

Thoughts on why noncopulative sex is immoral:

By non"copulative" sex, I mean any sex that does not complete by penile penetration of the human vagina: masturbation, felatio, cunnilingus, sodomy, bestiality, pederasty, etc.

Even when infertile, their union is part of God's plan of procreation, exists for the sake of God's plan of procreation. And we should always be at least habitually conscious of this, or at least not explicitly deny it as we do in noncopulative sex. When infertile, their union is still what it is for the sake of God's plan of procreating and educating children.

The penis is what it is for the sake of what it can do when it enters the vagina at times of fertility. The vagina is what it is for the sake of what can happen when a penis enters it at times of fertility.

A man and woman's union is based on what sex can do at times of fertility. And sex is always what it is for the sake of what it can do then.

As long a sex is a means to the existence of an absolute, it can also be a means to our ends but never just a means to our ends.

The unitive meaning of sex includes is procreative meaning. (So separating the two means that unitive love is not based on valuing our partner as an AV.) So even when infertile, we must unite procreatively. That is, we must unite in a way that expresses the PM aspects of unity, expresses the fact that the unity is for the sake of creating Avs. (Grisez)

Love and life (that is, the love appropriate to Avs) are not two separate meanings but are intrinsically connected and conditioned. (Grisez)

We cannot do anything inconsistent with the sex act's itself, with our mode of union's itself, being suited to procreating. We must choose a means of union that is the same means we choose when we procreate. Whenever we unite, we must unite in the way that is a means of procreating. We must do what is suited for conception when the other conditions are, or if the other conditions were, present.

If so, we can have sex even if we know ourselves to be infertile due to causes extrinsic to their choice, extrinsic to the way they choose to have sex. We need not have the intention to procreate, only to use our PMA in a way consistent with procreating, that is, in a love-for-persons-as-AVs way.

Of itself, the sex drive, the PMA drive, is impersonal and merely physical. So how do we prevent ourselves from using sex in a way that makes the other an object of appropriation because her body is an object of appropriation? Is it enough to pursue sex as willingly given, e.g., by a prostitute, in order to treat the other as an EI and not merely as a means to our ends? No, using her person-making attractiveness is not like using her food-making attractiveness.

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The Lord intended the procreative act (and hence the one that completes vaginally) to be the vehicle of committed love between the spouses. The Lord intended the vehicle of committed love between the spouses to be the procreative act, the act that can transmit life, and hence the act which terminates vaginally. He did not intend just any act of passion or any orgasmic act or any ecstatic act to be the vehicle of love between spouses. He did not intend the vehicle of love between spouses to be just any ecstasy-producing act. He intended the spousal relation to be based on the act designed to procreate, the act chosen by evolution for its procreative function.

God wants the act that unites two people in committed love to be the same act that can create persons.

That is, the same act by which they can create persons when conditions out of the control of the choice of this act would allow them to create persons.

Because sexuality is our person-making ability, the context in which we use it can either affirm the ethically absolute value of the person as such or deny it. Do we have the right to tell someone else: I consensually give you permission to use my person-making ability in a way that prevents the absolute value of the person from being affirmed?

The act by which couples unite with each other should be the same act by which they can procreate. In other words, any use of our sexuality must be subordinate to its purpose of creating persons. That subordination does not mean that we should refrain from sex when infertile, but it does mean that even infertile sex must be subordinate in our evaluations to the absolute value for the sake of which sexuality exists. How do we subordinate infertile sex and the goals that it achieves to that other goal? One requirement is that we complete sex vaginally. If we choose not to complete sex vaginally, the status of our sexuality in our evaluations is not the status of existing for the sake of creating persons.

And to use sex as if it is the means for the coming into existence of persons, we must choose to use sex in the manner in which our union with our partner, our common pleasure with our partner, can bring persons into existence. That is, we must complete sex vaginally.

Sexual love is person making love. As person making love, it must be a love that honors, values, persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists; otherwise it is unworthy of being person making love.

So choose that our choice cannot be a cause of, cannot be a reason for, . . . the chosen act's not being a fertile act. So choose that the chosen manner of acting could not be a cause of . . . , that the chosen manner of acting is the same as the manner that can cause . . . . When we are already infertile, we cannot so choose that we cause the act to be infertile, but we can so choose that we cause it to be a kind of act, a kind of use of our sexuality, the could not be person making, that is, that could not be what it is for the

sake of being a person-making ability..

