

xxx Simon on Analogy, June 15, 2005

Simon's "On Order in Analogical Sets" is the most original contribution to the question why being is not a genus since Aristotle. Its originality might be obscured by Simon's presenting his analysis under the heading of Cajetan's "analogy of proper proportionality." But Simon's analysis is independent of, and escapes any criticism of, Cajetan's because it operates on the level of this most fundamental question about analogy.

Simon saw that what distinguishes being from a genus has to be more than the fact that being, unlike a genus, is predicable of all the differences between beings. The difference of red from other colors is not a color; "a color" expresses the logical unit containing what is expressed by "color" and what differentiates the color red. But the difference of one kind of being from another must itself be a being; otherwise it is nothing. What enables a genus to express similarity between its instances is abstraction, not the psychological act of abstraction, but an objective concept's logical property of including some intelligible values belonging to its instances while not including others. Because animal leaves out certain features of its instances, it expresses a similarity between dogs and cats. Because it does not leave out other features, it expresses a difference between dogs and roses. To the extent that none of the features of things are left out of being, being does not abstract from differences between things. But the failure to abstract from their differences prevents a genus from expressing similarity between things. So insofar as being does not abstract from differences, it must, unlike a genus, express not only similarity but also difference between kinds of being.

When things are similar, we can assert the same predicate of each: "Dogs are animals and cats are animals." When they differ, we can assert a predicate of one and deny it of the other: "Dogs are animals and roses are not animals." Once a genus is predicated of its instances, the genus has

expressed their similarity. To express a dissimilarity, we must affirm of one and deny of another something other than the genus. Being is a value with respect to which its instances are both similar and dissimilar. They are similar in that they are beings. But since being is also something with respect to which things differ, it must be affirmable of some things and deniable of others. If it were merely predicable of the differences between things, it would exclusively be something with respect to which those differences themselves are similar, just as a genus is something with respect to which its instances are similar. Since being must be both a common ground and a difference between kinds of beings, we must be able to express their difference by denying being of some of the same things of which it is affirmed.

The simultaneous affirmation and negation of the analogue being cannot be an outright contradiction; therefore, the negation must amount to a restricting, an abatement of the common ground. Insofar as a genus abstracts from differences, the predication of differences does not make the species more or less instances of the genus. In the order of reality, a human being is a higher animal than a dog; in the logical order of concepts and statements, a human being is not more of an instance of the genus, animal, than a dog, just as the scalene is not more of a triangle than the isosceles. But that which exists in itself is more of the common value, that which exists, than that which does not exist in itself. Since the common ground between substance and accident cannot abstract from their differences, the expression of their differences must amount to a re-affirmation of the common ground in one case and a restricting negation of the common ground in the other. In the order of logic, one member of the set has priority over the other with respect to the predication of the common ground. Unlike specific differences, the differences between substance and accident ("exists in itself" and "does not exist in itself" — not just "in itself" or "not in itself") express the fact that one is more of an instance of the common ground

than the other since the differences strengthen the affirmation and weaken the affirmation, respectively, of the analogue. Incomplete abstraction, not proportionality as such, makes being non-generic.

Simon discovered, then, that there are intelligible objects that, unlike genera, are logically orderable with respect to such priority and posteriority in the predication of an otherwise common value. He recognized that the main concepts of philosophy are thus analogically orderable. Those concepts are "ontological." That is, while being is common to all things, philosophy uses the concept of being and its cognates, especially existence and that which exists, to express what distinguishes one member of a set (substance/accident, act/potency, cause/effect, the necessary/the contingent, the entitative/ the intentional, real being/being of reason, privation/negation, etc.) from another. Since being is not a genus, philosophy's other main concepts will be analogically orderable also. Many analogical sets other than those Simon explicitly mentions as such are crucial to his work. And it can be shown that the central concepts of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics are analogues predicable of orderable sets of analogates. Simon shows that one of these analogical sets is this: abstraction that abstracts completely/abstraction that does not abstract completely.

In addition to its importance for explaining how being and other concepts differ from genera, the unavoidable co-presence of assertion and negation in the use of analogues explains a constant thorn in the side of metaphysicians: paradoxes, apparent contradictions. Some philosophers have found the prevalence of paradox a reason for declaring metaphysics invalid, but they fall into self-referential inconsistency when they reject it. Simon for the first time explains metaphysical paradox in a way consistent with the validity of metaphysics. And he does so not by any ad hoc hypothesis, but by drawing consequences from one of the most ancient and fundamental insights

of metaphysicians into their own enterprise.

xxx Simon on analogy, January 23, 91

In the order of discovery, Simon arrived at his position by addressing Aquinas's statement that all analogical predication involves an order of priority and posteriority. Cajetan's analogy of proper proportionality seemingly does not provide a grounds for such an order. Simon found such a ground, not in the proportionality itself, but in the imperfectly abstract character of analogical concepts. And focusing on imperfect abstraction took Simon back to the heart of the original problem for which the concept of analogy was introduced, not religious language but why being is not a genus.

xxx Being is not a genus, analogy, paralogues, parageneric abstraction, Simon, 12-27-00

Here is an attempt to state why the usual presentations of the reason that being is not a genus are insufficient. The reason is not that whatever features other than being itself are predicated to distinguish one kind of being from another are features of which being is affirmatively predicable. The words the reason is not that differences like material, rational, finite, living, etc., features that distinguish one kind of being from another, are all features of which being is affirmatively predicable (living is a mode of being, materiality is a mode of being, etc.).

