

Logic, entailment, inference, 3/9/95

Title: Inference. Simultaneous Awareness that All A is B and All B is C causes awareness that All A is C. Inference is a relation defined by reference to the causing of knowledge. Validity of inference is a relation defined by reference to truth. Knowledge and truth are not identical.

SSR, G and L, 3/9/95

Title: The Enemies of Sexual Happiness.  
Empiricism and Metaphysics, Rationalism/Empiricism, 3/7/95

Putnam and Gallison, and Quine in "The Scope and Language of Science" accuse Duhem of a howler when he contrasts what is known by science to what things may really be in themselves. They accuse him of incorrectly assuming there is some other possible zone of knowledge beyond that of science, called metaphysics.

But in fact there is another alternative. In fact, it's more than just another alternative. The truth is that without metaphysics, science cannot do its job; science cannot provide us with knowledge or even with rationally justified belief. So the above thinkers are guilty of a false dichotomy and much more than a false dichotomy.

Italian Article, 2/20/95

1. L comes into existence to objectify real existents.
2. So L for cdo's must be based on that for real existents, ie., must be built using that for real existents, must be derived from that for real existents.
3. L fo real existents uses existential quantification to attribute predicates to individuals, because the real existence of things is the cause of the truth of sentences attributing features to them.
4. So we use the existential quantifier to attribute predicates to cdo's, because the L in which we do so is derived from that for real existents.

Ethics, Double Effect, 11/1/94

Check out the dispute about double effect between Joe Boyle  
and the guy who wrote "Why Abortion is Wrong" in the J of P.

Putnam, Meaning, 11/1/94

Mental states are a NECESSARY CONDITION for such things as having stereotypes AND referring. Putnam does not show that they are not necessary conditions, only that they are not sufficient conditions. And who ever said they were more than necessary conditions; who NEEDS to say that are more than necessary conditions.

Ethics, Sex, Value of Life, 11/1/94

Every consciously chosen s-act either affirms the value of life or denies the value of life, is either an affirmation of the value of life or a rejection of the value of life. It cannot avoid being one or the other; it cannot not be one or the other. If human life is not an end higher than any other achieved in the s-act, then human life is just an accidental product of a chemical drive.

Abort art, 11/1/94 BIG

A zygote is potentially rational but also potentially anencephalic. Yes, but consider a three-year-old that is potentially a musician. She is also potentially deaf, etc., depending on what environments she is exposed to. The point is that deliberately preventing her from becoming a musician would deprive someone of the achievement of a value they are capable of. The fulfillment of one of those potencies would be a value; the fulfillment of the opposite would be a deprivation. Being a musician is a value as measured by the ends of human nature in general. That is, as measured by what states of act constitute fulfillments relative to a nature the zygote is capable of developing, the achievement of which nature would be a higher achievement and a BETTER achievement, because it would constitute an ontologically higher mode of being. It would be higher, because it would include all the kinds of activities the lower modes are capable of and more.

Deliberately depriving a zygote of the fulfillment of one of those potentialities, the potentiality of becoming fully human, would deprive it of ends that would be as valuable to it as any end that one could achieve by making such a decision. As long as it is an organism with the capability for such ends, the fact that it has opposite capabilities does not matter. Depriving that organism of such achievements is depriving it of values equal for it as any value we would be achieving thereby.

2/7/95

The question of whether an organism is capable of certain ends before it is acted on by external forces, as all causes must be in order to act, is the question of whether the capacity belongs to the internal form of the organism or whether it is accidental to its internal form. The form of a brush makes it capable of being used, by an external cause, to create beauty. But when the external cause is through, there is no more orientation to beauty in the brush than there was before. The internal form that the zygote has now, however, is such that, when acted on by external forces, the zygote's nature is to acquire proximate capacities that are developments of the form already there, not accidental relative to that form. It is not that the exterior caused imposed a permanent characteristic passively, as one might bend a brush handle, for instance. Rather the external cause enabled the xygote to develop intelligence because of a characteristic the nature of the xygote already possessed that enabled the zygote to become an active cause of intelligence.

Ethics, RA, 2/7/95

Can any other ethical theory deny the rational appetite theory? Does not any theory implicitly affirm the RA theory. For any theory asserts propositions to be true. Those propositions must claim to express what things are. They try to express what things are and, since they are theories of ethical value, they make a claim on our decision-making dispositions. They imply that our decisions are defective if they do not evaluate according to the theory's propositions about what things are.

