

The Conformity of Knowledge with the Real:
On the Relation of Objects of Cognition to Things

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[Editor's introduction: This paper gathers in one place several discussions of Yves R. Simon, originally occurring in diverse writings, on the relation of the objects of our cognition to reality. (Identifying the multiple sources required a proliferation of endnotes. The philosophically important notes are indicated in the text by "*" in bold after their numbers.)

The most fundamental epistemic question is the nature of truth, since epistemology evaluates, and truth is the goal by which the success of inquiry is judged. Modern Aristotelians solve problems about truth by distinctions found together in no other philosophy. No one has discussed those distinctions more profoundly than Simon. The main distinction that Simon explains here is between the *objects* we are made aware of in cognition and extramental *things*.

An "object" in Aristotelian epistemic vocabulary is an object of cognition, a term of a relation: cognition-of. To be an epistemic object is to be describable by predicates like "seen," "known," "meant," "named," "referred to," etc. The meanings of such predicates have the structure, *being-related-to-a-conscious-state, -act, or -subject*; they are epistemically reflexive meanings, since they refer the cognized back to cognition. As such, they presuppose meanings without such a reflexive structure, meanings that are not something's relation to a cognitive state, act or subject. For just as what we eat is not first "the eaten," it is meat, bread, fruit, etc., what we see is not first seen as "the seen"; it is first seen as red, moving, oblong, etc. So to be an object, something must first be describable by nonreflexive predicates like "red," "moving," etc. The alternative is an infinite regress—not the backward-looking series, "I know X, and know that I know X, and know that I know that I know X," and so on, but the forward-looking series, cognitive relation to term X, X being a cognitive relation to term Y, Y being a cognitive relation to term Z, and so on. What cognition first relates to is not cognized as being the term of that, or any other, cognitive relation, but is related to as red, moving, oblong, etc. From the viewpoint of the meanings of predicates,

nonreflexive meanings are epistemically primary.

With the distinction between objects and things, Simon answers two fundamental questions about truth. Asking the first question, never asked Simon's way before, and answering it constitutes a much needed revolution in how epistemology should be done: If truth is conformity of the mind with what is outside the mind, how can we ever know truth? For we cannot compare the known to the unknown; we can only compare what is "in the mind" to what is "in the mind." The answer to this question leads to the answer to the second: What is the epistemic purpose of forming statements when we are already aware of things by means of concepts and sense acts? Simon deftly shows how statements allow a comparison of what is "in the mind" in one way with what is "in the mind" in another way to reveal what is true about things as extramental existents. (In showing this, Simon contrasts human knowledge's merely partial mode of making things objects to what would be the case in exhaustive knowledge, but Simon's arguments about human knowledge do *not* depend on the existence of exhaustive knowledge. In effect, his arguments about human knowledge use the hypothesis of exhaustive knowledge as a foil.)

We begin with Simon's explanation of another distinction important for epistemology, between mental dispositions through which we have cognition, *formal* (or *mental*) "concepts," and the objects they make us aware of, *objective* "concepts."]

I.

A formal concept is the psychological reality designated by the word "concept"; it is an accident, a quality or disposition by reason of which the intellect is able to know a certain object. An objective concept is the object of a concept; it is an aspect of the thing known; it is that aspect of the thing known which is delivered to the intellect by a certain (formal) concept. "We lay hold of a thing 'by' our mental [that is, formal] concepts . . . just as we lay hold of an animal by our hands or see a monument by our eyes. We seize it by such and such an objective concept as we seize an animal by the paws or the ears, or as we see a monument by the façade or the apse."² This distinction of a formal (or mental, or psychological) meaning and an objective meaning holds for all terms designating intentional realities:

image, memory, representation, idea, notion, concept, etc. The common use of these terms evidences the spontaneous distinction of these two meanings; when we say "I believe your story because it is told by you, but, so far as I am concerned, I have lost the memory of this event," we mean that our power of remembering – a psychological reality – lacks a certain quality or disposition – again, a psychological reality – without which the past event cannot be present to me as remembered event. When, on the other hand, we say: "This event is the happiest memory of my whole life," "memory" is identified with "past event"; the word "memory," in the latter case, is taken in the objective sense; in this sense, a memory is the remembered event, or, more precisely, it is that aspect of the past event which is rendered present by a "formal," or "mental" memory.

The theory of the two-sided character of intentional realities was clearly outlined by Aristotle³; it plays a central part in St Thomas' philosophy of knowledge; John of St. Thomas gave it a new power through extreme accuracy of expression. In our time it has often been pointed out that idealism makes itself plausible by taking advantage of an easy confusion between the formal and the objective meaning of such terms as concept, idea, etc. Recall the criticism of Berkeley by Bertrand Russell. "Berkeley's view, that obviously the color must be in the mind seems to depend for its plausibility upon confusing the thing apprehended with the act of apprehension. Either of these might be called an 'idea'; probably either would have been called an idea by Berkeley. The act is undoubtedly in the mind; hence, when we are thinking of the act, we readily assent to the view that ideas must be in the mind. Then, forgetting that this was only true when ideas were taken as acts of apprehension, we transfer the proposition that 'ideas are in the mind' to ideas in the other sense, i.e., to the things apprehended by our acts of apprehension. Thus, by an unconscious equivocation, we arrive at the conclusion that whatever we can apprehend must be in our minds. This seems to be the true analysis of Berkeley's argument and the ultimate fallacy upon which it rests."^{4 5}

II.

States of consciousness and modes of the psyche are not "that which" is known—except in a secondary process of reflective knowledge—but "that by which" what is

known is known. In direct and primary forms of knowledge, the thing is that which is known. Inasmuch as it is *known* or at least knowable, a thing is an "object."⁶ In everyday English "thing" and "object" are synonymous. In epistemology "object" is opposed to "subject" and a thing need not be an object, nor an object a thing. A thing becomes an object as it becomes known or knowable. . . . What I dream about is an object and exists objectively, that is, as something being known by me in my dream, but it need not be a thing that exists outside my mind.^{7*} To put it in another way, an object is that with which an operation, be it cognitive or appetitive, is concerned. Thus, to be an object (objectivity) always involves a relation to a subject.^{8*}

Between object and thing, there is a distinction of reason [a "logical" as opposed to real distinction] resulting from the fact that the object implies a system of relations of reason – to a power, a habitus or an act – which the thing does not imply.⁹ If I say that a cat may look at a queen, I imply that a queen may be looked at by a cat. Now, consider the relation of the cat who is looking at the queen, and the queen who is being looked at by the cat. The relation is real in the cat but it is not so in the queen. . . . The change, the new *reality*, is entirely in the cat. . . . But to understand what is happening we are not afraid to say that the queen *is* being looked at by the cat, and the relation of being looked at is a *relatio rationis*, a relation of reason.¹⁰ Objective existence, . . . understood as "to be of object," implies the relations of reason which bring about a distinction of reason between object and thing. Real existence, understood as "to be of thing," is in no way affected by these relations.