Specific differences do not establish an order of priority and posteriority respecting the common ground. Parageneric differences (or “paraspecific differences” or “paradifferences”): an abatement that does not have the effect of denying the original affirmation of the common ground, but that, unlike a specific difference, establishes an order of priority and posteriority with respect to do the common ground.

And that simply means that a paralogue, unlike a genus, is such an orderable common

ground. But the priority and posteriority is not in the ontological order of causality, or the psychological order of the first paralogate known to us relative to the second, but the logical order arising out of affirmation and negation. (Affirmation and negation with respect, not to the truth of the original affirmation of the common ground, but to an order in the truth of predicating the common ground, an order based on ontological and psychological order but not identical with them. It is an order in the strength of the predication of the thus orderable common ground, a common ground that is orderable with respect to diminuendo and crescendo).

In other words, the paragraph preceding the last simply means that there are intelligible values, objective concepts, intelligible features of reality that unlike genera are orderable with respect to strength of predication by means out of affirmation and negation, unlike specific differences. Such intelligible values happen to occur; that is simply a brute fact we have to take account of.

But to say that it is simply a brute fact that we need to take account of does not mean that we cannot explain why there are such intelligible features by the need of our intellects to abstract from prime matter and therefore use univocal concepts. As a result, intelligible values that are not diversified by the pure potentiality of prime matter cannot be objectified by means of univocal concepts. So they must be objectified in the way paralogues are objectified. These are objects intelligible in themselves but are not the proper objects of our mode of intelligence, not the proper objects of reason.

But at the same time they are the basis of the intelligibility of the objects that are the proper objects of reason. And that is why philosophy has so much difficulty explaining knowledge of our proper objects, because knowledge of our proper objects has to be explained in terms of knowledge of objects that are not our proper objects.

May 31, 91

The distinction between a specific difference and a paragenic difference as denied of one of the paralogates is this: the specific difference does not, and the denial of the paragenic difference does, constitute an abatement of the common factor, the genus or paragenus, respectively. In the case of paralogates, the denial "involves" the common factor, where "involves" means the common factor is abated, lessened, restricted. A specific difference is not a limitation of the generic factor.

On the other hand, what makes the denial non-contradictory is that the paragenic difference is not "involved" in the denial the same way it is involved in the affirmation. That is, the abatement of the paragenus does not destroy the truth of affirming the paragenus. Rather the denial sets up a hierarchical set, hierarchical with respect to the common factor itself, not just that one specific difference, for example rational, is higher than another, for example brute, where neither is higher with respect to the genus itself.

100 does not fulfill the definition of even number more than 10 does. But substance fulfills the definition of being, not "more than" accident does, but in a "more perfect way" than accident. Where "in a more perfect way" implies that a paragenic value, as such, is by nature open to different ways of realization that are more or less perfect relative to the standard of the paragenus itself. That is. The paragenus constitutes a standard of greater and lesser perfection for itself. (Also, not only does the truth of the denial not contradict the truth of the affirmation, but the truth of the denial -- and of the double affirmation -- presupposes the truth of the single affirmation of the paragenus.)

Linguistically, what is affirmed and denied (e.g., in itself/not in itself; in another/not in another)

may look like a specific difference. Logically it is a diminishment or partial taking away of what is affirmed. It stands between a specific difference, on the one hand, and contradiction, on the other. If we express the difference in any other way, we have a univocal genus/specific difference relationship or a contradiction.

Dogs are animal but not rational. Accidents have existence but not their own existence. How can something exist but not have its own existence? Compare that to the question how can something be animal but not be rational. Whatever "rational" is true of, "animal" is also true of, but not vice versa. But whatever has existence would seem to have its own existence.

Generic abstraction is abstraction that makes its inferiors equal with respect to that which is abstracted, that is, the common ground. Parageneric abstraction does not make its inferiors equal, does not objectify them equally with respect to the common ground. "Equality" here does not refer to whether something is more or less in a quantitative sense, but whether something satisfies a predicate more or less well.

Paralogues, Communicability and difficulty, predicament, May 20, 1997, EXAMPLE

A pure relation is more of a relation, more of what it is to be a relation, than is a mixed relation.

A substance is more of a being, more of what a being is, than is an accident. Entitative existence is more of what existence is than is intentional existence. God's goodness is infinitely more of what goodness is, infinitely more of a goodness, than is a creature's goodness.

In contrast, a rational animal is not more of an animal than is an irrational animal. Nor is an irrational animal more of an animal than is a rational animal.100 does not fulfill the definition of

even number more than 10 does.

The bottom line is that just as a universal has the logical properties of nonrepugnance for being in many and of predicability of many, a paralogue, P, has the logical property of being able to SUFFER a restriction or amplification after it is predicated of more than one. It has the logical property of being able to be denied of one and of being predicable of another reduplicatively to express difference, the logical property of being able to express difference.

