the ability that serves our ends is, like her food making ability, not so related to that for the sake of which everything else exists that in order to give that for the sake of which everything else exists its proper place in our values we have to love her her in a specific, unique, Sense. We do not have to relate to her person making ability, or to her because of her person making ability, in a way that involves a love for her, or a desire for her, which is both beyond the love that any dealing with another person morally requires and beyond a desire for her just for the sake of sexual pleasure. If we don't have that kind of love for her when we use her for the sake of creating a new person, are we really able to value the new person as a person deserves to be value, as opposed to merely valuing her as something that will fulfill our ends. That is the question.

Does it help to put it this way? As it is now, at least prior to artificial conception, producing another person required a desire not just for the new person but a desire that relates us to the partner in person making. But that desire relating us to the partner in person making has two interesting characteristics. One is that it is a desire for her for the sake of attributes which as a matter of fact constitute her person making ability. But the other is that this desire for her because of those person making attributes cannot be a desire, morally, that values her person making ability just for the sake of making a new person. As things are now, it has to be a desire for those attributes because of what they are and what they make her not just as a means to the existence of another person, but what they make her with respect to being a person love for her own sake. Or they make her a person worthy of love for features she possesses independently of whether those features are means to any other end than making her an object of our desire or love.

And it is that lasts characteristic that is the key to morality, sexual morality. Is it also the key to the immorality of artificial conception? That is the question.

Is it morally correct for me to so evaluate the use of my sexuality that it does not exist, sexuality or the use, for the sake of a union of love between ends in themselves? Is a morally correct to evaluate my sexuality as if it does not exist for the sake of uniting me in love with another absolute value, another being for the sake of which everything else exists? In other words, is it moral for me to separate the use of my sexuality from all the psychological and intimately interpersonal aspects of my sexuality that go into the use of my sexuality in normal sex? For those aspects of my sexuality exists precisely for the sake of sex acts being love acts between two beings worthy of committed love for their

own sake.

An act of using someone's food making ability or laundry doing ability does not exist for the sake of a union of committed love with another and in itself. It does not exists for the sake of giving myself to another and in itself for her own sake. All I have to do to ensure that I am treating be Foodmaker or the laundry due her as an end in itself is to make sure that she is acting voluntarily and being treated fairly, that is, equally. But to respect the status of our person making ability as existing for the sake of making ends in themselves, the chosen use of someone's person making ability, unlike the use of their food making nor laundry doing ability, must be an act of love for her sake as an end in itself, an end in itself having ability to making ends in themselves. Because to truly evaluate the product of that ability as something for the sake of which everything else exists, I must evaluate someone who has that ability as worthy of love, of committed love for her own sake.

So it is a 2 way Street: a choice to use my person making ability must be a choice evaluating the product of that ability as that for the sake of which everything else exists, including the ability; and a choice to use my person making ability must be the choice that evaluates that ability as existing for the sake of an act of love for the other person maker as something for the sake of which everything else exists. Otherwise, we are not consistently evaluating ends in themselves as ends in themselves. (It must be a choice evaluating the product as an end in itself, and a choice evaluating the object of the desire that produces the child as an end in itself.)

Let's say that out of love for my wife, I want to give her baby and choose artificial conception to do so. The process I choose I choose Out of love, but the process itself is not a process of love. And a process that is not itself a process of love exists as a means to the end of already existing persons. So in choosing an act that is not a process of love we are evaluating the product of the act as existing for the sake of already existing persons. Why? Because a process that is not itself a process of love can only be be chosen by evaluating it as an act that exists as a means to the end of already existing persons, by evaluating it as a means that exist for the sake of the end of already existing persons. And so we must consistently evaluate the product of the act that way.

The process is chosen and exists only because it product is wanted by me, that is, the process exists for the sake of producing a baby only because the baby is wanted by me. That same process could be used for other scientific goals.

In the case of morally done sex, however, we evaluate the act both as existing for the sake of producing an end in itself and as an act of love that respects an existing end in itself as an end in itself, an act of love for an existing end in itself. Evolution designed intercourse for the sake of producing a being that is in fact something for the sake of which everything else exists.

A sex act should not only be an act of desire (love of concupiscence) for another person, but can only respect that person as an end in itself by being (chosen as, evaluated as) an act of desire that gives existence to beings that are that for the sake of which everything else exists. Conversely, a sex act should not only be an act resulting from the desire for another person (the child) but an act evaluated as an act of love of friendship for an existing person maker, an act treating an existing person maker as an end in itself.

An act of using another person's person making ability cannot be just a matter of fairness, the way it using her food making ability or her laundry doing ability can be. But artificial conception uses another person's person making ability in the same way that I use her food making or laundry doing ability, that is, using those abilities does not require an act of love of friendship, an act of committed love for the other as an end in herself. So using her person making ability must require that kind of commitment.

The act by which I create a thing for the sake of which everything else exists, the act which I choose to be act creating a thing for the sake of which everything else exists, must be a chosen act that is itself an act of love for my partner person maker. Why? Because the existence of the organic unit that makes persons is an act of love in which persons are united, or by which persons are united. To choose to become a person maker without choosing an act of loving union with another thing for the sake of which everything else exists is to evaluate my person making ability to be other than what it is: a way of creating things for the sake of which everything else exists by a loving union between things for the sake of which everything else exists, by a unity between ends in themselves that is a loving relation of friendship, not just cooperating in a task.

The value of the product depends on the value of a producer. To choose to replace creating ends in themselves by a loving union between ends in themselves is to evaluate the creation as the product of something less than a loving union between ends in themselves and so as less than something itself worthy of love as an end in itself.

In sexual person making, what makes the 2 partners into one person making organism is an act of love between them. So what makes the person is an act of love of persons for persons. What makes the two partners into a person making organism is an act of love for another end in itself precisely as being an end in itself with an end in itself making ability. That end in itself making ability is an ability to love another end in itself for the sake of that ability.

I am a product of masturbation. I am a product of using the person making ability as an object of utility, like a food making ability or a laundry doing ability. I am a product of using a person making ability as if it could be replaced by a machine, as if it were an ability that could be <u>replaced</u> (as opposed to the irreplaceable value of the product) by a machine.

When I use her laundry doing ability, my relation to her as an end in itself only requires for voluntary participation. That is, it does not require to be used in a way that (does not require an act that) should be exclusive, committed, irreplaceable, etc., does not require my relating to a person making being as an object of love for an end in itself, what is not require committed love for an ended itself precisely because the ability I am using exist for the sake of beings that our ends in themselves, an ability whose proper evaluation requires me to love her in a way worthy of an end in itself, not just to be fair to her.

In intercourse, the partners must not just will to be fair to one another about sharing goods of concupiscence, as they can when they share their food making ability. They must not just evaluate their mutual use of there person making ability as just sharing a good of concupiscence with one another fairly. They must evaluate the use of their person making ability, their mutual use of their mutual person making ability, as as requiring to be part of an act of love for, an act of committed love for, another end in itself making end in itself. It must be love for another end in itself making end in itself for her own sake, not just for the sake of making a product. This is the only way to avoid treating the results as a good of concupiscence.

In artificial conception, I agree to share a good of concupiscence, and I agree explicitly not to share an act of love of friendship. I explicitly agree to exclude an act of love of friendship.

We are not obligated to intend to procreate. But if that is our intention, the good of the offspring must be primary in our intention. For example, before conception it would be immoral for me to alter my jeans so that the offspring will have cystic fibrosis for the sake of an experiment. You might reply that a nonexistent person has no rights. That is correct. But whatever we think of "rights talk" once we intend to create a person, it is immoral for us to do anything prior to that person's existence that does not take the benefit of that person into account. So there are ways of bringing human offspring into existence that are immoral even if the immoral acts occur prior to the existence of the new person.

Consider this. Human persons are the products of acts that are mere plaything's. If so, what is the value of a person? If a person is the product of an activity that is essentially trivial, were essentially for the sake of pleasure, is that product really something we can describe as that for the sake of which everything else exists? Or if a person is an accidental product of a romp of physical passion, is the existence of that product the existence of the absolute value to which every other value is relative? If the greater cannot come from the lesser, the answer to these questions must be no. Then why should we not give the same answer to the question whether the product of a mechanical means of person making is absolute value?
If we intend to create a person, we must simultaneously intend to serve the

interests of that person as a being for the sake of which everything else exists. If when we intend to create a person we do not simultaneously intend to do whatever is necessary to serve the interest of that person as an end in itself, we are not valuing persons as ends in themselves. The person we intend to create is not an end in itself in our values.

But is the good of that person serve if we separate the generative function of our person making ability from its unitive function? Does it serve her good to be the product of a mechanical act? Does it serve her good if we use our person making ability outside of an act of love and for the other already existing person who is our partner in the act? Outside of an act of love for our partner precisely as having a person making ability, an act in which the existence of one person making organism is constituted by the love of the two already existing persons for each other as having person making abilities.

In artificial conception, the product does not come from the existence of a unified person making organism, an organism the meaning of whose existence is love of one person for another person. Is the existence of such a product the existence of an end in itself worthy of love as being something for the sake of which everything else exists?

In artificial conception, I "use" or person making ability, but not as an object of love, not as a feature because of which I love her. I use it as a pure means to something other than itself or than her. I separate her person making ability from its role of being an object of a love act, or from its role of making her the object of a love act. I am making her person making ability a mere tool.

Sexual love is not just a person making act. It is an act of love that is person making, an act that loves the whole person of the partner because of the partner's person making ability. In artificial conception, the person making ability of the other is a mere tool. So the existence of the product of the person making ability is the existence of something that comes from the use of a mere tool, rather than from an act of love that at the same time constitutes an act of the person making ability,the ability to make that product.

Artificial conception is person making but is not a person making act of love. It uses another person's person making ability, but does not treat her person making ability as a feature because of which she is loved, because of which she is an object of love an object of love for her own sake, not just for the sake of making something else. Or, it does not treat her person making ability as itself an object of love, but as a mere tool not loved for its own sake. And if the product of our person making ability is the product of a mere tool not loved for its own sake, can the value of that product be that of something for the sake of which everything else exists?

But if we are valuing her because of her person making ability, we can be at the

same time valuing her for her own sake only if we are valuing her person making ability as existing for the sake of the existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists.

In artificial conception, I separate person making from an act of love for another absolute value. I separate my use of my person making ability from an act of, an act expressing, committed love for another end in itself. I can morally use a food making or laundry doing robot and so separate my use of a food making ability or laundry doing ability from an act of justice for another end in itself. So my use of another entity's food making ability or laundry doing ability does not require a relation to another end in itself considered as such. Can I morally separate my use of my person making ability from a desire for another already existing person because of her person making ability? In that case, the offspring is not the results of a desire for another already existing person because because of the features that maker of person maker; nor is the offspring the result of a desire to give my person making ability to another already existing person because of her person making ability.

Maybe approach it this way: start with an animal that has both in offspring making ability and, for example, a nest making ability. Let's assume that in this species both abilities require the cooperation of the male and female. Now elevate that animal to the status of a person, that is, the status of something for the sake of which everything else exists. The moral value of the nest making ability in itself has not changed. Now that ability serves the interests of an end in itself, but the ability itself does not produce an end in itself. The status of the offspring producing ability, however, that is, the moral value of that ability, as changed.