(In so far as our language habits were shaped by the problems of modern idealism, "objective" is used in opposition to "subjective" and means "pertaining, not to some state of consciousness or mode of the psyche, but to the real world, independently of the knowledge that we have of it"; so understood, "objective" is synonymous with real and, in fact, is often used as an emphatic way of expressing reality as opposed to subjectivity.¹¹)

In an act of simple intellectual apprehension [the presentation of an objective concept by a formal concept], the intellect conforms to its object . . . But the conformity of

thought and that which is thought becomes itself an object of knowledge only in the act of judging.¹² To understand why knowing the conformity between thought and reality requires us to judge the truth of propositions, we need maximum strictness about the relation between the ideas of *thing* and of object. We can use "thing" to mean that which exists outside the mind, the concrete reality whose act is extramental existence, made up of an essence joined to its properties, its contingencies, and finally its existence (actual or possible), and "object" to mean *whatever of that thing* is made manifest in knowledge.¹³ (Thus: *that which* is known, and *that aspect* in the thing *by which* that thing is known, "that which" . . . understood in opposition to "that by which," both taken in an objective sense. There is also a nonobjective sense of "that by which" i.e., the formal concept is that by which both the aspect and, thereby, the whole . . . are known.¹⁴) If we are to know truth, we must say first that the object, in this stricter meaning, is not really distinct from the thing—as if the object could be one real existent and the thing another—and second that the thing and the object do not necessarily coincide totally.^{15*}

Total coincidence of object and thing requires an exhaustive knowledge, in which the entire thing is constituted as an object. The object is always identical with the thing, but this identity may be only partial in the sense that in all knowledge that is not exhaustive there is more in the thing than in the object.^{16*} If the whole of a thing were known, with no residual amount of not yet explored reality, the coincidence of thing and object would be complete and knowledge would be exhaustive. In relation to inexhaustive knowledge, an object is never more than an aspect of a thing. From any given standpoint, it is impossible to see simultaneously the six faces of a cube.¹⁷

III.

Now, it is this lack of total coincidence between the object and the thing . . . that gives rise to the problem of the identity of the thing and the object in our knowledge. Not that this identity can be purely and simply unknown; it is the essence of the object to manifest the thing or, better, to be the thing as it manifests itself in knowledge. Thus the skeptical position, which despairs of knowing whether there is, beyond the phenomenal object,

some reality identical with what we apprehend, goes contrary to the natural movement of the intellect, and can be refuted by reduction to absurdity.

It is quite remarkable, however, that despite the most systematic determination to contradict the spontaneous certitudes of the intellect, skeptical doubt concerning the identity of the object and the thing – of the phenomenal object and the thing itself – has never been extended to the phenomenal object considered in its phenomenality. The skeptic gives up on knowing the truth because he does not know where to go from there; namely, how to verify that the object is identical with the thing.

And so even though truth consists in the relation of conformity between thought and reality,¹⁸ rather than in the identity between the object and the thing, and even though that identity is never *unknown* – we can decline to *acknowledge* it but only at the price of an arbitrary forcing – knowing truth certainly involves an explicit recognition of the identity of object and thing, which just attaining the object does not always provide. For simple intellectual presentation of the object to include knowledge of the truth, the apprehending cognition must suffice for knowing expressly that the object is identical to the thing. How could the mind know expressly that it is conformed to reality if it did not know expressly that its object is identical with the real? And if the mind knows that its object is identical with the real, how could it not know that it itself conforms to reality? The act of knowing the conformity of the mind to reality and the act of recognizing the identity of the object and the thing must go hand in hand. When in addition to simple intellectual apprehension a further act is required for knowing the conformity of the mind with the real, it is because the identity of the object and the thing is not adequately expressed by the apprehension.

For the identity of an object and a thing to be fully manifest and expressed just by an act of apprehending the object itself requires an exhaustive knowledge. Let an intellectual presentation of an object be sufficiently penetrating to know immediately everything knowable in the thing, leaving no transobjective element; then the identity of object and thing does not need to be recognized by an act distinct from the apprehending act, since the latter act knows the thing entirely at the same time as the object. An exhaustive knowledge leaves

no room for skepticism. Skepticism requires an incomplete knowledge. Even feigned skeptical doubt, which the human intellect cannot really live, is not possible in exhaustive knowledge. Postulate an evil spirit with exhaustive knowledge. Feigned doubt about the object-thing is no more possible for it than feigned doubt about the object-phenomenon is possible for the skeptic, and for the same reason: If the thing is known exhaustively, it has entered whole and entire into phenomenality.^{19*}

But in knowledge that is not exhaustive, the identity of the thing and the object, even though never in doubt, cannot be expressed by the mind to itself except through comparing the object with the thing. To recognize the conformity of knowledge and the real is to know the truth.²⁰ We possess this truth of knowledge only in the act of judging. . . . Here the intellect compares what exists inside itself with what exists outside itself, . . . and knows whether its knowledge, in giving the thing intentional existence, has preserved the thing's identity with itself.²¹ And this is where the skeptical doubt comes in. If our human, less than exhaustive apprehension is unable to express the identity of the thing and the object it apprehends, because the thing overflows the apprehended object, how are we to catch up to the thing to compare it with the object and the mental concept of the object? To the extent that it exceeds the object, the thing in itself, by itself, is something unknown. Therefore, comparing the object with the thing that does not totally coincide with the object would mean *comparing the known with the unknown, which is something obviously impossible*. [Emphasis added.]

IV.

Still, that is what we have to do: compare the object with the transobjective thing in order to verify not only their identity but also the conformity of our thought to reality. And since one cannot compare the known with the unknown, and since the object of the non-exhaustive apprehension is presented to the mind surrounded by an area of the unknown, it is necessary to somehow get the object to communicate what it does not express, and guided by the light the object provides to go beyond it and reach the transobjective thing in its very transobjective existence. And there seems only one way to do this. Comparing the

limited object with the thing, clearly absurd if it is a matter of comparing the known and the unknown, is possible by means of a comparison of two objects, which would tell us what goes on in the transobjective existence of the thing and make that transobjective existence pass into objectivity notwithstanding.

This is the way, unknown to the skeptic, that a realism concerning intellectual knowledge has found to solve the paradoxical problem of comparing the object and the thing. We compare one object with another object, the known with the known, and if there arises from this comparison a requirement to identify them, revealed either by rational analysis^{22*} or experience, that requirement presupposes an identity that is not realized in the phenomenality of the object – otherwise the two objects would be one – and can only be realized in the transobjective existence of the thing.²³ For instance, *the object Socrates is not identical with the object man. So, if I have to identify these two objects, this can be only because of their identity in the transobjective thing. The thing that is Socrates, and that manifests itself in the object of thought Socrates, is the same thing that is man, and that manifests itself in the object of thought man.*^{24*} But when I thus verify the identity of these objects in the transobjective thing, by an operation that is strictly the work of my own mind, I know at the same time that my mind conforms to the real.

It is in this way that we come to understand the role of the enunciative synthesis [the proposition], how necessary it is for the preparation of the judicative synthesis [the judgment], and in what essential way the latter differs from it. Judgment consists in saying *Yes* or *No*. *Yes*, the thing is just as the thought presents it; *no*, it is different. An exhaustive apprehension requires no comparison between the mind and the real, since it testifies directly to the mind that the thing is just as it reveals itself. But lacking an exhaustive apprehension, we carry out the necessary comparison between our thought and the real by way of the enunciative synthesis, in which the mind both reflects upon itself and transcends objectivity to attain reality in its most distinctive otherness.²⁵

By “reasons for judgment” I mean the light that compels the mind to assent to the identity in a transobject of objects of thought that are not identical in their being as objects.

What compels the mind to an interobjective identification cannot come from the properties belonging to an object considered in its very state of being an object. Distinct objects cannot be identified with respect to the properties that belong to them considered in their states of being objects; from this point of view the Megarians were right. What compels the mind to an interobjective identification comes from the object precisely insofar as it is a *manifestation* of the thing. As we have seen in the preceding, although the identity of an object and a thing is acknowledged only in judgment, it is never unknown. The identity of object and thing is present when an object is first attained. From the first instant of knowledge, that identity, though as yet unexpressed, has the power to make itself fully known. The object, non-exhaustive as it may be, gets the power to make known the transobjective connections it has with another aspect of reality from its real identity with the thing.