The opponent will want to admit that being is \*somehow\* denied of the secondary paralogate; being is logically included in the concept that is affirmed and denied. Still the opponent will say that the concept that is affirmed and denied differs from the concept twice affirmed. So the concept affirmed and denied is tantamount to a specific difference after all; otherwise the denial would contradict the affirmation.

But unlike a specific difference, what is denied is an abatement of what is affirmed. It does not directly contradict what is affirmed, but it still abates, restricts and limits what is affirmed. The paradifference is an extra objective abatement of the extra objective value affirmed. The affirmation and denial just objectify something extra objective. A Specific difference is extra objective but is not an extra objective restriction or abatement of the genus. Specific differences do not do that because the common factor is not so logically included in specific differences that denying the specific difference constitutes an abatement of what is common.

That such non-contradictory abatements occur is a brute fact we must accept. To describe



that brute fact we must use human language with all of its conditions. The human language we use to describe that fact will always make us tend to see the situation in terms of a contradiction, on the one hand, or, on the other hand, if not a contradiction, then an ordinary specific difference. This situation however, is just another instance of the difficulties arising from the brute fact we are trying to describe, since abstraction, the condition for affirmations expressing similarity and denials expressing dissimilarity, is itself paragenetic. (In other words, a paradifference is and is not like a specific difference.)

The fact that these differences can appear to be specific differences is an example of the kind of error paragenetic abstraction and paragenetic language can lead us into. The only solution is to be constantly struggling against those tendencies, struggling in order to preserve necessary truths.

Analogy, paragenetic, Feb. 19, 95

The opponent says: You have not succeeded in distinguishing a paralogue from a genus, because the difference of two paralogues is just another specific difference. You have not distinguished the difference between two paralogues from a specific difference. I answer with an unequivocal yes and no. The difference between two paralogues functions as a specific difference, and it does not function as a specific difference.

To some, a paradifference will seem just like another specific difference. Is there a distinction between them or is there not? The answer is yes and no. In other words, "logical difference" is itself a paralogue fully affirmable of the specific difference relative to its genus, while affirmable and deniable of a difference dividing paralogues from one another.

May 30, 2005

Ontological causal factors, or their absence, (specifically, prime matter or its absence) explain why some similarities cannot be objectified by word functions abstracted generically. So the word functions objectifying them must be both affirmable and deniable of one of the paraspecies. ("Some similarities" means some features which are similar in two different things." )

January 4, 82

Start with a description of the cause of univocal abstraction, pure potency. Then describe conditions in which the differentiating potency is not a pure potency. In such a case how do we express (signify, refer to, represent) similarity and difference. We express similarity in the same way we do in the case of univocal abstraction. We assert the same objective concept of two different things. But to express difference we cannot affirm and deny something other than the same objective concept that express similarity.

September 6, 81

How can a paragenus be a feature with respect to which paralogates are both similar and different? The paragenus is not contradictory, but there is a problem in our ability to objectify the paragenus, a limitation of our ability to objectify the paragenus. (And remember that all logical properties result from our limited way of knowing; God and Angels do not use logic.) The potential causal principle that allows the paragenus to be multiplied in the paralogates is not itself a featureless principle. So in each case the paragenus is a material relation to a positive reality or set of positive realities (features) which differ as actualities, differ in their actual features.

So the paragenus cannot be similar in the two cases by the kind of similarity objectified

by universal concepts's unqualified similarity. (This describes similarity by its \*effect\* in the kind of concepts we use and by a cause in a potential principle that at the same time has its own actual features by which it differs from another potential principle, and these are not just features derived from the paragenus.)

So in addition to objectifying the similarity between the paralogates by the unqualified assertion of the paragenus, we must also objectify the differences between the paralogates by the qualified assertion of the paragenus in one case and denial of the qualified paragenus in the other case. There is no other way to do it.

When we are predicating the difference that is due to potencies with diverse features, we must use that which expressed the similarity, because the sameness cannot be abstracted from the difference resulting from the diverse features of the potencies, the non-neutral potencies, the way color can be abstracted from red.

xxx analogy and proportionality, May 31, 2005

Univocal predication results from the fact that the principle of multiplication has no features of its own and so does not modify the actual features that are similar between two things. When the principle of multiplication has features that are essential to its role as principle of multiplication, the common act is received in a way that is proportioned to the features of the principle of multiplication. This prevents univocal predication, and the proportional form displays the relation of a common feature two distinct principles of multiplication.

The proportional form does not itself show that the multiplication is not univocal. For that, we must add that the relation to distinct terms cannot be eliminated from that which is signified by the parageneric term. In other words, we can state "paragenerically" that parageneric

abstraction is proportional and *\*only\** proportional, while univocal abstraction can be proportional but is not essentially proportional. So "proportional" is doubly affirmed and one case while affirmed and denied in the other case. In univocal predication, the relation to *\*distinct\** terms is not essential to that which is signified.

