

How Yves Simon Trumps Cajetan on Analogy

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Abstract (including the Appendices, especially Appendix B):

When we are dealing with questions like why being is not a genus, the unity of the subject of metaphysics, words said of both God and creatures, and other key philosophical problems, Aquinas's doctrine of the analogical use of words is decidedly *secondary*. That is a doctrine about how some words are defined, as Ralph McInerny has shown. What is crucial is Aquinas's doctrine of two kinds of abstracted common ratios, generic and non-generic (for divine names, the metaphysical doctrine of pure and mixed perfections is also crucial). The reason that being is not a genus or that metaphysics deals with both substance and accident is not that 'being' satisfies Aquinas's doctrine of how analogical words are defined. That it must satisfy that doctrine is just one *effect* of the fact that 'being' expresses a common ratio that is non-generic in Aquinas's sense. This also causes another effect more important than 'being's satisfying that doctrine: one science must deal with both substance and accident. And the fact that simple perfections are non-generic common ratios causes predicates to be used analogically of God and creatures by causing the more fundamental effect that we can attribute a perfection to both while affirming of one and denying of the other their identity with the perfection. Thomism can't be taken seriously as a living philosophy if, when we deal with such issues, we must work through all the historical baggage unnecessarily associated with the term 'analogy,' We especially don't have to speak for or against 'attribution' or 'proportionality' in relation to analogical usage, as McInerny has shown, or to non-generic abstraction. (The same goes for the historical baggage accumulated by Aquinas's ethics. See 'Person and Ethics in Aquinas' by David M. Gallagher, *Acta Philosophica* [Rome] 1995, and my 'Natural Obligation: How Rationally Known Truth Determines Ethical Good and Evil,' *The Thomist* 2002.)

Simon's "On Order in Analogical Sets" is the most important contribution to the question why being is not a genus since Aquinas. Its originality might be obscured by Simon's presenting his analysis under the heading of Cajetan's "analogy of proper proportionality." But the importance of Simon's contribution does NOT depend on the Cajetanian framework he employed. Simon's analysis is independent, and escapes any criticism, of Cajetan's because it operates on the level of the most fundamental question — more fundamental than the doctrine of 'analogy' itself — with which analogy is associated: Why is being not a genus?.

Simon saw that what distinguishes being from a genus has to be more than the fact that being, unlike a genus, is predicable of all the differences between beings. The difference of red from other colors is not a color; "a color" expresses the logical unit containing what is expressed by "color" and what differentiates the color red. But the difference of one kind of being from another must itself be a being; otherwise it is nothing. What enables a genus to express similarity between its instances is abstraction, not the psychological act of abstraction, but an objective

concept's logical property of including some intelligible values belonging to its instances while not including others. Because animal leaves out certain features of its instances, it expresses a similarity between dogs and cats. Because it does not leave out other features, it expresses a difference between dogs and roses. To the extent that none of the features of things are left out of being, being does not abstract from differences between things. But the failure to abstract from their differences prevents a genus from expressing similarity between things. So insofar as being does not abstract from differences, it must, unlike a genus, express not only similarity but also difference between kinds of being.

When things are similar, we can assert the same predicate of each: "Dogs are animals and cats are animals." When they differ, we can assert a predicate of one and deny it of the other: "Dogs are animals and roses are not animals." Once a genus is predicated of its instances, the genus has expressed their similarity. To express a dissimilarity, we must affirm of one and deny of another something other than the genus. Being is a value with respect to which its instances are both similar and dissimilar. They are similar in that they are beings. But since being is also something with respect to which things differ, it must be affirmable of some things and deniable of others. If it were merely predicable of the differences between things, it would exclusively be something with respect to which those differences themselves are similar, just as a genus is something with respect to which its instances are similar. Since being must be both a common ground and a difference between kinds of beings, we must be able to express their difference by denying being of some of the same things of which it is affirmed.

The simultaneous affirmation and negation of the analogue being cannot be an outright contradiction; therefore, the negation must amount to a restricting, an abatement of the common ground. Insofar as a genus abstracts from differences, the predication of differences does not make the species more or less instances of the genus. In the order of reality, a human being is a higher animal than a dog; in the logical order of concepts and statements, a human being is not more of an instance of the genus, animal, than a dog, just as the scalene is not more of a triangle than the isosceles. But that which exists in itself is more of the common value, that which exists, than that which does not exist in itself. Since the common ground between substance and accident cannot abstract from their differences, the expression of their differences must amount to a re-affirmation of the common ground in one case and a restricting negation of the common ground in the other. In the order of logic, one member of the set has priority over the other with respect to the predication of the common ground. Unlike specific differences, the differences between substance and accident ("exists in itself" and "does not exist in itself" — not just "in itself" or "not in itself") express the fact that one is more of an instance of the common ground than the other since the differences strengthen the affirmation and weaken the affirmation, respectively, of the analogue. Incomplete abstraction, not proportionality as such, makes being non-generic.

Simon discovered, then, that there are intelligible objects that, unlike genera, are logically *orderable* with respect to such priority and posteriority in the predication of an otherwise common value. He recognized that the main concepts of philosophy are thus analogically orderable. Those concepts are "ontological." That is, while being is common to all things, philosophy uses the concept of being and its cognates, especially *existence* and *that which exists*, to express what distinguishes one member of a set (substance/accident, act/potency, cause/effect, the necessary/the contingent, the entitative/ the intentional, real being/being of reason, privation/negation, etc.) from another. Since being is not a genus, philosophy's other main concepts will be analogically orderable also. Many analogical sets other than those Simon

explicitly mentions as such are crucial to his work. And it can be shown that the central concepts of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics are analogues predicable of orderable sets of analogates. Simon shows that one of these analogical sets is this: abstraction that abstracts completely/abstraction that does not abstract completely.

In addition to its importance for explaining how being and other concepts differ from genera, the unavoidable co-presence of assertion and negation in the use of analogues explains a constant thorn in the side of metaphysicians: paradoxes, apparent contradictions. Some philosophers have found the prevalence of paradox a reason for declaring metaphysics invalid, but they fall into self-referential inconsistency when they reject it. Simon for the first time explains metaphysical paradox in a way consistent with the validity of metaphysics. And he does so not by any ad hoc hypothesis, but by drawing consequences from one of the most ancient and fundamental insights of metaphysicians into their own enterprise.

Appendix A: Terminology

Given the importance of this kind of abstraction, we need better terms for it than the bland and opaque “incomplete” and “imperfect” abstraction. If you wish to retain the vocabulary of “analogy” (which I argue against in Causal Realism, Ch. 11), you can call it “analogical abstraction” as opposed to “univocal abstraction.” That has the advantage of indicating that in the type of analogy involved there is a kind of unity of abstraction, while in analogy by attribution there is not.

But for the reasons given in Causal Realism, I there suggested “paralogical” abstraction, and so “paralogue” instead of “analogue” for that which is abstracted (e.g., being), and “paralogates” instead of “analogates” for the kinds (e.g., substance and accident) from which it imperfectly abstracts. I now see that “parageneric” would be a less ambiguous term for the abstraction. [And following the suggestions in Appendix B, added in 2008, we could also call it “orderable” abstraction or abstraction “of/by inequality.”] Correspondingly, that which is abstracted would be a “paragenus.”

“Paraspecies” would be no less awkward than “paralogate.” But we really don’t need either, since we can simply call the logical inferiors of the paragenus “species.” The reason is that while the logical relation of imperfect abstraction holds between a paragenus and its logical inferiors, the inferiors themselves need not be imperfectly abstracted from their inferiors; the inferiors of a paragenus might themselves be “perfectly” abstracted. That is, the terms that express the inferiors of the paragenus might themselves be univocal. If so, we would not need to use the vocabulary either of the “analogical” or the “parageneric” for them. For example, in Aristotle the inferiors of “accident” are nine genera; if so, their names are univocal.

Accident is a “species” relative to the “paragenus” being. But is accident a genus or paragenus relative to its “species,” the nine categories? If it is “paragenerically” abstracted from them, we must be able to set up descending 2-member analogical sets encompassing them. For example, “accident” might be said analogically of quantity (univocal) and such-and-such (which would be something analogically common to all the other accidents); “such-and-such” itself might be said analogically of quality (univocal) and accidents-involving-relations; “accident-involving-relation” might be said analogically of relation itself (univocal, since “relation” is here used only for categorical relations) and the accidents-based-on-relations; etc. [For a better way of setting up this kind of example, see Section of Appendix B (search for “Porphyrean tree”).

All of this is independent of whether the “analogy of being” extends all the way to individual acts of existence. Even if it does, we would still have to account for the analogical relation between “being” and general terms like “substance” and “accident.” That is what Simon’s concept of order in analogical sets does.

Finally, always remember that analogy is NOT Aquinas’s solution to the problem of religious language (see Causal Realism). His solution is the doctrine of pure and mixed perfections (I KNOW these are not his own terms) and the doctrine that act is limited only by potency, both doctrines concerning characteristics of objects in their existence as things, not as objects, while the doctrine of analogy concerns objects as objects (the doctrine of analogical causes is an extension of the original terminology to describe things as things).

Appendix B: Simon, Aquinas and McInerny on Analogy

[Due to the length of this appendix, I have placed brackets around the most important paragraphs. This was written long after the body of this paper and Appendix A when I was finally introduced, by Ralph McInerny, to Aquinas’ texts on non-generic common ratios. The material may seem too important for an appendix. But as much as possible, this web site in meant to set a good example by offering philosophical rather than textually interpretive Thomism. The proportion of philosophical reasoning to interpretation that follows does not set that good example. If I had more time, I could have added the philosophical material to the body of this paper and put the interpretive discussion, appropriately, in endnotes.]

Aquinas states that there is a common ratio associated with the analogical term ‘being’ (*In I Peri.* L. 8, n. 6) and some other analogical terms, among them ‘true’, ‘good’, ‘person’, ‘principle’, ‘origin’ ‘manifestation’, ‘potency’, ‘passion’, ‘sin’, and ‘virtue’. This appendix will show what Simon says about order in analogical sets conforms completely to what Aquinas says about the common ratios of analogical words. What Simon says is not just consistent with Aquinas, nor does it just follow rigorously from Aquinas, which it does. What Simon says was all but said by Aquinas already.

To my knowledge Aquinas does not say that there is a common ratio associated with every analogical term. All that will matter here is, first, that at least some analogical words are associated with a ratio that is common to the analogates and, second, that some analogical words signify a perfection found in each of the analogates. Health is found in a living body but not in other analogates of ‘healthy’ like medicine and urine; on the other hand, ‘being’ names something found in both substance and accident. I will only be talking about common ratios that happen to be associated with those analogical words that happen to assert the presence of the reality signified by the word in each of the analogates.

But in the last analysis, it would not make any difference here if there was a common ratio for every analogical word. Neither the association of analogical words with common ratios nor the presence of the thing signified in each analogate constitutes an essential division of analogical words according to Aquinas’ strict definition of them: a word is analogical if its meaning for one thing is included in its meaning for another. But as being and Aquinas’ other examples show, both the association of a word with a common ratio and the presence of a signified perfection in each analogate can be very important for philosophical reasons other than, and even more important than, the definition of ‘analogy’ itself.

In fact, one of the things Ralph McNerny's ground-breaking and very much needed reinterpretation of analogy shows is that Aquinas's doctrine of analogy is not as philosophically important as we previously thought, because it was not intended by Aquinas to answer, and does not answer, all the questions we wanted to use it to answer. (Ironically, this verifies an intuition of one of McNerny's opponents, Gilson, who came to doubt the importance of analogy.) For example, Aquinas' doctrine of analogy does not explain how words can without equivocation express qualities intrinsic to both God and creatures. In the last chapter of *Causal Realism*, I have shown that the doctrine of pure and mixed perfections, not the doctrine of analogy, solves the problem of how the meanings of predicates like 'good' and 'exists', of which we know only finite examples, could exist in an infinite state.