The use of another being's person making ability requires an evaluation of an already existing person by its very nature. The use of a food making ability or a laundry doing ability need not. The latter abilities could belong to robot's. Does artificial contraception require that our use of our person making ability relates us to another person as an object of evaluation? Now it does, but not necessarily in the future. For example, ova might be made in artificial ways rather than taking from a woman's womb.

In artificial conception, the cause of another end in itself's existence is an object of mere love of utility. For it is a mechanical process. If the cause of entity 1's existence is an object of mere love of utility, is a mere tool, a mere mechanical process, can entity 1 be an end in itself, an absolute value, something for the sake of which everything else exists? How can it be if the greater cannot come from the lesser? Compare to: we are product of a mere desire for pleasure.

In artificial conception, our act of choice is a choice for the greater to come from the lesser. But to so evaluate the greater that in our evaluations it comes from the lesser, is to evaluate the greater as if it were not the greater and the lesser as

if it were not the lesser. In other words, and so choosing, we are evaluating a child to be something that has the kind of value that a machine is able to produce. It has the kind of value that does not require an act of love of one absolute value for another absolute value, an act of love one for the other precisely under the aspect of their being absolute values.

When I masturbate or remove an egg from the uterus, there is no essential teleological connection between such an act and creating a person. Sperm and eggs could be used for other scientific purposes. In fact, without deliberate human intervention, the occurrence of conception would be entirely accidental to these acts. In normal sex, on the other hand, if conception is going to happen, it's going to happen, unless deliberate human intervention prevents it. The occurrence of conception, when it takes place, is a natural outcome of the act; it is an outcome naturally connected to the act. Human intervention would be necessary to <u>prevent</u> conception.

In normal sex, the act is naturally and necessarily procreative; so is naturally in conformity to the transcendence of the person making ability's goal of making persons over all other goals. In artificial conception, the acts performed are extrinsic to the person making ability's goal of making persons. So in choosing artificial conception, I am not evaluating an act of my person making ability to be what it is, that is, one with a natural relation to making persons.

Evolution gave the person making ability the goal of acts that are person making whether I want them to make persons or not, whether I want them to be person making acts or not. In other words are evolution designed my person making ability for acts that make things for the sake of which everything else exists, whether I want them to make things for the sake of which everything else exists or not. In artificial conception, on the other hand, an act is person making <u>only</u> because I choose it to be person making. The process exists for the sake of making a baby only because a baby is wanted by me, not because the nature of the act is ordered to something that has value whether or not I want it. So the baby would be a product of an act, not that produces something of intrinsic value no matter what other people want, but an act that produces something that has whatever value it has only because another person wants that.

An act that makes a baby should be an act that by its nature, by what it is, is an act of love of friendship for another person, not just the love of concupiscence for a baby, for pleasure, etc.
The value we place on sexuality will determine the value we place on human life. So if we make sexuality into a machine for making persons, rather than an act of love that makes persons, then...

As of now, life comes from an act of love. And the meaning, the value, of human life is that of committed love one person for another, the committed love from which life comes. So what is the meaning of human life if it comes from a mechanical process, rather than from an act of love? The giving of existence is

not an act of love in which two people give each other their life-sharing power. The process of creating human life is not identical with an act of love between two people.

It is an injustice to the child unless the cause of its existence is committed love for persons as such, and so unless the cause is an act of committed love for persons as such. It is an injustice to the child if her existence is not the result of an act that is an act of love between two persons.

To make artificial conception the moral equivalent of natural is to evaluate conception by an act of committed love of two persons for each other because of their sexuality to be morally equivalent to making persons by a machine.

From the point of view of the injustice done to the child, being a test tube baby is much like being a child of rape or a child born illegitimately. Because of person is worthy of committed love for her own sake, because it is the meaning of her existence to be something worthy of committed love, she should come into existence in a way consistent with that meaning. Bringing a child into existence the way mere things come into exist, mechanically, is an injustice to the child the way bringing a child into existence the way mere animals come into exist, as a result of blind passion, is an injustice to the child. The child's existence should be the result of an act of placing of value on another person, and because of the other person's feature of being someone with a person-making ability, as being worthy of committed love.

Artificial contraception and artificial conception both treat sexual beings as if sexuality were merely a way of performing tasks and so treat sexual beings as such as if they were makers of mere things. Only an act of committed love for another person as a sexual being can treat a sexual being as if the value of sexuality is not that of tasks were making thing is. Morally, if a human person may come from a mere capacity for making things, the person is not an end in itself.

When a child results from an act of marital love, she results from the fact that, beyond wanting the child in wanting each other, the parents value persons as worthy of committed love for their own sake. When human life comes from an act expressing committed love for each other as sexual beings, the meaning, the value, of the result of sexuality is that of committed love of one sexual being for another from which the new person comes. So the meaning of the coming into existence of the child is not just that she was wanted by someone else but beyond that she is something worthy of committed love just for being what she is, a person.

To say that the value of the child depends on whether the child comes from an act expressing committed love amounts to saying that the act is understood as an actualization of their committed love, a manifestation of their committed love,

an exercise of their committed love. So when human life comes from an act that is understood as an exercise committed love, understood as an actualization of committed love, and that is performed because it is so understood, then the value of the child is that of an end in itself. For the source of the child's existence is the very fact that the parents value persons as worthy of committed love for their own sake.

Children deserve to know that the meaning of their existence as persons is love between persons, the self-giving of one person to another. So they deserve to know that their existence, is, not from a machine, but from acts in which persons value each other, as beings with person-making ability, to be worthy of committed love.

01-21-00

The following comments are based on comments in the file Notes2. They concern a variety of different topics under the heading of sexual morality.

We value things for what they can bring into existence. But something we value for what it can bring into existence is not an absolute value, since its value is subordinate to and measured by that which it can bring into existence. Persons must not be valued for what they can bring into existence. The existence of a person is the value that measures all other values, that all other values to be consistent with.

Committed love <u>implements</u> the value of the person.

There are 2 good paragraphs dated Jan. 24, 95.

If society has the duty and the interests of protecting and preserving human rights, not all religions are equal from the point of view of society. Not all religions are of equal value from the point of view of society. Since there are no rights without God, secular humanism is not of equal value to theism.

Because of sexuality is our person making ability, the way in which we use it, and the context in which we use it, can either affirm the ethically absolute value of the person as such or deny it. We do not have the right to tell someone else "I consensually give you permission to use my person making ability in a way that prevents the absolute value of the person from being affirmed.

Why is extramarital sex "dirty" or degrading? What does it degrade? Degrades the value of human life. If human life is the product of an act of animal passion, what then is the value of human life? On the other hand, if human life the product of committed love between persons, what is the value of human life?

There is a good paragraphs on euthanasia agent may 3 0, 9 5.

On illegitimacy: if we separate our life-giving faculty from committed love, we are separating the life we give, human life, from being deserving of committed love.

It is important to focus not only on the fact that the goal of sex is an absolute value but also the fact that what sex gives human beings is the most fundamental thing of all, existence. It is because sex gives us existence that the parent responsible for giving the child committed love. Under normal circumstances, I am not responsible for giving committed love to the child of the parents across the street. But they are responsible. Why? Because they are responsible for the very existence of this being that is something for the sake of which everything else exists.

So in seeking freedom from the connection between sex and committed love for the sake of pleasure, we are devaluing our own existence we are choosing to live like animals (who cannot choose it; they have to live that way). That is why extramarital sex is "dirty," because of what it does to the value of human life. This is truly "sexual alienation," that is, alienation from our meaning as persons.

xxxLogic, Metaphysics, logical relations, features, properties, 5-23-00

Compare "Tom knows dick" to "Dick is known by Tom." From a metaphysical point of view, the first relation is a real relation, a real existent, while the second relation is a logical relation only, a nonreal existent. But from the point of view of the way they are represented logically, the way they are objectified, they are equally relations. For both we use a "tom related to Dick" "Dick related to Tom" logical structure to objectify them. This should clearly show that metaphysics cannot be based on logic. Also, it should clearly show that for every predicate with a distinct meaning there is not a really existing feature distinct from another really existing feature.

xxxWittgenstein and Poinsot, formal signs, Haldane, language of thought, BIG 12-27-00

Revise the article on Wittgenstein and Poinsot to emphasize that formal signs are not "the language of thought;" they are the opposite of that. In the traditional medieval categories, or scholastic categories, the language of thought would be conceptualism, not realism of in a variety and especially not of the diacritical variety. Think of Ockham's natural signs, as described by Greg Reichberg. And they are not formal signs. They function as signs by first being objects of awareness, objects that naturally represent things other than themselves. And formal signs do not function as signs in the way that language does. They function as signs in a way opposite to the way language does, contrary to that

way. If formal signs were objects of awareness, we would need an infinite regress of psychological entities by means of which we were aware of formal signs in order to be aware of the first formal sign.

xxxProblem of reference, Putnam, Kripke, BIG 12-27-00

This is what the problem he is. If the meaning of a name is not a description, how can a name succeed in referring and less than name to saying actually exists? In other words, how is the name succeed in communicating; how does it succeed in objectifying. If its meaning would that of a description, as the meanings of predicates are, it could get its meaning from other words. Where does it get its meaning if there are no other words to get its meaning?

Well, where do our primary predicates get their meaning? An alcoholic in dts sees a pink elephant. He points and says, "that is coming at me," or "I fear that." The name "that" refers to an individual in his perceptual field. Is this a private language? No, because language must already exists in order for him to do this. He is just extending the use a language that came into existence for the sake of communicating about really existing public objects. Once public language exists, we can use it for imaginary objects.

Should we had: we can souse language as long as we are using it for an object of awareness that is capable of description, where "capable" does not refer to the actual resources of any language or of any user of language. It refers to the fact that the object has, for example, perceivable features.

xxxBeing is not a genus, analogy, paralogues, parageneric abstraction, Simon, 12-27-00

Here is an attempt to state why the usual presentations of the reason that being is not a genus are insufficient. The reason is not that whatever features other than being itself are predicated to distinguish some kind of being from another are features of which being is affirmatively predicable. The words the reason is not that differences like material, rational, finite, living, etc., features that distinguish one kind of being from another, are all features of which being is affirmatively predicable (living is a mode of being, materiality is a mode of being, etc.).

Paralogues: an abatement that does not have the effect of denying the common

ground, but that, unlike a specific difference, establishes an order of priority and posteriority with respect to do the common ground. Specific differences do not establish an order of priority and posteriority respecting the common ground.

And that simply means that a paralogue, unlike a genus, is such and orderable common ground. But the priority and posteriority is not in the ontological order of causality, or the psychological order of the first paralogate known to us relative to the second, but the logical order existing out of affirmation and negation. (affirmation and negation with respect, not to the truth of the predication of the common ground, but to the truth of in order in the truth of predicating the common ground, and order based on ontological and psychological order but not identical with them. It is an order in the strength of the predication of the (so) orderable common ground, a common ground that is orderable with respect to diminuendo and crescendo).

In other words, the paragraph preceding the last simply means that there are intelligible values, objective concepts, intelligible features of reality that unlike genera are orderable with respect to strength of predication by means out of affirmation and negation, unlike specific differences. Such intelligible values happen to occur; that is simply a brute fact we have to take account of.