Even proponents of ethical nihilism or relativism claim to make statements about what things are. And they claim that it is wrong for another person to impose obligations on them, as if there were objective moral values. In addition, no one really believes these theories. Those who claim to be the first to tout abortion rights, selective freedom of speech, etc., etc.

Also, utilitarianism says that we are obligated to maximize human ends. It says that what human beings are includes the orientation to the achievement of certain ends. And it says that awareness of that, given what are dispositions for rational decisions are, awareness of the previous fact makes our decisions successful or defective according to whether they aim at the achievement of human ends. And it says that that is the nature of ethical value.



Ethics, RA, value of life, suicide, murder, 11/1/94 BIG, BIG

Our rational appetite is the rational appetite of a single, lowly human being. For such an RA, the value of another single, lowly innocent human life must be an absolute value. For instance, we cannot deliberately kill one person to save 100. We are not in a position to say that more good would be done in the long run by saving the 100 than saving the one. Our rational appetite cannot evaluate itself and ourself as the judge of whether the one should die and the 100 live. To so evaluate us would be to misevaluate what we are. It would be to say that the ends we aim and choose are sufficient to arbitrate life for other human beings; that is, that we are the setters of ends of other human beings.

Compare yourself to the creator. He causes human deaths every day, for his purposes. The RA of a mere individual is failing to evaluate things to be what they are, if it says, in effect, I will be the one to decide whether these 100 will live or that one will live. Or, whether these 100 live or that one lives will depend on my purposes, my ends. My ends will determine who does and does not live.

Philosophical Arrogance, U-Turn, February 20, 1995

Frege: "Arithmetic totters." not "My theory of arithmetic totters."

Quine: "Contrary-to-fact conditionals are scientifically disreputable," not "My theory of science considers them to be disreputable."

Ordinati, UPS, PUL, February 20, 1995

Your job is to ensure that the environment is one in which other people can use their gifts, including leadership gifts such as teaching, pastoring, evangelizing, and . . . (Ephesians 4).

And remember, any movement that is genuinely from the Spirit will be controversial.

Logic, P of NC, February 20, 1995

It is sometimes said that only one thing is unique about the P of NC, namely, that without it, everything follows. Quote Russell on this. In fact the argument that everything follows from contradiction is invalid. And the argument showing why it is invalid also shows what is unique about the P of NC, ie., it expresses the work that the relation other-than or different-from does. Without that work, we can't make any inference that depends on a logical relation that, in turn, depends on negation. And all sentential or truth-functional relations depend on negation.

Paraconsistent logics use a relation other than negation in their paraconsistent portions. So far I have said nothing about "meaning". I could have said that the "meaning" of negation signs in paraconsistent logics is different from the "meaning" of the signs I have been using. I do not need to talk about meaning, but there is nothing wrong with that, as long as the following rules apply: 1) awareness of what negation (the relation other-than) is is not lexicological awareness of the happenstance that that relation is what a certain mark is used for; so awareness of meaning required for logical truth is not lexicological awareness. We can be lexicologically mistaken (e.g., by thinking "not" is used the way we use "or" -- and there can be behavioral evidence for this), and logically correct. 2) in non-lexicological awareness of meaning, the awareness is something "mental" in a psychological sense, but that of which we are aware, the "meaning" need not be mental in that sense. Logical meanings may be mental in the sense that they are only objects of awareness, but they are not mental in the sense of . . . .

Fallacies, February 20, 1995

Good conclusion; good argument. A is a good thing; so more of A is a good thing.

Abortion, February 20, 1995

Choice is a good thing. But is more choice a good thing? When we extend choice to human life, i.e., when we make human life a matter of choice rather than knowledge, we are extending it to any ends that could conceivably justify or give value to our choices. But what if we can't know? Then the unacceptable risk argument has to apply.

1/24/95

## Abortion Statement

### Philosophers and Others for a Rational Abortion Policy

We affirm the right of women to choose abortion, where that right has the following meaning.