We cannot choose to use our person making ability as a means to an end in such a way that our choice causes it, and so we cause it, to be a kind of act that could not exist for the sake of producing that for the sake of which everything else exists. So choose to use our person making ability that, to the extent that the act is in the control of our choice, the act is the kind of act by which we can produce that for the sake of which everything else exists.

So choose in such a way that it is not the causality of our choice that prevents the act from producing that for the sake of which everything else exists, and so causes us to evaluate ends in themselves as if they were not that for the sake of which everything else exists.

So choose that the act chosen does not cause our choice to evaluate persons as if they were not that for the sake of which everything else exists by causing us to evaluate our person making ability as if it did not exist for the sake of that for the sake of which everything else exists, as if it were not one of the "everything else" that exists for the sake of persons. As if that which gives existence to persons were not one of the "everything else" that exists for the sake of the persons that it gives existence to. So maybe the argument against not vaginal sex is just a mirror image of the argument in favor of using sex when we know we are in fertile.

Nature has designed times of infertility for the benefit and well-being of those sex has brought into existence, both parents and children. But if we are to value those that sex has brought into existence as that for the sake of which everything else exists, we must value our sexuality as existing for the sake of bringing that for the sake of which everything else exists into existence.

The way we use our person making ability must be the same way that can produce offspring, the same way that we use it when we produce AVs, by which we produce offspring, when and if we are fertile. For the use of our person making ability must always be such that any other goal we are seeking is subordinate to the goal of making persons., the goal of uniting with another person-maker for the sake of

being person makers, for the sake of being the kind of united organism that can make persons when we are fertile.

In having a sex nonvaginally, the partners are doing it in a way which could not be a way that they become person makers. Each is relating to the other person in a way that could not be a way they unite to form a person maker. They are doing it in a way that could not be a way of subordinating sex to its person making ability. *They are doing it in a way in which they could not be evaluating the other purposes of sex in subordination to its person making purpose. In having sex while they know they are infertile, they are not necessarily evaluating sex to be something other than a person making ability., that is, as existing for the sake of something other than the existence of persons. In fact, they may be choosing vaginal sex precisely for the sake of avoiding a choice that would evaluate sex to exist for some other purpose.*

In having sex nonvaginally, they are saying in effect "let's not use our person making ability in the way that would be necessary if we were to evaluate it, treat it, and evaluate ourselves as having it, is always being something that is what it is for the sake of the existence of absolute values."

When we choose to use sex not vaginally, we are doing more than just recognizing the fact that we are otherwise infertile at that time. We are taking advantage of that infertility in such a way that in our evaluations we are saying "I can use my sexuality as if it did not exist, as if it is not what it is, for the sake of the existence of the absolute value." And so we are saying that the absolute value is not the absolute value. ("I can use my sexuality in a way not subordinate to the end of . . .")

A chosen sex act, insofar as it is chosen as a means to an end, insofar as it is a term of an evaluation by our will, must be suited for procreation, must be an act existing for the sake of making persons. (Insofar as it is a way of acting, a way of seeking an end). In our evaluations, it must be an exercise of an ability that exists for the sake of making persons, that is what it is for the sake of the existence of persons.

If nature prevents our sexuality from being able to produce persons at a particular time that is one thing.

But if we do anything that would cause a sex act not to be in our evaluations a person making act, the kind of act by which . . . ,that is another thing. Even when we know we are infertile, it is possible for sex to be, in our evaluations, in our system of values, something that is what it is for the sake of the existence of persons. But that is not possible if we use sex noncopulatively. If nature makes our sexuality infertile, still nature does not make sexuality to be, in our evaluations, something that is not what it is for the sake of the existence of persons.

In using sex at infertile times, I am not evaluating myself to be an agent oriented to prevent a means of person-making from having the status of being a means of person making. I am not misevaluating sex acts to be . . . something contrary to, opposed to, procreation. I am not evaluating myself to be an agent oriented to using sex in a such a way that it could not be a person making ability, in a way that is not what it is for the sake of its ability to produce children.

so choose that our evaluation of the chosen act, our way of evaluating the act, of making it a means to an end is, could not be causes of the act's being infertile, could not be a cause of the act's not being person making. (Because if our way of evaluating it did anything that could or would cause the act not to be a person making act, the act cannot be what it is, in our evaluations, for the sake of making persons.) So choose that the chosen means to an end is not prevented by the choice from being a means of person making, from being the way the partners can make persons when other conditions out of the partner's control are present.