The analysis presented here is meant to be an improvement to certain features of McNerny's analysis. I use the word 'improvement' because, for the most part, my remarks are intended as enhancements to, rather than criticisms of, McNerny. I am offering alternatives he may not have thought of, and I have hope that he will see the advantages of them when he gets the chance to consider them. But if he did not think of them, the only reason I was able to was that I had the benefit of reading him. In no way could I have come up with most of these ideas except by building on his contributions. And even where I am reluctantly forced to be critical of someone from whom I have learned so much, I would not have come up with some of the criticism without having the benefit of his work. We all owe McNerny an immense debt of gratitude; if it wasn't for him, we would still be in the dark about analogy.

(Note on terminology: I am not suggesting that we should always transliterate *ratio* instead of translating it.¹ The problems surrounding analogy are subtle, and 'Sufficient unto the day are the problems thereof' [hereafter, SUDAPT]! The best way to translate *ratio* is an important question in itself, but I am trying to avoid every problem whose solution is not absolutely necessary for the questions dealt with here. The reader will have noticed that I am also using the anglicized plural 'ratios' rather than *rationes*.)

1.

It should come as no surprise that the presence of a common ratio is often crucial to the philosophical issues for which we need analogous terms. We often must make arguments like:

- (A) Whatever exists is good.
X exists.
Therefore, X is good.

This reasoning does not mention anything that is specific to the existence or goodness of X because it does not turn on anything specific to the existence or goodness of X. The reasoning will be equally sound whether X is a substance or an accident, a creature or God. So 'exists' and 'good' are used in exactly the same ways, respectively, in the premises and conclusion of this argument; no matter what X is. And their use in the same ways requires that there be ratios expressed by 'exists' and 'good' that are common to the logical inferiors of these terms. If not, the ratios expressed by 'exists' and 'good' would only pertain to X, and not to any analogate different from X, though we can understand the argument and its validity without knowing which of the different analogates X is. (So another 'problem' Aquinas' doctrine of analogy does not solve is that of multiple meanings in arguments; for there is no such problem. There are NEVER multiple meanings for the same term within the confines of a valid argument.)

But the fact that 'exists' and 'good' are used in exactly the same ways in the premises and conclusion does NOT mean that they are univocal terms; for the common ratios they express are not generic ratios. *In I Peri.* L. 8, n. 6 states that the common ratio of 'being' differs from a

generic ratio in that 'being' is predicated with priority and posteriority with respect to that common ratio itself. There 'priority and posteriority' are contrasted to 'equal participation' in a common ratio. Although rational and irrational animals are not equal on the scale of greater and lesser degrees of perfection, they are equal with respect to the common ratio expressed by 'animal'. Neither one is more or less of that ratio; if they could be, that ratio would not be a genus. But Aquinas says that substance has priority to accident in the common ratio itself of 'being'. So the fact that 'being' can express a ratio that is common to both does not mean that the ratio is predicated equally with respect to both; calling substance and accident 'being' does not require that the common ratio is something with respect to which the members of this pair are equal. Rather, substance has priority, and accident posteriority, with respect to the very common ratio of 'being'. This non-generic character of the common ratio requires that the difference between substance and accident must be expressed by explicitly predicating the ratio of 'being' with priority of substance and posteriority of accident. And as we will see, that differential predication will require using 'being' in ways that satisfies Aquinas's definition of analogical, rather than univocal, terms.

N.B. In the *In I Peri.* L. 8, n. 6 text Aquinas speaks in the plural of *proprias rationes* for each of the logical inferiors of a *ratio communis*, as if the logical inferiors of an analogical common ratio each has its own proper ratio. This implies that when he is contrasting common ratios to proper ratios, he is NOT using 'proper' ratio as he does when he says, as in *ST 16, 6*, that the proper ratio of an analogous word is found in only one of the analogates. The ratio that is found in only one analogate is a proper as opposed to a secondary, derivative or extended ratio, not to a common ratio. Further evidence of this is provided in *ST 16, 6* itself. There, he eschews contrasting the way the proper ratio of 'healthy' is found only in the body to the way he elsewhere says the ratio of a generic word is common to its species. Instead, he contrasts the proper ratio of 'healthy' to the PROPER ratio of 'animal', which he says is found in each of its species. So the meaning of 'proper' in that article is not in contrast to the meaning of 'common' that, by hypothesis, also describes the relation of a generic ratio to the species. The contrast is between two ways that 'proper' ratios of words relate to the things of which the words are predicated. Calling a generic ratio 'common' there would have obscured the point Aquinas was trying to make.

Saying that there is something common to diverse things implies that there is something proper to each; in the sense in which a generic ratio is common to its species, each species does have a proper ratio. Each analogate of 'healthy', however, does not have a proper ratio in the sense of 'proper' in which Aquinas there wants to say that the proper ratio of 'healthy' is found in only one analogate. Therefore, in contrasting 'healthy' to 'animal', he needs a sense of 'proper' different from the one that is contrasted to 'common' when we say a generic ratio is common to its species; for in the latter sense, each species called 'animal' does have its own proper ratio. What each species of animal does NOT have is its own secondary ratio of the word 'animal'. Aquinas is saying that while only one instance of 'healthy' has the proper as opposed to derived ratio, each instance of the common ratio of 'animal' has its own proper as opposed to common ratio. So when he says that the ratio of 'animal' as said of its species is the proper ratio of 'animal', he does not use 'proper' in the sense opposed to the sense in which he elsewhere calls the ratios of 'being' and other analogical words 'common'.

He is contrasting a ratio of 'animal' found in both men and horses to a ratio of 'healthy' found only in a living body. Substance and accident each have a 'proper' ratio in the sense opposed to the common ratio of the analogous word 'being', but only substance has a 'proper' ratio in the sense in which only one analogate has the proper as opposed to secondary or derived ratio of 'being'.

Every analogical word has a proper ratio found in only one analogate; that ratio is not opposed to a common ratio because not every analogical word has a common ratio. The proper-as-opposed-to-secondary ratio distinction is made in terms of the definition applying to all analogous names, since this proper ratio is the meaning of the name exclusive to the primary analogate, as opposed to the ratio constituted by the way the meaning exclusive to the primary analogate is included in the meanings(s) exclusive to the secondary. The proper-as-opposed-to-common ratio distinction occurs in contexts where it need not apply to all analogical words and does not establish a per se division of analogical words as such; for the contexts are not those defining the 'analogical' use of words.

But even if there were a common ratio for every analogical word, the 'proper'/common ratio distinction would not be the same as the 'proper'/secondary (and hence different, not common) ratio distinction. When there is a common ratio, it is common to relative to the multiple 'proper' ratios differentiating the analogates. But when there is such a common ratio, one analogate will still require a 'proper' ratio found only in it in contrast to a secondary and so different, not common, ratio found in another analogate. (I present more evidence for this in Sections 4 and 5.)

What differentiates substance from accident as an instance of the common ratio of 'being' is not something that leaves these instances equal with respect to that common ratio, as what differentiates man from other animals, reason, does leave them equal with respect to the common ratio of 'animal'. What differentiates substance from accident must express or imply the priority of substance to accident with respect to the common ratio of 'being', because that is the way substance and accident differ. Substance must be differentiated from accident by some qualification to the common ratio of 'being' that gives substance priority with respect to that common ratio. So what expresses that difference must include or imply a reference to the common ratio that will not be included or implied by what expresses the difference of accident. Both what-exists-in-itself and what-does-not-exist-in-itself are proper ratios as opposed to the common ratio of 'being', what-exists, while only what-exists-in-itself is the proper ratio of 'being' as opposed to the secondary ratio, what-does-not-exist-in-itself.

But we must say more than this if being is not a genus. For the difference of humans from other animals, reason, can be understood in a way that also implies a reference to the genus, animal. There are times when we need a word that distinguishes the kind of intelligence that can only be found in animals from the kind that can be found in other beings or possible beings, separate substances. The word serving that purpose is 'reason'. When 'reason' is understood in that way, it implies a reference to its proper subject, an animal substance. And in general, the most proper kind of specific difference is a perfection that has the genus as its per se subject and so is found only in things of which the genus is true. The expression of what such a specific difference is will always imply a reference to its genus as to its proper subject, a logical 'material cause'. But the way the difference of substance from accident refers back to the common ratio of 'being' must amount to more than this. If not, there would be no difference

between the common ratio of 'being' and a generic common ratio. The way that 'reason', in this sense, refers back to its genus does not make 'reason' express or imply a priority of humans to other animals with respect to the common ratio of 'animal', as the difference of substance from accident must express or imply the priority of substance to accident with respect to the common ratio of 'being'.

The text from *In Peri. L 8*, therefore, obviously brings us very close to Simon's position on order in analogy. Where Aquinas speaks of a common ratio, Simon speaks of the 'common ground', the extra-logical content of the common ratio. Simon uses the word 'order' to express Aquinas' priority and posteriority 'in the very ratio of being'. So both Aquinas and Simon recognize two kinds of common ratio, one of which we can describe as an ORDERABLE ratio to distinguish it from a generic ratio, where 'orderable' expresses the fact that the logical inferiors of the ratio are unequal with respect to it, since one must be differentiated from another by priority and posteriority with respect to the predication of the common ratio, and where priority and posteriority are opposed to a genus' equality in its inferiors.

So the expression of what differentiates accident from substance must amount to a diminishment respecting the ratio of 'being' itself. Conversely, what differentiates substance from accident must amount to an aggrandizement of the ratio of 'being', as compared to the difference of that ratio in the case of accident. As a diminishment of the ratio of 'being', or an aggrandizement contrary to that diminishment, the difference qualifying the common ratio of 'being' is not just something added to that ratio from the outside, the way reason is a perfection added to the other perfections constituting the ratio of 'animal'. Reason is something added to the ratio of 'animal' as an outside addition; humans are animals plus an extra perfection. Substances are not beings plus an extra perfection that is outside of what is expressed by the ratio of 'being', since there can be nothing that falls outside of what is expressed by the ratio of 'being'. The difference of substance must amount to a prioritizing of the ratio of being, as compared to the opposite of that prioritizing for the difference of accident. Correspondingly, the expression of what differentiates accident from substance must include or imply an absence or negation of the way of prioritizing the ratio of 'being' that differentiates substance. This is just what Simon's theory of ordering by a reaffirming and non-contradictory negating of the common ground says.

I could have started with other texts about analogical words and common ratios that bring us even closer to Simon. *De Malo*, q. 7. a. 1, ad 1 says:

Division is of two kinds. One kind is the division of a univocal genus into its species, which equally participate in the genus, as the division of animal into cow and horse. The other kind is the division of what is analogously common into those things of which it is said according to priority and posteriority, as being is divided into substance and accident and into potency and act. And in such things the common ratio is satisfied perfectly by one alone, but by others in a certain respect and posteriorly. And such is the division of sin into venial and mortal. Hence the definition given (in the objection) of 'sin' is satisfied perfectly by mortal sin but imperfectly and in a certain respect by venial sin.

And ad 2 says:

'Venial' is a DIMINISHING difference with respect to the ratio of sin, and THAT KIND OF DIFFERENCE IS FOUND IN ALL THINGS THAT PARTICIPATE IN SOMETHING COMMON IMPERFECTLY AND IN A CERTAIN RESPECT (my emphasis).

Both the objections and these replies leave no doubt that the ‘ratio of sin’ mentioned in the second reply is the kind of common ratio that is contrasted to a generic common ratio in the first reply. So Aquinas is saying that in all cases where there is a common ratio, what distinguishes the difference between analogates from a difference between species of a genus is a diminishment of what is common. And the diminishment corresponds to the analogical term’s being ‘said with posteriority’ of what satisfies the common ratio imperfectly. Although Aquinas does not always use distinctions like equality/inequality, perfectly/imperfectly, absolutely/in a certain respect, primarily/secondarily to describe the kind of priority and posteriority that distinguish analogical meanings according to his strict definition, he does so explicitly and conspicuously in several philosophically crucial cases where both a common ratio and the intrinsic possession of the perfection from which the name is imposed are involved.

To get Simon’s paragenic order out of these texts, all we have to do is add that the difference of the analogate that satisfies the ratio perfectly will have to at least imply a denial, a negation, of the diminishing difference of the analogate that satisfies it imperfectly; or vice versa. (More on the use of negation in this connection in Sections 4 and 5.)

