

XxxPutnam, Meaning, Being first known, Indexicality, Being logically included, 8/
7/94 BIG

"Water" means "something moist, fluid, transparent, etc." or "This moist, fluid, transparent, etc. thing." The basis of indexicality is the logical inclusion of something or thing in all our concepts. We always mean a certain something or a certain thing, and that thing can differ on twin earth. So maybe P proves, or at least confirms, that being is first known and logically included. It seems that you can argue that, if P's theory of meaning is correct, then being is first known and logically included in all our concepts. And if it were not included in the way just described, would indexicality be true?

Re translation of "Quasar", "beech", and "elm", etc. Note that we can know the genus without the species, but not vice versa.

Meaning, Putnam, Truth, the Mental, January 16, 1994

Start from the truth of sentences: caused by identity of the things that are diversely made objects by the words. So far there is no reference to psychological states; I am talking about truth, not awareness of truth. But why does a word objectify one thing or set of things and not another? What causes a noise to do this is what the noise is used for. The verb "used" may imply a reference to a mental state. But even if we say that what a predicate is used for is a "concept," we do not mean anything essentially mental by "concept." For example, "water" objectifies what it does because "water" is used for water; is that for which "water" is used something mental? Well, is water something mental? "Tree" is used for trees. Are trees something mental?

But what is it for "tree" to be used for trees? Does this mean it is used for the set of all trees? Then how can it be used for one tree? It can objectify trees because it is used for the word-function of "trees", which is what it is for something to be a tree. Calling this a concept does not make it something mental, unless to be a tree is to be something mental. The use of "word-function" was solely to avoid the apparent reduction to the mental implied by "concept."

But is what it is to be a tree an abstract entity? (P. in M of M.) It is not an entity at all. It is what it is to be a certain entity; and it is made object by another entity, a mental state.

P's arguments at most show that having the concept of tree is not sufficient to explain our awareness of truth, which requires awareness that trees are objectified by "tree." P does not and cannot show that awareness of the word-function of "tree" is not a necessary condition for awareness of truth, because it is necessary condition for truth.

Sure, the person on twin earth can use the same word-function to objectify things that are not trees. But the fact that a psychological state of awareness of a word-function is still necessary is shown by P's own example of "here," or "this." When I and my twin use these words, the contents of our psychological states appear to be the same, except for one thing: the here and the this I am aware of are different individuals from those he is aware of. Further, I am aware that these are unique individuals, even though I cannot objectify what distinguishes them from their counterparts otherwise than by the use of other indexicals. The point is, our psychological states are necessary conditions for awareness of the truth of sentences using "this" and "here." And the similarity of those states does not prevent us from being in the state of awareness that these are distinct individuals; rather those similar states allow us to be aware that we are dealing with distinct individuals. They are necessary conditions for that latter awareness.

Even the Scholastics knew that having concepts was not sufficient for the framing of propositions whose truth could be assented to. So they added supposition. Supposition is a logical doctrine; but it requires a psychological state behind it, as Maritain explicitly pointed out as early as the 1920s. So whatever we think of the doctrine of supposition, the mental state of having a concept was recognized to be only a necessary condition for having propositions; and the other conditions were further mental states.

Referring, January 21, 1994

The way we objectify actual existences is not by "referring" but by judging --

something Geach denied.

Meaning, Putnam, January 14, 1994

If there is silicone life on twin earth, would "genitalia" mean the same thing? Absolutely, because it's functions would be considered more important than how those functions were accomplished.

What about death? If here death consists in the soul leaving the body and on twin earth it does not, "death" would still mean the same thing. And why are not "genitalia" and "death" natural kind terms (since P. includes actions among natural kind terms).

Meaning, Putnam, Judgment, self-consciousness, thing-object, January 8, 1994

What is the meaning of "The Meaning of Meaning"? P. teaches us at least two things, both of which count against his own conclusion that our mental state does not determine meaning. One thing he teaches is what he calls the division of linguistic labor. But that theory counts against his discussion of translation in response to Searle in Representation and reality. To see this, see my discussion of translation in Notes2, dated Jan. 4 of this year. I do not refer to the division of linguistic labor there, because I had not found it in P yet. But the assumptions I work under there are what P call the division of linguistic labor.

Another thing he teaches us is that the contents of our consciousness can be the same as our counterpart on twin earth, yet we can still "mean" (or is it "refer"?) different things. The answer to this is yes and no. Even though the content of my sensory awareness (not just conceptual, as his own examples show) can be the same on twin earth, I can know that I am related to a unique individual and use that awareness to make a unique allusion ("reference" in the broader sense) to this individual. And, contrary to P, is not this awareness part of my psychological state? Only this awareness comes about through judgment, metaphysical, ontologically analyzed judgments, based on concepts originally derived from sensation. So P's discussion of indexicality requires psychological states, only it requires such states more broadly conceived than just the contents of conception or sensation.

There is still a paradox, but an ordinary phil one: in some sense, I and my twin have the same consciousness when we judge "This is a unique individual". But this just shows the distinction between thing and object and the fact, shown by Husserl and Maritain, that we are aware of more than the mere aspects by which a thing is objectified.

And the same analysis applies to my and my twin's self-awareness. In some way the contents are the same, but those contents put me in a position to judge that they make me aware of a unique person. Perhaps, the more that we are both aware of through the same contents is Maritain's subjectivity, subsistence. See John Crosby's UFL article in "Life and Learning", the UFL proceedings for 1993.

The bottom line is that my and my twin's identical conscious states do allow us each to know a different truth expressed by "This is ..." Because each of us is aware of what we are using "This" for and what we are using "This" for is a unique individual and we each know that it is a unique individual.

Putnam, meaning, science, operational defs, September 15, 1993

In translating, sometimes we realize the truth of "They must be using 'X' the way our scientists use, e.g., "quasar." So we translate 'X' as 'quasar.' "That which our scientists call 'quasar' " is the meaning. "Called 'quasar' by our scientists" is our means of objectifying that meaning. Being called quasar by our scientists does not enter into the thing we mean; it is just the means of objectifying the thing we mean. Because being called 'quasar' does not enter into the meaning, it need not enter into what we translate when we translate 'quasar' as 'X.'

Also, operational definitions define things by our means of objectifying the thing, the operations being means of objectifying things, but not the things objectified.

Putnam on meaning, July 25, 1993

Elms and beeches problem. The way to handle the problem of translating "what experts call 'beeches' in English" is to analyze a similar case where ambiguity as between

"elm" and "beech" is not at issue. For there are many, many cases when all a person knows about X is that there is something that experts, or just others, refer to as "X". E.g., what scientists call "pulsars." And often the person who has no more knowledge than this of what, e.g., "pulsars" means is a professional translator. This must happen very frequently. So there is no reason whatever analysis explains what the translator does in this case cannot apply to elms and beeches as well.

Putnam and Maritain, 2-26-93

There is an intrinsic relation between the shape on the retina, say the shape A, and the object seen. So when we imagine or remember that shape, why can't there be an intrinsic relation of the state of our brain to the previous state of the retina? There should be nothing mysterious about that. The problem is that so far we have only got a connections between states of the brain and sensibly distinguishable features. And Carnap's failure showed that we can't construct the rest of our concepts out of concepts for sensibly distinguishable features and the concepts of logic (or set theory). But even if we could, are there brain states with intrinsic natural connections to concepts like those of sets, truths, members of sets, etc.?

In any case, we need more than empirical and logical concepts. We get that more from judging, e.g., that an instance of the shape A exists.

Instead of "Putnam and Classical Realism," do "Putnam and Maritain." Then you can use quotations about the "natural metaphysics of the human mind" regarding, e.g., fire, from both DK and from Formal Logic. Then you can collect several articles in a book like "M, the first post-modern," or "M post-modern or ultra-modern," or "M and the modern mind," etc., etc. It can include the two M and Wittgenstein papers, one of which can develop the nature of logic. It can include the M and Putnam paper and the Poincaré Wittgenstein paper.

It can also include the "M's views on the philosophy of nature" paper.

Including it will give you the chance to correct what you say about empiricists making the necessary equivalent to the analytic. It will also give you the chance to correct or at least add to what you say about perinoetic knowledge.

And why shouldn't there be a mental state (one, at least) with an intrinsic relation to that which is logically included when we are aware that what has been objectified by "red," etc. is more than an object of awareness? That implicitly reflective awareness is certainly natural to the intrinsic makeup of the mind if anything is. For the makeup of the brain orients it to that implicitly reflective awareness as the goal of all its other operations and states! So when we come to realize that awareness of real existence is logically included in that awareness, we are relating to something, the previous judgmental awareness, for which there is a brain state with an intrinsic relation, just as when we imagine or remember the shape A, we are relating to something for which there is a state of the nervous system, namely, the shape on the retina, with an intrinsic relation. And once we have the concept of existence, we can construct other concepts, both ontological concepts and those that simply presuppose ontological concepts in the background, i.e., presuppose them as logically included.

So the key is that there can be a mental state that constitutes, intrinsically, a judgment. So after you have explained a lot of other things in this article, you can bring up, for the first time, P's criticism of Searle about brain states having intrinsic relations to their objects.

And notice how much more relevant to the issue of mental states as related to linguistic behavior are P's arguments than Quine's. Q's are at best indirectly related, on the basis of many dubious assumptions, e.g., the assumption that the necessary truths used to pin down translations are somehow related to "meaning" in a mental sense in a way that empirical truths are not.

C and D, and Math, 2-6-93

(and see immediately preceding note) Maybe the way I distinguish mathematical and philosophical abstraction in CR is only an effect of the real difference between them.

Maybe I should ask what the necessary causes are of the kinds of knowledge we have in metaphysics and in math and look for essential differences among those causes. For example, an essential cause of phil knowledge is awareness of X as a transcendental causal relation or, in other words, the necessary bearer or term of a causal relation. Math uses causal relations to diversely objectify quantitative relations, but quantitative relations are not necessary causal relations, nor do they enter math as such.

Putnam, 4-20-93

On meaning: Knowledge of nature is causal knowledge, knowledge of X as the source of effects. An elm is a tree where the source of the phenomena is a source of the same kind (kind=nature) as these trees that I have seen, rather than the source of the kind of individuals called "beeches" elsewhere.

This has implications for ethics. In abortion article, I talk about ends of the the same "kind"; "kind" = "nature," and "nature" underlying cause, or underlying causal structure, or underlying causal dispostions.

And for a blind person, "red" might mean "the color of bullfighter's capes." What does "quantum gravity" mean to me? There might be a Frenchman for whom "x,y,z" means what "quantum gravity" means to me, except for the words. There are contexts where the appropriate translation of "quantum gravity" as used by me would express the fact that I only know there is something for which others use those marks; and the French translation could use "x,y,z" instead.

I have a kind of lexicological knowledge of meaning in the case of "quantum gravity" but no nonlexicological knowledge. That disinction is important in dealing with this problem of Putnam's. In translation, I am often interested in the nonlexicological object pointed to by the lexicological knowledge that, say, "quantum gravity" has a use, the nonlexicological object pointed to by the lexicological description "that which 'quantum gravity' means." And I should translate accordingly, ignoring the differences between the corresponding lexicological descriptions in the two languages.

Putnam, 3-17-93

The atomistic/holistic problem is a false dichotomy. Sure, to understand the meanings involved in a self-evident truth, we have to know the entire background language. That is a statement concerning the necessary causes of the discovery or pedagogical learning of those meanings, not a statement of how statements using those meanings are verified.