Human life is a more important value than freedom of choice, since there can be no freedom of choice, unless we enjoy human life. Therefore, we affirm the right of women to have freedom of choice over their own bodies, where that "right" has the following meaning:

- D There can be no choice, unless the person enjoys human life; therefore human life is a more important value than freedom of choice.
- D Freedom of choice over one's own body must be extended to all female human beings not just some.
- D Therefore, where there is a reasonable doubt as to whether human life, including the life of female human beings exists, the benefit of the doubt must go to the organism who may be a human being.
- D Since human life is more important than choice, the choice of when to consider an organism a human being must be made on the following basis:

The value of decisions are measured by the ends to whose future achievement we are ordered prior to making decisions. So the existence of the capacity for the eventual achievement of those ends must be the criterion for choosing what to believe about the beginning of human life. If the existence of a being with that capacity does limits on the value of human choices, nothing can.

The judgment as to whether a being with that capacity exists must relate two things: the (2) intrinsic makeup of the organism as it now exists and (2) the normal external conditions necessary for the intrinsic features to . . .



Ontological Analysis, EAP, Existence as an Object of  
Knowledge, 02/20/95

Saying that existence is the cause of the truth of sentences seems circular, because causality is defined by reference to existence. But short of going to infinity, some definitions must appear to be circular. For some term or terms must be that with reference to which all other terms are defined. And statements describing these basic terms must describe them in less basic. And what terms other than existence or its cognates would you like to consider most basic, i.e., which terms are more basic than existence and its cognates? Logical terms? The point is that a priori no terms should be considered even to be candidates for being more basic than existence and its cognates.

Ethics, February 20, 1995 BIG

Maybe bring in the idea of the end of decisions conforming to reason without the idea of the rational appetite. I.e., we in fact hold decisions to that end, and holding decisions to that end is what moral judgments consist in. That is what morality is. But do those judgments have any ontological basis? Can we go any further than "If you want your decisions to conform to what things are as known by reason, then you must behave this way." NOTE THE PRECEDING FORMULA AS NOT STATING A PRINCIPLE ABOUT HOW TO ACTUALLY ACT, I.E., WHAT ACTIONS TO CHOOSE, BUT AS RELATING SUCH FORMULAS TO THE GOAL OF CONFORMITY WITH REASON.

Then, later, at the end answer that question: As a matter of fact, we can go further, but only by resurrecting the idea of the rational appetite. Is this ad hoc? No, because unless we admit the notion of the rational appetite, ethics is totally irrelevant to human behavior. Because, unless we have a rational appetite as described, there can be no FREEDOM OF CHOICE. The ironic thing is that those who spend the most time worrying about ethics, its nature, why be moral, etc. do not even believe in freedom of choice. But ethics is senseless, unless we have freedom of choice.

I.E., Wittgenstein, Truth, Logic, February 20, 1995

In the Tractatus the identity is between a logical form and a real form. But in The Blue Book and the Philosophical Investigations, the identity the opponent wants is between the thing which exists outside the mind and the thing which exists inside the mind. Why else would the opponent want to say that Mr. Smith or the gun's report exist in our thoughts, unless she wants to say that what is within our thoughts is identical to what exists or is wished to exist outside our thoughts. But here there is no question of logical form.

Ethics, abortion, February 20, 1995 BIG

The "is-ought" so-called problem is based on the premise that evaluation by reason presupposes an orientation to an end independent of reason. The evaluation is always a relation between the evaluated and an end to which we are oriented before the evaluation. But what if reason has its own end, e.g., the contemplation of God? Then it cannot not evaluate things with reference to that end. And even if it can calculate the relation of things to other ends, reason would know that any conflicting evaluation (not all calculations of the relation of things to other ends need conflict with the end of contemplating God) would be contrary to the necessary end of its, reason's, evaluating ability.

Also, what if we have an ability that necessarily relates us to the end of evaluating things to be what they are, as known by reason. What if we have an ability that necessarily gives us the end of evaluating things according to reason's knowledge, where "according to" means the same thing that it does in the case of truth, i.e., evaluating things to be what they are. Is this far fetched? On the contrary, I would argue that we have an ability such that we cannot avoid using that ability and so having that end. And I would argue that we acknowledge the existence of that ability every time we make a moral judgment, because the achievement or failure to achieve that end is what constitutes specifically moral good or evil..