April 2, 84

When an act is differentiated by a potency with no features, the differentiated acts are univocally abstractable. What if the differentiating potency possesses features? How do we express the difference between act A and act B? By the relation of each one of them to its potency.

But that relation is not something other than the act itself; act is a material relation to potency. So we must differentiate by affirming and denying the paragenus itself, that is, affirming and denying a relation to a potency that is specific to one of the acts and is not something other than that act itself. But the relation affirmed and denied is the act itself objectified in a way that it is not objectified when the act is predicated of both of the different paralogates to express their similarity.

In that sense, the relation to what is specific to one of the acts is "abstracted from." But in another sense, the relation is not abstracted from because it is not something other than the act that is so related. Affirming and denying "red" of a red thing and green thing, respectively, does not affirm *\*and\** deny color; it only affirms color. Affirming and denying "exists in itself" of substance and accident does affirm and deny being, the same thing that was abstracted (compare to color) to express similarity.

As with univocals, outside the mind there is *\*only\** similarity, not identity. But similarity outside the mind sometimes is sufficient to ground specific and generic identity, sometimes

only pargeneric identity.

The reason is that the way the paralogue exists constitutes a restriction on what the paralogue is in another instance. The differences between the ways the paralogue exists derive from potencies that are not pure potencies. They derive from a cause that is other than the cause of the similarities. But in each case, the cause of the similarities is a transcendental relation to a \*non-neutral\* differentiator. Therefore what the similarity is in a given case is so related to the way it exists in a certain case, that the way it exists cannot be abstracted from as a specific difference can be abstracted from. The paralogue \*is\* the way it exists in a particular case. So the paralogue not only has the logical property of predicability, it has the logical property of expressing the way it exists in a certain case, which happens to differ. If a genus could express the way it exists in a certain case, that way would not differ.

xxx pargeneric abstraction, February 2, 88

Cookie-cutter example: compare two cookies cut in batter, on the one hand, with one cookie cut in batter and something else cut in some amorphous sludge, on the other hand. In the second case, the component cause so differentiates the form received from the efficient cause that the univocal word "cookie" is no longer true of both results. (But notice that from the point of view of the efficient cause the form communicated to both is the same.)

January 11, 91

Outside of the mind, no objective concept (a nature absolutely considered) possesses the unity making it predicable of many. Inside the mind, before it is predicated of many, being has the negative logical unity of non-repugnance for being predicated of many, just as a univocal concepts do. For that negative unity does not specify which distinct things, if any, an objective concept may actually be predicable of.

But when we predicate being of accidents, we find it there is also a certain repugnance to that predication. Being can be said of accident not only because of being's prior non-repugnance to be in many, whatever that many may turn out to be (we need not have thought of the distinction between substance and accident, finite and infinite, etc., to have the concept of being which in fact is not repugnant to being predicated of them) but because what accidents happen to be happens to satisfy that objective concept. But what accidents happen to be also happen to be somewhat repugnant to that objective concept.

So being possesses the kind of logical unity that is prior to positive universality "perfectly," just as univocal concepts do. But it does not possess the subsequent logical unity resulting from predication perfectly, since that of which is predicated can be both somewhat satisfying and somewhat not satisfying of that objective concept. So the logical unity of predication is accompanied by the logical disunity of denial.

"Somewhat satisfying" does not mean that a thing satisfies one note (the genus) and not another (the specific difference). Since the objective concept is not a transcendental relation to multiplication by a matter, since it is a transcendental relation to multiplication by potencies possessed by distinct forms of act, it follows that this single non-repugnant objective concept is one that cannot ground a perfect second logical unity; it follows that in the second instance, it must be something with respect to which a thing is somewhat similar and somewhat dissimilar, dissimilar to the first instance with respect to a transcendental relation to the distinct potency.

But what derives from the distinct potency, from the relation to the distinct potency, is identical with the point of similarity predicated of both relatives insofar as it, the point of similarity, is act. Such predications do occur. Our job is to accept them as they are, for what they are, to accept the fact that they are what they are.

And it's so happens, it occurs as a brute fact, that there are concepts of which we make non-contradictory predications and denials, denials which are abatements of what is predicated without contradiction and without denying a mere specific difference.

The denial involves the way being is found in one case, but the \*way\* being is found is identical with what that which is found is.

xxx Parageneric abstraction, February 23, 88

In parageneric abstraction, what is it that allows us to hedge, to attenuate, without either contradicting ourselves or equivocating? This question can be asked either from the metaphysical point of view or the epistemological point of view, from the point of view of the paralogue as thing or as object. From the metaphysical point of view, there is a similarity to be objectified. The similarity is the basis for the fact that the hedge is not an equivocation. There is also the fact that the paralogue is the same from the point of view of its pre-existence in its efficient cause. So there is a metaphysical basis for the similarity just as the component cause is the metaphysical basis for the dissimilarity.