It is not just the series of motions in the sex act that are for the sake of persons. The pleasure and everything else associated with sex are for the sake of the existence of persons, and for the well being of the new persons created by the act.

Conditions of in fertility are not subject to our choice. They are not under the control of choice. And so the appropriateness of a chosen act to realize organic complementarity depends, or the appropriateness of a

chosen act to be a person making act or a means of union in our evaluations depends, on being the choice of a pattern of behavior which, and when conditions out of the control of this act of choice exist, could result in conception. ... as long as we do not choose to be causes of the prevention of those conditions; as long as we do not choose to prevent those conditions. (Compare to choosing to prevent those conditions.) Conditions of infertility are not subject to our choice, but neither is it subject to our choice whether a given way of using our sexuality is suitable to . . . , is the kind of act that . . .

Conditions of in fertility are not part that human sex act. That is, they are not part of the sex act as chosen, since they are not in the control of human choice. So the appropriateness of the human sex act to realize organic complementarity (Grisez) does not depend on its being able to cause conception from a physical point of view, but on its being the kind of behavior, the pattern of behavior, by which human beings can become causes of reproduction by means of their choice to use a sex act, by means of their choice to use their sexuality. It depends on human beings choosing to use their sexuality in the manner in which they could become reproducers, if other necessary conditions out of their control were present.

Letting die is OK only if (but I need not say "if") we are not the cause of the death. Letting the sex act be infertile is OK if nothing we do causes it to be a way of so relating to another person maker that she could not be a person maker if she were fertile.

Letting someone die is OK when we are not the cause of the death; letting the sex act be infertile is OK if nothing we do causes it to be infertile, causes it to be a way of so relating to another person-maker that she cannot be a person-maker.

I strongly and sincerely love my wife, but my love is not based on respect for the person as an end-in-itself, because I do not subordinate, in my system of values, every other aspect of sex to procreation. Now I find out that we are infertile. Nothing in that revelation changes the status of the person in my values. So the person remains something that is, de facto, not an end-in-

itself, not that for the sake of which everything else exists.

So now I can continue the same way without consciously and deliberately interfering with procreation, but I have still done nothing to give the person the status it deserves in my system of values. So just ignoring the value of the person may be moral in some contexts, that is, contexts in which I do not have to consider taking action against procreation. But even in that context, I am faced with the choice of so using other aspects of my sexuality that the way I am using those other aspects could not be subordinated to the purpose of making a person. So ignoring is not enough to do justice to the person as an absolute value. To do that the way I, as a sexual being, must do it, as a free sexual being must do it, the only way I can do it is to freely subordinate every other aspect of sexuality to the purpose of making a person, even if I know that we are infertile.

This is it:

A human sex act as such, that is, as an object of human choice and as directed by human choice, must be so directed that nothing in the way in which it is chosen, nothing in the manner in which we direct it to an end, would prevent it from being a reproductive act.

Maybe sex just arose accidentally. But as used for rationally conscious chosen ends, it must exist for the sake of things that do not just happen to be that for the sake of which everything else exists, and it must exist for the sake of those things precisely as that for the sake of which everything else exists. So sex exists, not just for the sake of things that have been accidentally to be ends in themselves, but for the sake of those things precisely as that for the sake of which everything else exists.

If when infertile, I use my person making ability not vaginally, I evaluating it as a means to the kind of ends animals achieve, that is, goods of concupiscence. I have excluded the nature of persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists from the goods involved in my choice. So my person making ability is like my food making ability in my values. In using my food making ability as a food making ability, I am not



so choosing that I am putting myself in opposition to the good of ends in themselves as such. In using my person making ability in the way I choose to use my food making ability, I am so choosing that I am putting myself in opposition to the value of persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists.