But that statement about the nature of moral good and evil is not directly intended to give us any moral principle to follow. Principles, like treat equals equally, express causal conditions without which an evaluation by our rational evaluating ability cannot achieve the end of evaluating things to be what they are. But why those principles are necessary for that end is a different, though essential and legitimate, question. It might have been the case, for example, that the beings we call human could have been so different that evaluating them differently would not have violated the end of the rational appetite. In fact, that is not so. But that fact is one thing; the nature of the rational appetite as oriented to its end is another.

Abortion, gestation, February 20, 1995 BIG

Chemical from the mother. We are cutting it off from ends  
it is capable of achieving, if only it receives the help  
from the environment that we are preventing it from getting.

Abortion, Gewirth, February 20, 1995 BIG

Assume for the sake of argument that we can mark some specific point at which the child becomes a "prospective" and not just a potential agent. At that point, the child's ability to make a choice will be in some way "proximate." Make it as proximate as you like. The fact remains, that the ends she is capable of achieving will always be potential and future. Her relation to ends will always be that of potentiality. Or her ends relation to what she is now will always be that of potentiality. But it is her ends that bestow value on everything else, including bestowing value on her being a "proximate agent". And a zygote shares that potential relation to human ends. Assume the ultimate human end was the production of some specific kind of music. As long as a human being was potential with regard to that end, her achievement of that end is of equal value, and only of equal value, to the zygote's achievement of that end.

SSR, Ethics, February 20, 1995

Why sex should terminate vaginally.

The Lord intended the procreative act (and hence the one that completes vaginally) to be the vehicle of committed love between the spouses. The Lord intended the vehicle of committed love between the spouses to be the procreative act, the act which can transmit life, and hence the act which terminates vaginally. He did not intend just any act of passion or any orgasmic act or any ecstatic act to be the vehicle of love between spouses. He did not intend the vehicle of love between spouses to be just any ecstasy-producing act. He intended the spousal relation to be based on the act designed to procreate, the act chosen by evolution for its procreative function.

UPS, PUL, February 20, 1995

You have been taught to rely on the liturgy as your main pastoral tool, even to the point that weekday liturgies seem as important as the Sunday liturgy. But the sacraments rely on other things to make them effective; what is going to make the Sunday liturgy effective?

The kind of environment we are talking about is one that depends on the gospel. It comes about through the action of the Holy Spirit, not through our designs or good intentions. But the Holy Spirit works through personal faith; He is the one who brings us together.

For example, you can use a scripture study program to communicate the kind of interesting knowledge about the scriptures that you got in the seminary. Or you can use it as a context in which to preach the gospel, lead people to the gospel, to a personal relation to Jesus, and then create the context in which the Holy Spirit can create an environment of Christian relations.

Your job is to train lay leaders (or find lay persons who can train other lay leaders) and let them lead, to the extent, at a minimum, of bringing people to the gospel and allowing the Spirit to create a gospel-centered environment.



Meaning, Putnam, Analytic Truth 1/24/95

Is he just saying that meaning isn't something in the mind? No, but that's an important part of what he's saying. Still, what's in the mind does determine what I and my twin mean by "water" to a large degree. And if meaning is what's in the world, that goes along, contrary to Putnam, with the original view that there are truths knowable by knowing meanings. Even if what's in the mind does not entirely determine meaning, what's in the mind sometimes allows us to know meaning sufficiently to know truths that, by hypothesis, do not depend on what the meaning is conjoined with in the world, and hence are true as long as the meaning, to the extent that we know it, is what it is, and hence are truths whose opposites are contradictory. Even stereotypes are "known" and hence in some way "in the mind," and they can conceivably give rise to truths known by knowing meanings. If meaning is something "out there," that's what the scholastics would have said all along.

## Analytic Truth

Notice the difference between "A human being is a rational animal" and "Every bachelor is an unmarried man." The first expresses an analysis in which the predicate objectifies in a more distinct and detailed way something first known in a less distinct way. The second records the fact that we use the word "bachelor" in a certain way.

Putnam, Meaning, Reference, Truth, Logic, Thing and Object,  
10/21/94

When P says that reference is determined, in part, by the world, i.e., by what exists, he is implicitly affirming the doctrine of the identity of object and thing, i.e., of object and what is more-than-an-object, i.e., what exists extraobjectively in the world. Or at least we can say that the identity of thing and object is a necessary condition for the truth of what P says about reference being determined by what exists.