Sometimes it is the objective content of the concept that reveals its need to be joined in the mind to the objective content of another concept, and the judgment so determined is what we call a rational judgment. At other times, when the content by itself does not manifest the need for such an association, it is experience that shows us the association of one particular object with another. For example, although there is nothing in the concept of this man and in the concept of a flute player that compels my mind to assent to the proposition "This man is a flute player." I do so because I see and hear this man playing the flute.²⁶

V.

A being of reason is an object, which neither does nor can exist except in the mind in the capacity of object.^{27*} You have in this definition all you need in order never to do what has been done by so many people: to confuse a being of reason with a psychological reality. That is the ambiguity of the expression "being of reason," but the Latin *ens rationis* is just as bad. Ignoramus may take it to designate psychological realities, but a psychological reality is an *ens reale*, a real being of a particular kind that is just as real as anything else. Take a man with plenty of happy memories who is unfortunately involved in a head-on collision, so that as a result of brain injuries his memory is gone. A certain faculty that he had to remember what he did as a child and as a young man is gone. Something real is gone. We may

elaborate indefinitely on the nature of such psychological realities, our sensations, our images, our recollections, our acts of understanding, our acts of reasoning, our concepts and so forth and so on; that these are real things is not questionable. You may say that they are reducible to movements of particles if you are a very staunch materialist after the fashion of a hundred years ago – that is one way to see things. Then psychological realities would ultimately be of the same nature as the so-called physical realities. Real they are anyway, whether you interpret them materialistically or not. A being of reason is that which neither does nor can exist except in the mind and in the capacity of object. This is the distinguishing part, the differentiating part, of the definition. “In the capacity of object,” not in the capacity of disposition, not in the capacity of habit, not in the capacity of memory or image or concept but in the capacity of object.

Let us consider some examples. Beings of reason are found in several domains. There is one where they are overwhelming because they are alone. It is logic. Logical properties are beings of reason. That is the first thing to get in order to define logic and to distinguish it from its unscrupulous neighbors. Logic is surrounded by neighbors that have absolutely no scruples, for instance, the psychology of the intellect, the critique of knowledge and, worst of all, the ethics of thought. These neighbors of logic are always ready to swallow it up. There are on the market indefinitely many books of logic, especially perhaps since the beginning of the nineteenth century, where there is a little logic and much that may be very good in itself but is not logic. However, what is very good in itself and is not logic becomes vicious when it is called logic. What we have to understand here is exceedingly simple. Just take a little fact such as an incident in the jungle. A beast of prey, a lion, devours a deer. That is a real event that does not belong to the logical world; it belongs to the real world. When you have observed a number of the same such facts you are perfectly entitled to generalize and to say that the lion is a carnivorous animal. Here you are no longer considering an individual, real event, but a general property. I would even say an essential one. We approach very clumsily, imperfectly and unclearly such essences as that of lion. If you ask me exactly where this species of lion begins and exactly where it ends, you know that we do

not know those things. Opinions on it change from generation to generation of zoologists. Though we are very uncertain about those things, when I say a lion and a deer, I am sure that I speak of two different things, things that have different natures. Without being able to ascertain their natures with much clarity, when I say "lion" I circumscribe one thing, and when I say "deer" I circumscribe something else. A lion is carnivorous so that if there are too many deer in a jungle it is a good thing to let the lions do their job. And a deer is herbivorous so that if you grow corn it is better to destroy a deer. All that is clear. We are talking about the real world all the time. We start with individual happenings, then we consider, no matter how clumsily, universal types. We speak of the real world all the time.

Then a day comes when I consider the proposition: "The lion is carnivorous." That proposition refers to the real world but I may reflect upon the proposition and say, "In the proposition, 'the lion is carnivorous,' 'lion' is subject and 'carnivorous' is predicate."^{28*} But there are no subjects or predicates in the jungle. Those objects exist in the mind alone. It is as simple as that in principle. The development of those principles may involve tremendous difficulties. In principle it is as simple as that: a lion belongs to the real world, the devouring of a deer by a lion belongs to the real world, the lion's property of being a carnivorous animal belongs to the real world, and when I stop to think that I understand those properties in arrangements of objects, my understanding belongs to the real world too. But as I arrange those objects in such a way as to understand them, what happens to those objects in this mental arrangement? They acquire properties that they never have in the jungle or in the desert. We can put it in a slightly different way. The lion and the deer exist twice, in the jungle and as objects in the mind. As a result of the second existence that they enjoy in the mind, they acquire new properties that depend on their first existence but that follow in part too from the distinguishing characteristics of this second existence. That is the difference between the logical and the real world. It is these new properties that are the object of logic. You can think of indefinitely many examples of them. To be a subject, to be a predicate, to be a major term, to be a minor term, to be a middle term, to be a middle term in a syllogism of the first figure; these are so many logical properties that belong to things, not in

their real but in their objective existence.^{29*}

We ought then to try to rule out the confusion of beings of reason and psychological realities. I understand the lion through a disposition of my psyche (call it a concept if you please), which is something real, a psychological reality. A memory of a lion, which is simply an image by which I remember it and which can be destroyed if a hammer is suddenly applied on my skull – that is a psychological reality. I understand subject, predicate, middle term, and so on, also through psychological dispositions which are realities, just as real as anything else. The relevant point here concerns not that through which I understand but the object understood. Lion: real; deer: real; devouring: real; carnivorous: real; subject in the proposition “The lion is a carnivorous animal”: that is a logical property. You see that it does not exist in the jungle. And it cannot exist anywhere else than in the mind in the capacity of object. Why? Because it is a property that things acquire as a result of the peculiarities of the second existence that they enjoy as objects of consideration, as objects of knowledge. It should be clear, then, why the possibility of making real a being of reason, a logical property, is excluded. These are properties that result from existence as objects. So, in the real world it is simply contradictory to fancy that they may exist. Those logical properties are not contradictory in themselves. There is nothing contradictory about a predicate or a subject. What would be contradictory would be the realization of a predicate. The day will never come when you can tell me, “I shook hands with a predicate in the street.” That is impossible because it is a strict contradiction.³⁰

In opposition to the real properties or “first intentions” of things, these logical properties are called “second intentions” in scholastic language. The laws of second intentions are the rules of reasoning.³¹ A failure to distinguish between real existence and objective presence, existence as a thing and existence as an object . . . supposes that the intellect has no work to perform in knowing, but passively receives the thing according to one-to-one correspondence in which every mode of objective presence has its exact and actual counterpart in the ontological structure of things. This is at once a realism and a confident sort of rationalism which in effect *models the ontological upon the logical* (the intentional logical), i.e.,

upon the rational and dialectical mode of the human intellect.^{32*}

It is obvious that we have here a linguistic and almost a social problem concerning the word "object." A young friend of mine who taught logic to freshmen told me that they all come to college with the interpretation of "object" as the thing that you aim at, an end, a goal, an aim. That is not astonishing at all because they are practical boys. And the object of practice and of the arts has the character of an end. So it is no wonder if object and end are lumped together in the mind of freshmen. When they are so in the mind of philosophers too it is less excusable, and it is too bad that it should happen. On the other hand, there is something much more serious, which is the identification of object with thing. Many people tell you, "This table exists objectively," meaning thereby that if I cut my throat and go out of existence and you also and all men, the table will still exist. Now, pay attention to the role of object in all theory of knowledge, including the theory of knowledge that you are using every day, and you will see that far from meaning real, "object" mean almost the opposite. For instance, there are objects in a dream, represented objects. Do they exist objectively? It is even the only way they exist. They do not exist as things, but they do exist as objects. We just have to reflect upon those things and upon our spontaneous use of words to see the difference between real existence and objective existence. I beg you to pay attention to that. Words have an awfully tyrannical power and can pervert anything.