Putnam says that the realist/idealist distinction makes no real difference. But Maritain has a realist metaphysics and epistemology that precisely justifies a holistic approach to scientific truth. (So maybe title it P and M, or P and M's Classical Realism, or P and M: Internal Realism or Classical Realism? At end, change from "classical" realism to "diacritical or teleonomic" realism.

Also, see the marginal notes in the commentaries on the Tractatus for points on P and and on analytic philosophy in general, including some good quotes from P.

Putnam, 3-12-93

In the Philosophical Investigations, #20, Wittgenstein asks us to consider two languages, in one of which the single word "slab" does the work done in the other by the for words "Bring me a slab." He asks whether different things are going on in peoples' heads when they use these sentences in the same sense. Now in one way, there is obviously something diferent going on in their heads; they are mentally related to very different physical signs. At the same time, they are related to the same sense in the single act of being related to those physical signs as signs. The question is, could the relation to the same sense by the only thing in common to what is going on "in their heads." Why not? One group of people learn to be related to that sense in the act of being related to a long phyiscal sign; the other group of people learn to be related to that sense in the act of being related to a short physical sign.

Could the physical causes on the intentional relation to the sense be different in each case? Why not? Different causes can have the same effect. Laughter can be caused by telling a joke or by tickling. Is it possible that the only unity of the two is one of abstraction; we abstract from each the common relation to the sense,

but everything other than the intentional relation to the sense is different? Again, the only thing excluded is that everything physical be the same and the intentional relation be to a different sense.

If two languages use the same sound, "ga," for different senses, we know the physical state of the mind will be different. Words are first associated with sensibly distinguishable features that have different states of the nervous system associated with them. Terms that are logically included, such as ontological terms, come from the act of judgment, which may have many different objects and so many different physical states.

Putnam, 1-23-93

Title: "Putnam and Classical Realism." Use P's reference to "since the 17th century to justify the reference to "classical." Send to Review of Meta and ask Jude, after it is accepted, if I can revise it based on P's own input.

State that it can appear that the burden of proof is fully on the person who claims there are ontological, regulative, necessary truths. In one sense, the burden of proof is there, and I fully accept it (even if other classical realists shun it). But in another sense, it is enough to hypothesize that change needs a cause. What makes this sufficient is that we can give a cash value to that hypothesis: it amounts to the hypothesis that change is a relation of dependence (as in the disposition is not distinct from the ground).

Relate classical realism to the 4 points of internal realism that P gave in class. Especially point out that there is more than one way for thoughts to conform to reality and that there need by neither a fixed number of "objects" or a fixed "kind" of object. Ontologically there are substance and accident, but we may not, and probably do not, know how many. And the ontological cut does not tell us how to take the empiriological cut. And even ontologically, there are different cuts in the sense that there is also the cut between causes and effects, created and uncreated, infinite and finite, material and immaterial, knowing and nonknowing, one and many, etc., etc. There are also degrees of knowledge, etc.

This title, by being broader than "The Meaning of 'The Meaning of Meaning',"

(which could be a subtitle within the whole) could even give you a chance to talk about logic, i.e., in addition to the sacrilization of logic (which has always been around) there is a sacrilization of a tool of logic.

To claim that we have no right to say that the science of the future will not causes us to revise the principle of noncontradiction (or the principle that a change happening to something would not exist without the thing to which it happens) is to say this: that which the science of the future may tell us about what things are will be that things are not what they are; that which the science of the future will discover about what things are will require that things are not what they are. In other words, to claim that now is to imply a contradiction now; so we must give up noncontradiction now, i.e., believe that negation is and is not negation now.

In Representation and Reality, P says Rorty gives up reference. Not really. So that statement of P's can be used as an entree for a discussion minimizing the importance of "reference" but not of extension, which Rorty certainly does not deny. Other statements of P's provide openings. The first chapter of RWHF says Kant first posed phil questions as they should be posed. Well, classical realism has answers to those questions that have not been tried, even though classical realism did not start off by asking its questions in the same way. The laziness of Thomists explains why classical realism's answers are not better known. Also, in either "Meaning Holism" or Representation and Reality, and perhaps in both places, P explicitly says he is talking about the theory of mental representations we have received from the 17th century!

Use the quote about Kant being the first to properly formulate the questions as an excuse to bring in the common assumption of rationalism and empiricism, which P may not have looked at in that way; for K's question arises, ultimately, from that common assumption.

I do not know whether the universe is one substance. But I am aware of models of arguments which, if valid, would show, for instance, that each human being is a substance. Is the existence of such models sufficient to found the concept of truth? It should be. What if I am convinced for a long time by a proof that each human being

is a substance? Then, I at least believe that the assertion that each human being is a substance is either true or false. But now, what if I find a flaw in the proof. Does "each human being is a substance" cease being either true or false? At that rate, nothing would become true until someone knows that it is true. But don't make a big deal out of the anti-realist concept of truth; not that much of what you need to say hangs on it. Draw the battle line elsewhere.

Reference, 1-20-93

If the "reference" of a word means its extension, then the function of intentional existence is not to provide a reference for a term. The function of intentional existence is not to provide a reference for "unicorn." On the contrary, "unicorn" has no extension, and what exists intentionally when we know the meaning of "unicorn" is something with no extension. So it exists intentionally in spite of its having no extension.

Putnam, 1-8-93

Title: "The Meaning of 'The Meaning of Meaning'." Instead of "mental representation" he should say "intentional object." And notice that intentional objects include both the formal and material objects. He seems to be saying that the two planets have the same formal objects but different material objects. And notice that while "the conductor of this bus" can extend to more than one individual, "this bus" does not, i.e., this bus at this point in space-time. If the buses being at this point in space time, or some other individuating condition, is objectified when this bus is my object, the two planets do not have the same intentional object.

An interesting test would be to have people from both planets unknowingly moved to a neutral planet where both kinds of water we found. And what do we do on earth, when we encounter tribes that do not have our kind of X but do have a species of X or, at least, some substance with similar phenomenal characteristics to X?

Also, is it temerity to predict that science will not force us to revise the laws of logic? To claim that the laws of logic are revisable is to claim that negation will cease to be negation. Is it temerity to predict that negation will not cease to be negation? That mass times velolcity will not cease to be mass times velocity?

Also, is it really true that we would say twin water wasn't water? When someone first hears that whales and dolphins are fish, don't they protest? And then don't they ask, "Well, what do you mean by 'fish?'" And children laugh wwhen we tell them that they are really animals. Also, we call spiders insects and ask for a definition when told they are not. Also, we think peanuts are nuts; we are surprised to find that stars are really other suns; that such and such isn't a star but a galaxy; that penguins are birds; etc.

Also, a virus isn't really alive; that bacterium is not really a protazoan, since it doesn't have a membrane. Whales and dolphins are not really fish.

Re "fish": When I find out that those who know more about what things are than I do know that whales are mammals, not fish, I also find out that what they are using "fish" for is more detailed than what I am using fish for. I may find out that the word-function for which everyone else in the society uses "fish" is more detailed than the word-function I thought they were using "fish" for. But since I have an idea of what mammals are (which before this time I need not have thought contradicted the idea of fish, i.e., up to now some mammals could have satisfied my idea of fish), I can restrict my use of "fish" to those things the society calls fish without learning the further details the society has in its word-function for fish. Does my word-function for fish now include a reference to the noise "fish"? I.e., does my word-function now include a reference to that for which others in the society use the noise "fish"?

What would it mean if it did? I would be objectifying their word-function for fish (which does not include a reference to the noise "fish") the way a translator does. A translator starts off not knowing what we use "fish" for but believing there is some word-function for which we use the noise "fish." A translator is objectifying the word-function of "fish" by an external causal relation of which that word-function is the term, a contingent causal relation that does not reveal any more of the nature

of the term than that it can be the term of such a relation. The translator and I have object-descriptions of the word-function of a thing-description, and we do not confuse the word-function of the object-description with the word-function of the thing-description. And everyone in the society could make use of such object-descriptions for knowing how to use every term in the language, without its following that translations should include the object-description in the word-function of the translation. (Reply to Putnam's reply to Searle in Representation and Reality. Note that all I have to say is that it does not follow that the translation should include)

When I learn that whales are not fish, I learn that I have been using a word incorrectly, where correctness is judged by how (certain) others use the word. In this vanilla situation, what is there that argues against a mental state of awareness of meaning? Nothing. Then what is there that argues against such a mental state when a traveller to Twin Earth finds that he has been using "water" otherwise than the natives have? P would reply that what argues against it is that their mental states are the same, whereas my mental state re "fish" is not the same as the experts. But consider the mental state(s) of the first person who learned that whales' underlying biological causal structure, i.e., reproductive structure, was more like a horse's than a trout's? Until that time, he had the same intentional object for "fish" that we had, i.e., something that lives underwater. And so "fish" for him referred to whales, just as "water" refers to the same thing(s) on earth and twin earth.

So maybe the way to proceed is to see what goes into learning that I am using "fish" incorrectly, or into learning that we should restrict the use of the word "fish." And after establishing that, compare step-by-step with progressively more complex Twin Earth examples.

And very importantly, note that P's arguments do not disprove, in fact they assume, the existence of intentional objects. For example, some of them rely on the fact that the intentional objects would be the same on Twin Earth. But the scholastic theory of mental entities is basically meant to explain our awareness of intentional objects. P's arguments are directed against specific theses concerning intentional objects and sign behavior that are peripheral, at most, to the scholastic theory.

For example, meaning in the mental sense is not what is at stake in analyticity; nor were the scholastics necessarily thinking about synonymy or translation, certainly not primarily. As for intention and extension, P's arguments do not even contradict the principle that they are inversely proportional to one another. His arguments only claim to show that intention is not sufficient to determine extension.

Also, P says that reference is a social phenomenon and that we rely on others, experts, to determine correctness of reference. But this requires my awareness of social realities, e.g., the existence and nature of experts. This awareness is itself intellectual and is either linguistic or pre-linguistic, i.e., is the kind of awareness the use of predicates presupposes. So that awareness requires me to have natures and other universals as intentional objects. So I still need psychological entities to explain my cognitional relation to these objects. This is not a chicken-before-egg argument. It is true, as P would no doubt say, that there is no privileged set of primary objects of this awareness, primary objects my awareness of which is presupposed by my awareness of what predicates refer to. Its just to say that P's arguments, e.g., the social nature of reference, do not eliminate the need for mental entities as causes of the awareness of objects the social nature of reference requires.

And the same cause cannot have different effects. Different psychological states can relate us to the same intentional object, but can the same psychological state in two different people relate them to different intentional objects? The psychological state (the total state, a complex of many dispositions and factors) by which I am related to what I know about the thing I call "water" cannot relate me to another intentional object. P might agree but reply that the cause of my referring to water is not just that psychological state but social realities of which I am aware. But my awareness of those social realities requires psychological states. Can all the relevant psychological realities of two people be the same and yet have different effects, the effects of referring to two different substances by "water"? P says part of the causality is the environment, the nature of things in the environment, whether I am aware of the difference of those natures or not (e.g., water and twin water). I can make P's point consistent with mine by noting that logically

included in my intentional object for "water" is the logically vague object: something whose nature causes these characteristics I associate with water. That logical inclusion and that vagueness, together with the facts that (Husserl) objects are always presented as more than objects and that logical relations like inclusion are transparent, i.e., terminate in what is more than an object, makes P's position consistent with mine.