Other texts of Aquinas brings us even closer to Simon. *Supra 1 Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2 ad 5 says that the ratio of ‘person’ is analogically common because it ABSTRACTS from inferiors. *De Pot.*, q. 2, a. 5 ad 6 says that the generation of the Son and the production of creatures are not of one ratio univocally but only analogically, by reason of which they are able to communicate in one ‘distribution’. As the *De Pot.* objection shows, ‘distribution’ cannot express a relation belonging only to a word and not to the meaning of a word. If so, things named equivocally would share the same distribution, and equivocation would not invalidate an argument. But the common distribution of meanings in an argument presupposes abstraction from differences between the things included in the distribution. Notice also that in response to the objection that there is no one ratio of ‘sin’ covering both mortal and venial, the *De Malo* text implies that we can speak of a ratio, not just a word, as being ANALOGOUSLY common, since it calls a genus, not just a word for a genus, ‘univocal.’ And the *De Pot.* text speaks of things as being of one ratio ACCORDING TO ANALOGY, which allows things of which the ratio is predicated to be under one distribution. These uses of the vocabulary of analogy for ratios, not just for words, will be important below for the solution to an apparent contradiction posed by another text of Aquinas.

Since there are two kinds of common ratios, must we not also have two kinds of abstraction, as Cajetan and Simon say; for what allows a ratio to be commonly distributed is abstraction from differences. The same conclusion follows from the fact that Aquinas says there are similarities between things that share the same name analogically and says that analogical terms sometimes, as in the case of God and creatures, express perfections substantively found in each analogate. So things are sometimes named analogously because of their similarity with respect to perfections found in each. But to objectify things as similar in a certain respect, we assert of both a predicate with the same meaning. To assert a predicate of both with the same meaning, we must objectify a perfection by means of a ratio that does not objectify, and so abstracts from, differences between instances of the perfection. But the ‘same’ abstracted meaning need not be a univocal meaning since it need not be a genus.

2.

What then can differentiate the abstraction of a common ratio of an analogous term from that of a generic term, which also must abstract from differences? The two kinds of abstraction

must be such that one kind does, and the other kind does not, make the logical inferiors equal with respect to the perfection, where equality is contrasted to a diminishment of the perfection in one case and the opposite of diminishment in the other. For Aquinas says diminishment (and hence non-diminishment) is always the way posteriority (and hence priority) is expressed in the case of analogically common ratios. But how can there be a mode of logical abstraction like that, or how can there be a kind of extra-logical perfection that is a principle of real, extra-logical similarity between things without being subject to univocal abstraction?

Actually, the question should be how can there NOT be such a mode of abstraction, if there are kinds of perfection that are not multiplied, ultimately, by reception in a subject that is a pure potency with no intelligible features of its own? All things are only similar, not identical, outside the mind. For things to be similar, they must be similar in a certain respect. Sometimes they are similar with respect to an abstractable intelligible feature, a feature absolutely considered, with respect to which they are equal. If so, the feature can be predicated of them univocally. But how can an intelligible feature be so multiplied that it can be predicated univocally of each instance? Only a multiplier with no intelligible features can permit the univocal objectification of a multiplied value, since the multiplication of the value must not modify its intelligible features.

Actions are received according to the modes of the receivers. As the modes of receivers as receivers differ from each other, so what is received by each will differ. If the modes of the receivers do not differ in any way, as they must not in the case of reception by a pure potency with no intelligible characteristics, what is received in each case will not differ by any intelligible characteristics. So the received effects can be equal with respect to an abstracted intelligible characteristic. If the modes of the receivers as receivers have diverse intelligible features precisely as multipliers of the act communicated by an efficient cause, the received acts must still be similar, to the extent that they are communications of one perfection existing in an efficient cause. But they cannot be sufficiently similar that what is received in each case will not differ by any intelligible characteristics; for that would require multiplication by diverse receivers that, precisely as receivers, had no intelligible characteristics. When diverse multipliers of a perfection received from an efficient cause have diverse intelligible features precisely as multipliers capable of receiving the action of that cause, diverse features as per se receivers of the perfection communicated by the cause, the resulting perfections cannot be exactly the same with respect to their intelligible features. So they cannot be sufficiently similar to be objectified by univocal predicates, since univocal predicates require a ratio containing intelligible features with respect to which things are equal.

I have called the kind of abstraction associated with many important analogical terms ‘paragenic’ abstraction. We could also call it, now, ‘orderable’ abstraction, that is, abstraction that characterizes a ratio orderable by priority and posteriority in its predication. Or we could call it abstraction ‘of/by inequality’, abstraction that calls for inequality in the predication of the ratio. (We could, of course, also call it ‘analogical’ abstraction, but I consider the vocabulary of ‘analogy’ counterproductive in general. I have explained why in Causal Realism.)

McInerny’s enlightening analysis of analogy in Aquinas has now given us more reason to avoid that vocabulary: Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy simply does not, and is not meant to, do all the things we thought it did, things that still need to be done in some other way. As much as I don’t like the term, however, I think we still need ‘paragenic’ for the common ratio associated with an analogical term; so we probably still need ‘paragenic’ abstraction. (Please remember

that ‘abstraction’ in these discussions should always be understood primarily, not as a psychological act, but as a logical value, a logical fact about the content of an objective concept, namely, that certain other objects are not included in it. The psychological act that gives us the logically abstract *concept* of existence is not abstraction from sense experience but the *judgment* that an object already psychologically abstracted from sense experience has a state, real existence, prior to and independent of its state of being abstract, in either meaning, and sensed. See Chapter Five of *Causal Realism*.)

So Aquinas’s statements on the abstraction and distribution of an analogical common ratio bring us directly to Simon’s position. Simon saw what the body of this paper argues. We express similarity between things by asserting of them some common predicate whose meaning, by the hypothesis of its being common, abstracts (in the logical sense) from differences between them. To express dissimilarity, we assert some predicate of one that we deny of the other. In the case of an analogically common value, what is asserted to express difference must be a way of being prior or posterior, equal or unequal, with respect to the possession of that common value which is asserted of both things to express similarity, and what is denied to express difference must be that same way of being prior or posterior with respect to possession of that common value. That is why there are only two members in each of Simon’s analogical sets: to express the difference between analogates, we must assert something of one that we deny of another. If predicate ‘F’ is not used the same way when it is asserted and denied, the assertion and denial have not accomplished the purpose of expressing a difference between things. In the analogical case, the assertion and denial that express difference must amount to an ordering of a common value, a value that, unlike a generic value, is subject to diminishment or increase by means of logically subordinate concepts, and judgments using them, that express a way something can have priority or posteriority in the possession of the common value itself (as opposed to the way species of a genus can be ordered in overall perfection by having some characteristic extraneous to the common perfection, a value that adds to the common value something that falls outside it).

3.

Simon, therefore, shows how two significant questions Aquinas’s statements on analogy raise must be answered. First, how do we express dissimilarity between things of which a common ratio can be predicated when we cannot use the method of asserting and denying an additional ratio, a ratio whose content is some reality outside of the content of the common ratio? Wherever there is a common ratio that must be predicated of its logical inferiors by priority and posteriority, expressing the difference between them must amount, on the one hand, to a reduplicating, reinforcing, amplifying or strengthening, or on the other hand, to a restricting, diminishing, limiting or weakening of what is expressed by the word for the common ratio, the content of the common ratio. Some of the descriptive participles and adjectives I have just used come from traditional logic’s way of expressing distinctions affecting the truth of propositions or the validity of arguments. Phrases for other relevant traditional distinctions that come to mind are speaking ‘formally’ or ‘materially’, ‘exercised’ or ‘signified act’, ‘virtual’ or ‘formal’ possession of a perfection, ‘intrinsic’ or ‘extrinsic’ formal causes, etc. Such distinctions have not often been mentioned in the context of explaining analogy. But when we look at the multitude of ways of expressing priority and posteriority in predication that are actually used in Aristotelian philosophy, we find all the various kinds of distinctions just mentioned, and more. For example, as a prioritizing of the common ratio itself of ‘being’, the difference of substance is a non-redundant reaffirmation of the content of that ratio, a reduplicating affirmation of that content.

And the difference of accident is a negation of what is expressed by that non-redundant reduplication. Substance and accident are both existents, but substance is an existent and exists in itself, or not in another existent, while accident is an existent and exists in another existent, or not in itself. ('Itself' is a word for the reduplicating logical relation: identity)

This suggests another way we can arrive at Simon's position from a text like that from *In I Peri*. L. 8, n. 6 above, without even mentioning texts explicitly talking about analogical abstraction and distribution. After learning that a common ratio like that of 'being' is not related to its inferiors by the addition of a foreign ratio but by priority and posteriority with respect to the common ratio itself, we can wonder how we are able, as we must be, to use affirmation and denial to express the difference between the inferiors of an analogical common ratio. A modest proposal: Why not look at the way Aquinas himself does it? The analogy of 'being' is just one example of what he does over and over (and what later Aristotelians have found it necessary to do over and over in demonstrating that Aristotelianism is capable of making cumulative progress when answering questions Aquinas himself did not). He and they use subordinate ratios that amount to the reduplication, amplification or reaffirmation of the common ratio, or amount to the opposite, the restriction, limiting or diminishing of the common ratio. Such is the way they repeatedly and consistently express priority and posteriority in predications that, unlike 'healthy' as said of food and urine, are philosophically important otherwise than as mere examples of analogy. And that is precisely what Simon means by order in analogical sets.

The occurrence of ordered analogical sets in Aristotelian philosophy, and at such important places in that philosophy, is much too frequent to be accidental. We only have to think about predications of God and creatures. God is good and is his goodness. Creatures are good and are not their goodness. Saying that both God and creatures are good objectifies them as similar with respect to each of them being good or being a locus of goodness. But unlike generic predication, it does not objectify them as equal with respect to being good or to goodness. For God and creatures differ, not by some outside qualification added to their being good or their goodness, but by inequality in their being good or their goodness. So to objectify them as dissimilar with respect to being good and goodness, we must find a way of referring to the common value reduplicatively but non-redundantly in one case, and deny what we say by means of that non-redundant reduplicative reference in the other, a denial that does not contradict the original, non-reduplicative way of asserting the common value of both.

Concrete and abstract concepts, like good and goodness, human and humanity, are just logically different ways of signifying (objectifying) the same 'nature absolutely considered', in the vocabulary of *On Being and Essence*. As such, they have diverse meanings even though they are signifying the same common extra-logical value. Since they have diverse meanings as different ways of signifying that value, using both forms in asserting that something is good while denying that it is its own goodness is not contradictory, despite the use of negation in the latter case. But since they signify the same common value, asserting that God is good while affirming that he is his goodness amounts, not to adding a specific difference taken from anything really distinct from the common value, but to an amplification of goodness with respect to God's way of being good. And denying that that a creature is its own goodness amounts to a restriction, limitation or diminishment of goodness with respect to a creature's way of being good.

In Aquinas' terminology, should we say that the diversity in meanings of 'good' and 'goodness' amount to diverse ways of signifying the same common ratio or to diverse common

ratios signifying the same extra-objective value? A valid question, but SUDAPT! I do not know a reason of sufficient importance for using any energy and time to settle it, given all the more important questions calling out for work that Aristotelians have not trained their graduates students to do. Unless I state otherwise, I will speak of one ‘common ratio’ for the same extra-objective value whether expressed concretely or abstractly.

(Some, of course, would find the need to salvage a text of Aristotle or Aquinas a reason of sufficient importance for expending time and energy. And McNerny has read one text, *Supra I Sent.*, d. 22, q. 1, a. 3 ad 2, to imply that when a term is used analogically, it expresses distinct ratios, e.g., being an organism with health or causing an organism to have health, while there is one ‘thing signified’, e.g., an organism with health, but signified in different ways in these diverse ratios. As far as I can tell, his interpretation of this text is consistent with Simon’s views on analogy, and vice versa, and I have no objection to the explanatory apparatus McNerny seems to base on that interpretation. But I do not want to make anything I say here to depend on that apparatus. For in strictest logic that text does not have to be read as saying anything more than this: The equivocal is always divided by the thing signified (and so not merely by ‘a mode of signifying’); the univocal is divided by signified real differences (and so not merely by ‘a mode of signifying’); the analogical is always divided by a mode of signifying what is otherwise the same, for example, an organism with health. But that text does not say that analogical terms always have the same ‘thing signified’. Perhaps there are contexts where it would be more helpful to say ‘the thing signified’, in one case, is the relation of food to the health of the body but, in another case, the relation of urine to the health of the body; if so, the ‘what is otherwise the same’ that is signified in diverse ways would only be a PART of ‘the thing signified’ in each case. Of course, the fact that this text does not itself justify McNerny’s apparatus does not rule out the apparatus’ being justified on other grounds. Still, as McNerny has so well shown regarding Cajetan, it is dangerous to read into a text more than need be read into it. But SUDAPT!)