What is the answer from the epistemological point of view? Again there are two ways to look at it. We can look at cases where the paralogue is affirmed of both paralogates. So far it is used univocally, not analogically, so the problem does not come up. (For example, God is a being; accidents are beings; quantity is a being; shape is a being; color is a being.) Now look at the one paralogate where it is both affirmed and denied. What is twice affirmed in the first cases is not the same as what is affirmed and denied in the second. . . . What is affirmed of both paralogates is the common ground as abstracted from the differences caused by the common

ground's relation to distinct non-neutral potencies. What is affirmed of one paralogate and denied of the other is the common ground as not so abstracted. But the common ground that is not abstracted from when predicated of both paralogates is the \*same\*, in each paralogate, as a material relation to this potency rather than that. So the paragenic difference must reduplicatively affirm the common ground as it exists in one paralogate (either the paralogate first relative to our knowledge or the paralogate first relative to the real existence of the paragenus) and denying it as it exists in the other paralogate.

What is affirmed to express similarity is owed to the efficient cause. What is denied to express dissimilarity is owed to the component cause. That is, what is affirmed and denied do not contradict each other; they are different. But what is affirmed is, as a matter of fact, the same form as what is denied insofar as the form we objectify is a relation to its efficient cause. We do not explicitly express its relation to its efficient cause, but that is what it is, a material relation to its efficient cause. When we deny the paralogue, we are objectifying what it is insofar as it is caused to be by its component cause. God is good but does not have goodness that is does not receive goodness as in a component cause.

January 22, 91, EXAMPLE

"Good" and "goodness" appear to have different word functions; so do I fail to show that the same word function is affirmed and denied when we say both that God is good and is goodness, on the one hand but creatures are good and are not goodness, on the other. On the contrary,



"good" and "goodness" are and are not distinct word functions. They are only logically distinct; the extra objective value they are identical with is the same. They are objectifications of the same extraobjective value that have different logical properties. A nature objectified as a whole, for example, man, and the nature objectified as a form, humanity, are the same extraobjective value whose objectification is diversified by a logical relations only. The same is true of the paragenic value objectified by "good" and "goodness."

August 11, 81, EXAMPLE

Is the word function of "good" as in "I am good" the same as the word function of "goodness" as in "I have goodness"? It would seem that they must be the same if the difference between being good and having goodness is only logical. The word functions differ not insofar as they objectify an aspect of things as things, but in so far as they include diverse logical characteristics of the way that aspects of things as things are objectified.

Does this explain why "good" and "goodness" are not univocal when said of God in creatures? We can say that God is good, but unlike creatures, he is goodness. These are logically distinct word functions, good and goodness, but insofar as they objectify things as things they are the same. So "good" is not a univocal term because, unlike with univocal terms, on thing that is good is also goodness, while another thing that is good is not goodness.

But Tom is a man and *\*not\** humanity, although "man" and "humanity" are not paragenic. Yes, but while we can in some sense affirm "man" of a thing and at the same time deny the thing's identity with "humanity," we cannot affirm the identity of anything with humanity, that is, we cannot make a double affirmation, a reduplicative affirmation, of the same extra objective value that is objectified by "man" and "humanity."

So the reason predication of God in creatures is not univocal is that when we say God is

goodness and we are not goodness, we are affirming and denying the same extra objective value that we simply affirm when we said God is good and we are good. It looks like we are not affirming and denying the same thing since the word functions of "good" and "goodness" differ logically. But insofar as they objectify an aspect of things as things, they are the same. And this is where analogy differs from univocity. In so far as two differing univocal terms, like "man" and "humanity" objectify aspects of things as things, they are the same. But they cannot be affirmed and then re-affirmed and denied of the same things.

March 13, 79

In effect, I replace Kant's Copernicus a revolution with an Einsteinian revolution. Kant put the constants inside the mind, not out. These constants are the principles at the basis of empirical knowledge. I put the principles of empirical knowledge back in reality. But at the same time I propose the paradox of truth being publicly verifiable yet not communicable to all experts in the sociological sense of "expert."

Just as experts disagree, Einstein notes that things appear different to different observers. Yet, the different appearances do not imply there are different physical laws. That is, there is a constant producing constant numbers. Likewise, disagreement among experts in philosophy does not imply there are no publicly verifiable truths.

And to get a constant, Einstein's revolution proposes the paradox of light always appearing constant even to those in motion relative to the source of a light. I propose a theory of paragenetic word functions whose use for secondary paralogues can be misunderstood even

when understood concerning the primary paralogates.

At the ontological level, what controls the affirmation and negation to prevent contradiction?

First, necessary truths. Second, which paralogates are primary in themselves, and third, which paralogates are primary in our knowledge.

June 2, 82

We can fail to grasp a self-evident truth only by misunderstanding how a word is used. But we can understand a paragenic word function in one way and misunderstand it in another. The same word function is a means of objectifying similarities and differences. The word function can be understood as it is used to objectify differences, that is, with the qualifications which objectify differences, to the exclusion ("logical exclusion") of its use for similarities.

Several factors force this on us. (1) one paralogate is more known to us; we consider the qualification proper to this paralogate as proper to the paragenus. Why? Familiarity, and (2) because the more known to us is the cause of our \*knowledge\* of the paragenus. So the epistemological fallacy forces a restrictive understanding of the paragenus, because the paragenus becomes an object of our knowledge in the qualified State. (3) cognitive value commitments. (4) non-cognitive value commitments. (5) one of the qualified understandings of the paragenus is most closely related to what can be represented in the imagination.