Concerning P's statement that we "would not say" Twin water was water, i.e., that "water" refers to both. As a matter of fact, we do resist and protest when we are told that our usage does not conform to that of experts. I resisted when told peanuts were not nuts. Think of "commonly but inaccurately called 'tars'." If you want to call them 'tars', what's wrong with that? Later, but only later on reflection, I realized "there must be a good reason."

In saying against Searle (HWAHF) that mental states are not intrinsically related to certain objects, is P seriously saying that someday we will not be able to examine the state of a person's brain and know what he is thinking of? I should not accuse P of implying that until I am sure. But someday science will be able to do that, and what else would Searle want to mean by mental states being intrinsically related to certain objects (maybe ask Dennett about this)? And why should this be surprising. Is it surprising that evolution selected the brain precisely for the ability of states of the brain to relate us to what things are. Would not those kinds of brains whose states did not relate us to specific objects have been deselected? And if Quine can argue from Darwin, why can't I?

In the case of elms and beeches, we can look at the brain and say this person has the intentional object common to elms and beeches. If the person knows that elms are not beeches, he must use more of his knowledge, more than that common intentional object, when distinguishing between them. And whatever that additional knowledge amounts to, we should be able to look in his brain and find states relating him specifically to that additional knowledge.

The only problem left is the Twin Earth problem, where the intentional objects are the same and there apparently is no additional knowledge by which to distinguish the intentional objects. (Reread that NYT article on cups.) If P is correct that

we would say TE "water" refers to something different from our water, it is because of what is logically included in both intentional objects, namely, whatever has the nature that grounds this behavior in these cases. Without that logical inclusion, the environment cannot enter into determining reference.

So the meaning of "The Meaning of Meaning" is that it forces us to enrich our idea of logical inclusion, but it does so in a way that adds to what we know about it without contradicting anything essential that we know about it.

Logical inclusion can help P by explaining how the environment can help fix reference.

Indeterminacy of translation, 1-8-93

Notice that the reply to Quine is strictly behavioral. Behavioral evidence shows how the "apparatus of individuation" is being used. So what have Quine's arguments got to do with the "mental" in the sense of something interior. Quine too hastily equates "meaning" with the "mental."

Putnam, 1-4-93

After our phone conversation about analyticity and about existence. He says the key part of Quine's argument against analytic truths is not the lack of criteria but the paragraph in "2 Dogmas" that say we cannot predict that science, e.g., quantum theory, may not require us to reform our logical laws. And for himself, he added that the claim that knowledge of meaning is sufficient for us to make that prediction about the history of science makes too strong a claim for meaning, but too much of a burden on knowledge of meaning.

My reply. For basic logical necessity, the only meaning involved is the meaning of negation signs, the relation other-than or different-from. (So we are not talking about meaning in general, or awareness of meaning in general, as the cause of our knowledge of irreversible truth.) Awareness of what that relation is does not require any inexplicable insight into the natures of things, since it is a cognition-constituted relation, a human construct. Since it is our construct, there is no reason why our knowledge of that relation should not be sufficient to know that truths

dependent on it will not be revisable, because they would either be different truths about negation or be truths about a different relation from negation, i.e., no longer be truths about negation. Even Quine says we need "differences" of some kind, but negation is just the relation "different from" (which is not a point about synonymy in the sociological sense; yes "negation" happens to mean the same as "different from," but aside from sociology, Quine's point needs to use "differences" in the sense in which it is equivalent to "other than.")

It is not our subjective relation to meaning that guarantees irreversibility of truth; it is the nature of the meanings, or some of them, to which we are related. In fact, those meanings cannot be changed; change just does not apply to them. They are like the forms that are the terms of processes of change. Things change by acquiring and losing forms; forms do not change per se, only per accidens. Thus, we cannot change the relation of negation and make it not be what it is. Likewise, mass times velocity, P's example in the first chapter of RWHF, is, contrary to P, a timeless essence.

P will reply to my point that the foundations of empirical knowledge provide a means of deciding between frameworks that it cannot decide whether numbers are sets of sets or functions, whether points are defined as the center of concentric circles or as limits. I do not claim the foundations of empirical knowledge can settle all questions. Also, questions about mathematically abstracted objects do not concern physical existence. If and when math objects are related to questions about physical existence, the math objects must be viewed as properties of putative causes, necessary properties, of putative causes of experienced things. If two math theories handle those properties equally well, the math theories, or the differences between them, do not have physical content to that extent.

Putnam and paralogues, 12-22-92

After reading Putnam on meaning, e.g., twin earth and elms/beeches problem. Why couldn't a tribe refer to both elms and beeches by one word, e.g., "oak"? Then when a scientific biologist tells them those are really two different kinds of tree, they

say, Oh, there are two different kinds of oak. The biologist says, No, they are not species of the same genus. But he is just defining the genus differently; he is not taking the sense-perceivable similarities between elms and beeches to define the genus. And all that amounts to is saying it is better to take the underlying causal structure, rather than the phenomenal characteristics, as defining the genus; but there is nothing to say you can't take the phenomenal characteristics as defining a generic term. Still, the phenomenal characteristics are slippery, changeable from person to person, hard to describe with precision, etc., etc. Those are all reasons for not using the phenomenal characteristics to define a generic term; it is not very useful to do so. But no issue of truth about elms and beeches and, more importantly, about the mental entities that allow us to use words meaningfully, enter in.

Another example, a tribe might use "table" for three-legged things, never having seen four-or-more-legged things. Their decision as to whether to continue using "table" for 3-legged things has nothing to do with the issue of mentalism; nor does "decision" in this context have to be an explicit mental act.

Short book and Putnam, 2-8-93

The wild dogs of Africa are not dogs; they are related to jackals, not to wolves. Yet from the standpoint of "mental representations" they are much more like the ordinary dogs we are most familiar with than are chiuauas or pekinese.

Also, consider islanders who had seen whales and dolphins but no other sea creatures. They use the word "shif" for them. Then some of the islanders migrate to a place where other sea creatures are found. They use "shif" for all sea creatures. Would it make sense to tell them that the new sea creatures are not really shifs, or, after a long enough period of time, for them to go back to the original island and tell them that whales are not really shifs? And what if the original islanders also had a word for mammals, as opposed, say, to reptiles and birds and insects, etc., but use the word only for land mammals and would not have considered shifs, i.e., whales and dolphins, mammals, because their word "mammal" covered only land creatures? Would it make sense for them to learn that whales were not really

shifs but mammals? Or would it make sense for the migrated islanders to learn that fish are not really shifs, because shifs are mammals?

Putnam, 3-5-93

Can concepts have the same extension and yet differ in intension? P responds to the example of "things with a heart" and "things with a liver" by noting that "heart" and "liver" have different extensions (actually, his argument is vice versa). But all this amounts to is saying that we can objectify the same things by means of words with different meanings, if those meanings make reference to really distinct things, that is, things describable by meanings that do not have the same extension.

The only question left is whether diversely objectifying the same thing by means of words whose meanings include different cognition-dependent objects should be said to have the same intension or not? And as long as we are aware of the causal issues involved and accomodate them, we can define "same intension" any way we want.

(Reference: what logical property must predicates have in order for us to know, before we can judge the truth or falsity of a proposition, that the proposition asserts something of an actual or possible extra-cognitional existent, rather than of a fictional or other cognition-dependent object? What logical property must we be able to recognize predicates as having? Once we name that property the only other one of any interest is the truth or falsity of the proposition. So what is left for "reference"? And maybe the property in question is not "logical," at least not in any narrow sense of that term, but semantical. That is, it is the meaning of the proposition that counts, ie., our knowledge of what the proposition is saying, is talking about. Maybe all the "does 'F' refer?" discussion results from defining "exists" in terms of reference, rather than vice versa.)

xxx Truth, Meaning, Putnam, Identity theory of truth, 9-7-94 BIG

In Chapter 3 of Causal Realism, I first say truth requires identity between

things and *what is objectified by the words of a sentence* and then I ask how it is determined what things are objectified by the words of a sentence. My answer is that the word-functions, i.e., the meanings(t) of the words of the sentence determine what things they objectify. Putnam comes in at that point. The meaning(t) of "water" is not just the collection of notes shared by water on Earth and Twin Earth. Our meaning(t) for "water" is the kind of thing *on Earth* that has that collection of notes. Fine. But what of it? All this means is that we consciously use our awareness of a collection of notes in association with something else we are aware of: the existing instances of that collection that we are aware of.

For the moment, however, forget about the question of meaning. Just consider the following psychological fact. A baby of Earth and a baby on Twin Earth have exactly similar objects as they view the two kinds of water. Their psychological states are the same, considered from the point of view of the collection of features that characterize the object of their consciousness. But these similar psychological states make them aware of two different kinds of things. Is the fact that two such similar states can make us aware of different kinds of things a paradox, even apart from the problem of meaning? No, it is not. And seeing why it is not a paradox also shows why it does not create a special problem for meaning.

On earth, two persons seeing gold and fools gold for the first time can have the same psychological states. Yet those states make them aware of two different kinds of things, by some definition of difference. There are scores of examples like this. Many things look like water, and only differ from water in other respects. We could if we want say that the persons looking at gold and fools gold see the same kind of thing, call it X, by defining X by the features gold and fools gold have in common. So the only thing that the

gold/fool's gold example, and all others like it, including the Earth/Twin Earth examples, shows is that the same psychological state can make us aware of things that differ in ways not expressed in this psychological state.

So where is the problem about meaning? Putnam would reply that the Twin Earth person does not have a definition of "water" that makes "water" refer to our water. The Twin Earth person manages to *mean* something different on the basis of the same psychological state. But are the psychological states precisely the same, when we consider the individuating aspects of the "referring," i.e., the contraction of the reference of water to just the examples around "here"? E.g., by "gold" I mean the kind of thing with X qualities "over there." But Putnam would say that the psychological state that allows me to give meaning to "over there" is the same in both cases, or can be the same. Still, in each of those psychological states, I *know* that I am looking at an unrepeatable individual. And I can use my knowledge of that *truth* to give a distinct meaning to "over there". Likewise, I can *know*, through similar psychological states, that I am looking at a certain *kind* of thing, where "kinds" are distinguished, as Putnam admits, by some standard of importance.

So the question comes down to two people looking at similar things and, on the basis of the same or similar psychological states, forming judgments like: "This is a unique individual" or "This unique individual belongs to a certain ontological (or chemical, or whatever) type" of "The chemical type of this unique individual is what I will mean by "water." All of those judgments are enabled by, have as their *sufficient* conditions, certain psychological states having certain types of objects, e.g., the meaning of the word "individual" or "type." And why can't such psychological states, in the right combination, allows us to make unique or planet-specific, etc.,

references?

XxxPutnam, Meaning, Being first known, Indexicality, Being logically included, 8/
7/94 BIG

"Water" means "something moist, fluid, transparent, etc." or "This moist, fluid, transparent, etc. thing." The basis of indexicality is the logical inclusion of something or thing in all our concepts. We always mean a certain something or a certain thing, and that thing can differ on twin earth. So maybe P proves, or at least confirms, that being is first known and logically included. It seems that you can argue that, if P's theory of meaning is correct, then being is first known and logically included in all our concepts. And if it were not included in the way just described, would indexicality be true?