Expressing analogical priority and posteriority with respect to a common value can happen by means of an indefinite number of logical devices. Entitative existence is an entity’s (an existent’s) existence for ITSELF (‘itself,’ again, being a word for the reduplicating logical relation: identity); intentional existence is an entity’s existence for another entity, for an existent that is NOT itself. Prime matter is a potency that in itself is a PURE potency, that is, is NOTHING BUT a potency, is NOT ALSO something actual; every other potency is not a pure potency, is not nothing but a potency, is also something ACTUAL.

Simon gave several other examples in ‘On Order in Analogical Sets’. I have given further examples in Chapter 11 of *Causal Realism* and in ‘Analogy and the Disrepute of Metaphysics’. For more examples in Simon, see the closing editorial footnote, note 31, to Chapter 7 of the Simon Anthology, *Philosopher at Work*, p. 171; see editorial footnotes 5, p. 61, 10, p. 65, and 14, p. 71 in Chapter 5 of that volume; see *A Critique of Moral Knowledge*, p. 41 ff; and see ‘An Essay on the Classification of Action and the Understanding of Act’, *Revue de l’Université d’Ottawa* (1971), 518-541.

The fact that religious language too transcends the domain of matter explains the apparent contradictions that so frequently occur in it. It must use the pargeneric yes-and-(almost)-no constructions Simon identified. Scripture emphatically tells us not to fear and that perfect love drives out fear, but also tells us to work out our salvation in fear and trembling. Sometimes it tells us the Christian ‘yoke is easy’, sometimes that the Christian life is hard.

Sometimes it is negative about the role of the law and/or works, sometimes positive. Sometimes it opposes faith to works or the law; sometimes it asserts the necessity of faith and works, faith and law. Sometimes it tells us we can rely on God to be the entire active cause of our salvation; sometimes it tell us we must be active causes of our salvation. Sometimes it tells us salvation depends on our being weak, sometimes on our being strong. In one place, it tells us that a clear conscience tells us how we stand with God; in another place, it tells us a clear conscience is not sufficient for being right with God. In one place, we are told we must be like children, in another to put away the things of a child. Notice that such apparent contradictions arise even before we try to do systematic theology; they occur in pastoral language, which is religious ordinary language. Theology can work all such things out, so that there are no real contradictions. But the fact that avoiding contradictions requires work demonstrates that Simon's paragenic order is present in religious language as much as philosophical. Simon was doing theologians, as well as philosophers, a favor. (And let us not forget Maritain's identification, in part two of *The Degrees of Knowledge*, of another important source of apparent contradictions: the distinction between speculative and practical vocabulary.)

4.

The second question raised by Aquinas' analysis that Simon answers is just how the ratio of an analogous name as said of a primary analogate is included in the ratio of the name as said of a secondary analogate when there is an orderable common ratio predicable of both. According to Aquinas' doctrine of analogical words, the ratio exclusive to the primary analogate must be included in the definition of the word that is exclusive to the secondary analogate. 'Healthy' as said of secondary analogates expresses causal relations to what it expresses of the primary. (Medicine causes health; urine causes knowledge of health since it is an effect of health.) But Aquinas denies that terms predicated of God and creatures must express only the fact that God is the cause of perfections found in creatures, as opposed to expressing perfections that are found in God to which perfections in creatures are similar.

Likewise, 'being' as said of accidents cannot express only, though it must imply, causal relations between accidents and substance; 'being' as said of both substance and accident expresses something found in each. For whatever a substance has relations to, if 'exists' does not express a perfection belonging to the term of such a relation, that relation cannot be a causal relation; it cannot even be a real relation as opposed to a relation of reason. You cannot have real causal relations to effects that do not really exist. An accident can be nothing more than something *of* a substance, *to* a substance, *from* a substance, etc. But those prepositions must express either a formal (*secundum esse*) or a material (*secundum dici*) relation between substance and accident. If the former, the terms of the relation, the substance and accident, must each be realities distinct from the relation. If the latter, the relation must be identical with a being, either the substance or the accident, that is NOT JUST a relational mode of being (note the analogical weakening of the way the common ratio, relation, applies to the second kind of relation.) So we cannot define the ratio of 'being' that is exclusive to accidents merely by an accident's causal relation to substance any more than we can define 'wisdom' as said of God to mean 'the cause of created wisdom'.

How then is the primary analogate of an orderable common ratio included in the definition of the analogical term as said of the secondary analogate? Where the common ratio is orderable rather than generic, what the primary analogate is is a way of having the common ratio that constitutes a strengthening, a prioritizing relative to the way of having the common ratio that

constitutes what the secondary analogate is. So what must be included in the definition of the secondary analogate is the way of having the common ratio that is NOT true of the secondary analogate, otherwise what the primary analogate is would not be included in the definition of the secondary analogate. Where there is a common ratio associated with an analogical word, the definition of the secondary analogate must include a reference to the primary analogate by including a negation of the way of having the common ratio that defines the primary analogate. In short, where there is an orderable common ratio, the inferiors must constitute an analogical set in precisely Simon's sense.

It does not follow, however, that the way of expressing the difference of the analogate that is primary, whether in our knowledge or in being, must be positive rather than negative from a logical point of view, the point of view of the way we must objectify the difference. Again, the logical devices by which analogical terms are defined when there is an orderable common ratio are many and varied, but most significantly, they can be complex, subtle and, to say the least, confusing. The primary analogate, outside the mind and probably in our knowledge as well, of the common ratio of 'relation' is the formal relation. But formal relations are by essence the weakest mode of being (the weakest analogate of 'accident' — quantity and quality being 'absolute' modes of being-in-another). The common ratio of 'relation' is most true to itself, is achieved most genuinely, is fulfilled in the way that is most appropriate to what it is, in the place where the common ratio of 'being' is least true to itself, is achieved least genuinely, and is fulfilled in a way that is least appropriate to what it is. So to express the formal relation's stronger way of fulfilling the ratio of 'relation', we construct formulas that strategically imply a non-contradictory negation of any more complete way of fulfilling the ratio of 'being'. A formal relation is a 'pure' relation where 'pure' means 'only a relation', 'nothing more than a relation'. Only such a minimizing formula expresses what the primary analogate of 'relation' IS, expresses the kind of WHAT, the kind of BEING, that the primary analogate is.

Correspondingly, the difference of a material relation (so-called since it is the material cause when a formal relation exists in a subject) must be expressed by a negation, this time a contradictory one, of what is expressed by using negation in the formula for the primary analogate of 'relation'. So the minimizing formulas for formal relations constitute a maximizing, an amplification, of the common ratio as compared to the way that ratio is satisfied by material relations. And the primary analogate is included in the definition of the secondary by using negation to contradict what is expressed by a formula already constructed from a negative point of view. The effect of this double negation is, of course, something positive. A material relation is a mode of being that is absolute ('absolute' in a primary analogous sense in the case of substance, in a secondary analogous sense in the case of quantities and qualities that provide the foundations for a substance's formal relations). But to objectify an absolute mode of being, not qua absolute, but qua satisfying the common ratio of 'relation' in a posterior way, we must use, not a formula that is fully positive from the logical point of view, but one that negates the prior negative effect of the formula expressing what the primary analogate of 'relation' is.

Again, that is why there are only two members in each of Simon's 'yes and yes' and 'yes-and-no' or 'yes-but' analogical sets of inferiors of a common ground: The common ground must be affirmable of each member of the set. But one analogate must be distinguished by a kind of priority (or posteriority) with respect to the common ground that is denied of the other. So the definition expressing the exclusive way the common ground is possessed by one of the things

analogically named must include the contradictory opposite of the exclusive way the common ground is possessed by the other. Substances exist in themselves; accidents do not, etc.

Aquinas not only frequently used the negation of one analogate's exclusive way of having the common ratio as the way the definition of the other analogate refers to the proper ratio of the first, he was explicitly aware of doing so. In the *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, Book IX, L. 1, he gives two different divisions of 'potency' into primary and secondary analogates. In each division, the primary sense of 'potency' is its use for an active principle of change. One secondary sense, its use for a passive potency for change, is 'reduced to' the primary because the secondary meaning is 'the principle by which one thing is moved by some other thing in as much as it is other'. (The reference to the otherness of the thing by which a passive potency is moved is, of course, the negative way that the active potency is included in the meaning of 'passive potency'.)

But there is another way of dividing 'potency' into primary and secondary analogates, because another use of 'potency' distinct from that for active potency is 'a disposition by which a thing cannot undergo a change for the worse' (*In Meta.*, 1778). For we sometimes use 'potency' such that we explain a change for the worse not by a capacity (a potency) but an incapacity (957). Sometimes thing's change for the worse indicates a lack of ability (potency) to resist an agent's power (active potency) to cause the change.

In both of these secondary senses of 'potency' there is a reference to the undergoing of a change, but one reference to the undergoing of a change consists of a denial. 'For in one sense the term designates a principle by reason of which someone CANNOT be acted upon (for evil); and in the other sense it designates a principle by reason of which someone can be acted on' (for good or evil). So Aquinas considers the case where potency means that someone CANNOT undergo a certain kind of change a case where 'something within us is referred to the undergoing a change' (1779), just as much as the case where potency means the ability to undergo a change. And

'Since the state of being acted upon depends on action, the definition "of the primary kind of potency," namely, active potency, must be given in the definition of both (secondary) senses of potency. Thus these two (secondary) senses of potency are reduced to the first, namely, to active potency, as to something prior' (ibid.).

even though the way the primary sense must be given in the definition of one of the secondary senses is by including an explicit negation of the primary sense in that definition. For that secondary analogate is defined as a potency because of which something is not acted on by the primary analogate in a certain way. So Aquinas considers the active potency to be included in the definition of an analogate as something the active potency CANNOT act on in a certain way just as much as it included in the definition of another analogate as something it can act on.

So what is partly the same between the diverse meanings of an analogical term is not always the meaning that is exclusive to the primary analogate, as it is for 'healthy'. Between 'exists in itself' and 'does not exist in itself', what is partly the same is NOT what is expressed by the phrase 'exists in itself', the phrase that refers recursively to the primary analogate. That phrase is used to express the way the meanings of 'substance' and 'accident' are partly different. What, then, is the element that is partly the same in the meanings of 'substance' and 'accident'? When we say an accident does not exist in itself, we are not denying that the accident exists at all. On the contrary, we are assuming that it does; otherwise, 'accident' wouldn't be predicable of any categories of cognition-independent being, but only of the opposite, beings of reason. So

what is partly the same in these meanings is the assumed 'an existent' or 'something that exists', and therefore is something that either does or does not exist in itself. When there is an orderable common ratio, what is partly the same between the diverse meanings of the analogical term is the common ratio itself. That's why it's common; it's predicated of both. What is partly different is the weakening or strengthening of that ratio which is exclusive to each of the analogates.

5.

As I said above, Aquinas' calling a ratio, not just a word, 'analogically one' and 'one ratio according to analogy', which is what allows things of which the ratio is predicated to be under one distribution, is important for saving at least one other text from contradiction. ST I q. 13, a. 5 ad 1 says that our first predicate, 'being', is analogical. (The context is an objection about pure equivocation as opposed to analogy's 'controlled equivocation', in McInerny's felicitous phrase.) How can this be since Aquinas repeatedly says that the *per prius* and *posterius* in analogical terms consists of the inclusion of one of thing for which the analogical term is used in the definition of another? If so, the term whose definition is placed in another definition must originally be univocal, since there is no analogical usage until one use of a term has already been placed in another definition of the term. But Aquinas says 'being' is analogical from the beginning AND is our first predicate. So 'being' cannot be analogical by way of our placing some prior univocal definition, e.g., that of 'substance', either in its ('being's') definition or in some other definition, e.g., that of 'accident'.