But to say that it is simply a group fact that we need to take account of does not mean that we cannot explain why there are such intelligible features in terms of the need of our intellects to abstract from prime matter and therefore deal with univocal concepts. As a result, intelligible values that are not diversified by the pure potentiality of prime matter cannot be objectified by means of univocal concepts. So they must be objectified in the way paralogues are objectified. These are objects intelligible in themselves but are not the proper objects of our mode of intelligence, not the proper objects of reason.

But at the same time they are the basis of the intelligibility of the objects that are the proper objects of reason. And that is why philosophy has so much difficulty explaining knowledge of our proper objects, because knowledge of our proper objects has to be explained in terms of knowledge of objects that are not our proper objects.

xxxTime, order of past and present, 12-27-00
Event B. is causally related to event A such that B. and A cannot coexist. Since they cannot coexist, there must be in order between them. They are in order to set. One must be first in existence; the other second in existence. Are these ordinal numbers, "first" and "second," sufficient to define the temporal sequence of before (the past) and after (the future)? Or does the use of these ordinal's presuppose a standard (and a standard other than causal, since not all temporal sequences are causal) for before and after such that we mean that A is first "in

time" and B. second "in time." Yes.

So how do we define before and after? Are they pure primitives in the definition of time? No, Aristotle's brilliant stroke: define before and after from the relation of spatial point C to point D. period. As spatially immobile, either of these two points can be used as the start of the lying segment, but not of the motion from C to D. so we can use the cognition-independent order of motion to define the order of time.

Time is a quantity of motion according to the order of before and after given by the motion from C to D. the quantity is a different kind of quantity from the spatial length, of which either of the two points could be the beginning, indifferently, and the time is the same quantity to the whole spatial universe.

xxxSpatial relations, BIG 12-26-00

The concept of time includes a being of reason. Likewise, the concepts of the true and the good include beings of reason. Can this approach be extended the problem of place, or the problem of spatial relations? Again, threeness is a reality, but is not a reality over and above the reality of, say, Larry, moe, and curly. We objectify the reality of threeness by taking a common characteristic, that of being is due to, and seeing that characteristic and Larry, Moe, and curly, in relation to each other.

Likewise, we get "to the left of" or to the right out of" by taking something, for example, Moe, to use as a point of view, and hence a source for a relation of reason, and viewing Larry and curly in relation to him. (But don't I presuppose "spatial" relations here?)

There is a new existence, a new state of affairs. But I objectify that new existence using a relation of reason. What is the new state of affairs? For example, Moe has ceased being in a state of motion at a certain rate in a certain direction for a certain time. But what was the old state of affairs? For instance, Moe was at rest in a certain place, and then move in a certain direction.

BIG, this looks like it. A continuum, and extended reality, exists. It has real parts outside of real parts. We can designate (being of reason?) Really distinct parts by "A," "B." the parts so designated are at a certain distance from one another. That is, the part of a continuum between A and B. has a certain length. That length is a reality, because it is a real part of the continuum, and a continuum is a reality. And at the size of that length is a reality even if we use beings of reason to objectify that size. At AA is also at certain distances from other points, C, D., D. etc..

Now the same occupying that part of the continuum we call A begins to move in the direction of B. then the thing stops. What is new? It was in motion in a

certain direction, covering a certain length in a certain time. Now it is at rest at a different distance from B., C, D. etc., then it was before. So there is a new state of affairs, but no really existing relations, or no no really existing relations. The distance from the thing that was in A to cap B is shorter that was. That is a reality, a fact. But that distance already existed. What is new is the presence of the thing formerly at A in a part of the continuum that previously existed the where "at" is an objectify the relation of reason, a relation of reason used to objectify a reality.

xxxMaterial logic, BIG 12-26-00

Properties of objects as objects, that is, logical properties, are ways of being objects of knowledge. That is, they are ways of being that which fulfills our goal, achieves our goal, when our goal is knowledge. Material logic studies properties of objects as objects that are defined by (caused by) properties of objects as things. A certain property of things as things is relevant to its status as an object, to its second existence as an object. In other words, a certain property of things as things is relevant to the thing's way of being that which fulfills the goal of having knowledge.

 more specifically, it is relevant by the standard of the goal of knowledge of truth. (Relevance must always be measured by some goal.) That is, knowledge of the identity of object and thing. So logical properties are features of our ways of knowing truth and the identity of object and thing; or features of the process of achieving the goal of objectifying things and knowing that what some object is is also what things are.

Whether A is an effect of B., or vice versa, is relevant to the status of A and as an object to be understood. It is relevant to A's way of being an object of knowledge to A's way of being that which fulfills our goal of having knowledge. It is relevant to A vis-a-vis our goal of understanding A, of knowing truths about A by means of truths about B and vice versa.

Whether what A is requires prime matter is relevant to be intelligibility of A, since prime matter is unintelligible through itself.

Whether what accidents are in themselves makes them understandable only in relation to substance is relevant to the goal of understanding accidents. So ANALOGY does belong to material logic!

Another example would be necessary and contingent truth.

xxxThing/object identity as source of error, Gilson, 12-2 29-00

We begin the epistemology by asking epistemological questions. The appropriate way to ask epistemological questions is to use object descriptions.

So we think in terms of object descriptions, and it is perfectly natural to do so. So Gilson is incorrect if he implies that if we start with thought, we begin as "idealists."

But what we are seeking to know about is our ability to know the truth of sentences using thing descriptions. And so we are seeking to know whether what is objectified by a thing description is what is also objectified by another thing description. That is why we need not "begin as idealists."

At the end of my article on thing an object in Maritain, I say that the problem is that the identity of the thing an object must coexist with their diversity, and vice versa. It's deeper than that. The factor of identity does not just exists with the factors of diversity. The difficulty is that it is the factors of diversity themselves that enable the identity; the identity between thing an object occurs by means of factors of diversity, factors like abstraction, universality, possibility.

Another point. In causal realism I say that cognition dependent existence is not intentional existence what is a substitute for real existence, a cognition dependent substitute for real existence. I could've also said that it is a cognition dependent replica of real existence, or an imitation of real existence.

xxxGod's knowledge of time, BIG, 12-29-00

Mozart has a famous statement about how he composed symphonies. He says that he saw the whole symphonies from beginning to end at one time. He did not see a step by step; he saw in all and once. Now imagine Mozart conducting a symphony. Simultaneously with the downbeat, he goes into a reverie in which he relives the initial experience in which he saw the symphony all and once. And assume that he stays in that reverie throughout the whole performance of the symphony. From the viewpoint of the players, the symphony proceeds step by step, each note ceasing to exist as the succeeding note comes into existence. But from the point of view of the conductor's consciousness all the notes are there, including their relations of preceding and succeeding, at once. Both the players and conductor experience the whole symphony. Like the players, the conductor experience is the whole thing. But he does so in one unchanging moment that endures throughout the succeeding moments of the player's consciousness.

An even better metaphor like the following. When we look at any picture, the grasp at one time a whole composed of distinct parts. If we were not grasping a Gestalt, wherein multiple parts are grasp at the same time, the only alternative would be that we were grasping and infinitesimally small point. So let us imagine that we are viewing one picture, let's say a picture of someone in action of some kind. If we can grasp one collection distinct parts at one time, what is there to prevent us from grasping a somewhat larger collection by adding another picture to the first grasping the two at the same time? In fact, we do the equivalent of

this all the time.

So now let us add a third picture and lying each of them up one beside the other, the words, three in a row. If the fact that each of these pictures taken individually is a complex of distinct parts is not prevent us from grasping that picture for what it is, what is there to prevent us from grasping all three simultaneously? In fact not only does the fact that which are individually is a complex of distinct parts not prevent us from grasping it, we have just seen that that's the only way we can grasp anything. That's what grasping anything amounts to. So what is only a small step from their grasp being the three distinct parts together simultaneously.

Now let us label these pictures "past," present," "future." It shows that there is no contradiction in God's seeing the whole of time simultaneously. Of course, no metaphor is perfect and someone might object that each of these pictures is static, whereas time flowing. So this metaphor does not represent God's grasp of the flow of time, since you cannot break that flow of into an actually distinct parts as these pictures are.

But if this objection as opposed to create a problem we can just combining the three picture metaphor with the Mozart metaphor. Because in the Mozart metaphor, it's a whole flow of time that is grasped at once. Or we can even stay within the metaphor of the pictures. We assumed that they were pictures of action. Even though each picture is a still, we rarely see a picture of action, even a cartoon, and think of the action portrayed as frozen in time. At any one time, we perceive the portrayed action as extending through time. In other words, each of us can do a little bit of what Mozart to do a lot of. And if Mozart could do it, can't God?

xxxHypostatic union, subsistence, BIG 12-29-00

In every being except God, action is distinct both from the essence of the agent and from the act of existing of the agent. So the virtual action by which an existing substance produces its necessary accidents should not be formally identical with either the essence or the existence of the substance. It should be distinct from the essence of the substance somewhat as ordinary action distinct from the active potency.

Any effect has a transcendental relation to a cause. But where more than one cause can produce that kind of effect, the nature of the fact does not reveal the nature of the cause. But there is one thing we know about every effect, or about the necessary cause of every effect. We know that it is a supposit, a subsistent, something with subsistence. In the case of necessary accidents, that which has the subsistence could be the individual substance or God.

Begin: My theory captures only a portion of the traditional theory of subsistence.

(For example, on some serious, subsistence distinguishes Socrates from Socrates's individual human nature.) My theory is intended to capture no more than that. But that is all I need.

xxxLiberal Conservative, 3-7-01

Non fundamentalist liberals, realist liberals rather than moderate liberals, have always: an anti-Communist and antisocialist. Then nonideological wind of the ideal is not possible; they bend when the neo conservatives won't. Have always opposed to capital punishment, even before it was fashionable to do so. Been willing to admit that conservatives are sometimes right. Our willing to cooperate with those that fundamentalist liberals consider "enemies," for example, Pat Robertson. Think we should learn from past failings, such as our naivete regarding Soviet espionage; we do not avoid discussing those failings of the grounds that "it might give help to the conservatives." Do not consider conservatives and these as if this were some sort of game or war, even though that is what conservatives think of us. Believed that that moral obligation binds us objectively and meta culturally; we hold our positions because we believe we are objectively obligated to do so; without objective obligation, there would be no reason to do so. Believed that the basis of a political position must be moral obligation that binds objectively, binds because it is based on our ability to know objective truth. Believed that we should judge, evaluate sexual behavior not just for what it can contribute to our individual pleasure, but to our long-term personal happiness and that of others, especially of children that have been and will be produced. Do not view abortion as . . . Believed in government intervention in the economy because of the necessity of private property and free markets and hence of the necessity to redress their failures.

xxxBooks on historical Jesus, 3-7-01

Josh McDowell, "new evidence that demands a verdict". Lee Strobel, "the case for Christ." (This as a star after it) Dr. Gary Habermas, "the historical Jesus's."

xxx medical ethics, 4-1 1- 01

Reed Grisez and Boyle on letting die. Maybe that is the issue. Why letting die, for example, removing food and water, does or does not make need a cause of death. For example, a disease puts him in a coma, so it causes him not to be able to feed himself. What is my responsibility? If I letting die, do I cause is death; do I intend his death as a means to an end?

xxx freedom, Nihilation, 4-11-01

Another phrase from commonsense that expresses what Maritain means by nonconsideration of the rule: mind your manners; keep in mind.