October 7, 80

These factors incline us to tend to identify the word with one of its uses rather than the other, so that it is difficult to see the truth of sentences using the word in the other sense.

June 2, 82

In other words, what the word means to us is something not true of all the paralogates.

Yet we do not misunderstand the word completely, because that which is not true of all the paralogate \*is\* still (in a sense) the common paragenus itself. For example, in a case where what is secondary from the point of view of the paragenus is first in our knowledge, what the word means to us is the paragenus plus a negation or restriction on it, on the paragenus itself. So what the word means to us is a diminishment of the paragenus; the word means the paragenus as diminished.

September 9, 85

Causes that can produce philosophical knowledge coexist with causes of error. What is the cause of philosophical knowledge? The public character of the meanings of our words, their intersubjective character. What is the cause of error? Another feature of the same meanings, their paragenic character.

But the latter is a logical relation; can a logical relation be a cause? Yes, a logical relation is an object of knowledge, an object of knowledge that is a characterizing cause. Specifically, the cause of error is the negation using the paragenus, non-X, something's being non-X, something's being objectifiable by the paragenus with a partial negation. That causes the apparent contradiction, and results from the paragenically abstracted character of the paragenus, that is, from the fact that the paragenus is attributable to one of the paralogates accompanied by a negation.

xxx paragenic abstraction, May 30, 2005

Given the bewildering combinations of yes and no that paragenic abstraction gives rise to, what establishes the order that sorts these combinations out? necessary truths. But the knowledge of those necessary truths depends on grasping causal relations between paragera and hence on using paragenic terms properly. Hence the dilemma: the truth is out there and is knowable as

such (verifiable as such), but only with good fortune.

November 22, 83, EXAMPLE

Paragenera and self evidence. Consider the self-evident statements "nothing is in potency and act at the same time" and "whatever becomes X has the potency to become X." these appear ontologically uninformative, trivial, if potency is considered a mere logical construct, because admitting the existence of potency would appear to violate the principle of the excluded middle. Is potency a way of being? If so, it is also essentially a way of non-being. What is potentially F is not F. So the paragenic affirmation and negation of being of potency can rob these two crucial \*causally\* necessary truths of their value as being extra-objectively informative by making potency seem a mere being of reason.

January 12, 85, EXAMPLE

The following truth is either self-evident or derivable from the self-evident: "The common good is higher than the individual good." That is, if there is a such a thing as a common good, it is higher than the corresponding private good, since the common good would include the private good. The paragenic character of the objective concept, good, can cause the error of denying the antecedent, that there is such a thing as a common good.. (Bertrand Russell explicitly does this someplace.)

The antecedent is denied because the existence of one of the paralogates of good, the common good, is denied. For in order to affirm the existence of a good that is "common", we must also appear to deny its commonness by holding that all goods belong to individuals and only to individuals. But that is only a paragenically apparent contradiction of the commonness of the common good. For there are two kinds of goods that individuals can enjoy, private goods and common goods. The common good can and must flow back to and be participated in by each

individual.

Regarding necessary truths based on paragenetic causal connections, paragenetic concepts do not imply that there can be no such truths. Rather they imply that such truths are accompanied by a clause like "all A is B, such that as one thing differs from another with respect to being A, so it differs from another with respect to being B. where "as one thing differs from another" does not refer to random differences but to differences that are themselves governed by necessary truths based on the paragenetic differential. For example, All A(1) are B(1); All A(2) are B(2); etc. (Here is a place where the concept of proportionality is relevant. The way A's are necessarily connected to B's is proportional such that A(1)s are necessarily connected to B(1)s and A(2)s to B(2)s.)

January 22, 91, EXAMPLE

How can paragenera ground necessary truth? Being is a point of similarity between substance and accident. Look at substance. In substance, being is an aspect grounding in necessary relation to goodness. What grounds the necessary relation to goodness is not any aspect other than being or anything differentiating being from the outside. But if being grounds a necessary relation of substance to goodness, and being is what is similar between substance and accident, being must also ground necessary relation between accident and goodness.

Of course, being is also a point of dissimilarity between substance and accident. So something true of substance's necessary relation to goodness must not be true of accident's. But that means goodness and its connection with being must be paragenetic, which is precisely what

we should expect. If something parageneric, for example, being is identical with something else, for example, what is good, that something else must also be parageneric. And if between these two paragera there is a necessary connection, the necessary connection must also be subject to the "yes and no" conditions of parageneric abstraction.

Predicament, 12-7-92

Philosophers are constantly dealing with apparent contradictions; they are our stock and trade. Most of the questions classified as "philosophical" problems probably arise because of some apparent contradiction. But we do not seem to have asked Why there are so many apparent contradictions, why they arise so frequently and easily. Paralogues provide the answer.

The way philosophers must use language, the nature of the way they use language, requires them to produce apparent contradictions. That is the nature of the beast and the reason philosophy is full of apparently unsolved problems. When a philosopher writes a solution to a problem, it commonly happens that the proposed solution generates as many, or as significant, paradoxes as the problem she is trying to solve.