One way out would be to say that although 'being' originally has the univocal meaning, *substance* or *what exists in itself*, unlike most other originally univocal terms 'being' MUST go on to be used analogically in other cases. But why must it later be so used? Nothing requires us to use 'healthy' of medicine or urine. As said of them, 'healthy' is just an abbreviation for facts we could express without having analogical uses of 'healthy' among our linguistic tools. Why would 'being' have to be different in this respect? Unlike 'healthy', 'being' is used for each analogate to express something intrinsic to them (although this does not constitute a difference affecting the definition of 'analogy' per se; the definition of 'analogy' is indifferent to intrinsic or extrinsic predication as McInerny has so importantly pointed out). But univocals and pure equivocals can also express something intrinsic to the things they are said of. Why is 'being' both an intrinsic predication and a predication for which, unlike in univocal and equivocal predication, its first instance must be included in the definition of the posterior instance?

As Aquinas often notes about many analogical terms that happen to be of importance philosophically, there is some SIMILARITY between those things intrinsic to the analogates for which the analogical term is used, for example, a similarity between effects of God and God. This is true of 'being'; it is said of substance and accidents, of material creatures and immaterial creatures, and of creatures and creator because they each exist in some way. So 'exists' expresses a way in which one analogate is similar to others. But does this get us any further? Univocal terms also express similarities between things. Why is 'being' both a term used to express similarities and one that MUST be used analogically of at least one of the similar things? At least part of the answer is that the similarities between substance and accident, creature and creator are not sufficient to put them both in a common genus. If the respect in which they are similar could be expressed by a univocal predicate, the predicate would have to express a genus, a species or a subspecies. So we cannot use univocal terms to express their similarity. But neither will purely equivocal terms do, since pure equivocation does not, as such, express any similarity.

By this process of reasoning, do we arrive at the conclusion that the similarity of substance and accident, creature and creator must be expressed analogically? Not quite. From the fact that being is not a genus, we do reach the conclusion that we must use predicates that are neither purely univocal or equivocal, predicates whose meanings are not totally different but not totally the same. But that is not quite Aquinas's definition of analogy and so could not quite be an explanation of why 'being' MUST be also used analogically.

The definition of 'analogy' that McInerny has correctly shown us to be Aquinas' is not just that the meanings of a term are partly the same and partly different. Aquinas gives the more specific description that what constitutes the sameness-in-difference (and vice versa) is that what the term expresses is said *per prius* of one thing and *per posterius* of another. And even more specifically, he says that the priority and posteriority consists of (or results from) the fact that one use of the term is included in the definition of another. Because one use is included in the definition of another, it follows of necessity that these uses of the term are related by priority and posteriority and that they are partly the same and partly different. (Perhaps we could imagine cases where the sameness-in-difference does not consist of prior and posterior uses of the term, or where the priority and posteriority did not consist in one use being included in the definition of the other. If so, I am certainly not able to offer any such examples and even less able to offer examples that would be philosophically important [in the sense that philosophy needed to USE the example in solving its problems] or just philosophically interesting [in the sense that, as for 'healthy', it is helpful pedagogically or in the order of discovery for philosophy to at least TALK ABOUT the example]. If there were such examples, however, they would not satisfy Aquinas' strictest definition of 'analogy'.)

So how do we get from the above reasoning about 'being' as expressing a non-generic similarity to 'being' as analogous in the precise sense that predication by priority and posteriority is essential to it because one instance must be included in the definition of another? In Aquinas we can get to it because there are such things as analogical, as opposed to generic, common ratios. These are ratios whose common logical inferiors are such that their differences MUST be able to be expressed by priority and posteriority with respect to the common ratio itself. The logical inferiors of the common ratio are such that the difference of one is expressible by a strengthening with respect to the common ratio and the difference of another by a negation of that strengthening (or conversely by a weakening and a corresponding negation of the weakening).

Unlike a generic common ratio, which would found univocity, the ratio expressed by 'being' is essentially ORDERABLE with respect to its inferiors. Its nature requires that the ratios peculiar to the inferiors instantiating it are ordered with respect to it in such a way that they differ as being more or less, prior or posterior with respect to the common ratio. Since what one inferior is is nothing but a diminishment of the other inferior's way of having the common ratio, the subordinate ratio for one of them must include a reference to the subordinate ratio for the other. Therefore, predication of the word for the common ratio must be analogical, according to Aquinas' definition. This is exactly how *In I Peri*. L. 8, n. 6 illustrates priority and posteriority with respect to a common ratio.

So to explain what it means for first our predicate not to be a genus, it is not enough to say that 'being' is an analogical term, since the definition of an analogical term would seem to imply that in its first usage the term must be univocal. Rather, to explain what it means for our first predicate to be analogical, we need to know why being is not a genus; for the way that being

is not a genus is the reason why the word 'being' must be analogical, why our first predicate must be a word in the definition of one of whose instances the diverse definition of another instance must be included, why our first predicate is such that to express what one of its logical inferiors is, we need to refer to another logical inferior. The reason being is not a genus is NOT that 'being' is an analogical term. The reason that 'being' is an analogical term, the reason that one instance of being must be included in the definition of another, is that being is a non-generic common ratio.

Because 'being' expresses a common ratio that is not a genus, that ratio must be predicated of its inferiors in unequal ways, by priority and posteriority, not in equal ways. The reason being is not a genus is that the difference between its instances is nothing but an order of before-and-after, more-and-less with respect to an essentially orderable common ratio. Since we cannot express the difference between its inferiors by an addition that would leave them equal with respect to the common ratio, we must express it by affirming of one and denying of another a way of having the common ratio that amounts to a strengthening or weakening of what is expressed by the word for the common ratio in one case and a negation of that strengthening or weakening in another. And by denying of one analogate the other's way of having what the word for the common ratio expresses, we are including the strengthening or weakening that is the distinguishing ratio of one in the definition of the other by denial. And so we necessarily express what each inferior is by means of language that is analogical, according to Aquinas' definition of 'analogy'.

Association with an orderable common ratio is incidental to the nature of an analogical term, as such. But association with an orderable common ratio is essential to the reason 'being' and many other crucial philosophical terms must be analogical, namely, that they express non-generic, orderable, common ratios. For that is the reason why the ratio exclusive to one inferior must be included in the definition of the other, which is what makes a word analogical. The reason why 'being' must be said analogically of substance and accident is that when 'being' is said of accident, it is said of something whose distinguishing ratio is nothing but a negation of the way of having the common ratio of 'being' that is exclusive to substance.

So there is one more example to be added to the list of analogical common ratios: the common ratio associated with the phrase 'common ratio' itself. That phrase must be said with priority of a genus and posteriority of an analogical paragenus; to put it another way, 'common ratio' expresses a ratio that is an analogically common ratio, a ratio that is itself a paragenus, with respect to these logical inferiors: the primary analogate, a generic common ratio, and the secondary analogate, a paragenic or analogical common ratio. A generic common ratio is one with respect to which the logical inferiors are equal; with respect to an analogical common ratio, the logical inferiors are not equal. A generic common ratio is one that is not predicable of its inferiors with priority and posteriority regarding the common ratio itself; an analogical common ratio is one that is so predicable.

'Analogical' and 'analogically' are defined primarily for words and then extended, in a way that refers to the primary definition, to the common ratios expressed by certain of those words. For the vocabulary of analogy is extended to those common ratios whose inferiors are differentiated, not by specific differences, but by unequal ways of instantiating the common ratio. That is, the vocabulary of analogy is extended to those common ratios the terms for which must be used analogically when expressing the distinctive ratios of the logical inferiors of the common ratio. The definition of the primary analogate of 'analogy', namely, words, is included

in the definition of the secondary analogate, namely, common ratios that must be so expressed by words that the distinctive ratio of one logical inferior is expressed by a strengthening or a weakening of the way a word is used to express what is distinctive to the other. (Notice that this way of extending 'analogical' is not based on a common ratio covering the different uses, the use for words and the use for ratios. There is a common ratio for genera and paragenera, an analogical rather than univocal common ratio. But 'analogical' common ratios are so called, not due to their sharing a ratio with words, but due to their necessarily causing the words for them to satisfy Aquinas' definition of analogical words.)

And in terms of the definition of 'analogy' that applies to all analogical words, whether associated with common ratio or not, when the proper ratio of any primary analogate is included in the definition of the secondary, the ratio proper to the primary does NOT become a 'common' (or abstracted) ratio in the sense in which Aquinas speaks of analogical common (and abstracted) ratios. Not only is there no support for that in Aquinas, but the fact that he allows the reference to the proper ratio of the primary in the definition of the secondary to be a NEGATION, a denial, rules that out. When we refer to the proper ratio of 'substance' by explicitly excluding it from the ratio of 'accident', we do not make the proper ratio of 'substance' common to substance and accident; we do the opposite.

6.

One important conclusion from all of this is that we must use statements like 'Whatever other than substance is called being must be referred to substance in order to explain the predication' (McInerny, *Studies in Analogy*, p. 54) very carefully, according to distinctions McInerny has taught us. If we are explaining why predicating 'being' of things other than substance satisfies the definition of an 'analogical' predication, we must explain that there is a reference to 'being' as said of substance in the meaning of 'accident'. But when we are explaining the attribution of being to accidents, we might be explaining other things than why the word 'being' satisfies the definition of an 'analogical' word. When we are explaining why the attribution satisfies the definition of 'analogy', we are explaining the truth of a second-order statement belonging to the science of logic. If we are explaining why the first-order statement of metaphysics, 'Accidents exist', is true of the extra-logical world, we must refer to substance but not because the definition of analogical words would not be satisfied unless we did. Rather, we must refer to substance because accidents could not exist except by residing in substance as their material cause. And if we are explaining the second-order, logical fact that 'being' as said of substance and accident is non-generic, or explaining how 'being' can be said of both and yet not be a genus, the explanation is not that the meaning of 'accident' refers to the meaning of 'substance' and therefore satisfies the definition of an analogical word. The fact that 'being' as said of accident makes an analogical reference to the way 'being' is said of substance is not the explanation of but a necessary consequence of the reason 'being' can be said commonly of substance and accident even though they do not have a generic common ratio, namely, the fact that 'being' expresses an orderable common ratio.

Even more importantly, we can say that when one science happens to deal with several things referred to by one analogical word, the reason is not that there happens to be a common word used analogically of them. It is not the fact that we use a word analogously of different things that is the basis for one science studying them. Rather, the extra-linguistic facts that happen to ground the analogical use of a word also explain why one science must study the different things. This is true both of examples like 'healthy' as said of the body and medicine

and 'being' as said of substance and accident. The reason one science is interested both in the condition of the body and in penicillin is not that each can be called 'healthy' without equivocation of a purely arbitrary kind. A language need not use 'healthy' in these ways, and there are probably many cases where we could have extended words for other things studied in the sciences the way we have analogically extended 'healthy' but have not done so. But there is an extra-linguistic connection between penicillin and the condition of the body which both requires one science to be concerned with each and makes the extension in meaning from 'healthy' as said of the body to 'healthy' as said of penicillin anything but arbitrary. Likewise, there is an extra-linguistic reason why the definition of 'accident' must refer to the meaning of 'being' that is exclusive to substance, namely, that the intrinsic natures exclusive to substance and accidents amount to no more than a strengthening or diminishing, respectively, of the common ratio of 'being'. And that extra-linguistic reason, not its linguistic consequence that the proper ratio of 'substance' must be referred to in the definition of 'accident', is also the reason the science of being as being MUST study both substance and accident, the former primarily and the latter secondarily. For one science to study different things, there must be a relationship between the things that is relevant to the science for some other reason than the relationship's being the basis of the analogical use of a word.