To cease considering something is to cease <u>taking it into</u> consideration at the practical, concrete, existential level.

xxxFaith and reason, 4-17-01

Before heading faith, I can wonder whether God has revealed anything to man. And I can search for reasons to think that in a particular religion God has indeed reveal things to man. I might not know what kind of reasons those might be or even what kind of reasons they could be, but I can assumed that it is possible for God to do this and that God knows best what kinds of reasons he has to use to let me know that he is revealing something.

But according to rationalists, we shouldn't even get that far. To them, it is a violation of reason to believe that God has revealed anything. So there is something wrong if we even bother looking. In other words, they claim to know that God is unable to give us sufficient reasons for thinking that he is revealing something. They claim to know that such reasons cannot exist. They know that not even God could find such reasons, because they would be contradictory to the nature of "reason" in the sense of intelligence. Therefore, rather than wondering whether God has provided evidence such that since that evidence exists, we have a moral obligation to believe that someone says is from God, rationalists know that it would you wrong to think that evidence giving us a moral obligation to believe could ever exist.

Put this way, it is their view that is immediately seen to be irrational. How could they possibly know that it is beyond the mind of God to design evidence such that its existence would be sufficient for us to know that if we do not believe something is God's revelation, we are being morally wrong? How do they know, in other words, that God cannot give us the inestimable gift of knowing things we are incapable of knowing by natural reason?
They might try to reply that kind of evidence I'm talking about is contradictory, and therefore not even God to create such evidence much less design it. They would say it is contradictory because it is asking reason to deny itself. Is not faith something that is beyond reason? Or is not faith in something that is beyond reason? And if reason could justify faith, why would it be faith?

To answer this, we simply has to locate precisely the dividing line between reason and faith. First, Jesus provides sufficient evidence for believing that he says, or will say, is God's revelation. Up until now reason alone is operating. We have not gone beyond reason. Now Jesus's tells us something that reason would be incapable of knowing. We are beyond reason now, but we are justified in doing so because within reason itself we saw sufficient evidence for believing that what ever Jesus's might say next is true, whether or not what he says next is something that falls within reason or outside of reason.

The importance of the above argument is that we do not even have to give an

analysis of how evidence can show us that it is obligatory to believe, in order to reply to the rationalists. And once the folly of that rationalists's reasoning is seen, the obligation of asking ourselves whether God has ever revealed anything is clear.

When we start down that path, the first thing we can do is eliminate those religions and those persons who do not claim to be revealing anything from God. Perhaps the next thing we can do is eliminate those religions and those persons who do not claim to have an answer to the problem of evil. Another thing we can look for his consistency of certain kinds. For instance, one kind of consistency that we should look for what that most people do not is the following. If the leaders of the Christian Church had been free of all sins in their decision-making, we would know that Christianity could not be reveal truth, because the history of the Christian Church would be inconsistent with Christian teaching that leaders of the Church will indeed be guilty of sin.

And when we start down has all looking for whether or not God has revealed anything, we know in advance that what we are looking for is whether some human being can speak for God. In other words, does the Koran and speak for God? Does Moses speak for God? Etc. and when we put the question that way, the next question is whether some human being claims to speak for God has credentials that would amount to the kind of evidence we are looking for. If God is going to speak to us, he will either speak to me directly, in which case I am the human being that is the vehicle of his revelation, or evil speak to someone else. Either way he has to give the person he is seeking to sufficient evidence for that person to know that he should believe what is coming next. And so if I should believe what another human being claims to be revelation from God, I need evidence about that human being, sufficient evidence of that human being. And so that human being must have credentials.

But knowing that the human being must have credentials narrows the field considerably. Where are the Muslim miracles, the Buddhists miracles, the Hindu miracles, etc.? Where are the Jewish miracles after Jesus's? Very quickly the field will narrow down to Jesus's, at least to the important extent that the know we have to take a serious look at the credentials Jesus offers. Our question becomes same question that the Jews that had for Jesus's, "are you are the one who was to come, or shall we wait for another?"

In McInerny's detective example, what I am deciding on the basis of inductive reasoning, that is, on the basis of whether or not it is reasonable to believe the opposite, is whether I should enter into with this person the kind of relationship that would make it totally inappropriate, totally contrary to the nature of the relationship, to hire a detective to investigate further whether the person deserves that kind of relationship.

Similarly, when I decide that the opposite of putting my faith in Christ is

unreasonable, I am entering into a personal relationship which would be broken by certain kinds of doubt.

Also, the kind of certitude given by knowledge that it is unreasonable to believe the opposite of a proposition is not the kind of certitude that constitutes faith. The latter kind of certitude is given as a get to after acting on the basis of the first kind of certitude. And when that second kind is given as a gift, or after it is given as a gift, it then becomes a personal relationship of the kind that would be broken by the detective type of investigation. So maybe I could read "the grammar of assent" and add the necessary enhancements to it.

"Religious assent": religion is a species of justice. So the issue is that something is due God in this situation. What is due God? The recognition that divinely revealed truth is involved.

If my conscience disagrees with the ordinary magisterium, I must follow my conscience. If an expert disagrees, she is <u>obligated</u> to explain why to other experts, for the sake of enlightening them. But the case of keeping such disagreements the secret from non' experts is gone forever. So the magisterium must have occur each to say publicly that someone whose conscience disagrees is obligated to follow their conscience.

I am obligated to believe that Dr. if I have a family to support, etc.. So prior obligations determine the obligation to believe the doctor's statement that this is the only way to save a life.

xxxSuicide, April 24, 2001

Morality governs behavior toward persons. But the source of the behavior is also a person, and so the source of the behavior must respect her own personhood. I cannot acknowledge the value in another's personhood without implicitly acknowledging the value in my personhood, a value that binds me as much as the other person's value binds me. For if I do not respect that value in myself, I implicitly disrespect it in the other. If I do not respec the value of personhood in myself, I imply that personhood anywhere does not have a value that I am defective if I do not recognize.
    In the phrase "another person," as used in the claim that morality concerns behavior towared another person, it is the word "person" not "another" that has the moral significance.

xxxMedical Ethics, April 24, 2001

I cannot choose refraining from preserving life, e.g., from saving a drowning man, as a means to death, e.g., to inherit as a result of death. Can I choose to refrain from preserving life as a means to ending undue suffering? What if saving the life would inflict undue suffering on me? If that would be a legit reason for me to refrain from saving the life, why wouldn't saving the other person from undue suffering be a legit reason to refrain from saving her life?

xxxIntellectual fads, June 26, 2001

Values clarification, deconstruction, new math, progressive education, not directive counseling. There is another list like this in one of my other notes files.
xxxWittgenstein and Maritain, Varghese, Possenti, logic, formal systems, logical knowledge, 09-16-01

Another necessary truth, a self-evidently necessary truth, known by the science of logic is "extension and intention very in inverse proportion to one another.

xxxTake a Message to Michael, 09-22-01

I start off by saying that ethical values concerned the interior act of choice. In doing so, am I making huge and unjustified psychological assumptions about occult mental acts. Not all. Referring to the interior act of choice as the seat of moral value is just a summary way speaking about the fact that moral value concerns the way he rationally conscious beings cause their exterior behavior. One mountain ranger performs the same exterior acts as the other. But one does it thinking that those acts to save lives; the other does it thinking that those acts will take lives.

De jure, I should not have to explain all that. De facto, many people will think I am making invalid assumptions. That is because most contemporary philosophers asked uninformed questions based on false assumptions. But should I not address those philosophers and help them see? Sure. But if I address those who falsely asked the question I just mentioned, what about those who falsely asked other questions about whatever my next point will be?

You have to make choices about whom you will address. But what about all of those for contemporary philosophers or so screwed up? Well, I've written a 500 page book to address their problems. So you can't blame me for not trying. Certainly, I may not have succeeded. But no one would be more delighted then I if someone did the job better than I did. But what would it take to do the job better? 1000 page book ? 1000 page book that no one will read?

My solution is really very very simple. The last analysis only two pieces all speculative knowledge are at stake: that God is the infinitely perfect source of all being; and that persons have freedom of choice. Our conscious appetitive do to the rest. To explain how

and why they do the rest takes more speculative knowledge. But that is a different matter.

So the speculative knowledge that are choices are either in conformity to or not a conformity to its not "scientific" knowledge. But neither is its knowledge about "values." Values don't enter the picture until the appetitive faculties respond or fail to respond. And the last sentence is a piece of object of knowledge, or should say speculative knowledge, about what things are that is not "scientific" knowledge; nor is it a statement of some sort of normative fact, whether an intuitional normative fact or whatever.

Those last issues are all false issues and ill formed questions. They arise because philosophers don't get back to what is most basic and what is most fundamental, namely, the nature of ethical values. Ethical good and evil have to apply to what I above called the interior act of choice, and they have to be measured by some sort of goal, some sort of end we think we "should" applied to those choices, where "should" does not have a moral meaning yet but means the end to which we are holding choices is a naturally necessary end for the faculty of making choices.

The ideas of the last paragraph are basic and fundamental, and unless we ask them first, there is no possible way we can understand ethics, where understanding ethics is a form of speculative knowledge. In particular, if we asked the kind of questions that contemporary philosophers ask first, questions that that don't get back to the most basic issues, there is no way we can understand ethics.

It is absolutely fundamental that we talk about goals and ends when we talk about making moral judgments. We have to be asking whether some end is achieved or is not achieve. If we don't understand that we don't understand the question we're asking. And if we don't understand that we are asking that about the interior act of choice we don't understand what question we are asking.

Perhaps the objection to referring to the interior act of choice is like Michael's objection to speaking of awareness rather than recognition. He didn't like awareness because it sounded to psychological. Then what is recognition? What is recognition is not something psychological ? He probably meant something like "recognitions is a state I can verify empirically." Fine. I can accept that. But so is awareness of state I can verify. Interior act of choice might sound too psychological, that is, the adjective "interior" might sound to psychological, but I needed something to distinguish between the seat of moral value and the exterior acts performed.

Likewise that persons have freedom of choice is a speculative truth what a nonscientific speculative truth. It is a metaphysical, ontological, or philosophical speculative truth. So the apparent dichotomy between scientific facts and values is a false dichotomy but not all for the reasons that ordinarily are given. Because the reasons ordinarily given by themselves based on false dichotomies based on false premises. Again, where you start to cut through all of that? The false problems of modern philosophy are all layered on other false problems of modern philosophy that are layered on other false problems of

modern philosophy.

You have to start somewhere. I've tried to ways. I've written a 500 page book theoretically addressed to people do not share my assumptions, more victimized by all those false questions, and I've written a paper on ethics address to people who share certain specific assumptions that I share.