Sex is what it is, as all the features it has, at times of infertility for the sake of what it is at times of fertility. In the same way, the brain is what it is at times of sleep for the sake of being a thinking instrument, an instrument for thinking. The brain always is what it is for the sake of being an instrument for thinking. Likewise, our sexuality at all times is what it is for the sake of being a person making ability. If it were not, then persons would not be that for the sake of which everything else exists. The times of infertility, even after menopause, are for the sake of our being person makers, and so for the sake of the existence of persons, because human person making does not stop at conception, it goes on until the offspring has reached psychological maturity in adulthood. So the parents need sexuality as a unifying factor to remain together while they are raising the child, even if one or the other of the parents has become permanently infertile. (And so the parents themselves need the subordination of sex to being a pma.)

Since our sexuality is always what it is for the sake of being a person making ability, that is, for the sake of bringing into existence that for the sake of which everything else exists, any use of our sexuality must use it as if, it must be treated as if, must value it to be a person making ability. For it is what it is for the sake of being a person making ability. It is what it is even at times of infertility for the purpose of being a person making ability.

Compare the following cases. One infertile couple only completes the sex act vaginally, because, in their estimations, the other values associated with human sexuality must always be what they are, in our evaluations, primarily for the sake of being a person-making ability. For the reason sexuality exists at all in human beings is for the sake of a value that must always be the value to which other values are subordinated in our evaluations. Another infertile couple, knowing that their sexuality cannot produce persons, practices sex in a way in which it would be impossible to make persons even if they were fertile. The act by which they express their love is not the same

act by which children come about, when couples are fertile. Should we say that they have not evaluated persons to be less than absolute values, since the means they are using to achieve other goals is not in fact a person-making ability? The primary reason why their sexuality exists at all is so that human beings can make other human beings at certain times in their lives. Since the existence of human beings is the existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists, the primary reason why our sexuality exists at all is for the existence of human persons. If we fail to evaluate our sexuality as if the primary reason it exists is for the sake of the existence of persons, we are failing to evaluate persons as that for the sake of which everything else exists. And if we so evaluate our sexuality that the way we use it would make the coming to be of a person impossible, we are failing to evaluate our sexuality as if the primary reason it is what it is is for the existence of persons.

Pornography, casual sex, etc., trivialize our person-making ability. They do it even though, e.g., the woman in the pornography is not fertile at the time. The features of her we are trivializing are the features by which we make persons, when we can make them, the features necessary for making children, when we can make them.

Are those features trivial when we are infertile? If so we could hurry and sterilize them before they become non-trivial.

The brain is an instrument for thinking, even when we are sleeping. It still is what it is, because evolution selected it for thinking. The stomach is still an instrument for digesting, even when we are fasting. What the stomach is, its design, its nature, is an organ selected for digesting; etc.

If I use drugs, etc., I violate what the brain is for. If I use sex anti-procreatively when I am infertile, I trivialize the features by which we can make persons.

Even when we are infertile, temporarily or permanently, to conform to what reason knows about human sexuality, a rational appetite must value everything else associated with sex as existing for the sake of making persons. Our cognitive faculties are what they are primarily for the sake of giving us knowledge of truth even when we are unconscious and so cannot exercise the ability to know truth. Our cognitive faculties do not entirely cease being what they are when we are unconscious, and the primary reason why they are what they are at that time is knowledge of truth. The existence of the first rational beings may have been an accidental product of blind forces of nature, but even if reason was selected for reproduction because, at some time in our evolution, it contributed something other than knowledge of truth to our survival, reason itself is not blind. And by reason itself we can recognize that it is rational knowledge of truth that makes us ends-in-themselves and that, therefore, what reason is deserves to be valued, even when it is not functional, primarily for being that which makes persons absolute values. (So a brain damaged person is still an AV.)

For persons do not cease being absolute values when reason is not functional. So should we value them as not being AVs at those times? Not valuing sex as a PMA at all times would be like not valuing persons, even comatose persons, at all times as being AVs.

When we judge brain damage, of any kind, to be a misfortune, by what standard do we judge it to be a misfortune? By the standard of whatever goal the damaged part of the brain could formerly achieve that it can no longer achieve. By implication, then, we are saying that, other things being equal, we should value what that part of the brain is in terms of what it formerly could contribute. Other things might not always be equal; something that is a disadvantage from one point of view might turn out to be an advantage from another point of view. But if the value in question is an absolute value, or a necessary condition for an absolute value, other things can never be equal.