We must also be careful when we use statements like 'In names common to God and creature, the underlying reference of effect to cause always explains the community of the name' (*The Logic of Analogy*, p. 93). 'Explains the community of the name' can mean different things in different contexts. If we are explaining why a statement like 'Some creatures have free will' is true, a reference to the fact that God caused the power of free will in them might be the relevant answer. But if we are explaining why the community of 'will' as said of God and creature is the kind that satisfies Aquinas' definition of 'analogy', the answer is not that our means of including God's way of having a will in the definition of a creature's way (or vice versa) must be a reference to the fact that God's will is the cause of a creature's or that a creature's is an effect of God's.

7.

This section addresses a technical confusion the preceding analyses might leave you with and can safely be skipped by any who finds it uninteresting.

This just-cited extra-*linguistic* reason why analogical predication is required for 'being' is not an extra-*logical* reason, as is the reason that justifies the analogical predication of 'healthy'. Isn't there an extra-logical reason, however, why substance must be referred to in the definition of 'accident', namely, that accidents could not exist except as fulfillments of a potency of substance? Yes, but when we are asking questions about sciences, definitions (including the definition of 'analogy'), ratios being proper and common, extrinsic and intrinsic denominations, etc., we are in the domain of logic. The reason why the *logical* fact of the inclusion of the health of the body in the definition of 'healthy' as said of penicillin is directly grounded on an *extra-logical* fact is that there is no logically common ratio intervening as there is in the case of 'being' as said of substance and accident. (A paragenus is logical in the same sense that a genus is.)

Still, that common ratio, as well as its diminishment in the case of accidents, must have an extra-logical basis; so the logical inclusion of substance in the definition of 'accident' has a crucial indirect ground in what the realities objectified by the common ratio and its diminishment are. The extra-logical basis for a ratio's being common is a similarity between

perfections found extra-logically in different analogates. To express similarity between perfections found in each, we must be able to assert a predicate in the same sense of each. So the predicate must be associated with a common ratio that, as said of each, objectifies a perfection found in each. Thus, we saw that 'good' and 'exists' are used in the same way in each statement of argument (A), no matter that the candidates for the minor term, 'X', can differ infinitely in how they satisfy the associated common ratios outside the mind. And there is an extra-logical similarity between what we use 'exists' for in the case of substance and what we use it for in the case of 'accidents'. In each case we are trying to express, for example, that what we are predicating 'exists' of stands outside of nothing, or outside of its causes, or outside of merely being conceived or imagined. (I don't mean to imply that any such description can adequately define the undefinable: the objective concept which, as our first, is presupposed by every definition and which, as Aquinas says, is analogical from the beginning.) And both substances and accidents can stand outside their causes, etc.

Likewise, the analogical diminishment and/or strengthening of a common ratio must have an extra-logical basis since it must express an extra-logical condition. The logical diminishment that expresses the difference of accidents must consist of a reference to an extra-logical condition, not just to the logical fact that what distinguishes accidents is a diminishment of a common ratio. 'Diminishment' as it has been used here expresses a logical property, since it is a difference that is opposed to a specific difference in the case of generic common ratios. Real natures, however, are differentiated by real extra-logical properties, not by logical properties. The specific difference of humankind, rationality, is a real, extra-logical characteristic that acquires the logical property of being a specific difference only because of our use of it to objectify human nature by means of a definition, a use made necessary by the real, extra-logical structure of human nature. The content of a non-generic common ratio is extra-logical, just as is the content of a generic common ratio. And so the differences between inferiors must amount to a diminishment or strengthening of the extra-logical content of the common ratio; for the logical diminishment or strengthening must express a real, extra-logical condition just as a specific difference must.

So the fact that the direct reason the use of some words must satisfy the definition of analogy is logical, not real, namely, that the words have non-generic common ratios associated with them, does not at all lessen the importance of expressing what distinguishes the analogates by means of real, not logical, properties. That what distinguishes the secondary from the primary is a diminishment of what is exclusive to the primary is true of every secondary analogate of a common analogical ratio; so that logical fact tells us nothing about, for example, substance and accident as extra-logical values studied by the first-order science of being as being. We cannot distinguish accidents from substance, for the purposes of that science, just by stating the second-order fact, belonging to the science of logic, that since whatever distinguishes accidents from substance must be a diminishment of a common diminishable value whose undiminished state constitutes what is exclusive to substance, we must refer to substance when expressing what accidents are. As we have seen, that would explain why 'being' as said of substance and accident must satisfy Aquinas' definition of 'analogy', but the fact that the word, 'being', satisfies that definition does not tell us why and how the science of being as being must deal with both substance and accidents.

How the logical diminishment necessitated by the non-generic common ratio is made depends on, and is itself necessitated by, what that distinguishing real, extra-logical condition is in each case. And how the logical diminishment is made will vary greatly according to the extra-

logical condition being expressed. As we saw above using the example of 'relation', the ways we express the differences of primary and secondary analogates when there is a common ratio vary considerably from the logical point of view. But the ultimate reason for the exact way we express such a difference is what the thing being expressed is extra-logically.

The way we logically diminish the common ratio of 'being' to express what an accident is differs from the way we logically diminish the common ratio of 'virtue' to express what non-moral virtues are. The way we must logically diminish the common ratio of 'being' is by expressing the extra-logical fact that accidents only acquire the status of real existents by residing in another being which, ipso facto, is their material or subjective cause, the potency of which they are acts. They are only beings of another being; so there must be an at least implicit reference to substance in the definition of accident since that in which accidents exist is something which does not itself exist by residing in another being. But moral virtues are not the material causes of intellectual virtues; so intellectual virtues cannot be correctly distinguished from moral by saying or implying that they reside in moral virtues, as we must distinguish accidents by saying or implying that they reside in substance. So there is a shared logical reason why the secondary analogates of both 'being' and 'virtue' must be defined by reference to their respective primary analogates: They must be so defined because 'being' and 'virtue' both express non-generic, orderable common ratios. But there is no shared extra-logical reason for the particular way the definition of the secondary analogate must refer to the primary analogate in each case. Extra-logical reality requires that accidents be defined by referring to substance as to the subject in which they reside. Extra-logical reality requires that intellectual virtues NOT be defined by referring to moral virtues as to the subject in which intellectual virtues reside. Still in each case, the definition of the secondary analogate must refer to the primary analogate by some means; for it must include some sort of logical diminishment of the way of satisfying the common ratio that expresses what the primary analogate is because that way constitutes what the primary analogate is.

That the definition of 'accident' must include a reference to substance is necessitated by the logical fact that being is a non-generic common ratio. That the definition 'accident' must include a reference to substance is also necessitated by the extra-logical fact that accidents only exist as residing in substances. These are differing but absolutely complementary lines of necessity. Both their necessity and their complementarity is sealed by the fact that the common ratio expresses a similarity between perfections found extra-logically in each, while the strengthening or diminishing of the common ratio expresses an extra-logical dissimilarity, an extra-logical condition found in one but not the other. But the fact that accidents only exist by residing in substance, and therefore must be defined analogically by reference to substance, is not the reason why substance and accident are studied by one science. The reason is that there is an extra-logical similarity between perfections found intrinsically in both that the common ratio 'being' objectifies. For we can predicate 'does NOT exist in itself' of accident without giving any reason why the science of being as being should study accidents. Unicorns don't exist in themselves either. What makes accidents of interest to the metaphysician is that we can predicate 'exist in another' of accidents, which presupposes that that they have an extra-logical condition which we must be able to express by 'EXISTS', given the extra-logical condition that we express by 'exists' in the case of substance.

So there is no conflict between saying that the direct reason substance must be referred to in the definition of 'accident', unlike the reason we can use 'healthy' analogically, is logical and saying that substance must also be referred to in the definition of 'accident' because of the extra-

logical fact that accidents are nothing but actuations of potencies of substances. As McNerny has taught us, the definition of 'analogical' usage by the fact that one thing is referred to in the definition of another leaves room for all sorts of important and scientifically relevant first-order differences between cases of analogy, differences that do not constitute divisions essential to the analogical character of terms as such. In the same way, the fact that many terms are associated with common ratios that require analogical usage because the ratios are non-generic leaves room for all sorts of important and scientifically relevant first-order, extra-logical differences that do not constitute essential divisions with respect to the logical character of non-generic common ratios as such.

8.

I will now reply to two possible objections of a purely textual nature. First, in the large majority (at least) of texts where Aquinas defines analogical terms, there is no reference to a common ratio but there is often (and perhaps always, at least for all practical purposes) a reference to the fact that a term is analogical because it expresses meanings that are diverse but are partly the same. In the definition of 'analogical', do the conspicuous presence of differentiated meanings and the conspicuous absence of references to a common ratio imply that Aquinas is rejecting the idea that there can ever be a common ratio associated with an analogous term? No, in strictest logic it only implies that, if there is such a common ratio, it is incidental to the reason the word is classifiable as analogical. It leaves open the possibility that some analogical terms have such an 'incidental' (from the strict point of view of the definition of analogy) common ratio associated with them.

But the fact that the presence of a common ratio is incidental to the definition of an analogous term does not imply that when there is a common ratio, that ratio is incidental to the reason a particular term must be used analogously. As we have seen, the orderable character of a common ratio is the reason why what is distinctive to one analogate must amount to no more than a strengthening or weakening of what is distinctive to another analogate's way of having the common ratio, and so the reason why the definition of one thing of which an analogous term is used must include a reference to another thing's way of having the common ratio.

Second, however, at least one text of Aquinas seems to explicitly reject the association of an analogous term with a common ratio, and to reject it in a way that casts doubt on the association of any analogous term with a common ratio. That text is in the *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 6, n. 81; it seems to assert that there is no one common ratio for 'good'. I don't like saying this, but that text would have pleased Gilson no end; it appears to give credence to his suggestion that Aquinas is not always expressing his own views in his commentaries on Aristotle.

For in *De Veritate* q. 21, a. 4 ad 8 and 9, Aquinas clearly distinguishes 'the ratio of goodness absolutely considered' (the ratio of that by which whatever is good, whether creature or creator, is good) from the ratio of 'the first' or 'pure goodness', which differs from the ratio absolutely considered by an addition of reason (a negation, namely, the first goodness' inability to receive any reality distinct from what it is, an inability that cannot be a characteristic of goodness absolutely considered, just as universality and individuality cannot be characteristics of a nature absolutely considered). By rigorous implication, therefore, he also distinguishes both the ratio of goodness absolutely considered and the ratio of the first goodness from the ratio of 'secondary goods', instances of goodness absolutely considered that are 'not pure goodness'. The implication is rigorous because the distinction of the first, pure instance of goodness from

goodness absolutely considered implies that there are secondary, impure instances that differ from goodness absolutely considered by the contrary addition of reason: the negation of the addition of reason, the previous negation, that distinguishes the first goodness. So there is a common ratio for 'goodness' (or 'good') predicable both of the pure goodness and of goods that are not the pure goodness.

And in *ad 4* of that question, having just said that 'being' can be predicated of essence and of whiteness, Aquinas adds that the other transcendentals can also be predicated of them because the transcendentals are inseparably connected with 'the ratio of 'being'' — notice the singular — which he knows to be a common ratio (and which he is clearly assuming to be a common ratio because it can be predicated of both essence and whiteness and because the other transcendental's connection with it enables them to be so predicated). So Aquinas again asserts the existence of a ratio for a transcendental term like 'good' that, as inseparably connected with the ratio of 'being', must also be a common ratio, and as Aquinas also says, it too expresses something intrinsic to its analogates.

(It would not be worth it to spend time and energy reconciling these texts of Aquinas with the *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*, even for the purpose of proving or disproving Gilson's view of the commentaries. Aristotelians have other solemn obligations to fulfill first. But if it were worth it, note this: Before the replies to objections in that *De Veritate* article assert that there is a common ratio for 'good', the body of the article approvingly cites the *Nicomachean Ethics*' criticism of Plato that his principles do not make room for common ratios for non-univocal terms, which is the context where Aquinas's commentary and Aristotle APPEAR to reject, not just Plato's, but ANY common ratio for 'good'. So *De Veritate*, unlike the *Ethics* commentary, implies that the *Ethics*' argument against a common ratio only works against Plato's version. In the commentary, was Aquinas just showing deference to Aristotle's apparent position? Or did Aquinas agree with Aristotle then but later decide that the *Ethics*' critique of a common ratio for good only applies to Plato's version? Who can know for sure? And if we can't know for sure, SUDAPT!)