Re translation of "Quasar", "beech", and "elm", etc. Note that we can know the genus without the species, but not vice versa.

Meaning, Putnam, Truth, the Mental, January 16, 1994

Start from the truth of sentences: caused by identity of the things that are diversely made objects by the words. So far there is no reference to psychological states; I am talking about truth, not awareness of truth. But why does a word objectify one thing or set of things and not another? What causes a word to do this is what the word is used for. The verb "used" may imply a reference to a mental state. But even if we say that what a predicate is used for is a "concept," we do not mean anything essentially mental by "concept." For example, "water" objectifies what it does because "water" is used for water; is that for which "water" is used something mental? Well, is water something mental? "Tree" is used for trees. Are trees something mental?

But what is it for "tree" to be used for trees? Does this mean it is used for the set of all trees? Then how can it be used for one tree? It can objectify trees because it is used for the word-function of "trees", which is what it is for something to be a tree. Calling this a concept does not make it something mental, unless to

be a tree is to be something mental. The use of "word-function" was solely to avoid the apparent reduction to the mental implied by "concept."

But is what it is to be a tree an abstract entity? (P. in M of M.) It is not an entity at all. It is what it is to be a certain entity; and it is made object by another entity, a mental state.

P's arguments at most show that having the concept of tree is not sufficient to explain our awareness of truth, which requires awareness that trees are objectified by "tree." P does not and cannot show that awareness of the word-function of "tree" is not a necessary condition for awareness of truth, because it is necessary condition for truth.

Sure, the person on twin earth can use the same word-function to objectify things that are not trees. But the fact that a psychological state of awareness of a word-function is still necessary is shown by P's own example of "here," or "this." When I and my twin use these words, the contents of our psychological states appear to be the same, except for one thing: the here and the this I am aware of are different individuals from those he is aware of. Further, I am aware that these are unique individuals, even though I cannot objectify what distinguishes them from their counterparts otherwise than by the use of other indexicals. The point is, our psychological states are necessary conditions for awareness of the truth of sentences using "this" and "here." And the similarity of those states does not prevent us from being in the state of awareness that these are distinct individuals; rather those similar states allow us to be aware that we are dealing with distinct individuals. They are necessary conditions for that latter awareness.

Even the Scholastics knew that having concepts was not sufficient for the framing of propositions whose truth could be assented to. So they added supposition. Supposition is a logical doctrine; but it requires a psychological state behind it, as Maritain explicitly pointed out as early as the 1920s. So whatever we think of the doctrine of supposition, the mental state of having a concept was recognized to be only a necessary condition for having propositions; and the other conditions were further mental states.

Referring, January 21, 1994

The way we objectify actual existenc is not by "referring" but by judging -- something Geach denied.

Meaning, Putnam, January 14, 1994

If there is silicone life on twin earth, would "genitalia" mean the same thing? Absolutely, because it's functions would be considered more important than how those functions were accomplished.

What about death? If here death consists in the soul leaving the body and on twin earth it does not, "death" would still mean the same thing. And why are not "genitalia" and "death" natural kind terms (since P. includes actions among natural kind terms).

Meaning, Putnam, Judgment, self-consciousness, thing-object, January 8, 1994

What is the meaning of "The Meaning of Meaning"? P. teaches us at least two things, both of which count against his own conclusion that our mental state does not determine meaning. One thing he teaches is is what he calls the division of linguistic labor. But that theory counts against his discussion of translation in response to Searle in Representation and reality. To see this, see my discussion of translation in Notes2, dated Jan. 4 of this year. I do not refer to the division of linguistic labor there, because I had not found it in P yet. But the assumptions I work under there are what P call the division of linguistic labor.

Another thing he teaches us is that the contents of our consciousness can be the same as our counterpart on twin earth, yet we can still "mean" (or is it "refer"?) different things. The answer to this is yes and no. Even though the content of my sensory awareness (not just conceptual, as his own examples show) can be the same on twin earth, I can know that I am related to a unique individual and use that awareness to make a unique allusion ("reference" in the broader sense) to this individual. And, contrary to P, is not this awareness part of my psychological state? Only this awareness comes about through judgment, metaphysical, ontologically analyzed judgments, based on concepts originally derived from sensation. So P's discussion

of indexicality requires psychological states, only it requires such states more broadly conceived than just the contents of conception or sensation.

There is still a paradox, but an ordinary phil one: in some sense, I and my twin have the same consciousness when we judge "This is a unique individual". But this just shows the distinction between thing and object and the fact, shown by Husserl and Maritain, that we are aware of more than the mere aspects by which a thing is objectified.

And the same analysis applies to my and my twin's self-awareness. In some way the contents are the same, but those contents put me in a position to judge that they make me aware of a unique person. Perhaps, the more that we are both aware of through the same contents is Maritain's subjectivity, subsistence. See John Crosby's UFL article in "Life and Learning", the UFL proceedings for 1993.

The bottom line is that my and my twin's identical conscious states do allow us each to know a different truth expressed by "This is ...". Because each of us is aware of what we are using "This" for and what we are using "This" for is a unique individual and we each know that it is a unique individual.

Putnam, meaning, science, operational defs, September 15, 1993

In translating, sometimes we realize the truth of "They must be using 'X' the way our scientists use, e.g., "quasar." So we translate 'X' as 'quasar.' "That which our scientists call 'quasar' " is the meaning. "Called 'quasar' by our scientists" is our means of objectifying that meaning. Being called quasar by our scientists does not enter into the thing we mean; it is just the means of objectifying the thing we mean. Because being called 'quasar' does not enter into the meaning, it need not enter into what we translate when we translate 'quasar' as 'X.'

Also, operational definitions define things by our means of objectifying the thing, the operations being means of objectifying things, but not the things objectified.

Putnam on meaning, July 25, 1993

Elms and beeches problem. The way to handle the problem of translating "what experts call 'beeches' in English" is to analyze a similar case where ambiguity as between "elm" and "beech" is not at issue. For there are many, many cases when all a person knows about X is that there is something that experts, or just others, refer to as "X". E.g., what scientists call "pulsars." And often the person who has no more knowledge than this of what, e.g., "pulsars" means is a professional translator. This must happen very frequently. So there is no reason whatever analysis explains what the translator does in this case cannot apply to elms and beeches as well.

Putnam and Maritain, 2-26-93

There is an intrinsic relation between the shape on the retina, say the shape A, and the object seen. So when we imagine or remember that shape, why can't there be an intrinsic relation of the state of our brain to the previous state of the retina? There should be nothing mysterious about that. The problem is that so far we have only got a connections between states of the brain and sensibly distinguishable features. And Carnap's failure showed that we can't construct the rest of our concepts out of concepts for sensibly distinguishable features and the concepts of logic (or set theory). But even if we could, are there brain states with intrinsic natural connections to concepts like those of sets, truths, members of sets, etc.?

In any case, we need more than empirical and logical concepts. We get that more from judging, e.g., that an instance of the shape A exists.

Instead of "Putnam and Classical Realism," do "Putnam and Maritain." Then you can use quotations about the "natural metaphysics of the human mind" regarding, e.g., fire, from both DK and from Formal Logic. Then you can collect several articles in a book like "M, the first post-modern," or "M post-modern or ultra-modern," or "M and the modern mind," etc., etc. It can include the two M and Wittgenstein papers, one of which can develop the nature of logic. It can include the M and Putnam paper and

the Poinot Wittgenstein paper.

It can also include the "M's views on the philosophy of nature" paper. Including it will give you the chance to correct what you say about empiricists making the necessary equivalent to the analytic. It will also give you the chance to correct or at least add to what you say about perinoetic knowledge.

And why shouldn't there be a mental state (one, at least) with an intrinsic relation to that which is logically included when we are aware that what has been objectified by "red," etc. is more than an object of awareness? That implicitly reflective awareness is certainly natural to the intrinsic makeup of the mind if anything is. For the makeup of the brain orients it to that implicitly reflective awareness as the goal of all its other operations and states! So when we come to realize that awareness of real existence is logically included in that awareness, we are relating to something, the previous judgmental awareness, for which there is a brain state with an intrinsic relation, just as when we imagine or remember the shape A, we are relating to something for which there is a state of the nervous system, namely, the shape on the retina, with an intrinsic relation. And once we have the concept of existence, we can construct other concepts, both ontological concepts and those that simply presuppose ontological concepts in the background, i.e., presuppose them as logically included.

So the key is that there can be a mental state that constitutes, intrinsically, a judgment. So after you have explained a lot of other things in this article, you can bring up, for the first time, P's criticism of Searle about brain states having intrinsic relations to their objects.

And notice how much more relevant to the issue of mental states as related to linguistic behavior are P's arguments than Quine's. Q's are at best indirectly related, on the basis of many dubious assumptions, e.g., the assumption that the necessary truths used to pin down translations are somehow related to "meaning" in a mental sense in a way that empirical truths are not.

(and see immediately preceding note) Maybe the way I distinguish mathematical and philosophical abstraction in CR is only an effect of the real difference between them. Maybe I should ask what the necessary causes are of the kinds of knowledge we have in metaphysics and in math and look for essential differences among those causes. For example, an essential cause of phil knowledge is awareness of X as a transcendental causal relation or, in other words, the necessary bearer or term of a causal relation. Math uses causal relations to diversely objectify quantitative relations, but quantitative relations are not necessary causal relations, nor do they enter math as such.

Putnam, 4-20-93

On meaning: Knowledge of nature is causal knowledge, knowledge of X as the source of effects. An elm is a tree where the source of the phenomena is a source of the same kind (kind=nature) as these trees that I have seen, rather than the source of the kind of individuals called "beeches" elsewhere.

This has implications for ethics. In abortion article, I talk about ends of the the same "kind"; "kind" = "nature," and "nature" underlying cause, or underlying causal structure, or underlying causal dispostions.

And for a blind person, "red" might mean "the color of bullfighter's capes." What does "quantum gravity" mean to me? There might be a Frenchman for whom "x,y,z" means what "quantum gravity" means to me, except for the words. There are contexts where the appropriate translation of "quantum gravity" as used by me would express the fact that I only know there is something for which others use those marks; and the French translation could use "x,y,z" instead.

I have a kind of lexicological knowledge of meaning in the case of "quantum gravity" but no nonlexicological knowledge. That disinction is important in dealing with this problem of Putnam's. In translation, I am often interested in the nonlexicological object pointed to by the lexicological knowledge that, say, "quantum gravity" has a use, the nonlexicological object pointed to by the lexicological description "that which 'quantum gravity' means." And I should translate accordingly, ignoring the differences between the corresponding lexicological descriptions in the

two languages.

Putnam, 3-17-93

The atomistic/holistic problem is a false dichotomy. Sure, to understand the meanings involved in a self-evident truth, we have to know the entire background language. That is a statement concerning the necessary causes of the discovery or pedagogical learning of those meanings, not a statement of how statements using those meanings are verified.

Putnam says that the realist/idealist distinction makes no real difference. But Maritain has a realist metaphysics and epistemology that precisely justifies a holistic approach to scientific truth. (So maybe title it P and M, or P and M's Classical Realism, or P and M: Internal Realism or Classical Realism? At end, change from "classical" realism to "diacritical or teleonomic" realism.

Also, see the marginal notes in the commentaries on the Tractatus for points on P and and on analytic philosophy in general, including some good quotes from P.