Does word 'F' in Theory T refer? Huh? Do you mean is the sentence 'An F exists' true? The last question seems to make truth prior to reference, i.e., reference would be defined in terms of truth. But the opponent would come back and say that in order for a sentence to be true, it must have a logical property by which it makes a claim about the physical world, say, rather than about mathematical objects or logical constructs. Yes, there must be such a logical property. But that is not the same thing as reference, if you mean by 'F's' referring the fact that an F does indeed exist. Rather the logical property some terms in the sentence must have is one that enables it to merely make a claim about physical existence. That is, for the sentence to be potentially true or false, it must have a property which fixes its claim to be a claim about physical existence or whatever.

Whatever that property is, we do not have to answer all questions about it. Maybe it's what some call supposition or designation, or 'referring'. But we need not know, for purposes outside of logic itself, whether the whole theory, e.g., of supposition is true.

Also, we need to distinguish the question of what kind of claim a sentence makes from the question of how we epistemologically know what kind of claim it makes, just as we must distinguish the question of whether a sentence is true from the question of how we know it is true.

Also, we must distinguish the question of what kind of claim it makes from the question of whether the existential quantifier has different functions. To know whether a sentence is true, I need to know what kind of evidence is relevant to its truth, i.e., what kind of evidence would exclude the opposite from truth.

The kind of evidence that is relevant to its truth is determined by the kind of claim it makes. But I can know, for instance, that 'The human is a species' makes a different kind of claim from 'The human is a rational animal' without answering the question whether 'A species is a logical relation' talks about a domain that exists in a different sense of existence than

does "A rational animal is a body." In fact, there are at least two kinds of questions about the existential quantifier that I do not need to know the answer to in order to know what kind of evidence is relevant to the above claims of different kinds. For I can negatively answer the question whether "exists" has more than one logical function, while affirming that "exists" has more than one extralogical value associated with it, a cognition-independent value and a cognition-dependent, but not narrowly "logical" value.

Ethics, What Aquinas Did not Tell Us, Moral Species, Acts specified by objects, 26-Sep-94

In one set of circumstances, a given act is stealing. In other circumstances, it is occult compensation. In other, it is the needy taking from someone who has more than she needs. Why the differences? The circumstances create different moral species. What does that mean? It means the acts differ in having or not having the property of being morally wrong. But that still leaves us with the question of what it is to be morally wrong or right. The answer is found, not in the theory of acts being specified by objects, but by asking what is the nature of moral good or evil. The answer is that moral good or evil is measured by a specific kind of finality, the finality of the rational appetite, as opposed to other finalities we have by virtue of having other faculties. Moral evil is a privation of the end of the act of the rational appetite. Some circumstances make an otherwise similar action defective by the standard of the RA; some do not make it defective.

Ethics, RA, Truth, Ethical principles, (Abortion article at end) 9/13/94 BIG

To see why "Evaluate things to be what they are" is not itself an ethical principle, just compare it to its analog in epistemology; for this whole theory came from a comparison of the act of the will with the act of judging and knowing truth. "Judge things to be what they are; make judgments that assert things to be what they are" is not a principle in any science, even in metaphysics, that you can use in a process of determining what judgment about what things are you should or should not make. Those phrases come from reflective, after-the-fact analyses of what goes on in first-order, non-reflective processes that use principles like "Entities should not be multiplied without necessity," "Similar causes have similar effects." And so on.

It seems to follow that "Evaluate things to be what they are" does not directly help us decide what decisions are defective or not defective, decide that the decision to do or not do what is defective or not defective. Indirectly it might, just as epistemology might indirectly help the first-order sciences, as in the case of relativity. But then, how do we decide whether the decision to do X is defective or not defective? The answer must totally come from statement about what we are and what our ends are and what the things our decisions deal with are. The reference to "what our ends are" would be circular, if it meant the end of the rational appetite. For the question is how to determine what actions do or do not conform to the RA's end. But if we were alone in the universe, the answers would be different than they are now. Or if only yourself and God existed, the answer would be different. Or if other people existed, but your decisions never affected them. Etc., etc. But given the universe we exist in and given our nature as, for example, potential makers of ethical absolutes, our decisions cannot avoid evaluating ourselves in relation to others, and so cannot avoid either evaluating or not evaluating ourselves and others to be what we are.