When speaking of beings of reason, the first domain to consider is obviously that of logic. Logic could be defined as the science whose object is constituted exclusively by beings of reason. Does this mean that any consideration of reality is out of place in a book of logic? That is another question. Just remember the example of the lion and the deer and it is clear enough that the logical beings of reason are grounded in reality. It is because the lion actually devours the deer that in the proposition, "The lion is a carnivorous animal," "carnivorous" is predicate. You see how the logical is grounded in the real. So far as I can see, in order to be understood, in order to be intelligible, the logician should be constantly considering the real foundation of logical properties. So, even if a book of logic is supposed to give you an understanding of logical objects, do not be surprised if it is filled with considerations

relative to the real world, under either its physical, metaphysical or psychological aspects. For example, in his treatise *On Interpretation*, Aristotle considers the logical division of propositions into contingent and necessary. That involves a physics and a metaphysics of contingency and necessity. In a philosophy like that of Spinoza, if Spinoza could be absolutely consistent, *non datur contingens in natura rerum*, there is nothing contingent in reality. That is a motto of Spinoza. How consistently he lives up to that, I do not know. Suppose that a philosopher is absolutely consistent in developing a philosophy of universal and absolute necessity; for him the division of propositions into propositions whose matter is contingent and propositions whose matter is necessary would make no sense. Aristotle, however, is quite normally led apropos of this logical division to expound his philosophy of contingency, so that if you want to write a paper on contingency in Aristotle, you will have to consult not only the physical and the metaphysical writings but also his logical works. Wherever he is concerned with the division of propositions into necessary and contingent, you are likely to find some remark on necessity and contingency in the real world because that is where the logical properties of these propositions are grounded.³³

Although the object of logic is entirely constituted by second intentions, there are . . . reasons why discourse about real being should appear in the works of a logician. . . . The logician discourses about the real because the explanation of logical intentions requires such discourse.³⁴ I hope that there will always remain a few logicians dedicated not to virtuosity in calculus but to the understanding of logical properties.³⁵

VI.

Over and above the primary existence that they enjoy in nature (be it nature as actual or possible³⁶), things enjoy, as objects of understanding, a new existence—objective, intelligible, intentional—which brings forth in them a new system of properties. The object of logic is constituted by the properties which accrue to things by reason of the new existence they enjoy as objects of the human mind.³⁷ The treatment of universality achieved decisive progress when Thomas Aquinas explained that the predicates “universal” and the “individual” pertain not to the intelligible constitution of any nature but to the states in which nat-

ures exist, to their way of existence.^{38*}

There are within each thing features which belong necessarily to its constitution, without which this thing would not be what it is and without the grasp of which it is not understood for what it is. Think of the plan of a building in the mind of the architect; when the phase of planning is over, the determination of the building with regard to situation, materials, arrangements, size, etc., is complete. The problem that remains to be solved is one of execution or realization; it concerns the difference between not to be and to be, it does not concern any of the constitutive features of "that which was to be." All the difference between the building as planned in the architect's mind and the actually existing building concerns the way in which the thing exists, not the system of features that cause it to be what it is and to be intelligible as a definite sort of being. The actually existing building, in case of a real storm, shelters real humans, and the merely planned building shelters but imaginary dwellers against imaginary storms. Yet it is, in various states, the same building, same location, same size, same materials, same arrangement. How is it that one and the same thing admits of conditions so different from each other as merely objective existence in the mind and actual existence in the world of reality? What makes both conditions possible is that neither pertains to the necessary constitution of the thing. Examine this building in detail; you will find that it contains seven bedrooms, one living-room, one kitchen, one dining-room, etc.; but this inquiry, no matter how thorough, will never yield, as one feature among other features, "merely objective existence in the mind," "actual existence in the world of reality" – such existential conditions are foreign to the constitution that causes a thing to be what it is.

Similarly, the analysis of a nature will never yield, as a feature to be included in a definition or derived from it, the predicate "universal" or the predicate "individual." Let "man" be the universal under analysis; we may consider the features constitutive of its definition; then the properties connected with its differentia; then the properties connected with its genus; then its remote genera, etc. We shall find such intelligible features as rationality, progressivity, sociability, morality, sensibility, life, corruptibility, etc., but never indi-

viduality" or "universality"; these are not features, but existential modalities. A nature is not, of itself, either universal or individual, and this is why it is capable of assuming both the state of individuality in the real and, in the mind, a state of universality produced by a process of abstraction and positive unification.^{39*}

Asserting the reality of a human nature, one and the same in all men, does not imply belief in any Platonic type. It is in the mind alone that human nature, or any nature, possesses a condition of positive unity. In the real the features which make up the universal human nature exist in the state of individuality, which means that human nature exists in James as identical with the individual reality of James. The same human nature exists in Philip in the state of individuality, which means that it exists in Philip as identified with the individual reality of Philip. (Yet James is not identical with Philip. As John of St. Thomas says, two things each of which is identical with the same third thing are not necessarily identical with each other if the third thing is virtually multiple: "But the universal nature is virtually multiple because it is communicable to several things; therefore, identity with it does not entail the identity of the individuals among themselves."^{40*})⁴¹

Editor's Afterword

To know truth, we cannot directly compare cognitive states to extramental things; for we have no access to extramental things, in order to make the comparison, except through cognitive states. What we directly compare are the object of a conscious state of naming or describing with the object of another such state, or of a state of sensing, remembering or introspecting. Knowing affirmative truth requires making the same thing(s) a cognitional object in different ways.^{42*} The truth of "The man is a chef" requires extramental identity between one of the things describable by "man" and by "chef," respectively. But we do not compare the things objectified by "man" and by "chef" as objects. As objects they are distinct, not identical. So each of the diverse objects must, to begin with, be cognized as something that is not just an *object of cognition*, in either the fundamental meaning of "object" or the stricter, secondary meaning.⁴³ First, each object must be cognized not just as something related to cognition as that-which is *described, meant, referred-to, named* or whatever (the

primary meaning of "object"), but as actually or (putatively) possibly *more than an object*. Again, the reflexive bespeaks something reflected on, short of infinity. Second, the knowable values that are that-by-which an at least possible thing is cognized (the narrower meaning of "object") must make it known as something potentially made an object in more than that way, e.g., not just as a man or a chef. For by being known as a possible extramental thing, a man is known as possibly being more, extramentally, than just the knowable value, a man. If not, we could never know the truth of "The man is a chef." (Unless otherwise specified, "object" will be used in its fundamental meaning. The broader, fundamental meaning [that which is known] is inclusive of the narrower meaning because, in order to be that by means of which a thing is known, a knowable value must itself be known.)

In comparing diverse objects as things, for example, a thing we call "the man" and a thing we call "a chef," we are aware that a thing has been diversely objectified; if it was not diversely objectified, we could not compare it to itself. So awareness of truth also requires an at least implicit reflection of the mind on its own conscious states, and so the awareness that gives us knowledge of truth, awareness of the identity of diverse objects of cognition as things, is also an awareness of the mind's conformity with things.