March 6, 79

Why in philosophy but not elsewhere must we constantly qualify our use of predicates to the point where we appear to be in contradiction or, on the other hand, are we always avoiding apparent contradictions by qualifying the use of predicates to the point where the meaning of the

predicate seems lost, that is, the predicate seems deprived of some ordinary meaning?

Because the predicate is a paragenus that cannot be abstracted from differences with which it is associated because the differences are not rooted in a principle of multiplication that has no intrinsic characteristics. So in differentiating one paralogate from another by making a denial using the paragenus, we seem to be denying the meaning of the paragenus.

Paralogues, Thing and Object - Pena - 3-27-89

Pena objects to the use of terms like "as" "insofar as" and other reduplicative terms. But the analysis of paragenic abstraction in Chapter 12 of Causal Realism shows that reduplicative expressions are unavoidable in philosophy.

xxx Predicament, complexity of philosophical questions, August 4, 86, EXAMPLE

Examples of multiple meanings for epistemological questions. Knowing God's quiddity but not knowing it quidditatively. The senses and the intellect now know natures, but the senses do not know natures as such.

September 30, 91, EXAMPLE

For an apparent three-member analogical set that really reduces to 2, see Aquinas on the three kinds of goodness: the valuable, the useful, the pleasing.

March 2, 91, EXAMPLE

In all areas of philosophy we have (1) the problems created by paragenic language. But this is triply or quadruply so in epistemology. For in epistemology (2) we have 2 modes of existence about which we need to know necessary causal connections. In other areas paragenic language just makes it difficult to know causal connections for one mode of existence. (3) and we need to know the relations between these 2 modes of existence. And (4) we have 1, 2, and 3 at both the sense and intellectual levels. And (5) we need to know the relations between the sense and



intellect and, therefore, between all of the other factors just distinguished for the sense and intellectual levels. An (6) in all of the preceding cases we have the ambiguities that come from the source other than paragenetic abstraction, namely, the unity-in-distinction of thing an object.

, EXAMPLE

Is knowledge of ethical laws by inclination non-rational? Yes and no. The inclinations in question are rational inclinations, inclinations that derive from our nature as rational beings. As Maritain says in "Neuf lecons".

February 23, 84, EXAMPLE

The division of being into good and evil is paragenetic. The evil (defective) thing is not good as such, as evil, but at the same time is good as a thing. And in discussing ethics, we have to move from saying that something is an evil (morally) to saying that it is an apparent good (good for me) and an ontological good. And a moral evil that is an \*apparent\* good for me is at the same time and ontological good and so a \*real\* good.

And the privation theory of evil can appear to be saying that evil does not exist, that nothing is evil.

April 15, 84, EXAMPLE

Maritain speaks of knowing "not in the mode of knowing" when describing knowledge by inclination or connaturality, for example, in "NEUF lecons." Also, he speaks of knowing "by way of not knowing" when describing subjectivity as subjectivity in "existence and the existent."

November 9, 79, EXAMPLE

To know a quiddity but not know it quidditatively. Also in "reflections on intelligence" Maritain calls empirical sciences physico-physical.

October 13, 86, EXAMPLE

God is an end-in-himself; so are creatures, but they are not ends the way God is.

September 13, 86, EXAMPLE

Perinoetic knowledge knows essences but does not no essences in themselves.

June 3, 2005, EXAMPLE

In discussing freedom of will, sometimes we need to say that our decisions determine the ends of our behavior; sometimes we need to say that decisions bear on means, not ends.

xxx Paralogues and Intentional Existence (IE), 2-3-93, EXAMPLE

The paragenic affirmation and negation of the same in IE is not where I thought it was. I thought it was between "real" as applied to extraobjective existence and "real" as applied to intraobjective existence, so that I would have to find a way to make the second sense (real as genuine in opposition to apparent) a negation of the first (real as existing for itself as opposed to merely for another). And I couldn't find a way to make the second a combined affirmation and negation of the first.

In fact, the paragenic set is between genuine as applied to extraobjective existence and a diminished sense of genuine as applied to intraobjective. Intentional existence is genuine existence, but not fully genuine in the way extraobjective is. So the paragenic set is composed of two instances of what I call the second sense of "real" in the last paragraph.

But this was an interesting philosophical mistake. What led me to look for the paragenic affirmation and negation in the wrong place? The fact that the primary use of "real" for genuine had another sense of "real" associated with it, a sense that was not in anyway associated with the second use of "real" for genuine. Maybe this too is a common occurrence in philosophy.

February 9, 79, EXAMPLE

Empirical causal knowledge \*appears\* to be causal knowledge that isn't causal knowledge. It knows relations that are causal relations but not as such. So of the temptation is to confine the description "causal knowledge" only to the primary paralogate, ontological causal knowledge in either philosophy or theology.

xxx Parageneric paradoxes in Scripture, May 31, 2005, EXAMPLE

"Christ put an end to the law." Romans 10, 4. "I did not come to destroy the law but to fulfill it."

Somewhere in the Gospels.

Faith not works. Romans. Faith and works. James.