There it is: (for end of abortion article) We cannot avoid evaluating ourselves in relation to others. We cannot avoid giving ourselves and others comparative places in our system of values. As a result, when we make decisions, we cannot avoid giving things the value of being or not being what they are. We cannot avoid evaluating them as if they were what they are, or as if they were what we evaluate them to be. We cannot avoid giving them evaluations which conform or do not conform to what they are. For we cannot avoid giving them a value which is that of being what they are or not being what they are.

For we cannot avoid evaluating others as if they were or were not equal to us in respect of being capable of achieving human ends, and in so evaluating them, we are relating to them as if they really exist the way we

evaluate them to be. Just as, in judgment, in belief, we cannot avoid relating to them as if they really were what we believe them to be. And that relation gives these states an intrinsic finality, which makes them defective or not defective by its standard.

Math abstraction versus philosophical abstraction, 9/13/94  
BIG

In a lengthy math equation, you have to remember what symbols like X and Y stand for. This is different from remembering what words stand for, because words always have the same meaning, while symbols have totally different meanings in every equation. Of course, the symbols for mathematical and logical operators retain the same meaning from formula to formula. But their meanings are relations terminated in values represented by place-holding symbols like X and Y.

Some philosophers consider words like "something, or what a thing is" to be placeholders like X and Y are; rather than having meanings that are the very objects that philosophy studies. The meanings of those terms are the very objects philosophy studies. Likewise, "exists" is supposed to be a grammatical placeholder. Philosophical terms are supposed to express empty logical or grammatical forms that are replaceable each time by "real" meanings, the way X and Y are replaceable by their values, or propositional variables are replaceable by propositions. Philosophical terms are supposed to be variables with varying meanings, rather terms whose meanings are the real objects of philosophy. In other words, philosophical terms are supposed to be abstract in the way that mathematical and logical terms are, e.g., a predicate is a propositional "function". Rather, this shows that their modes of abstraction are radically different. Or simply, if I am right, their modes of abstraction must be radically different.



Putnam, meaning, 9/13/94 BIG

How can two people whose psychological contents are the same, refer to distinct individuals? First, they are phenomenologically the same; yet the individuals each is aware of is distinct. But how can we even express that fact? We can, because "individual" and "distinct" are universal terms. This is an individual, and that is an individual. The meaning of those terms allows us to construct word-functions by which we objectify the fact that each is a unique individual, that the contents, though phenomenologically the same, are distinct entities. Even the thoughts "This is a distinct individual entity from that" are phenomenologically the same. But just as color presents something really distinct from itself, extension, because of necessary internal causal relations between them, these phenomenologically similar thoughts in the two people's minds can objectify the fact that these individuals are distinct. E.g. both mean by "water" the chemical nature of this individual. But the meanings of those terms, together with the fact that they have a perception of distinct individuals, allows those phrases to differentiate things, even though the meanings present in the mind are phenomenologically the same.

Logical Relations, 8-22-94

A relation whose nature is such that one of its terms, or its bearer, must have the characteristic "known" or some characteristic derivative from the characteristic "known", e.g., truth. But doesn't that description apply to negation as well? And if we add that the relation is for the sake of knowledge, doesn't that broadly apply to negation as well? What if we say, not just that the term or bearer must have the characteristic "known" but that the term or bearer is that characteristic itself, for some derivative of that characteristic? If we say the latter, can we say that logical relations terminate in what things are, since our initial objects are identical with things?

Philosophical Arrogance, U-Turn, February 20, 1995

Frege: "Arithmetic totters." not "My theory of arithmetic totters."

Quine: "Contrary-to-fact conditionals are scientifically disreputable," not "My theory of science considers them to be disreputable."

Ordinati, UPS, PUL, February 20, 1995

Your job is to ensure that the environment is one in which other people can use their gifts, including leadership gifts such as teaching, pastoring, evangelizing, and . . . (Ephesians 4).

And remember, any movement that is genuinely from the Spirit will be controversial.