Identity can be cognitively partial since it always requires *distinction*, cognitive distinction (nonidentical objectification), between the terms of the identity relation. We can know "A is A" only if we use distinct tokens of "A" to objectify one A. The object expressed by "the man" can be completely identical with an extramental thing *in its status as thing* (and so completely identical with a thing also expressed by "a chef"). But in the thing's cognitional status as the object expressed by "the man" (the stricter meaning of "object"), that thing is only partially identical with what it is in its status as thing; for the information conveyed by "man" does not include that conveyed by "chef," "father," "blue-eyed," etc. As each identical with things, two objects can be identical with the same thing, while being distinct as objects. *Objects* can be extramentally identical as things but cognitively diverse as objects; *things* can be cognitively diverse as objects but extramentally identical as things.

If identity is not compromised by the paradox that it only holds between the cognit-

ively non-identical, it need not be compromised by the paradox of being cognitively partial. We know "Al is Al" and "A male is a male"; both "Al" and "a male" objectify a whole, an entire extramental thing. But if you know only that a thing is called "Al," you know incomparably less about the thing than if you know it is a male. If you know only that a thing is called "Al," you know it only by a feature of its external environment; if you know that a thing is a male, you know it by one of its intrinsic features. And since what is diversely objectified by "Al" and "a male" is not first known reflexively as an *object* but non-reflexively as an at least possible transobjective thing, nothing prevents our knowing that the same whole is being partially objectified in these diverse ways.

The paradox that we can only grasp the identity of the cognitively nonidentical epitomizes the reason why Maritain said "The first and most important of philosophic problems," not "in itself" (which is the distinction between existence and essence in anything but God) but "for us," concerns the relations between things as things and things as objects of our cognition.^{44*} Epistemic understanding of the goal of knowledge of truth, requires making identity consistent with nonidentity. It requires a way of describing the sense in which objects and things can be known to be identical that preserves their diversity, and a way of describing the sense in which they are known to be diverse that preserves their identity. That requires the further distinction between real existence (the state or condition in which something is not just an object of conception or imagination) and objective existence (the state or condition of being present in some kind of cognition). Another required distinction is between attributes pertaining to things as things and as objects of cognition. When something that really exists, at least potentially, is also something present in awareness, it becomes associated with attributes, like *being-named-"Al"* or *being-in-the-extension-of-"man,"* that it can be associated with only as a result of and for the sake of its status as an object of cognition. Thus, we have (1) *that which* can exist as a thing and is also present as a cognitional object: the same; (2) existence as a thing and cognitional presence as an object: different; (3) attributes pertaining to something as a thing or only as a cognitional object: different.

For truth, there must be only a cognitive distinction, a "distinction of reason", between that which is a thing and that which is an object; what is a thing (actual or possible) and what is a cognitional object must be really identical. But the same cognitional object possesses attributes pertaining to things as things, like being a male, and pertaining to things as objects of cognition, like being in the extension of the predicate, "male." The latter attributes are "beings of reason" that have no status other than that of being cognitional objects (presence in cognition). Some beings of reason *are logical*, like being an antecedent or a middle term. But Simon does not need to offer necessary and sufficient conditions for beings of reason to be logical. To avoid some perennial philosophical traps, it is enough to know that logical properties are among the attributes that pertain to things not as things but only as cognitional objects.

One trap is the false dichotomy that logic must be either a branch of psychology or a study of "abstract objects" of some kind. Logic is not about laws of *thought*. Logic concerns relations of *objects* of (rational) thought as objects, not as things; its laws result from the nature of certain beings of reason that are properties pertaining to things as objectified in true or false statements.^{45*} Another trap is the attempt to model ontology on logical properties of objects. Contrary to so many thinkers, the conformity of knowledge with the real that makes statements about things as things true cannot be between things and *logical* characteristics belonging to things as objects. With respect to logical properties, things and cognitional objects must *differ*; for truth requires that thing and object be cognitively distinct, but only cognitively distinct. The properties of things as cognitive objects that make the laws of logic true must differ from the attributes that statements about things as things objectify.

Hence, contrary to Frege's "identity theory of truth," the truth condition of a statement is not identity between a statement's logical arrangement of objects and an extramental state of affairs, which would require states of affairs and statements to share logical properties. The truth condition is a prior identity between diverse objects of the names and predicates in statements and the same (actual or possible) extramental thing(s). Unless what are objectified by names and predicates, respectively, were each known as

more-than-an-*object* to begin with (although we cannot describe them as such until we later reflect on what we know to begin with), we could not come to know them as the *same* more-than-an-object.

So the thing/object identity analysis is not an interpretation of the verb "to be", especially not an interpretation of "is" as an identity sign.⁴⁶ Awareness of truth depends on an awareness of the identity of the objects of names and predicates with things that is prior to the formation of statements and so prior to the awareness of the functions that "to be" has in them. It is also prior to the entrance of words like "identity" and "same," as well as the use of "is" for identity, into language.^{47*} When we are later able to express the objective concept *identity* (a being of reason), we are able to use it to express (objectify) what from the beginning was the relation between objects of cognition and extramental things prior to our knowledge of the truth of statements.

Intuitively, since propositional truth follows from thing/object identity, we can understand why truths are necessary by understanding why some diverse objects must be diverse solely as objects, not as things. That can only be a result of the way identical things are diversely objectified. Diverse objectification can only occur by using words for values that are more-than-objective or using beings of reason. If diverse objectification consists of reference to values pertaining to things as things that are contingently connected, the identity of objects as things is contingent by hypothesis. If the sole difference between objects consists of values that can pertain to objects only as a result of being objects, the identity of the objects as more-than-objects is necessary by hypothesis. For example, by understanding how "not" and "non" are used, we can know that the objects of "A" and of "not non-A" do not differ otherwise than as objects; for their difference is hypothesized to consist only of a being of reason canceling the difference expressed by "non" by the way we use "not."

Chapters 3, 4 and 9 of my *Causal Realism* try to work out these surprising thing/object consequences in detail.⁴⁸ Crucial to that analysis is the fact, shown by the thing/object account of truth and by Wittgenstein's private language argument,^{49*} that real beings are our first objects of concept. This implies (1) that the first terms of relations that are beings

of reason, like negation, are real beings, and (2) that the language we use for beings of reason must be derived from that for real beings. As a result, a principle like "Not 'A is not A'" must hold for both real beings and beings of reason. For since its necessary truth derives from a relation whose primary terms must be real beings, it could be false for beings of reason if and only if it could be false for real beings. Although negation words express beings of reason, their use in "Not 'A is not A'" does not make the difference between the two objects *consist* only of beings of reason. The difference consists in something real, since the relation, other-than, enters language primarily to relate terms that are more-than-objects. And the diversity of what "red" and "a color" objectify consists only of a property of objects as objects; so their extramental nonidentity would contradict the meanings of those words.

Diversity of objects can also consist of reference to distinct real values so related that one does not exist without the other, on pain of contradiction. Such a connection would be a necessary *causal* connection, by the meaning of "cause" Hume used to argue that we cannot know necessary causal connections. The identity of objects whose diversity consists solely of reference to such a relation is due to real causal connections, not to beings of reason. The thing/object account of truth and necessary truth is itself derived from causal necessities.

Notes

¹ [Edited with title, introduction, afterword, translation revisions, interpretive arrangement and editor's notes by John C. Cahalan. The order of sentences in some paragraphs has been changed to make the connections and transitions between selections from different contexts clearer. A minimal number of editorial clarifications are inserted in Simon's text in brackets. The source of a selection is given in an editor's note at the end of the selection. Selections are copyrighted by the indicated publishers and used with their permission. Ed. note.]

² See Jacques Maritain, *Formal Logic*, tr. By Imelda Choquette (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1946), pp. 18-19.