Is there another way do it? Recall that both Hume and Kant had to write short books to get anyone to listen to what they said in their long books. So yes, I will try to write a short book that accomplishes what the short books of Hume and Kant accomplished. In yet, unlike in my first book, I will cut to the chase and establish that every event must have a cause. Then I will show that that truth is the basis of empirical knowledge. That will show that our questions about scientific knowledge as opposed to other kinds of knowledge start off with false assumptions about what scientific knowledge is. But not just false assumptions about science not being objective. That itself is a false dichotomy. Science is objective. But neither is it false because there is another kind of fact called moral facts, whether intuitive or not. Again these are all false questions.

xxxThe short book, a reintroduction to philosophy, 10-01-01

The introduction to the short book will talk about the question of Post Fregean lack of success in reducing paradox in disagreement in philosophy. The question is how far I should show my hand in the introduction. How far should I go in describing just how bad the situation is?

Should I, for example, give my examples about the differences between metaphysical abstraction and mathematical abstraction, that is, computational abstraction. I could give an example of metaphysical abstraction and clearly label it as something from old-fashioned philosophy. Then I could show the difference between the kind of abstraction that held in old-fashioned philosophy and the kind of abstraction that people today say is an indication of the ability to do philosophy.

xxxAbortion, 02-06-02

The zygote is in <u>control</u> of its development despite the help it needs from its environment. It is in control of the things that make the development human development. Its action <u>directs</u> its transformation from a zygote into an adult human being. It is in control of its development insofar as that development as features that are specifically human.

xxxRelativism, tolerance, truth, knowledge of truths, 0 2-07-02

Replace relativistic tolerance with the recognition of the great difficulty of finding philosophical true and so with humility toward ourselves and tolerance toward others.

Relativism gives an exhilarating sense of freedom. The freedom is freedom from finding truths. This implies that relativistic tolerance is arrogant as compared to humility before the truth. (Rorty's quote from Chesterton.) Pure rejection of true, as opposed to humility about it, is arrogance: "I have nothing to be humble about, since there is no such thing as truth.

xxxWhat every undergraduate should learn from a philosophy course, 02-07-02

Any undergraduate should know about relativism, science is them, skepticism, and what is at stake in morals if the person is not an absolute value and all values are relative, etc.

xxxEvery event must have a cause, causal necessity, causality, Hume, 2-12-02.

If something is an effect of an efficient cause, that thing is a material relation of dependence on the efficient cause. It is identical with a transcendental relation of dependence; what it is it is a transcendental relation of dependence. Therefore it at one time it has an efficient cause, it must have an efficient cause whenever it occurs. For whenever it occurs assumes that we are talking about the exact same thing occurring. If it is the exact same thing and at one time it is identical with a transcendental relation of dependence on an efficient cause, if what it is is the same thing as a transcendental relation of dependence, it must always be a transcendental relation of dependence. For if it were not such a relation, it would not truly be identical with something else which is such a relation. It cannot really be the same thing, or the same kind of thing.

Maybe a way to make the argument would be something of the form: since change is dependent on a cause, on a material cause, if it did not also have an efficient cause, then something or other that cannot be a being of reason would be a being of reason. Or something that can only be a being of reason would be a real being.

In causal realism I argued that if there were no efficient cause, than the change would be the cause of itself. Why? Because it needs an actual cause and it, the change, is what makes the actual cause the actual cause. An opponent might say that describing that which undergoes a change as a cause of the change is an extrinsic denomination for that which undergoes the change, and since it is an extrinsic denomination, it puts nothing real in that which undergoes the change.

(So making something an actual material cause, or making it truthfully describable as a material cause of something other than itself no more changes the thing intrinsically then making something desired by something other than itself change is the thing intrinsically or making something known by something other than itself change is the thing intrinsically. But here precisely it is a change in what the thing is that makes it truthfully describable as the term of the change's relation of dependence on something other than itself. What is known about a thing is what it is prior to being known; what is good about a thing is what it is prior to being desired. That by which a thing is a cause of the change is not just what it is prior to undergoing the change.)

But the same thing is true of "good" as said of that which is desired, of "the true" as said of that which is known. These predicates adds nothing real to their subjects. But precisely because they add nothing real to their subjects they are identical with their subjects. They are identical with that which their subjects are. They are identical with whatever it is its their subjects are. So the fact that they add an extrinsic denomination, a being of reason, to their subjects does not mean that they do not characterize what their subjects are intrinsically. Just as what is desired about something is intrinsic to it, what makes a thing a cause is intrinsic to it. What makes that which undergoes a change a cause of the change is intrinsic to that which undergoes the change.

In order for what it is to go from not being truthfully described as an actual cause of the change to being truthfully described as an actual cause of the change, the subject of the change must change. Unless the subject changes, the change itself does not have anything that actually causes it; it only has something that potentially causes it. In other words the change is only potentially caused. It only potentially has a cause. It only potentially has that which causes it. It only potentially has something as that which causes it.

(The opponent will say that as soon as the potential subject of the change exists, there exists all there is to that without which the change would not exist. But the change only has a term of its relation of dependence when the change exists. And having a term of its relation of dependence is not an extrinsic denomination for the change, since the relation of dependence on a term is intrinsic to what the change is; the change is an intrinsic relation of dependence on its term. That is true of the change at the time that the change exists.)

Only by undergoing the change, does the subject of the change become truthfully describable by the extrinsic denomination "cause of the change." That extrinsic denomination applies to what the subject is together with the change; it does not apply to the subject without the change. Just as what is desired about a thing is intrinsic to it. What makes a thing a cause of the change, a material cause of the change, is interior to it. But the interior features making it a material cause of the change include the change. (The interior features described by "cause of the change" include the change. For if you do not include the change in what "cause of the change" describes, what the subject is is not the cause of the change, since what the subject is is something only potentially undergoing the change.)

When we say that a change needs a cause, of what ever kind, we are saying that when the change exists there must be something describable by the extrinsic denomination "cause of the change" and so describable because of what it is intrinsically. But it is the change that brings it about that what the subject is intrinsically describable as "cause of the change."

When we say that a change needs a cause, any kind of cause, we are saying the change would not exist without the existence of something nonidentical with itself in whole or in

part. The subject undergoing the change is in part identical with the change.

Without the change, the subject's reality would not be sufficient to describe the subject as that which the change has for its cause; the subject's reality would not be sufficient to be that which the change has for its cause. The change can have something for its cause only if the change has drawn its subject from potency to act so that where what the subject is was at one time only in potency with respect to the change, what the subject is no longer includes a potency with respect to the change. What-The-subject-is's not being potency with respect to the change, or the change's now being part of the subject, part of what the subject is, is what constitutes the state of affairs of the change's actually having something for its cause.

"Actually having something for its cause" is in extrinsic denomination of the change. But the extrinsic denomination describes that which the change is intrinsically, since the change's relation of dependence on an actual cause is identical with what the change is. The change has a relation of dependence on what the subject is intrinsically, what the subject intrinsically is. Describing what the subject intrinsically is by a relation of reason to the change. Or rather, we are not describing what the subject intrinsically is by a relation to the change that is only a relation of reason to the change. We are describing what the subject intrinsically is by something that intrinsically belongs to it, the change.

If you want to say that what make the subject a cause of the change is what it is prior to the change, or is what it would be the change had not occurred to it, you have to face the fact that what the subject was prior is it's the change is something that is only potentially undergoing the change. And what is only potentially undergoing the change is not that which satisfies the change's relation of dependence, the relation that is not just an extrinsic denomination for the change but is identical with what the change is.

New Start:

Maybe a way to make the argument would be something of the form: since change is dependent on a cause, on a material cause, if it did not also have an efficient cause, then something or other that cannot be a being of reason would be a being of reason. Or something that can only be a being of reason would be a real being. Or if the material cause were its only cause, ... a being of reason ...

In causal realism I argued that if there were no efficient cause, than the change would be the cause of itself. Why? Because it needs an actual cause and it, the change, is what constitutes the actual cause the actual cause; undergoing the change itself is what it is for the actual cause to be an actual cause.. An opponent might say that describing that which undergoes a change as a cause of the change is an extrinsic denomination for that which undergoes the change, and since it is an extrinsic denomination, it puts nothing real in that which undergoes the change. So becoming an "actual cause" is a being of reason expressing the simple fact that the change exists.

(The opponent will say that making something an actual material cause, or making it

truthfully describable as a material cause of something other than itself, no more changes the thing intrinsically then making a thing desired by something other than itself changes the thing intrinsically or making something known by something other than itself changes the thing intrinsically. But here precisely it is a change in what the thing is that makes it truthfully describable as the term of the change's relation of dependence on something other than itself. What is known about a thing is what it is prior to being known; what is good about a thing is what it is prior to being desired. That by which a thing is a cause of the change is not just what it is prior to undergoing the change. Or just: to be a cause of a change cannot be just being that which it was prior to the change.

The opponent will say that the necessity of any cause is based on the real distinction between cause and effect. Here, the change is really distinct from that which undergoes it. So the change plus the subject is not the cause of the change, since it includes the change. But a whole including a part is really distinct from the part. The change still needs a cause distinct from itself, and if the subject is the only cause, the cause is the subject undergoing the change; so the change is cause of itself.)

But the same thing is true of "good" as said of that which is desired, of "the true" as said of that which is known. These predicates adds nothing real to their subjects. But precisely because they add nothing real to their subjects they are identical with their subjects. They are identical with that which their subjects are. They are identical with whatever it is its their subjects are. So the fact that they add an extrinsic denomination, a being of reason, to their subjects does not mean that they do not characterize what their subjects are intrinsically. Just as what is desired about something is intrinsic to it, what makes a thing a cause is intrinsic to it. What makes that which undergoes a change a cause of the change is intrinsic to that which undergoes the change. (Perhaps this is what must be firmly established first: like the good and the true, what makes a thing a cause is something intrinsic to it, but not what is intrinsic to it prior to the change. The reality on which the BORs the good and the true are based is some reality outside of that which is desired or known. The reality on which the BOR "actual cause" is based is not something really distinct from the subject, namely, the change, because it is the subject including the change, with the change.)

In order for what it is to go from not being truthfully described as an actual cause of the change to being truthfully described as an actual cause of the change, the subject of the change must change. Unless the subject changes, the change itself does not have anything that actually causes it; it only has something that potentially causes it. In other words the change is only potentially caused. It only potentially has a cause. It only potentially has that which causes it. It only potentially has something as that which causes it.

(The opponent will say that as soon as the potential subject of the change exists, there exists all there is to that without which the change would not exist. But the change only has a term of its relation of dependence when the change exists. And having a term of its relation of dependence is not an extrinsic denomination for the change, since the relation of dependence on a term is intrinsic to what the change is; the change is an intrinsic

relation of dependence on its term. That is true of the change at the time that the change exists.

But I am not saying that the change "causes" its subject to be the change's cause, only that the change is included in its own cause. If the change is a cause of its subject's being a material cause, the change does it by being a formal cause. But would it be good to call an accidental form a "cause" here? Maybe Maritain's analysis of the accidental "essence" in Intro to Phil as that "by which . . ." could be helpful here.)

Only by undergoing the change, does the subject of the change become truthfully describable by the extrinsic denomination "cause of the change." That extrinsic denomination applies to what the subject is together with the change; it does not apply to the subject without the change. Just as what is desired about a thing is intrinsic to it. What makes a thing a cause of the change, a material cause of the change, is interior to it. But the interior features making it a material cause of the change include the change. (The interior features <u>described</u> by "cause of the change" include the change. For if you do not include the change in what "cause of the change" describes, what the subject is is not the cause of the change, since what the subject is is something only potentially undergoing the change.)