Likewise reason knows that, even though someone is infertile, to the

extent she can perform sexual functions at all, what the features that constitute human sexuality are deserve to be valued as existing primarily for the sake of the coming to be of new persons. Even when we become naturally infertile, as at menopause, the primary reason that the faculties we continue to have exist at all is so that, at another period of our life, we could make beings of absolute moral value. If we refuse to value human sexuality in this way, persons are not, in our evaluations, that for the sake of which everything else exists.

We are obligated to value the features of human sexuality as existing primarily to be a means to an AV. When infertile, what sexuality then is still deserves our respect as . . . , still has the dignity of being . . . , still is not a plaything.

Sex has that link to human life not just in the sense that at certain periods of the month it can cause human life, but in the sense that its role in our lives is to make us person-producers and person-rearers. That is its role in the human species. The reason for the existence of sex at all is the existence of sex at those times when it is fertile.

In order for a choice to evaluate a sex act to be a means of union between two ends in themselves, evaluate the act as a means that respects the partners as ends in themselves, the choice must evaluate the sex act as existing for the sake of making that for the sake of which everything else exists, everything else including the loving union of two ends in themselves.

So if a couple uses their sexuality non-vaginally, in their valuation the act by which they give each other pleasure is not an act that exists for the sake of making, is not what it is for the sake of making persons. And so it is not what it is for the sake of making that for the sake of which everything else exists. And if not, they cannot be consistently evaluating each other as beings for the sake of which everything else exists.

If we do anything that would cause a sex act not to be, in our evaluations, what it is for the sake of the

existence of persons, we are causing the sex act not to be in our evaluations a natural sign expressing the status of our partner as a being worthy of committed love.

How does the sex act express, signify, the status of the partners as worthy of committed love? By being the means by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence. (By being the means, in our evaluations, by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence.) But if we use sex nonvaginally, we are using it as if it were not the means by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence. So sex would not express the status of the partners as worthy of committed love. (Because in our evaluations it is not a means to the existence of beings worthy of committed love, although that is what it is in fact at all times, that is, something that exists to be a means to the existence of absolute values .)

How does the sex act express, signify, the status of the partners as worthy of committed love? By being the means by which beings worthy of committed love come into existence. So if we choose to use our sexuality in a way in which it cannot be the means of procreation, we are choosing to use it in a way that it cannot express the value of the partners as worthy of committed love. So our choice does not evaluate the person as something worthy of committed love for its own sake. The sex act expresses that value not only by being an act of desire for another person but by being an act of desire that can give existence to beings for the sake of which everything else exists. If we do anything that would cause a sex act not to be in our evaluations such an act we are not evaluating the person as the absolute value. And we are causing the sex act not to be a natural sign expressing the status of the partners as beings worthy of committed love.

When we see heterosexuals acting romantically toward each other, we know we're watching nature's design for making persons at work. We know this whether or not we know that the members of the couple are now fertile. Because we know what the primary and essential purpose for our sexuality is, and not only is it essential it is absolute.

When we see heterosexuals acting romantically toward each other, we are watching nature's design for

making person at work. We are watching nature's person making apparatus at work. We are watching nature's person making function at work. The way it works is for one person with a partial person making ability to be attracted to another person for the sake of the other person's partial person making ability. One person desires another person because of the other person's partial person making ability. One partial person making ability desires union with another person because of the other person's partial person making ability.

This is it.

The result, that is, the desired union, is the existence of a complete person making agency, a complete person making causal system. To say that my sexuality exists for the sake of the existence of persons is to say that, first of all, my sexuality exists for the sake of the existence of a complete person making causal system. So the fact that persons are that for the sake of which everything else exists means that my sexuality, as far as my values are concerned, must exist for the sake of the existence of a complete person making causal system. In my values, my sexuality must exist for that sake if persons are to have the status in my values all being that for the sake of which everything else exists. (What kind of causal system? A machine? No. A union of love, of self-giving, a union that is an act of love.)

I see an elderly, infertile couple kissing romantically. I am watching nature's plan for making people in action. The couple are not doing anything that would make their sexuality not be a person making ability. They are not doing anything that would cause their sexuality not to be a person making ability. They are not doing anything that causes it not to be a person making ability. Gays do.