³ *On Memory*, 1.450^o25.

⁴ *The Problems of Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt, 1912), p. 65 ff.

⁵ [Source: *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas: Basic Treatises*, ed. Yves R. Simon, John J. Glanville, G. Donald Hollenhorst (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955) p. 588, n. 19. All selections from this source are used with the permission of the publisher. John of St. Thomas is better known to many as John Poinset. Ed. note.]

⁶ [Source: *Material Logic*, p. 623, n. 44. Ed. note.]

⁷ [Simon's analysis does not strictly depend on calling the state or condition of presence in cognition an "existence," only on distinguishing that state from extramental existence, actual or possible. Still, calling it a kind of existence is justified; see John C. Cahalan, "Wittgenstein as a Gateway to Analytical Thomism" in *Analytical Thomism*, ed. Paterson and Pugh. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2006). Ed. note.]

⁸ For a full discussion of the meaning of object and subject, see L M Regis, *Epistemology* (New York: Macmillan, 1959), especially pp. 175-252. [Source: Yves R. Simon, *The Great Dialogue of Nature and Space*, ed. Gerard J. Dalcourt (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2001) p. 111. All selections from this source are used with the permission of the publisher. Ed. note.]

⁹ [Source: *Material Logic*, p. 623, n. 44. Ed. note.]

¹⁰ [Source: *Great Dialogue*, p. 106. Ed. note.]

¹¹ [Source: *Material Logic*, p. 623, n. 44. Ed. note.]

¹² [Source of the preceding two sentences: *Metaphysics of Knowledge*, p. 137. Ed. note.]

¹³ Maritain, *Degrees of Knowledge*, pp. 90ff. [Source: Yves R. Simon, *Introduction to Metaphysics of Knowledge*, trans. Vukan Kuic and Richard J. Thompson (New York: Fordham University Press, 1990) pp. 141-142. Material from this source continues until Section V, except for the sentences identified as from other sources in the respective endnotes. All selections from this source are used with the permission of the publisher. Some translations from this source have been revised. Ed. note.]

¹⁴ [Source of the preceding two sentences in parenthesis: *Material Logic*, p. 596, n. 49. Here, "objective" and nonobjective" do not have their post-idealist connotation but refer to

the objective as opposed to psychological *means* by which a thing becomes what is known; see n. 12. The psychological means is the “formal concept”; see Section I. Ed. Note.]

¹⁵ [The truth of a proposition like “The man is sick” requires that some extramental thing be really identical with (i.e., only cognitively distinct from) different cognitional objects: identical with what is made an object by “man” what is made an object by “sick.” “Object” always describes something reflexively, as related to knowledge, the primary sense of being an object discussed in the first three paragraphs of Section II. But things never become related to human knowledge by means of all the knowable values they extramentally possess. In “The man is sick,” both one concrete thing and two of its knowable values *being something human and being something sick* are “objects” in that primary sense. But *being something blue-eyed, being a father, being something sleeping*, are not made cognitional objects in that proposition. So understanding how we know truth requires that we make explicit a secondary narrower sense of “object” as distinct from “thing”: an extramental value by means of which a concrete thing or things becomes known in a given case. A meaning for “object” that was not thus derived from the primary meaning of “object” by way of recursion would be insufficient for helping us understand how we know the conformity of the mind with the real. For we need to say that when concrete thing, A1, is known as an instance of the value *something human, something human* is not just an “object” (primary sense) cognitively distinct from the whole thing, A1; that value’s being an object in the primary sense is also *the reason* that A1 himself is an object in that sense. That value’s being known (being an “object” in the primary sense) allows its possessor to be known. And the way it allows its possessor to be known is epistemic—by being known itself—not by being a concept in the subjective, psychological sense. The *cognitively partial* (see nn. 13, 37 and the “Editor’s Afterword.”) values by means of which things are known are sometimes called “formal objects” and the things themselves called “material objects.” This *ordered* distinction between “object” in the sense of anything known and “object” in the sense of a cognitively partial aspect that by being known becomes a means through which a whole thing is known is an example of what Simon calls an “analogical” (read: nongeneric) set. (See “On Order in

Analogical Sets," in *Philosopher at Work*, ed. by Anthony O. Simon [Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999].) It is also an indication, as Simon explains in Section III below, of the intrinsic imperfection of the human mode of knowing that makes theoretical, though not lived, skepticism possible. So the thing/object distinction embodies two of the most basic conditions that make paradox and disagreement so prevalent in philosophy: the difficulty of keeping distinct what belongs to things in their status as extramental and what belongs to things as a result of being cognitional objects, while simultaneously preserving the identity between what belongs to things as things and what we know about them; and the difficulty of mistaking apparent contradictions for real ones when dealing with nongeneric common values. At www.foraristotelians.info, see John C. Cahalan, *Causal Realism: An Essay on Philosophical Method and the Foundations of Knowledge* [Lanham, Maryland; 1985] pp. 427-458; and "How Simon Trumps Cajetan on Analogy," with Appendix B, "Simon, Aquinas and McInerney on Analogy," pp. 1-15. Ed. note.]

¹⁶ [Although the truth of "The man is sick" requires unqualified extramental identity between one of the things objectified by "man" and by "sick," neither word can express all the information about what a thing is. Since human knowledge is not exhaustive, we *make use of* only some of a thing's *extramental* parts and features to objectify (primary sense) the whole thing through an object (stricter sense) that is *cognitively* partial. Do not confuse what holds for a cognitively partial objectification of (partial *information* about) a thing with what holds for a thing's integral extramental parts or features. That would be a way of confusing what pertains to things as objects and what pertains to things as things. "Cognitively partial" does not mean that two cognitional objects (stricter sense) are each identical with only some of a thing's integral extramental parts or features, which as partial are really distinct from the thing, a whole. In "The man is blue eyed" or "has blue eyes," the distinct objects (stricter sense) are *the man*, on the one hand, and *blue eyed* or *having blue eyes*, on the other, not *the man* and his *blue eyes*. For it is he, not his eyes, that is blue eyed; nor do his eyes have blue eyes. So that truth requires complete extramental identity but only *partial* cognitive identity between what is objectified (stricter sense) by "the man" and by "blue eyed" or "has

blue eyes," respectively. *The man and a blue eyed thing* are really identical; *to be a man* and *to be blue eyed* are not. And in "Red is a color," "color" expresses only part of the information that "red" does, but not a partial feature of red really distinct from another partial feature; otherwise, red would not be a color but a combination of color and that other feature. "Color" and "red" objectify the same feature of experience, but do so in *cognitively* diverse ways. On cognitively partial identity, see n. 37 and the Editor's Afterword. Ed. note.]

¹⁷ [Source of the preceding three sentences: *Material Logic*, p. 623, n. 44. Ed. note.]

¹⁸ John of St. Thomas, *Curs. Th.* I, disp. 2, a. 2 (Vives, III, 93B).

¹⁹ [Recall that in Section II Simon defines the whole *thing*, which here enters entirely into awareness, as "the concrete reality whose act is extramental existence, made up of an essence joined to its properties, its contingencies, and finally its existence (actual or possible)." So if the object of an intellectual apprehension does not include a thing's extramental existence, the knowledge is not exhaustive but partial. Concerning "possible" existence, see n. 19. When we contemplate objects as possibly identical with "real" things, we are contemplating them as having a state that is more than merely being conceived or imagined. So what the skeptic can only feign to doubt, in the sense of lived doubt as opposed to philosophical theory, about the possible existence objects would exercise, and do exercise, if identical with real things is that it is extramental existence; the skeptic cannot cease knowing pre-theoretically, even if her theory denies it, that *esse* is other than *percipi*. Ed. note.]