When we say that a change needs a cause, of what ever kind, we are saying that when the change exists there must be something describable by the extrinsic denomination "cause of the change" and so describable because of what it is intrinsically. But it is the change that brings it about that what the subject is intrinsically describable as "cause of the change."

When we say that a change needs a cause, any kind of cause, we are saying the change would not exist without the existence of something nonidentical with itself in whole or in part. The subject undergoing the change is in part identical with the change.

Without the change, the subject's reality would not be sufficient to describe the subject as that which the change has for its cause; the subject's reality would not be sufficient to be that which the change has for its cause, <u>would not be sufficient for the change to actually have something other than itself as its cause</u>. The change can have something for its cause only if the change has drawn its subject from potency to act so that where what the subject is was at one time only in potency with respect to the change, what the subject is no longer includes a potency with respect to the change. What-The-subject-is's not being potency with respect to the change, or the change's now being part of the subject, part of what the subject is, is what constitutes the state of affairs of the change's actually having something for its cause.

"Actually having something for its cause" is in extrinsic denomination of the change. But the extrinsic denomination describes that which the change is intrinsically, since the change's relation of dependence on an actual cause is identical with what the change is.

The change has a relation of dependence on what the subject is intrinsically, what the subject intrinsically is. Describing what the subject intrinsically is by a relation of reason to the change. Or rather, <u>we are not describing what the subject intrinsically is by a relation to the change that is only a relation of reason to the change</u>. We are describing what the subject intrinsically is by something that intrinsically belongs to it, the change.

If you want to say that what make the subject a cause of the change is what it is prior to the change, or is what it would be the change had not occurred to it, you have to face the fact that what the subject was prior to the change is something that is only potentially undergoing the change. And what is only potentially undergoing the change is not that which satisfies the change's relation of dependence, the relation that is not just an extrinsic denomination for the change but is identical with what the change is.

"Actually having something as its cause" does <u>not</u> describe what the change is by adding to what the change is a BOR based on what its extrinsic to the change, adding a concept that is a BOR because it is based on a relation that is extrinsic to what the change is. The change's relation of dependence on what the subject is such that without the subject the change would not exist that relation is <u>not</u> extrinsic to what the change is. Something that actually has something other than itself as a term of the change's relation of dependence is <u>what</u> the change is. Something that actually has the subject of the change as term of a relation such that without the subject that something would not exist, or not be what it is, is what the change is.

But "without the subject" in that statement means "without that which is the subject being the subject," "without that which is the subject actually undergoing the change, actually changing it what it is, actually changing from what it is being only potentially what undergoes the change.

To be a cause adds nothing real to the thing that becomes a cause. To be a material cause does add something real to the thing that becomes a cause; it adds something that makes the subject a cause, not by its being extrinsic to the cause but by its being intrinsic to what the cause now is. It adds something that makes the change now actually have the subject as term of the change's relation of dependence on something other than itself.

Maybe do it this way: Make the false assumption that the change's relation of dependence on something other than itself were also something nonidentical with the change. What follows from that? Then contrast to the case where the relation of dependence is identical with what the change is. What follows if the subject is term of a relation that is extrinsic to what the change is?

New Start:

The good is a BOR but it describes what is intrinsic to the good. "Cause" is a BOR but it describes what is intrinsic to the cause, what the cause is intrinsically.

In the case of the good and the true, the reality on which the BOR is based is external to the thing described. In the case of "cause" is the reality on which the BOR is based external to the thing described? In the case of the true and the good, no change takes place in what the thing is intrinsically when it becomes truthfully describable as good or true. In the cause of "cause," however, the opposite is the case. (So is "cause" really a BOR or only apparently a BOR? "Really a BOR" depends on the subject's distinction from the effect, the change; "apparently a BOR" depends on including the change with the subject. Maybe what I want to show is that by claiming that the subject is the only cause of the change, you have it both ways, that is, the change is part of itself and so not really distinct from the cause in the way that it must be distinct from the cause. In other words, "cause" is a BOR as said of the efficient cause, but if there is no efficient cause, "cause" would invalidly cease being a BOR.)

Another argument:

The whole (substance plus accident) is an effect of its parts. But this time want of parts is an effect of the other. So does that make the whole the cause of itself? The whole, the subject plus the change, is an effect of its parts. There would be no subject changing without the subject and its change. But there would also be no change without the subject; so a whole is cause of itself. For the subject can be what it is without the whole existing. If the change were not caused, the whole would not exist; so either the whole has no cause or is cause of itself.

And notice that it is not just the subject that has a causal relation to the change. There is another causal relation here. The change has a causal relation to the whole. The whole is not just a mereological sum, a conceptual unity. They unity consists of the fact that the change is an actualization of the subject. The change, like any form, actualizes its subject. So the whole exists because of the causality of the change relative to the subject, causality that "produces" the whole. But the causality that produces the whole exists because of a causality of the subject relative to the change. So the whole does not exist merely by the causality of the subject relative to the change; it also exists by the causality of the change relative to the subject.

The change benefits from, experiences, receives the causality of the subject only insofar as the subject is part of the whole and so only insofar as the subject is a cause of the whole.

The best of the above revised and put in order (but see below for even better)

> In causal realism I argued that if there were no efficient cause, than the change would be the cause of itself. Why? Because it needs an actual cause and it, the change, is what constitutes the actual cause the actual cause; undergoing the change itself is what it is for the actual cause to be an actual cause. An opponent might say that describing that which undergoes a change as a cause of the change is an extrinsic denomination for that which undergoes the change, and since it is an extrinsic denomination, it puts nothing real in that which undergoes the change. So becoming an "actual cause" is a being of reason expressing the simple fact that the change exists.

The opponent wants to say that just as being a good is not a feature of, a part of, what a good thing is, being a cause is not a feature of what a cause is.

But that is not really the issue. The question isn't whether to be a cause of A is anything intrinsic to the cause. The question is whether A happens to be intrinsic to that which A has for a cause, that on which A depends. If so, A is cause of itself.

But the same thing is true of "good" as said of that which is desired, of "the true" as said of that which is known. These predicates add nothing real to their subjects. But precisely because they add nothing real to their subjects they are identical with their subjects. They are identical with that which their subjects are. They are identical with whatever it is its their subjects are. So the fact that they add an extrinsic denomination, a being of reason, to their subjects does not mean that they do not characterize what their subjects are intrinsically. Just as what is desired about something is intrinsic to it, what makes a thing a cause is intrinsic to it. What makes that which undergoes a change a cause of the change is intrinsic to that which undergoes the change.

The good is a BOR but it describes what is intrinsic to the good. "Cause" is a BOR but it describes what is intrinsic to the cause, what the cause is intrinsically. Just as "desired by A" describes what is intrinsic to B, not what is extrinsic to it, "cause of A" describes what is intrinsic to B. Change has a relation of dependence on what the subject is intrinsically.

"Desired by A" and "cause of A" both describe something, B, by a relation possessed by something that is non-identical with the thing described. It would seem, therefore, that to say that when A "causes something to be A's cause" it is not really doing anything to the cause. That phrase says nothing more than that A is caused by B, where the only genuine as opposed to linguistically apparent causality goes on in A, so that A is not cause of itself in any real sense.

But the difference between "desired by A" and "cause of A" is that the truth condition of the first does not consist of a change in what B is intrinsically, while the truth condition of the second does consist of a change in what B is intrinsically. The cause of A is not B as not undergoing the change but is precisely B as undergoing the change. So the change is part of what its cause is; so the change is cause of itself, since it belongs to its cause precisely insofar as it has a cause. The change has something on which it depends only to the extent that it is part of that on which it depends.

"Being a cause of A" need not express anything in addition to what B is when B is not the cause of A. So being a cause of A does not produce a contradiction unless A is part of its "cause," for then A is included in, is part of, that which is allegedly extrinsic to it.

In general, "being a cause of A" does not express anything in addition to what B is when it is not a cause of A; the only thing in addition to what B is when it is not cause of A is something entirely nonidentical with B, A. That is true of being a cause in general, but precisely the opposite is true of being that kind of cause we are calling a component cause or material cause. Being a material cause adds something to what B is, something that constitutes what it is for B to be a material cause; and what is added constitutes the truth condition of B's being a cause not by being extrinsic to what B now is but by being intrinsic to what B now is. It adds something to B that constitutes what it is for A to have that on which A depends, that which A's relation of dependence has for a term, that constitutes what it is for A to be caused, where to be caused is not extrinsic to what A is.

 like the good and the true, what makes a thing a cause is something intrinsic to it, but not what is intrinsic to it prior to the change. The reality on which the BORs the good and the true are based is some reality outside of that which is desired or known. The

reality on which the BOR "material cause" is based is not something really distinct from the subject, namely, the change, because it is the subject including the change, with the change.

In the case of the good and the true, the reality on which the BOR is based is external to the thing described. In the case of "cause" is the reality on which the BOR is based external to the thing described? In the case of the true and the good, no change takes place in what the thing is intrinsically when it becomes truthfully describable as good or true. In the cause of "cause," however, the opposite is the case.

To be a material cause does add something real to the thing that becomes a cause; it adds something that makes the subject a cause, not by its being extrinsic to the cause but by its being intrinsic to what the cause now is. <u>we are not describing what the subject intrinsically is by a relation to the change that is only a relation of reason to the change</u>. We are describing what the subject intrinsically is by something that intrinsically belongs to it, the change.

The "union" of the subject and the change is not just a mereological sum, a logical entity. It is a union consisting of causal relations, constituted by causal relations, a union of causal relations that "produce" a new reality, a changing subject, that is different from the reality that existed before. What the change is is nothing other than something belonging to, characterizing, its subject, a feature of its subject. That is the nature of the relation we happen to be calling "dependence on a material cause."

The fact that B needs something intrinsic to itself for A to be caused means that A needs for B to have that intrinsic thing for A's relation of dependence, which is identical to what A is, to have a term. But that thing intrinsic to B is A itself; so A is cause of itself.

Something that has something other than itself as term of a relation of dependence is what a change is, what A is. (term of a relation such that without that thing other than itself a change would not be what it is) But a change's not existing without its subject means "without that which is the subject actually changing in what it is, without what-it-is ceasing to be only potentially that which undergoes the change, only in potency to undergoing the change."

(Feature F, e.g., a spherical shape, is identical with a potency to roll. When the ball is rolling, feature F is no longer identical with a potency to roll, but feature F is still identical to feature F. That is the nature of the low, weak mode of being we call "potency." As it is low on the scale of being, it is low on the scale of preserving identity, which is a property of being. That paradox is what Greek philosophy was all about. It is solved by the fact that feature F is an intrinsically imperfect mode of being that can never, for example, exist in an infinite state.)

If you want to say that what makes the subject a cause of the change is what it is prior to the change, or is what it would be the change had not occurred to it, you have to face the fact that what the subject was prior to the change is something that is only potentially undergoing the change. And what is only potentially undergoing the change is not that which satisfies the change's relation of dependence, the relation that is not just an extrinsic relation to the change but is identical with what the change is.