Also, as above illustrated in argument (A), we cannot reason about the transcendentals without common ratios for each of them. When the middle and major terms are transcendentals, even an argument applying a truth about transcendentals to an individual instance, as in (A), does not rely on ratios peculiar to the instance rather than common to all the instances. So whatever the interpretive truth is about Aquinas' texts on analogy, for the sake of philosophical truth he should have said that there are common ratios for the transcendentals.

9.

Given their centrality in arguments about the transcendentals, about predicates attributable to both God and creatures, and other matters, it is important to avoid certain misconceptions about analogical common ratios.

On p. 128 of *Aquinas and Analogy*, McNerny says:

What would the *ratio communis* of the analogous name 'healthy' be? Perhaps this: '_____ health'. That is, it is not so much a *ratio* as the skeleton of all the *rationes*. In the case of 'being', *ens*, the proper notion is 'that which exists of itself and not in another'. The other meanings of 'being' are various ways of referring to *esse* via the proper way, that is, substance. This common notion can be expressed by *habens esse* and *id quod habet esse* insofar as *habens* and *id quod habet* are not a determinate mode of existing but placemarkers for modes. That is, the common notion of 'being' could be

expressed as ‘_____ exists’ or ‘_____ existence’. When it is filled in as *id cui debet esse in se et non in alio* we have the proper notion, which applies to substance.

On p. 283 of *Being and Predication*, he says:

I've suggested elsewhere that it is advisable to think of this (a common ratio associated with an analogous name) as the possibility of a *ratio* rather than a *ratio*. That is, *habens in habens esse* is a blank or variable whose fillers or values will differ.

On p. 54 of *Studies in Analogy*, he says:

To notice that *habens esse* is one phrase tells us nothing of how it is common to the things named being; to insist on its oneness is very much like insisting on the fact that the same word ‘being’ is common to many.

In ratios common to substance and accident like ‘what has existence’ or ‘what exists’, can ‘what has’ or ‘what’ be considered mere place holders for the distinguishing modes of existence that make substance substance and accident accident, respectively? No for several reasons. For one thing, doing so would make the common ratio of ‘being’ into a logical rather than real value; for that is what happens if we think of ‘what has’ or ‘what’ as mere blanks before the word ‘existence’: ‘_____ existence’. Such a place holder would be a logical entity, a logical relation, at most; so what is *common* about the common ratio of ‘being’, that which the relation of commonness accrues to, would be a merely logical value to that extent. It is what fills in the conceptual blank, not the blank itself, that is extra-logical; what the empty conceptual place is held for is something extra-logical, not the held conceptual place itself. But in differing by priority and posteriority with respect to the common ratio of ‘being’ substance and accident do not differ by priority and posteriority with respect to a merely logical value. It is not a merely logical value that is found in both when ‘being’ or ‘exists’ expresses something found intrinsically in both.

And if the common ratio of ‘being’ is an empty logical value, must we not wind up good post-Fregeans, treating the ‘something’ in the ‘there is something such that’, which interprets Frege’s existential quantifier, as having a logical or grammatical value only, since ‘there is’ acquires a merely logical value after Frege. (See my ‘Wittgenstein as a Gateway to Analytical Thomism’ in *Analytical Thomism: Traditions in Dialogue*, ed. Paterson and Pugh, 2006) To be, *habens esse*, would be to be known.

And if the common ratio was something merely logical, why couldn’t the ratio be univocal the way dialectical common ratios can be, as McInerny has reminded us?

And if the common ratio of ‘being’ is such that *habens esse* tells us nothing of how it is common to the things named being, what about the common ratios that Aquinas says the analogical words ‘person’, ‘principle’, ‘origin’, ‘true’, ‘potency’, ‘passion’, ‘virtue’, ‘manifestation’, ‘sin’, or ‘good’ have? Are their common ratios just empty placemarkers?

And what does the use of common terms in arguments about the transcendentals, like argument (A), tell us? Nothing? Then, arguments like (A) would contain no more information than is expressed by: Whatever is blank-1 is blank-2; X is blank-1; so X is blank-2. Is what is common to the terms in arguments about the transcendentals something empty?

And if so, what does it mean for the inferiors of an analogical common ratio to ‘participate’ in that ratio, as *In Peri. I, L. 8, n. 6* says substance and accident participate in the common ratio of ‘being’. Or what does it mean for the analogates to participate in the common ratio by priority or posteriority, or by increase or diminishment?

And if the common ratio is a variable which does not yet have a value or ‘filler’, (since the values will be proper if only the variable is common), is the community of the analogical

name as said of each analogate like an unknown quantity of algebra? Then why is not the community of a generic name also like an algebraic unknown quantity, since the difference between analogical and generic common ratios is not that the value of the latter is known but that its value is not subject to orderable inequality. So the comparison with a variable of algebra would be that a genus is like a variable whose yet unknown value will be the same in every solution to the formula, while a paragenus is like a variable whose yet unknown values will differ in every solution.

And according to *In Peri. I, L. 8, n. 6*, the values of algebraic unknown quantities, numbers, differ by priority and posteriority according to their proper ratios, not their common ratio, being a multitude measurable by 1. If an analogical common ratio is like an unfilled mathematical variable, what is it that the analogates differ by priority and posteriority with respect to?

And if a common ratio is an unfilled variable, what is it that would be distributed when the analogates communicate in one distribution? If it is only the variable itself, like an 'x' that is shared by different solutions to a formula in algebra, in the sense that they are represented by that one symbol, we have pure and simple nominalism.

And the way the proper ratio of many analogical words is referred to in the secondary ratio is by way of negation, as we have seen. The way the proper ratio of 'being', for example, is included in both the notion of substance and accident does not express anything substance and accident have in common but expresses what distinguishes them. It does not express that intrinsic quality of substance on the one hand, or accident, on the other, which is what is expressed by calling them both beings; for the way the proper ratio of 'being' is included in that of accident is by negation, by denying that it is a perfection of accident. The way it is included denies that something intrinsic to substance is also intrinsic to accident. If we now take the common ratio of 'being' to tell us nothing about the analogates, or to be an empty blank or placemaker, the analogates will have nothing in common, since any 'common' predication will tell us nothing about either one, and accident will have no intrinsic perfection, since neither the common nor the proper ratio of 'being' attributes anything to it.

And what happens when we have a multi-level Porphyrean tree of analogical common ratios? At each level, the inferiors of a common ratio are common ratios with respect to their own inferiors. The ratio of 'being' is common to substance and accident. The ratio of 'substance' is common to material and immaterial substances. The ratio of 'accident' is common to absolute accidents and 'categorical' relations. The ratio of 'absolute accident' is common to quality and quantity. If every common ratio of an analogical term was just a blank place holder, only at the bottom level of the tree, where the ratios of 'quantity' and 'quality', and of 'relation' in the categorical sense, are no longer paragenic and so found univocal predication, would we reach ratios that were not blank place holders. Every common ratio above that level would be an empty place holder whose inferiors were other empty place holders until we reach the bottom of the tree where the common ratios are generic.

But why are 'quantity' and 'quality' and their respective inferiors not just further empty place holders relative to the types they divide into? If we reply that 'quantity' and 'quality' are not just empty place holders because their common ratios are genera, and so ground univocal predication, we beg the question by implying that the reason paragenic common ratios differ from generic is that the generic are not merely empty place holders while the paragenic are. (On page 226 of *Being and Predication*, McInerney compares the phrase 'having existence' to the

phrases ‘having whiteness’ and ‘having humanity’. If it were true that ‘having existence’ is a mere placemaker, a mere possibility of a ratio, a mere blank to be filled in, etc., that *Being and Predication* comparison would imply that ‘having whiteness’ and ‘having humanity’ were similar blanks to be filled in.)

Another example of a pargeneric tree would be ‘existence’ as said of entitative and intentional existence, ‘entitative existence’ as said of pure and received — and uncaused and caused, infinite and finite, etc. — existence, and ‘received existence’ as said of substantial and accidental existence. Another example would be ‘knowledge’ as said of speculative knowledge (knowledge differentiated by the reduplicative ‘for the sake of knowledge’) and practical knowledge (knowledge for the sake of something that is not just knowledge), and ‘practical knowledge’ as said (reduplicatively) of practically practical knowledge and of speculatively practical (where ‘speculative’ has the effect of canceling the latter reduplication) knowledge. For another example, see Simon, *Philosopher at Work*, p. 61 n.5.

And common ratios for analogical words are necessary to distinguish analogy from mere metaphor. Can the distinction of analogy from metaphor depend on an empty blank, a place holder signifying nothing, a variable representing an unknown value?

And Aquinas clearly taught that the ‘thing signified’ of an analogous name sometimes exists in more than one analogate. See, for example, *De Veritate*, 4, 1, where his examples are ‘being’ and ‘good’. But how can there be a ‘thing signified’ found intrinsically in more than one case unless it is objectified by a common ratio? A noise without a common ratio can signify something found in case 1 and found in case 2; for purely equivocal noises can signify something found intrinsically in each case. To distinguish an analogical from an equivocal word, either the thing signified must be found intrinsically in only one case, to which the use of the word for the other case would make reference; or it is found in both cases unequally, so that the use for one case would amount to a weakening or strengthening of what the word attributes to the other.

And, finally, I raised the specter of nominalism a moment ago. Unquestionably, a Thomist and medievalist as astute as McNerny had no intention of painting himself into a nominalistic corner. But take another look at the last of the three quotations from McNerny at the beginning of this section:

To notice that *habens esse* is one phrase tells us nothing of how it is common to the things named being; to insist on its oneness is very much like insisting on the fact that the same word ‘being’ is common to many (*Studies in Analogy*, p. 54)

How much closer can you get to nominalism than that? When we have predicated *habens esse* of more than one thing, the only oneness (commonness) expressed is like the oneness we express by saying the same noise ‘being’ is common to many. Nor does this remark from the following page help:

By the community of ‘being’ we mean neither the community of the generic nature nor that there is some subsistent thing apart from individuals in the category of substance. ‘Being’ is simply a wider, more common or universal name for what could more properly be called a substance, a quantity, a quality, or yet more properly, respectively, a man, a triangle, a color.

Yes, ‘being’ is a more common name for those things. But the whole question is what value does its greater commonness and universality have? Just the value that the same noise is pronounced for each?

Ironically, one of McNerny's opponents, Gilson, may have unintentionally painted himself into the same corner. How much difference is there between reasoning, as Gilson does in *The Elements of Christian Philosophy*, that existence cannot be known by an abstract concept because existence is concrete, and reasoning that since concepts tell us what things are and the things our concepts apply to are individuals, universality can only have a linguistic value? Universal words can never express a non-linguistic value that would be common to more than one instance. At least one of Gilson's disciples (Frederick Wilhelmsen in *The Paradoxical Structure of Existence*) carried Gilson's reasoning to a conclusion that only lacks the name 'nominalism', a conclusion that is other than 'nominalism' only nominally. (And by the way, how does nominalism avoid the consequence that all words are purely equivocal, since for the nominalist the logical relation, universality, doesn't pertain to anything other than similar noises and marks?)

I suspect McNerny felt forced into this untenable interpretation of the analogical common ratio only because he happened not to think of some of the alternatives presented earlier, especially that a 'common' is not opposed to a 'proper' ratio in the same sense that a 'proper' ratio is found in only one analogate — alternatives I was able to think of only after having the benefit of reading McNerny. On p. 32 of *Studies in Analogy*, for example, McNerny gives two possible senses in which a ratio can be common. In one sense 'it is saved perfectly and properly in every use' of a word. In that sense the ratio can only be univocal, since the phrase 'saved perfectly' rules out a diminished way of having the ratio. The other sense is 'that some of it is involved in every extended use of the word, something which calls for a reference back to the full and proper notion'. This sense might appear to mean that a ratio can be orderably common. But the phrase 'reference back to the full and *proper* notion' (my emphasis), as well as its context, shows that he is using 'proper' in the sense in which only one analogate has a ratio that can be called 'proper'. But that is the sense of 'proper ratio' that is opposed to a secondary, derivative or extended ratio, not to a common ratio. The reference to the primary analogate's exclusive ratio in the definition of the secondary analogate does not make the former ratio common; the reference to the primary ratio in the secondary must often occur in a denial, which does the opposite of making the ratio common, as we saw in Section 5.