²⁰ [Source of this sentence: *ibid.*, p. 136. Ed. note.]

²¹ [Source of the preceding three sentences: *ibid.*, p. 137. Ed. note.]

²² [Rational analysis grasps necessary truths verified by the contradictoriness of the opposite. See the Editor's Afterword. Ed. note.]

²³ Despite the criticism of Franz Brentano (*Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene*, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1911, pp. 35ff) . . . we think that a proposition of the type *A is* is a true predication, one in which the verb *to be* plays the role of copula and predicate at the same time, and that the assent given to this proposition bears not on the term *A* itself, but on the synthesis of *A* and existence. As we see it, a judgment that would

not bear on an enunciative synthesis [a proposition] could only be an exercise completely devoid of specification, a blind act. [This does not imply that our possession of the objective concept, *exists* or *existence*, precedes our first judgement of the kind "Something red exists, or something red has existence." We acquire that concept when the comparison of diverse objects is between an object of concept like *something red* and what is also an object of external sense perception. That comparison makes us expressly acknowledge (and so makes us aware of the need for a way to expressly acknowledge) what the mere cognition of an objective concept does not expressly acknowledge: that in addition to having the characteristics, *something red*—which an object of imagination can also have—the something red that we sense is in a state that is more than being just an object (of concept, imagination or sensation), the state that we call "existence" in the simultaneous act of forming and assenting to the proposition "Something red exists." That comparison of diverse objects also makes us able, upon reflection, to call that state "real existence" or "extracognitional existence" as opposed to something red's state of merely being an object of conception or imagination. Simon explains how real existence becomes an object of external sensation in "An Essay on Sensation" in *Philosopher at Work*. I expand on his explanation in *Causal Realism*, Chs. 5 and 10, "Wittgenstein as a Gateway," pp. 208-211, and in John C. Cahalan, "The Problem of Thing and Object in Maritain," *The Thomist* [1995], p 41. Ed. note.]

²⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. th.* I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 5; Maritain, *Reflexions sur l'intelligence*, Ch. 1; *Degrees of Knowledge*, p. 84. [Emphasis added. Simple presentative understanding (cognition 1) of the objects for which we use "Al," "man," etc. does not express an object's identity with either a thing that actually exists extramentally or another object that possibly exists. Even simple presentative understanding of the object for which use "actual extramental existent" only presents something as a possible extramental existent; it cognizes existence as "signified act" but not as transobjectively "exercised act." (See Maritain, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, pp. 255-256; *Formal Logic*, pp. 63-64.) To know (cognition 2) that in understanding such objects we also understand something that is identical with an actual existent, we need to compare known object to known object—not as objects but as possible (to begin

with) existent things that as a result of the comparison we will come to know, by knowing, e.g., that the *man* is a *chef*, *Al* is a *man*, or *Al exists*, to be identical with the same actually existent thing. In necessary truth objects are identical as possible existents. See the Editor's Afterword. Ed. note.]

²⁵ [Source: *Metaphysics of Knowledge*, pp. 142-148. Ed. note.]

²⁶ [Source: *ibid.*, pp. 153-154. Ed. Note.]

²⁷ [Language being public, the first purpose it serves must be the objectification of real, as opposed to merely conceived or imagined, existents. (See Cahalan, "Wittgenstein as a Gateway.") But once language has objectified real existents, we can use language for other cognitive objects, like beings of reason, imaginary objects and fictions, including objects that come into apprehension only as attributes belonging to *other* cognitive objects in their states of being cognitive objects. The identity pertinent to "Frodo is a hobbit," is itself cognitive, not extramental, since Frodo the hobbit only exists in cognition. But that identity is still extracognitive relative to the specific cognitive acts required to diversify the objects of "Frodo" and of "a hobbit" in order to form the statement, "Frodo is a hobbit." The same holds for "Frodo is Frodo" and "A hobbit is a hobbit." Likewise, sensory objects like color, sound and taste may have no status other than being phenomenal objects (but see Cahalan, "Wittgenstein as a Gateway"). Sensing them, however, and expressing them in language are diverse objectifications of them. So as sensed objects, they are extracognitive relative to their state of being cognitively objectified as the meanings of words. To know "Something red exists" or "Red is a color," we have to grasp the identity in an extralinguistic state of items that are made linguistic objects in diverse ways. Ed. note.]

²⁸ [Function-argument syntax has been shown to be as consistent with the thing/object identity analysis of truth as subject-copula-predicate syntax. See Cahalan, *Causal Realism*, pp. 87-102; "Wittgenstein e Maritain: verità, esistenza, logica". *Per la filosofia*, (1995). The following is a translation and revision of a pertinent section from the latter: The thing/object account of truth does not depend on the subject/predicate sentence structure, with "is" expressing identity, nor on any syntactical structure or any interpretation of "is." In "*aRbc*,"

(for example, "Joe gave a cup to Sue") a is objectified by " a " and by "...Rbc" (that is, as something standing in relation R to b and c). b is similarly objectified by " b " and by " $aR...c$ "; c is similarly objectified by " c " and by " $aRb...$ ". And R is objectified by "R" and by " $a...bc$ " (that is, as a relation holding for things a , b , and c). And " $aRbc$ " is true if and only if what are objectified by " a ," " b ," " c ," and "R," respectively, each have that kind of identity with what are objectified in those other ways. The thing/object analysis does not commit Simon to fictions like the true "logical form" or true "logical subjects and predicates" of statements. Having shown the essential *epistemic* purpose of statements, he could say that, as long as that purpose was served, other purposes, like using calculational methods as tools of *logic*, could be legitimately served by diverse syntaxes. And Aristotelians have long known that "Al is a man" is only a logically distinct way of saying what "Al has humanity" says about things as things. See Joseph Bobik, *Aquinas on Being and Essence* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), pp. 106-115. Ed. note.]]

²⁹ [Nominalism (in the original, not the set-theoretic, sense) would say that it is the word "lion," not the lion, that is a subject and the word "carnivorous," not the activity of eating meat, that is a predicate. Simon could reply, correctly, that it is not the word "lion" that we are describing as carnivorous or the word "carnivorous" that we are asserting to be a property of lions. But Simon's basic point here would hold even if nominalism was correct. Being subjects and predicates are not among the physical properties of strings of shapes like "lion" and "carnivorous." They are beings of reason that come into apprehension only as result of the fact that we use such physical strings of shapes as tools for cognitively objectifying things like lions and acts like – and dispositions to perform acts like – eating meat. So even if nominalism was true, the truth conditions of statements still could not include "correspondence" between the way things exist in the real world and any *logical* properties, properties belonging to cognitional objects as such or means of objectification as such, pertinent to statements. Ed. note.]

³⁰ [Source: *Great Dialogue*, pp. 94-98. Ed. note.]

³¹ [Source: *Material Logic*, p. xi. And see p. 587, n. 10; p. 591, nn. 26 and 31. Ed. note.]

³² Such *anthropomorphism* is also the basis of Scotistic formalism (see *Material Logic*, pp. 102-114). There are notable parallels to this spirit in Plotinus, Avicenna, Leibniz, Hegel, and Whitehead. [Source: *Material Logic.*, p. 624, n. 52. Emphasis added. Ed. note.]

³³ [Source: *Great Dialogue*, pp. 98-99. Ed. note.]

³⁴ [Source: *Material Logic*, p. xviii. Ed. note.]

³⁵ [Source: *Great Dialogue*, p. 100. Ed. note.]

