

## The Trinity as a Counterexample to Transitivity of Identity

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Trinity

Reading from handwritten notes written on this day. In the beginning, there were two really distinct relations, 1 and 2. Each of 1 and 2 were infinitely perfect realities. What it means for them to be infinitely perfect realities is that each possessed the characteristics that Thomistic theology demonstrates to belong to the nature of God. Each of 1 and 2 possesses stop start possessed not only their own distinctive relative ways of being but also possessed all possible non-relative ways of be, non-relative perfection's, non-relative kinds of actuality.

Since 1 and 2 are infinitely perfect, all of the non-relative perfection that each possesses must be the same instance of infinite perfection, the same simple single instance of the infinite existence of all non-relative perfection. Why? Why are they the same instance? Because there cannot be too infinite instances of all possible non-relative perfection's. They are very infinity would require them to completely overlap one another and not be distinct from one another. So the instance of all possible non-relative perfection that 1 is identical with is the same as the instance of all possible non--relative perfection that 2 is identical with. How can this be?

When non-relative perfection exists in an infinite state they do not require the existence of any multiplicity. In fact, they require complete simplicity and universality. In order to be real, however, relations require real multiplicity. They must either exist in as perfections of something other than themselves or have something other than themselves to which they are the relations, something other than themselves to be there correlative opposites. If not, speaking of relations really existing is mere verbiage.

The two relations, 1 and 2 that existed in the beginning supply the needed multiplicity for one another. They each supply really distinct multiple that the existence of the other as a real relation requires.

But since the non-relative perfection with which each of 1 and 2 is identical do not imply multiplicity when they exist in an infinite state, each of multiple relative perfections, 1 and 2, can be identical with the same instance of infinite non-relative perfection.

How can a relation like 1 or 2 be identical with a non-relative perfection? Let us simplify things by speaking of two non-relative perfections, intellect and will, rather than the infinite number there can be. Non-relative intellect and will can each exist in an infinite state since they are nature's imply no dependence on anything that would be a cause of their being finite, they are nature's imply no dependence on anything that would be a cause of finitude. But when they each exist in an infinite state they must be identical with each other, the same as each other, or else they would limit each other. So in the infinitely perfect instance with which 1 and 2 are both identical, intellect and will happen

to be identical. The energetic stop start of the are identical in this particular case, even though they are non-identical when they exist in other instances.

Well, if intellect and will can be the same as each other when they exist in an infinite state a relation, like 1, existing in an infinite state can be identical with intellect and/or will existing in an infinite state. If intellect and will can be identical with each other when they exist in an infinite state, a relation can be identical with intellect and will when it exists in an infinite state.

But there is this difference between two non-relative perfections existing in an infinite state and a relative perfection. Non-relative perfections do not of themselves imply any multiplicity. Let us to simplify just consider the infinite perfection of intellect. If there is any multiplicity associated with intellect, it is not because it is intellect. It is because in this particular case of intellect, intellect is identical with a relation, namely, 1. It's being identical with the relation is why it would require multiplicity, not it's being identical with intellect.

But is identical with the relation in this particular case, intellect must be associated with the multiplicity stop start with a multiple that is the correlative opposite of 1, the correlative opposite of the relation we already know that intellect happens to be identical with in this case. What can the distinct reality that is the correlative opposite of relation 1 that this instance of intellect is identical with be?

In this case, intellect is also identical with relation 2, really distinct from relation 1. So distinct relation 2 is also identical with this intellect, and with the same intellect that 1 is identical with. So 1 and 2, distinct as relations by our first hypothesis, must not be a distinct as identical with the non-relative perfection, motor being, intellect.

From our two hypotheses, therefore, the hypotheses that these two real relations exist and are each an infinitely perfect being, it follows that transitivity of identity must not apply to one instance of perfection that is non-relative, as intellect (or as will, or as stop start transitivity of identity must not apply to an instance of perfection that is non-relative, as intellect (or as will, or as whatever) units. The reason transitivity identity does not apply however, is not that intellect is intellect but that it is also identical with a relation in this particular instance. Transitivity does not apply to intellect stop start transitivity of identity does not apply to intellect in this particular instance because there must be a distinct relation with which the otherwise non-relative perfection is identical, in this case.

NY shouldn't that be the case? What's wrong with transitivity of identity not applying in this case? Or why couldn't intellect be identical with the relation in this case? Because it would violate transitivity of identity? And why should transitivity of identity apply in this particular case. Since a restriction on transitivity of identity follows from our premises, it would beg the question to argue that there must be an error in the premises because they lead to a restriction on transitivity of identity.

But the argument above shows that these premises would put a restriction on transitivity of identity, would restrict, would prevent transitivity of identity from being true in this case. So to disapprove this restriction on transitivity of identity, the opponent would have to argue that something else was wrong with the premises than a violation of transitivity of identity. She would have to argue that something other than a violation of transitivity of identity prevents the premises from which this restriction on transitivity of identity follows from being true premises.