If the subject is only potentially undergoing the change, the subject is only potentially what it needs to be for the change to have something whose causality the change enjoys (whose intrinsic reality the change enjoys, benefits from, experiences as the term of the change's relation of dependence). The subject only potentially has what it needs to have for the change to have something on which it depends.

What makes something a potential subject of a change is identical with an

actual feature or set of features the subject already has. What makes the ball a potential subject of the kind of change we call rolling is that the ball is actually a solid actually with a spherical shape. Being A potency for a certain kind of change is identical with actually being a solid of a certain shape. But being identical with a potency for that change is no longer what being a solid of a certain shape is, when the solid is actually rolling. So at one time the same set of features are identical with, another time not identical with, a potency for a certain change.

That is just a fact about the kinds of realities being a solid and being spherical are, intrinsically imperfect realities that are at different times the same as themselves while being identical with opposite potencies: the potency to change, the potency to be at rest. It is precisely this "weird" nature of potency that makes change require a sufficiently actual efficient cause. It is precisely this low, weak mode of being that constitutes potency (and for which I called it "weird") that makes potency require an efficient cause in order to be actualized. The material cause alone won't do precisely because it IS the potency.

Without the change, the subject's reality would not be sufficient for the change to have something for its cause, for the subject to be that which the change has for its cause; the subject's reality would not be sufficient to be that which the change has for its cause, would not be sufficient for the change to actually have something other than itself as its cause, to actually have the subject as its cause. The change can have something for its cause only if subject's potency has been actualized, put into act, is actualized, so that where what the subject is was at one time only in potency with respect to the change, what the subject is no longer includes a potency with respect to the change. What-The-subject-is's not being potency with respect to the change, or the change's now being part of the subject, part of what the subject is, is what constitutes the state of affairs of the change's actually having something for its cause.

When we say that a change needs a cause, of what ever kind, we are saying that when the change exists there must be something describable by the extrinsic denomination "cause of the change" and so describable because of what it is intrinsically. But it is the change that brings it about that what the subject is (the change that constitutes what it is about the subject that makes the subject) intrinsically describable as "cause of the change." "Cause of the change" applies to, is true of, what the subject is with the change, not what the subject is without the change.

Just as what is desired about a thing is intrinsic to it. What makes a thing a cause of the change, a material cause of the change, that which undergoes the change, is interior to it. But the interior features making it a material cause of the change include the change. (The interior features described by "cause of the change" include the change. For if you do not include the change in what "cause of the change" describes, what the subject is is not the cause of the change, since what the subject is is something only potentially undergoing the change.)

The opponent will say that as soon as the potential subject of the change exists, there exists all there is to that without which the change would not exist. But the change only has a term of its relation of dependence when the change exists. And having a term of its relation of dependence is not an extrinsic denomination for the change, since the relation of dependence on a term is intrinsic to what the change is; the change is an intrinsic relation of dependence on its term. That is true of the change at the time that the change exists.

But I am not saying that the change "causes" its subject to be the change's cause (for the change is what it is for the subject to be that without which ...), only that the change is included in its own cause. If the change is a cause of its subject's being a

material cause, the change does it by being a formal cause. But would it be good to call an accidental form a "cause" here?

Without the change, the subject is only potentially that which the change experiences as its cause, only potentially that which the change benefits from. Unless the subject changes, the change itself does not have anything that actually causes it; it only has something that potentially causes it.

The opponent will say that making something an actual material cause, or making it truthfully describable as a material cause of something other than itself, no more changes the thing intrinsically then making a thing desired by something other than itself changes the thing intrinsically or making something known by something other than itself changes the thing intrinsically. But here precisely it is a change in what the thing is that makes it truthfully describable as the term of the change's relation of dependence on something other than itself. What is known about a thing is what it is prior to being known; what is good about a thing is what it is prior to being desired. That by which a thing is a cause of the change is not just what it is prior to undergoing the change. Or just: to be a cause of a change cannot be just being that which it was prior to the change.

The opponent will say that the necessity of any cause is based on the real distinction between cause and effect. Here, the change is really distinct from that which undergoes it. So the change plus the subject is not the cause of the change, since it includes the change. But a mereological whole including a part is really distinct from the part. The change still needs a cause distinct from itself, and if the subject is the only cause, the cause is the subject undergoing the change; so the change is cause of itself.

Other possible arguments:

Maybe a way to make the argument would be something of the form: since change is dependent on a cause, on a material cause, if it did not also have an efficient cause, then something or other that cannot be a being of reason would be a being of reason. (If the change is not included in its own cause, in what the subject now is, the subject's changing is just a mereological sum, a logical entity; so all the entities we know are just logical entities of ultimate "particles.") Or something that can only be a being of reason would be a real being. Or if the material cause were its only cause, ... a being of reason ...

(So is "cause" really a BOR or only apparently a BOR? "Really a BOR" depends on the subject's distinction from the effect, the change; "apparently a BOR" depends on including the change with the subject. Maybe what I want to show is that by claiming that the subject is the only cause of the change, you have it both ways, that is, the change is part of itself and so not really distinct from the cause in the way that it must be distinct from the cause. In other words, "cause" is a BOR as said of the efficient cause, but if there is no efficient cause, "cause" would invalidly cease being a BOR.)

We know that some things, for example, laughter, have efficient causes. What has an efficient cause is a material relation of dependence on the efficient cause. So if the same thing were to occur without an efficient cause, it could not really be the same thing, since the thing in question, by its identity with itself, is a relation of

dependence on an efficient cause. (If it cannot remain what it is when something else is what it is, its not remaining what it is is a material relation of dependence on an efficient cause. The dependence is not a relation in the cause; so it must be a relation belonging to the effect. And if it is not a material relation in the effect, there will be an infinite series of effects, since every effect will require such a formal relation, and every formal relation will be an effect requiring such a formal relation.)

If it were not just change that needs an efficient cause but a special kind of change, it would not just be the insufficiency of the component cause to be the term of the change's relation of dependence that the calls for an efficient cause to make up for the insufficiency. The efficient cause would make up for the insufficiency of a certain kind of component cause but not for other kinds; other kinds would be component causes even though they are not sufficient to be component causes.

In the "special" case, what a change is would be a relation of dependence on something, the efficient cause, sufficient to make the component cause a component cause. In the special case, the change would need something to make the component cause the component cause. And it would need something sufficient not just because component causes are, as such, insufficient, but only because special cases of subjects of change becoming component causes require a sufficient efficient cause, not component cause as such. (Not just because component causes are insufficient, but because what some particular subjects are is insufficient.)

But the component cause as such is insufficient. So there are two types of insufficient component cause, A and B. Both types A and B are insufficient, but only type A's insufficiency requires the addition of something sufficient.

But where would the change's <u>additional</u> relation of dependency come from? There would be an additional relation of dependency because now there would be two kinds of change. <u>Every</u> change would still be a relation of dependence on an insufficient component cause. But some cases of having necessary conditions would require sufficient conditions and some would not. Those that would "require" sufficient conditions would do so because their relation of dependency on sufficient conditions would be identical with what they are. But all changes are identical with a relation of dependency on an insufficient component cause; so the relation of dependency on a sufficient efficient cause would be an additional relation. But there cannot be a real multiplicity of distinct relations if they are all identical with the same thing.

If something is an effect of an efficient cause, that thing is a material relation of dependence on the efficient cause. It is identical with a transcendental relation of dependence; what it is it is a transcendental relation of dependence. Therefore it at one time it has an efficient cause, it must have an efficient cause whenever it occurs. For whenever it occurs assumes that we are talking about the exact same thing occurring. If it is the exact same thing and at one time it is identical with a transcendental relation of dependence on an efficient cause, if what it is is the same thing as a transcendental relation of dependence, it must always be a transcendental relation of dependence. For if it were not such a relation, it would not truly be identical with something else which is such a relation. It cannot really be the same thing, or the same kind of thing.

With the efficient cause, the change does have something on which it depends that does not include the change itself. Given that the efficient cause is what it is, the component cause cannot remain what it is. If the component cause did not remain what it is without an efficient cause, the component cause's not remaining what it is, the change, would be part of its own cause (be its only cause). With the efficient cause, the cause of the subject's not remaining what it is, the change, does not include the new state the subject is in, does not include what the subject now newly

is; the cause of the subject's not remaining what it is is what the efficient cause, something distinct from the subject is. (With the efficient cause, the subject's not remaining what it is, the change, is not part of its own cause. The change does have something on which it depends, something as the term of its relation of dependence, but the change alone does not constitute what it is for that which the change has a term of its relation of dependence to be the term of its relation of dependence. The (existence of the) change alone does not constitute what it is for the change's relation of dependence to have a term; does not constitute what it is ...)

Remove the efficient cause and the only cause of the subject's not remaining what it is, the change, is what the subject is, not what anything other than the subject is. But it is not what the subject is prior to not remaining what it is. The only cause is what the subject is when it does not remain what is previously was. The only cause is the subject precisely as not remaining what it is. The only cause is the subject as not remaining in the condition, in the state, that does not include the change itself as part of what it is. The change itself is included in that which the change has as term of its relation of dependence.

The subject could have remained what it previously was for an indefinite length of time. During none of that time would the change have a term of that relation of dependence that is identical with what the change is (the change would not be in a relation, have a relation, be related, to a term other than itself without which the change cannot exist; the change would be related to a term other than itself without which it could not exist). If at any point during that time the change actually had a term of its relation of dependence, was in a relation to such a term, was related to such a term, had a relation to such a term, the change would have existed at that time. Since the change did not exist at that time, the change did not have that on which it actually depends at that time.

So without the efficient cause, the only cause would be the subject precisely in the state of being what it now is as opposed to being what it previously was. With the efficient cause that which the change has as term of its relation of dependence (that which the change is related to as . . ., that which the change is in a relation to such that . . .) does not include what the change is in any inconsistent way; since what the efficient cause is is other than what the changing subject is.

Mustn't the changing subject also be in a relation with the change that is real? Does the change's relation to the subject not touch the subject at all, not affect the subject at all, not relate the subject to the change (so that, or as if, to say "the subject is related to the change" does not describe the subject intrinsically - as it could have described the subject before the change). On the contrary, that is precisely what the change's relation to the subject, which is identical with what the change is, does. To say that the subject is related to the change does not add a third thing called "the subject's relation to the change," over and above the union of subject and change. If it did, there would be an infinite series of them.

But the subject's potency for the change is now a material relation of being something that changes, of having the change as part of what it is. What the subject is is now identical with the relation of having a state of change; is identical with that which is a relation of having a state of change. A relation of being fulfilled by a state of change, actualized by it, realized by it.

It is that real relation to the change that the subject is that constitutes the subject's
being the component cause of the change, that constitutes the change's having a term, that constitutes the subject's being the term of the change's relation of dependence. So the subject's being the component cause of the change depends on the change's real relation to the subject which makes the subject really related to the

change. The subject's being that real relation to the change depends on something other than the subject's actualized potency, the feature that at one time was a potency for the change but no longer is a potency for the change; it depends on the change. But then that on which the subject's being that real relation depends, the change, is caused by the subject. So . . . the change's dependence on the subject is caused by the subject's dependence on the change.