Logic, P of NC, February 20, 1995

It is sometimes said that only one thing is unique about the P of NC, namely, that without it, everything follows. Quote Russell on this. In fact the argument that everything follows from contradiction is invalid. And the argument showing why it is invalid also shows what is unique about the P of NC, ie., it expresses the work that the relation other-than or different-from does. Without that work, we can't make any inference that depends on a logical relation that, in turn, depends on negation. And all sentential or truth-functional relations depend on negation.

Paraconsistent logics use a relation other than negation in their paraconsistent portions. So far I have said nothing about "meaning". I could have said that the "meaning" of negation signs in paraconsistent logics is different from the "meaning" of the signs I have been using. I do not need to talk about meaning, but there is nothing wrong with that, as long as the following rules apply: 1) awareness of what negation (the relation other-than) is is not lexicological awareness of the happenstance that that relation is what a certain mark is used for; so awareness of meaning required for logical truth is not lexicological awareness. We can be lexicologically mistaken (e.g., by thinking "not" is used the way we use "or" -- and there can be behavioral evidence for this), and logically correct. 2) in non-lexicological awareness of meaning, the awareness is something "mental" in a psychological sense, but that of which we are aware, the "meaning" need not be mental in that sense. Logical meanings may be mental in the sense that they are only objects of awareness, but they are not mental in the sense of . . .

Fallacies, February 20, 1995

Good conclusion; good argument. A is a good thing; so more of A is a good thing.

Abortion, February 20, 1995

Choice is a good thing. But is more choice a good thing? When we extend choice to human life, i.e., when we make human life a matter of choice rather than knowledge, we are extending it to any ends that could conceivably justify or give value to our choices. But what if we can't know? Then the unacceptable risk argument has to apply.

Ontological Analysis, EAP, Existence as an Object of  
Knowledge, 02/20/95

Saying that existence is the cause of the truth of sentences seems circular, because causality is defined by reference to existence. But short of going to infinity, some definitions must appear to be circular. For some term or terms must be that with reference to which all other terms are defined. And statements describing these basic terms must describe them in less basic. And what terms other than existence or its cognates would you like to consider most basic, i.e., which terms are more basic than existence and its cognates? Logical terms? The point is that a priori no terms should be considered even to be candidates for being more basic than existence and its cognates.



Ethics, February 20, 1995 BIG

Maybe bring in the idea of the end of decisions conforming to reason without the idea of the rational appetite. I.e., we in fact hold decisions to that end, and holding decisions to that end is what moral judgments consist in. That is what morality is. But do those judgments have any ontological basis? Can we go any further than "If you want your decisions to conform to what things are as known by reason, then you must behave this way." NOTE THE PRECEDING FORMULA AS NOT STATING A PRINCIPLE ABOUT HOW TO ACTUALLY ACT, I.E., WHAT ACTIONS TO CHOOSE, BUT AS RELATING SUCH FORMULAS TO THE GOAL OF CONFORMITY WITH REASON.

Then, later, at the end answer that question: As a matter of fact, we can go further, but only by resurrecting the idea of the rational appetite. Is this ad hoc? No, because unless we admit the notion of the rational appetite, ethics is totally irrelevant to human behavior. Because, unless we have a rational appetite as described, there can be no FREEDOM OF CHOICE. The ironic thing is that those who spend the most time worrying about ethics, its nature, why be moral, etc. do not even believe in freedom of choice. But ethics is senseless, unless we have freedom of choice.

I.E., Wittgenstein, Truth, Logic, February 20, 1995

In the Tractatus the identity is between a logical form and a real form. But in The Blue Book and the Philosophical Investigations, the identity the opponent wants is between the thing which exists outside the mind and the thing which exists inside the mind. Why else would the opponent want to say that Mr. Smith or the gun's report exist in our thoughts, unless she wants to say that what is within our thoughts is identical to what exists or is wished to exist outside our thoughts. But here there is no question of logical form.

Ethics, abortion, February 20, 1995 BIG

The "is-ought" so-called problem is based on the premise that evaluation by reason presupposes an orientation to an end independent of reason. The evaluation is always a relation between the evaluated and an end to which we are oriented before the evaluation. But what if reason has its own end, e.g., the contemplation of God? Then it cannot not evaluate things with reference to that end. And even if it can calculate the relation of things to other ends, reason would know that any conflicting evaluation (not all calculations of the relation of things to other ends need conflict with the end of contemplating God) would be contrary to the necessary end of its, reason's, evaluating ability.