Elsewhere, in discussing Scotus, McNerny correctly dismisses the further alternative that the common ratio of analogical word is some sort of 'disjunctive predicate', a disjunction of all the proper-as-opposed-to-secondary ratios. Several of this section's objections to the empty placemaker theory of an analogical common ratio would refute the disjunctive predicate theory as well.

10.

Although McNerny's minimizing analyses would apply to any common ratio associated with an analogical word, their contexts make it clear that he is mainly concerned about minimizing the common ratio of 'being'. He recognizes that being is what is first known and is that to which all our concepts are reduced. But he correctly adds that as being is 'first known', that is, when we know that X exists and nothing more about X, we have the minimal kind of knowledge we can possibly have about X. Everything else we subsequently learn about X will be an addition to what we knew when we first knew only that X exists.

Existence must start off as a rock-bottom minimal object of knowledge, but McNerny seems to think it has to stay that way, even when we reach metaphysical heights.

To say of God that he is subsistent existence is the safest and best way to speak of him because it says the least, is most confused, least informative and thereby implies least restriction on the divine being (*Being and Predication*, p. 234).

But rather than considering existence something minimal, doesn't Aquinas say that it is the act of all acts in creatures? And doesn't he recognize that before he talks, in ST, about 'He Who Is' as the most appropriate name of God? And don't the two arguments that ST I, q. 13, a. 11 gives imply that existence's being the act of all acts is at least part of the reason 'He Who Is' is the most proper name? One argument is that existence is the essence of God, and one reason Aquinas had given for its being God's essence is that it is the act of all acts in creatures. The other argument makes 'He Who Is' the most proper name of God, '*totum enim seipso comprehendens, habet ipsum esse velut quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum*'. And in *1 Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1*, doesn't he give the following as a reason 'exists' can be properly predicated of God:

Among all other participations in divine goodness, like to live, to understand and so on, existence is the first and is like the origin of the others, since it pre-contains all predicates in a certain kind of unity; and that is also the way God is the divine origin, and all things are one in him.

As just indicated, Aquinas also gives the fact that 'exists' is an indeterminate name as a reason it is properly said of God. What is the force of calling it 'indeterminate' in this context? To see, analyze the statement 'Existence is the act of all acts' the way Simon (and Maritain) has shown any affirmative truth must be analyzed: Its truth requires the extra-objective identity of distinct objective concepts. 'Existence' and 'act of all acts' must objectify the same dimension of extra-objective reality, but not in the same way. How does the way 'existence' objectifies that dimension of reality differ from the way 'act of all acts' does?

One obvious way is that 'existence' signifies less determinately as 'living' signifies less determinately than 'animal' and 'animal' than 'human', though each of the latter can signify an individual of the same extra-objective nature. But there is more. 'Existence' does not SAY 'act of all acts'; it does not even say 'act'. To recognize that the dimension of reality which first becomes an object of intellection when we make a judgment like 'Something red exists' is a kind of act as distinct from potency requires a later and much more sophisticated union of two objective concepts like 'Existence is a state of act'. 'Existence' does not say 'act of all acts' and even less does it enumerate any of the acts that existence is identical with in God, such as knowledge, love, power, goodness, intellect, etc. Still, God's existence pre-contains all those perfections extra-objectively. So those perfections are extra-objectively (that is, really) included in what we attribute to God when we say he exists; they are just not objectively (cognitively) included. They are really pre-contained in God's existence; they are not pre-contained as known objects in our understanding of the meaning of the word 'existence'. Therefore, they are not objectified as included in God's existence when we say 'existence' rather than 'act identical in God with knowledge, love, power', etc. That is the sense in which 'existence' is said to describe God indeterminately.

So the indeterminacy that Aquinas cites as one of the reasons 'existence' is said of God not only properly but most properly is hardly just any old indeterminate indeterminacy. It is an indeterminacy in objectification that is consistent with the fact that what is thus objectified is already known, by another mode of objectification, *judgment*, to be extra-objectively identical

with the act of all other (really distinct) acts in creatures, and to be extra-objectively identical in God with an act that, rather than being really distinct from all those other enumerated acts, includes them all. '*Omnia alia includuntur quodammodo in ente unite et indistincte, sicut in principio*' (In *I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 3). If 'existence' as said of God was not an indeterminate way of objectifying an act (more) determinately objectified as God's 'knowledge', 'love', 'beauty', etc., that is, a way of objectifying a reality with which God's knowledge, love, etc. are identical, but without 'existence' by itself objectifying them to be identical, 'He Who Is' would not be a proper name of God.

That is the only sense in which we can be consistent with Aquinas when we say that 'existence' is a proper name of God *because* of its indeterminacy. Thousands of human words, and perhaps all of them, are afflicted with indeterminacy in one way or another. Just consider the word 'determinate' itself. Indeterminacy alone does not make a name suitable to be a name of God. Only indeterminate words that are identifiable as words that indeterminately objectify what God is, identifiable as objectifying the same dimensions of reality that other words enumerate more determinately, are suitable names for God. Think of all the words for mixed perfections that are indeterminate but not suitable names of God.

So it is only a half-truth to say that 'He Who Is' is the best way to speak of God 'BECAUSE it says the least', and it is at most a half-truth to say 'He Who Is' is best 'because it . . . is MOST confused' (*Being and Predication*, p. 234; my emphases. In *I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4 says '*est sicut in quadam confusione*'). To say that 'Who exists' is the best is to compare it to other names of God; so compare it to a name like 'knower'. That word is affected by indeterminacy at least as much as other human words (if you doubt that, please explain the history of epistemology). To know is identical with the essence of God just as to exist is; so God's knowledge is identical with his act of existence. But the human word 'knowledge' does not indeterminately objectify what the human word 'existence' objectifies in God, the way 'existence' indeterminately objectifies what 'knowledge' objectifies in God. The reason we can indeterminately objectify in God by means of 'existence' what all other words objectify (more) determinately is that what our word 'existence' objectifies in creatures is knowably identical with what our words 'the act of all acts in creatures' objectify. But what our word 'knowledge' objectifies in creatures is not identical, knowably or any other way, with what 'the act of all acts in creatures' objectifies. 'Who exists' is not the best name of God just because it says less than all names like 'knower' but because, unlike the meaning of 'knowledge' as taken from creatures, the meaning of 'existence' as taken from creatures can indeterminately objectify for human beings all other perfections, named by us or not, in God since it alone names the act that is the act of all other even *possible* perfections found in creatures.

If I am reading McNerny correctly, he finds it difficult to identify that which is first known minimally with that which we later discover to be the act of all acts in creatures and the very essence of God. Referring to Fabro, he says 'It is surely difficult to get hold of the exact nature of the coincidence or identity of starting point and point of arrival Fabro insists on' (*Being and Predication*, p. 233). McNerny concludes that the starting point of our thought must be 'anything but what is first in reality. What is really first must be sought as a dialectical limit, but we don't run to first base if we are already there' (ibid., p. 235). But there is no contradiction in believing that the dimension of reality whose objectification starts off as the most minimal way of knowing what we know is the same dimension of reality that we can later know as, in Simon's felicitous phrase, 'the absolute'.

The reference to Fabro reminds us that McNerny is trying to counter some misunderstandings on the part of certain existential Thomists. And no doubt some existential Thomists have been guilty of exaggerations concerning important issues. For example, although act of making a factual *judgment* of existence, like 'X exists', is the psychological source of the *concept* of existence used by metaphysics, it does not eliminate the need for, or take the place of, that concept (see *Causal Realism*, ch. 5). But McNerny seems to have gone to the opposite extreme (and if so, has done no more than all we philosophers, not to mention human beings in general, are wont to do when reacting to a serious error). In doing so, he appears to have made the same mistake he describes as identifying 'the 'movement' of thought and 'the movement' of being (*Being and Predication*, p. 235). The only sense in which existence as first known is something minimal is just that: as something known, as an object of a certain kind of knowledge, but not as an extra-cognitional perfection. The fact that existence is minimally known to begin with does not imply that knowledge does not start with what is first in reality. All it implies is that we have no idea that what we are dealing with is what is first in reality until much later. What we know now as really distinct from what exists and as related to the totality of what exists as act to a distinct potency is what we originally knew very minimally.

The fallacy that McNerny seems to be committing is one that Aquinas described in ST I, 85, a. 1 ad 1 and elsewhere. If we judge that color is not in some colored body, like an apple, we are in error. But there is no error involved in just considering a color apart from the fact that it is the color of an apple. In both cases, color is understood otherwise than it is. In the first case, 'understood otherwise' refers to what is asserted and believed about the transobjective, extra-conceptual existence of the color. In the second case, it refers to the mode of understanding in the one who understands color in either of these ways, the cisobjective, intra-conceptual condition a color acquires in order that we can understand what it is extra-conceptually. But the person in whose knowledge color is other than it is in the second sense need not judge that color is other than it is in the first sense. Likewise, the mode of knowing of the person who only knows the truth of 'X exists' is a minimal mode of knowing X and existence. But having that minimal mode of understanding is not the same as judging that X's existence is something minimal as an extra-cognitional state, condition, perfection or value. Does the child who has the minimal knowledge that a rattle exists judge that its extra-cognitional existence is a dimension of reality that is the rattle's most insignificant, most minimal perfection?

Whatever we know, we can know better later than we knew it at first. But a better way of making something an object of knowledge does not make that object different as an extra-cognitional thing. A child who understands the word 'dead' sufficiently to know she will never see her dead father again has a conceptual relation to what death genuinely is. Does that mean she knows that death is the separation of the substantial form from prime matter or understands the difference between the death of the brain stem and partial brain death? No. But neither does it mean that when she is later able to make death an object of philosophic or scientific definition, she is knowing a different extra-objective state from the one she knew when she first learned the meaning of 'dead'. Nor does it mean she first judged, incorrectly, that death was NOT, in addition to being what she then understood, the separation of the substantial form from prime matter or the death of the brain stem. Likewise, 'knew minimally' does not mean that, when we originally knew that X exists, we judged that existence was the least possible perfection X could have. We did not judge that existence was something minimal as a perfection found outside of the mind, though our knowledge about what X and its existence are outside of the mind was

minimal. So we cannot contradict ourselves when we later judge that existence is the act of all X's other acts or the very essence of God.

Please do not think that I am accusing a philosopher as exceptionally learned and clear as McInerny of an elemental mistake. The problem of keeping straight the relations of things as things and things as objects of knowledge is not only 'the crux of the problem of realism' (as I have elsewhere somewhat loosely but not inappropriately translated Maritain). It is also the *crux philosophi*, the philosopher's cross, as modal logic is the 'logician's cross'. Maritain called the problem of universals the most important philosophical problem *quoad nos*; he later recognized that the problem of universals was an instance of the problem of thing and object. The real distinction of existence from essence in everything but God is the most important philosophical problem in itself. But the difficulty of balancing the distinctions between things as things and things as objects with the identity between what the thing is and what the object is has always been and always will be a huge obstacle to properly conceptualizing the truth about being in itself. The thing/object distinction that we find in Aristotle (by implication, in his use of the word 'object', his analysis of the fallacy behind Plato's Ideas, and his distinction of first philosophy from logic), Aquinas (the contrast with things as things being an implication of his explicit use of 'objects as objects', as well as an implication of several of his other theses), Cajetan (where the explicit contrast between things 'as things' and 'as objects' may first occur), Poinsot, Maritain and Simon is not a magic bullet for solving philosophical problems, as some thought that the distinction between existence and essence was. The *distinction* of thing and object (distinction-yet-identity) is just the most appropriate way of describing what causes us to stumble over the most difficult problems *quoad nos*. The *problem* of thing and object is just that, a problem we all will be struggling to overcome as long as we are doing philosophy on this side of the grave.

¹. Even if John Deely's use of the OED to justify translating *ratio* as 'rationale' was an incorrect reading of the OED, as I worry it could be, he might well argue now that his use of 'rationale' has become an accepted neologism among semioticians, due to Deely's own seminal work. This would be far from the first time an accident has produced good usage.