The very, very best of the above revised and shortened:

In causal realism I argued that if there were no efficient cause, than the change would be the cause of itself. Why? Because it needs an actual cause and it, the change, is what constitutes the actual cause the actual cause; undergoing the change itself is what it is for the actual cause to be an actual cause.. An opponent might say that describing that which undergoes a change as a cause of the change is an extrinsic denomination for that which undergoes the change, and since it is an extrinsic denomination, it puts nothing real in that which undergoes the change. So becoming an "actual cause" is a being of reason expressing the simple fact that the change exists.

The opponent wants to say that just as being a good is not a feature of, a part of, what a good thing is, being a cause is not a feature of what a cause is.

But that is not really the issue. The question isn't whether to be a cause of A is anything intrinsic to the cause. The question is whether A happens to be intrinsic to that which A has for a cause, that on which A depends. If so, A is cause of itself.

But the same thing is true of "good" as said of that which is desired, of "the true" as said of that which is known. These predicates adds nothing real to their subjects. But precisely because they add nothing real to their subjects they are identical with their subjects. They are identical with that which their subjects are. They are identical with whatever it is its their subjects are. So the fact that they add an extrinsic denomination, a being of reason, to their subjects does not mean that they do not characterize what their subjects are intrinsically. Just as what is desired about something is intrinsic to it, what makes a thing a cause is intrinsic to it. What makes that which undergoes a change a cause of the change is intrinsic to that which undergoes the change. Just as "desired by A" describes what is intrinsic to B, not what is extrinsic to it, "cause of A" describes what is intrinsic to B.

The difference between "desired by A" and "cause of A" is that the truth condition of the first does not consist of a change in what B is intrinsically, while the truth condition of the second does consist of a change in what B is intrinsically. The cause of A is not B as not undergoing the change but is precisely B as undergoing the change. So the change is part of what its cause is; so the change is cause of itself, since it belongs to its cause precisely insofar as it has a cause. The change has something on which it depends only to the extent that it is part of that on which it depends; the change has something on which it depends only by being part of that on which it depends. Not an "accidental" but a part essential to the subject's being that on which A depends, essential to A's having the subject as that on which A depends.

"Being a cause of A" need not express anything in addition to what B is when B is not the cause of A. So being a cause of A does not produce a contradiction unless A is part of its "cause," for then A is included in, is part of, that which is allegedly extrinsic to it.

In general, "being a cause of A" does not express anything in addition to what B is when it is not a cause of A; the only thing in addition to what B is when it is not

cause of A is something entirely nonidentical with B, A. That is true of being a cause in general, but precisely the opposite is true of being that kind of cause we are calling a component cause or material cause. Being a material cause adds something to what B is, something that constitutes what it is for B to be a material cause; and what is added constitutes the truth condition of B's being a cause not by being extrinsic to what B now is but by being intrinsic to what B now is. It adds something to B that constitutes what it is for A to have that on which A depends, that which A's relation of dependence has for a term, that constitutes what it is for A to be caused, where to be caused is not extrinsic to what A is.

like the good and the true, what makes a thing a cause is something intrinsic to it, but not what is intrinsic to it prior to the change. The reality on which the BORs the good and the true are based is some reality outside of that which is desired or known. The reality on which the BOR "material cause" is based is not something really distinct from the subject, namely, the change, because it is the subject including the change, with the change.

To be a material cause does add something real to the thing that becomes a cause; it adds something that makes the subject a cause, not by its being extrinsic to the cause but by its being intrinsic to what the cause now is. we are not describing what the subject intrinsically is by a relation to the change that is only a relation of reason to the change. We are describing what the subject intrinsically is by something that intrinsically belongs to it, the change.

The "union" of the subject and the change is not just a mereological sum, a logical entity. It is a union consisting of causal relations, constituted by causal relations, a union of causal relations that "produce" a new reality, a changing subject, that is different from the reality that existed before. What the change is is nothing other than something belonging to, characterizing, its subject, a feature of its subject. That is the nature of the relation we happen to be calling "dependence on a material cause."

The fact that B needs something intrinsic to itself for A to be caused means that A needs for B to have that intrinsic thing for A's relation of dependence, which is identical to what A is, to have a term. But that thing intrinsic to B is A itself; so A is cause of itself.

A change's not existing without its subject means "without that which is the subject actually changing in what it is, without what-it-is ceasing to be only potentially that which undergoes the change, only in potency to undergoing the change."

If you want to say that what makes the subject a cause of the change is what it is prior to the change, or is what it would be the change had not occurred to it, you have to face the fact that what the subject was prior to the change is something that is only potentially undergoing the change. And what is only potentially undergoing the change is not that which satisfies the change's relation of dependence, the relation that is not just an extrinsic relation to the change but is identical with what the change is.

If the subject is only potentially undergoing the change, what the subject is intrinsically is only potentially what the change needs to be for it to have something whose causality the change enjoys (whose intrinsic reality the change enjoys, benefits from, experiences as the term of the change's relation of dependence). The subject only potentially has what it needs to have for the change to have something on which it depends.

(Feature F, e.g., a spherical shape, is identical with a potency to roll. When the ball is rolling, feature F is no longer identical with a potency to roll, but feature F is still identical to feature F. That is the nature of the low, weak mode of being we call "potency." As it is low on the scale of being, it is low on the scale of preserving identity, which is a property of being. That paradox is what Greek philosophy was all about. It is solved by the fact that feature F is an intrinsically imperfect mode of being that can never, for example, exist in an infinite state.)

It is precisely this "weird" nature of potency that makes change require a sufficiently actual efficient cause. It is precisely this low, weak mode of being that

constitutes potency (and for which I called it "weird") that makes potency require an efficient cause in order to be actualized. The material cause alone won't do precisely because it IS the potency.

Without the change, the subject's reality would not be sufficient for the change to have something for its cause, for the subject to be that which the change has for its cause; the subject's reality would not be sufficient to be that which the change has for its cause, <u>would not be sufficient for the change to actually have something other than itself as its cause, to actually have the subject as its cause</u>. The change can have something for its cause only if subject's potency has been actualized, put into act, is actualized, so that where what the subject is was at one time only in potency with respect to the change, what the subject is no longer includes a potency with respect to the change. What-The-subject-is's not being potency with respect to the change, or the change's now being part of the subject, part of what the subject is, is what constitutes the state of affairs of the change's actually having something for its cause.

When we say that a change needs a cause, of what ever kind, we are saying that when the change exists there must be something describable by the extrinsic denomination "cause of the change" and so describable because of what it is intrinsically. But it is the change that brings it about that what the subject is (the change that constitutes what it is about the subject that makes the subject) intrinsically describable as "cause of the change." "Cause of the change" applies to, is true of, what the subject is with the change, not what the subject is without the change.

Just as what is desired about a thing is intrinsic to it. What makes a thing a cause of the change, a material cause of the change, that which undergoes the change, is interior to it. But the interior features making it a material cause of the change include the change. (The interior features <u>described</u> by "cause of the change" include the change. For if you do not include the change in what "cause of the change" describes, what the subject is is not the cause of the change, since what the subject is is something only potentially undergoing the change.)

The opponent will say that as soon as the potential subject of the change exists, there exists all there is to that without which the change would not exist. But the change only has a term of its relation of dependence when the change exists. And having a term of its relation of dependence is not an extrinsic denomination for the change, since the relation of dependence on a term is intrinsic to what the change is; the change is an intrinsic relation of dependence on its term. That is true of the change at the time that the change exists.

<u>But I am not saying that the change "causes" its subject to be the change's cause (for the change is what it is for the subject to be that without which ...), only that the change is included in its own cause.</u>

Without the change, the subject is only potentially that which the change experiences as its cause, only potentially that which the change benefits from. Without the change itself being part of what the change has for a cause, the change has no cause. So either it has no cause or is cause of itself.

The opponent will say that making something an actual material cause, or making it truthfully describable as a material cause of something other than itself, no more changes the thing intrinsically then making a thing desired by something other than itself changes the thing intrinsically or making something known by something other than itself changes the thing intrinsically. But here precisely it is a change in what the thing is that makes it truthfully describable as the term of the change's relation of dependence on something other than itself. What is known about a thing is what it is prior to being known; what is good about a thing is what it is prior to being desired. That by which a thing is a cause of the change is not just what it is prior to undergoing the change. Or just: to be a cause of a change cannot be just being that which it was prior to the change.

<u>If the subject is the only cause, the cause is the subject undergoing the change; so the change is cause of itself.</u>

With the efficient cause, the change does have something on which it depends that does not include the change itself. Given that the efficient cause is what it is, the component cause cannot remain what it is. If the component cause did not remain what it is without an efficient cause, the component cause's not remaining what it is, the change, would be part of its own cause (be its only cause). With the efficient cause, the cause of the subject's not remaining what it is, the change, does not include the new state the subject is in, does not include what the subject now newly is; the cause of the subject's not remaining what it is is what the efficient cause, something distinct from the subject is. (With the efficient cause, the subject's not remaining what it is, the change, is not part of its own cause. The change does have something on which it depends, something as the term of its relation of dependence, but the change alone does not constitute what it is for that which the change has a term of its relation of dependence to be the term of its relation of dependence. The (existence of the) change alone does not constitute what it is for the change's relation of dependence to have a term; does not constitute what it is ...)

Remove the efficient cause and the only cause of the subject's not remaining what it is, the change, is what the subject is, not what anything other than the subject is. But it is not what the subject is prior to not remaining what it is. The only cause is what the subject is when it does not remain what is previously was. The only cause is the subject precisely as not remaining what it is. The only cause is the subject as not remaining in the condition, in the state, that does not include the change itself as part of what it is. The change itself is included in that which the change has as term of its relation of dependence.

The subject could have remained what it previously was for an indefinite length of time. During none of that time would the change have a term of that relation of dependence that is identical with what the change is (the change would not be in a relation, have a relation, be related, to a term other than itself without which the change cannot exist; the change would be related to a term other than itself without which it could not exist). If at any point during that time the change actually had a term of its relation of dependence, was in a relation to such a term, was related to such a term, had a relation to such a term, the change would have existed at that time. Since the change did not exist at that time, the change did not have that on which it actually depends at that time.

So without the efficient cause, the only cause would be the subject precisely in the state of being what it now is as opposed to being what it previously was. With the efficient cause that which the change has as term of its relation of dependence (that which the change is related to as . . ., that which the change is in a relation to such that . . .) does not include what the change is in any inconsistent way; since what the efficient cause is is other than what the changing subject is.

Other possible arguments:

Maybe a way to make the argument would be something of the form: since change is dependent on a cause, on a material cause, if it did not also have an efficient cause, then something or other that cannot be a being of reason would be a being of reason. (If the change is not included in its own cause, in what the subject now is, the subject's changing is just a mereological sum, a logical entity; so all the entities we know are just logical entities of ultimate "particles.") Or something that can only be a being of reason would be a real being. Or if the material cause were its only cause, ... a being of reason ...

(In other words, "cause" is a BOR as said of the efficient cause, but if there is no efficient cause, "cause" would invalidly cease being a BOR. So is "cause" really a BOR or only apparently a BOR? "Really a BOR" depends on the subject's distinction from the effect, the change; "apparently a BOR" depends on including the change with the subject. Maybe what I want to show is that by claiming that the subject is the only cause of the change, you have it both ways, that is, the change is part of its cause and so not really

distinct from the cause in the way that it must be distinct from the cause.)