Putnam, 3-12-93

In the Philosophical Investigations, #20, Wittgenstein asks us to consider two languages, in one of which the single word "slab" does the work done in the other by the for words "Bring me a slab." He asks whether different things are going on in peoples' heads when they use these sentences in the same sense. Now in one way, there is obviously something diferent going on in their heads; they are mentally related to very different physical signs. At the same time, they are related to the same sense in the single act of being related to those physical signs as signs. The question is, could the relation to the same sense by the only thing in common to what is going on "in their heads." Why not? One group of people learn to be related to that sense in the act of being related to a long phyiscal sign; the other group of people learn to be related to that sense in the act of being related to a short physical sign.

Could the physical causes on the intentional relation to the sense be different in each case? Why not? Different causes can have the same effect. Laughter can be

caused by telling a joke or by tickling. Is it possible that the only unity of the two is one of abstraction; we abstract from each the common relation to the sense, but everything other than the intentional relation to the sense is different? Again, the only thing excluded is that everything physical be the same and the intentional relation be to a different sense.

If two languages use the same sound, "ga," for different senses, we know the physical state of the mind will be different. Words are first associated with sensibly distinguishable features that have different states of the nervous system associated with them. Terms that are logically included, such as ontological terms, come from the act of judgment, which may have many different objects and so many different physical states.

Putnam, 1-23-93

Title: "Putnam and Classical Realism." Use P's reference to "since the 17th century to justify the reference to "classical." Send to Review of Meta and ask Jude, after it is accepted, if I can revise it based on P's own input.

State that it can appear that the burden of proof is fully on the person who claims there are ontological, regulative, necessary truths. In one sense, the burden of proof is there, and I fully accept it (even if other classical realists shun it). But in another sense, it is enough to hypothesize that change needs a cause. What makes this sufficient is that we can give a cash value to that hypothesis: it amounts to the hypothesis that change is a relation of dependence (as in the disposition is not distinct from the ground).

Relate classical realism to the 4 points of internal realism that P gave in class. Especially point out that there is more than one way for thoughts to conform to reality and that there need be neither a fixed number of "objects" or a fixed "kind" of object. Ontologically there are substance and accident, but we may not, and probably do not, know how many. And the ontological cut does not tell us how to take the empiriological cut. And even ontologically, there are different cuts in the sense that there is also the cut between causes and effects, created and uncreated, infinite and finite, material and immaterial, knowing and nonknowing, one and many,

etc., etc. There are also degrees of knowledge, etc.

This title, by being broader than "The Meaning of 'The Meaning of Meaning'," (which could be a subtitle within the whole) could even give you a chance to talk about logic, i.e., in addition to the sacrilization of logic (which has always been around) there is a sacrilization of a tool of logic.

To claim that we have no right to say that the science of the future will not causes us to revise the principle of noncontradiction (or the principle that a change happening to something would not exist without the thing to which it happens) is to say this: that which the science of the future may tell us about what things are will be that things are not what they are; that which the science of the future will discover about what things are will require that things are not what they are. In other words, to claim that now is to imply a contradiction now; so we must give up noncontradiction now, i.e., believe that negation is and is not negation now.

In Representation and Reality, P says Rorty gives up reference. Not really. So that statement of P's can be used as an entree for a discussion minimizing the importance of "reference" but not of extension, which Rorty certainly does not deny. Other statements of P's provide openings. The first chapter of RWHF says Kant first posed phil questions as they should be posed. Well, classical realism has answers to those questions that have not been tried, even though classical realism did not start off by asking its questions in the same way. The laziness of Thomists explains why classical realism's answers are not better known. Also, in either "Meaning Holism" or Representation and Reality, and perhaps in both places, P explicitly says he is talking about the theory of mental representations we have received from the 17th century!

Use the quote about Kant being the first to properly formulate the questions as an excuse to bring in the common assumption of rationalism and empiricism, which P may not have looked at in that way; for K's question arises, ultimately, from that common assumption.

I do not know whether the universe is one substance. But I am aware of models of arguments which, if valid, would show, for instance, that each human being is a

substance. Is the existence of such models sufficient to found the concept of truth? It should be. What if I am convinced for a long time by a proof that each human being is a substance? Then, I at least believe that the assertion that each human being is a substance is either true or false. But now, what if I find a flaw in the proof. Does "each human being is a substance" cease being either true or false? At that rate, nothing would become true until someone knows that it is true. But don't make a big deal out of the anti-realist concept of truth; not that much of what you need to say hangs on it. Draw the battle line elsewhere.

Reference, 1-20-93

If the "reference" of a word means its extension, then the function of intentional existence is not to provide a reference for a term. The function of intentional existence is not to provide a reference for "unicorn." On the contrary, "unicorn" has no extension, and what exists intentionally when we know the meaning of "unicorn" is something with no extension. So it exists intentionally in spite of its having no extension.

Putnam, 1-8-93

Title: "The Meaning of 'The Meaning of Meaning'." Instead of "mental representation" he should say "intentional object." And notice that intentional objects include both the formal and material objects. He seems to be saying that the two planets have the same formal objects but different material objects. And notice that while "the conductor of this bus" can extend to more than one individual, "this bus" does not, i.e., this bus at this point in space-time. If the buses being at this point in space time, or some other individuating condition, is objectified when this bus is my object, the two planets do not have the same intentional object.

An interesting test would be to have people from both planets unknowingly moved to a neutral planet where both kinds of water we found. And what do we do on earth,

when we encounter tribes that do not have our kind of X but do have a species of X or, at least, some substance with similar phenomenal characteristics to X?

Also, is it temerity to predict that science will not force us to revise the laws of logic? To claim that the laws of logic are revisable is to claim that negation will cease to be negation. Is it temerity to predict that negation will not cease to be negation? That mass times velocity will not cease to be mass times velocity?

Also, is it really true that we would say twin water wasn't water? When someone first hears that whales and dolphins are fish, don't they protest? And then don't they ask, "Well, what do you mean by 'fish?'" And children laugh when we tell them that they are really animals. Also, we call spiders insects and ask for a definition when told they are not. Also, we think peanuts are nuts; we are surprised to find that stars are really other suns; that such and such isn't a star but a galaxy; that penguins are birds; etc.

Also, a virus isn't really alive; that bacterium is not really a protazoan, since it doesn't have a membrane. Whales and dolphins are not really fish.

Re "fish": When I find out that those who know more about what things are than I do know that whales are mammals, not fish, I also find out that what they are using "fish" for is more detailed than what I am using fish for. I may find out that the word-function for which everyone else in the society uses "fish" is more detailed than the word-function I thought they were using "fish" for. But since I have an idea of what mammals are (which before this time I need not have thought contradicted the idea of fish, i.e., up to now some mammals could have satisfied my idea of fish), I can restrict my use of "fish" to those things the society calls fish without learning the further details the society has in its word-function for fish. Does my word-function for fish now include a reference to the noise "fish"? I.e., does my word-function now include a reference to that for which others in the society use the noise "fish"?

What would it mean if it did? I would be objectifying their word-function for fish (which does not include a reference to the noise "fish") the way a translator does. A translator starts off not knowing what we use "fish" for but believing there is some word-function for which we use the noise "fish." A translator is objectifying

the word-function of "fish" by an external causal relation of which that word-function is the term, a contingent causal relation that does not reveal any more of the nature of the term than that it can be the term of such a relation. The translator and I have object-descriptions of the word-function of a thing-description, and we do not confuse the word-function of the object-description with the word-function of the thing-description. And everyone in the society could make use of such object-descriptions for knowing how to use every term in the language, without its following that translations should include the object-description in the word-function of the translation. (Reply to Putnam's reply to Searle in Representation and Reality. Note that all I have to say is that it does not follow that the translation should include)

When I learn that whales are not fish, I learn that I have been using a word incorrectly, where correctness is judged by how (certain) others use the word. In this vanilla situation, what is there that argues against a mental state of awareness of meaning? Nothing. Then what is there that argues against such a mental state when a traveller to Twin Earth finds that he has been using "water" otherwise than the natives have? P would reply that what argues against it is that their mental states are the same, whereas my mental state re "fish" is not the same as the experts. But consider the mental state(s) of the first person who learned that whales' underlying biological causal structure, i.e., reproductive structure, was more like a horse's than a trout's? Until that time, he had the same intentional object for "fish" that we had, i.e., something that lives underwater. And so "fish" for him referred to whales, just as "water" refers to the same thing(s) on earth and twin earth.

So maybe the way to proceed is to see what goes into learning that I am using "fish" incorrectly, or into learning that we should restrict the use of the word "fish." And after establishing that, compare step-by-step with progressively more complex Twin Earth examples.

And very importantly, note that P's arguments do not disprove, in fact they assume, the existence of intentional objects. For example, some of them rely on the fact that the intentional objects would be the same on Twin Earth. But the scholastic theory of mental entities is basically meant to explain our awareness of intentional

objects. P's arguments are directed against specific theses concerning intentional objects and sign behavior that are peripheral, at most, to the scholastic theory. For example, meaning in the mental sense is not what is at stake in analyticity; nor were the scholastics necessarily thinking about synonymy or translation, certainly not primarily. As for intention and extension, P's arguments do not even contradict the principle that they are inversely proportional to one another. His arguments only claim to show that intention is not sufficient to determine extension.

Also, P says that reference is a social phenomenon and that we rely on others, experts, to determine correctness of reference. But this requires my awareness of social realities, e.g., the existence and nature of experts. This awareness is itself intellectual and is either linguistic or pre-linguistic, i.e., is the kind of awareness the use of predicates presupposes. So that awareness requires me to have natures and other universals as intentional objects. So I still need psychological entities to explain my cognitional relation to these objects. This is not a chicken-before-egg argument. It is true, as P would no doubt say, that there is no privileged set of primary objects of this awareness, primary objects my awareness of which is presupposed by my awareness of what predicates refer to. It's just to say that P's arguments, e.g., the social nature of reference, do not eliminate the need for mental entities as causes of the awareness of objects the social nature of reference requires.

And the same cause cannot have different effects. Different psychological states can relate us to the same intentional object, but can the same psychological state in two different people relate them to different intentional objects? The psychological state (the total state, a complex of many dispositions and factors) by which I am related to what I know about the thing I call "water" cannot relate me to another intentional object. P might agree but reply that the cause of my referring to water is not just that psychological state but social realities of which I am aware. But my awareness of those social realities requires psychological states. Can all the relevant psychological realities of two people be the same and yet have different effects, the effects of referring to two different substances by "water"? P says part of the causality is the environment, the nature of things in the

environment, whether I am aware of the difference of those natures or not (e.g., water and twin water). I can make P's point consistent with mine by noting that logically included in my intentional object for "water" is the logically vague object: something whose nature causes these characteristics I associate with water. That logical inclusion and that vagueness, together with the facts that (Husserl) objects are always presented as more than objects and that logical relations like inclusion are transparent, i.e., terminate in what is more than an object, makes P's position consistent with mine.

Concerning P's statement that we "would not say" Twin water was water, i.e., that "water" refers to both. As a matter of fact, we do resist and protest when we are told that our usage does not conform to that of experts. I resisted when told peanuts were not nuts. Think of "commonly but inaccurately called 'tars'." If you want to call them 'tars', what's wrong with that? Later, but only later on reflection, I realized "there must be a good reason."