We cannot be responsible for making the use of our person making ability into the kind of use in which it cannot be a person making ability. We cannot be responsible for making the way we use our person making ability be a way in which it cannot be a person making ability. This is what the homosexual does. Or this is what homosexual acts do. To choose a homosexual act is to choose to use our person making ability in a way that it could not be a person making ability. When we simply use sex while infertile, we are not using sex in a way in which it could not be a person-making ability. The timing of the use prevents it

from being a person-making ability, but the manner in which we use it to, for example, seek pleasure does not prevent it from being a person-making ability. As far as it is in our control, nothing we did prevents it from being a way of using our sexuality that could not be a person-making way.

Why can I not use my sexuality anyway I want when I am infertile? Because in doing so, I would be doing what animals do and achieving the kinds of goods animals, that is, beings that are not ends in themselves, achieve. The nature of the person, the value of the person, is not involved in any of the goods of those kinds. So I need not be truly valuing myself and my partner as ends in themselves while pursuing those kinds of goods. In other words, when using my sexuality non-vaginally, I am evaluating my sexuality as if it were like my food making ability. That is I am evaluating my sexuality as if it were oriented toward goods that are not in themselves ends in themselves. That's all it is at that time.

I just used the phrase "need not." But to say that I need not do something does not amount to saying that I am contradicting the doing of that something. Yes, but in using my food making ability, I need not, but in using my person making ability in a certain way I must, be putting myself in opposition to the value of a person as that for the sake of which sexuality exists. My sexuality does not exist just for the sake of this person, namely, myself, as my food making ability does. (My sexuality exists for the sake of another person with a partial person-making ability becoming part of a complete person-making causal system.)

In other words, ends in themselves must always use sexuality as if it is the means, was the means, by which they came into existence. If we do not use it as if it is a means by which we came into existence, we are not evaluating our coming into existence as the coming into existence of that for the sake of which everything else exists. And so we are not evaluating ourselves as that for the sake of which everything else exists.

Valuing her as having a person-making ability must always subordinate other aspects of her sexuality to its being a person-making ability.

If I do not evaluate myself as a maker of that for the sake of which everything else exists, I cannot evaluate myself, my partner, my children,

etc. as that for the sake of which everything else exists.

If we created an artificial means of procreation, our own nature, our own psychology, would not change. As of now, when sex is the only means, the relationship of one partner to the other fully values the other partner as an end-in-itself if and only if we subordinate that relationship to the purpose of procreation. Given that the nature of our psychological makeup would remain the same,

Person making is the reason for my existence as a sexual being. If not, Persons are not Avs and I am not an AV.

We cannot use our person-making power outside of a context in which we leave the use of that power open to making persons. Nature may close the context so that persons cannot be made, but we cannot. This illustrates the sense in which we are responsible for our actions, not for their results. Or better, the sense in which ethics governs good or evil actions, regardless of results. The action in question is the act of the will. Just as it is against the goal of the rational appetite to evaluate ourselves to be agents oriented to our own destruction, and to the cessation of our orientation to ends, it is against the nature of the rational appetite to evaluate ourselves to be agents oriented to the preventing our person-making power from making persons.

The knowledge that directs my action cannot be the knowledge that act X will cause a posited sex act to be infertile, i.e., to achieve the end of being free from children. But I can use the knowledge that nature will cause a posited sex act to be infertile as the knowledge that directs my choice of whether or not to have sex.

The causal connection I adopt as a plan 1) cannot be the connection between act X and the effect of making me infertile; 2) cannot be the connection between act Y, e.g., sodomy, and . . . ?

I cannot knowingly chose as a means to an end an act that uses my PMA,



my sexuality, in a way that would make me a cause of infertility, that would prevent my PMA from being a PMA. Even if I am not now fertile, my PMA is still a PMA from the point of view of human means and ends, just as a sleeping brain is what it is for the sake of knowing - only the end of the PMA is an AV. But using it at that time nonvaginally would cause it not to be, would prevent it from being, a PMA.