Also, what if we have an ability that necessarily relates us to the end of evaluating things to be what they are, as known by reason. What if we have an ability that necessarily gives us the end of evaluating things according to reason's knowledge, where "according to" means the same thing that it does in the case of truth, i.e., evaluating things to be what they are. Is this far fetched? On the contrary, I would argue that we have an ability such that we cannot avoid using that ability and so having that end. And I would argue that we acknowledge the existence of that ability every time we make a moral judgment, because the achievement or failure to achieve that end is what constitutes specifically moral good or evil..

But that statement about the nature of moral good and evil is not directly intended to give us any moral principle to follow. Principles, like treat equals equally, express causal conditions without which an evaluation by our rational evaluating ability cannot achieve the end of evaluating things to be what they are. But why those principles are necessary for that end is a different, though essential and legitimate, question. It might have been the case, for example, that the beings we call human could have been so different that evaluating them differently would not have violated the end of the rational appetite. In fact, that is not so. But that fact is one thing; the nature of the rational appetite as oriented to its end is another.

Abortion, gestation, February 20, 1995 BIG

Chemical from the mother. We are cutting it off from ends  
it is capable of achieving, if only it receives the help  
from the environment that we are preventing it from getting.

Abortion, Gewirth, February 20, 1995 BIG

Assume for the sake of argument that we can mark some specific point at which the child becomes a "prospective" and not just a potential agent. At that point, the child's ability to make a choice will be in some way "proximate." Make it as proximate as you like. The fact remains, that the ends she is capable of achieving will always be potential and future. Her relation to ends will always be that of potentiality. Or her ends relation to what she is now will always be that of potentiality. But it is her ends that bestow value on everything else, including bestowing value on her being a "proximate agent". And a zygote shares that potential relation to human ends. Assume the ultimate human end was the production of some specific kind of music. As long as a human being was potential with regard to that end, her achievement of that end is of equal value, and only of equal value, to the zygote's achievement of that end.

SSR, Ethics, February 20, 1995

Why sex should terminate vaginally.

The Lord intended the procreative act (and hence the one that completes vaginally) to be the vehicle of committed love between the spouses. The Lord intended the vehicle of committed love between the spouses to be the procreative act, the act which can transmit life, and hence the act which terminates vaginally. He did not intend just any act of passion or any orgasmic act or any ecstatic act to be the vehicle of love between spouses. He did not intend the vehicle of love between spouses to be just any ecstasy-producing act. He intended the spousal relation to be based on the act designed to procreate, the act chosen by evolution for its procreative function.

UPS, PUL, February 20, 1995

You have been taught to rely on the liturgy as your main pastoral tool, even to the point that weekday liturgies seem as important as the Sunday liturgy. But the sacraments rely on other things to make them effective; what is going to make the Sunday liturgy effective?

The kind of environment we are talking about is one that depends on the gospel. It comes about through the action of the Holy Spirit, not through our designs or good intentions. But the Holy Spirit works through personal faith; He is the one who brings us together.

For example, you can use a scripture study program to communicate the kind of interesting knowledge about the scriptures that you got in the seminary. Or you can use it as a context in which to preach the gospel, lead people to the gospel, to a personal relation to Jesus, and then create the context in which the Holy Spirit can create an environment of Christian relations.

Your job is to train lay leaders (or find lay persons who can train other lay leaders) and let them lead, to the extent, at a minimum, of bringing people to the gospel and allowing the Spirit to create a gospel-centered environment.

Meaning, Putnam, Analytic Truth February 20, 1995

Is he just saying that meaning isn't something in the mind? No, but that's an important part of what he's saying. Still, what's in the mind does determine what I and my twin mean by "water" to a large degree. And if meaning is what's in the world, that goes along, contrary to Putnam, with the original view that there are truths knowable by knowing meanings. Even if what's in the mind does not entirely determine meaning, what's in the mind sometimes allows us to know meaning sufficiently to know truths that, by hypothesis, do not depend on what the meaning is conjoined with in the world, and hence are true as long as the meaning, to the extent that we know it, is what it is, and hence are truths whose opposites are contradictory. Even stereotypes are "known" and hence in some way "in the mind," and they can conceivably give rise to truths known by knowing meanings. If meaning is something "out there," that's what the scholastics would have said all along.