In saying against Searle (HWAHF) that mental states are not intrinsically related to certain objects, is P seriously saying that someday we will not be able to examine the state of a person's brain and know what he is thinking of? I should not accuse P of implying that until I am sure. But someday science will be able to do that, and what else would Searle want to mean by mental states being intrinsically related to certain objects (maybe ask Dennett about this)? And why should this be surprising. Is it surprising that evolution selected the brain precisely for the ability of states of the brain to relate us to what things are. Would not those kinds of brains whose states did not relate us to specific objects have been deselected? And If Quine can argue from Darwin, why can't I?

In the case of elms and beeches, we can look at the brain and say this person has the intentional object common to elms and beeches. If the person knows that elms are not beeches, he must use more of his knowledge, more than that common intentional object, when distinguishing between them. And whatever that additional knowledge amounts to, we should be able to look in his brain and find states relating him specifically to that additional knowledge.

The only problem left is the Twin Earth problem, where the intentional objects

are the same and there apparently is no additional knowledge by which to distinguish the intentional objects. (Reread that NYT article on cups.) If P is correct that we would say TE "water" refers to something different from our water, it is because of what is logically included in both intentional objects, namely, whatever has the nature that grounds this behavior in these cases. Without that logical inclusion, the environment cannot enter into determining reference.

So the meaning of "The Meaning of Meaning" is that it forces us to enrich our idea of logical inclusion, but it does so in a way that adds to what we know about it without contradicting anything essential that we know about it.

Logical inclusion can help P by explaining how the environment can help fix reference.

Indeterminacy of translation, 1-8-93

Notice that the reply to Quine is strictly behavioral. Behavioral evidence shows how the "apparatus of individuation" is being used. So what have Quine's arguments got to do with the "mental" in the sense of something interior. Quine too hastily equates "meaning" with the "mental."

Putnam, 1-4-93

After our phone conversation about analyticity and about existence. He says the key part of Quine's argument against analytic truths is not the lack of criteria but the paragraph in "2 Dogmas" that say we cannot predict that science, e.g., quantum theory, may not require us to reform our logical laws. And for himself, he added that the claim that knowledge of meaning is sufficient for us to make that prediction about the history of science makes too strong a claim for meaning, but too much of a burden on knowledge of meaning.

My reply. For basic logical necessity, the only meaning involved is the meaning of negation signs, the relation other-than or different-from. (So we are not talking about meaning in general, or awareness of meaning in general, as the cause of our knowledge of irreversible truth.) Awareness of what that relation is does not require any inexplicable insight into the natures of things, since it is a cognition-

constituted relation, a human construct. Since it is our construct, there is no reason why our knowledge of that relation should not be sufficient to know that truths dependent on it will not be revisable, because they would either be different truths about negation or be truths about a different relation from negation, i.e., no longer be truths about negation. Even Quine says we need "differences" of some kind, but negation is just the relation "different from" (which is not a point about synonymy in the sociological sense; yes "negation" happens to mean the same as "different from," but aside from sociology, Quine's point needs to use "differences" in the sense in which it is equivalent to "other than.")

It is not our subjective relation to meaning that guarantees irreversibility of truth; it is the nature of the meanings, or some of them, to which we are related. In fact, those meanings cannot be changed; change just does not apply to them. They are like the forms that are the terms of processes of change. Things change by acquiring and losing forms; forms do not change per se, only per accidens. Thus, we cannot change the relation of negation and make it not be what it is. Likewise, mass times velocity, P's example in the first chapter of RWHF, is, contrary to P, a timeless essence.

P will reply to my point that the foundations of empirical knowledge provide a means of deciding between frameworks that it cannot decide whether numbers are sets of sets or functions, whether points are defined as the center of concentric circles or as limits. I do not claim the foundations of empirical knowledge can settle all questions. Also, questions about mathematically abstracted objects do not concern physical existence. If and when math objects are related to questions about physical existence, the math objects must be viewed as properties of putative causes, necessary properties, of putative causes of experienced things. If two math theories handle those properties equally well, the math theories, or the differences between them, do not have physical content to that extent.

Putnam and paralogues, 12-22-92

After reading Putnam on meaning, e.g., twin earth and elms/beeches problem. Why

couldn't a tribe refer to both elms and beeches by one word, e.g., "oak"? Then when a scientific biologist tells them those are really two different kinds of tree, they say, Oh, there are two different kinds of oak. The biologist says, No, they are not species of the same genus. But he is just defining the genus differently; he is not taking the sense-perceivable similarities between elms and beeches to define the genus. And all that amounts to is saying it is better to take the underlying causal structure, rather than the phenomenal characteristics, as defining the genus; but there is nothing to say you can't take the phenomenal characteristics as defining a generic term. Still, the phenomenal characteristics are slippery, changeable from person to person, hard to describe with precision, etc., etc. Those are all reasons for not using the phenomenal characteristics to define a generic term; it is not very useful to do so. But no issue of truth about elms and beeches and, more importantly, about the mental entities that allow us to use words meaningfully, enter in.

Another example, a tribe might use "table" for three-legged things, never having seen four-or-more-legged things. Their decision as to whether to continue using "table" for 3-legged things has nothing to do with the issue of mentalism; nor does "decision" in this context have to be an explicit mental act.

Short book and Putnam, 2-8-93

The wild dogs of Africa are not dogs; they are related to jackals, not to wolves. Yet from the standpoint of "mental representations" they are much more like the ordinary dogs we are most familiar with than are chihuahuas or pekinese.

Also, consider islanders who had seen whales and dolphins but no other sea creatures. They use the word "shif" for them. Then some of the islanders migrate to a place where other sea creatures are found. They use "shif" for all sea creatures. Would it make sense to tell them that the new sea creatures are not really shifs, or, after a long enough period of time, for them to go back to the original island and tell them that whales are not really shifs? And what if the original islanders also had a word for mammals, as opposed, say, to reptiles and birds and insects, etc., but use the word only for land mammals and would not have considered

shifs, i.e., whales and dolphins, mammals, because their word "mammal" covered only land creatures? Would it make sense for them to learn that whales were not really shifs but mammals? Or would it make sense for the migrated islanders to learn that fish are not really shifs, because shifs are mammals?

xxxReferring, Truth - 4-10-01

Is there a problem about referring? Crosson says we can think we are referring but fail to do so? What can this possibly mean? "The present king of france is bald" The truth of that sentence depends on how it words used, the meanings of its words. It so uses "the", "present," "king," etc that it is not true unless there is something that is now the present king of france. Or what it uses "the present king of france" for is something that, if it existed, would be the present king of france. It uses "the present king of france" for an object and individual, that would be the present king of france if, in addition to being an individual object, it were also a thing. Or it so uses that phrase that, for it to be true, there would have to be something that was the present king of france.

So if I believe that sentence true, I believe there is a present king of france. If that is what "referring" means, then not to succeed in referring means to believe falsely that there is a present king of france.

Does refer mean I *intend* to so use the phrase that it "picks out" an existing individual, "designates" an existing individual? But it already picks out an individual (i.e., if there is "a" king of france, there is only one). So I succeed in *intending* to designate an existing individual. The only failure is the failure to accomplish what I intend. But what can that mean other than that the individual I believe to exist doesn't. To succeed just in intending to designate an existing individual, I must believe such an individual exists. And what more do I need to succeed just in intending? Now to accomplish what I intend, the existence of the individual is required, but that is totally outside of my control, outside of what I am doing or not doing.

In Chapter 3 of Causal Realism, I first say truth requires identity between things and *what is objectified by the words of a sentence* and then I ask how it is determined what things are objectified by the words of a sentence. My answer is that the word-functions, i.e., the meanings(t) of the words of the sentence determine what things they objectify. Putnam comes in at that point. The meaning(t) of "water" is not just the collection of notes shared by water on Earth and Twin Earth. Our meaning(t) for "water" is the kind of thing *on Earth* that has that collection of notes. Fine. But what of it? All this means is that we consciously use our awareness of a collection of notes in association with something else we are aware of: the existing instances of that collection that we are aware of.

For the moment, however, forget about the question of meaning. Just consider the following psychological fact. A baby of Earth and a baby on Twin Earth have exactly similar objects as they view the two kinds of water. Their psychological states are the same, considered from the point of view of the collection of features that characterize the object of their consciousness. But these similar psychological states make them aware of two different kinds of things. Is the fact that two such similar states can make us aware of different kinds of things a paradox, even apart from the problem of meaning? No, it is not. And seeing why it is not a paradox also shows why it does not create a special problem for meaning.

On earth, two persons seeing gold and fools gold for the first time can have the same psychological states. Yet those states make them aware of two different kinds of things, by some definition of difference. There are scores of examples like this. Many things look like water, and only differ from water in other respects. We could if we want say that the persons looking at gold and fools gold see the same kind of thing, call it X, by defining X by the features gold and fools gold have in common. So the only thing that the gold/fool's gold example, and all others like it, including the Earth/Twin

Earth examples, shows is that the same psychological state can make us aware of things that differ in ways to expressed in this psychological state.

So where is the problem about meaning? Putnam would reply that the Twin Earth person does not have a definition of "water" that makes "water" refer to our water. The Twin Earth person manages to *mean* something different on the basis of the same psychological state. But are the psychological states precisely the same, when we consider the individuating aspects of the "referring," i.e., the contraction of the reference of water to just the examples around "here"? E.g., by "gold" I mean the kind of thing with X qualities "over there." But Putnam would say that the psychological state that allows me to give meaning to "over there" is the same in both cases, or can be the same. Still, in each of those psychological states, I *know* that I am looking at an unrepeatably individual. And I can use my knowledge of that *truth* to give a distinct meaning to "over there". Likewise, I can *know*, through similar psychological states, that I am looking at a certain *kind* of thing, where "kinds" are distinguished, as Putnam admits, by some standard of importance.

So the question comes down to two people looking at similar things and, on the basis of the same or similar psychological states, forming judgments like: "This is a unique individual" or "This unique individual belongs to a certain ontological (or chemical, or whatever) type" of "The chemical type of this unique individual is what I will mean by "water." All of those judgments are enabled by, have as their *sufficient* conditions, certain psychological states having certain types of objects, e.g., the meaning of the word "individual" or "type." And why can't such psychological states, in the right combination, allows us to make unique or planet-specific, etc., references?

xxxProblem of reference, Putnam, Kripke, BIG 12-27-00

This is what the problem is. If the meaning of a name is not a description, how can a name succeed in referring

unless the named thing actually exists? In other words, how is the name succeed in communicating; how does it succeed in objectifying. If its meaning would that of a description, as the meanings of predicates are, it could get its meaning from other words. Where does it get its meaning if there are no other words to get its meaning from?

Well, where do our primary predicates get their meaning? An alcoholic in dts sees a pink elephant. He points and says, "that is coming at me," or "I fear that." The name "that" refers to an individual in his perceptual field. Is this a private language? No, because language must already exist in order for him to do this. He is just extending the use of language that came into existence for the sake of communicating about really existing public objects. Once public language exists, we can use it for imaginary objects.

Should we add: we can so use language as long as we are using it for an object of awareness that is capable of description, where "capable" does not refer to the actual resources of any language or of any user of language. It refers to the fact that the object has, for example, perceivable features.

xxx3-6-90, Referring and Truth

No matter how much I intend a sentence to be true, I can't make a sentence true. The logical relation of truth does not come to a sentence from my intentions, from what I am trying to do in forming and asserting the sentence. I don't cause a sentence to be true; I perceive that it has the logical relation of truth; I find that the logical relation of truth is a characteristic of the sentence. So truth is still a logical relation since, among other things, it is relation that obtains only in consciousness, perception.