As of now, when sex is the only means, the relationship of one partner to the other fully values the other partner as an end-in-itself if and only if we subordinate that relationship to the purpose of procreation. But if we create an artificial means of procreation, our nature, our psychology, does not change. Given that we are the same, can we still fully value ourselves, our partner, etc. as ends-in-themselves, if we use our sexuality in a way contrary to the purpose of procreation? If we use the power that brought us into existence, to which we owe all the value our existence has, in a way contrary to the purpose of bringing that kind of value into existence?

But can't we just choose to so value ourselves? Choice consists of a concrete pursuing of an end by a choice of a means. We cannot succeed in valuing ourselves or the other as an AV if we choose a means in a way that prevents us from valuing AVs to be what they are. And to choose to use our PMA, even when infertile, in a way in which our choice would cause it not to be a PMA is to choose as if an AV was not an AV. To choose a way of relating to the other person's PMA in a way that would prevent her from being a partner in a unified PMA . . .

Common good materially considered. Using an infertile PMA nonvaginally amounts to willing the common good formally, not materially. The couple must will it materially, not just formally.

If we so evaluate our sexuality that, as a result of that evaluation, as an effect caused by that evaluation, our sexuality could not make persons . . .

The prohibition of birth control is like the moral prohibition against taking

someone's life. That is, we are not always obligated to do something positive to save a life; similarly, we are not always obligated to perform an act that will produce a baby. And we are always obligated never to do something positive with the intention of taking a life; similarly, we are obligated never to do something positive with the intention of preventing the production of a baby.

It seems that in both of the above cases it is the value of a human person as a moral absolute, as an end-in-itself that is at stake. That is, the same status of a person as an end-in-itself prohibits positive action for the end of taking a life or of preventing a life, but does not prohibit refraining from an act that will save a life or that will produce a life.

(But is it the case that we can never refrain from an act with the intention of someone's dying as a result, but can refrain from an act with the intention of someone's not coming into existence as a result? If so, the difference between these cases must be explained. But actually this is good; something is needed to distinguish birth control from murder.)

The reason why I exist sexually, the reason for the existence of my acting sexually, is to cause the existence of another TFSW, to get me into a relationship with a new TFSW.

The means for causing the existence of an AV is not just our sexuality; it is the existence of whole persons with sexuality.

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Below this line are texts moved from above to the end.

A desire for sex is nature's plan for making people. But notice that nature planned it this way independently of infertility. That is, this essential part of natures plan for making people, this desire that exists for the sake of making people, exists whether or not other parts of the person making ability are functioning.

Using sex while thwarting the making of a person reduces the use of our person-making ability to a power for performing tasks, functions. For tasks bring into existence things that are not worthy of committed love for their own sake. And to the extent that we are valued only for (and if we were valued only for) our ability to perform tasks, we are not valued as worthy of committed love for our own sake (think of the robot cook). To equate making a person with the performing of tasks is to equate value of a person and the value of things that are less than absolute values.

We are valuing someone precisely as a sexual being, insofar as she has sexuality. But sexuality exists for the sake of being a person-making ability; sexuality exists for the sake of an AV worthy of committed love. So we can desire someone as a sexual being the way we desire someone as having food-making ability. (The food-making ability does not produce an AV and so does not involve the issues of treating them as AVs, but our acquiring the use of their pma does involve that issues, for it involves their freedom.) Or we can value the other as a sexual being to be, for that reason, worthy of committed love. If we do not value the other as a sexual being to be worthy of committed love, are we valuing the other person to be an end-in-itself?

When I refrain from sex, I am not evaluating my nature to be less than a producer of an absolute. I am doing the opposite, I am giving my nature a place in my system of values as the producer of the *only* thing that has absolute value, a person. For I am evaluating it to be something that should not be used in a way that prevents its being a producer of the only thing that has absolute value.

If we frustrate the production of a person for the sake of other ends, in our evaluations, the existence of a person is not that for the sake of which all other values associated with sex exist; for we are pursuing those values by thwarting the of conceiving a person. In that case, the existence of a person cannot have the status of an absolute value in our estimations of value, since

the existence of a person is not even that for the sake of which a means of producing a person exists.

So I cannot morally try to achieve any end in any circumstance by choosing my person-making ability as a means while at the same time also choosing as a mean an act that thwarts the goal of procreation. But the decision to achieve some end by refraining from using my person-making ability can be a deliberate way of refusing to place a value on a person-making ability that treats it as if it did not exist for the sake of making persons,