³⁶ [Source of the preceding seven words: *Great Dialogue*, p. 172. Ed. note.]

³⁷ [Source: *Material Logic*, pp. x-xi. Ed. note.]

³⁸ *On Being and Essence*, chap. III, trans. A. A. Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), pp. 38-39 " . . . we can consider it [i.e., nature or essence] in two ways. First, we can consider it according to its proper meaning, which is to consider it absolutely. In this sense, nothing is true of it except what belongs to it as such; whatever else is attributed to it, the attribution is false. For example, to man as man belongs rational, animal and whatever else his definition includes, whereas white or black, or anything of this sort, which is not included in the concept of humanity, does not belong to man as man. If someone should ask, then, whether the nature so considered can be called one or many, neither should be granted, because both are outside the concept of humanity and both can be added to it. If plurality were included in the concept of humanity, it could never be one, although it is one inasmuch as it is present in Socrates. Similarly, if unity were contained in its concept, then Socrates' and Plato's nature would be one and the same, and it could not be multiplied in many individuals.

"Nature or essence is considered in a second way with reference to the act of existing [esse] it has in this or that individual. When the nature is so considered, something is attributed to it accidentally by reason of the thing in which it exists; for instance, we say that man is white because Socrates is white, although whiteness does not pertain to man as man.

"This nature has a twofold act of existing, one in individual things, the other in the mind; and according to both modes of existing, accidents accompany the nature. In individ-

ual beings, moreover, it has numerous acts of existing corresponding to the diversity of individuals. Yet, the nature itself, considered properly – that is to say, absolutely – demands none of these acts of existing. It is false to say that the nature of man as such exists in this individual man, because, if existing in this individual belonged to man as man, it would never exist outside this individual. Similarly, if it belonged to man as man not to exist in this individual, human nature would never exist in this or that individual, or in the intellect. Considered in itself, the nature of man thus clearly abstracts from every act of existing, but in such a way that none may be excluded from it. And it is the nature considered in this way that we predicate of all individual beings.” [The bracketed insertions in this note of Simon’s are by him. Ed. note.]

³⁹ [For Simon, following Poinot (John of St. Thomas), among the many senses of “abstraction” are distinct logical and psychological senses. All that “process of abstraction” need mean here, for what Simon is saying about objects in their state of objective existence, is some cognitive process, including judgment (*Material Logic*, p. 591, n. 25) that, even if it is not an “abstraction” in the psychological sense, results in cognition of an “abstract” object in the *logical* sense that the object does not include all the features belonging to its individual instances—a negative sense opposed to the “*positive* unification” of the object as logically universal, that is, as one and the same while apt to be said of multiple instances. (Ibid., pp. 94-102; Cahalan, “Thing and Object in Maritain, p. 35.) Notice that “individual” and “universal” are themselves universals. Tom is an individual, and Dick is an individual; “human” is a universal, and “canine” is a universal. As beings of reason, individuality and universality are secondary “natures” to which the distinction between nature and mode of existence also applies. They are properties that accrue to *other* natures in the existence of those other natures as objects of cognition, but since the secondary natures can be objects of cognition themselves, properties pertaining to cognitional objects as cognitional objects must accrue to them also. As a (secondary) nature grasped by a universal concept, individuality does not include what is unique to Tom’s individuality; if it did, “individual” would only be true of Tom. As a (secondary) nature grasped by a universal concept, universality does not include

what is unique, namely, the respective extensions of "man" and "canine," to the universality of "man" or "canine"; if it did, attributing "universal" to "man" would require attributing "canine"'s universality, and that of every other universal, to "man." Ed. note.]

⁴⁰ John of St. Thomas *Cursus philosophicus, Logica* II, q.3, a. 2, ed. Reiser (Turin: Marietti, 1930), p. 320, b, 11. [Human nature's being "virtually multiple" means that in real existence the human natures of Al and Tom are only similar, not identical, but they are sufficiently similar that each individual nature is identical with the same human nature that has objective existence as a universal, since the reason that human nature can have the property of universality in its status as object of concept is precisely that this cognitional object does not include what is unique to Al's human nature or Tom's. (This fact about what is not included in a cognitional object is what "abstraction," in the logical, not psychological, sense means.) So the objective concept of human nature is identical with what each of Al and Tom's human natures are *as far as it*, that objective concept, *goes as known object*. Likewise, the objective concepts of animal, living and body are identical with what each of Al and Tom's individual natures are *as far as they*, these objective concepts, *go as known objects*. The objective concept of animal is identical with what Al is, but as a known object, it does not go so far as to include Al's human characteristics. The objective concept of living is also identical with what Al is, but as a known object, it does not go so far as to include Al's animal characteristics; etc. And since these objective concepts do not go so far as to include what is unique to Al, or to humans, or to animals, respectively, the concept of human does not go so far as to be identical with what Al is to the exclusion of being identical with what Tom is, and the concept of animal does not go so far as to be identical with what humans are to the exclusion of being identical with what lions are, and the concept of living does not go so far as to be identical with what animals are to the exclusion of being identical with what plants are. The standard properties of identity apply at each universal level. Human nature and animal nature are specifically and generically identical, respectively, with Tom's human nature, and Tom's human nature is specifically and generically identical, respectively, with human nature and animal nature. And if Al is identical to Tom with respect to universal *U*, Tom is identical

to AI with respect to *U*. If AI and Tom are identical with respect to *U*, and Tom and Joe are identical with respect to *U*, AI and Joe are identical with respect to *U*. For more on universals' identity with individuals, including an application to Wittgenstein's problem of carrying on a series, see John C. Cahalan, "If Wittgenstein Had Read Poincaré: Recasting the Problem of Signs and Mental States," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* (1994). As that article indicates, the more familiar notions of the identity of individuals and of sets of individuals presuppose this identity of universals with individuals. Ed. note.]

⁴¹ [Source: Yves R. Simon, *Philosophy of Democratic Government* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press) pp. 197-200. Used with permission of the publisher. Ed. note.]

⁴² [Even knowing a one-word truth like "Gavagai" requires objectifying something diversely, at least by sensing it and by using what is sensed as the meaning of, or at least part of the meaning of, the word "gavagai." And see Cahalan, *Causal Realism*, pp. 91-92. Ed. note.]

⁴³ [See Section II, n. 12. Ed. note.]

⁴⁴ [To be exact, in *An Introduction to Philosophy* (pp. 159 and 193), he calls the problem of universals "the first and most important of philosophic problems," not "in itself" but "for us." But the problem of universals is an instance of the problem of thing and object: "If, for example, I can say *Peter is a man*, it is because the thing . . . apprehended under the object of thought *man* is identical with the thing apprehended under the object of thought *Peter*. When I thus proceed from the existence of things in my mind to their existence in reality, I must say that the object of thought *man*, single in my mind, is multiplied *in* all the individuals in which it is realized and is identical with each" (ibid. p. 205, n.2). See Section VI. Ed. note.]

⁴⁵ [In Section V Simon also rightly distinguishes logic from the calculational methods that are its indispensable tools. Carroll's Achilles-Tortoise paradox shows that this is as necessary as distinguishing physics from its indispensable tool, mathematics. See Cahalan, *Causal Realism*, pp. 83-85 Ed. note.]

⁴⁶ [Ibid., pp. 89-91. Ed. note.]

⁴⁷ [Ibid., pp. 181-189. Ed. note.]

⁴⁸ See also Cahalan, "Does Everything Follow from Contradiction? Yes and No." Soon to be posted at www.foraristotelians.info.

⁴⁹ See Cahalan, "Wittgenstein as a Gateway."