Likewise, I may intend to objectify an existing individual by a name or description (to "refer to" an existing individual). If that is what referring is, namely, something I intend, something I am trying to do with certain language-forms, then the actual existence of anything named or described has nothing to do with whether I am referring or not. The language refers even though nothing exists; for "referring" expresses my intention to objectify, expresses my attempt to do something. The ambiguity comes because we can say "My attempt to refer was not successful," as if I failed to produce an act of referring, instead of producing an act of referring that

did not accomplish my intentions for that act. Compare "The operation was not successful"; that is the sense in which referring, in this sense, can be unsuccessful.

Or, "referring" can mean, not acting with the intention of objectifying an existing individual, but succeeding in that intention. If so, the logical relation of reference does not come from my intentions; I could refer accidentally. I find that a name refers; I discover that it has such a relation to a real existent. But that relation is not part of what I do; not a characteristic I put in any of my acts insofar as they come from me.

But much philosophy has traded on that ambiguity. For truth there has to be reference (in the second sense). It does not follow that we have to succeed in referring in the second sense in order to use language for the purpose of objectifying existents (referring in the first sense). So it does not follow that in order to refer we have to be acquainted with the existent we are objectifying, much less that there must actually exist some individual to be the term or our relation of referring.

Either referring is, like truth, in which case it is independent of what I do or try to do; or referring is something I am doing. What I am doing might be trying to objectify a real existent, intending to. If so, referring does not need a real existent to occur. If it needs a real existent, it is not something I do.

Was a previous theory referring (intending to objectify) what my theory refers to? Who cares? The important thing is whether they contradict one another.

Putnam, Meaning, 11/1/94

Mental states are a NECESSARY CONDITION for such things as having stereotypes AND referring. Putnam does not show that they are not necessary conditions, only that they are not sufficient conditions. And who ever said they were more than necessary conditions; who NEEDS to say that are more than necessary conditions.

Meaning, Putnam, Analytic Truth 1/24/95

Is he just saying that meaning isn't something in the mind? No, but that's an important part of what he's saying. Still, what's in the mind does determine what I and my twin mean by "water" to a large degree. And if meaning is what's in the world, that goes along, contrary to Putnam, with the original view that there are truths knowable by knowing meanings. Even if what's in the mind does not entirely determine meaning, what's in the mind sometimes allows us to know meaning sufficiently to know truths that, by hypothesis, do not depend on what the meaning is conjoined with in the world, and hence are true as long as the meaning, to the extent that we know it, is what it is, and hence are truths whose opposites are contradictory. Even stereotypes are "known" and hence in some way "in the mind," and they can conceivably give rise to truths known by knowing meanings. If meaning is something "out there," that's what the scholastics would have said all along.

Putnam, Meaning, Reference, Truth, Logic, Thing and Object,
10/21/94

When P says that reference is determined, in part, by the world, i.e., by what exists, he is implicitly affirming the doctrine of the identity of object and thing, i.e., of object and what is more-than-an-object, i.e., what exists extraobjectively in the world. Or at least we can say that the identity of thing and object is a necessary condition for the truth of what P says about reference being determined by what exists.

Does word ϕ in Theory T refer? Huh? Do you mean is the sentence ϕ true? The last question seems to make truth prior to reference, i.e., reference would be defined in terms of truth. But the opponent would come back and say that in order for a sentence to be true, it must have a logical property by which it makes a claim about the physical world, say, rather than about mathematical objects or logical constructs. Yes, there must be such a logical property. But that is not the same thing as reference, if you mean by FEs referring the fact that an F does indeed exist. Rather the logical property some terms in the sentence must have is one that enables it to merely make a claim about physical existence. That is, for the sentence to be potentially true or false, it must have a property which fixes its claim to be a claim about physical existence or whatever.

Whatever that property is, we do not have to answer all questions about it. Maybe it's what some call supposition or designation, or ϕ referring ϕ . But we need not know, for purposes outside of logic itself, whether the whole theory, e.g., of supposition is true.

Also, we need to distinguish the question of what kind of claim a sentence makes from the question of how we epistemologically know what kind of claim it makes, just as we must distinguish the question of whether a sentence is true from the question of how we know it is true.

Also, we must distinguish the question of what kind of claim it makes from the question of whether the existential

quantifier has different functions. To know whether a sentence is true, I need to know what kind of evidence is relevant to its truth, i.e., what kind of evidence would exclude the opposite from truth.

The kind of evidence that is relevant to its truth is determined by the kind of claim it makes. But I can know, for instance, that "The human is a species" makes a different kind of claim from "The human is a rational animal" without answering the question whether "A species is a logical relation" talks about a domain that exists in a different sense of existence than does "A rational animal is a body." In fact, there are at least two kinds of questions about the existential quantifier that I do not need to know the answer to in order to know what kind of evidence is relevant to the above claims of different kinds. For I can negatively answer the question whether "exists" has more than one logical function, while affirming that "exists" has more than one extralogical value associated with it, a cognition-independent value and a cognition-dependent, but not narrowly "logical" value.

Putnam, meaning, 9/13/94 BIG

How can two people whose psychological contents are the same, refer to distinct individuals? First, they are phenomenologically the same; yet the individuals each is aware of is distinct. But how can we even express that fact? We can, because "individual" and "distinct" are universal terms. This is an individual, and that is an individual. The meaning of those terms allows us to

construct word-functions by which we objectify the fact that each is a unique individual, that the contents, though phenomenologically the same, are distinct entities. Even the thoughts "This is a distinct individual entity from that" are phenomenologically the same. But just as color presents something really distinct from itself, extension, because of necessary internal causal relations between them, these phenomenologically similar thoughts in the two people's minds can objectify the fact that these individuals are distinct. E.g. both mean by "water" the chemical nature of this individual. But the meanings of those terms, together with the fact that they have a perception of distinct individuals, allows those phrases to differentiate things, even though the meanings present in the mind are phenomenologically the same.

Putnam, concepts, meaning of meaning, twin earth, Dec 23, 1999

Different mental states can each make us aware of X. Can the same brain state make 2 different people aware of different objects? In part, at least, yes. Brain state Y can make A1 think of apples and H2 think of oranges, because Y does these things as part of a whole complex of brain states that can differ in each case.

Both A and H are daydreaming. In one and only one of them a change bringing brain state Y into existence occurs. Because of Y plus all this other brain states, A would think of apples, H of oranges. This can especially apply to different languages where different structures condition the way we form concepts.

xxxMeaning, Putnam, Linguistic theory of the analytic, Jan. 28, 94

P's discussion of meaning presupposes the linguistic/and or psychological account of analytic truth. [And he sometimes seems to confuse the "necessary," in the sense of

necessary conditions for being aware of what a word is used for, with the necessary in the sense of necessary conditions for being X (where X is that which a word is used for).] But to be aware that "Red is a color" is necessarily true, I need an awareness (a psychological state) of what red is and what color is. But I do not need any other awareness of what these are than the awareness I need to be aware, e.g., that "the color of blood is red" is true, or even just means what it means. And I sometimes have such awareness of what red and color are, because that awareness is a necessary condition of the awareness, which I sometimes have, of the meaning of, or the truth of, "The color of blood . . ."

But "necessary" in the last sentence does not refer to analyticity; it refers to a causal condition for awareness of either necessary or contingent truth. There seems to be a confusion in P of where the adjective "necessary" enters the discussion, is to be placed in the discussion.

And the whole discussion of necessary and analytic truth is after-the-fact in philosophy. P refers to philosophers who still try to make something of analytic truth, to do something with it. But that is, in the first instance, irrelevant. I do not have to first prove or justify their existence, and then use them. In fact, I could not do that first, and it would be irrelevant, if I could. I first show that the opposite of some proposition is contradictory. Only later can I be interested in how the kind of knowledge described in the last sentence comes about.

Jan. 18, 95

It is precisely by means of what is represented by his concepts that Putnam himself can know that his twin means something else by "This" when both say "This is an individual unique in the univers." Here "by means of" (quo) is not the quo of psychological concepts being quo's not quod's, but an objective quo, a phenomenological quo. By means of one object (a quod), another is presented, as by means of color, extension is presented.

The scholastic doctrine that corresponds to Putnam is the formal object/material

object distinction.

One person can have exactly the same representative content in two different experiences and yet know, through what is represented by "This is a unique, unrepeatable, individual," that what she knows through each of those experiences is a unique, and hence distinct, individual. What makes this possible is the fact that "unique, unrepeatable, individual" is a universal concept, or rather a combination of three universal concepts.

Meaning, Putnam, Jan. 4, 94

"Meaning is what, is that which, is preserved through translation." Assume all I know about quasars is that they are that which scientists objectify by the instrumentality of the English word "quasar." I am capable of discovering that what Chinese scientists objectify by the use of the word "xxx" is the same as that which is objectified by the use of the English word "quasar." Is the meaning of "quasar" (circularly): that which is objectified by "quasar"? Is that my meaning for "quasar". No, I never believe the proposition "The meaning of 'quasar' is: that which is objectified by 'quasar.'" I.e., I never believe or assert that that which is objectified by "quasar" is the fact that something is objectified by "quasar." Meaning is a social thing. My belief about the meaning of quasar is the social belief that scientists do you "quasar" for something, even though I do not know what that something is. Whatever they use it for is the meaning and "xxx" may have the same meaning in Chinese.

Likewise, I believe biologists use "elm" and "beeches" for more complex combinations of notes than I have so far used them. Those combinations are the meanings of "elm" and "beech" and those meanings go beyond that for which I have used, beyond what I have meant, by these words, for I meant the same things by these words.

So the meaning of "quasar" does not include, circularly, a reference to the word "quasar." And I can know that I am ignorant of the meaning of quasar. Later I can

know that I have learned part of the meaning of "quasar," e.g., I learn (know from evidence) it refers to a celestial, extraterrestrial phenomenon, then learn that it refers to a type of star, etc. So I can know part of the word-function, and know that I know part, while still knowing that I need to know more to have a word-function with the same extension that "quasar" has in the use of scientists.

Same with "elm" and "beech." When I learn that my word-function for "elm" includes both elms and beeches in its extension and learn that these words do not have the same extension in the language, then "elm" does not come to circularly include in its meaning: that for which I use "elm." Rather, I have learned that I do not possess a word-function rich enough to give "elm" the extension it has among tree experts, while knowing, from causal reasoning from dictionaries, etc., that there is a richer word-function (maybe more than one) that is a meaningT that will give "elm" the extension it has in English.

Is meaning something that is preserved in translation? If I successfully translate "quasar" by "xxx" while remaining ignorant of the meaning of either word, I have still "preserved meaning" in the sense that I have translated "Quasar" by a word which has, and which I know to have, the same meaning, even though I do not know what that meaning is.

Concerning "The Meaning of Meaning," p. 224. In 1750, "water" need not have 'referred' to different things on the to planets. Forget twin earth. Let's say we discover Putnams' xyz on some island surrounded by water. The natives of the island refer to both by "aaa". We translate "aaa" by "water". Later the natives and we both learn that xyz is not water. We can now say one of (at least) two things, both of which are consistent with our (not the natives') original word-function for water. That word-function in 1750 could have been: a thing with any underlying causal structure that produces this set of observable properties (... , the set possessed both by water and by xyz). Or, secondly, that word-function could have been: a thing with the underlying causal structure that gives the thing we call water this set of properties. In both cases, the meaning is a thing with a certain set of properties (by which the thing becomes an object). That need not imply "indexicality." Whether we judge that there are two kinds of water or judge that "water" equivocally referred

to different things depends on the relative importance we judge the properties to have vis-a-vis the specific underlying structure that causes the properties in each instance.