"Unless you become as little children," Jesus. "I have put away the things of a child" Paul.

January 29, 79, EXAMPLE

Westermarck's theory of moral values implicitly (at least) suppresses its own data. The data it suppresses is our disagreement in moral judgments. He suppresses this because if moral concepts are what he says they are, it would be contradictory to have such disagreement; it would be impossible. The theory does not just fail to explain the data, it makes the data impossible; the data contradicts the theory and vice versa.

How can philosophers make such mistakes? We don't \*see\* a contradiction. Why not? Perhaps parageneric abstraction can also prevent us from seeing contradictions that \*are\* there.

January 30, 82

Or look at things from the perspective of the second affirmation. How does the second affirmation differ from a specific difference? The affirmation of a specific difference does not repeat the affirmation of the word function of the genus except insofar as the genus is the logical component cause of the specific difference. In the case of the paragenus, the second affirmation does repeat the word function of the first affirmation.

January 30, 82, EXAMPLE

In objectifying what differentiates being A from being B as beings, that is, differentiating them with the concept of a difference that has being for its logical component cause, being must also be included in the logical characterizing cause, the difference, because the abstraction of the logical component cause is not rooted in prime matter. Therefore the logical component cause, the common ground, *is* the logical characterizing cause. That is, the logical component cause, the logical component cause as a relation to a term that is not differentiated by prime matter but by something with its own features, must be part of the logical characterizing cause.

, for what is denied derives from the distinct potency, the material cause, whereas a specific difference derives from form

A specific difference is logically distinct from its genus in way that being is not. Being, the common ground, is logically included in the difference. The specific difference is logically included in the species, but not in the genus. The genus is the subject, the logical material cause, of the specific difference. Being is not just the subject of its difference but is logically included in it (for example, what *exists* in another *being* or does not exist in another being).

Paralogues, 4-10-99

See yesterday's handwritten note about the difference logically including the sameness. Maybe it's the other way around. Maybe the sameness logically includes the difference. I.e., the sameness in A logically includes the way the sameness exists in A. The way it exists in A, and which differentiates it from B, is included in what we assert when we assert it of A. No it has to be the other way around, as yesterday. When we assert it, e.g., of God, we do not yet assert the way it exists in God; that comes second. And what is logically included has to be at least as general, not less general, than that in which it is included. But the difference is less general.

We could say that we are just predicating different things, for example, once predicating existence, once predicating existence in another or not in another. But the thing objectified in each case is not a different thing. Neither is the thing objectified by a specific difference. The specific difference is not the same form as related to a component cause. The genus, the similarity, is the logical component cause of the difference because the genus is drawn from the real component cause. In paralogues it is the difference that is drawn from the real component cause and is objectified in differentiated predications. In univocals, the same form is objectified (that is, the same nature); the general is taken from the matter, the difference from the form. In paralogues the general is taken from the form, the difference from the matter.

April 9, 91

In paragenic language, the difference that is affirmed of one and denied of the other logically includes the sameness, makes explicit reference to the sameness. What makes reference to the

already affirmed sameness is once affirmed a second time and once denied. (A particular way of referring to the sameness is affirmed and denied. A way of relating to the sameness is affirmed and denied. A way of having the sameness, of being the sameness, is affirmed and denied. But it is a way of being the sameness that logically includes the sameness, that refers to the sameness.)

\*\*\*\*\*

Outtakes:

March 13, 79

to get a constant, Einstein's revolution proposes the Paradox of light always \*appearing\* constant even to those in motion relative to the source of a light. I propose a theory of para generic word functions whose use for secondary paralogate can be misunderstood even when understood concerning the primary paralogate.

But what results from the transcendental relation to the distinct potency, namely, the point of dissimilarity, is identical with the point of similarity, because the point of similarity is identical with a transcendental relation to a potency the other paralogate does not share.

, not in the objective concept of being, but in the instance to which it is applied, accident

It was the problem of three bodies. That third sense of "real" through me off.

Also, we often use the same term both generically and for one of the species that fall under the genus. E.g., we say "animal" of both men and animals, but we also distinguish the two by saying nonhumans are just animals. What is the difference between this and paragenic predication?

The answer to that question will help us understand the difference between paragenic differences and specific differences.

And notice that over the cookie and the other thing there may still be some generic term that is

univocal. But that term would not univocally express an element common to the cookie and the other thing and only to the cookie and the other thing. It would express univocally what the cookie and the other thing both have in common with other kinds of things.

So we have to affirm the same predicate we affirmed before and then take something away from the way the predicate exists in the first case, or from what the predicate is in the first case.

. For that situation is an example of the brute fact we are trying to describe

Either the difference is not "only logical", or the word functions are the same, or

, not of what I call the first and second senses

Yet what is affirmed is similar to what is denied for the reason we saw in the first paragraph.

Although the affirmed and denied are different, they are (1) similar to one another and (2) involved in one another in a way that a specific difference is not involved in the genus. The specific difference has the genus for its logical component cause. The similar paralogue is involved in what is denied between paralogues in a unique way -- or vice versa -- what is denied is involved in what is affirmed