"Fish" or "mammals." Let's say the native's religion allows them to eat "fish," meaning creatures that live in water, but not other animals. To them, it would be important to keep living-in-the-water as the intention of "fish" and not to switch to the scientific intention.

The real question is whether our psychological state determines our awareness of the truth of sentences (Putnam postpones discussion of the meaning of sentences at the beginning.) and what our awareness of "meaning" contributes to it. To be aware of truth, I must understand the words of the sentence. Since I can sometimes achieve awareness of truth, I can sometimes achieve awareness of the meaning of sentences. Is meaning as extension sufficient? Supposition is what determines truth. I.e., when I say, "water has density X" (something twin earth's xyz might not have), I intend "water" to "suppose" for (stand for, do duty for, substitute for, be a vicar for) the liquid I know on earth, even if the extension of "water" includes things on other planets, because of the word-function that gives "water" meaning, things on other planets that may not have the property I attribute to water.

"There is a pen on the table behind you." I do not know whether that statement is true, because I do not see behind me. "There is an elm tree behind you." How much do I have to understand to be able to judge the truth? If I can judge the truth (e.g., learn that it is an elm, not a beech, a pen, not a pencil), I have a sufficiently detailed understanding of what it is to be an elm or a pen (or a sufficiently detailed understanding of other things that lead me to causally deduce that what I now see is what they call an "elm" or a "pen"). Is this just "extension"? I can know that X falls into the extension of "beech" or "quasar" without knowing the meaning of either word.

I can understand the sentence "There is an . . . behind you" before knowing its truth. When I understand its words, do I just understand them extensionally? But how can I understand them extensionally, if I do not yet know, am not yet aware, of the existence of this pen, this table, this elm, i.e., not yet aware of that extension

which is relevant to the truth of this sentence, and to the "meaning" of this sentence, if meaning is extension?

Other earthly and actual examples, to replace twin earth fictions. Are penguins birds? Whales mammals? (Notice that at stake in these examples are beliefs about the realities objectified by these words, not just about the meanings of the words.) Washoe's "water-bird". Why not "Flying fish"? Why not ducks? What about extraterrestrial "Life"? how can we talk about it, if life differs in "meaning" or "reference" the way "water" is supposed to on twin earth? Won't ET life take a different form from ours, just as TE water is different from ours underneath? Same with extraterrestrial intelligence. Why do we say "intelligence" continues to mean the same thing, while "water" does not. Only because we take, judge, certain notes associated with intelligence to be more important than others, and we judge the phenomenal similarities of water and xyz to be less important than their chemical structure. But if our religion were different . . .

Other earthly examples, West "Indians," "prairie dogs," "water-horse (hippopotamus). ("Flying ants"???) Extra-sensory "perception"; why call it "perception"?

Actually, in addition to examples on earth, can have examples using the same person, the same representative content, and the knowlede that the unique thing objectified by that content now differs from the unique thing that was objectified by it before.

Truth, Putnam, Jan. 4, 94

After listening to Don Asselin at the Nov., '93 Maritain meeting: Putman has a "picture", not a theory. But the picture is made up of propositions; that's the only way it conveys any content. And are those propositions true or false?

Putnam, meaning, 4-23-93

"Knowing the meaning of 'cube'" can refer to the knowledge that the string of marks 'cube' is used for cubes. Or it can refer to the knowledge of what it is to be a cube, without reference to the word "cube," because the description "meaning of the word 'cube'" is true of what it is to be a cube whether or not we know that this description is true of what it is to be a cube.

5-18-93

Beeches/elms: The distinction between that from which the name is imposed ("the trees that botanists call 'beeches'") and that to which the name is imposed. We don't translate that from which the name is imposed. Every language is different here. We translate that to which the name is imposed.

Also, we translate that which is objectified, not the mode of objectification.

Putnam, 2-10-93

"That for which 'elms' is used" can be taken in two ways, lexicologically and nonlexicologically. Taken lexicologically, it cannot constitute part of the meaning of "elms" and so does not survive translation and should not survive translation. Taken nonlexicologically, why shouldn't it survive translation. In knowing the intentional object "the intentional for which experts use 'elm'," in the nonlexicological sense, I am precisely aware of the intentional presence, in the experts, of an object into which the lexicological relation to "elm" does not enter.

Putnam, 2-5-93

Notice that "called 'elms'" and "called 'beeches'" are extrinsic denominations. Notice also that we use constructions like "what English calls 'awe'" "what the Greeks

meant by charisma," (from The Godfather) "what Americans call "bus-i-ness." Surely, using these constructions does not commit us to including these noises in their respective meanings, so that we would have to include them in the translation of those meanings. No, we are saying "that meaning which the English associate with 'awe,' etc., so that the meaning, not that with which it is associated in English, would be what gets translated. We are saying "that which they are aware of when they use 'awe,' etc., the way I am aware of what death is, when I hear 'Your mother died today'." What gets translated is what I am aware of when I hear that noise, not its relation to the noise.

Perhaps start this way: Classical realists justifiably pride themselves on not making the false assumptions about concepts that have come down to us from the 17th century. (Reference, e.g., Adler, Ten Philosophical Mistakes, Deely, Tractatus de Signis.) But even though Putnam cites the 17th century as a source, he has offered fresh arguments. Therefore, we need to know whether the classical realist picture can still stand in the face of his arguments. We need to know how his arguments relate to the classical realist picture.

Putnam, 1-13-93

The intentional object associated with "water" on both planets is: something, some type of being, whose nature causes it to have these phenomenal properties. Is the preceding formula "indexical" enough? I.e., if it were anything whose nature causes it to have these phenomenal properties, then the extension of the intentional object would be both kinds of water. And to save P's view and my own, I want an intentional object such that what is logically included in it restricts the extension to the kind of water on the particular planet. Do I need: the kind of being, a thing with the kind of nature, that these samples of entities with these phenomenal properties have? Why not; for then the specific nature of these entities would be logically included, even if included only with the logical property of vagueness.

What makes it possible for the nature of things in the environment to determine reference, and the only thing that makes it possible, is that logically included in

our concept of, say, water is: a thing of the nature that causes these phenomenal properties; a thing of the kind of nature that causes these phenomenal properties; something with the nature that causes the properties X, Y, and Z. If that were not logically included in our concept, the nature of what is in our environment would not determine reference.

Concerning elms and beeches and identifying the meaning of "elm" as that for which others are using the word "elm." We are often in a position of starting only from knowledge that a word used by others has some meaning, and until we come to know completely what that meaning is, we rely in part, for our use of the word or, at least, for our understanding of others when they use the word, on our knowledge that others are using "elm" for a meaning. This goes on all the time. When it does, and it does so even from the beginnings of language, we are partially in the same position translators are in, not completely, but significantly. All language users are partially in that position at all times.

Compare acquiring the meaning of "elm" to acquiring the meaning of "exists." To acquire the meaning of exists, we have to be aware of something not included in or even directly related to that meaning: we have to be aware that some thing of a particular nature, a tree, a man, etc., has been made object of concept. That awareness is necessary for our acquiring awareness of the meaning of "exists" but is not part of our awareness of the meaning of "exists" (otherwise, the meaning of "exist" would include an essential reference to being known). But that previous awareness that something else has been objectified is part of the way in which we make an object of the meaning of "exists," even though it is not part of that which is made an object in this way. Likewise, the fact that a sound like "elm" objectifies a meaning is part of the way we objectify what that meaning is, even though it is not part of that meaning. But the fact that awareness that the noise "elm" has a meaning is not part of that meaning, does not contradict the fact that our awareness that the noise "elm" has a meaning is a necessary and essential part of our objectification of the meaning of "elm," of the way we objectify that meaning.

Also, word-functions are both objects and means of objectifying things: intention and extension.

Putnam, 1-6-93

On meaning. Does the environment partially determine the referent of "water"? What if everyone had learned to use the word "water" the way we learn to use the word "unicorn, namely, from fiction. Say we learn to use "water" for a clear, odorless, etc. liquid. So far "water" means the same thing here and on Twin Earth. Then one day we encounter a liquid of that description and those on Twin Earth encounter a different liquid but of the same description. Do our meanings of "water" change? Putnam might respond that this is "reference by description," but does that make a difference here?

10-5-92

Truth and Reference

Jan. 21, 95

(Reference: what logical property must predicates have in order for us to know, before we can judge the truth or falsity of a proposition, that the proposition asserts something of an actual or possible extra-cogntional existent, rather than of a fictional or other cognition-dependent object? (What logical property must we be able to recognize predicates as having?) Once we name that property the only other one of any interest is the truth or falsity of the proposition. So what is left for "reference"? And maybe the property in question is not "logical," at least not in any narrow sense of that term, but semantical. That is, it is the meaning of the proposition that counts, ie., our knowledge of what the proposition is saying, is talking about.)

10-5-92

Putnam, in class, says that reference is more important than sense. The reason seemed to have been that between two theories, the same term will have different senses. But to judge truth, or judge between conflicting truth claims, you need to be able to pick out something that both claims are about. If the senses of terms differ, they don't allow you to pick out the thing you need to pick out. So you need to know

reference more than sense.

I say: to judge any truth, a thing must be objectified in more than one way. So to judge between conflicting claims, something must be once objectified the same way in the two claims and once objectified positively in one claim and negatively, in the other claim, but positively and negatively relative to the same sense and, as a result of the same sense, positively and negatively relative to the same reference. If meaning changes so that we cannot objectify any reality the same way in the two theories, the theories cannot be in conflict.

How someone else is using a word, and hence what he is referring to by it, is an empirical matter. We may not have a "direct" way of expressing what he means in our language, but to the extent that we can construct a locution that expresses what he means in our language, there is a locution that means the same thing in two languages, and it is possible to judge whether the statement is true. And if it is not possible to judge whether it is true, the statement does not conflict with anything else we can express in our language.

Does someone believe that Tully is the murderer, if he does not know that Cicero is Tully? The only interesting way of putting this is: does she know that the sentence "Tully is the murderer" is true"? Knowing the truth of that sentence requires knowing how "Tully" is used. But she can lack knowledge of how "Tully" is used, and as long as we know how it is used, we can say "She knows that Tully is the murderer," as long as "knowing that Tully is the murderer" is not used equivalently to "knowing the truth of the sentence 'Tully is the murderer.'" For we can use "She knows that Tully is the murderer" equivalently to "She knows the truth of the sentence 'The person sitting over there (or the person in the green shirt, or the person named 'Cicero,' etc.) is the murderer.'" But more, when we say "She knows that the person sitting over there is the murderer," we do not imply that she knows he is sitting over there. So we are not necessarily saying, "She knows the truth of the sentence, ' . . .'" We are saying she knows a state of affairs objectified by that sentence; a dog can even know such a state of affairs ("Fido knows Tully is sad").

When we use sentences, we are objectifying states of affairs. The only time when quantifying in is even an issue is when the state of affairs we are objectifying

is a person's knowledge of the truth of a particular sentence.

(Again, this analysis shows that the assertive-redundancy theory of truth is incorrect.)